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A keynote presented at Section 4 Modernization and Intercultural Communication in the Cyberage: A Philosophical Inquiry held at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences on the November 20, in the afternoon of the 27th General Assembly of the International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies (CIPSH), International Social Sciences Council (ISSC) and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) Meeting on Cultures and the Internet, Beijing November 19-20, 2004. Cyberphilosophy and a Possible Foundation for the Future Oriental Philosophy of Techno-science in a Framework of Metaphilosophical Pluralism LIU GANG PH. D Faculty of Philosophy of Techno-science Institute of Philosophy Chinese Academy of Social Sciences No. 5 Jiannei St. Beijing 100732 China B: www.blogchina.com E: [email protected]; [email protected] P: 8610 68667864 (H) M: 13701275882 ABSTRACT Cyberphilosophy, refers either to the Philosophy of Computing and Information (PCI) or simply the Philosophy of Information (PI). The terms: ‘computational turn’ and ‘information turn’ were first introduced in the 1990s to the international community of philosophy, and the research programme of the PI in 2002 in particular made PI an independent area of philosophical research. The scientific concept of ‘information’ is formally taken into philosophical inquiry. A new and tool-driven philosophical discipline of PI with its interdisciplinary nature is established. PI is an ‘orientative’ rather than ‘cognitive’ philosophy. Special attention should be paid to the orientative philosophy for it is more important than the cognitive philosophy both in the philosophical nature and profoundness.

The basic framework shift to the PI reflects the shift from industrial to information society. When PI is under consideration in the history of western philosophy, it can be regarded as a shift of large tradition. There are three large, i.e., Platonic, Kantian and Leibniz-Russell traditions, which could be summed up as classic, modern and formal traditions. And PI belongs to the Leibniz-Russell tradition. The kernel concept is material implication in the system from Leibniz’s algebraic logic to Russell’s mathematical principles. C. I. Lewis put forward strict implication system later. This system inaugurated ‘modern modal logic’ on the one hand and brought about Leibniz’s possible worlds theory into contemporary discourse of philosophy on the other. S. A. Kripke developed the possible world semantics for the modal logic, which becomes the mainstream of the semantics of model theory. Modern modal logic plays a vigorous and important role in information and computer sciences (ICS) and information and communication technology (ICT). In the discussion of the position of the possible worlds, we have modal Platonism and modal realism, but both of the theories are made in the framework of western philosophy. In this essay, it is argued that possible worlds could be seen as worlds in information, which is then an interpretation of modal informationalism. Our interpretation is made on the basis of Leibniz’s lifelong connection with China, a fact often overlooked by the western philosophers. Possible world theory was influenced by the Neo-Confucianism flourishing since the Song Dynasty, and the foundation of which is I-Ching. Therefore, his theory of possible worlds could be understood as an organic naturalism in the framework of metaphilosophical pluralism.

It could be argued that Leibniz’s possible world theory was formulated in respect to the impact of the thought of I-Ching, in that one of the prominent features is the model- orientated of the theory construction. There are two approaches to theory construction, i.e., axiomatic and modeling methods. The origin of the former is from the ancient Greek and the latter from the ancient China. And they determined the different features of theoretic structures between the oriental and occidental traditions of techno-science. The tendency of the future development of techno-science is changing from the axiomatic to the modeling orientation, at least the two approaches would be complementary one another. The formation and development of modern science has been evolved along the western tradition, however, the future development would not necessarily be along the given orientation. The difference of theoretical features under the perspective of the philosophy of techno-science would provide a breakthrough for the China’s traditional culture and would be helpful for us to comprehend the future orientation of the development. To some extent, this means the retrospective of tradition in the turning point of history, and some of the manners of thought in China’s cultural tradition might become the starting points in formulate the future oriental philosophy of techno-science.

I. THE BIRTH OF A NEW PARADIGM IN PHILOSOPHY Cyberphilosophy, a new term coined with the appearance of cyberspace and the coming of cyberage, is generally regarded to either the ‘Philosophy of Computing and Information (PCI)’ (Floridi 2004a) or simply ‘Philosophy of Information (PI)’, (Floridi 2002, Liu 2002a, 2002b, 2003a) a new paradigm in the philosophy emerged since the very beginning of this century (Floridi 2002, Liu 2002a, Gordana 2003, Liu 2004). PI as a new theoretical field pays special attention to the following two areas: a) the critical investigation of the conceptual nature and basic principles of information, including its dynamics, utilization and sciences, and b) the elaboration and application of information-theoretic and computational methodologies to philosophical problems (Floridi 2002, Liu 2002a, 2003a).

Information and computer science (ICS) and information and communication technology (ICT) have already shown their tremendous impacts on our society. Since the 90s in the last century, the international community of philosophy made deep reflections in front of the great challenge of the information revolution, and put forward ‘computational turn’ (Burkholder 1992) . It is commonly said that Leslie Burkholder coined the phrase ‘computational turn’ in 1992. Just as Robert Cavalier pointed out in his inaugural speech that ‘the last quarter of the 20th Century brought the beginnings of a Computational Turn in philosophy in regard to both teaching and research. It was, I believe, Leslie Burkholder who first used this term, comparing the richness of this event to the Linguistic Turn in Philosophy. This turn is quite deep and its impact will no doubt broaden during the first decades of the 21st Century. ’ (Cavalier 2000) In 1998 The Digital Phoenix a collection of essays was published based on a general survey of the US community of philosophy with an interesting subtitle How Computers are Changing Philosophy, in which Terrell Ward Bynum and James Moor acknowledged that there emerged a new force in philosophy:

From time to time, major movements occur in philosophy. These movements begin with a few simple, but very fertile, ideas – ideas that provide philosophers with a new prism through which to view philosophical issues. Gradually, philosophical methods and problems are refined and understood in terms of these new notions. As novel and interesting philosophical results are obtained, the movement grows into an intellectual wave that travels throughout the discipline. A new philosophical paradigm emerges. . . . ( Bynum and Moor 1998, 1).

Methodologically, computer provides such a powerful tool for the philosophy and thus this philosophy is regarded as ‘tool-driven’ just as Freeman Dyson puts it (Dyson 1999). And Michael Heim said that computer is ‘laboratory for metaphysics’ (Heim 1993). Computing even goes beyond this just as Bynum and Moor go on:

Computing provides philosophy with such a set of simple, but incredibly fertile notions – new and evolving subject matters, methods, and models for philosophical inquiry. Computing brings new opportunities and challenges to traditional philosophical activities. . . . computing is changing the way philosophers understand foundational concepts in philosophy, such as mind, consciousness, experience, reasoning, knowledge, truth, ethics and creativity. This trend in philosophical inquiry that incorporates computing in terms of a subject matter, a method, or a model has been gaining momentum steadily ( Bynum and Moor 1998, 1).

In 2002 Luciano Floridi put forward ‘information turn’ (Floridi 2002) and Adams even goes father simply declaring that the ‘information turn’ happened at ‘the midpoint of the Twentieth Century as the beginning of the informational turn. ’ (Adams 2003). Later in 2004, Metaphilosophy issued another important essay by Floridi, which is a revised version of the speech delivered at The Herbert A. Simon Lecture on Computing and Philosophy given at Carnegie Mellon University in 2001 (Floridi 2004). Minds and Machines consecutively issued two special issues on PI in 2003 and 2004. Blackwell published the Guide to the Philosophy of Computing and Information in 2004, which is the first book in this field (this Guide is to be rendered into Chinese recently) integrating the interests of computing and information in a single volume. Elsevier is now snowed under with a 14 volume of Handbooks of the Philosophy of Science, among which volume 10 is entitled Handbook on the Philosophy of Information, edited by Johan van Benthem and Pieter Adriaans (Benthem and Adriaans 2004). In addition, various professional conferences have been held worldwide and APA Committee on Philosophy and Computers (CAP), a local academic organization changed its name as International Association of Philosophy and Computers (IACAP).

Information as a concept of ‘retroactive prefiguration’ in philosophy is not only it is recognized as a fundamental notion in the sciences but also in the humanities, especially it is crucial to understanding physical computation, communication, and human cognition. There happened several ‘turns’ in the western philosophy, e.g., from being to knowledge and to meaning in the last century, now information comes into the range at the very beginning of the new century. Therefore, PI with its emphasis on the ‘information turn’ is taken as an orientative rather than a cognative philosophy. Cognitive philosophy concerns much more with ‘what’, taking philosophy as an activity pursuing the establishment of knowledge and the corresponding systems. Orientative philosophy, on the other hand, inquires ‘how’, i.e., it points out the orientation of our interests to a specific field or direction. Orientative philosophy is by all means higher than the cognitive philosophy both in its philosophical nature and profoundness. Therefore, special attention should be taken to the orientative philosophy in the new century (Liu 2004).

II. PI IN THE CONTEXT OF WESTERN TRADITIONS OF PHILOSOPHY Any school should be rooted in its own context of thought from philosophical traditions. Without a tradition the school of this philosophy would not be subsumed so that it could not go any farther. What is the context of thought for PI in the philosophical traditions? The shift based on the PI could be seen as a mirror of the shift from the industrial society to the informational society. And from the perspective of the history of philosophy, such a shift could be regarded as a shift of large tradition, or a return of a large philosophical tradition (Liu 2003b). Then what is it? Generally, there are two approaches to the history of philosophy; one is the normal approach according to the textbooks, and the other, to the philosophical traditions. G. MacDonald Ross wrote a textbook entitled Leibniz in 1980s and he gave out the normal approach popular at present. In the very beginning of the Introduction of Leibniz he showed us the picture of how to observe the history of the modern philosophy invented by Kant,

Traditionally, university courses on the history of modern philosophy have been structured round a pantheon of seven great philosophers: three ‘continental rationalists ’: Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz; three ‘British empiricists ’: Locke, Berkeley and Hume; and Kant. The empiricists were supposed to have believed that all our knowledge was built up out of the data of sense, whereas the rationalists were supposed to have restricted genuine knowledge to what could be deduced from indubitable truths of reason. Kant, on the other hand, created a new synthesis out of what was right in both empiricism and rationalism. Needless to say, this way of viewing the history of philosophy was invented by Kant himself. It has, however, had a remarkably long run for its money (Ross 1984).

Kant was right when he made the ‘new synthesis’ in his times. However, from the perspective of the ‘rear-view mirror’ Kant’s treatment of Leibniz is rather biased. Just as Joseph Needham put it that Leibniz was facing two irreconcilable conflicts of theological idealism and atomistic materialism, which never got a successful solution in the history of European thought. Leibniz became a bridge maker trying to solve the antimony (Needham 1980). In effect, Leibniz had already made a new synthesis prior to Kant. Just as Ross gives out that ‘Leibniz stood on the interface between the holistic and vitalist worldview of the Renaissance, and the atomistic and mechanistic materialism that was to dominate the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.’ (Ross 1984) In effect, he introduced the organic worldview from the Neo-Confucianism to integrate the split he was facing. Therefore, whenever the philosophy of Leibniz is concerned there are always particular difficulties to put into the Procrustean bed invented by Kant. The reason why Leibniz cannot be put into the mould is that he had had a close relationship with oriental traditions, especially the Chinese tradition in the 17th century. Leibniz, in my opinion, is an ‘alternative’ in the history of western philosophy. This is the reason why he could not feel so comfort in the mould as Descartes and Spinoza do. I would rather agree with Ross that many of Leibniz’ ideas were too radical for his own age, and were taken up only much later… So, It would be rash to judge him merely by those ideas that have subsequently become part of our view of the world. As with all great philosophers, his work no doubt contains hitherto unrecognized potential.

How to emancipate Leibniz from the shadow of Kant becomes a major problem, otherwise Leibniz would be considered as a pre-Kantian figure (Heim 1993) and has nothing to do with China. Mu Zongsan, a famous Chinese philosopher on Kant, in his later years re-combed the threads of the western philosophy. He gave out another scheme other than those given in the textbooks for he is especially concerned with three traditions of the western philosophy, i.e., Platonic, Kantian and Leibniz-Russellean. (Mu 1997) Actually, these traditions could be categorized as classic, modern and formal at large. We are much concerned with the formal tradition here. People may not be familiar with the stem from Leibniz to Russell that formed a large tradition for they have already accustomed by the generalization made by Kant (Mu 1997). Mu opened up a new approach to view the splendor of the western scholarship, i.e., integrating the continental and Anglo-Saxon philosophy via the formal tradition. Leibniz and Russell, then, would jointly form a large tradition by picking up Leibniz out of the Kant’s mould and emphasizing logic and mathematics until Russell’s succession. By this way Leibniz would be released from the Procrustean bed of Kant.

Norbert Wiener, the founder of cybernetics, viewed Leibniz as a patron saint for cybernetics, because his work is closely related with two concepts: universal language and logical calculus. (Wiener 1948, ) Obviously, scientists viewed Leibniz’ contributions as ‘universal language’ and ‘symbolic logic’. In effect, Leibniz only gave out an idea and some initial steps but he did not bring his ideas into reality. It is Russell that did the technical jobs. So we have sufficient reason to hook up Leibniz with Russell, i.e., from the Leibniz’s logical algebra to Russell’s Principia Mathematica. The achievement is concentrated in Russell, i.e., his Principia Mathematica summed up all of the work. Actually, Russell also takes Leibniz as a pioneer of mathematical logic. In his History of Western Philosophy, Russell gives out his evaluation on Leibniz on this account, saying that Leibniz was a pioneer of mathematical logic, and he saw its importance prior to anyone else (Russell 1955). And it has been generally acknowledged that why he became the father of the symbolic logic is due to the heuristic of the intelligible features of the Chinese characters (Lewis 1918).

From the evaluations by Wiener and Russell, Leibniz is important only when he is considered technically, i.e., his ideas on the universal language and logical calculus. However, his philosophical theory was overlooked. Russell even thought his metaphysics is nothing but a vain hope. So far as the philosophy of Leibniz is concerned, the universal language and logical calculus are only foundations for his philosophical system, if he had a system at all. Russell is clear that almost all of the philosophy of Leibniz comes from his logic (Russell 1951). And his logic is simply an ‘SP’ logic, i.e., P exists in S. It is interesting to see that the philosophy of Leibniz was divided into good and bad ones in Russell’s works. In Russell’s opinion, his logic is good but secret and metaphysics derived from the logic is bad and vulgar. I would rather argue that logic could not only been seen in superficial and technical way just as Martin Heidegger scorned (Heidegger 1978, 1984). Logic does have a metaphysical foundation. As a realist, Russell is a philosopher of single-world assumption or real world model, i.e., any symbols and formulas in the formal system should be understood as objective, i.e., all of these abstracts represent their real beings in the real world. After analysis, they are finally the habitats in our real world. This view of reality is clearly expressed in his Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, in that he calls for sound sense of reality for logicians (Russell 1930, 159). To sum up, Leibniz was seen and interpreted by Russell via a single-world spectacle, so that it is partial or even misleading, even though Russell is an expert on Leibniz.

The formalization of traditional logic takes a long time; the contribution of Leibniz in his times is that he was the first to express the four propositions in the Aristotle’s logic in algebraic forms. It was very significant at that time since it elaborated the expressions primarily not very strict. It could be clear to see which inferences are valid and which are invalid in the traditional syllogism and at the same time it revealed the problems untouched. After the formalization of Leibniz, the original logic system became more stable. But the work in this phase of formalization was limited in the traditional logic, and there were still limitations. The system from the algebraic logic of Leibniz to the mathematical principles of Russell formed the material implication system. However, this system was also not perfect; some of the logical values could not be expressed. In the beginning of the 20th century, Clarence Irving Lewis, an American logician put forward another system, called the strict implication system.

Another important reason why we emphasize the Leibniz-Russell tradition is that they formed the second phase in the development of logic. Aristotle’s logical system with symbol expression is the first phase. And this system becomes logical algebra with transformation of Leibniz, then it turns to the Russell’s system, therefore, Leibniz and Russell could be combined to form the second phase. If the logical algebra is taken as a transition, and Russell is taken as a representative, it is the material implication system. Hence, Leibniz and Russell are jointly viewed as the second phase no matter how to say it, from the beginning or from the end. The third 10 phase is the strict implication system proposed by Lewis. It is often said that the development of the pure logic is done with these three phases. In this long course of development of logic showed the ‘splendor of western achievements, it is the brilliance of western culture. From Leibniz to Russell, there are active results, which are positive and constructive rather than negative and deconstructive’ (Mu 1997).

Russell developed the symbolic logic of Leibniz into the ‘classic logic’. Lewis, however, was unsatisfied with the key notion of ‘material implication’ in Russell’s system. He thought it too far away from intuition and too weak for our common sense to understand the concept of implication. According to Lewis, it should be strengthened. Finally, he put forward ‘strict implication system’, in which two modal words of ‘necessary’ and ‘possible’ were used, and on which the ‘strict implication’ calculus systems were constructed, which initiated the ‘modern modal logic’. Lewis not only improved Russell’s system with his construction of strict implication system but also revived the theory of possible worlds of Leibniz. Unfortunately, the strict implication system that spent Lewis some 20 years could not avoid those ‘implication paradoxes’ happened in the material implication system. In addition to the construction of more strict formal systems, the strict implication systems have not any practical uses for they are only propositional calculus. However, Saul Kripke, an American logician put forward the ‘theory of possible worlds’ in modal logic semantics that broke the embarrassment encountered in the community of logic. It is often said that Kripke à la Leibniz, which means his semantics is created according to the ideas of Leibniz. It was Leibniz in the 17th century who employed the concept of ‘possible worlds’ for the first time when he was constructing his philosophical cosmology. Leibniz said

Now as in the Ideas of God there is an infinite number of possible universes, and as only one of them can be actual, there must be a sufficient reason for the choice of God, which leads Him to decide upon one rather than another (Leibniz 1898, sect. 53 ). In other words, there are necessarily and permanently infinite worlds in God’s mind that he could create. But alternatively he chooses one of the best as our real world. Hence, the possible worlds are alternatives to be chosen by the God. When they are not in contradiction to logic they are possible and they are the possible totality of the created, in this sense, possible worlds are perfect accordingly.

The fundamental idea of Kripke’s semantics of possible worlds is to prescribe the various conditions of modal propositions in respect to the models constructed according to accessible relations on set of possible worlds. Hence, his semantics based on the work of Alfred Tarski is also called ‘relational semantics’. In effect, the semantics of possible worlds have already been widely accepted in the international community of logic, becoming a standard to check other kinds of semantics, i.e., other new constructed semantics should be compatible with Kripke’s relational semantics. The semantics of possible worlds realized the idea of semantics of formal language proposed by Leibniz, or rather, Aristotle’s algebraic interpretation by Leibniz can be seen as the semantic model of the traditional syllogism systems -- the most elegant axiomatizations of classical propositional logic -- constructed by Jan Lukasiewicz. Such logical technique becomes one of the important components in the ideas of mathematical logic. With the shifting of ideas of semantics from the model of the real world to that of possible worlds, the focus in logical inquiry also shifts from the syntax to semantics. In a recent essay, Floridi also pointed out that there are five concepts of information are relevant with semantics (Floridi 2004b).

The rise of PI means a series of transformations, e.g., from Kantian to Leibniz- Russellean tradition; from real world to possible worlds; from theory of construction to the theory of generation; from syntax to semantics; from the theory of proofs to the theory of models; from geometry to algebra and from classic logic to modern logic, from pursuing diachronic identity to pursuing synchronic similarity; from the ‘context of discovery’ to the ‘context of innovation’; etc. In philosophy, this change can be viewed as the ‘primacy of forms’ to the ‘primacy of materials’. However, the philosophical empiricists have long been in doubt with any philosophical analysis with contents for they don’t believe in such a thing as the primacy of materials. However, the issues discussed in those in favor of the primacy of materials are often related to in the fields in our previous metaphysics, ontology or ethics (Stegmüller 1986, 151).

III. AN OPEN PROBLEM IN PI Modern modal logic opens up a tremendous promise for the application in both ICS and ICT. It can be imagined that this theory will still have more important roles to play with the development of quantum information sciences and a substantial step towards the realization of the idea of building quantum computers. Albert Einstein once said that it is difficult to understand the meaning of a concept when it becomes more and more universal and more frequently comes into the horizon of the people. Hence, it would be necessary to carry out inquiry from different perspectives, and that would result in more achievements. It seems that information is such a ‘magic’ concept we have ever encountered. However, its ontological position is not determined as yet from the present situation of inquiry. Just as Jon Barwise said: ‘the place of information in the natural world of biological and physical systems is far from clear.’ (Barwise and Seligman 1997, xi) It is not hard to see that in the very planet we are living, i.e., ‘the natural world of biological and physical systems’, the position of information is still a problem to be settled. On the other hand, Floridi also employed the dichotomy of materialism and idealism we are familiar. He said:

Most people agree that there is no information without (data) representation....this principle is often interpreted materialistically, as advocating the impossibility of physically disembodied information, through the equation “representation = physical implementation”. The view that there is no information without physical implementation is an inevitable assumption when working on the physics of computation, since computer science must necessarily take into account the physical properties and limits of the carriers of information. It is also the ontological assumption behind the Physical Symbol System Hypothesis in AI and cognitive science. (Floridi 2004b, Liu 2004b)

This is obviously the materialist view on information; however, it is also arguable that representation of information not necessarily requires a physical implementation. Floridi then goes to the idealist scenario:

…environments in which there are only noetic entities, properties and processes (e.g. Berkeley, Spinoza), or in which the material or extended universe has a noetic or non-extended matrix as its ontological foundation (e.g. Pythagoras, Plato, Leibniz, Hegel), seem perfectly capable of upholding the representationalist principle without also embracing a materialist interpretation. The relata giving rise to information could be monads, for example. (Floridi 2004b, Liu 2004b)

Essentially, Floridi is arguing that if one drops the Descartes’ dichotomy, i.e., information is both different from physical/material and mental, whether information itself could win an independent ontological category? It seems that he has no better way out so he has to come back to Wiener’s complain that information is information. No materialism which does not admit this can survive at the present day. (Wiener 1948, 132). It can be concluded that there still no satisfactory solution to the position of information. To my knowledge, it seems that under the framework of western philosophy with a long history of mind-body dualism, it is not likely to find an acceptable solution for the concept of information. Even in Floridi’s two approaches to the philosophy of information, he has to admit that one is from the AI (artificial intelligence) to PI, and he called this approach a safe one (Floridi 2003). However, he noted that there is such a split claiming that this approach ought to be from GOFAI to LAI, i.e., AI should not try to simulate the human intelligence, rather it should emulate, or to compete with the natural intelligence, chess playing, for example (Floridi 2004c). Fundamentally, it seems hard to go out of the shadow of such dualism. In my opinion, the reason why PI could become a research programme is that its half academic resources come from the AI. And the philosophical assumption of AI is just the Descartes’ mind-body dualism.

It seems that our problems encountered today are quite similar to those Leibniz met some three hundred years ago. Therefore, when the position of the information is being discussed, we have to go back to Leibniz to make another new synthesis from an oriental perspective. Just as Heidegger had pointed out that Leibniz ‘not only does the ancient and medieval tradition of logic converge in him in an independent new form; he becomes at the same time the stimulus for posing new questions, providing suggestions for tasks which are in part taken up only in recent times. From Leibniz we can create for ourselves perspectives reaching back to the ancients and forward to the present, perspectives important for the foundational problems of logic.’ (Heidegger 1978, 1984, 22). No doubt Heidegger’s evaluation on Leibniz is worthy praising. But I would like to have a step further that in Leibniz there not only converged ancient and medieval western tradition, but also absorbed oriental, especially the tradition of Neo- Confucianism. In effect, Leibniz employed the thought of the Neo-Confucianism to make a new synthesis of the split of the western philosophy. It can be seen that such a split cannot be integrated simply dependent on pure western philosophical elements or resources. The Neo-Confucianism is an organic knowledge on the nature, a theory of synthetic level, or an organic naturalism. The system of thoughts of the Ne0- Confucianism represented by Zhu Xi stands for the highest level of the Chinese philosophical ideas (Needham 1969, 1987, 61). However, it is just this point that is overlooked by the western philosophers. Now, it is still necessary for us to try to make a new synthesis on the concept of information from the oriental perspective.

IV. MODAL INFORMATIONALISM: AN ORIENTAL APPROACH TO THE POSSIBLE WORLDS The contemporary development of the theory of possible worlds is also valuable for the philosophy of information. After the establishment of the semantics, the nature of the possible worlds has been widely discussed among logicians and various views have been proposed. Among which there are two famous realist interpretations, i.e., David Lewis’ radical realism and Kripke’s soft realism. It should be pointed out that these two interpretations were made completely in the framework of the western philosophy. The radical realism is also called modal Platonism, a dualist interpretation in terms of Platonism, which were criticized and scorned as the ‘telescopic theory’. While Kripke proposed the soft realism in respect to Aristotle’s logic, and the possible worlds were understood as Aristotle’s ‘potentia’, and in Aristotle’s logic the predicate is actually assigned as ontological. Therefore, his logic in effect focuses on the predicate. Now that Kripke is in line with the ontological position of the predicate, he is sure to be in favor of Aristotle’s ‘potential infinity’ rather than the ‘actual infinity’ in the classic logic. Kripke’s interpretation eliminates the possible worlds in reality, which is understood as ‘possible states’ of affairs. (Kripke 1982, 15).

So far as Leibniz is concerned to me, he is taken as an ‘alternative’ in the history of western philosophy. One of the important reasons is that he had been in close relation with China in his whole life. And the western philosophers often overlook this historical link. However, this overlook was amended to some extent in Needham’s Science and Civilization in China. The famous scholar Joseph Needham wrote a special section of Zhu Xi, Leibniz and the Organic Philosophy (Needham 1980, 496ff.), where he pointed out that the Chinese thoughts generalized in lixue (lit. studies of reasons, or just Neo- Confucianism as Derk Bodde rendered, a scholastic school dominated China’s ideology for some 700 years across nearly three Dynasties of Yuan, Ming and Qing) contributes to the European thoughts much larger than they have been acknowledged. And the whole significance in philosophy has not been apprehended as yet. And in another book of Leibniz and Confucianism, Mungello gives out a sound study (Mungello 1977). It can be concluded that similar mistakes by Russell would be repeated when we still ‘cut’ Leibniz completely in the mould of western philosophy.

Now we are going to open a new, i.e., an oriental approach to comprehend Leibniz’s theory of possible worlds. I think that possible worlds could be viewed as worlds in information. This would be an interpretation of modal theory of information of modal informationalism. According to Leibniz’s idea, the number of possible worlds is infinite, then we would apply the notion of actual infinity into the possible worlds, i.e., the ‘abstraction of actual infinity’ employed in single-world assumption is generalized into the multiple worlds assumption. The notion of infinity is no longer seen as an infinite extending process, as it were, rather it is seen as a finished totality, or more fashionably, ‘allatonceness’. In this way, ‘infinite’ would be seen as ‘finite’; alternatively we could treat the ‘infinite problems’ with ‘finite methods’. So far as the human beings do not have a position of God, so we don’t have God’s eye to view all of the details at one time. Therefore, the axiomatic method could only be confined into a certain model. Models are artifact by which we could investigate those objects essentially non-constructive. Conversely, we would be able to have an infinite possibility in constructive capability. It is necessary to point out, our modal informationalism is different from the classic logic, in which other three principles of nonempty of individual domains, two-value and extensional are not necessary and sufficient conditions. This is because the possible worlds in our horizon no longer limited in the physical or ‘natural’ world, rather they are informational and metaphysical worlds. And this could ensure the plurality of subjects and analyticity of all propositions. In effect, in Leibniz Monadology, each monad represents a unique perspective, and in the totality of monads, each monad has to be accepted. This can be explained via the law of sufficient reason. To my understanding, each monad or perspective stands for a unique modal and what’s more is that not a single perspective or model can be partitioned by more than one monad. Otherwise, the chances for larger changes would be missed.

Ross once gives out an interesting example to show the constructively infinite possibility, as he puts it like this:

A better model of Leibniz's system would be an elaboration of the example of the cube. Computer graphics can be used to create animated film sequences representing the changing shapes and positions of imaginary objects from particular perspectives. We can imagine an infinity of such films, each from infinitesimally different viewpoints, all being run simultaneously. Even though the objects and their interactions are entirely Fictional, it will be as if there had been infinitely many cameras filming one and the same scene from different points of view. The simplest way of describing what they portrayed would be by adopting that fiction, even though its only reality would be as a formula in a computer program. But although this formula would not be real in the sense of having a physical embodiment outside the computer, it would be objective. It would be the only representation not biased towards one or other perspective, and all the others could be derived from it. (Ross, 98) Mathematically, Georg Cantor’s continuum hypothesis was proved in 1963 to be independent to the set-theoretic axiom one another resulting in a wide and free choices or alternatives for the nature of the infinite set. Just as Cantor said that the nature of mathematics is free. People with single-world assumption feel perplexed for this, however, people with multi-world assumption feel encouraged. The inquiry of mathematics shifts from the theory of proofs to the theory of models. The meaning of the possible worlds is determined by its interpretations. In our interpretation, information is given an ontological position in the possible worlds. But such an interpretation of ‘ontology’ is oriental rather than occidental. In our approach, possible worlds could be an alternative interpretation considering a line of filiation of Leibniz’s lifelong relationship with China.

V. A POSSIBLE FOUNDATION FOR THE FUTURE ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNO-SCIENCE One of the important features for modern science is to construct the adaptive milieux for the scientific theories. The studies in the philosophy of science showed that the model theory initiated by Polish logician Tarski in 1930s plays an important role in modern science. Model theory studies the relationship between the formal language and its interpretations. It is more adaptive to modern science than the axiom theory to elaborate scientific theories. The reasoning in model theory belongs to analogy, whereas that in axiom theory is in the kind of deduction. Compared to innovation, there are obvious deficiencies in the latter. Philosophically, analogy is ampliative reasoning, i.e., its conclusion has more information than its premise, so that it is obviously contrasted with that conclusion is already contained in the deductive reasoning. In model theory, the theory is viewed as a cluster of model isomorphic to experience, and various relations among theories and objects could be explained by the concept of isomorphism, i.e., analogy or similarity. Analogy is to show that a group of objects in limited number shows likeness in many aspects, and it would probably show the likeness in another aspect so that to find out the likeness of various structures, i.e., the process of finding out the isomorphic structures, means a process of finding out some unobserved propositions from the original observation statement. And these inferences would become new initial propositions so that more and more observable properties would be found out. Giere goes even farther that ‘scientific reasoning is to a large extent model-based reasoning. It is models almost all the way up and models almost all the way down. (Giere 1999, 56).

Physically, the significance of modeling lies on taking theories as a cluster of models isomorphic to observations. Theories are expressed by models rather than axioms and concept of isomorphism is used to explain the mathematical and physical relationships between theories and objectives. The largest significance of finding out the relations among the isomorphic structures is that we could apply calculations onto the knowledge we have already known, just as arithmetic operations, deducing the facts experience with isomorphic structures. There is another advantage for the model method, i.e., many of the structures corresponding to the unreal factors can be contained in the model. Model as a logical calculus of theories is an idealized form of theories, in which not all of the variables in the formal system are required to be existent in our real world, but they can be logically inferred in their sets. The logical function for the model rests on the continuation of series propositions that were not observed and from which new initial proposition would be resulted so that more and more observable properties would be revealed.

Now let’s turn to Leibniz again. As we have already known that he had a lifelong interest in China’s Neo-Confucianism, at the same time, he was also very much interested in I- Ching. Zhu Xi, the representative of the Neo-Confucianism made tremendous contribution in China’s history, especially his comments on Si Shu (The Four Classics), however, the metaphysical foundation of the Neo-Confucianism is just I-Ching and Zhu had spent his whole life in the work of the elaboration of I-Ching (Chen 2000, 2). It is arguable that China’s philosophy is informational, especially the classic of I-Ching. I would rather agree to some extent on this point. But due to its strong propensity on the divination or fortune-telling, it is disputable for it often makes judgment of facts equal to that of values, so this classic would always become focus in different times. But I would rather think that one of the real essentials of I-Ching is its model theory and the relevant analogical inference. The feature of model theory reasoning in I-Ching has impacted profoundly on the mind-set among the Chinese. Dong Guangbi once said that one of the features of the traditional science in China is nothing but the modeling mind-set of I- Ching (Dong 2003). Accordingly, China’s theories are categorized as the tradition of modeling, while the western theories are classed as that of axiomatization. This is a distinctive feature to differentiate two classes of scientific theories, the significance is not only a breakthrough of whether there had been science in China’s traditional culture, but also, in my opinion, would become the possible foundation to construct the future philosophy of techno-science of our country, and at the same time, it would be helpful to envisage the development of techn0-science in the present and the future. It can be seen from the contrast perspective of east and west, the difference emerged in the theoretical expression, while the difference of the expression sprouts from the philosophical foundation of the views on nature and their impact on the logical make-up and mode of theoretical construction.

Dong also made interpretations in terms of modern mathematics on the symbolic system, i.e., the hexagrams in I-Ching, in which Leibniz’s work on the hexagrams in I- Ching was taken as a pure mathematical inquiry. Dong’s conclusion leads to that it has to be acknowledged that there ought to be three schools in the inquiry of I-Ching, along with the traditional ones, i.e., xiangshu (numerical) and yili (rational) schools in China, there ought to be a shuli (mathematical) school (Dong 1987). Dong employed the phrase ‘ought to’, in other words; it is still to be identified whether there is a mathematical school in the studies of I-Ching in the native land of China. However, he has encompassed Leibniz into the realm of the inquiry of I-Ching, it is obvious that Dong’s vision is not only historical but also global and worldwide, as Leibniz had been, who is regarded to be the first to acknowledge the independence and value of other civilizations and cultures (Poser 2002). Especially in today’s globalization and informationalism, it is wise and insightful to adopt a pluralist dimension in metaphilosophy. In this sense, I would agree with Dong’s opinion, i.e., there is a mathematical school in the inquiry of I- Ching, however, this school was not developed in the native land of China, and at least it is not the mainstream in the studies of I-Ching. On the contrary, the mathematical school got developed vigorously abroad in the western world since it has not been suppressed by the xiangshu and yili schools. The mathematical school made contributions to the transformation of the traditional logic and it can be envisaged that it would still have a tremendous promise in the days to come. In my opinion, it seems that China’s I-Ching provided arguments and supports for the transformation of the western scholarship to some extent, e.g., Leibniz’s work on the Aristotle’s formal logic and his binary interpretations of the hexagrams in I-Ching are outstanding witnesses.

Now, how to reconcile the mathematical school with our academic resources becomes one of the new and heuristic subject matter. We should also adopt a ‘rear-view mirror’ to look into our present. However, where to find this ‘rear-view mirror’? It is just the achievements in the western thought, philosophy and science, etc. Zhang Shiying, a famous scholar on Hegel in his recent book said that it seems that lots of precious things are still asleep in our traditional philosophy, and they should be aroused by the western thoughts. Whenever they are awake, they could be more fascinating than those who aroused them (Zhang 2004, 523). And the aroused would inevitably become the foundation on which the future oriental philosophy of techno-science would rest.

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