Thomas Hobbes Lived in England (And for a Time in France) During the Last of the 16Th Century

Background.

Thomas Hobbes lived in England (and for a time in France) during the last of the 16th century and through most of the 17th century. He developed important and influential views about the nature of knowledge, of mathematical and scientific proof (he was perhaps the most important opponent of the scientific revolution in England), and ethics. His most important work was in a branch of ethics known as political philosophy, of which we will say more in a moment. Roughly, political philosophy concerns morally permissible ways of organizing states. Any such organization involves constraints on the freedom of its citizens, and so the question is which such constraints are morally legitimate.

Hobbes’ views in all of these branches of philosophy were strongly influenced by the political history of England during his life. England was at that time undergoing a civil war (1642-1660/88). The war was partly political. There was a struggle for power between the king and parliament, and between nobles and commoners. But the war was not merely, or maybe even mostly, about political differences between various groups. The war was as much religious as anything else. The king (Charles I) was Anglican, but widely held to be a Catholic sympathizer. Ireland of course was Catholic, and Scotland Calvanist. Much of parliament was divided between two kinds of Puritans—Anglicans who wanted a reformed Church of England, and Presbyterians. Religion in England was at that time a state matter, the King got to say what religion everyone in the country was to practice (though one of the political issues was toleration, that is freedom of religion). So when territory was captured by one side, people were often tortured and killed because of their religious convictions or associations. The civil war lasted a very long time, with different persons succeeding for periods to the throne or control of country, and controlling different bits of territory. The result was a horrific slaughter. Worse, the fact that the country was for long periods unsettled, being invaded or occupied, or involved in battles, made it impossible for people to raise food or conduct commerce in large areas of the country for long periods of time. So often enough even those who were not killed outright in battle or as a result of religious persecution nonetheless lost their property and their livelihoods, and many starved or died from disease. Hobbes saw the resulting civil chaos as the worst of possible evils, to be avoided at any lesser cost if possible. Hobbes was especially sensitive to religious differences as a cause of the civil war because the civil war followed closely a long period in which various occupants of the English throne enforced Catholic or Protestant religious practices in turn.

In the reading, Hobbes presents his ethical theory. From this he derives a detailed political philosophy, a set of claims about the just organization of a state. But in some sense, his political philosophy is for him a prior commitment. Because he thinks the most important thing is to avoid the chaos of civil war, and because the civil war with which he was familiar turned not merely on political differences but on religious differences, Hobbes thought it was crucial that a good state be authoritarian. According to Hobbes states have the moral authority not only to regulate commerce, to recruit citizens for the army, to punish those who transgress the laws, and so on. They have the moral authority to legislate what their citizens are to say and to believe. For Hobbes, there is no such thing as a moral right of individuals to freedom of speech, conscience or religion. To allow such freedom is to allow exactly the kind of difference in opinion which leads to civil war, and that of course is the most evil of results. So Hobbes’ moral theory is designed to yield this kind of result in political philosophy. Nonetheless, Hobbes defends his moral theory on grounds that are independent of the exact details of his political philosophy.

Hobbes’ ethical theory can be summed up very briefly, though at the price of omitting important details. Hobbes thinks that, outside of the constraints of a civil authority, a state, no action is ever morally impermissible so long as it serves one’s self interest. But within the constraints of a civil authority, some actions are obligatory (and their contraries impermissible), while others are permissible. In brief, one should always obey the laws of the state, whatever they are, with only one exception. If those laws require that one allow oneself to be killed, they need not be followed (and indeed, ought not be followed in that respect). Second, one should otherwise do onto others as you would they do unto you. So what kind of defense does Hobbes offer for his view?

Hobbes defense falls under various categories. He thinks moral rules are natural laws, so he is a ‘natural law’ theorist. But he thinks these natural laws have a basis in rational self-interest, so he is also an ethical egoist. Because this self-interest is rational, he thinks that moral rules are a kind of constraint on rationality—to act immorally is, for Hobbes, to act in an irrational manner. So what makes the moral rules true is not, for example, that God chose them (the more standard view among natural law theories), or that they maximize some intrinsically morally valuable thing, like human happiness or human autonomy. Rather, what makes the moral rules true is the same sort of thing that makes logical rules or mathematical rules true—to violate the rules is to act irrationally. Finally, Hobbes thinks that if people act rationally they agree to form a state, and to abide by whatever legal, rather than moral, rules a state chooses to enforce. It is this agreement, or social contract, which underwrites the moral authority of the state to constrain the freedoms of its citizens. Hence, this kind of theory of ethics and political philosophy is called a ‘social contract’ theory. Hobbes is the originator of this tradition; the most important defense of liberal democracy, owed to John Rawls, is also in this tradition. We are now prepared to look more carefully at the ethical theory Hobbes offers, and his defense of it.

The Theory And Its Defense.

Hobbes thinks there is one first order precept, which together with some unpleasant but nonetheless true, facts about human beings, generate a set of general principles (he calls these laws or precepts) governing moral action. The first order precept, which he calls the ‘Right of Nature’, is this: Each man may morally use his own power for the preservation of his life, and to secure whatever it is he thinks will help him protect his life from threats.

The unpleasant facts concern what life is like outside the constraints of a state with the power to enforce the rules it legislates. This condition is called the ‘state of nature’. Hobbes thinks that outside the bounds of a state, life is the war of all against all. Life in these conditions is ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’. In the state of nature one is always in fear of being deprived of one’s property, and indeed one’s life, by some other or collection of others who is stronger. Hobbes reasons as follows.

It is always rational to seek to preserve one’s life, and never rational to do things which unnecessarily jeopardize one’s life. In the absence of some overpowering authority on which one can rely to protect one’s life, to ensure one’s property, and so on, there is no means which would be illegitimate to use, if using them would help to protect one’s life. For not using them would just be to voluntarily put one’s life at risk unnecessarily. This would be no problem if there were reason to think that no one would ever need or want to harm you, or if you were sufficiently powerful than none could with impunity harm you. But this is not so. Hobbes thinks humans are essentially driven to conflict, and so to do ill to others, by three features of character: competition, diffidence and glory.

People are basically equal in strength and smarts. Though one may be stronger than another, he will not be so strong as 2 or 3 or 10 together. So no one can ensure their own safety by relying on his own strength. And while people differ in smarts, this difference is not so great as differences in strength or physical ability, and more easily overcome. From this equality in ability comes also equal demands on available resources. There is only so much to go around, and no one will think that another has better right to what is there than does he. This drives men to conflict from competition over resources. This fact of competition causes people to anticipate the use of force by others to take what they no have. To forestall such a use of force, people strike preemptively, “by force or whiles to master the persons of all men he can, so long till he see no other power great enough to endanger him; and this is no more than his own conservation requires…”. Such conflict arises from diffidence—the anticipation of harm at the hands of others. Finally, says Hobbes, some seek power for its own sake, and every person wants that his fellows should value him as much as he thinks he deserves. These desires drive men to conflict over glory.

So in the absence of authority, men will be driven to conflict. In such conditions, there is no means for self preservation which are illegitimate. So there will in these conditions be no constraint on the evils one person does to another. Moreover, it is impossible for one person acting alone to forestall the predatory attempts of others, so no one can be secure. This is the state of nature.

If Hobbes is right about it always being in one’s rational self-interest to preserve one’s life, then it follows that men ought do whatever is necessary to avoid the state of nature, so long as this does not itself require that they sacrifice their lives (for that would defeat the purpose). To avoid the state of nature is to seek peace, i.e. the absence of the war of all against all. Peace can be assured only if there is some authority more powerful than any individual or collection of individuals governed by the authority. For otherwise the authority could not protect you if the more powerful individuals decided to thwart the dictates of the authority. This authority is the state (for Hobbes, this is the King). How much power must the state have? What are the limits of its permissible exercise of power? Hobbes thinks there is only one limit on that power. Individuals have only one right against the state, exactly the one right they have in a state of nature, the right to act so as to preserve their lives. The best way to secure one’s life is to submit to a state with the power to enforce peace, so long as the state does not aim to kill you, so anything else the state may decide to do with or to a citizen is permissible. This Hobbes calls the first, and fundamental, law of nature.

He differentiates between rights, or freedoms, and laws (of nature or reason), which constrain freedoms. So by a ‘law’ he means a general principle which expresses what one is obliged to do, or forbidden from doing, and any such principle is a constraint on the freedoms one enjoys in the state of nature. Such principles will be justified in that respect of them will be necessary for the formation of a state and its ability to efficiently exercise its power in enforcing peace. So from the facts about the state of nature, the first order precept (the right of nature), and the first general principle (the first law of nature) other laws, i.e. restrictions on freedom, follow. The first is derived like this. In the state of nature everyone has a right to everything (this is the right of nature). To seek peace is to be willing to give up as much of your rights as others are willing to give up of theirs in order to establish the authority of the state. The first law of nature, the first constraint on one’s freedoms, is that one ought to seek peace (for not to do this is to fail to use the best means to secure your life, and that is irrational). Seeking peace requires this kind of compromise. So the second law of nature is that one ought to be willing to give up one’s rights, so long as others do the same, in order to establish a state powerful enough to secure peace by force. As Hobbes puts it, “…we are obliged to transfer to another such rights as, being retained, hinder the peace of mankind…”

Hence, if no one is in fact willing to seek peace with you, there are no moral constraints on your actions. But if there are willing cooperators, then you must be willing, with them, to give up whatever rights are necessary (so long as they do too), to create a state with sufficient authority to enforce the peace. When one gives up a right to a thing, on the condition that someone else does the same, one has a contract. So the moral basis state imposed constraints on one’s freedom is the contract you are obliged to make with others, provided they are willing, to forego exactly the rights to behave in the way the state forbids, whatever this may be. Hence, Hobbes account is a ‘social contract’ theory.

Hobbes thinks of the idea that one ought be willing to give up whatever rights are necessary to secure peace, provide others do the same, as the general form of the idea that one ought to do unto others as you would have them do unto you. If you will not give up a right, you should not expect others to give up their corresponding rights, and so should respect them. In some sense, each of the subsequent laws is a special case of that general rule.

The third natural law is that one must perform the covenants or contracts one makes. The reason for this is that if people do not keep their contracts, then contracts are in vain, and so there is no point in the initial social contract. But without that, we would be in a state of nature, and it is irrational not to seek peace enforced by a state rather than live in the state of nature. To violate this law is to act unjustly, according to Hobbes.

We will skip the 4th law (which concerns gratitude). The fifth law of nature is that everyone should strive to accommodate himself to everyone else—that is, one should go along with the majority, one should strive to avoid eccentricity or giving unnecessary offence. The idea is that unless conforms to this law, unless one exhibits what Hobbes calls complaisance, others are obliged to tolerate you. While they may do so, they ought not be made to do so, because this can give rise to exactly the sorts of difference of opinions that lead to the demise of the state in civil war.

The sixth and seventh laws are closely connected, and of interest to current political debates in our country. Hobbes claims in the sixth law that one ought to forgive or pardon wrongs done in the past, if the wrongdoers sincerely ask it, and will in the future refrain from future wrong actions. He claims that to forgive in this way is simple to grant peace to one who desires it, and that of course is something everyone should constantly do, for not to do it is to will the return of the state of nature, and this would be irrational. The seventh law says that one should punish, seek revenge, only to the extent that this punishment is sufficient to prevent future wrongs of that kind, either by the wrong-doer or by others, who will fear the punishment. One should not, however, seek a punishment which somehow balances the wrong. An eye for an eye is, according to Hobbes, a bad maxim—it demands too much in some cases, and perhaps too little in others.

The final law we want to consider concerns what is now called distributive justice. The question here concerns rules for dividing property or goods among persons. Hobbes has two rules governing distributive justice. The first follows from the 3rd law, which is that arbitrators to disputes about contracts should give to each his own. This of course doesn’t say very much, because it doesn’t decide the central issue of what each owns. That is governed, in part, by a law requiring equity. Hobbes says that goods should be divided equally, and that goods not divided equally should be enjoyed in common, if this is possible, and if not possible should be divided by lot. Lots are of two sorts—natural, by which Hobbes means first possession, and arbitrary, by which Hobbes means some selection procedure which is agreed upon by those contending for the good, say trial by combat, or choosing straws, or what have you. Such agreements are of course contracts, so to enforce them is to give to each his own.