There Is No Remotely Convincing Evidence at the Cross-Country, Large-N Level, at The

Mapping: CARE Economic Programming in Conflict Sarah Cussen, [email protected]

Definitions:

Economic Programming While much literature on post-conflict recovery, and most donors, use the term to cover a very broad range of macroeconomic stabilisation policies, employment, infrastructure development, and livelihoods, because most CARE’s programming is targeted at the community level, I have used the term to mean microfinance/microenterprise development (e.g. VLSA or skills training), livelihoods, income generation, and private sector engagement.

Conflict Sensitivity The term ‘conflict sensitivity’ is defined as the ability of an organisation to:  Understand the context in which it operates;  Understand the interaction between its intervention and the context; and  Act upon the understanding of this interaction, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts on conflict dynamics.1

Peacebuilding Peacebuilding is an umbrella term that has evolved over time, and the many definitions lead to confusion, and to assumptions that being conflict sensitive is ipso facto doing peacebuilding, or that advances in critical development areas (such as economic growth) also contribute to reduction of conflict and promotion of peace, which they may or may not. The OECD-DAC definition emphasises that “peacebuilding interventions are efforts that adopt goals and objectives aimed at preventing conflict or building peace”2

CARE’s Definition of Peacebuilding (“Strategic Peacebuilding Workshop Report”, March 2010) Peacebuilding is a comprehensive, long-term process working towards sustainable peace based on the values of rights and human dignity. Peacebuilding recognises and supports the central role that local actors and processes have in ending violence and constructively addressing both the immediate effects and structural causes of violent conflict.

Introduction

The economic programming mapping included country offices that are CARE UK priorities, DFID priorities, and country offices where CARE UK advisors have good contacts. Country offices that responded include: Afghanistan, Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Nepal, West Bank/Gaza, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Uganda, and Yemen. Information was also drawn from Bolivia, Peru, Somalia, the DRC, and CARE UK Conflict and Private Sector Engagement Advisors. DRC, Pakistan, and Somalia are still being pursued for information. These conclusions are preliminary, and may not be representative of CARE as a whole. The countries were chosen because of their importance to CARE UK.

Conflict Sensitivity and Economic Programming in Fragile States

1 Conflict Sensitivity Consortium 2 OECD Guidelines for Effective Engagement in Fragile States “Many immediate post-conflict interventions aim at short-term job creation and target supply-side problems, but do not necessarily target the longer-term increase in demand for skilled employees.” –USAID Micro-report #101, “Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Value-Chain Development.”

A number of Country Offices target conflict-affected communities for economic programming, mostly alternative livelihoods, income generation activities, and other activities that could be categorized as micro-enterprise development, such as training, microfinance, technical assistance, and inputs. The goal of these programmes is mainly recovery, with some country offices integrating a peacebuilding component into some of the work as well. Many of the project proposals clearly identified unemployment and underemployment, poverty, and lack of economic opportunity as underlying causes of conflict.

 Country Offices have applied conflict sensitive approaches/Do No Harm to economic programming, but not consistently and not in every project.  Country Offices that have done Do No Harm training roll-outs are not applying the framework consistently to every project, but point to the fact of the training as evidence of conflict sensitive programming.  Even though most of the economic programming done across CARE in fragile states particularly targets communities affected by or recovering from conflict, because they are often the most vulnerable, very few Country Offices have done a conflict analysis in designing the projects or programmes.  There was evidence that a number of Country Offices see their livelihoods projects themselves as “local capacities for peace,” which is a misapplication of the Do No Harm framework.  Beyond micro-enterprise development, CARE does very little work in private sector engagement in conflict-affected countries, with the exception of some work in Sri Lanka and Uganda. Some Country Offices have expressed interest in starting to engage (e.g. Somalia and South Sudan) but have limited time and resources at the moment.  The CARE Sierra Leone project taking part in the Conflict Sensitivity Consortium pilots includes microenterprise development, alternative livelihoods, and VSLA and may be useful for wider lessons for CARE.  CARE DRC is an implementing partner on the largest DFID-funded NGO project in the world, the Community Driven Reconstruction Programme, part of which is designed to support economic recovery.

Economic Programming and Peacebuilding

CARE’s Niche in Peacebuilding (“Strategic Peacebuilding Workshop Report”, March 2010) CARE’s wider range of programming before, during and after conflicts enables us to take an integrated approach to development and peacebuilding. Our long standing relationships at community level, our credibility with national governments and our global reach make us well placed to: 1) Facilitate trust building within and between communities 2) To help raise community voices and issues at a higher decision-making level 3) Support the translation of national and international policy initiatives into good practice at the local level. While the take-up of conflict sensitivity appears to be limited in CARE economic programming, there are a number of examples of combining this type of programming with peacebuilding or social cohesion interventions. The VSLA and peacebuilding connection is explored below, but one of CARE’s niches in peacebuilding may be combining it with peacebuilding work. Rachel Goldwyn is doing some work exploring the connection and theories of change behind the interventions.

 CARE Yemen has been doing conflict resolution between Somali refugees and host communities in Yemen. The second phase of the project will extend to joint livelihoods work to deepen relationships established in the first phase and improve economic opportunities for both communities.  In CARE South Sudan, access to economic opportunity and conflict prevention are key parts of their recently developed theory of change—they plan to do more work addressing both, and already have related projects, such as a CIDA project that combines developing small opportunities and skills training for youth along with peacebuilding skills.  While many of the proposals and documents examined appear to support that many country offices are combining livelihoods and income generation activities with peacebuilding, a more in-depth examination needs to be done. There are examples of projects that be labelled as peacebuilding, but do not truly address conflict.

The work with private sector that clearly attempts to address conflict is limited but there are a few examples. Projects in Bolivia and in Sri Lanka explicitly look at prevention of conflict around private sector operations.

 CARE Bolivia has experience working with extractive industries to promote economic development and preventing or mitigating social conflict around their operations.  CARE Sri Lanka’s tea plantations project has explicitly considered conflict sensitivity and the Community Development Forum model has conflict resolutions mechanisms.  Upcoming work in the cocoa sector in Côte d’Ivoire has the potential to include elements of community-level peacebuilding

Microfinance, Peacebuilding, and Social Cohesion

CARE pioneered the village savings and loan model, and has been promoting it for two decades. VSLA promotes locally self-managed savings and loans associations in rural areas. While CARE has many mixed VSLA groups, the majority are focused on building solidarity among women. The flexible system enables members to respond to economic opportunities as well as unforeseen shocks that may typically drive them into a cycle of uncontrollable debt. CARE undertook an intensive, multi-year impact study of women participating in the groups found that even beyond what they learned in terms of financial and business management, VSLA encouraged women to share their ideas and information with each other, building networks community networks while giving access to finance.

CARE has used the VSLA model in many countries affected by conflict. Most use the model without adaptation, although some Country Offices have considered how to leverage the model as a tool for peacebuilding, and the Conflict Sensitivity Consortium has included projects with VLSA elements in its pilots with CARE Kenya and CARE Sierra Leone. Some Country Offices seem to use VSLA as the peacebuilding or social cohesion (a term often used when “peacebuilding” is too political) element in programmes. While its potential as a tool of empowerment is not in doubt, and its potential in peacebuilding is exciting, doing VSLA is not automatically doing peacebuilding.

 CARE Burundi has done a lot of interesting work in considering VLSA groups can be used in peacebuilding. All of the VSLA groups in the country groups include training on community conflict resolution to help members deal with conflicts between them, and in the complex political context of the country, and link up to local peace clubs CARE works with.  In South Sudan, the women’s networks created and strengthened by VSLA groups are being leveraged for community-based conflict prevention work, including local conflict monitoring.  In Cote d’Ivoire, there is anecdotal evidence that women involved in VSLA groups reached out to their husbands and sons during the recent political crisis to prevent them from participating in the violence. Women also reported that the access they had to loans through the VSLA groups allowed them to recover from the crisis more quickly. They were unable to work during the violence, but loans helped them rebuild and reopen their market stalls for example.  Some Country Offices call their VSLA projects “peacebuilding” because they work across ethnic groups, but do not measure effects on peace, incorporate conflict resolution, nor has conflict sensitivity been considered.  Numerous countries affected by conflict use the model.

Economic Opportunity and Conflict

Lack of economic opportunity is cited by citizens as a cause of conflict, and is often the most significant reason why young people join gangs, criminal organisations or rebel groups.3 –Building Stability Overseas Strategy

“There is no remotely convincing evidence at the cross-country, large-N level, at the quantitative case study level, or at the ethnographic, ‘qualitative’ level, for any bold claims that unemployment is a mechanistic causal factor in violent conflicts in developing countries. The evidence on youth unemployment is even weaker.”4 –2011 WDR Input Paper

In spite of a lack of convincing academic evidence, the idea that lack of economic opportunity causes conflict has been accepted as fact. While it is likely that a lack of economic opportunity plays a role in driving war economies, it isn’t as simple as some strategies and projects make it appear. Jobs do not prevent conflict— underemployment and quality of opportunity also matter. There are a number of CARE projects that work around income generation and livelihoods projects that could look into this link.

 In Yemen CARE is working with vulnerable youth in Hajjah, in particular youth at risk of engaging in conflicts, whether inter-village or tribal disputes, or the recurring conflict in neighbouring Sa’ada. These youth are participating in the planning of the project, which includes vocational skills training and community dialogue around economic and employment issues.

3 4.9 BSOS document, page 15 4 “Unemployment and Participation in Violence,” Christopher Cramer, http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/unemployment  CARE Afghanistan has a large programme that supplies short-term employment to food-insecure households in Kabul under a USAID Stabilisation grant that appears to make this assumption, although further information is needed. The programme was included in CARE Afghanistan’s efforts to mainstream Do No Harm.  CARE DRC’s DDR project is well thought of by partners, including UNDP, and project participants, and provides short-term vocational training, along with a reinsertion package for ex-combatants (mixed with civilians). The learning from the project seems to be that the short-term training is inadequate to prevent rejoining armed groups, and conflict and tensions within training groups that include traumatized, depressed and violent individuals are difficult to manage.5

Thoughts on Ways Forward

In discussions with the UK government on how to frame the BOND Conflict Group Private Sector workshop, HMG mentioned the topics they are most interested in around private sector and conflict, including:  How to conflict sensitise job and growth creation programmes  Making HMG’s ‘prosperity agenda’ conflict sensitive  Engaging the private sector in HMG conflict analysis

However, in that same meeting targeting at-risk young men for employment and the private sector’s role in stabilisation were also raised. HMG’s agenda on jobs, private sector, and conflict is not clear, and how their current macro ideas link to the community-level where most of CARE’s work happens is even less clear. A conversation with the conflict advisors linked to DFID’s PSE team should be a priority.

The real gap in all of the literature on the role of the private sector in fragile states is how macro economic initiatives link to the community-level where CARE works. The types of private sector companies that have the potential to have a large impact on fragile state economies are mainly extractives, telecoms, and construction—many (though not all, and there is room for work) of the poor, rural, conflict-affected communities where CARE works are unlikely to receive much benefit from this type post-conflict/stabilisation investment, at least in the short-to-medium term. So how does micro-enterprise development link back up to both private sector engagement, and the other types of national economic investment?

Areas with potential for future work:  Including conflict in value-chain assessments  Conflict sensitizing CARE’s private sector engagement in countries affected by conflict  Learning around VSLA and conflict—both its role in peacebuilding, and conflict sensitivity of VSLA (starting with the work done by the Conflict Sensitivity Consortium)  Linking CARE’s community-level livelihoods work and skills training with private sector engagement at the national level  Exploring the links between employment and conflict in CARE’s experience, such as DDR skills training and recidivism or where we have succeeded in reaching at-risk youth

5 DRC Trip Report, Howard Mollett, April 2011. This work could include pilots, improving programme quality of existing work, and research into what has worked well at CARE (for example in VSLA or skills training for employment).