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LBJ and Vietnam

November 24, 1963 LBJ Pledged US to South Vietnam - Immediately after the assassination of JFK, LBJ met with Henry Cabot Lodge, the US Ambassador in South Vietnam. LBJ instructed Lodge to tell the South Vietnamese government that under his leadership the US would keep “our word” and help South Vietnam win against an “`externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy.'” [1] Shortly after taking office, LBJ sent Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on a fact-finding mission to Vietnam. McNamara had taken such a fact-finding mission for JFK in July 1963. When McNamara reported to LBJ, he noted that the situation had degenerated since July. Diem followed American wishes and established 200 “strategic hamlets,” armed hamlets where ARVN units were located to protect the peasants, in nearby hamlets and villages. McNamara found that by the fall of 1963 half of the “strategic hamlets” were abandoned. American Air Force General Curtis LeMay, an outspoken conservative critic of the administration, advocated bombing North Vietnam. LeMay claimed “`we are swatting flies when we should be going after the manure pile.'” [2]

Early 1964 Sihanouk in Cambodia Favors VC, NVA, and China - Early in 1964 Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia allowed VC and NVA forces to use Cambodia for a supply line of goods from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. In a secret agreement Sihanouk allowed China to use the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville to unload war supplies shipped to the VC and NVA. When Thailand's dictator died, Sihanouk used a radio address to celebrate the deaths of that ruler, Diem in South Vietnam and Kennedy in the US. This is further evidence of expanding communist influence in Southeast Asia. [3]

Late 1963 - LBJ's Choices: As 1963 ended and 1964 began, LBJ was

Early 1964 faced with difficult choices about the nation's action in Vietnam and received contradictory advice. Irwin and Debi Unger list the three basic actions LBJ could take: withdraw (which he saw as appeasement), fight a limited war, or fight an unlimited war (perhaps even an invasion of North Vietnam). Johnson always opposed appeasement and would not consider withdrawal from Vietnam. He found three problems with an unlimited war: it was too costly for the American economy, it would risk drawing the Chinese and Soviets into the conflict and possibly escalate into World War III, and it would “generate massive domestic opposition.” [4] Johnson selected the middle way of fighting a limited war with the full knowledge that the negative possibility of stalemate. In making this decision, Johnson relied on the Cuban Missile Crisis when a policy of “graduated pressure” proved successful. LBJ's military advisers wanted the third option. “He believed he understood better than any of them, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that achieving American ends in Vietnam did not require invading North Vietnam or deploying nuclear weapons.” [5]

January 1964 Khanh Seized Power - Nguyen Khanh seized power from Dong van Minh early in 1964. Nguyen Khanh was an ARVN general. He fought for the Viet Minh early in his life, but changed sides, attended a French military school, and led French colonial troops. Khanh was involved in the November 1963 coup d'état and led young aggressive army officers. He wanted to establish a dictatorship in South Vietnam, but the Americans were very alarmed even at hints of a dictatorship. He got rid of a number of army officers and alienated many that were left. The people of South Vietnam did not like Khanh. On August 25, 1964 he was forced to resign but returned to power two days later. He was successful in avoiding a coup d'état organized by Roman Catholics in the fall of 1964, lost his position to a new constitution, and then led a successful coup d'état in late December 1964. The Americans decided that Khanh had to go, so the United States suspended all military aid to South Vietnam. This ploy backfired when Khanh made himself dictator. Unable to achieve success, he was thought to have approached the North Vietnamese in an attempt to negotiate a peace. According to some reports, the United States military commanders used their influence against Khanh. At any rate, he was forced out of power but managed to name his successor, Phan Huy Quat. Khanh was made “roving ambassador” for South Vietnam and roved to France where he remained for the duration of the Vietnam War. His family background was one of social status and wealth so he led a good life in France. When the PAVN and VC took Saigon, Khanh moved to the United States where he lives today. Phan Huy Quat was a physician in North Vietnam who fled to South Vietnam in 1954. He was selected to run the government after Nguyen Khanh and did so from February 1965 until the June 1965 coup d'état (see the item dated June 1965, below).

February 1964 USSR, US Work Together to End War? - Early in February 1964 Alexei Kosygin, the Premier of the Soviet Union, went to North Vietnam and at the same time McGeorge Bundy, National Security Adviser for JFK and LBJ, was in South Vietnam. J. Martin Gilbert believes that each carried the same message: South Vietnam and North Vietnam should work out a compromise agreement. Gilbert gives no proof that the USSR and US made some agreement for a negotiated settlement, but his writing suggests this possibility. [6]

At this time as well as all other times when “compromise agreements” were proposed, according to Lind, there was no real possibility for any coalition. “The Vietnamese communists were never serious about a coalition government for either South Vietnam or the country as a whole, except as a transition to communist rule; talk of a coalition government was a propaganda ploy intended to fool western liberals and leftists. (It did.)” [7] Lind was, I believe, wrong if he thought many were fooled by talk of a coalition. Most, including Johnson, Nixon and their advisers, probably understood a coalition would merely delay a communist triumph but the delay would be sufficient to extricate the US from Vietnam.

June 1964 Maxwell Replaced Lodge - In June 1964 General Maxwell Taylor replaced Henry Cabot Lodge as American Ambassador in South Vietnam.

June 6, 1964 US Aircraft Shot Down over Laos - Souvanna Phouma was the neutralist premier of Laos and was opposed by the communist Pathet Lao. In May 1964 American reconnaissance aircraft began flying over Laos with Souvanna Phouma's approval. The Pathet Lao guerrillas shot down a reconnaissance aircraft on June 6. Johnson gave approval for armed American aircraft to fly protective cover for the reconnaissance aircraft. On June 9, 1964 Johnson ordered a retaliatory strike in Laos against the Pathet Lao to demonstrate American resolve. Since all air activity over Laos was secret, American media was given no information. The People's Republic of China's press released news of this American strike in neutral Laos. The American press protested in editorials. The Washington Post editorial stated it was “sad when the people of the United States had to rely on China's news agency for word of covert operations in Vietnam.” [8] Aviation Weekly, a very respected publication, said the US State Department's war news was so often contradicted by reality that “reporters refused to believe a story `until it had been officially denied.'” [9]

August 2-5, 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution - The Maddox and C. Turner Joy were United States destroyers operating in the Gulf of Tonkin off the coast of North Vietnam (in Naval parlance “Yankee Station” as opposed the “Dixie Station” in the waters off South Vietnam). In later years crew members of these two vessels told members of the press in the United States that the ships had sophisticated electronic equipment and their mission in 1964 consisted of “covert operations.” On August 2, 1964 officers on the Maddox told superiors they were fired upon in international waters without provocation by North Vietnamese patrol boats operating out of bases in North Vietnam. On August 4 both the Maddox and the C. Turner Joy reported that North Vietnamese patrol boats made unprovoked attacks against them in international waters. This information went up the chain of command to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. The officers of the Maddox and C. Turner Joy later said they informed their superiors that the sonar and radar reports did not substantiate without a question of doubt the facts they asserted. How far up the chain of command this information traveled is open to question, but Lyndon B. Johnson did not disclose this information to Congress. Congress was also not informed that the Maddox and the C. Turner Joy were involved in “covert operations.” On August 5 Congress acted on the information that two United States naval ships were fired upon without provocation in international waters. Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. This document authorized the President to take any measures necessary to defend against attacks. Presidents Johnson and Nixon considered this Congressional act to be the “declaration of war” required by the United States Constitution before a president can wage war. Only two senators opposed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution: Wayne Morse of Oregon and Ernest Gruening of Alaska. Future critics of the war such as J. William Fulbright of Arkansas were personal friends with President Johnson and said they took his word and supported their president. Fulbright wrote Arrogance of Power in 1967, a work that lent respectability to the anti-war movement in the United States. After August 5 President Johnson authorized American air raids against torpedo boat bases and oil depots in North Vietnam.

Hammond states that there might be questions about the reality of the 1964 Tonkin Gulf attacks, even if the second every happened. He asserted that in 1964 both the press and the president believed the attacks really occurred. [10]

Mann devoted many pages to the issues surrounding the Gulf of Tonkin incident and the resulting resolution. He saw LBJ and his advisers manipulating the incident to obtain Senate support for the eventual use of United States troops in Vietnam. Mann claimed the United States government approved of “Plan 34-A” early in 1964. This plan used United States naval vessels with sophisticated electronic equipment to go into North Vietnamese territorial waters, provoke the North Vietnamese to use radar, identify the specific location of North Vietnamese radar installations and give this information to South Vietnamese commando units. These units would raid the North Vietnamese radar installations. The Maddox was operating within North Vietnamese territorial waters in August 1964 and was involved in “Plan 34-A” operations. When attacked, the Maddox had retreated to international waters. Even though the reports of the second attacks against the Maddox and the C. Turner Joy were reliable, soon investigations on board these ships began to cast doubts of the validity of the presumed attacks. According to Mann the doubts of the validity of the second attacks were conveyed from the Captain of the Maddox to his superiors and eventually to the White House in August 1964. Mann contends that administrative officials such as National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, lied to Senators regarding these events. Bundy knew that the Maddox was involved in “Plan 34-A” activities but lied to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Bundy also, according to Mann, swore that the second attack happened just as it was reported even though by the time of his testimony, the Maddox's Captain uncertainty was known at the White House. [11] The duplicity of the administration on the Gulf of Tonkin incident haunted men such as William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who believed what he was told in 1964 but later came to believe he had been deceived. [12]

December 1964 FLAMING DART - Viet Cong planted explosives in US officer quarters in Saigon in December 1964. Viet Cong attacks against the Pleiku United States military base resulted in FLAMING DART air attacks against barracks and ports in North Vietnam. This was called the strategy of “escalation.” The Viet Cong escalated the action by attacking the United States billet at Qui Nhon. The United States escalated its responses and began the military build-up that resulted in hundreds of thousands of American servicemen and women in Vietnam. The Battle of Binh Gia was in a significant step in that build-up (see the item dated May 29, 1965, below).

Late 1964 Instability in South Vietnamese/Conflict With US - Hammond recorded events involving American media in Vietnam that demonstrated the instability of the South Vietnamese government under Nguyen Khanh. Khanh, Air Marshall Nguyen Cao Ky and Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu, dismissed the civilian government because, they claimed, the civilians refused to remove old generals to allow aggressive young generals power. American Ambassador General Maxwell Taylor criticized Khanh's move. Khanh then called in Beverly Deepe, correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor, and criticized Taylor. Taylor, irked at Deepe's published accounts, invited all other US correspondents to a “background” briefing during which he roundly criticized the South Vietnamese generals in charge of the government. Deepe, piqued at her exclusion from Taylor's briefing, felt under no obligation not to report what was said, reported Taylor's negative comments as “rumors” from a private briefing. This story was copied widely in the United States. The New York Herald Tribune carried it under the headlines “Taylor Rips Mask off Khanh.” [13] Khanh was furious with Taylor and almost took action against the American ambassador. Media representatives in Vietnam believed Khanh's actions reflected the inherent instability of the South Vietnamese government.

1965 Sukarno Boasted of United Communist Action Against US - Additional evidence of the growing awareness of Southeast Asia as an area of communist expansion came in a 1965 speech by Sukarno. He expounded on his slogan “`Crush America'” in a speech predicting “that China would `strike a blow against the American troops in Vietnam from the north while Indonesia would strike from the south.'” [14] This sort of statement fed fears in America that communism was spreading across the Far East and helped persuade American leaders to stand firm in Vietnam.

January 27, 1965 Contradictory Advice to LBJ and the Decision - As 1965 began, LBJ was in the same position he faced in 1964: what to do in Vietnam. McGeorge Bundy and Robert McNamara sent a memo to LBJ. A recent coup d'état destabilized the South Vietnam regime and 5,000 students ransacked the library of the US Information Service in Hue. In light of this evidence of instability, Bundy and McNamara sent a memo to LBJ recommending the use of sufficient military power “`to force a change in Communist policy'” rather than negotiating. [15] In just over two weeks, on February 15, Vice President Hubert Humphrey sent the president a memo with the opposite advice. Humphrey's memo was prescient because he predicted the reaction the American people would have to escalation in Vietnam. George Ball, one of Johnson's most trusted advisers, basically agreed with Humphrey. McGeorge Bundy now told LBJ that the retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam taken in January and early February should be transformed into sustained bombing of North Vietnam. Perplexed at the various recommendations, Johnson asked former President Dwight “Ike” Eisenhower who was the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe during World War II, for advice. Ike recommended a bombing campaign of North Vietnam and this was the deciding factor in LBJ's decision to launch Operation Rolling Thunder on March 2. [16]

January 1965 AP Poll of US Senators - In January the Associated Press conducted a poll of the opinion of US Senators on the War in Vietnam. Of the sixty-three Senators who answered the poll, three wanted the US to withdraw from Vietnam immediately, eight wanted US forces to be used against North Vietnam, thirty-one wanted a negotiated settlement once South Vietnam's government became more stable, and ten favored immediate negotiations. [17] Editorial opinion at the time condemned LBJ because it was said he provided inadequate leadership. Public opinion polls of the American people showed significant ambivalence. Americans wanted to stop the spread of communism but had little faith in the stability of the South Vietnamese government. Few saw how the nation could win if South Vietnam was so politically unstable. [18]

February 7, 1965 VC Attack US Air Base - In the late hours of February 6 and the early hours of February 7, 1965 the VC attacked an American air base near Pleiku and a Special Forces unit at Camp Holloway. Eight Americans were killed in action (KIA) and ten airplanes destroyed. In Washington McGeorge Bundy argued that no one could be sure the US could win a war in Vietnam. But, he argued the situation for the US and South Vietnam was hopeless unless the US showed its critics that it possessed the “will to stay the course.” [19] McGeorge Bundy further warned that US bombing raids against specific VC provocation would not work. He contended that only sustained and continuous bombing pressure on North Vietnam would be successful. This argument by McGeorge Bundy, according to Gilbert, was the genesis of Rolling Thunder, a three-year bombing attack against North Vietnam (see the item dated March 1965, below). LBJ followed Bundy's advice but earlier maintained that the war could not be won by air power alone. He believed success would result only from substantial American ground troops in Vietnam. [20]

LBJ considered Georgia Senator Richard B. Russell as a mentor. Throughout his career he depended on Russell. Russell must have felt as a lot of Americans in late 1964 and early 1965: no one was sure about what to do in Vietnam, but many were ready to fish or cut bait. “`We either have to get out or take some action to help the Vietnamese,' Senator Richard Russell of Georgia intoned in the National Observer. `They won't help themselves.'” [21] One of LBJ's biographers concluded that Russell was a major influence on Johnson. Russell originally cautioned LBJ not to get involved in Vietnam, now he changed his advice.

March 1965 Rolling Thunder - Operation Rolling Thunder began in March 1965 and continued until October 31, 1968 (See item dated January 27, 1965 for the reasons LBJ used to implement this operation). It resulted in more bomb tonnage being dropped on North Vietnam than was dropped in the entire Pacific Theater of World War II (see the item dated March 1968, below). Operation Rolling Thunder was under the control of President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara who tried to use it to force North Vietnam to negotiate. Others, such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General William C. Westmoreland, used Operation Rolling Thunder to justify additional ground troops to support the air war. Missions were carried out by the United States Air Force with F-4 and F-105 tactical fighters and by the United States Navy using F-4, F-8, A-4 and A-6 fighters and attack aircraft. McNamara submitted a list of targets the military wanted to hit to the White House. The President and his advisers approved targets from McNamara's short list. This process pleased neither the military (who thought it was their business to select targets) and the civilians opposed to the war (who thought politicians were selecting North Vietnamese civilians for death and destruction). (For a comparison of different methods of target selection see the items dated May 10 through October 23, then December 18 – 30, 1972.)

March 1965 First US Combat Group “In-Country” - The 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade landed at Da Nang in March 1965. [22] This was the first United States combat group to be stationed “in-country.” The seven years duty in Vietnam was to be the longest war for the United States Marine Corps. The Marines sustained 13,073 combat deaths and 1,748 deaths in Vietnam from other causes. Marine casualties in Vietnam, 101,574, outnumbered those in World War II by 4,000. 794,000 Marines served in Vietnam and 669,100 served in World War II. There had been elements of the Marine Corps in Vietnam before this combat group. For example, a marine helicopter task force assisted the ARVN as early as April 1962.

On April 1 more US troops were sent to Vietnam for “defensive purposes.” General Westmoreland soon had permission to let these grunts patrol around the bases they were defending. In this “patrol” activity, one could act offensively in a “defensive” assignment. American forces began offensive operations before long. This was not purely a military “escalation” in the use of grunts. LBJ told the American ambassador in South Vietnam, now General Maxwell Taylor that US troops were not to be mere advisers to the ARVN but should also go with ARVN into combat. Washington lawyer, long-time Democratic Party leader, and LBJ informal adviser, Clark Clifford, said that a substantial commitment of US troops to South Vietnam would produce a “quagmire” with no hope of ultimate victory. Critics of the US government's Vietnam War policies henceforth constantly used the term quagmire. [23] Earlier the press reflected a general opinion in America that the US should not send ground troops into Vietnam until the South Vietnamese government had some stability. But by the spring of 1965 the course of events forced the issue: either get out of Vietnam or send in US ground troops before South Vietnam collapsed. [24]

The sometimes subtle, sometimes blunt alterations in the official explanation of the use of US ground forces became fodder for journalists. “Columnist Arthur Krock had the last word. `There is certainly fundamental “change” in a “mission,”' he said, `which begins as strategic counsel and technical assistance within a government territory, proceeds to bombing outside that territory . . . moves onward to “perimeter defense” that inescapably leads to ground combat, and finally is given authority for expansion into formal ground warfare.' Quoting Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland, he added: `“The question is,” said Alice to Humpty Dumpty, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”'” [25]

March 11, 1965 Operation Market Time - In early 1965 seventy percent of the supplies needed by the VC in South Vietnam were shipped in coastal vessels from Haiphong (or some other North Vietnamese harbor) to one of any number of destinations along the South Vietnamese coast. On March 11, 1965 the combined navies of South Vietnam and the United States began Operation Market Time. Naval and coastal ships covered the 1,200-mile long South Vietnamese coast and extended their patrols to forty miles out in the South China Sea. Patrol aircraft extended the range to 150 miles in the South China Sea. [26] In the eighteen months prior to July 1967 Operation Market Time sank several large ships and investigated 700,000 watercraft. The flow of war materials from North Vietnam no longer had this easy route. After Operation Market Time became effective, the NVA and VC in South Vietnam had to use the Ho Chi Minh Trail. [27]

May 4, 1965 Pause to Rolling Thunder - President Johnson called a pause to Operation Rolling Thunder to allow the North Vietnamese time to begin discussions to end the conflict. This pause followed a speech Johnson delivered at Johns Hopkins University on April 7. In this speech, Johnson offered to negotiate and proposed a billion-dollar economic development package for a peaceful North and South Vietnam. There is good reason to believe broaching this peace proposal was disingenuous. The administration had good reason to believe there could be no negotiation unless there was a bombing pause. Most critics felt the Johns Hopkins speech was given to pacify Americans who demanded an attempt at negotiations. The May bombing pause was also seen by many as an attempt to silence administration critics and not a sincere effort to end the conflict.

End of April 1965 Media Problems with the War - As always tension existed between the obligation of the media to provide truth to Americans and the military need to maintain secrecy. One consistent problem was that there were multiple sources of news in Vietnam, each with its own perspective. When two sources seemed to disagree, the press concluded there was a cover-up by someone. A proposal allowed the dissemination of political information from one source and technical military information (number of troops, types of bombs being used, targets, types of aircraft, number of KIAs on each side and so forth) from a military source. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt this approach would damage the image of the US in world opinion. He insisted that all information come from one source. This decision was followed and caused another problem. LBJ and Nixon both were able to “exploit the military's credibility with the American people by drawing officers supposedly above politics into the business of selling the war.” [28] Thus General Westmoreland presented information on conditions in Vietnam prior to the Tet Offensive and then was seen as overly optimistic. Americans tended to discount his veracity when he told the truth about Tet. May 11, 1965 Battle at Song Be - The VC overran a US military position and the nearby town of Song Be in Phuac Long province located in the Central Highlands (in the northwestern area of South Vietnam). Song Be was about 50 miles (80 klics) north of Saigon near the Cambodian border. The VC held the city overnight, then withdrew. Song Be was the location of a successful NVA attack in 1967 (see the item dated October 27, 1967 below).

May 29, 1965 The Battle of Binh Bia - VC attacked Binh Gia, a town in the Quang Ngai province along the coast of South Vietnam. Two South Vietnamese battalions dropped their weapons and ran. This event resulted in General William C. Westmoreland, commander in Vietnam from 1964 to 1968, to notify his superiors that he did not believe the ARVN could defeat the Viet Cong without massive assistance from the United States.

June 18, 1965 Operation Arc Light - On June 18 the first Operation Arc Light took place. This was the introduction of B-52 bombers to Vietnam. These huge bombers flew from Guam and later from Thailand. These planes flew six miles high and could not be heard from below. The first sound enemy forces heard were the mighty explosions. Bombs would clear an area several hundred yards wide and two or three miles long. The massive bombs dropped from a flight of B-52 bombers would destroy every object in this area. Arc Light was the work of the Strategic Air Command. Areas to be hit by Arc Light were selected by Recon teams or other means and marked by radar guidance devices. VC or NVA bases or supply depots were generally the targets. In late 1965 Arc Light targets were expanded to include ground troop support. An ARVN or American ground unit under attack might precisely specify the area holding the NVA or VC enemy and call in an Arc Light strike. Following an Arc Light strike, witnesses saw nothing but torn earth and bits of trees. On Hamburger Hill repeated Arc Light strikes did not silence the NVA, dug into the hillside with bunkers. Post war testimony by NVA indicate that Arc Light strikes were terrifying, highly destructive and damaged morale badly. At Khe Sanh, in 1968, Arc Light strikes were made within 3,000 feet of the besieged US Marines.

June 1965 Nguyen Cao Ky in Power - Air Marshall Nguyen Cao Ky led a coup d'état that ousted Phan Huy Quat in June 1865. Quat remained in Saigon until 1975. When the PAVN and VC took Saigon, they executed Quat. Ky appeared to be the dynamic leader South Vietnam needed. He was young, slim, handsome, and had a winsome French wife. On the negative side, he wore black boots and gave some the impression that he was a Vietnamese version of Adolph Hitler. He was the coup d'état member who seemed most capable of soothing Buddhists because he claimed to be a Buddhist. Soon Ky turned on the Buddhists, claiming they had made an agreement with the Communists. Ky used his influence with ARVN generals to rig elections in 1967 and he was elected Vice President of the RVN. Nguyen Van Thieu, a second of the three 1965 coup leaders, was elected president in 1967. The Tet offensive reduced Ky's power considerably and in 1971 he retired from politics. Ky wisely fled Vietnam just before the NVA and VC captured Saigon in April 1975. Ky has lived in the United States since 1975 and is now sixty-nine years old. Nguyen Van Thieu served as President of South Vietnam until 1973. July 1965 Forty-Four Additional US Battalions to Vietnam - Lyndon B. Johnson approved the request of Westmoreland for additional forty-four battalions for Vietnam.

August 18, 1965 Operation Starlight - Operation Starlight took place in August 1965. This was a major Marine operation that defeated a VC Regiment with a combination of ground fire, air strikes and naval guns. Another major American operation, Silver Bayonet, began in August and ran into the fall. Operation Starlight was the first major battle for American ground forces in Vietnam. Operation Starlight lasted until August 24. There was a significant disparity in the “body count.” Forty- five Marines were killed (120 were wounded) versus 614 VC deaths. The difference was thought to be due to the heavy artillery and naval guns that supported the Marines. Later the NVA moved in heavy artillery. This was an important American victory because the Marines were inexperienced. [29]

November 14, 1965 Battles of the Ia Drang Valley: The Battle of LZ X-Ray - With the introduction of American Marines and army units in large numbers, and following Operation Starlight, a Marine victory over the VC, Ho Chi Minh and General Vo Nguyen Giap sent NVA units into South Vietnam. In October conflict began when the NVA attacked at Plei Me, a Special Forces camp south of Pleiku, the center of military operations for II Corps. Slightly over five miles (8 klicks) west of Plei Me several streams flow from the Central Highlands eventually into Cambodia. These streams include the Ia Drang River flowing through the Ia Drang Valley. On November 14, 1965 the U.S. Army's 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), known as the 1st Air Cav, sent a Battalion into the Ia Drang Valley. The 1st Air Cav was an innovation. The new warfare used helicopters (helicopters used to transport troops were known as slicks) to transport grunts (grunts was the universal term for American ground troops in Vietnam) to “insertion points” where they could conduct “search- and-destroy” efforts. Rapid mobility was the idea and November 14 was the test for this new concept supported by JFK's administration. The Battalion sent in was the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry. The landing zone (LZ) selected for the slicks to drop off the grunts was designated X-Ray and unfortunately a NVA regiment was in that area. When the slicks went in to LZ X-Ray, it was hot (they took enemy fire). This began the Battle of LZ X-Ray and we'll read about it. [30]

November 14, 1965 Battles of the Ia Drang Valley: The Battle of LZ Albany - After the Battle of LZ X-Ray, elements of the 7th Cavalry was sent on a two-mile walk to an area where slicks would pick them at LZ Albany. The NVA ambushed these grunts and a second horrible battle was fought. In these two battles the US Army and the NVA discovered that each was composed of professional soldiers who could dish it out and take it.

November 1965 Protests Against the War in US - Anti-war demonstrations become widespread in the United States in the fall of 1965. In March the first faculty at the University of Michigan organized teach-in. During subsequent years faculty and graduate students at colleges and universities across the nation held teach-ins. A large number of college students protested the war but polls showed consistently that a majority of all Americans between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five supported the war. In November two young Americans practiced immolation, one in front of the Pentagon and one outside the United Nations. Three-fourths of the respondents to polls conducted in the United States wanted a cease-fire in Vietnam. [31]

December 17, 1965 Johnson Called a Brief Halt to Bombing - LBJ asked his senior advisers to give him their opinions on the chances of ultimate victory in Vietnam. The verbal reports of this meeting vary but ranged from votes of two-to-one or three-to- one against an ultimate victory in South Vietnam. Following this advice, Johnson called a bombing halt in December 1965 as an indication to the North Vietnamese that a negotiated peace might be possible. When there was no positive response, bombing resumed. Gilbert noted that American ground troops continued attacking VC villages during the bombing halt with the obvious implication that had there been a halt to American military action, negotiations might have been possible. [32]

December 1965 US Changes Strategy on Vietnam - Lind argued that the bombing suspension that began on Christmas Day, 1965 symbolized a shift in US strategy. By this date it was evident that the Kennedy inspired strategy of “pacification” or counterinsurgency was not working in Vietnam. Those who advocated the US fight a conventional war in South Vietnam, won out. The war had to be a “proxy war” overtly fought against the NVA and VC and only covertly against the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China. It must be a “limited” war. An “unlimited proxy war” could not be fought. Unlimited war would involve overt conflict with either the Soviet Union, China or both these communist superpowers. The US, China and the Soviets were “engaged in the greatest proxy conflict in the Cold War since the Korean War.” [33] This was a complex proxy war. The US opposed China and the Soviet Union covertly by fighting North Vietnam. China and the Soviets covertly fought two proxy wars: one against the US for world hegemony, the other against each other for hegemony within the communist world. [34]

End of 1965 Suharto Replaced Sukarno - By the end of 1965 Sukarno was ousted from power in Indonesia. Suharto, an Indonesian general, replaced Sukarno. Suharto remained in power until 1998. Suharto broke with China, maintained neutrality, but favored the US. [35]

January-March 1966 Operation White Wing - For forty-two days the 1st Air Cav and ARVN units fought NVA units in the northeast of II Corps. The 1st Air Cav conducted fruitless search-and-destroy missions in the An Lao Valley. The 1st Air Cav and ARVN found and fought NVA units along Route 1, the main road that runs parallel to the South China Sea coast from the South of South Vietnam all the way north into North Vietnam. South and west of these battles the 1st Air Cav and ARVN conducted successful search-and-destroy missions in the Kim Son Valley. Just south of the Kim Son Valley was an area of VC and NVA concentration where additional battles were fought. [36] The 1st Air Cav claimed a six-to-one kill ratio (1,342 dead NVA versus 228 1st Air Cav deaths).

March 1966 More Buddhist Demonstrations - Buddhist demonstrations in Da Nang and Hue became frequent and were aimed at the government under the leadership of Ky. Perhaps aided by United States Marines (or perhaps the Marines merely did nothing but stand by), Ky crushed the Buddhists in Da Nang, Hue and Saigon. In Da Nang hundreds of civilians were killed with the Buddhists. Hue was besieged and all opposition to Ky was crushed. The Buddhists leader in Hue, Tri Quang, was arrested in May 1966 and after this the Buddhists ceased political activity in South Vietnam.

April 1966 Arc Light Expanded into North Vietnam - B-52 bombers made their first Arc Light raid into North Vietnam. The first target was the Mu Gia pass through which war material passed. The Ho Chi Minh Trail began in North Vietnam, ran south through Laos and Cambodia, two nations in which American troops could not fight by international agreement. The Ho Chi Minh trail was hidden under trees whose foliage remained green all year. There were large depots of equipment and ammunition dumps along the Ho Chi Minh trial to the west of Vietnam in Cambodia. There were several terminals for the Ho Chi Minh trail, the most significant terminus was in the A Shau Valley. Arc Light raids were used to destroy the Ho Chi Minh trail and any goods en route at the time of the strikes. Mountain passes were excellent targets since the Ho Chi Minh trail had no choice but to use certain passes to get over and around mountains.

August 1966 Morley Safer Versus the Military - In August 1966 an incident illustrated tensions between American military for whom publicity could mean more KIAs and the media for whom reporting the truth was an essential definition of America's commitment to freedom of the press. Morley Safer of CBS News interviewed US Marines showing Marines burning South Vietnamese peasant's homes. The comments of these Marines were dramatic and as in most situations did not tell the whole truth. Were VC tunnels or bombproof shelters for VC in the homes? The military brass were upset, relayed the message back home. CBS News President, Fred Friendly was asked to recall Morley Safer. It was pointed out to Friendly that Safer was a Canadian, not an American. Friendly refused to recall Safer. As always each side had a point. The press saw this as an attempt by the military to replace a reporter who told the truth with an “American” who might be relied on to report events from the viewpoint of the American military. The military was displaying the frustration of trying to fight a war on television. [37]

September 14 to Operation Attleboro - Operation Attleboro lasted for weeks and took

November 15, 1966 place west of the Iron Triangle (see the entry dated January 1967, below). After fighting for weeks, the NVA withdrew and crossed the border into Cambodia. [38] Westmoreland saw that the NVA would fight to maintain bases and began to plan the invasion of the Iron Triangle, which took place two months after the end of Operation Attleboro.

November 1966 China and North Vietnam - Mao Zedong sent Zhou Enlai to talk with Ho Chi Minh. Ho and Giap seemed to be unable to sustain the war against South Vietnam or they were angling for increased support from China. Zhou Enlai urged Ho to continue the war. China had enormous investments in North Vietnam. The North Vietnamese railroad system was rebuilt to withstand the constant American bombing and China constructed hundreds of additional railroad miles. Chinese engineers, equipment and laborers built thirty-nine new bridges and fourteen new tunnels. China had 327,000 Chinese troops stationed in North Vietnam to: 1) help in construction projects, 2) keep the North Vietnamese people subdued while the NVA fought in South Vietnam, and 3) to be used to fulfill China's pledge that an American invasion of North Vietnam would be met with Chinese armed intervention as China had done in Korea. China was either unable or unwilling to increase significantly its support for North Vietnam. Mao did not cease to support Ho, but could not or would not match Soviet aid. By the end of 1966 Soviet support for North Vietnam began to exceed that of China. The Soviets sent half of their aid to all communist satellites to North Vietnam. [39]

January 1967 Operation Cedar Falls: US & ARVN in the Iron Triangle - The seventeen-day “search-and-destroy” Operation Cedar Falls took place in January 1967. Operation Junction City, another massive attack on the Iron Triangle, followed operation Cedar Falls in February 1967. Some 32,000 United States and ARVN troops destroyed VC tunnels dung in the Iron Triangle. The Iron Triangle was located twenty miles (32 klicks) northwest of Saigon. The area was fifty square miles (130 square klicks) and was bordered by the Thi Tinh and Saigon Rivers, which had their confluence at this location. The Iron Triangle was between the villages of Ben Suc (a notorious VC stronghold) and Ben Cat. Miles of tunnels were destroyed with bombs, shells, napalm, explosives and bulldozers. The VC had underground barracks, supply dumps, hospitals and weapons factories located in the Iron Triangle and connected with a system of tunnels. American units could patrol above ground without knowing that a few meters below their feet weapons were being made or wounded VC were undergoing operations. In early 1967 hundreds of tons of supplies were captured but virtually all of the VC escaped into Cambodia. Ben Suc was destroyed and its population, about 6,000, was relocated. A few months later the Iron Triangle's tunnels and supply dumps were back in operation and this was one of the bases from which the Tet Offensive was launched early in 1968. Arc Light raids using delayed fuses on bombs designed to strike and penetrate the earth before exploding neutralized most of the underground supply facilities. At that time, the VC and NVA merely moved their supply depots across the border into Cambodia. President Nixon authorized the secret and illegal use of American military units in Cambodia. These actions did not stop the NVA and VC.

February-May 1967 Operation Junction City - Operation Junction City was the largest American action during the Vietnam War. The fighting occurred in IV Corps along the Cambodian border south of the “Fishhook.” The “Fishhook” was a salient of Cambodia with a slight hook look about it located on the south side of the border feature dubbed the “Angel Wing.” Further south there is a larger salient into Vietnam known as the “Parrot's Beak.” The “Parrot's Beak” is about thirty miles (about fifty klicks) west of Saigon. Between the “Parrot's Beak” and the “Fishhook” the NVA had a wide area with easy access to the Cambodian border. The NVA could flee south into the “Parrot's Beak,” north to the “Fishhook,” or west and reach sanctuary in Cambodia. Operation Junction City was fought between US forces and the NVA with little if any action by either the VC or ARVN. The series of battles lasted from February until early May and some were very intense. The American body count showed almost a 10:1 kill ratio (2,728 NVA deaths versus 282 dead Americans). The NVA eventually fled into Cambodia, one of the goals of Operation Junction City. However, they took their HQ with them and the destruction of NVA HQ for IV Corps was another purpose of the operation. This NVA HQ continued to operate until war's end. [40] President Nixon sent ARVN and US forces into Cambodia in 1970 to destroy this NVA HQ (see items dated April 22-29, 1970 and April 29-May, 1970, below). March 1967 - The Battle of Con Thien - In March 1967 the NVA became active

November 1967 around a marine base at Con Thien. This was a battle against highly trained NVA under the direction of General Giap. Con Thien was near the seventeenth parallel, the line that separated North Vietnam from South Vietnam following the Geneva Accords (see the July 1954 item above). The area on both sides of the seventeenth parallel was a demilitarized zone (the DMZ). The US forces and the ARVN had bases just south of the DMZ and the NVA had bases just north of the DMZ. The NVA were using new Soviet military weapons against the Marines. In September the NVA began a siege that lasted for over a month. The Marines successfully defended their base with the aid of air, naval guns, and artillery support. The US military, ARVN, and the American media focused on the battles around the DMZ. They saw this as a desperate move: using NVA and the latest Soviet weapons appeared to be a last ditch effort by Ho and Giap. Giap was conducting a masking operation. While attention was focused on the area around the DMZ the NVA and VC were preparing for the great Tet Offensive of early 1968.

April 1967 100,000 Protesters in NYC - In New York (where there were 100,000 protesters) and in San Francisco (where 20,000 gathered) protests were carried out. According to Lind “The anti-American rhetoric of many antiwar activist was creating a backlash from which conservative politicians would profit for decades.” [41]

May 1967 Glassboro Summit Meeting - President Johnson met with Soviet Prime Minister Alexei N. Kosygin at Glassboro State Teachers College in Glassboro, New Jersey. This was a major meeting of the two leaders of the Cold War Superpowers.

Kosygin carried a secret message from Hanoi to LBJ. Hanoi offered to negotiate if LBJ would stop Rolling Thunder. Johnson gave Kosygin a secret message for Hanoi. LBJ would agree to a bombing halt if negotiations began in earnest but if the negotiations did not prove fruitful, he would resume bombing. [42]

May 9, 1967 CORDS - on May 9 Robert W. Komer was appointed Head of CORDS. CORDS was the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, created to bring together all US military, State Department, CIA, AID (Agency for International Development) and USIA (United States Information Service) operations in South Vietnam. [43] This was the process of implementing President Johnson's promise to spend a billion dollars in North and South Vietnam to provide a better life for the people. Since the North Vietnamese refused, Johnson was going to spend the money in South Vietnam to improve the living conditions and the economy of the nation. Many critics of the American intervention in Vietnam kept saying: “you have to win the hearts and minds of the people.” This was a phrase originally made by an officer who argued this was the only way to win the war. Johnson's administration was trying to “win the hearts and minds of the people.” CORDS did win the support of Vietnamese peasants, caused them to begin to support the Saigon government, and seemed to destroy support in the countryside for the VC. The incredible successes of CORDS were impressive until early 1968. The Tet Offensive demonstrated that the VC were stronger than ever in South Vietnam and had been quiet in the second half of 1967 because they were preparing for the Tet Offensive. After the Tet Offensive, CORDS did not receive much attention. Summers shows a dramatic change in VC power in Hamlets located in the Mekong Delta. [44] His map shows extremely large numbers of VC hamlets in October 1967 and virtually no VC hamlets in the same area in October 1971. Given the reports of Vietnamese peasants, one has difficulty accepting Summers' data. From all accounts, the Vietnamese peasants only sought peace and a chance to grow sufficient crops to survive. They “supported” the side that had local power as a matter of self-preservation. When the VC were dominant, locals were VC. When South Vietnamese had local power, the locals were loyal to Saigon. Summers' map appears to reflect this feature of the war less than any major philosophical conversion that happened in a four-year period. As soon as VC entered a hamlet loyal to Saigon in 1971, the villagers would be loyal to the VC.

June 1967 Muhammad Ali Convicted - Muhammad Ali was convicted for refusing to report for duty after being selected by his Selective Service Board. He applied for conscientious objector status but that application was rejected. Ali claimed to be a conscientious objector on religious grounds, he was a Black Muslim (nee Cassicus Marcillus Clay, he changed his name to Muhammad Ali when he converted). The United States Supreme Court reversed Clay's conviction.

October 21, 1967 Protest March in Washington Drew 50,000 - The anti-war “March of the Pentagon” in Washington, DC drew 50,000 demonstrators.

October 27, 1967 Battle of Song Be (Border Battles) - The VC and NVA attacked Song Be, over-run by the VC in 1965 (see the item dated May 11, 1965 above). In this 1967 attack the ARVN, supported by US artillery, held Song Be against the VC and NVA.

October 29, 1967 Battle of Loc Ninh (Border Battles) - Two days after the Battle of Song Be, US forces drove back a VC attack in the Battle of Loc Ninh. Loc Ninh was about twenty miles north of Song Be or about seventy miles (117 klicks) north of Saigon near the Cambodian border. The fighting was particularly intense and the VC loses were significant. In 1972 the VC and NVA captured Loc Ninh (see the April 4- 6, 1972 entry below).

October 1967 - Battle of Dak To (Border Battles) - Dak To, like Song Be and Loc

November 1967 Ninh, is located near the Cambodian border in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. Dak To is sufficiently north to be near the Laos border. In October 1967 the NVA attacked US forces in the Battle of Dak To. Units from the 173rd Airborne Brigade and elements of the 4th Infantry Division and these Americans held Dak To. The battles of Dak To, Loc Ninh and Song Be were dubbed the “Border Battles” because they were located near the Cambodian-South Vietnam border. The Border Battles were seen as an indication that the American effort was winning the Central Highlands. However, the Border Battles were pre-Tet Offensive battles, fought by the NVA and VC to prepare for that major offensive against Hue and Saigon early in 1968. These actions in the northwest of Vietnam were designed to attract the attention of American leaders away from Saigon.

January 21, 1968 Siege of Khe Sanh - On January 21, 1968 a NVA force assaulted a Marine outpost located on a hill overlooking Khe Sanh, a Marine base. [45] The Marines were prepared because a member of the NVA defected and informed them of this assault. This was the first action of what became the Siege of Khe Sanh. Located about six miles (ten klicks) from Laos and about fourteen miles (twenty-three klics) from the DMZ, Khe Sanh overlooked Route 9, the main highway from Laos to the coast of South Vietnam (roughly parallel to the DMZ). Khe Sanh was a natural location for a base to control entry into Vietnam over Route 9 and from the DMZ. An army Special Forces camp was set up at Khe Sanh in 1962. William Westmoreland ordered the Marines to establish a base at Khe Sanh to protect against NVA entry into South Vietnam. During the spring of 1967 the Marines began to make contact with NVA units in the hills that overlooked Khe Sanh. Vicious firefights took place between the Marines and the NVA over possession of those hills in the summer and fall of 1967. By the end of 1967 both sides had lost heavily but the hills around Khe Sanh remained in the hands of the US Marines. NVA from three different divisions had been captured; indicating a very large concentration of NVA in the vicinity. President Lyndon Johnson, fearing that Khe Sanh was beginning to look a lot like Dien Bien Phu, asked for a military guarantee that the Marines would not be taken. General Westmoreland beefed up Khe Sanh until it had an artillery battalion and four infantry battalions with additional artillery and air support from other locations. By the end of 1967, Westmoreland and the Joint Chiefs of Staff promised Johnson that the NVA could not take Khe Sanh.

NVA artillery, located in Laos, continually pounded Khe Sanh and the surrounding hills. The NVA had the latest and best Soviet artillery pieces. During the January 21, 1967 assault, a NVA artillery shell hit a Marine ammunition dump, detonating 1,500 tons of explosives producing fifty-seven Marine casualties (forty-three wounded and fourteen killed). During January and February 1968 the NVA attacked constantly with small groups supported by mortar and artillery support. On February 25 a Marine platoon sustained forty-eight casualties. Nineteen hundred and sixty-eight was a leap year and on leap-year day a NVA assault against a Khe Sanh perimeter defended by ARVN troops failed. The NVA sustained heavy losses from artillery fire and an Arc Light strike. Following this experience, Westmoreland ordered heavy air support from fighters and B-52 Arc Light bombers. The figurative code name Niagara was used because the US Air Force and Marine pilots made bombs cascade on the NVA like Niagara Falls. During the monsoon weather Khe Sanh was most in danger. There was constant artillery from the NVA, which prohibited supply aircraft from using the Khe Sanh airstrip. Food and other supplies were dropped from planes to keep Khe Sanh from surrendering. When the monsoon rains broke a task force (Operation Pegasus) of US army and Marines and ARVN units broke through the NVA and relieved Khe Sanh. Advisers recommended abandonment of Khe Sanh, but Westmoreland was determined to keep the base open. When he was replaced in June, orders were changed. The Marines pulled out of Khe Sanh on July 5, 1968. The abandonment of Khe Sanh was essential because a second monsoon season of NVA assaults might have resulted in success. After Khe Sanh, it was evident that the NVA was overpowering in the northwest of South Vietnam.

January 31, 1968 Tet Offensive - Tet, the Vietnamese New Year, was a cease-fire period by international agreement. On Tet in 1968 some 84,000 NVA and VC troops attacked US and South Vietnamese positions and anticipated a massive uprising among the people of South Vietnam. The uprising did not take place, most of the attacks failed, the expected collapse of the South Vietnamese government did not occur, and eventually a large percentage of the VC were destroyed. This last result is a controversial one. Those who see Vietnam as an American military success but a failure because of incompetent civilian leadership, emphasize that the VC were virtually non-existent after Tet. These historians, such as Henry Summer, see a military victory in Tet with an end to the “clandestine” war carried out by the VC. The NVA began a more traditional invasion of South Vietnam after Tet. The VC were severely damaged in the fighting that followed the initial Tet Offensive, but it was not as clear-cut a demarcation as Summers contends.

General Giap's strategy was to conduct warfare in the interior of South Vietnam in the summer and fall of 1967. The “Border Battles” and the siege of Khe Sanh were very successful in implementing Giap's strategy. By January 1968 a large portion of US forces had been drawn to the interior and northern areas of South Vietnam. Giap quietly moved his forces into the vicinity of South Vietnamese cities and coastal provincial centers. The Tet Offensive was scheduled to begin on January 30, then was delayed to January 31. Some units did not receive notification of the delay and began the offensive on January 30. By February 1 fifty hamlets, fifty-eight of 245 district towns, five of six autonomous cities, and twenty-seven of forty-four provincial capitals were under assault.

There is a question of American preparedness for the Tet Offensive. US Lieutenant General Fred C. Weyand was very well prepared and seized the offensive from the VC in the early hours of the attack on Saigon (see the item dated 2:30 a.m. January 31, 1968, below). The Ungers quote a statement made years later by Westmoreland. Westmoreland stated that he thought a major offensive was coming from the VC. But he thought the VC would launch this offensive well before Tet or a good time after the holiday. He did not believe the VC would have an offensive during Tet. [46]

2:30 A. M. Tet Offensive, Battle of Saigon - A VC C-10 Sapper Battalion blew a

January 31, 1968 hole in the wall of the US embassy in Saigon at 2:30 a.m. on January 31, 1968. The VC controlled portions of the US embassy grounds but did not penetrate the embassy building. All members of VC C-10 Sapper Battalion were killed. The fighting on the embassy grounds went on into the day of January 31 and was on American television. The American public saw the truth but not the whole truth. But the pictures of VC in apparent control of the American embassy in Saigon were so vivid and emotionally upsetting that the whole truth was beyond the comprehension of most Americans. The whole truth was that US Lieutenant General Fred C. Weyand had enveloped Saigon in one of the most powerful concentrations of American military power in all of American history. Weyand somehow anticipated Giap's strategy and received permission from General Westmoreland to prepare Saigon for an assault at Tet. Tet was the traditional time for surprise attacks in Vietnamese history. In 1779 Nguyen Hue attacked and defeated the Chinese forces that had controlled Vietnam during Tet. All Vietnamese school children knew of the great Tet offensive of 1779. Weyand gathered fifty battalions of US infantry, armor, and armored cavalry based at Long Binh, the corps-level headquarters near Saigon. Weyand also had control of Australian, New Zealand, Thai forces and was the coordinator for the ARVN III and IV Corps. The NVA and VC launched an attack against Saigon with thirty-five battalions. General Weyand had a 5,000-man counterattack launched a few hours after 2:30 a.m. on January 31. He had Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry on the roof of the US embassy around dawn. Weyand's genius was most evident when he sent a large force of tanks and armored personnel carriers (the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry of the 25th Infantry Division) racing through the darkness on the night of January 31 to Tan Son Nhut and hit the VC and NVA's rear. General Westmoreland's HQ and the HQ of the South Vietnamese military were located at Ton Son Nhut. These HQs were a prime target of Giap's assault plans. Had Giap's attack succeeded in capturing American and Vietnamese military HQs, television film of VC inside the American embassy grounds would have been a minor event for Americans! Weyand's counterattack at Ton Son Nhut resulted in vicious fighting and put the enemy on the defensive. Weyand's massive concentration of forces around Saigon was sufficient to blunt the VC and NVA offensive, but the power of the enemy was demonstrated in the length of time required to clear the Saigon of assaulting forces. It was not until February 5 that US forces turned the mop-up activity to the South Vietnamese units. The 1968 Battle of Saigon ended on March 7. [47]

3:30 A.M. Tet Offensive, The Battle of Hue - The Tet Offensive against Hue

January 31, 1968 was more successful than the assault of Saigon. Hue is divided by the Perfume River where that stream has its confluence with the South China Sea. Most of the old Imperial Capitol of Hue, including the Imperial Palace of Peace and the Citadel of Hue, the First ARVN Divisional HQ, and the Giahoi Area are located west of the Perfume River. The New City of Hue is located between the Perfume River and the South China Sea. American forces agreed not to enter Hue because it was a Buddhist center defended by the South Vietnamese military. The VC seized the Imperial City of Hue and NVA and these forces retained control of the area west of the Perfume River from January 31 until February 24. As many as 6,000 South Vietnamese were presumed murdered by the NVA and VC during this month-long occupation. The graves of 2,800 who were beaten to death, shot, and even buried alive were uncovered. Some 3,000 civilians disappeared and their bodies were never recovered. One special unit of the ARVN had its HQ in a corner of the Citadel in Hue and never relinquished control of this base. This ARVN HQ was in the corner of the Citadel which put it on the northern edge of the Imperial City of Hue, just inside the old moat that ran in straight lines forming a square that encircled the Imperial City of Hue (see Summer, 135). ARVN units entered Hue from the north, crossed the moat and arrived at First ARVN Divisional HQ. From that location they fought the CV and NVA in the rest of the old Imperial City of Hue. On February 2 American units, including the 3rd Brigade, 501st Infantry of the 1st Air Cav, moved to the west of Hue to block VC and NVA reinforcements or any NVA or VC units trying to leave the city. On February 4 American forces were invited to enter the Imperial City of Hue for the first time in the Vietnam War. American Marines entered the eastern side of the old Imperial City of Hue and worked their way down the side of Hue along the west bank of the Perfume River. These Marines had house-to-house fighting and it was a vicious and slow assignment. Supported by American Naval fire, the Marines cleared the southeast side of Hue by February 9. South Vietnamese Marines entered the old Imperial City of Hue to assist ARVN and in house-to-house fighting, these Marines sustained one casualty for every yard of the city they conquered. This fighting continued until March 2. American units that were stationed in the New City of Hue, east of the Perfume River fought off repeated NVA and VC attacks and the New City never fell into the hands of the attacking forces. March 1968 Meanings of the Tet Offensive - According to Summers, the Tet Offensive was a VC military failure. There were 45,000 losses out of the 85,000 attacking VC and NVA forces. Hue was captured, but not held. Saigon experienced a week of fighting, but was not taken. The South Vietnamese government did not fall and there were no massive defections to the VC. But Tet marked the beginning of the end of American involvement in Vietnam. Summers argued that the anti-war movement would have attracted more supporters had protesters been less radical. [48] There may be truth in this assumption but Lind made a compelling case for a different explanation based on statistical data (see the item dated June 1973, below).

Tet and its aftermath turned Americans against the War in Vietnam. During the fall and early winter of 1967 American military gleefully reported military successes in the Border Battles. Khe Sanh was identified as another Dien Bien Phu by the press and even President Johnson, we now know, felt the same way. The military assured the press, and as we now know gave Johnson a promise, that Khe Sanh could not be taken. The military version of Vietnam in January 1968 was that the VC and NVA were being ground away and everyone could “see light at the end of the tunnel” (the popular phrase at the time). [49] The American people believed the American military. American politicians believed the military and repeated the military version of Vietnam. Suddenly, the Tet Offensive shattered the version of the Vietnamese war believed by the American people. The military, many American began to believe, was fallible. Most Americans who followed the war closely understood that Giap had been terribly successful at making the American military believe they were winning the War in Vietnam and that the VC and NVA were being pushed to the borders of South Vietnam.

Tet was a turning point in the war for many Americans for another reason. There were graphic pictures of the brutality of war. War is always brutal, but never before had Americans seen the reality of war. Television and still cameras provided graphic pictures of the horrors of war. A particularly moving picture was that of a South Vietnamese officer putting an automatic side arm to the head of an apparent civilian and pulling the trigger. The victim might have been a VC officer, but the American people realized, he might have been an innocent civilian or even a personal enemy of the South Vietnamese officer. Such graphic pictures showed the truth but not the whole truth. Without the whole truth, human imagination could conjure all sorts of possibilities. The typical American viewer carried the image of that assassination in her mind and saw evil in the South Vietnamese officer. Tet turned Americans against the Vietnamese War and made others uneasy about the conflict. As the war progressed, other apparent atrocities were pictured, many merely scenes of war. Khe Sanh proved to be a successfully defended position, but then it was abandoned. Most Americans saw the abandonment of Khe Sanh as another example of the incompetence of the American military. The military leaders bragged that Khe Sanh could not be taken, and after close calls, it was saved. But then Khe Sanh was abandoned. Regardless of the reasons, the perspective of many Americans who followed the war closely, this withdrawal was seen as a tacit admission by the military that Khe Sanh could not be protected during the next monsoon season. This gave the appearance, regardless of reality, that the American military had made another blunder in bragging that Khe Sanh could never be taken. My Lai was a straw that broke the camel's back for millions more Americans. What they imagined, they now thought, really did occur. The Ungers view Tet as a turning point for Lyndon Johnson. Military historians blame the ultimate American failure on Johnson's (and McNamara's) lack of courage and their “criminal” refusal to listen to their own military experts. Summers almost seems pathological in his hatred of McNamara. What these military experts fail to appreciate is that the politicians were responding to the American public. Many Americans saw the Vietnam War as an evil activity with all sides committing acts that were antithetical to “the American way.” These Americans might not have marched in protest, but certainly exerted their influence politically, as politicians were well aware. It was not merely the President and his advisers, it was the Congress and state and local politicians who began to clamor for an American withdrawal after Tet.

The Ungers argue that Tet was a VC defeat in that the VC did not secure their objectives and their guerrilla force came out in the open and was virtually destroyed. On the other hand, ARVN lost 3,000 soldiers, the pacification program was damaged, almost one million new refugees were dumped on the South Vietnamese economy, which was unable to care for existing refugees, and the offensive was a terrible psychology blow to LBJ and the American people. [50]

Lind summarized the Tet Offensive as a “devastating military setback for the communists.” But he also saw Tet as a US defeat because 1) the sensational method of coverage by the American press built the VC into more than they were, 2) Westmoreland's overly optimistic reports were discredited. “The war was winnable - but it was far from being won at a cost acceptable to the American public.” [51]

Luncheon at noon, Luncheon at State Department & LBJ - On February 23 the Joint Chiefs of

February 27, 1968 Staff requested 206,000 additional troops in Vietnam in response to the Tet Offensive. McNamara had been replaced with a new Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford. LBJ attended a working luncheon at the State Department and McNamara was in attendance. Johnson asked for advice regarding the request for 206,000 additional troops for Vietnam. McNamara launched into an attack on the request. He stated that such an increase would require calling up 150,000 army reservists, accelerating the draft, and adding $20 billion to the 1969 fiscal year budget. McNamara noted the military response was always more of everything and he saw no reason to believe additional men would change anything in Vietnam (former requests had not changed the situation). Those present said this meeting was a clear indication that “the ground had shifted. On the drive back to the White House Califano [Joseph Califano, the president's domestic affairs adviser] remarked to McPherson [Harry McPherson, LBJ's favorite speechwriter and trusted counselor]: `It really is over.' The Texan concurred: `You bet it is.'” [52]

Evening Television Walter Cronkite Special on CBS News - In the 1960's, before cable

February 27, 1968 television, there were only three programs providing national news: ABC News, Chet Huntley and David Brinkley on NBC News, and Walter Cronkite on CBS News. By 1968 Walter Cronkite was one of the most powerful men in the United States. He had impeccable integrity, was well respected by all, and a huge percentage of Americans believed what he said. Cronkite was a “hawk” (pro- war) on Vietnam and had visited the war zone before. In the middle of February 1968 he visited Vietnam again. On February 27 he showed film he brought back from Vietnam in a “TV Special.” Cronkite never editorialized on TV, but that night was different. He ended the program with a dramatic confession: after his last visit to Vietnam he had changed his mind. He stated that the only rational option for the US in Vietnam was to negotiate. LBJ watched Cronkite, got up and switched off the TV and said, “`If I've lost Cronkite, I've lost middle America.'” [53]

February 28, 1968 LBJ and Dean Acheson - LBJ invited Dean Acheson, secretary of state under Harry Truman and the man who developed the US Cold War policy of Containment against communist aggression, to the White House. Acheson advised LBJ and had supported America's stance in Vietnam since its inception. On February 28, for the first time, Acheson expressed doubts about US participation in the War. LBJ impressed on Acheson that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the most important military advice available to a president, wanted 206,000 more troops in Vietnam. Acheson said “`With all due respect, Mr. President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff don't know what they are talking about.' When Johnson remarked that it `was a shocking thing to say,' Acheson replied, ` Then maybe you out to be shocked.'” [54]

March 1, 1968 Clark Clifford's Study Group - After the trauma of February 27, Johnson asked Clark Clifford to chair a group to analyze all data on Vietnam and make a recommendations regarding the Joint Chiefs of Staff request and more significantly the US's future involvement in the war. Clifford began working immediately: representatives visited Vietnam, research on all aspects of the war was conducted, the impact of new costs on the national economy was evaluated, and long intense meetings were held where all perspectives were debated. One surprising result of this study was an indication of severe national economic problems if an additional $20 billion were added to the 1969 fiscal budget (See the item dated Luncheon at Noon, February 27, 1968, above). The Clifford study group recommended: 1) that an additional 22,000 troops be sent to Vietnam, 2) a change in American military strategy for Vietnam (described below), 3) continued study for a final response. The strategic recommendation was to abandon the “search-and-destroy” strategy of attrition initiated by William Westmoreland. A new strategy would pull American troops closer to Vietnam cities to protect these centers from VC and NVA attacks. This new strategy would cost much less, require fewer US troops and reduce American casualties. The new American strategy anticipated the South Vietnam military forces would bear more of the burden of fighting. [55]

March 16, 1968 My Lai Massacre - My Lai was a small hamlet in the South Vietnamese province of Quang Ngai. [56] On March 16, 1968 Company C of the 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, of the 23rd Infantry Division (the “Americal Division”) was sent to the area on a search-and-destroy mission. In the days before March 16 the company, commanded by Captain Ernest Medina, had sustained casualties from booby traps and the company was informed that the hamlet was filled with enemy and without civilians. Men of the company encountered livestock and civilians. Looting began, livestock was shot, houses were burned, women were raped, and up to 400 civilian men, women, children, and babies were killed. The most egregious atrocities were committed by a platoon commanded by Lieutenant William Calley. Not all the men of Company C participated in the atrocities. A helicopter pilot flying in association with the search-and-destroy mission, Hugh C. Thompson, Jr. saw the massacre. He used his helicopter to protect women and children at My Lai. His crewmembers, Lawrence Colburn and Glenn U. Andreotta threatened to kill their fellow Americans in Company C. This helicopter crew saved at least one group of My Lai civilians. Colburn visited My Lai in recent years and the reunion with some women he saved on March 16, 1968 has been on television. Capt. Medina and his divisional commander, Maj. General Samuel Koster, did nothing about the My Lai Massacre. The Americal's “dirty little secret” was suppressed. This was the one great atrocity by Americans during the Vietnamese War. Certainly there were individual cases of soldiers shooting prisoners, etc. This sort of action occurs in every war perpetrated by every side. But at My Lai officers not only condoned the atrocities, they participated in them and then superior officers suppressed the massacre. There is nothing that can be said to justify any of these actions. At the same time, the VC used murder, torture, and intimidation regularly and had always done so. These tactics were what made so many peasants support the VC. Not to support the VC would mean death to peasants.

March 25, 1968 Wise Men Meeting - Clark Clifford called meeting of the Wise Men, for March 25, presumably to report the final decision of the study group that had been working since February (See the item dated March 1, 1968). The Wise Men were elder Americans of high reputation in government (secretaries of state and other powerful cabinet members) and the military (World War II generals and Chiefs of Staff such as Maxwell Taylor, Omar D. Bradley and Matthew Ridgway). These men met to advise Johnson on the War. This group had consistently supported Johnson's Vietnam War policies. At the March 25 meeting the group advised Johnson to begin withdrawing from Vietnam. The only members of the group to oppose this advice were: Abe Fortas, a cabinet member and Supreme Court nominee of Johnson's; Robert Murphy, a professional diplomat, acknowledged international expert on foreign affairs, and author of an excellent memoir (A Diplomat Among Warriors); and Generals Taylor and Bradley. Everyone who had close contacts with Lyndon Johnson after this meeting agree that the change in attitude among the Wise Men left Johnson a shaken man.

The day following this meeting, Johnson was informed of the recommendation and said he would not follow it, that the Wise Men had been “brainwashed.” The message was a blow to LBJ, as did the news that George McGovern defeated him in the New Hampshire Presidential Preference Primary. Maxwell Taylor had been one of the Wise Men who did not agree with that group's recommendation. Taylor told others, and probably repeated his observation to LBJ, that he was amazed at opinion about Vietnam. He reported that he recently encountered politicians, diplomats, foreign policy specialists, some military officers and even some conservatives who had shifted from a pro-war (“hawk”) stance to a position opposed to the war (“dove”). [57]

March 30, 1968 LBJ Announced He Will Not Run for Presidency - In March 1968 President Johnson announced a partial cessation to the bombing in Vietnam as a prelude to negotiations. At the same time LBJ announced that he would not be a candidate in the 1968 presidential election but that he would devote all of his time and energy to bringing the Vietnam War to a close. Between 1965 and 1968 the US lost 922 planes in the bombing. North Vietnam had experienced 304,000 fighter bomb sorties by Naval and Air Forces planes and 2,380 B-52 sorties. North Vietnam has sustained damage during Rolling Thunder from 643,000 tons of bombs compared to 454,000 dropped during the entire Korean War and 537,000 dropped in the Pacific Theater of World War II. [58]

General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., replaced General Westmoreland. Abrams graduated from West Point in 1936 and was a tank commander under General George Patton in World War II. He was in the high command structure of the Army during the build-up in Vietnam and deputy to Westmoreland. Abrams oversaw the reduction and final withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam. After the Vietnam War his task was to rebuild the army.

April 1968 Martin Luther King Assassinated - Dr. Martin Luther King was assassinated in Memphis, Tennessee in April 1968. King and Lyndon Johnson had a warm relationship. Johnson, identified in the minds of most Americans as a Southern Senator who opposed substantial changes in civil rights, surprised many. As president he accomplished more for the Civil Rights Movement than did John F. Kennedy. Johnson and King became a formidable pair and together passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. King then became disenchanted with the War in Vietnam and Johnson felt from 1966 on that King had betrayed their friendship. King's position was based on his nonviolent philosophy and on a growing concern that too many black men and too few white men were going to Vietnam. Before his assassination, King recommended civil disobedience and merged his civil rights movement with the anti-war movement.

April 1968 Protest Rally Drew 200,000 in NYC - An anti-war rally in New York attracted 200,000 demonstrators, twice as many as the largest prior protest meeting held in April 1967.

May 1968 Paris Discussions Between USA, North Vietnam Began - The United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam began discussions in Paris. In January 1969 the Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government (the political arm of the Viet Cong) began participation in these talks. These discussions dragged on for five years, but eventually resulted in an agreement in 1973. Meanwhile the war continued.

May 12, 1968 Evacuation of Kham Doc - The NVA began to attack and take (or force the withdrawal from) American outposts in I Corps. These outposts, located along the border between Vietnam and Laos or along the DMZ, were used for surveillance. LRRP or SOG patrols went from these bases into Laos, Cambodia or along the DMZ to monitor NVA activity, particularly along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and Cambodia. These teams might plant beacons used to guide Arch Light raids, and then return during the Arch Light raids and immediately upon the raid's cessation quickly monitor the damage done. Slicks would insert the team at one end of the strip where Arc Light bombs had destroyed everything. The team raced in a zigzag run down the bombed area and the slicks waited at the other end for a quick extraction. Pressure was on the team to provide a body count or the destruction of NVA supplies. By February Kham Doc was the only outpost left for the Americans in I Corps. Kham Doc was located about fifty miles (about eighty klicks) southwest from Da Nang and about six miles (ten klicks) from the Laotian border. [59] On May 10 the NVA overran an outpost of Kham Doc. By May 12 the NVA attacks against Kham Doc could no longer be sustained and slicks were called in to evacuate Kham Doc. The NVA fire was too intense for slicks to carry out the evacuation and fixed wing transports were sent (C-123 Providers and C-130 Hercules). These transports heroically landed under intense enemy fire. Air Force fighters put down a massive amount of ordinance to subdue the NVA fire. Even so, one transport was shot down as it took off with a load of Montagnard dependents and all perished. The last transport took off and three Americans were left on the ground by mistake. These three had M-16s and a good bit of ammunition, and began firing with the intention of taking as many NVA with them as possible while they were alive. The transports discovered that the three Americans were left on the side of the airstrip. As NVA swarmed into Kham Duc, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph M. Jackson landed his C-130 as the NVA ran alongside the plane firing into it. The three Americans sprinted across the runway and jumped on board as Jackson gunned his engines for a successful take-off. For this action Jackson won the Congressional Medal of Honor, the only transport pilot to win this highest award for valor available to an American serviceman. The loss of Kham Doc was a severe blow to American and ARVN intelligence and an indication of the growing power of the NVA and VC.

June 5, 1968 Robert Kennedy Assassinated - Robert F. Kennedy was Attorney General in his brother's administration and remained in that position until a smooth transition could be affected. He then was elected US Senator from the state of New York and served in the Senate, supporting Johnson's war efforts from 1964 until early in 1967. At that time Kennedy called for a coalition government in South Vietnam as a potential solution to the conflict. He took personal responsibility for sending Americans to Vietnam and stated that he and his brother were wrong on the issue. It appeared as if Kennedy might challenge Johnson, a sitting president, for the Democratic Party Nomination in 1968. Following Johnson's withdrawal from that race, Kennedy increased his political activities and quickly became the front-runner for the nomination in August. On June 5, 1968 Kennedy was in California thanking his supporters for his victory in the California Democratic presidential preference primary when he was assassinated.

Michael Lind, in his 1999 work, Vietnam The Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America's Most Disastrous Military Conflict, uses recent material found in the Soviet archives to levy a serious charge against Robert Kennedy. Lind claims documents in the Soviet archives show the Robert Kennedy began secret communications with the Soviet leaders after JFK was assassinated and while he served LBJ as Attorney General. Kennedy, Lind claims, undercut LBJ and represented himself as the person who would rejuvenate JFK's policies after he (Robert Kennedy) was elected president in 1968. Lind believed these duplicitous actions were far worst than Nixon's secret dealings with the South Vietnamese government during the 1968 presidential election or his “conniving” with Greek military dictatorship before he was president. Lind wrote that Robert Kennedy “was guilty of acts of insubordination and political treachery with few if any parallels in American history.” [60]

August 1968 Riots at Democratic National Convention (Chicago) - The 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago was the scene of riots and huge demonstrations. [61] On August 28 ten thousand anti-war demonstrators battled Chicago police and national guard units. CIA undercover agents were in the crowd, although federal law specified that CIA agents could not operate within the United States. Undercover agents of US military intelligence units were also present. As they were hit with tear gas and beaten with clubs and rifle butts the crowd chanted “THE WHOLE WORLD IS WATCHING.” All three television networks had cameras and reporters covering the events on the streets of Chicago. Inside the convention Chicago Richard Daley felt that the Chicago police were insulted. As his mouth moved, the cameras closed in on him and most TV viewers thought he shouted certain well- known Anglo-Saxon obscenities to the speaker. Even though hundreds of demonstrators were arrested, thousands gathered the next day in Grant Park to demonstrate. Again police beat and arrested middle class college age demonstrators before TV cameras. Dick Gregory, a nationally known comedian and anti-war activist, invited a group of demonstrators to his home on the South Side of Chicago. Police barred this group's way and the event was featured on television. Vice President Hubert Humphrey had a peace plan in the proposed party platform and this provoked a bitter floor fight. President Johnson asked for a compromise that denied the Vice President his plan but gave the President a better position from which to negotiate peace.

November 1968 Bombing of North Vietnam Halted - In November 1968, desperate to negotiate a peace in his last months in office, President Johnson stopped the bombing of North Vietnam. Negotiations seemed to be nearing a possible agreement in Paris. Richard Mann claims that Richard Nixon used Madame Anna Chennault, widow of World War II General Claire Chennault, to communicate confidentially with South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu. Thieu, according to Mann, had agreed to LBJ's negotiations with North Vietnamese representatives in Paris. After Nixon promised to get a better deal for Thieu, he withdrew his approval of the negotiations. Mann sees Nixon's actions almost as treason, using secret contacts with a foreign leader to undermine the United States government's foreign policy. Nixon, according to Mann, called LBJ and swore he was innocent of any involvement with Thieu. Mann said this made LBJ furious since he had illegal wire taps that recorded Nixon's conversations which proved to LBJ Nixon was guilty, not innocent. Mann claims Nixon paid Thieu back by blindly supporting him even with this support was not in the best interest of the United States. [62]

January 10, 1969 Sweden Recognized North Vietnam - Sweden was the first Western government to recognize the North Vietnamese government. At the same time attempts were made to recreate the DMZ as a neutral zone. US and ARVN forces unilaterally entered the DMZ and ended its neutrality. [63]

February 1969 NVA & VC Escalated Attacks - Communist forces in Vietnam escalate

Footnotes

[1] Gilbert, 297.

[2] Gilbert, 297.

[3] Lind, 17. [4] Irwin Unger and Debi Unger, LBJ: A Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1999), 340. Hereafter cited as Unger.

[5] Unger, 341.

[6] Gilbert, 325.

[7] Lind, XVI, XVII.

[8] Hammond, 26.

[9] Hammond, 26.

[10] Hammond, 30.

[11] Mann, 356.

[12] Mann, 577-581.

[13] Hammond, 34.

[14] Lind, 17.

[15] Unger, 341.

[16] Unger, 342.

[17] Hammond, 35.

[18] Hammond, 35.

[19] Gilbert, 325.

[20] Gilbert, 317.

[21] Hammond, 32-33.

[22] Summers, 99.

[23] Gilbert, 317, 327.

[24] Hammond, 45.

[25] Hammond, 51.

[26] Summers, 101.

[27] Summers, 101.

[28] Hammond, 44. [29] Summers, 101-02.

[30] Summers, 104-06.

[31] Gilbert, 338.

[32] Gilbert, 328.

[33] Lind, 18.

[34] Lind 18.

[35] Lind, 18.

[36] Summers, 110-11.

[37] Hammond, 59-62.

[38] Summers, 111-12. Summers was wounded in this battle.

[39] Lind, 19.

[40] Summer, 118-19.

[41] Lind, 21.

[42] Lind, 21.

[43] Summers, 124-25. Summers included excellent statistical data with a description of CORDS.

[44] Summers, 149.

[45] Summers, 121.

[46] Unger 447.

[47] Summers, 132-33.

[48] Summers, 158.

[49] Summers, 130-135. Summers presented the military version of the meaning of Tet.

[50] Unger, 446-50.

[51] Lind, 21.

[52] Unger, 450.

[53] Unger, 448. [54] Unger, 451.

[55] Unger, 452.

[56] Summers, 141.

[57] Unger, 453.

[58] Summers, 96.

[59] Summers, 145

[60] Lind, 134.

[61] Summers, 159.

[62] Mann, 620-622.

[63] Gilbert, 400.

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