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Regional integration preferences in the EU neighbourhood Assessing EU relations with its Eastern neighbours at macro and micro regional levels

Viktoriya Khasson i ii REGIONAL INTEGRATION PREFERENCES

IN THE EU NEIGHBOURHOOD.

Assessing EU relations with its Eastern neighbours at macro and micro regional levels.

Viktoriya Khasson Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Hendrik Vos Centre for EU Studies, Ghent University Academic Year 2015-2016 Dissertation submitted with the aim to pursue the degree of “Doctor in Political Science”

iii Abstract

Applying the New Regionalism Approach, this research places EU relations with its Eastern neighbourhood into a regional perspective. In contrast with the EU-centred theoretical approaches, which focus on EU policy analysis, this inquiry aims to explain Europeanisation in the EU-neighbourhood countries by studying the factors that are pertinent to their domestic environment. To this end the research is built around the notion of Regional Integration Preferences (RIPs) from liberal international relations theory and dwells into the transitional nature of post-Soviet regimes as a main factor driving regionalisation. It is argued that in the context of regime transition, functionalist logic proves limited for explaining regional strategies adopted by the regionalisation actors. Rather, one should also consider the presence of regime survival interests behind the policy choices of political leaders. The analysis is pursued at two levels – macro and micro providing a comprehensive overview of EU-neighbourly relations. Each level is represented by a case study of an appropriate EU policy, e.g., the Eastern Partnership Initiative (EaP) and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument Cross Border Cooperation Programme (ENPI CBC) respectively. Both cases have demonstrated the correlation with the transition factor, although to different degrees. It is stronger in the case of EaP, where real progress has been achieved only alongside the advancement in regime transition, while the strategies of ‘virtual’ Europeanisation were used where the ruling governments in post-Soviet transitional (non- or semi-democratic) regimes wanted to foster their regime-survival interests. At the micro regional level, the transition factor appeared to be less direct, e.g. not linked to the calculations of regionalisation actors, but as a structural limitation (limited mobilization opportunities) to the capacity of politically powerful actors to steer regionalisation processes in the cross-border context. In conclusion, insights on relevance of RIPs concept for assessing the EU neighbourly relations and for the future research on regionalism in non- democracies are provided.

iv Besluit

De onderhavige opzoeking plaatst de EU-relaties met onze Oosterburen in een regionaal perspectief. In tegenstelling tot de EU geconcentreerde theoretische benaderingen, die gericht zijn op een analyse van het EU-beleid, heeft het huidig onderzoek tot doel de Europeanisering in de buurlanden van de EU te verklaren, door de studie van de factoren die relevant zijn voor hun binnenlandse omgeving. Hiervoor is het onderzoek opgebouwd rond het concept van regionale integratie voorkeuren van de liberale theorieën en blijft het stilstaan bij de traditionele aard van het post-Sovjet regime als belangrijke drijvende factor van de regionalisering. Bewezen is dat in het kader van de overgangsregeling de functionalistische logica slechts een beperkt toelichting levert aan de verklaring van de regionale strategieën aangenomen door regionaliseringsactoren. Men dient eerder rekening te houden met de overlevingsdrang van de regimes en de politieke keuzes van hun leiders. De analyse werd op twee niveaus uitgevoerd, macro en micro, elk vertegenwoordigd door een casestudie van een passend EU-beleid. Bv.: Het Oostelijk partnerschap (EaP) en het Europees Nabuurschaps- en partnerschapsinstrument (ENPI). Deze respectievelijke programma’s verstrekken elk op hun wijze een uitgebreid overzicht van de EU – nabuurschapsbetrekkingen. Beide gevallen tonen de correlatie met de overgangsfactor aan, zij het dan in verschillende mate. Het is meer uitgesproken in het geval van de EaP, waar echte vooruitgang is geboekt, weliswaar enkel met betrekking tot het overgangsregime, terwijl de strategieën van “virtuele” europeanisering werden gebruikt door de heersende regeringen in de periode van de post-Sovjet overgangsregimes (niet- of semi- democratisch) om zodoende hun overlevingsdrang te voeden. Op micro regionaal vlak is de overgangsfactor minder uitgesproken, bv.: niet gelinkt aan de berekeningen van regionaliseringsactoren, maar als een structurele beperking (beperkte mobilisatie kansen) van de rol van de politiek machtige actoren om de grensoverschrijdende regionaliseringsprocessen bij te sturen.

v vi Contents

List of figures and tables...... 3 List of abbreviations...... 4 Introduction...... 5

Chapter 1. The New Regionalism Approach as a theoretical basis for studying regionalism in the Eastern EU Neighbourhood....12

Chapter 2. Identifying the research problem. Post-Soviet regionalisation in the Eastern EU Neighbourhood...... 17 2.1 The development of Post-Soviet regionalisation: structures and processes...... 17 2.2 Micro-level regionalisation...... 30 2.3 Conclusion...... 34

Chapter 3. The conceptual framework...... 36 3.1 Defining RIPs...... 36 3.2 European Integration Preferences as emerging social practices...... 39 3.3The endogenous factor as an independent variable...... 45 3.3.1 The macro level: the interests of the ruling elites’ in post-Soviet transitional regimes 45 3.3.2 The micro level: regional mobilisation of the CBC actors 49

Chapter 4. Research design and methodology...... 52 4.1 The case study of RIPs formation in the EN countries...... 53 4.2 Data collection and analysis...... 54

1 Chapter 5. Formation of European Integration Preferences in the Context of Macro Level Regionalisation. The Case of the EaP ...... 57 Introduction...... 57 5.1 RIPs formation in the post-Soviet transitional regimes...... 57 5.2 The European Integration Preferences as practices of the EU- neighbour relations within the EaP initiative...... 70 5.2.1 The EU policy instruments: towards a new regional approach under the EaP? 71 5.2.2 The emerging social structures: policy implementation and discursive practices 76 5.3 Explaining EIPs: regime transition and elites’ interests...... 87 5.4 Conclusion...... 99

Chapter 6. Formation of European Integration Preferences in the Context of Micro-Level Regionalisation. The case of ENPI CBC...... 102 Introduction...... 102 (Neighbourhood Programmes 2004-2006 Interreg IIIA / Phare CBC / Tacis CBC and ENPI CBC 2007-2013) 103 Source: European Commission website. 103 6.1 Opportunity structures for regional mobilisation in the post-Soviet EU neighbourhood...... 103 6.2 European Integration Preferences as practices of the EU-neighbour relations within ENPI CBC...... 105 6.2.1 The EU policy instruments: the ENPI CBC as a framework for inclusive, partner-oriented practices 105 6.2.2 The emerging social practices within the ENPI CBC Programmes 111 6.3 Explaining EIPs of CBC actors: domestic opportunities for regional mobilization in the Eastern Neighbourhood...... 118 6.4 Conclusion...... 122

Chapter 7. Concluding remarks...... 124 Annex...... 130 Bibliography...... 134

2 List of figures and tables

Figure 1. Theoretical approaches to studying the EU relations with the Eastern Neighbourhood countries Figure 2. Consolidated integration indices of the Eurasian integration 2002-2008 Figure 3. If you were to choose between the union with Russia and Accession to the EU, which would you choose? (per cent) Figure 4. List of Euroregions on the post-Soviet space Figure 5. The regionalisation process and formation of the European integration preferences in the Eastern EU neighbourhood Figure 6. Endogenous factors of RIPs formation in transitional regimes Figure 7. European Integration preferences of the ruling elites in the Eastern neighbourhood 2013 Figure 8. The ENPI CBC Programmes in the Eastern Neighbourhood Figure 9. Composition of regional / local actors in the Neighbourhood countries Figure 10. Applications and approved projects by objective. ENPI CBC First Call for Proposals

Table 1. Regional cooperation structures in the area of the EU Eastern neighbourhood Table 2. The EaP. Multilateral track. Institutional progress Table 3. Policy implementation progress by EaP country 2009-2013 Table 4. Discursive practices by the ENs Table 5. Democratic transition indexes across the Eastern Neighbourhood from 2004 to 2013 Table 6. Implementation of the Neighbourhood Programmes 2004-2006 (Interreg IIIA/ Phare CBC /Tacis CBC) and the ENPI CBC 2007-2013 First Call for Proposals

3 List of abbreviations

CACO Central Asian Cooperation Organization CEECs Central and Eastern European Countries CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CORLEAP Council of Regional and Local Authorities of the Eastern Partnership CSTO Common Security Treaty Organization EaP Eastern Partnership EASTNEST PA Eastern Partnership Parliamentary Assembly EIP European Integration Preferences EN Eastern Neighbourhood ENP European Neighbourhood Policy ENPI CBC European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument Cross- Border Cooperation EEU Eurasian Economic Union EU European Union EurAsEC Eurasian Economic Union FTA Free Trade Union INTERREG Inter-regional cooperation programme JMA Joint Managing Authority NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization RCBI Regional Capacity Building Initiative PHARE Reconstruction Aid to Poland and Hungary RIPs Regional Integration Preferences PRAG Practical Guide to Contract Procedures for EC External Actions SES Single European Space SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization TACIS Technical Assistance to CIS countries USA United States of America UNM United National Movement WTO World Trade Organization

4

Introduction

When the EU border reached into post-Soviet space after the Eastern enlargements of 2004 and 2007, there appeared a new subject in the EU’s external policies – neighbourly relations. While neighbourhood policies were in no way new to the EU’s foreign policy, and had been a central part of it since the end of the Cold War, the notion of a ‘neighbour’ did not exist in European jargon. It was only the need to stop the consequent waves of enlargements to the East while at the same time structuring relations with the newly acquired peripheries that called upon the definition of a European Neighbourhood Policy1 (ENP) in 2004. The policy marked the EU’s ambition to become a more active player in the area of its direct vicinity by extending the zone of peace, prosperity and stability beyond its borders and creating a ring of friends and well-governed countries (European Council, 2003). Unable to offer membership perspective to the new Eastern neighbours (at least in the observable future), the EU had to come up with new incentives that were attractive enough to ensure compliance with EU requirements. Being largely criticised for its asymmetrical character, with Brussels imposing its policy on its neighbours, the ENP has seen various policy adaptations, including the introduction of the notion of ‘special relationship’ as the guiding principle of the EU’s relations with its neighbours.2 In addition, new region-specific policies, e.g. the Union for the Mediterranean (2008) and the Eastern Partnership (2009) have been launched in an attempt to redress the perceived asymmetry in existing policy by promoting principles such as ‘privileged partnership’ and ‘joint ownership’ through means of regional cooperation on a multilateral basis between the Union and its neighbourhood regions, as well as within the regions themselves. However, the potential of these policies remained largely unexplored and regionalism at the EU’s borders has been of a marginal importance in EU foreign policy making (Söderbaum and Van Langenhove, 2006; Scott, 2006; Cottey, 2012). A decade after the launch of the ENP, there remains confusion regarding the nature of the ‘special relationship’ between the EU and the countries covered by the ENP, e.g. the kind of integration arrangement that would stop short of accession but go beyond simple associational types of relations (Bechev, 2011). Most

5 importantly, reluctance to comply with the EU’s conditionality and the low speed of reforms and political turmoil across the neighbourhood, old and new, is contesting the EU’s transformative power and remains a major concern for the EU policy-makers and academics. It is also becoming clear that the EU should be aware that the results of integration would depend largely on the partners themselves. For example, as pointed out by the EU Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, Štefan Füle, “The more ambitious and willing partners are, the more concrete results can be achieved.”3 In the same manner, as it is stated by the European Commission (2014) in the Annual Progress report for ENP, “while willingness to reform cannot be imposed from outside, the EU has a special responsibility to support those partners that are engaged in the difficult and demanding path of transition towards democracy and more inclusive societies”. Against this background an overarching study of domestic factors influencing the European integration strategies of the EU neighbours seems timely. To this end, the aim of the present research is to analyse the Regional Integration Preferences (RIPs) in the Eastern EU neighbour countries, comprising Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The concept of RIPs clearly reflects the objective of pointing out an active element (a strategy) and, therefore, a steering of integration processes by EU neighbours (often deprived from actor capacity by the EU-centric nature of research). The use of this concept also permits an extension of analysis beyond the issue of compliance by considering those factors influencing the decisions and strategies of the EU´s Eastern neighbours (EN) in pursuing European integration, enabling, in such a way, a comprehensive view on EU-neighbour relations. In fact, the issue has never been addressed as an independent research subject. While extensive research has been conducted on the ENP’s shortcomings, it only considers the matter of compliance with EU policy, and stops short of explaining the decisions and strategies of the Eastern EU neighbours in pursuing European integration. Furthermore, the existing research in the field of post-Soviet studies has scarcely mentioned the European dimension, being focused instead on the dynamics within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Still, both disciplines provide valuable insights on the subject. For example, EU scholars have made attempts to address the issue of political developments in the EU neighbour states, while focusing mainly on Soviet legacies as contradicting the nature of European integration and the role of the external factors; e.g. Russia’s renewed efforts to re-establish its influence in the near

6 abroad (Batt et al., 2003; Kempe, 2003; Hayoz and Jesien 2005; Lynch, 2005; Flenley, 2008; Radchuk, 2011). The most prominent results within EU studies, however, have been achieved within the governance approach, focused on analysing the process of extension of the EU boundaries beyond its borders in different spheres (geopolitical, institutional, transactional and cultural) and the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion (Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Lavenex, 2004; 2008; Lavenex and Schimmelfenning, 2009; Dimitrova and Dragneva, 2009). It is argued that the projection of the EU’s legal order onto its neighbours under the ENP is burdened by the absence of adequate institutional inclusion, e.g. the transformation of the institutional boundary. In this regard, different types (or modes) of governance could be applied, ranging from softer to harder ones, providing various modes of interactions and institutional affiliation (Gänzle, 2008). In connection with these findings, the issue of ‘variable geometry’ has also attracted the attention of researchers within the discussion on alternative (to full membership) or ‘partial’ forms of integration as a way of reconciling the EU’s ‘widening’ and ‘deepening’ dilemma. This builds on such examples as the European Economic Area and the Northern Dimension (Tassinari, 2005; Browning, 2005; 2007; Berbec, 2010). It has been demonstrated that the EU tends to exhibit what is called by Browning and Joenniemi (2003), a “reluctance to regionalise” in its relations with the direct vicinity in favour of more traditional, hierarchical type of relations based on gate-keeping (Bechev, 2011; Kochenov, 2011). In a similar vein, Cottey (2012) concludes that despite a relatively large number of EU policies and initiatives that seek to promote multilateral cooperation with its direct neighbourhood, the impact of these efforts has been limited in terms of substantive cooperation and the effect on neighbouring states. He also argues that multilateral cooperation in the EU neighbourhood depends to a large extent on expectations of what the EU can and cannot do, stressing inter- subjectivity in the EU-EN relations. He suggests that the EU should be aware not only of its own capacity but also of the legitimation of other actors. Increasingly, EU scholars agree that in the absence of the ‘accession carrot,’ the study of EU neighbourly relations requires a particular theoretical framework reflecting the ‘mutually constitutive’ nature of this relationship, e.g. including an analysis of the EU’s attraction, on the one hand, and neighbour countries’ own priorities, on the other (Bosse and Korosteleva-Polgasse, 2009; Korosteleva 2012; Weber, Smith and Baun, 2007; Kochenov, 2011; Zwartjes et al., 2012).

7 In a meantime, a number of important questions remain unanswered, such as:  Why has the progress of European integration in the Eastern neighbourhood been so uneven and slow?  Can EU policy become a genuine integration project embracing the whole of the Eastern neighbourhood on a regional basis?  Will EU policy be directed exclusively at political elites or will it also reach out to broader society in neighbour countries, and which may be more successful?

Figure 1. Theoretical approaches to studying EU relations with the Eastern Neighbourhood countries

Theory Research subject Main issue

EU policy CIS states European integration EU policy’s impact studies CIS studies Institutional structures and measuring the degree of integration New Regionalism Focus on actors and Approach processes

In the same way as the European integration studies prove limited for studying EU-EN relations due to their insufficient consideration of neighbours’ preferences, the CIS studies are also failing to provide meaningful explanations. Despite being a prominent field of academic research that ever since the end of the Cold War has produced a large body of academic literature dealing with integration within the CIS and other regional structures created on the ruins of the USSR, it does not provide an adequate conceptual toolbox to reflect the complexity of regional integration processes on the post-Soviet space. As noted by Dragneva (2004, pp. 280-281), there are, generally, three broad perspectives that can be discerned within the literature of CIS integration. The first is the ‘don’t know’ perspective that recognizes the difficulty of identifying any recognizable (by Western standards) patterns of CIS integration, pointing out the need to deal with the perplexity of on-going developments. A second group of authors describe the CIS in terms of tensions between its members’ minimalist and maximalist positions, e.g. sceptics seeking only political cooperation and other adherents of more

8 advanced and structured forms of integration, including supranational elements. Finally, a third perspective approaches the issue from the point of view of the success or failure of CIS integration, evaluating it primarily by reference to a chosen normative model (and arguing most frequently for the ultimate death of the CIS project). The major limitation of the existing approaches from the point of view of the present research, however, is that they all perceive post-Soviet integration mainly in terms of state-driven regional arrangements and deals, security complexes and economic interdependence. The logic of state sovereignty is generally seen as predominant, looming over all social and economic spheres. While these features are certainly characteristic of post-Soviet integration, it should be acknowledged that the picture is more complex than a set of depersonalised institutional structures. Alongside the controversial top-down regional projects, which do not lead to any genuine integration, various other regionalisation processes are developing simultaneously in different directions, often contesting the course of official policy. Furthermore, the choices of regional strategies taken by political actors cannot be explained outside the social context they are embedded in. In the first place, this is the on-going processes of post-Soviet transformation, including the gradual development of democratic institutions and civil society. Furthermore, neither the ruling elites nor societies are developing in an international vacuum, but are exposed to different external influences, be it general characteristics of the globalised international system, geopolitical constellations, regional actors, or ideas. As noted by Van Langenhove (2012, p.21), building regions is a process that involves both local and global ideas and practices. These issues remained for long largely outside the scope of existing CIS research. It is only more recently, in the context of the European integration process expanding over the European continent, and the rising Russia´s Eurasian ambitions, that regional scholars started to address the post-Soviet space by looking at the integrity of the evolving political, economic and societal processes (Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2013; Dutkiewicz and Sakwa, 2014; Lane and Samokhvalov, 2015; Malfliet, Verpoest and Vinokurov, 2007; Molchanov, 2015). The post-Soviet space is increasingly seen as a contested region with undefined borders squeezed between (at least) two parallel integrations processes. Furthermore, the emerging dynamic in the Russia-EU shared neighbourhood, as noted by Samokhvalov (2015, p. 1371), “is more complex than a

9 mere ideological or geopolitical competition”. It becomes important to understand what are the major driving forces behind the integration process and why the preferences of major political actors incline in one or another direction. In this light, and considering the abovementioned limitations of the traditional theoretical approaches (as shown by Figure 1), the study of regional integration preferences (RIPs) in the Eastern EU neighbourhood envisaged here, will be based on the New Regionalisms Approach (NRA) as a more prominent way of dealing with the post-Soviet regionalism. It allows a development of a more appropriate theoretical basis for encountering both fields of study, the European integration process, on the one hand, and post-Soviet regionalism, on the other. Both fields can be brought together within a single conceptual framework by focusing on processes and actors rather than institutions and formal regionalist projects. In fact, the NRA approach was crafted specifically to reflect the growing diversity and pluralism of emerging regional arrangements worldwide, and especially, outside Europe. Regionalism in the post- Cold War era is seen not only as an inter-governmental phenomenon, but also as an inter-societal one influenced by both domestic and transnational factors. The NRA also permits the application of a multi-level perspective that ensures a comprehensive understanding of regionalisation processes emerging between the EU and its EN. While the NRA has not been consistently applied to the study of post-Soviet regionalism, it appears suitable for the purpose of this research, particularly as it finds explanatory power in the analysis of endogenous factors of regionalisation, e.g. allowing a study of how the peculiar transitional nature of post-Soviet neighbours influences the regional choices and emerging processes. As such, the research can provide new evidence about the nature of post-Soviet regional integration and more generally about regionalism in transitional states (and non-democracies). At the same time, approaching the EU neighbourly relations from the NRA perspective contributes to the understanding of what is called the inter-regional dimension, e.g. coexistence of various regionalist projects on the European continent. This is in line with the recent tendency in regionalism studies to be less Eurocentric, e.g. to avoid seeing the EU as a prescribed model, which can be applied in other places in the world (and especially so, in its neighbourhood).4 Having presented the theoretical underpinnings from the NRA, we will proceed by identifying the research problem by considering the nature of post-Soviet regionalisation (chapter two). Chapter three will outline a conceptual framework by

10 defining the European Integration Preferences (EIPs) as emerging (shared) social practices of regional governance in the Eastern EU neighbourhood and by making operationalization of the endogenous factors of post-Soviet regionalisation in terms of the transitional nature of post-Soviet political regimes. Chapter four will provide a methodological basis for conducting the research while the empirical study will be presented in the following two chapters (five and six), each dealing with a case study on EIPs formation in the particular context of relations with the EU at the macro- and micro- regional levels. Ultimately, the findings will be summarised in a concluding chapter while also providing insights on relevance of RIPs concept for assessing the EU neighbourly relations and for the future research on regionalism in non- democracies.

11 Chapter 1. The New Regionalism Approach as a theoretical basis for studying regionalism in the Eastern EU Neighbourhood

While embarking on a regional perspective for explaining EU relations with its neighbours, it should be noted that regionalism remains a contested concept. Common understanding has been reached only to that there are no ‘natural’ or ‘given’ regions, but only those that are interpreted (politically constructed or contested, and thus, (re)defined according to the particular problem or question under investigation). No single definition of ‘region’ is accepted as definitive, preventing coalescence around a single analytical model. As noted by Warleigh-Lack and Van Langenhove (2010, p. 546), the processes by which regions are created are characterised in different ways in different literatures, and the extent to which regional integration can be used as a catch-all term is hotly disputed. More recent efforts of understanding individual regions and regionalism in general through the comparative work, in turn, are still characterised by an ambiguity of what constitutes the research agenda, leaving a great margin of discrepancy about what should be compared and how (Fioramonti, 2012, p.152).

According to Hettne (2005), the emergence of different theoretical concepts in regionalist studies should be seen in the context of particular periods in the development of regionalism in recent history. Hence, the concept of regional integration appears in Europe after the Second World War. It is focused on trans-local processes of market integration while also mentioning social integration and political integration (usually referred to as neo-functionalist theories) and is often defined against the concept of regional cooperation (Haas, 1964) by emphasising the limits to state sovereignty. Various regionalist theories that emerged during this period describe the European adventure of integration. Significantly, none of them performed well when applied to non-Western areas; this paved the way to the emergence of a more appropriate, or ‘workable’ approach for the study of non-Western regions, which became known as comparative regional integration studies (or comparative regionalism) (Katzenstein, 1996; Genna and De Lombaerde, 2010; Acharya, 2012). By the end of the 1980s, the concepts of regionalism and regionalisation had emerged as a response to the need for a new framework to study the phenomenon of regionalism

12 in the context of growing interdependence and pressures to the Westphalian state system where governments increasingly returned to regional cooperation (and cooperative decision-making) as a crucial means to strengthen their vanishing sovereignty and to exercise shared authority (Hettne, Inotai and Sunkel, 2000; Hettne, 2005). The new global order implied that an extensive network of cross-border relations started to spread over such diverse fields as economics, the environment, education and healthcare, where there existed a multitude of actors beyond and below the state that increasingly acted alongside it (including sub-national territories as well as international organizations) (Farrell, 2005, p. 4).

According to the new theoretical perspective called the New Regionalism Approach, in such circumstances the research subject could no longer be limited to traditional fields of integration such as free trade arrangements and security regimes, e.g. the ‘old’ regionalism, but had to reflect regionalism as a comprehensive phenomenon characterized by several interrelated dimensions, many interacting levels of society and numerous actors (Hettne, 2005). Regionalism started to be seen not solely as an inter-governmental but as an inter-societal phenomenon. Accordingly, the distinction had to be made between regionalism, which stands for particular integration policies, strategies or projects leading to formal institution-building, and regionalisation, which is less formal and reflects rather an autonomous (political, economic or social) process driven by market forces, private trade, the flow of investment, or the increasing movement of people.5 In other words, apart from being consciously planned (by formal, top-down and state-driven policies), regionalism can be equally caused by various spontaneous movements, e.g. real bottom-up, market- and society- induced processes that question the territorial integrity, sovereignty or legitimacy of the nation state (Hettne, 2004). These multiple channels and complex social networks by which ideas, political attitudes, and ways of thinking are spread from one area to another, leading to the emergence of new identities and to the creation of transnational civil societies and of cross-governmental, multi-level and multi-player alliances across recognized territorial borders, are often called bottom-up or ‘soft regionalism’ (Hurrell, 1995; Oman, 1994). The growing diversity and pluralism of emerging regional arrangements worldwide suggested that non-Western regions have their own functional objectives (Koehane and Nye, 1972). In particular, the New Regionalism Approach (NRA) emphasised the

13 peculiarities of regionalism beyond the traditional European context by analysing the driving forces in the formation of regions instead of the traditional focus on measuring the degree of integration within formalised regional groupings.6 Its research objective is to identify the evolving processes and to examine how these processes shape regional communities, who are the region-builders, and what form of regionalist project is under construction (Schulz, Söderbaum and Ojendal, 2001, p.13). In fact, the NRA is focused first and foremost on the study of processes and considers regionalism as a political phenomenon shaped by political actors, with the major roles attributed to agency, actors and strategies.7 The ambition of the NRA (at the present stage of theory formation) is to contribute to global social theory by creating a broad and deep interdisciplinary and holistic understanding of what characterizes regionalisation processes in various parts of the world.8 To this end, the approach is perceiving as a ‘middle ground’ between area studies on the one hand, and ‘hard’ social science as reflected in the use of ‘laboratory’ comparisons on the other), while the empirical research is guided by issues formulated within an eclectic definition of what the ‘new’ regionalism is about. The predominant theory is that any analysis should avoid fixed or one-dimensional definitions of regions as well as narrow or simplified critiques of instrumental state strategies, regional organizations, security alliances or trading blocks.

To the contrary, the consideration of regionalism as a political phenomenon underlines the socially constructed (or de-constructed) nature of regionalisation,9 meaning that interests and identities are shaped in the process of interaction and inter-subjective understandings, while the relevance of ‘hard’ structures is limited (in accordance with Wendt’s 1992 definition of structure, which has no existence or causal power apart from process). In this research the focus of the NRA on processes and political actors allows for the conceptualisation of EU-neighbour relations not just in terms of integration (political and economic) projects, but as a more comprehensive process represented by a complex set of interactions at different levels corresponding to the multi-level nature of Europeanisation.

Secondly, as a consequence from the first point, the two processes – regionalism and regionalisation – should be given equal attention in tying together state as well as market and society actors from above and from below, within a range of areas

14 including material factors, ideas and identities, e.g. including top-down and bottom-up (or soft) regionalism.10

Furthermore, regionalist studies usually distinguish between two major types of interactions as corresponding to macro- and micro-regionalism. While macro- regionalism can be defined as taking place between the state and the global level (creating large territorial units of the global system), micro-regionalism can be located between the national and the local levels and can be either sub-national or cross-border in character. (In fact, non-state actors are often analysed in the literature on regionalism precisely in the context of micro-regions.) Micro-regions are often defined by networks of state and non-state actors and even interpersonal transaction networks, ethnic or family networks, religious ties, etc. (Mittelman, 2000; Perkmann and Sum, 2002). In its cross-border variety, micro-regionalism also implies networks of transactions and collaboration across national boundaries. It is important to note that micro-regionalism may emerge as an alternative or in opposition to the challenged state and sometimes also in competition with state-led regionalism (Jessop, 2003, p. 92). In this regard, Söderbaum (2005) points out the importance of links between macro- and micro-regionalism, suggesting that “sometimes the state has more autonomy with regard to social forces and at other times the global markets penetrate more deeply”. The author notes that in mainstream academic literature, the two types of regionalism, macro and micro, have been treated as a sharp dichotomy, with macro- regions created from above and micro-regions from below. However, he suggests that micro-regionalism and macro-regionalism are parts of the same phenomenon. All regions at each of these levels are driven by both exogenous and endogenous logics and, furthermore, influence each other in top-down and bottom-up directions. Thus, in order to generate an explanation of regional phenomena in a comprehensive sense, “the links between micro and macro regionalism should be considered. In the theoretical point of view, this means that we need to transcend the state as the main spatial category in the analysis and insert it into a more multi-scalar political landscape. We need to conceptualize not only the space but also the scales of regionalism” (ibid).

Thirdly, the interrelated global/regional/national/local levels should not be separated analytically. As noted by Hettne and Söderbaum (2000, p. 458), in contrast to the exaggerated emphasis on globalization pertinent to the studies of ‘old’ regionalism, the

15 focus should rather be made on the globalization–regionalisation dynamic and on how the changing world order makes the process of regionalisation possible or even necessary. While ‘new’ regionalism is associated with (or caused by) a multitude of often interrelated structural changes in the global system, the regional level should be seen not as analytically separate, but as reflecting the same kind of complexity that characterizes globalization, e.g. a greater pluralism of actors, a new range of issues, multilevel or hybrid forms of governance.11

Finally, opposing a focus on outside-in (systemic) and interdependence–driven (regional level) explanations within the conventional integration theories, the ‘new’ regionalism perspective pays greater attention to the inside-out (domestic) explanations. In particular, major effort has been made to transcend the state-centrism of ‘old’ regionalism theories by ‘unpacking the state’ and including several levels of analysis (Fioramonti, 2012). In fact, already within the studies of European integration, the analysis of societal and institutional factors in domestic politics concludes that, apart from cost-benefit calculations, integration depends on the preferences of national policy makers and interest groups.12 Together with growing evidence of regional integration in various parts of the world, it became widely accepted that regionalist movements are often driven by different functional pursuits than in Western Europe and responding to a different set of converging interests (Acharya, 2012). The understanding of these distinctive approaches to integration and peculiar impulses required in turn a whole new framework for considering such issues as state coherence, regime democratization, convergence, etc.

One of the early ‘new’ regionalism studies that has demonstrated an explicit link between trade liberalization and regime type investigated how public officials manage to strike a balance between promoting a country’s economic welfare and accommodating interest groups whose support is needed to stay in office (Mansfield and Milner, 1999). While policy makers might be in favour of trade liberalization, they may still face domestic obstacles such as influential domestic actors, for example importers and exporters, who might prefer multilateral rather than regional liberalization.13 Furthermore, Frye and Mansfield (2002) have demonstrated that non- democracies where political power is at least somewhat dispersed within the national government were more likely to liberalize trade than other autocracies where power is highly concentrated.14 Collins (2009) goes even further by arguing that in the absence

16 of an appropriate political representation of non-state actors in policy making, the behaviour of national leaders cannot reflect national interests or social preferences and, thus, should not be analysed through the prism of institutional choices at all. In her study of why Central Asian states failed to cooperate despite obvious potential gains from regionalism, the author demonstrated that when there are few mechanisms for society and independent business to pressure the government, states have little incentive to engage in regional cooperation for the betterment of their nation. Rather the leaders in neo-patrimonial regimes are driven by the motives of preserving their authoritarian regime, enforced through maintaining personal control and the ability to direct patronage to informal vested interests.15 The institutions in this case, do not imply the desire to resolve problems of common action, but may serve as a cover for pursuing ‘virtual’ integration strategies.

Chapter 2. Identifying the research problem. Post-Soviet regionalisation in the Eastern EU Neighbourhood

In order to start the study of regionalisation in the Eastern EU neighbourhood, we need to see first in which way can this area be defined as a region. What are the distinctive features of this part of the EU neighbourhood that allow us to treat it as a separate research subject and how do we tackle regionalisation processes developing simultaneously in various directions? To this end, this chapter provides an overview of post-Soviet regionalisation outlining major processes driving the development of regional structures on the post-Soviet space. Regionalisation processes at the micro- level are also analysed by inquiring into the nature of the cross-border cooperation across the former Soviet border.

2.1 The development of Post-Soviet regionalisation: structures and processes.

The breakdown of the Soviet Union in August 1991 gave place to the emergence of complex relations between the closely-tied former Soviet republics. As new subjects of international law, the New Independent States (NISs) started to search to assert themselves on the world arena leaving behind their Soviet past, while at the same time,

17 their existing interdependence with former fellow republics did not disappear overnight and had to be treated by different means (Worth, 2005). The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), established in December 1991, became the main regional framework for managing these relations. Over the following two decades, the CIS has seen a very turbulent development with many new regional structures emerging within and, mainly, outside its structures and including every time a variety of actors. Generally, three periods can be distinguished in the development of regionalisation on the post-Soviet space. The first one starts with the break-down of the USSR and the creation of the CIS and can be characterized as a ‘civilized divorce’ in that it contributed most to the smooth separation of the formerly strongly integrated structures than to creating any viable regional structures. The second period can be identified between 1995 and 2007 and marks the beginning of the multi–speed and multi-track integration on the CIS space with a more pragmatic approach taken by Russia, resulting in the emergence of such new structures as the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC, 2001), the Single Economic Space (SES, 2003) and finally, the Customs Union between Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan – the first legally binding arrangement on the post-Soviet space announced in 2007, outlining the sphere of Russia-led economic integration. Finally, the third period marksthe beginning of a more active engagement of the external actors, in particular the EU, and the rising tensions over the ‘common neighbourhood’ (Flenley, 2008; Haukkala, 2008).

The first period

The first period consisted of extensive treaty producing activity, mainly dealing with the issues relevant to the division of the former USSR’s heritage, including its nuclear weapons and its permanent seat at the UN Security Council, as well as Soviet property abroad and a number of strategic assets spread over the previously unified territory. This activity focused on issues of common concern, such as the status of external borders, migration and the fight against terrorism, international crime and illegal trafficking, as well as collective defence. The early CIS treaties also dealt with developing common understandings of major concepts such as sovereignty, intra-state conflicts and the use of force. As noted by Willerton and Beznosov (2007, p. 52), while averting many dangerous conflicts over the division of the Soviet legacy, these treaties seldom contained any agreements for common action. In other words, despite

18 the high level of ambition, no real progress was achieved in establishing new integration structures within the CIS. For example, the 1992 Tashkent Treaty (known as the Collective Security Treaty) was supposed to build up a comprehensive security system, including the establishment of Unified Commonwealth Forces and the supranational Union Commandment with common external borders and joint border guards, but resulted only in the simple coordination of armed forces (Malfliet, 1998, p. 102). In the same way, no progress could be observed in the field of the economic integration despite the fact that the issue remained a focus of high level statements, with memoranda, bilateral and multilateral agreements recognizing that closer economic cooperation among the NISs should become a basis for further deeper political integration, alongside the world examples of regional cooperation, in the first place, the European Community. The ambitious full-fledged economic union announced in 1993 was replaced by a more modest FTA a year later and its implementation has, to date, failed because of numerous reservations from the part of member states with regard to trade liberalization, unilateral exclusions from the FTA regime (such as Russian oil and gas) and restrictive quotas for sensitive exports (Sushko, 2010, p. 122). In addition, the collapse of the ruble zone in 1993 gave rise to economic differentiation diverting the traditional trade patterns. The trade between the CIS countries was increasingly regulated by bilateral agreements. Notwithstanding their participation in the CIS arrangements, the FSU republics were not inspired by the idea of losing part of their newly gained sovereignty in favour of any kind of supra-national arrangement. Nationalism was the dominant political ideology throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union (Joeniemmi, 1997). In the process of gaining recognition on the international arena, the former republics instead pursued foreign policies that explored new directions removed from the previously isolated post-Soviet space. For example, they willingly became part of pan-European structures such as the Council of Europe and the OSCE, as well as (sub-) regional organizations, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC), launched in 1992, and a number of other regional initiatives that had been launched in the European north. The five Central Asian states (and Azerbaijan) have since joined the Central Asian Economic Cooperation Organization (initiated by Turkey at the end of the 1980s), have established their own Commonwealth in 1993 (reintegrated into a new body, the Central Asian Economic Community, in 1995, and finally, in 2002, into the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO)), with the aim of moving

19 towards a common market. Another alternative initiatives include GUAM (established in 1996 by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova in 1996 with the US support), and the Community of Democratic Choice launched in 2005 as an effort to counterbalance Russian dominance in the post-Soviet space. In general, though, in terms of external environment, the first period can be characterized by a relative neglect towards post-Soviet developments from the part of the international community. After the euphoria of terminating the Cold War and the antagonism of bi-polarity sealed by the Paris Charter of 1990, it seemed that liberal peace had been established to a new undivided Europe. All of the post-Soviet states were swiftly recognized as fully fledged members of the UN and the OSCE, but little more has been done afterwards.16 In 1994, NATO also established the Partnership for Peace programmes with the CIS states, and, additionally, a series of bilateral councils with Russia and with Ukraine (launched in 1997). US policy has been focused primarily on various pipeline projects from the landlocked Caspian region directly to the West bypassing Russia (such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline), while the EU’s attention has focused on developments in its direct vicinity in Central and South- Eastern Europe, pushing the post-Soviet states to the background. Apart from these separate engagements, the CIS has been widely recognized by the international community as Russia’s legitimate backyard, leaving the CIS states largely on their own.

The second period

The beginning of the second period can be marked by the Russian 1995 Presidential decree on Strategic Policy of Russia towards the Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which introduced the principle of multi-speed and multi-tiered integration. Apart from making a first official recognition in Russian foreign policy of the strategic priority of the CIS, this document implied that cooperation would advance in accordance with the neighbours’ willingness to cooperate more closely with Russia (Malfliet, 1998, p.104). During this period Russia started to take a more assertive stance towards the CIS, resulting in the establishment of new, more viable, sub-regional structures. According to the Russian Foreign Policy Concept and the National Security Strategy issued in 2000, the CIS area ought to serve as a ring of peaceful and friendly states around Russia’s borders providing the environment of

20 security needed for the country’s modernisation. In particular, with the coming to power of President Putin in 2000, and the beginning of Russia’s economic recovery after a decade of decline, it was desired to gain global leadership and to assert itself as an independent actor in global politics on parity with other major players (and in contrast to Eltsin’s ambivalent efforts of integration into the West, which, at best, gained secondary positions) (Trenin, 2009). The first stepping stone towards building a more focused structure within the CIS was an agreement concluded in 1995 between Russia and Belarus, with Kazakhstan joining immediately after and followed by the 1996 quadrilateral treaty on “Deepening of Integration in the Economic and Humanitarian filed” (which also brought in Kyrgyzstan). Eventually, in 1999, it was turned into an Agreement on the Customs Union and Single Economic Space (where Tajikistan also participated), or the Eurasian Economic Union (renamed next year into Eurasian Economic Community, EurAsEC). In October 2004, Russia also entered into the CACO, which merged a year later with EurAsEC. In parallel, from 2003 onwards, Russia tried to engage Ukraine, the second largest CIS economy, into a more binding economic arrangement leading to a customs union. In view of Ukraine’s firm position to limit its integration within the EurAsEC by the FTA, a new structure called Single Economic Space (SES) was established in 2003 (with the participation of Belarus, and Kazakhstan) in order to find more attractive framework for Ukraine and becoming, if it had been materialized, a real locomotive of the CIS integration, accounting for 94 per cent of the GDP and 88 per cent of total trade flow between on the CIS states (Vinokurov, 2007). These efforts, however, did not bear fruit either in terms of creating binding regional structures or in changing the disintegration dynamic rolling on from the beginning of the 1990s. As noted by Shadikhodjaev (2009), the co-existence of at least three parallel tracks towards the Customs Union, e.g. the CIS economic union, the EurAsEC and the SES, proceeding at diverse speed and different levels, together with the additional challenge to the process posed by the WTO accession talks, was in fact, an impediment to any real trade integration or the development of a customs union. In fact, instead of traditional step-by-step approach, beginning with the FTA, cooperation was seen (especially by Russia) as an example of the fast-track integration within CIS, however often lacking concrete substance and implementation strategy. Numerous exclusions and administrative restrictions continued to constrain business relations

21 between member states, including deeply integrated Russia and Belarus (which concluded in 1999 a Treaty on the Union State) (Kembayev, 2009). While looking at the study of consolidated integration indices of the Eurasian integration17 between 2002 and 2008, there appears a picture of generally decreasing integration within the CIS 12 (Vinokurov et al., 2010, p. 60).

Figure 2. Consolidated integration indices of the Eurasian integration 2002- 2008 Source: Vinokurov et al., 2010, p. 60.

At the same time, the country-to region picture, already showed a different dynamic: the decreasing dependency on their CIS neighbours in Ukraine, Azerbaijan, (the region’s largest economies, after Russia) in Georgia and, most significantly, in Moldova; whereas Armenia and Belarus (as well as in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), to the opposite, experience increasing dependency on other CIS states. The authors explain that these small states keep strong economic links with their neighbours since they could not achieve diversification of trade destinations away from the CIS as their follow states from the first group had (ibid., p. 95).

22 Table 1. Regional cooperation structures in the area of the EU Eastern neighbourhood CIS Rus Bel Ukr Mld Ge Azrb Arm Kaz Kyr Tdj Uz Trk country* 1993 - 2009 Regional structure CST/CSTO X X X X X X X 2002** Union State X X 1999 SES 2003 X X X X EurAsEC X X O O O X X X X 2001 2006 CU 2010 X X X EEU 2014 X X X X X FTA 2011 X X X X X X

CACO X X X X 2002-2005 GUAM X X X X X 1994 1999 - 2005

ENP / EaP X X X X X X

*Moldovan and Ukraine have never ratified the CIS Charter, and, strictly speaking are not full members of the CIS. Turkmenistan downgraded its status to ‘associate member’ in 2005. Georgia withdrew from the CIS Council of Defence Ministers in 2006 and withdrew completely from the CIS in 2009. **Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan withdrew from the CIS CST in 1999. Uzbekistan re-joined in 2006.

At the beginning of the new millennium the region became a focus of closer attention by international actors. In the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks in the USA in 2011, and followed the deployment of NATO forces in Afghanistan, the US’s interest in the Central Asian states was reinforced. In response, Russia also started to reassert its positions in the Central Asian region by bilateral security agreements with Kyrgyzstan (the upgrade of a Russian airbase in Kant), and the deployment of its remaining forces in Tajikistan in a military base. Furthermore, in 2003 Russia signed an agreement with Kyrgyzstan on the upgrade of a Russian airbase in Kant (to be operated under the auspices of the CSTO) located near to the Manas facility, operated

23 by the US-led anti-terrorism coalition. In October 2004, Russia also sought to formalize the deployment of its remaining forces in Tajikistan as a military base (the troops of Russia's 201st Motorized Rifle Division which had been stationed in the country since the collapse of the Soviet Union), giving start to what has been called by the Tajik president Rakhmonov “the beginning of a qualitatively new cooperation” (Isakova, 2005). This strategy was part of Russia’s general effort to build its own security system starting including the founding of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001, comprising together with the FSU states also Iran, India and China,18 and the initiation of the Caspian Littoral States Summits in 2006, with the objective of keeping foreign powers outside the region.19 In fact, as noted by a number of researchers, Russian CIS policy should be seen in the context of its general relations with the West (Casier, 2007; Trenin 2005; 2009; De Wilde and Pellon, 2006). Indeed, as it could be observed during the first period of relatively low Western presence, Russia’s ‘free hand’ in the CIS remained rather liberal, with some ambitions of regional political leadership including inconsistent efforts to strengthen integration in the security and economic fields. To the contrary, during the second period, the increased international attention to the region bordering Russia was accompanied by a Russian policy of establishing itself as a dominant regional power. Therefore, at the beginning of the new millennium, and on the wave of its increasingly assertive foreign policy boosted by its own economic growth, Russia started to see itself as a regional power and even a leader of pan-European integration. Having agreed with the EU on the Four Common Spaces during the EU- Russia Summit in St. Petersburg in 2003, as a strategic basis for bilateral relations, Russia promised to bring the CIS closer to the EU under the ‘Together to Europe’ motto. In 2003, Moscow also undertook active mediation between Chisinau and Tiraspol with the aim of creating a common state in Moldova and helped the newly elected Georgian President Saakashvili to end the conflict in separatist region of Adjaria. Moscow also undertook (largely unsuccessful) efforts to export its model of sovereign democracy: President Putin’s declared ambition was to strengthen democratic institutions rule of law, market- and socially- oriented reforms, and the struggle against corruption. These, indeed, reflected the aspirations of many societies in the NIS (the ratings of the Russian president in the NIS were at their highest during this time) (White, Korosteleva, McAllister, 2008).

24 The wave of coloured revolutions in Georgia in 2003 and a year later in Ukraine largely frustrated Russian aspirations of regional leadership. The new ‘orange’ Ukrainian government took the firm stance to limit its engagement with the FTA: the SES project (and any binding agreement within CIS) was seen as not compatible with the newly declared course on stronger EU integration. For Russia, there remained no reason to continue providing concessions to Ukraine in the effort to anchor it into some kind of regional project, or as one Russian politician put it, “why should we prepare Ukraine for European integration at Russia’s cost?”. At the same time, Russia’s relations with the near abroad started to see the so-called economization, meaning that integration would be necessary only if it was (economically) beneficial for Russia (Isakova, 2005). The most evident manifestation of the new Russian approach came in the form of increases in energy prices (up to the global markets level) to the former republics that, up till then, had enjoyed reduced prices. Starting with Belarus in 2004, the major Russian gas companies started to acquire energy infrastructure assets in the near abroad in return for price concessions for gas supplies. In case of resistance, no concessions were made and, at times, the refusal to pay in accordance with the new prices was followed by supply cut-offs. When such a situation occurred in Ukraine in 2007, with Gasprom stopping supplies, it resulted in interruptions of transit of Russian exports through Ukraine to the EU, casting doubts about the reliability of Russian supplies, exposing the EU’s significant energy dependency, and ringing the first waking bells about the possible problems of the ‘shared neighbourhood’. Apart from the heavy energy lever, Russia started to use other mechanisms, such as economic boycotts and embargoes, e.g. wine embargo on Moldova, blocking imports of mineral water, money transfers and even ways of communications with Georgia. It also started playing sophisticated games in some ‘dormant’ problems such as in the break-away regions (for example, providing citizenship to the inhabitants of Transnistria and Abkhazia), or by using border controversies and Russian ethnic minorities. The use of these levers, however, as noted by Hedenskog and Larsson (2007), has been highly emotional and the political aspect has been more important than the actual strength of the lever. At the same time, Russia started to work on its ‘competitive advantage’ and to pay attention to the legitimacy of its policies by relying on soft policy instruments such as appeals to common cultural heritage, media campaigns, etc., without leading, however, to any major policy change (Trenin, 2009).

25 The culmination of the Russian policy during this period was the agreement on the EurAsEC Customs Union (CU) with Belarus and Kazakhstan announced in 2007,20 as the highest form of supra-nationalism reached in the former Soviet space, with initiation of this union targeted for 1st January, 2010.

The third period

Simultaneously, the CU agreement sharpened the problem of the ‘shared neighbourhood’ in EU-Russia relations. Following the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004,21 the EU presence in what had been seen as Russia’s exclusive ‘near abroad’ region was steadily increased: the policy marked the EU’s ambition to extend the area of stability, prosperity, and security beyond its borders and offered extended assistance and bilateral Action Plans, jointly agreed political documents outlining the agenda for economic and political reforms in the post-Soviet states. 22 Whereas Russia already perceived these changes with the feeling of competition and even as a direct challenge, the launch of the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative (EaP) in May 2009, directed explicitly at the six post-Soviet states of the ‘common neighbourhood,’ had yet, added another element for tensions. In contrast to the ENP, which covers among other areas the southern neighbourhood, the EaP is more focused and, therefore, confirmed the growing EU concern with the Eastern direction of its external policies. It has to be noted that up until then, the EU remained rather reluctant to step into this area and followed generally a ‘Russia first’ policy, neglecting the calls to pay greater attention to its post-Soviet neighbourhood such as from the Polish non-Paper on the “EU Eastern Dimension” in 2003. Furthermore, the European geographical location of the ENs evoked unsuitable discussions on future EU enlargement and the potential new aspirants for EU membership. It is only after the Russian-Georgian military conflict in August 2008 and the repeated cut-off incidents with the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine that the initiative received support among the EU member states (Boonstra and Shapovalova, 2010). In contrast, Russia’s own relations with the West during this period rapidly deteriorated. Growing differences over the nature of the bilateral ‘strategic partnership’ (agreed in 2003 as a framework for bilateral relations based on equal partnership) and the increasingly strained energy relations (not least due to the energy supply cut-off incidents) were marking the relations with the EU. At the international

26 level Russia´s efforts of redrawing the security architecture in Europe were frustrated,23 as well as its claimes for recognition of its military response to Georgia’s attack on the breakaway province of South Ossetia in August 2008 to be a legitimate and proportionate action in contrast to Georgia’s attack , fuelled, according to Russia, by Georgia’s NATO aspirations (in the hope to resolve the break-away dispute as a condition for NATO membership) supported by the US and a number of other members of the alliance. Against this background, Russia concentrated its main integration efforts on the consolidation and institutionalization of the CU. The symbolic value of the new project was high. For example, in June 2009, Russia declared that it would strive for WTO membership together with Kazakhstan and Belarus as a Customs Union,24 meaning that regional integration on the CIS space was considered preferable in terms of Russian foreign policy. The forging of this project was also presented as a response to the global financial crisis with an anti-crisis measure in the form of the assistance fund worth 10 billion USD (75 percent of which is Russia’s share, and 15 percent is Kazakhstan’s). The ambition was to create, on the basis of the CU, a common economic zone in just two years. Another idea expressed by President Medvedev was to make the ruble a regional reserve currency to fill the space between the Euro-zone and China (which could start with the currency union with Kazakhstan and Belarus).25 Finally, in October 2011 the then prime minister Vladimir Putin in an interview to Izvestia newspaper voiced the course on establishing the Eurasian Economic Union.26 In contrast with all previous Russia-led structures, the CU initiative previewed a Supranational Commission of the Customs Union, a permanent body working on the external tariffs harmonization, and the weighted decision-making power, where the 2/3 majority voting procedure ensured that Russia (with its 58 percent) could not block decisions alone. However, the implementation of the CU remained highly politicized, as were all other initiatives. For example, from the very first day of the announced entry into force of the CU in 2010, Belarus had put its participation on hold due to its plea that Russia should lift its oil duties. This was followed by Russia introducing a boycott of the milk imports from Belarus due to “the lack of appropriate standardization” (that became known as a ‘milk war’).27 Thereafter, observers expressed doubts about whether the CU project was a step forward towards integration on a more equal basis and the establishment of binding structures, although, it might also be a mere sign of Russia’s willingness to make concessions in

27 order to ensure that the integration process goes on re-establishing its political influence at the expense of economic benefits. Against this backdrop, the Russian near abroad policy continued to represent a mixture of efforts to gain legitimacy as a ‘soft power’ with occasionally more coercive measures. The high point was reached with the conclusion of the CIS FTA on 18th October 2011 at the St. Petersburg CIS Summit, when, in Putin’s words, the leaders present had “surprisingly came to an agreement” (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Ukraine became members, while Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan have not signed).28 In fact, the majority of the NISs conducted multi- vector foreign policies embracing parity and balance in relations with the West and the East in the optimal direction. In this light, the signing of the FTA with Russia, which came on the eve of the Eastern Partnership Summit in Warsaw and was largely unexpected by the European partners, has not been seen by the Eastern neighbours as contradicting their further European integration. Moreover, such policy orientations were largely sustained by the public opinion in the Western NISs. According to nationwide surveys conducted in Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova in October-November 2008, most of the respondents underscore the importance of relations of equilibrium with both Eastern and Western neighbours (Radchuk 2011, p. 28). Deliberating, then, on relations with Eastern and Western neighbours, two-thirds of Belarusians and more than one half of Moldovans and Ukrainians chose parity and balance in the relations, i.e. cooperation pursued to an equal extent with both the EU and with CIS countries. At the same time, when offered an alternative choice between integration with Russia or with the EU, the perceptions differed between the three countries (Figure 4). While in Belarus three times as many prioritized Russia over the EU, in Ukraine less than one half of respondents preferred Russia and one respondent in three chose EU membership. In Moldova, by contrast, more than half chose EU membership over integration with Russia. However, even with these differences in perceptions, the survey revealed the significance of Russia to its post-Soviet neighbours. Thus, all three countries ranked Russia as a friendly country and expected from it some economic assistance. The Belarusians and Moldovans approved of their foreign course in so far as it was directed towards Russia, and the Ukrainians censured it for its lack of a Russian vector (the study inquired firstly about how the foreign policy direction is perceived by the population and whether it is approved or not). According to the results, most Belarusians and Moldovans identified Russia as the object of their

28 foreign policy’s course, and this direction was approved, respectively, by two thirds and nearly half of the respondents in these countries. By way of contrast, Ukrainians believed that the EU was their main priority, and the percentage of respondents who were content with this policy was the lowest, which is one-fifth with two-thirds disapproving of it.

Figure 3. If you were to choose between the union with Russia and Accession to the EU, which would you choose? (per cent) Source: Radchuk, 2011, p. 25, Figure 3.29

Considering these factors, it can be concluded that while the role of the external actors has changed over the three periods, the regionalisation paths of the CIS states have not been altered, e.g. continued fluctuating between various integration vectors. No single external actor can be considered as the sole driver of post-Soviet regionalism, neither the regional hegemon Russia, nor the EU, which started to take a more pro-active stance in the region since the launch of the ENP, and even more with the introduction of the EaP initiative in 2009. European integration remains yet another regional strategy in the multi-vector foreign policies of the CIS states, not leading to any binding relationship linking the Western NISs and the Caucasus republics with the EU.

29 2.2 Micro-level regionalisation

The fall of the iron curtain produced shifts not only in the international system but also induced new regional dynamics at the micro-regional level, e.g. the cross-border cooperation at the sub-national level. As part of their new independence in making their own foreign policy, the NISs have generally taken a positive view of cross-border cooperation.30 In particular, the strengthening of relations with Western neighbours, former partners within the socialist block, was seen with great enthusiasm on account of their shared history, common cultural heritage and ethnic links, previously cut abruptly by the impermeable Soviet border. The northern regions of Russia started intensive cooperation with their Finnish counterparts and were actively engaged in various regional initiatives in the European North, such as within the Baltic Sea States Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic cooperation.31 The newly obtained freedom to cross the border resulted in the emergence of all kinds of exchanges and links between people: from joint initiatives in the field of culture, environment, education and youth activities to more symbolic gestures by the regional administrations in the effort to establishing para-diplomatic relations with their counterparts across the former border of the USSR. The most widespread cross-border activity, however, became ‘suitcase trading’. This expanded throughout the border area and mushroomed into the spread of open-air markets and what became known as the ‘bazaar economy’. This was due to a generally lower GDP per capita, lower labour costs, generally lower prices and a market that was not yet saturated with even basic goods and services in the former border regions of the Soviet Union. (Due to their peripheral location and additional burdens caused by the need to protect the national border, the peripheral regions of the former Soviet Union have been traditionally characterized by underdevelopment.) Some entrepreneurs also undertook some initial efforts to make cross-border contacts by organizing fairs, exhibitions, disseminating information and even opening economic missions (Krok and Smetkowski, 2006, p. 186). Despite the generally positive political climate for CBC alongside the former Soviet Union border, the institutionalization of cross-border activities did not proceed smoothly. In some cases, tensions between neighbouring countries prevented any kind of activity, such as in the case of Moldova and Romania, where extremely good

30 relations at the beginning of the 1990s spurred by the revival of Romanian identity in Moldova were soon overshadowed by political turmoil and the return of the pro- communist discourse there. As a result, no official activities took place until July 1997 when the first official document in the field of cross-border cooperation was signed (the Protocol for Trilateral Collaboration between the governments of Romania, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine). The situation was also somewhat complicated at the Russian borders because of relations between the former Baltic republics of the Soviet Union, which immediately took a course of integration with Western structures. Visa regimes were introduced here (although, with significant facilitations for cross- border traffic for local communities) and cross-border contacts were heavily burdened by the hardships of the political climate in bilateral relations with Russia. Apart from political problems, additional burdens to cross-border activities were caused by everyday issues of security such as the growth of shadow economic activities, smuggling and cross-border crime including illegal migration and human trafficking (Şoitu and Şoitu, 2010). Against this background, one of the most sophisticated and also the most popular form of CBC became Euroregions. The first initiative came as early as 1993 with the establishment of the Carpathian Euroregion at the borders between Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Ukraine. Considering the success of this form of cooperation in Western Europe, and their own experience of participation in Euroregions with the EU regions, the initiators were usually the CEECs, which have come to choose the same template for their cooperation across the former Soviet Union’s border (Kennard, 2004, p. 113). With these uncertain circumstances about the competences of regional and local administrations, it is not surprising that the concept of Euroregion was widely applied. The Euroregion framework provided for a more institutionally driven partnership involving administrations at the regional and national levels. Although they cannot be considered legal entities or organizations, they provided advantages such as a permanent character, having an identity distinct from the participating members, and disposing administrative, technical, and financial resources of their own (ibid., p. 77). The rise of Euroregions in the EU neighbourhood has often been seen as linked to the availability of EU funds for the CEECs. Thus, the major wave in establishing the Euroregions could be seen since 1997, when the funds under PHARE Small Project Facility became available to the pre-accession countries that allowed the financing of

31 large numbers of CBC projects with Eastern neighbours (Figure 4). Another source of EU financing available for CBC in the Eastern neighbourhood was the INTERREG programme, which allowed regions in EU member states to engage with their partners across borders into common projects. It was first applied at the Finnish-Russian border after Finnish accession to the EU in 1995, namely through programmes such as INTERREG II A, Kolarctic, Euroregio Karelia and South-East Finland, and INTERREG II B Baltic. After the enlargement of the EU in 2004, these programmes have also become available to countries in CEE and in the Baltic States,32 allowing for the financing of dozens of projects within Euroregions at the borders with the Eastern neighbours. In some cases, the establishment of Euroregion was linked directly with the management of these funds, such as in the case of Euroregions Karelia (in 2000) and Pskov Livonia (in 2003). In fact, facilitating the administrating the EU funds can be seen as a major positive contribution of Euroregions. Furthermore, they provided valuable experience of working together with partners from neighbour countries including the establishment of the first institutional partnerships. Euroregions have also served as an institutional framework for attracting international actors (for example, in common ecological problems such as the consequences of the Chernobil catastrophe or the use of water resources or forestry in Euroregions Nieman or Bialowieza Forest). The major problem, however, is often presented by the lack of a broader regional audience: the programmes’ activities have often remained rather symbolic and dependent on the support received from outside (Liikanen and Virtanen 2006, p. 129).

Figure 4. List of Euroregions on the post-Soviet space

Carpathian 1993 Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Ukraine Bug 1995 Poland, Ukraine, Belarus (joined in 1998) Neman 1997 Poland, Belarus, Lithuania and Russian Kaliningrad oblast Baltic, Shuchupe 1998 Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Denmark, Sweden and Russian Kaliningrad oblast Saule 1999 Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden and Russian Kaliningrad oblast Belovezhskaya 2002 Poland, Belarus puscha Karelia 1998 Finland, Russian Karelian republic Ozerny Krai 1998 Latvia, Lithuania Belarus

Lower Danube 1998 Romania, Moldova, Ukraine

32 (Dunărea de Jos) Upper Prut 2000 Romania, Moldova, Ukraine (Prutul de Sus) Siret-Prut-Nistru 2002 Romania, Moldova Pskov Livonia 2004 Latvia, Estonia, Russian Pskov oblast

All in all, apart from Euroregions, it is difficult to identify any other institutional form or capacity of cross-border regional governance or even any coherent approach to regional development across the former Soviet border. By the end of 1990s, petty trade was gradually going into a decline and was starting to be substituted by legal trade, leaving the border regions, at best, with the role of trade brokers in the asymmetric trade with the EU manufactures. While unfavourable economic and geopolitical factors often held back progress in CBC, the major problem remained the weakness of the local regionalisation actors. The first reforms, aimed at market liberalization, resulted in a dramatic and rapid deterioration of the ‘social capital’ and the impoverishment of the population, often accompanied by political instability and chaos in socio-economic policies. The lack of a middle class and a small business community impeded the rise of private initiatives. As a consequence of their socialist past, regional administrations on both sides of the border were normally unfamiliar not only with financing but also with practical ideas or any previous experience of joint action with their counterparts across the border. Often, the centralized administrative systems did not allow them any competences to steer regional development or to deal with regional problems either. In some cases, the neo- patrimonial nature of post-Soviet political regimes favoured the emergence of the so- called ‘captured regions’ where oligarchic clans monopolized regional development activities and subjugated them to their group interests (Zhurzhenko, 2006, p. 105). A vivid example of this was the Russian region of Karelia at the Finnish border, where elites were organized around the selling of non-proceeded wood to Finland, which hampered the development of related industries within the region itself (Schljamin, 2002). In such regions, instead of promoting modernization and transparency in regional development, any cross-border cooperation project served the narrow interest of business clans who fostered corruption and opportunism; this represents a clear example of RIPs driven by a logic of self-interest. Against this background, the Eastern EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007 became yet another quest for the CBC. On the one hand, the adoption of the Schengen regime, including the introduction of visa requirements as a part of the EU pre-accession

33 process in the CEECs (starting from 1998) affected the CBC very negatively, especially hitting hard the borders that enjoyed the most positive cooperation climate such as between Poland, Ukraine and Belarus. Furthermore, in contrast to the dynamic pre-accession process in the CEECs, the transition in the post-Soviet countries remained stagnant. As noted by Eliseeva (2003), the different paths of post-socialist political transformation in the former Soviet Union republics and in the Warsaw Pact states started to become more apparent in the sharpening of socio-economic disparities, which cast doubts over the effectiveness of common activities and the favouring an aid-like cooperation. On the other hand, the new common border with the EU opened a range of new opportunities. In view of the forthcoming enlargement33, the Commission developed a new approach towards the future neighbourhoodby publishing aCommunication entitled “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”, This document introduced the concept of CBC programmes that would be formulated on the principle of partnership and joint- ownership, meaning that partners from neighbouring countries would participate on an equal basis in the programmes’ planning and implementation procedures.34 In contrast to previous cooperation under the TACIS, PHARE or INTERREG programmes that suffered from a lack of coordination between different instruments applied at each side of the border, the new programmes were equipped with a single budget and operated under a single set of rules, meaning that project partners would be able, at last, to apply jointly for funding within a project. This approach was implemented swiftly during the 2004-2006 transitional period until the entry into force of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), 2007-2013, which boosted the CBC across the former Soviet border (as will be developed in detail in Chapter 6).

2.3 Conclusion

By looking at regional structures on the one hand, and processes on the other, it has been demonstrated that, despite differences in terms of institutional affiliations, there exists many similarities in regionalisation dynamics in the CIS: there has been a clear reluctance among the former republics to foster regional integration on the post-Soviet space. Most of them consistently avoided ceasing sovereignty within the Russia-led

34 structures (including Belarus, Russia’s closest ally), while no regional project emerged as a viable alternative to Russia’s influence. Instead, the NISs have generally practiced a balancing of various regional dimensions through multi-vector foreign policies with large fluctuations to various directions ranging from proclamation of the European integration course and NATO membership aspirations on the one hand, to FTA with Russia on the other. Furthermore, this regionalisation pattern has not been affected by the changing external environment but stems from constant domestic premises. The rising competition between Russian and the EU policies in the common neighbourhood remains simply a context in which specific politically powerful actors drive regionalisation processes. In the same way, at the micro-regional level, the regionalisation dynamic across the former Soviet border (the stumbling CBC) appears to be related to the (low) capacities of CBC actors rather than to other conditions created from outside. In such a way, the presence of these distinctive features makes it possible to consider (for the purpose of this research) the post-Soviet states at the Eastern EU border as a coherent unit of analysis (or a region) while the evolving regionalisation processes can be explained by inquiring into the particular nature of the domestic factors that condition the strategic policy choices of regionalisation actors.

35 Chapter 3. The conceptual framework

The conceptual framework is a representation of the main concepts that specifies the variables of interests and the expected relationships between them. Conceptual clarity involves precise and consistent use of terms, internal consistency within an argument and logical links between concepts, helping to identify the research questions (Punch 1998, p. 22). As previously defined, the present study aims to explain the regional strategies of the post-Soviet states in the context of European integration by finding the explanatory power in the inquiry about the domestic factors of regionalisation. Therefore, the central notion for building a conceptual framework will be defined as Regional Integration Preferences (RIPs), as these reflect the relationship between both endogenous and exogenous factors.

3.1 Defining RIPs

The term ‘preferences’ is borrowed from liberal international relations theory that considers state behaviour to be influenced by societal ideas, interests and institutions by shaping state preferences, e.g. the fundamental social purposes underlying the strategic calculations of governments (Moravcsik, 1997, p. 513). In contrast to realists or institutionalists, who consider world politics to be driven by the configuration of capabilities or information and institutions, respectively, liberals believe that the configuration of state preferences is the primary matter in world politics. The central theory is that state behaviour is defined by the domestic and transnational social context in which it is embedded. In the liberal conception of domestic politics, the state is not an actor but a representative institution that is constantly subject to capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction, by a coalition of social actors. It is a critical ‘transmission belt’ by which preferences and the social power of individuals and groups are translated into state policy. Government policy is constrained by the underlying identities, interests, and power of individuals and groups who constantly pressure the central decision makers to pursue policies consistent with their

36 preferences. Representation is not just a formal attribute of state institutions but includes stable characteristics of the political process, formal or informal, that privilege particular societal interests. Clientalistic, authoritarian regimes, for example, may distinguish those with familiar bureaucratic or economic ties to the governing elite from those without such ties. Even where government institutions are formally fair and open, a relatively inegalitarian distribution of property, risk, information, or organizational capabilities may create social or economic monopolies able to dominate policy. According to Ruggie (1983, p. 265) (cited by Moravcsik, 1997, p. 520), representative institutions and practices determine not merely which social coalitions are represented in foreign policy, but how they are represented. States do not act to automatically maximize fixed, homogenous conceptions of security, sovereignty, or wealth per se, but, instead, pursue particular interpretations and combinations of security, welfare and sovereignty preferred by powerful domestic groups. It is also assumed that each state seeks to realise its distinctive preferences under varying constraints imposed by the preferences of other states, without being either conflictual or partially convergent, but, rather, linked by policy interdependence. In such a way, the definition of interests of societal actors appears as theoretically central. Moravcsik distinguishes three variants of liberal theory, each grounded on a distinctive specification of the central element of liberal theory, social demands and the causal mechanism whereby they are transformed into state preferences. Ideational liberalism stresses the impact on state behaviour of conflict and compatibility among collective social values or identities concerning the scope and nature of public goods provision. Commercial liberalism stresses the impact of gains and losses to individuals and groups in society from transnational economic interchange. Finally, republicans stress the impact on state behaviour of varying forms of domestic representation and the resulting incentives for social groups to engage in rent seeking. The mode of domestic political representation determines whose social preferences are institutionally privileged. When political representation is biased in favour of particularistic groups, they tend to capture government institutions and employ them for their ends alone, systematically passing on costs and risks to others. This later variant is of particular relevance for this research, since political power in transitional regimes is highly concentrated in the hands of the ruling elites (as will be shown by the analysis of domestic factors later in this chapter). 35

37 All in all, the domestic factors pertinent to the nature of state-society relations appear primordial in the explanations of particular RIPs. It defines how (and whether) the politically powerful regionalisation actors will explore the opportunities from the external environment (exogenous factors) by adopting strategic policy choices with regard to the international system.36 In fact, RIPs may be developed with regard to different factors from the external environment be it actors or fields of cooperation ranging from ‘hard’ economic and security arrangements to ‘softer’ issues such as the environment, public health or cultural cooperation. As noted by Hurrell (1995), the two set of factors should not be opposed. Rather, we should look at the process of their interplay whereby internal preconditions (endogenous factors) define the way preferences are shaped with regard to external environment. As shown by Figure 5, in this circular process of regionalisation RIPs should not stay unchanged. In fact, once formulated, they continue to be confronted with the new factors in the external environment and ultimately, becoming themselves preconditions for the formulation of new regional integration preferences.37

Figure 5. The formation of European Integration Preferences in the Eastern EU neighbourhood

Domestic preconditions

2004

Regionalisation RIPs 2013

External environment / EU policy

38 3.2 European Integration Preferences as emerging social practices

As argued above, RIPs on the post-Soviet space cannot be defined only in terms of formal participation in regional institutions but should be seen as a more comprehensive process of regionalisation driven by the politically powerful actors. Furthermore, when it comes to EIPs, the definition has to include additional parameters, different from the traditional terms of inter-state or inter-regional relations. As a supranational entity, the EU is characterized by a complex international action and various forms of governance. In the study of EU external action and foreign policies there is a general agreement among scholars about the need to distinguish between the EU roles associated with its mere presence or being on the one hand, and as an active player using more traditional foreign policy tools (military or civilian), on the other (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999). In the context of neighbourly relations, this complexity, as noted by Bechev (2011), finds its reflection in the co- existence of two perceptions towards the EU: as a power or attraction, where the value of the EU’s internal market is uncontestable, and as an underperformer, the latter reflecting large disappointment by the neighbours with the ENP. In contrast to the optimistic rhetoric of Brussels officials about interdependence and joint ownership, the neighbours view the policy as a EU-centric enterprise designed to ensure that EU goals are achieved. Besides, as mentioned earlier, the ENP remains largely a ‘work in progress’ with new institutional arrangements, terms and conditions being developed (including on the principles of joint ownership) in order to overcome the limitations of the EU policy approach as being deprived of membership perspective. In this light, the EIPs have to reflect both the comprehensive and dynamic nature of the EU-EN relations. This means that we should assess these interactions not only in terms of compliance with the EU norms and rules in different spheres, but also in terms of cooperation attitudes and expectations associated with the EU’s actual or possible roles. One possible way to address the issue is within the perspective of international practices developed within the general social turn to practice in IR studies and concerned with understanding actors’ performances and associated meanings in international politics (Adler and Pouliot, 2011; Schatzki et al., 2001). The concept of international practices has been successfully applied to the field of the EU-neighbour

39 relations by Korosteleva, Natorski and Simão (2013) in their study called “The Eastern Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy: practices, instruments and social structures”. The authors depart from the understanding of international cooperation as being built up by performed practices (actions) regulated by the consented norms and rules that in their orderly occurrences articulate certain meanings and form particular patterns, which arrange agents, resources, instruments, and actions into stable social structures (Adler and Pouliot, 2011). They argue that since there are two interrelated aspects of practices – the performing action and its interpretation, which attributes it with the social meaning expressed through the emergence of new social structures – it is possible to disentangle the EU practices (that surround policy instruments as means to facilitate action) from those of the neighbours (as embedded in their social structures) (Korosteleva, Natorski and Simão, 2013, p. 3). Hence, the EU policy instruments are seen as social practices that are shaping existing and emergent social structures, while receiving their meaning and material realisation (only) in terms of their effect on the cooperation practices. The interpretative part refers to the emerging social structures as regulated patterns of competent interactions, bound by agreed rules and norms that are seen as embedded in the neighbours’ social structures.38 In other words, while practices may be necessitated by policy instruments, they obtain their material realisation in the patterned behaviour of competent individuals acting towards the collective goal. Therefore, as the authors argue, neither structures nor actors in international practices are assumed to be self-subsistent subjects. Both policy instruments as performing practices and emergent structures organized within and around competent collective actions should be examined together informing on the relations between particular set of (policy) practices and the emerging social practices, distinguishing between the four possible types: (1) parallel existence of practices linked in space and or time, but not interfering significantly; (2) symbiosis where practices are distinct, but they forma a coherent whole; (3) hybridization combining and forming new types of practices; and (4) subordination when practices form part of a hierarchical relationship. Within the present research the question is not so much in the estimation of the stronger or weaker degree of the EU impact over the EN, but rather, when the particular (existing or emerging) social structures point out to stronger or weaker EIPs.

40 The point of departure here will be the assumption that the study of emerging social practices can tell us not only about the nature of the EU-promoted governance arrangements, but in a larger sense about a preference of a particular type of (regional) order (out of several possible ones) emerging between the EU and its neighbourhood, e.g. the EIPs. The possible features can be outlined by inquiring into the nature of emerging social practices in the EU-ENs relations from the point of view of regionalisation processes. As such, studies of social structures are premised either on the principles of anarchy and/or of cooperation, or on the principles of ordered hierarchies and subordination. This hierarchy-anarchy dichotomy exemplifies tensions between the relations of equality and inequality, centre and periphery, domination and subordination, of arranging units into organized structures, and the nature of ownership.39 In their framework for the study the EU policy practices in the Eastern neighbourhood, Korosteleva, Natorski and Simão (2013) also suggest that the attribution of competence to the non-state actors by EU policy instruments provides grounds for their inclusion as meaningful actors in the development and consolidation of shared practices in the context of EU-neighbour relations. Hence a new inclusive-exclusive axis should be added to the analysis in order to reflect this recent extension of the EU policy practices to reach ‘all strands of society’ that triggers the emergence of new structured domains which challenge the established centre/periphery, hierarchy/network modes of governance, and necessitate redistribution of power in a less regimented way. If assesses in terms of regionalisation process, however, the emerging social structures have to be described not just in relation to the EU social order with its rules and norms (by defining their nature as being non-/hierarchical or inclusive/exclusive), but also in terms of conscious choices and mutual effort of all participating actors. It should be considered that regionalisation implies that a pre-regional zone rooted in territory is experiencing rise of intensity, scope and width of communication, cooperation and interaction alongside several dimensions (economic, political and cultural) leading to greater coherence and community. Throughout this process, all of the participating actors increasingly obliged to coordinate their policies aimed at resolving their existing or perceived collective action problems. Furthermore, the mutually reinforcing character of these relations means that workable solutions can be developed only when the interests of all actors engaged are respected. The major features of such an order

41 can be found in the definition of governance developed by Weber, Smith and Baun (2007, pp. 8-9) in order to “ascertain how the EU can promote different forms of cooperation (defined as mutually rewarding policy adjustment) with its neighbours without being able to extend the promise of EU membership.” The authors point out that apart from (1) the deliberate transfer or diffusion of EU norms and rules to non- member states participating within the ENP programme, there are other major governance themes including: (2) the purposeful coordination of multiple players (public or private) within a given multi-level social space; (3) the application of both formal (legislation, legal obligation, case law, etc.) and informal (best practices, professional norms or socialization) rule-making and compliance mechanism; and finally, (4) the convergence of divergent preferences in ways that manage or respect the initial plurality of interest involved. Further insights on the role of factors external to the EU policy in the analysis of the EU–neighbour relations could be found in the external governance approach, where it has been demonstrated that the effectiveness of the EU rule transfer abroad varies across the different parts of its neighbourhood and, even more significantly, across sectors of cooperation (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009). The EU’s hierarchical mode of governance (based on the transfer of the EU’s legal rules and relying on the EU’s own sector-specific institutional design), while being generally most effective, requires third countries to be strongly dependent on the EU and more strongly dependent on the EU than on alternative governance providers. For example, the case of Ukraine showed a stronger EU governance in trade and weaker in energy and foreign policy fields where the constraining factors are interdependence with Russia and the CIS (Dimitrova and Dragneva, 2009). At the same time, other forms of governance, called soft (or horizontal), such as networked or market ones, are more focused on promoting approximation to EU norms and practices and are often drawn on inferential or jointly negotiate rules, rather than on the export of the precise acquis in its entirety (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 807). In terms of institutional structures, the soft modes of governance usually entail joint decision making at lower political levels, e.g. in sectoral networks, agencies, assistance projects, exchanges, trainings, as well as cross-border cooperation engaging different sets of state and non-state and sub-national actors. The inclusion of

42 representatives of third countries is then based on functional expertise rather than political affiliation (ibid., p. 798). In contrast to hierarchical (hard) modes of governance that refer to existence of formal procedures, monitoring and sanctioning associated with conditionality, compliance or negotiations (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004), the network of governance often prescribes procedural modes of interaction rather than final policy solutions (Gänzle, 2008). They produce less constraining instruments based on mutual agreement, coordination or competition and ‘either persuade, shame, or praise actors into changing their policies,’ (Kelley, 2004, p. 428) providing a favourable context for mechanisms of influence based on social learning, communication and socialization (Friis and Murphy, 1999). In this regard, it is recognized that the degree of projected EU governance depends on the level of participation of external actors (which might exhibit uncooperative attitudes), although, stopping short of explaining the external partners’ cooperation attitudes. For example, according to Filtenborg, Gänzle and Johansson (2002, pp. 388-389), by engaging the external partners (who are willing to coordinate their policy spaces and scarce resources with the EU in order to realise shared political and economic projects), a network type of governance provides already for ‘shared policy spaces’ transcending national borders in different spheres the Union. In other words, by ‘blurring’ the existing boundaries with its neighbours, the EU creates an inclusive, partner-oriented approach in the EU external relations. As noted by Gänzle (2008), in its relations with the non-candidate neighbour countries, the EU is relying not so much on the hierarchical forms of policy export (practiced in enlargement) but, rather, tends to use the soft modes of governance. The resulting institutional order, as argued by Youngs (2009, p. 895), is “more sectorally fragmented and differentiated (policy-specific) and less “Europeanized” than the order projected through enlargement,” with the EU limiting itself to a mere projection of the EU acquis in particular fields and not even seeking a consistent macro-policy approach.40 The author also points out that the third country actors appear more likely to accept modes of external governance that resonate with their domestic institutional structures – to the extent that these are seen as normal and legitimate (Youngs, 2009, p. 901).41 In this regard, the study of the EU’s limited leverage over Belarus by Bosse and Korostelva-Polglase (2009), suggests more explicitly that the existence and construction of boundaries between the EU and its neighbouring states are essentially mutually constitutive processes that the external governance perspective fails to grasp.

43 The authors introduce the notion of ‘partnership’ to allow better considerations of the neighbours’ interests in the analysis. Another study demonstrated the importance of adequate accommodation of the external partners’ interests on the example of Russian participation in the EU’s Northern Dimension initiative, launched in 1999 and changed into a ‘joint policy of four equal partners’ (e.g. the EU, Iceland, Norway and Russia) in 2006, demonstrating that the effective cooperation within the initiative could only be established after the change of the initiative´s institutional structure in accordance with the joint ownership principle that has been crucial to ensure Russian engagement (Khasson, 2010). According to Bechev and Nicolaidis (2010, p. 491), in order to overcome the limitations of the ENP’s access-for-convergence logic, it might be necessary to supplement (but not replace) it with the exploration of various forms of what they call, ‘decentred integration,’ built on polity-building logic and “embedded in a more long- term strategic vision rather than ad hoc decisions aiming at increasing the policy’s efficiency exclusively by exploring the differentiation and conditionality toolbox.” The elements of such decentred integration are defined as follows: - Co-development: as a way to accommodate in policy-making the EU and its partners’ shared strategic goals in innovative ways. (The most salient example of such partnership for co-development is found in the management of the movement of people). - Empowerment: This is a logical consequence of co-development philosophy applied to security and political fields (such as fight against terror or democracy promotion). It can often be pursued by policy of conditionality regarding local processes – from rights of association to legal due process – rather than substantive rules framed in Brussels or the member states’ capitals. - Ownership: as involvement of the neighbours in defining the scope and contents of the special relationship under Article 7a. Ownership concerns the conditions that have to be co-owned by local actors in the governmental sector and outside it and is not opposed to conditionality but ensures that commitments are shared and contractual. - Decentralization: in terms of doing away with the complexity of the European governance such as involving the EU’s local delegations (and possibly other actors with more intimate knowledge of partner countries) in policy-shaping and

44 consequently in ex-post monitoring which in turn adds to the credibility of the policies. - Autonomous institutions: joint institutions, equal rotation and decentred summits providing for greater symmetry in the relations. This also includes agencies managing non-political aspects of the special relationship that can be located outside Brussels or even in the partner countries. - Status: an alternative type of status as a category well decoupled from access as a rewarding “carrot” but linked to joint polity-building rather than only convergence. - Geopolitical vision: as a part of the EU’s geostrategic interest in the world of rising powers and shifting balances of power and a driver of wider strategic community or overlapping security communities free from the hard constrains of regulatory and technical convergence. These elements clearly reflect the mutually constituent structure of the shared social structures emerging in the context of regionalisation. In such a way, while analyzing the emerging social practices defining the EIPs, we should search for the new interaction patterns emerging alongside these as reflecting stronger engagement of ENs in the building up of a new regional order.

3.3The endogenous factor as an independent variable

3.3.1 The macro level: the interests of the ruling elites’ in post-Soviet transitional regimes

The main argument of this study is that the major endogenous factor shaping RIPs in the post-Soviet EU neighbourhood countries can be found in the transitional nature of the ruling regimes. The stumbling nature of transition in the CIS states has been widely recognised and well documented (Headley, 2012). Its distinctive feature is that the opening towards liberal democracy that followed the dissolution of the USSR did not bear fruit and resulted instead, surprisingly, in the emergence of various forms of authoritarian or hybrid regimes in all of the former Soviet republics. These regimes can be characterized as having reached, at best, a pre-democratic stage, interlinking political and economic power, underdeveloped party systems, weak parliaments and, as a result, a high concentration of power in the hands of a small group (usually surrounding the President). According to Ottaway (2003, p. 3), they should not even

45 be seen as imperfect democracies struggling toward improvement and consolidation, but as regimes determined to maintain the appearance of democracy without exposing themselves to the political risks that free competition entails. In contrast to authoritarian regimes, they still draw some legitimacy, in some cases internationally, from their democratic structures despite their inauthentic nature. Importantly, however, such semi-authoritarian regimes are not moving towards democracy, but exist to keep a non-democratic regime in place and can be quite stable. In the same way as in authoritarian regimes, they are characterised by restrictions on the media and political freedom, and elections rarely occur in a fair electoral environment, meaning that the outcome is not in doubt. Parliaments tend to simply ratify government proposals. There are no strong parties and no parallel party structures mirroring those of government and parties do not seek to organize life outside the political sector. Patronage tends to run through individuals or the government rather than through the party and decisions are made by the leader and a few close advisers of associates rather than through formal party mechanisms. Leadership is highly concentrated and governors and leaders of other sub-national polities are almost all appointed by the president rather than directly elected. Leadership is also very personalized, with presidents enjoying a great deal of informal power. Finally, governments do not seek to achieve ideological goals but are primarily interested in maintaining the status quo: remaining in power and accumulating wealth. In other words, the entire regime is created to sustain in power a particular ruling elite, while public administration has features of both, patrimonialism and Weberian legal-rational bureaucracy.42 For the purpose of this investigation, the main question with regard to post-Soviet transitional regimes concerns the interests of the emergent ruling elites, the ways how are they endorsed and how are they different from the interests of elites in democratic states? In other words, to what extent do the policies of post-Soviet national leaders represent a ‘national choice’? According to Roberto Di Quirico (2011, p. 4), the explanation of the particular nature of political transformation in the post-Soviet political systems can be seen as subject to scale and the timing of economic and political liberalization processes in the post- Soviet space, which affected the formation of social classes and political actors and the corresponding institutional structures. The author points out that the emerging power elites are the groups that seized economic power after independence and maintained it from then onwards. The speed of the privatization process in the NISs depended

46 mostly on the country’s economic structure: those with a larger industrial sector saw faster privatization, which enabling a small group of people to grasp a large part of national industry (usually natural resources sectors) and play the role of alternative change actors. For example, in Russia, the largest CIS economy, rapid privatization resulted in the so-called ‘state capture’ by the small group of oligarchs standing in a sort of opposition to the governing (former Soviet) political elites. In contrast, slower privatization allowed for larger linkages between the political and economic elites by favoring the ones in power to strengthen their personal wealth and to grant benefits to their vested interests by offering attractive privatization deals. Another distinctive feature of privatization in the NISs, as defined by Di Quirico, is that no broad class of property owners has been created preventing the emergence of powerful social actions capable of instigating democratic transition. The majority of shares in the privatized state companies, at least the most valuable ones, were accumulated by a few powerful corporate groups or by the existing directors and senior managers of these companies, who continued to apply Soviet-style management techniques, without leading to any improvement in the management of the companies or restructuring of the economy. Coupled with the absence of strong trade unions or other civil society actors, such a change of ownership did not bring the desired economic and social transition. In such circumstances, the control of the state was becoming absolute, which fostered the regime consolidation process. The major issue of personal concern for many incumbent presidents in such regimes became the question of power succession: the main challenge was to ensure power succession through elections that would be recognized as legitimate by the international community, however, without, exposing them to the uncertainty of the democratic process. Indeed, looking at the various types of hybrid regimes that were consolidated in the CIS states during the first decade of the 21st century, one can find various power- sustaining systems. The most straightforward method to retain power used by the leaders of the CIS states was simply to force a constitutional change that lengthened the presidential rule beyond the two terms (or in the former Central Asian republics, that extended this rule for life). For example, President Lukashenko (elected in 1994) gained an extension, in 1996, of the end of his term from 1999 to 2001, and then during his second term held a referendum that allowed him to run for the third term in 2006, and he was successfully re-elected in December 2010 for a fourth term. Another method consisted in choosing a successor, as happened, for example, in Azerbaijan

47 when, in 2003, President Heyar Aliev simply withdrew from the presidential election in favour of his son Ilham. A variation of this method was developed in Russia: the president chose his successor and supported him through elections until accenting to power. This was used, for example, when Eltsin passed power on to Putin and Putin to Medvedev (while becoming himself Prime Minister), and this same mechanism was also applied in Armenia during the February 2008 elections when the incumbent, President Kocharyan, in power since 1998, who was ineligible for a third consecutive term, backed the candidacy of then Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan (Freire and Simão, 2007). These methods of power succession began to fail under the so-called coloured revolutions. Firstly, in Georgia in 2003, the popular protests that became known as the ‘Rose revolution’ protected against the electoral fraud by the ruling president, Shevardnadze, in favour of Mihail Saakashvili, who belonged to a new (non-Soviet) political establishment. A year later, in Ukraine, the ‘Orange revolution’ was directed against President Kuchma, in office since 1994, and the fabricated victory of his favoured candidate, the acting prime minister, Yanukovich. The opposition candidate, the former prime minister Yushchenko, positioned itself as an opposition to the ruling regime and headed massive manifestations that have brought him to power. Finally, in Moldova, the only parliamentary republic among the NISs thatremained for long a ‘plurality by default’ where no political force proved active enough to grasp political power,regime consolidation began in 2001 with the reinforcement of the president’s powers after Vladimir Voronin came to power, (elected by a communist majority in parliament) and lasted until April 2009 when in a similar way to other coloured revolutions, a popular protests called ‘twitter revolution’ arose against the failure of the parliament to nominate a new president (other than Voronin)., It has to be noted though, that whereas the new political elites brought to power by colour revolutions have declared a course on democratization, the regime transition process proved to be a rather long evolution. (This idea will be developed in more detail in Chapter 5). In conclusion, in terms of RIP formation, it is clear that regime survival interests are keenly present among post-Soviet elites. Depending on the degree of democratic transition, they exhibit a stronger or weaker present of both logics: functional logic on one hand (considerations of gaining legitimacy needed for re-election by performing coherent acts steering the country’s transition and conducting reforms), and regime

48 survival interests (endorsed through power sustaining mechanisms), on the other hand. In other words, the position of post-Soviet states in the EU neighbourhood along this axis depends on their state of transition (Figure 6).

Figure 6. Endogenous factors of RIPs formation in transitional regimes.

Regime survival logic Functional logic Power sustaining mechanisms Legitimacy pressures

RIPs in transition regimes non-democratic/ patrimonial regimes democratic regimes

3.3.2 The micro level: regional mobilisation of the CBC actors

The dichotomy of regime survival versus functional logic in RIP formulation by the regionalisation actors, described above, suggests new connotations in the context of micro-level regionalisation. Considering that micro-regionalism exists in different forms, there is also a greater variety of politically powerful social actors that drive regionalisation processes: apart from state administration units at the regional level, these are non-state actors such as transnational economic networks, grass-root NGOs, ethnic or cultural organizations. The role of particular (sub-national) actors at the micro-regional level started to be analyzed within the concept of regional actorness put forward by the NRA as a way of studying the ‘rise of regions’ (sub-national units), which took place since the 1980s, in particular in Europe. In contrast to ‘old’ regionalism, which considers only the role of the structural factors (including the international or supranational institutions, structures at the national level, such as the nature of centre-periphery relations and regional policy as well as the factors pertinent to the region itself, e.g. regional political, socio-economic or ethnic structures), the NRA explains regional power by analyzing the process of regional mobilization (Loughlin, 1996; Keating, 1998; Schmitt-Egner, 2002). The main argument is that regional actors develop particular (positive or negative) attitudes towards the factors/actors of the external environment depending on the opportunities provided for the fulfilment of their needs (a process of exploitation of the existing opportunity

49 structures). For example, explaining the ‘rise of regions’ that has taken place in Europe since the end of the 1980s, Hepburn (2007) concludes that when regional powers have been significantly strengthened during the so-called rise of Europe of the Regions (in the period of 1988-1995, when the EU fostered regional policy and the EU Committee of the Regions was created) regional elites opted for functional strategies vis-à-vis the EU; and to the opposite, when the opportunities provided by the EU were no longer seen as sufficient for regional empowerment, a negative attitude towards Europe prevailed. Besides, the change in the regions’ attitude vis-à-vis Europe was also accompanied by the change in the regions’ relations with the national centre. In other words, regions can apply functional strategies towards the actors which provide them with the best opportunities to satisfy their core needs by opting either for the functional type of their demands, or for the politicization of their predicaments (potentially leading to conflicts). In general, CBC as an exogenous factor provides important opportunities for regional development of border regions (usually suffering from their peripheral location within the national special development). In this regard, as put by Hagland-Morrissey (2008), the motivations of CBC actors are usually very pragmatic and closely linked with functional interests concerning specific trans-national problems, while the interactions are often developed spontaneously, alongside with (or in contrary to) the political developments at the national level. The role of political elites’ interests is decisive in the instrumentalisation of regional identity. Indeed, since the development of regional identity, according to Keating’s classification, can range from cognitive and affective steps to instrumental ones, it can be used “as a framework for mobilization and collective action in pursuit of social, economic and political goals” (Keating, 1998, p. 86), notably in voting and referenda. Importantly, unlike institutional structures, regional identity is not static and can be mobilized by regionalisation actors in accordance with the existing opportunities for regional empowerment. As noted by Schmit-Egner (2002, p. 186), in different types of regions particular elites play prominent roles: (1) cultural and political elites are the most influential in identity regions; (2) political and bureaucratic agents are especially significant in administrative regions; and (3) economic elites are important in structural regions. In his study of the EU border regions, Gren (1999) distinguishes also the role of regional development agencies that contribute to the growth of ‘regional consciousness’

50 originating from their participation in cross-border and interregional networks and lobbying activities. At the same time, regional mobilization can be seen not just a process of identity instrumentalisation but implies a more widespread process of exploitation of opportunity structures at all levels (Albina and Khasson, 2008). In other words, regional mobilization depends not only on the ability of regional elites to drive the identity formation process, but also on a whole range of structural factors (including at the level of the region itself) that define the interests of regionalisation actors. As noted by Sterling-Folker (2000, p. 102), “the relationship between social practices, identity and interests is inverted: [. . .] Identity is not an antecedent to interests but is itself a result of functional institutional efficiency related to interest and environment.” In terms of formulation of RIPs at the micro-regional level it can be said that regional mobilization towards particular factors/actors of external environment corresponds to the functional logic behind the strategies of the regionalisation actors. It means that the corresponding actions of regionalisation actors are considered as legitimate by the public opinion, e.g. identity development has reached the instrumental stage. The presence of various regionalisation actors pursuing the same mobilization strategies also points out to the functional type of emerging practices. The self-(regime) survival logic can equally be found at the micro-level regionalisation. It happens when the strategies pursued by regional elites (or other regionalisation actors) are not leading to regional mobilization, but are leading only to personal enrichment/empowerment while having clear detrimental effects on the well-being of the whole region.

51 Chapter 4. Research design and methodology

The main assumption behind this present research design, as elaborated in the course of prior theoretical deliberations, is that RIPs in the post-Soviet EU Neighbourhood are linked to the transitional nature of existing transitional regimes. The aim is to test this hypothesis by the mean of a concrete case study. Case study research is frequently used in regionalism studies since it is particularly well-suited for the study of emerging and complex phenomena.It is equally serving the purpose of explorative and descriptive research, (aiming to gain insights about areas of human activity that are not yet well documented or understood or to illustrate an example of a particular phenomenon) as well as allowing positivist inquiry, e.g. aiming to develop and evaluate theories.(Bryman, 2012). Whereas the conceptions and practices of the case study method vary considerably, (generally, four types of case studies are distinguished: descriptive; interpretative; hypothesis-generating and refining; and deviant cases), the challenge for the researcher when confronted with the case according to Vennesson (2008, p. 226), is to acknowledge and uncover its specific meaning, while extracting generalizable knowledge actually or potentially related to other cases. The author suggests that case studies should be conceived as contributing to three epistemological acts of scientific research, namely epistemological rupture, conceptualization and observation (from the applied rationalism), meaning that a scientific fact is ‘conquered, constructed and observed’. For the author, by the mere act of ‘casing’ – establishing ‘what is this a case of?’, and defining the boundaries of the phenomenon – researchers do already make a step away from conventional categorizations. In such a way, ‘casing’ takes place at various stages during the research, but especially at the beginning and at the end (ibid., p. 230). Conceptualisation is implied in the case studies as they are shaped by an explicit effort of theory construction that helps to define both the hypotheses and the data needed and, hence, inspires the empirical inquiry. Observation is a key component of case study research. It is based on in-depth empirical investigation using different types of data-gathering methods and procedures and in contrast to simple assumptions about actors’ goals and preferences

52 4.1 The case study of RIPs formation in the EN countries

In the light of the described approach, the choice of studying RIPs in the context of European integration (the process of ‘casing’) is implied already at the stage of identifying the research problem of how to explain the different directions in the regional strategies of the post-Soviet states. The relevance of the concept for answering the research question has been then theoretically informed and found as most appropriate for explaining EU relations with its neighbourhood. In the course of the theoretical deliberations, it has also been suggested that in order to be comprehensive, an inquiry about the European integration processes has to reflect multiple levels. This can be achieved by using multiple case studies, which allow for particular situation to be understood from different perspectives, or as a general whole ‘defined in multiple ways’ (as defined by Ragin, 2003). The use of various cases is also usually seen as making the case ‘rich’ (Pennings et al., 2008). Within the present research, the study of macro- and micro- regionalisation levels will allow not just a deeper analysis of EIPs manifested by different (state and non-state) actors, but will also provide ground for producing new generalizations concerning possible interconnections between the two levels. Whereas the main purpose of the selected cases is achieved by targeting relevant (e.g. politically powerful) actors driving regionalisation processes in the Eastern Neighbourhood at macro- and micro-regional levels, the selected cases should also correspond to particular policies in the EU external relations covering the entire area of the Eastern neighbourhood in a given period of time. This research aims to examine one single rotation in RIPs formation process starting from the launch of the ENP in 2004 and ending in 2013 (coinciding with the end of the EU budgetary cycle of 2007- 2013). In terms of impact on the post-Soviet neighbourhood, the EU neighbourhood policy during this time period can be considered as a permanent and stable factor from the external environment. Such an approach to case selection is called purposeful sampling or ‘qualitative sampling’ technique, which involves selecting certain units or cases ‘based on a specific purpose rather than randomly’ (Teddlie and Yu, 2007, p.80).

53 At the macro level, the case can be framed by the ENP/EaP, while focusing primarily on the EaP initiative launched in 2009 as a new policy designed explicitly towards the post-Soviet EU neighbourhood (in contrast to ENP which is directed to both Eastern and Southern neighbours). This initiative intended to upgrade the EU relationship with the ENs and to brush off frustration with the ENP that during five years of its implementation failed to deliver any positive change (Kochenov, 2011). While conceived as introducing a truly new type of relationship emphasising the regional dimension in the EU´s Eastern policies, the EaP still contains a great deal of continuity with the ENP in both policy design and the perceptions of the European neighbour countries towards the EU. 43 The case of micro-level regionalisation in its turn can also be represented by a dedicated EU policy targeting the border regions in the Eastern EU neighbourhood, the ENPI CBC 2007-2013 as well as its transitional period 2004-2006 when financing was provided by the INTERREG, PHARE and TACIS CBC funds (European Commission, 2003b). It is represented by nine programmes operated jointly with partners from Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine.44 The ENPI CBC policy approach was developed on the principles of partnership and joint ownership meaning an important innovation with regard to the inclusion of external partners and instigating, possibly new regionalisation dynamics.

4.2 Data collection and analysis

The logic of analysis in the present investigation should follow the direction opposite to the RIPs formation process (as shown by Figure 5 above), e.g. establishing a link (or a dependency) between the manifested EIP and domestic preconditions underlying this RIP, e.g. the factors that have determined the regionalisation choices of relevant politically powerful actors. This implies a two stage analysis (1) RIPs definition (or descriptive analysis) and (2) their explanation (interpretation) by the factor of regime transition (as defined in Chapter 3). In other words, the cases combine the descriptive and interpretative approaches, while the need to link a particular RIP with a corresponding state of regime transition requires the research to be guided by the general intent to understand the whole process of RIPs formation. In this regard, the case can be best served by the process tracing method. Process tracing is “a procedure for identifying steps in a causal process leading to the outcome

54 of a given dependent variable of a particular case in a particular historical context“ (Vennesson, 2008p. 230). In other words, using process tracing, the researcher assesses a theory by identifying the causal chain(s) that link the independent and dependent variables. The researcher’s focus is on learning whether a particular factor can be traced and linked to another with the goal to uncover the relations between possible causes and observed outcomes. In contrast to simple storytelling, the process tracing is focused. It deals selectively with only certain aspects of the phenomenon. The investigator is aware that some information is lost along with some of the unique characteristics of the phenomenon. It is also structured in the sense that the investigator is developing an analytical explanation based on a theoretical framework. Finally, the goal of process tracing is ultimately to provide a narrative explanation of a causal path that leads to a specific outcome (Bennett and George, 1997) Process tracing requires an important amount of ‘raw’ data that marks the course of events. Usually, this can be done by the use of primary sources ranging from histories and archival documents to interview transcripts, statistics etc. The empirical evidence informing on the EU policies implementation and discursive practices will be gathered at the first stage ( descriptive part) of the study using several sources. As noted by Yin (1984, p. 23), Using multiple sources and techniques in the data gathering process is precisely a key strength of the case study method. The primary source of data for the analysis comes from official policy documents, produced by the EU institutions and other relevant bodies and agencies. In order to identify the rethoric of national leaders in the EN countries regarding the relations with the EU and the EaP policy the conventional content analysis method will be used. Usually this technique serves well when the aim is to describe a phenomenon. Researchers avoid using preconceived categories, instead allowing coding categories to flow from the data (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005, p. 1279).It will be conducted using the official statements, speeches and interviews by the high level national officials in the open sources, primarily, the official Presidential web sites, but also main national news agencies and to national and international media. Another useful source of information is offered by interviews with the officials from the Representations of the EN countries in the EU. Three semi-structured interviews were conducted in the course of 2012 in the Representations of Belarus (December), Azerbaijan (April) and Moldova (March)45. The countries were chosen by representing the most reluctant, hesitant and most pro–European examples, and given

55 the abundance of information in the open sources in the three other neighbour countries. In order to obtain reliable, comparable qualitative data, the interviews were conducted using the same interview guide, e.g. following the same structure and covering the same issues, with only slight county specific differences in questions. The second stage (explanatory part) will contrast the constructed narratives with the evidence of post-Soviet political and democratic transition with the aim to establish the relationship of correlation.

For the CBC case the empirical evidence of cooperation patterns emerging within the CBC at the Eastern EU borders will be collected from the statistical data on the ENPI CBC Programmes´ implementation obtained from the Programmes´ documents and web sites (see list in the annex) as well as from the official documents and reports published by the European Commission and relevant EU bodies and network organizations. Additional data will be obtained through informal interviews with the CBC experts46 from the European Commission (officials at the programme management level in EuropeAid, DG RELEX andDG REGIO), and NEEBORas well as from occasional meetings with Programmes representatives from the ENPI CBC partner countries, such as during CBC conferences or their visits to respective Regional Representations in Brussels in the period between 2004 and 2012. The initially intended collection of primary data on the discursive practices of policy implementation by means of a survey resulted unfeasible (The requests to distribute the questionnaires to CBC project partners (the sampling group) have been declined by most of the Programmes´ secretariats for various reasons, primarily confidentiality of project partners´ contacts.). For this reason, data on attitudes and expectations of the CBC actors has been drawn from the secondary sources, e.g. different surveys on policy implementation progress conducted by INTERACT and RCBI as well as surveys on border regions, such as by ‘EU Dimensions’ and ‘EXLINEA’ research programmes. At the second stage thobtaineddata on manifested EIPs would be explained in correlation with regional mobilization opportunities provided within the systems of centre-regional relations in the EN countries.

56 Chapter 5. Formation of European Integration Preferences in the Context of Macro Level Regionalisation. The Case of the EaP

Introduction

The objective of this case study is to analyze the process of EIPs formation within the Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative in order to identify a correlation with the regime transition factor. The study covers six partner countries in the Eastern EU neighbourhood participating in the EaP, e.g. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. While the EU relations with the EN countries are examined since 2004, the EIPs are defined only as expressed towards the EaP, e.g. in the period from May 2009 until the end of 2013. The study will begin by providing a historical perspective on RIPs formation in the post-Soviet states by highlighting what particular interests stand for the presence of either regime survival or legitimacy pressures in considerations of the ruling elites. In the following part, the empirical evidence of the manifested EIPs in the EN countries will be analysed by inquiring into the nature of emerging social practices within the EaP initiative. Then, the correlation with the endogenous factors should be established through an overview of the regime transition progress in the EN countries.

5.1 RIPs formation in the post-Soviet transitional regimes

As elaborated above, the transitional nature of post-Soviet regimes manifests itself through the presence of two logics behind the calculations of regionalisation actors- one pertinent to the authoritarian regimes (regime-survival) and the other, characteristic to the democratic ones (functional logic driven by legitimacy pressures). Hence, looking at RIPs from the viewpoint of interests of the ruling elites can allow placing the countries on this continuum according to their degree of regime transition. Indeed, as it will be demonstrated below, regime survival logic, to a different extent, has been present practically in every country in the region while legitimacy pressures remained weak. Usually, this was achieved through the use of multi-vector foreign policy strategies (meaning that two (or more) policy directions are developed

57 simultaneously, the Western and the Russian one). These strategies allow the ruling elites to promote the objectives corresponding to their regime-survival interests, while mitigating the legitimacy pressures (where they exist) through an appropriate domestic or foreign policy discourse. Even if from the outset, some of the NISs had escaped the multi-vector game (such as Azerbaijan that has taken an independent Western oriented course with Turkey as a proxy, or Belarus that, to the opposite, has adopted a clearly pro-Russian course) at some point they have also relied at this technique to ensure sustainability of their regimes.

Azerbaijan

The autocratic regime of President Aliev, relying on its extensive petroleum rents, had no need whatever for external support. The President’s personal rule has been characterized by a high degree of power concentration, neo-patrimonial public administration and the use of a patron-client network. The country’s rich energy sector remained state-controlled with President Aliev wielding ultimate authority over the State Oil Company ´SOCAR´ and also over spending by the State Oil Fund. Petroleum rents have made it possible to sustain a large public sector employment (18% of the population, as compared, for example, with 8% in Georgia and 6.5% in Armenia), and a vast patronage network organized around access to, and distribution of, material resources which are exchanged for political support and loyalty (Guliyev, 2008). Privatization was allowed at a later stage of regime consolidation as a way of empowering a small group surrounding the President’s clan, and was initiated with the handing over of some state-owned enterprises to regime cronies, members of the ruling family, and associates who grasped control over many lucrative sectors outside the oil industry, e.g. construction infrastructure building, banking, services, etc. At the same time, the selective nature of economic reform, which benefited the elite more than anyone else, prevented the formation of a genuine capitalist market economy (ibid.). Coupled with the vanishing of oil resources, this situation resulted in growing pressures for economic diversification, which questioned, consequently, the basis of the regime’s legitimacy and, caused there to be a search for the EU’s technical assistance in modernizing the economy, as will be pursued within the Strategic Modernization Partnership.

58 Belarus

The basis of the President Lukashenko’s regime, in power since 1994, has been the concentration of economic power in state administration (as in Soviet times) while at the same time blocking any privatization processes from the very beginning and avoiding market reforms in order to spare the unpopular shock of transition. As noted by Leshchenko (2008), this regime has proved very viable on account of the successful imposition of a national ideology based on the values accepted by the majority of the population, including strengthened relations with Russia. This egalitarian national ideology has been used to sustain a collectivist approach to the economy and to keep dissent at bay, ensuring a domestic social homogenization and also a resistance to external pressures applied to the President. To this end, Western institutional actors have been portrayed as external enemies of the nation and their concerns for the democratic development as hypocritical pretext for their disguised aspirations to subdue the country (Leshchenko, 2008, p. 1426). In this regard, Lukashenko’s policy has been often characterized by critics as a complete and utter failure, leaving the country marginalized and isolated from the democratic international community. As noted by Leshchenko (2008, p. 1429), from the perspective of the regime survival, however, the ideology of Belarusian national independence has been highly successful. By ignoring Western approaches, he has successfully limited the influence of Western countries in Belarus to the extent that they have virtually no leverage in the country. At the same time, the integration process with Russia, which started in the 1990s, did not put the country on the brink of full unification with Russia, but ensured that Lukashenko had unprecedented economic and political support for his rule in Belarus, while the rhetoric of independence continued to place barriers in the way of yielding even a small share of authority over domestic issues to Russia (at least until late 2006 when a number of concessions were made regarding the ownership of the gas transport company Beltransgaz) and managed to avoid (at least for some time) a large-scale expansion of Russian capital in the country. In such a way, President Lukashenko managed to play off the interests of Russia and the West in the way that allowed him scope for political maneuver within the country, while ensuring Russia’s economic support for the unreformed and state controlled economy and enabling the government to bypass and ignore Western standards of democratic procedures and freedoms. In other words, some elements of a

59 multi-vector strategy were used to obtain more benefits and concessions from both sides.

Armenia

The most prominent example of the multi-vector strategy can be found in Armenia. Since the early 1990s, the essence of its foreign policy approach, known as a ‘policy of complementarity,’ was an attempt to combine and maintain a balance between the interests of all international and regional powers that are actively involved in the South Caucasus region.47 As stated in the National Security Strategy (adopted in 2007), “Armenia’s strategic partnership with Russia, its adoption of a European model of development, mutually beneficial cooperation with Iran and the United States, membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and intensification of cooperation with the NATO alliance, all contribute to Armenia's policy of complementarity” (ibid.). In particular, in its first two years of independence, Armenia’s policies were the most effective manifestation of complementarity: locked in a war over Karabakh, it was nonetheless able to take advantage of a unique foreign policy conjuncture whereby it received arms from Russia for military operations, funds from the United States for state building and to purchase arms, food from Europe, and fuel from Iran. As noted by Minasyan (2012), the idea was to avoid a pro-Western, pro-Russian, or pro-Iranian bias. Indeed, despite increasing anti-Russian stereotypes in the West, Armenia, Russia’s ally and a CSTO member, has never been regarded by the West as an exclusively pro-Russian actor. The first Armenian governments also undertook efforts to diversify its foreign trade and conduct democratic reforms in line with international pressures and, in particular, the aspirations of the Armenian Diaspora that plays an important role in the country’s economy. While the complementarity approach in foreign policy was generally preserved during the rule of Presidents Kocharyan (1998-2008) and Sargsyan (in power since 2008), the bias started to incline gradually towards the Russian vector. In fact, the major source of legitimacy for the ruling Presidents in Armenia remained primarily the firm position on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that required continuity militarization and, and hence, Russian support. As noted by Freire and Simão (2007, p. 16), the support of military forces became an indispensable condition for ascending to presidency, and it

60 is not surprising that in clan-based Armenian politics the latest presidents are Karabakhis (referring to Kocharyan and Sargsyan). In this way, Armenia’s security preferences remain clearly attached to Russian military guarantees within the CSTO security alliance, and Russia’s support with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, including an access to the Russian-made weaponry. Both presidents also have a control of most of the dominant business and economic sectors gained during the rather swift (from 1994 through to 2000), privatization process (when 90 percent of SMEs and 83 percent of medium and large enterprises were privatized) (Ishkanian, 2008). Business elites are deeply intertwined with political power, and vice versa, in a way that each has an incentive to preserve the status quo, fearing that regime change could kick off a new campaign of economic redistribution at the expense of today’s oligarchs. The normal practice has been that the business groups switched their allegiance with the change of president since the groups supporting the opponent during the presidential campaign were usually persecuted: for example, with Sargsyan’s rise to the presidency in 2008, the Grzo’s SIL Group that supported L.T. Petrosyan’s presidential campaign was substantially disassembled, and its most lucrative assets seized and effectively transferred (by rigged court actions) into the hands of loyalists of President Serzh Sargsyan.48 In fact, the interlinking of political leaders and oligarchs under the Kocharian and Sargsyan presidencies reached such a degree that particular economic interests became one of the most important factors in policy formulation. In a similar manner to these security considerations, the economic interests of the ruling elites were also becoming closely linked with Russia: continuous economic blockade by Azerbaijan and Turkey reinforced the dependence on the CIS markets, while massive investments by the Russian companies on beneficial conditions provided by the Armenian authorities have strengthened Russian economic presence in the country.49 Against this background the pro-European direction in the official strategy of complementarity remained a valuable asset for mitigating the arising legitimacy pressures. In this vain for example, Armenia called upon the establishment of a high level EU Advisory Group with the aim to provide policy advice to the Armenian government in implementing the ENP AP.50

61 Ukraine

Since independence, Ukraine has also kept a multi-vectorial foreign policy and become particularly notorious in its wish of approximation to the West, while keeping close ties with Moscow. All of the ruling presidents showed caution in ‘not overlooking its eastern neighbour’ while deepening relations with Western structures. Even under the ‘Orange’ government, the multi-vectorial foreign policy has been following the motto: “To Europe with Russia,” apparently trying to reconcile the Eastern and Western vectors in Ukrainian external relations. In other words, as noted by Freire (2009), while approximation to the West is valued, relations with Russia remain a fundamental pillar in the Ukrainian construct. This apparent desire for conciliation and complementarity, however, has also added suspicion about Ukrainian real intentions and has been understood in the West as a kind of mask for maneuvers by the political elites, searching for benefits both in Western friendship and Russian amity, not playing in favor of Ukraine’s integration with the West. In fact, for some time presidents Kravchuk (1991-1994) and Kuchma (1994-2004) managed to play with the country’s geopolitical and strategic location, pressuring both the West and Russia and seeking recognition as a bridging state, or the in-between power. Ukraine has been pursuing active cooperation with the USA (including the 1600-person military force sent to Iraq in the summer of 2003). Since 1998, Ukraine has also adopted many documents that declared the country’s prospects for European integration.51 As noted by Wolczuk (2004), in Ukraine the dominant elite surrounding president Kuchma declared itself to be pro-European. The reason, as the author explains, is that seeking European integration has served as important legitimizing, discursive resource both in internal and external contexts. In the domestic context, the proclamation of European aspirations fills an ideological void and boosts the legitimacy of the current regime which has made the achievement of prosperity, peace and stability, e.g. the qualities embodied in Europe, the cornerstone of its otherwise rather sparse ideological platform. In fact, even the pro-reform elites were seeking the prospect of the EU membership only as an acknowledgement of this possibility by the EU, since it would have strengthened their case in Ukraine for the unequivocal choice of the European path and weakened the appeal of the Eastern option (ibid.). Therefore, in external relations, the proclamation of a ‘European choice’ serves a valuable function as a pivotal component of multi-vectorial foreign policy strategy, insofar as it

62 serves as a counterbalance to the pull of Russia and puts limits on integration with Russia, at least beyond the scope needed to serve particular sectoral and group interests of the pro-presidential elite (ibid., p. 22). It is clear then that, during Kuchma’s rule, Ukraine’s European aspirations did not inspire any reform process that would lead to an improvement of standards of public life and economic well-being. Against this background, the coming to power of the new political elite as a result of the ‘Orange’ revolution in December 2004 has been accompanied by the overwhelming rise of the European integration vector in Ukrainian politics (furthermore, the EU, for the first time, clearly took the side of the Orange leaders against the arguably a pro-Russian candidate). The official statements of the Orange coalition were clearly acknowledging that Ukraine’s integration into European structures still requires the implementation of deep reforms. For example, as President Yushchenko said in the European Parliament on 23 February 2005, “Ukraine is ready to walk the distance to meet the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership. I would like to state in clear terms that we realise that the bulk of the work to integrate Ukraine into the EU has to be done by Ukrainians themselves.”52 This window of opportunity for placing the Europeanisation process well on track has not been used, however, and had only added to misbalance of rhetoric and action. Despite multiple documents and initiatives promoting European integration the cost of implementing the reforms necessary to move the country closer to European standards was still considered too high by the ruling elites. No political actor proved to be strong and/or sufficiently committed to overcome the declarative nature of European integration and to incorporate it into the domestic policies (Stegniy, 2011, p. 51). In fact, as Toms et al. (2002) put it, the Orange coalition turned out to be just an alternation within the dominant oligarchy: the power elite in Ukraine remained always a part of the same corporatist regime established during the slow-pace privatization of the country’s significant industrial sector (steel industries and energy transit infrastructures) in 1997-2002, when the initially cohesive oligarchy divided among themselves the country’s wealth while establishing strong linkages between economic and political elites. Against this background, the Orange revolution did not bring the desired democratization but became, rather, a great disappointment for the aspirations of many Ukrainians. As noted by Eberhardt (2009, p. 49), there was popular disenchantment with the unfulfilled promises of the Orange Revolution. The economic growth did not

63 reach the expected levels, corruption was maintained as a factor of high governing instability, and the social conditions of the population suffered only residual changes well below the expectations: the dream about a democratic and prosperous Ukraine dissipated in the complex post-communist transition, a long-term process demanding the implementation of reforms in a short period and giving signs of consolidation only in the long run. The political instability following the Orange revolution has prevented the government from pursuing any consistent domestic or foreign policy course. The brief rule of the Orange government (January 2005 to September 2006) was ended by the victory of the Party of Regions in the legislative elections in March 2006, implying the need for negotiating a coalition government and Yanukovich’s appointment as a Prime minister (from August 2006 to September 2007). The constitutional crisis in spring 2007 and the dissolution of the parliament in October 2008 leading to the early parliamentary elections in December 2008 did not contribute to the elaboration of a single FP line. According to the Ukrainian experts,53 in the situation of permanent struggle within the political elite, the MFA has chosen a less resistant strategy of simply servicing the EU and US visions of reform for Ukraine, occasionally accommodating their interests on the post-Soviet territory. In fact, it was not possible to elaborate a coherent position on European integration. There have been competing views represented by the president, the prime minister and the parliament. Key political players of the country tried to adjust FP priority to fit their own needs and interests. And in order to solve domestic disputes key international players were invited to arbitrate leaving little of Ukraine’s independence (Stegniy, 2011, p. 62). Furthermore, the Ukrainian elites continued with an idea that Ukraine’s sheer size and geopolitical significance as a counterbalance to Russia would guarantee it attention from the western institutions. Hence, European integration was still regarded as an exclusive foreign policy matter and hence remained rather insignificant in terms of domestic policy-making (Wolczuk, 2008, p. 91). In such circumstances, the simplest way to promote the relations with the EU was by accepting as a fait accompli all the initiatives proposed by the EU. Thus, for example, the signing of the ENP AP in 2005, preceded by active public discussions in Kyiv, was finally signed without any significant changes to the EU document, e.g. containing considerable asymmetry between the two parties and reflecting an ambivalent position of Ukraine (ibid., p. 54). Not surprisingly, the EU-Ukraine FTA negotiations, which started in 2007, have

64 entered into a deadlock caused by the incapacity of the Ukrainian government to demonstrate clear position on any of the issues to allow finding a mutually acceptable solution to move forward. In fact, the oligarchic groups that represent a large part of the ruling elite have already had sufficient access to EU market under the existing ‘GSP+’ provisions and were not gaining from the new one while jeopardizing their ties with Russia (Lupu 2010; Pleines, 2009). The negotiations were resumed only after the general policy approach of the so-called Euro-romanticism pursued by the Orange coalition was changed to the ‘pragmatic’ approach to Europeanisation under the Presidency of Yanukovich who won the elections in February 2010. Despite being considered a ‘Russian man,’ Yanukovich did not abandon the European vector but had even moved negotiations forward to closing of all chapters of the on-going Association Agreement (AA), including the FTA mentioned before by December 2011. Despite this progress however, as it will be shown later in this chapter, in the same way as the ‘virtual’ policy of the Orange coalition proved unsustainable, the pragmatic policy approach had very soon also reached its limits.

Moldova

Moldova also pursued a dual policy trying to reconcile and balance a distinctly pro- Western course with policy designed to strengthen and expand pre-existing ties to Moscow. In contrast to Ukraine, however, this dual loyalty was designed to ensure the country’s political survival, rather than counterbalancing the two powers. At the same time, it was also characterized by political ambivalence with the change of course more than once.54 During the years of independence, Moldova moved closer to Romania (symbolically, adopting the same national flag, an identical anthem and a similar currency name). Soon after that, however, Moldovan leaders switched to reaffirm the uniqueness of a Moldovan identity (in the 1994 Moldovan Constitution) and turned back closer to CIS and Moscow, which was seen as the only political force capable of resolving the frozen conflict with Transnistria. In March 1999, the ruling Alliance for Democracy and Reforms appointed the Sturza government, which became the first one that specifically stipulated European integration as its main strategic objective. Following the entry into force of the PCA in 1998, Moldova tried to intensify and upgrade its relations with the EU: it establishes a National Commission for European Integration and participated in many EU-driven regional initiatives, the

65 main one being the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe. This course lasted for nine months until the new government was appointed by the communist parliamentary majority that won the 2001 elections. When Vladimir Voronin, the leader of the communist majority, became President (as a result of a change of political system from direct presidential elections to parliamentary voting), he was committed to reversing the pro-market reform of the previous government and rebuilding the country based on a strong alliance with Russia. Yet, after just a few years he came back to prioritize European integration. Thus, in September 2003 he approved the Concept of Integration of the Republic of Moldova into the EU (including the guidelines for achieving the set objectives and a recognition that the process involves civil society institutions as well as central and local governments). Following the launch of the ENP in 2005, relations with the EU have been further intensified: the Commission’s delegation opened in Chisinau in 2005 and a Special EU Representative was appointed for the Transnistrian conflict. On 1 January 2006, Moldova received GSP Plus status, and in 2008 a preferential trade regime with the EU came into force. Additionally, Moldova joined a Central European Free Trade agreement. As Schmidtke and Chira-Pascanut (2011) explain, apart from the economic and political constrains in the international arena, such a U-turn in political course could be explained by strategic considerations of gaining electoral support. In fact, the Moldovan Communist Party needed to broaden its electoral attractiveness (based on Russian-speaking, Moscow-oriented community based on Soviet-style ideologies) and to strengthen its populist-ideological appeal by embarking on the European agenda and including promises associated with the prosperous and democratic West into its political repertoire. As noted by Danii and Mascautenau (2011, p. 101), by 2005, Moldovan society had reached political and social consensus on this issues, e.g. a majority of political parties and parliamentary fractions adopted a number of declarations committing Moldova to a course of European integration. As mentioned earlier, the country has not seen any attempts of regime consolidation until then, and President Voronin simply could not ignore these pressures. Starting his second presidential term, Voronin promised a thorough adoption of key EU reforms and embarked on a sustained campaign of rapprochement with the EU. Indeed, Moldova even created all the necessary institutions that were expected of the candidate countries such as Parliamentary Committee on European Affairs, a European Integration Department within the MFA, the EU units in all ministries, and so on. The

66 first years of the implementation of the EU-Moldova 2005 Action Plan were praised for a commitment to an irreversible European integration policy. At the same time as a result of Moscow’s renewed moves to reclaim its former sphere of influence, this time through punitive policies (the 2006 embargo on exports of wine fruits and vegetable), Moldova became practically isolated politically and economically from advantageous trade relations with other CIS member state. As a consequence, by the end of Voronin’s second term there was a new rapprochement with Russia, based in particular on Moldova’s firm promise to renounce NATO membership aspirations forever and maintain neutrality. Moldovan high officials continued to reiterate on numerous occasions that the integration of the republic into the European family was one of the strategic priorities of foreign policy, but this direction becomes very vague, e.g. without real effort or intention to continue fostering European integration process (Lupu, 2010). In such circumstances, the promise of Europe started to lose credibility,55 as confirmed soon during the Moldovan spring uprising (the so-called ‘Twitter revolution’), which was directed against the 2009 election results, but more importantly, against the political regime that seemed to have departed from its pro- European course. This was a clear political signal for ending practices of ‘virtual’ Europeanisation, and starting to deliver on the made commitments. Significantly, the coalition of opposition parties that had overtaken power had adopted an unequivocal pro-European stance, fostered by each of the three acting presidents who have consequently had the office until March 2012, when the parliament finally agreed on the candidature of Nicolae Timofti, who had in his turn, also fully supported the European integration course.

Georgia

Georgia has been probably the most determined among the NISs in its pro-western orientations and the course on integration into Euro-Atlantic structures was implemented most consistently, without evoking the multi-vector option. Since 1992, President Shevardnadze was a Western favorite for his stint as Soviet foreign minister, in which he played a major role in ending the Cold War. Having inherited a Georgia wracked by civil strife and dominated by warlords, he initially brought progress on several fronts, but after a few years he lost his way, allowing the country to slide into corruption and inertia.56 In contrast to its post-Soviet neighbours, Georgia integration

67 with the West has been seen as an optimal civilizational choice not only by elites, but also by the majority of the population. In this regard, as noted by Beachain (2009), the ‘Rose Revolution’ came not so much against the objectives of the former regime, but as a claim for their better implementation demanding from Saakashvili decisive action. Thus, one of the first steps of the new administration was to declare integration with EU as Georgia’s utmost foreign policy priority.57 The key to the Saakashvili’s strategy was to appeal to the West by presenting Georgia as a regional pioneer of democratic, economic and institutional reforms (and also a reliable transportation link between Europe and the hydrocarbons-rich Caspian Sea and Central Asia). This was underlined by symbolic measures, such as making all state structures to display the EU flag (Rinnert, 2011). Importantly, however, the transformation of the political system has been started through wide-ranging modernization reforms implemented in such fields as fighting corruption (especially in police forces through substitution of most officers and a number of liberalization measures), the effectiveness of tax collection, improved infrastructure and strengthened government regulation (ibid). The President had also undertaken a successful operation for reintegrating the secessionist region Adjara and took the course for terminating the ‘frozen conflicts’ in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well. The first years of Saakashvili’s presidency were, indeed, marked by close cooperation with the EU: establishment of the post of the Special Representative for the South Caucasus (EUSR) in 2003, negotiation of the ENP Action Plan (2004-2006), a donors’ conference in 2004, and the first ESDP Rule of Law mission deployed in Georgia in 2005 (Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira and Simão, 2008). At the same time, officials within the Saakashvili administration were skeptical of European integration because of a lack of cooperation mechanisms concerning security issues (in particular with regard to frozen conflicts) as well as due to ambiguous nature of the ENP, lacking concrete benefits. Many Georgian decision-makers perceived the EU as deeply divided by its own members’ contradictory preferences (Delcour and Tulmets, 2009). Early in the process, the government sought ‘selective convergence’ (Delcour, 2013) in negotiations with the EU (making use of the ENP’s joint ownership principle) focusing on bringing the AP the closest possible to its own priorities. Furthermore, the government’s bid for the fast economic recovery, by applying an extremely neo-liberal approach, conflicted with the task of approximation with the EU policies based on

68 greater state regulation. As a result, gradually, the number-one foreign policy priority was shifted to further approximation with NATO and the USA due to military help and Bush Administration’s strong support to Georgia’s NATO membership, perceived as a cornerstone for the country’s security and political stability. This has not lasted for long, however. While genuinely popular during the first years of his presidency, Saakashvili obtained only a very slim majority during the presidential elections in 2008, and continued to lose legitimacy throughout his second term. The situation of a continuous economic downfall, harsh economic reforms that have hit hard on the majority of the population as well as the loss of the break-away provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia following the disastrous war with Russia in August 2008 did not add popularity to Saakashvili’s regime. Moreover, the opposition has been voicing an ever stronger discontent with the increasingly authoritarian political practices and the lack of checks and balances in Georgia’s political system. In fact, despite significant political progress in paving the way for a transformation of Georgia’s political system the personal rule of the President has developed into what has been described by Mitchell (2012) as a semi-authoritarian regime: the government of President Saakashvili dominated Georgian politics almost completely; the ruling party, United National Movement, created by him, clings to power and does not tolerate much serious opposition. It has over 75% of the seats in parliament and controls local governing legislation. Likewise, every major appointed government official is either a party member of supporter. Saakashvili also holds a substantial degree of both formal and informal power. He appoints cabinet ministers and other officials. Few people are placed on the UNM’s lists for parliament without the president’s approval; key decisions are made by the president himself or with his closest advisers rather than through consultation with parliament (ibid.). Against this backdrop, the ‘European card’ was for Saakashvili a major asset during the parliamentary electoral race in 2012, and the role of the EU was prioritized again over NATO (especially, considering the EU’s constructive engagement in the 2008 post- war conflict settlement). In such a way, it is clear that the regional strategies pursued by the post-soviet Eastern EU neighbours allowed the ruling elites to privilege those policy directions that ensured the strengthening of their regime sustaining mechanisms, be it through developing closer ties with Russia, with the EU, or with both. In particular, this had resulted in a phenomenon of the so-called ‘virtual Europeanisation,’ when the declared

69 objective of European integration stayed largely at the level of political discourse while not aiming at the ultimate European future and serving rather as a mean in the changing calculations of the ruling elites. It was skilfully exploited when having officially declared the EU membership aspirations the ruling elites were not willing to work on fostering real integration progress. Therefore, in Moldova, for the communist government of President Voronin, this strategy served as a way of overtaking the pro- European electorate. In Ukraine, the European discourse of the ‘Orange’ government was rather masking the lacking domestic reforms and political instability. Even Georgia, the closest to the functional logic, where an explicitly pro-Western course has been largely maintained in accordance with the legitimacy pressures, did not escape such (temporary) shifts away from the primacy of European integration objective due to consideration of personal power preservation by President Saakashvili. To some extent, ‘virtual Europeanisation’ can be also found in Armenia, which is not aspiring for the EU membership, but the EU vector appears as a way of compensating the ever heavier Russian vector. It is not the case though in the authoritarian Azerbaijan, where the consolidated regime has no need to mitigate legitimacy pressures through particular FP directions, whereas the European vector has a very purpose. Finally, the pro-Russian President Lukashenko exploits the European vector as to allow him scope for political manoeuvre while obtaining benefits from both sides.

5.2 The European Integration Preferences as practices of the EU-neighbour relations within the EaP initiative

As defined in Chapter 4, the EIPs can be seen as social practices of EU-neighbour relations. The mutually constitutive nature of the interaction patterns reflecting these practices implies that apart from the logic enshrined in the EU policy instruments, the emerging social structures in the EN countries appear equally relevant. Furthermore, the comprehensive and dynamic nature of the EU as an external actor means that these structures concern both, the actual policy progress as well as the discursive practices that accompany it (including the expectations from the future EU role), have to be considered. First, however, a short overview of the EaP will be provided, outlining the policy instruments used by the EU in order to foster this new regional approach in its relations with the EN.

70 5.2.1 The EU policy instruments: towards a new regional approach under the EaP?

The launch of the EaP initiative in May 2009 has been seen as a declaration of a manifestation of the EU’s regional approach to its direct vicinity in the East. Apart from being the first EU policy targeting exclusively the post-Soviet neighbourhood, the initiative has been also shaped as a double-track policy combining bilateral and multilateral dimensions. This provides an important innovation in terms of institutional framework. Apart from upgrading EU-neighbour bilateral dialogue at the ah-hoc level (as established under the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements at the end of 1990s and, additionally, within the ENP), the EaP introduces a new multilateral institutional framework including: summits of the heads of states and governments in a 27+6 format (EU Member States and the EN countries) to be held every two years, annual meetings at the level of foreign ministers as well as sector-specific Ministerial Meetings (convened as necessary) (Table 2).

Table 2. The EaP multilateral track. Institutional progress Governmental track EaP Summit EU 27 and EaP 6 plus EU institutions and IFIs as observers. Every 2 years. Ministerial Council (Every year) (and sectoral Ministerial Meetings)

Sectoral cooperation

Platforms Panels Flagships Biannual meetings More frequent meetings

1 Democracy good 1. Integrated Border 1. Integrated border governance stability Management management programme, (EEAS) 2. Fight against Corruption IBM 3. Public Administration Reform 2. The Civil Protection 4. Improved Functioning of the Judiciary

2.Economic 1.Trade and Trade Related 3.Smal and medium-size Integration and Regulatory Cooperation enterprise (SME) facility Convergence with linked to DCFTAS Euro-Policies 2. Environment and climate 4.Environmentalgovernance

71 (DG TRADE) change prevention of natural and 3. Enterprise and SME Policy man-made disasters, 4. Labour Market and Social preparedness for them and Policies response to them

5. Regional electricity market, 3 Energy security Transport Panel (launched in energy efficiency and (DG TREN) October 2011) 58 renewable energy. 6. Diversification of energy supply, and the question of the southern energy corridor (postponed) 4.Contacts between people

Non-governmental track Parliamentary Assembly EURONEST (launched in May 2011) Civil Society Forum Assembly of the Regional and Local Authorities (CORLEAP)

In addition, the initiative also previews a multilateral cooperation framework under four Thematic Platforms supported by the work of designated panels and also Flagship Initiatives giving additional momentum, concrete substance and more visibility to the Partnership.59 Finally, at the non-governmental level, new institutional frameworks include the Parliamentary Assembly (EURONEST), the Civil Society Forum and the Conference of the Regional and Local Authorities under the Committee of the Regions (CORLEAP) (Delcour, 2011). The regional nature of the initiative remains, however, not evident. Alongside the created multilateral structures, the instruments of policy implementation remain characteristic to bilateral cooperation toolbox while limited financing does not allow for any significant advancement of regional cooperation. Thus, to begin with, within the total ENP budget, the EN accounts for just a half of funding provided to the Southern neighbourhood. Within this share, the €600 million are earmarked for the EaP as part of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) 2010- 2013 Regional programme,60 or about a quarter of the total funding available to Eastern Partnership countries over this period. These €600 million are distributed as following: 1. Comprehensive institution building programmes (bilateral), €175 million; 2. Pilot regional development programmes aimed at addressing regional economic and social disparities within the partner countries, €75 million (from 2012 onwards);

72 3. The multilateral dimension of the EaP framework of the ENPI Regional East Programme 2010-2013 (the four policy platforms and six flagships, as well as the non- governmental track), €350 million. It should be noted that scarce financing is not a novelty when it comes to regional initiatives (dimensions) in the EU foreign policies. As it often happens with such policies, ever since its inauguration, the EaP has been fostered mainly by the MSs that are direct neighbours with the Eastern partners: initiated by the Polish-Swedish proposal and launched in Prague during the Czech Presidency, it was then promoted during the Hungarian, Polish and Lithuanian presidencies while other EU MS remained rather indifferent. Furthermore, the EU agenda buzzed with handling of the financial crises and the new ‘Euro pact’ as well as the Arab Spring at its Southern borders kept the EaP of marginal importance. The EaP’s added value was meant to be in offering ‘the best of the ENP’ by advancing political association and economic integration with the EU by means of Association Agreements (AA) including a deep and comprehensive free trade areas (DCFTA) as well as further incentives including the perspective of visa free travel to the EU and a Comprehensive Institution Building programme (CIB) intended to support the reforms in the EN countries on their way towards Europeanisation. As stated in the Prague Declaration, the key objectives are enhanced political dialogue and strengthened trade relations, including the creation of a foreign trade agreement and gradual visa liberalization. The EaP also aims at facilitating social development and creating stability, improving administrative capacities and enhancing regional cooperation by engaging with a wide range of international top and mid-level actors (Council of the European Union, 2009). At the same time, the policy´s guiding principles continue to be those, used in the ENP, e.g. positive conditionality, differentiation and join ownership, meaning that the initiative inherits the same implementation problems of the ENP, in particular regarding the lack of membership perspective. In such circumstances, as noted by Boonstra and Shapovalova (2010), even if the EN prove ready for such a far reaching liberalization offered by the AA, the implementation of the commitments would require resources not comparable with the scarce available EU aid that is not sufficient to compensate stakeholders for what they feel would be lost through reforms, or to incentivize cooperation with the EU at the expense of traditional foreign policy alliances.61 While membership is still not on offer, the main incentives for

73 implementation of Association Agreements are free trade and free travel with the EU, the perspectives that remain still too distant at least for some of the neighbours: the visa-free regime is a long way to go process that implies the adoption of re-admission agreements and migration policy reforms as a quid pro quo condition for the beginning of the visa liberalization process (on track only in Ukraine by the launch of the EaP) (Hernández and Sagrera, 2011). Apart from dubious incentives, the problem of inconsistent application of conditionality seems to be even more acute in the light of the EaP’s intention to strengthen sectoral cooperation alongside the Europeanisation progress. Thus, for example, while democratic reforms are a clear precondition for deepening relations with Belarus, Brussels has a more hesitant approach towards democratization in its relations with energy-rich Azerbaijan. Furthermore, since the offer remains the same for everybody, the differentiation principle seems to fail since the committed ones do not see any stimuli in continuing often unpopular reforms for approximation with the EU’s acquis. Besides, partners that emphasize the principle of joint ownership understand that the EU should not impose any conditions on their participation in the EaP. In other words, the principle of joint ownership seems contradicting with the conditionality principle. Besides, it has not been consistently applied on the EU side either. As noted by Delcour (2011), the development of the EaP institutional framework shows that the agenda is EU-set, recreating rather, the traditional hierarchical approach in the EU FP making. For example, only Platforms 1 and 2 dealing directly with the issues relevant to AAs and DCFTA negotiations (priorities of bilateral negotiations on the EU agenda) have established the issue specific Panels (the frameworks providing inclusive forum for consultations and technical expertise jointly with the partners from the EN and characterized as most favourable in terms of advancing joint ownership of policy process and socialization), while within the two other Platforms these useful tools have resulted more difficult in settle. In other words, no real progress has been achieved in the fields outside the bilateral negotiations, with the exception of the Transport panel created at a special Ministerial meeting in October 2011.62 The work of Flagships has also been stumbling on account of difficulties in reaching an agreement on common interests and scarce financing: the available €350 million has been allocated in one year, which raised concerns among the EaP countries that there will be no funding for the regional projects currently being proposed (Boonstra and Shapovalova, 2010, p. 8).

74 The non-governmental track, as the main novelty of the policy, also appears controversial. While providing a wider platform for socialization at different levels, the role of the non-governmental structures is still to be seen as the first experience already points out that controversies among the EaP partners themselves might become a serious obstacle. Thus, for example, the very launch of the EU- Neighbourhood East Parliamentary Assembly (EURONEST PA),63 has been significantly delayed due to disagreements on arrangements for the participation of representatives from Belarus. The inaugural meeting was finally held in May, and the first ordinary session in September 2011. The Civil Society Forum (CSF) while being fairly successfully implemented, e.g. established from scratch immediately in 2009 with the first forum convened and presenting its recommendations ahead of the Ministerial Meeting in December 2009, is still lacking institutionalization in order to have any real impact on policy process.64 All in all, in the eyes of the EaP partners the EaP remains generally a bilateral endeavour: while the multilateral track is generally appreciated, it is assessed realistically, e.g. rather as a potential for the future, and an additional forum, rather than a new channel for cooperation with the EU.65 Alongside the implementation of the EaP, the European Commission tried to introduce a number of additional new frameworks and instruments to smoothen the policy progress. Following the adoption of the renewed European Neighbourhood Policy in March 2011, the differentiation among the EU neighbours was to be strengthened by applying a ‘more for more’ principle offering more support to those partner countries that make significant progress in reforms for democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Accordingly, an EaP Roadmap was agreed upon (during the second EaP Summit in November 2011) to become a particular instrument to help the committed ones on their way to Europeanisation. It was also intended as a tool to monitor joint commitment to reform and progress: on the one hand it contained jointly agreed objectives including reforms and progress that the partner countries would aim at, and on the other various instruments and support that the EU will provide through EU financial cooperation and policy dialogue in the time leading up to the next Summit in the second half of 2013. (European Commission, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2012). To this end, additional financial support was to be channelled through the specifically adopted Eastern Partnership Integration and Cooperation Programme (EaPIC) with €130 million allocated for the years 2012-13 (divided between Georgia, Moldova and Armenia). At the same time, a

75 designated consultations framework under the Informal Dialogue was launched aiming to further develop political and sector cooperation between the EU and its partners. The first meeting took place in June 2012 in Chisinau, and was dedicated to the issues of mobility, and the next one was held on transport ministers in Tbilisi in February 2013. Commissioner Füle characterized this new cooperation forum as follows: “The countries of our Eastern Neighbourhood have a unique opportunity to combine the value based relationship of the Eastern Partnership with strategic projects.”66 Despite these measures the created multilateral structures remain rather a supplementary element to the initiative´s bilateral core. Accordingly, it is hard to expect the emergence of any new patterns of interaction within the EaP that would be distinctly different from the previous practices within the ENP.

5.2.2 The emerging social structures: policy implementation and discursive practices

Looking at EaP policy progress since its launch in May 2009, it can be said that this initiative has given a new impetus to the EU´s bilateral dialogue with the Eastern neighbours. In 2010 negotiations on Association Agreements (AA) opened with Moldova (January) and the three Caucasus republics (July), leaving out just Belarus (which participated only in the multilateral track).67 The five countries also signed a Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) on the CIB programme.68 In the field of enhanced mobility, in November 2009 an Action Plan for lifting visa requirements was granted to Ukraine, which already had a visa facilitation agreement. In June 2010 visa facilitation agreements were signed with Georgia and Moldova; both also received an Action Plan shortly afterwards (January 2011). Negotiations advanced with Armenia and Azerbaijan. In 2011 significant progress was made on the preparation of the DCFTA negotiations launched with Moldova, Georgia and Armenia at the beginning of 2012. (The DCFTA talks with Azerbaijan could not be started because it had not entered the WTO.) The talks with Ukraine reached the most advanced level – Ukraine closed all the chapters in the AA negotiations, the latest being the DCFTA, which was to be discussed during the EU-Ukraine Bilateral Summit in December 2011.69 Despite this advance, the political dialogue within the EaP remained difficult. In particular, by the beginning of the second EaP Summit in Warsaw on 30 September

76 2011 there appeared a ‘general anxiety’ (using journalists´ wording) about the future of the initiative. The last two years following the launch of the EaP saw economic and political backlashes and a deteriorating state of democracy in all of the EaP countries, reforms were implemented inconsistently and human rights and democratic freedoms in the region had not changed or even deteriorated.70 Particularly harmful was the stalemate in relations with Ukraine – the engine of the EaP since the start of the initiative – caused by Ukraine´s resistance to EU demands to release members of the former government from prison, especially the former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. These lawsuits were considered by the EU as ‘selective justice’ and ‘politically motivated’, and were heavily criticised by the EU.71 Following the EP´s resolution, the signature of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (including the DCFTA), planned for the end of the year, was made conditional on Ukraine respecting the rule of law, releasing Tymoshenko and allowing the opposition to participate fully in the politics of the upcoming parliamentary elections. Further uncertainty was added by the signature of the FTA with Russia by Armenia, Ukraine and Moldova. Although compatible with the European integration process, it sent a signal that Russia will not cease to foster its interests in the region. Finally, against this background, the solidarity among the Eastern partners in refusing to sign the declaration condemning Belarus (the 2010 presidential elections were once again assessed as undemocratic) seemed to indicate a lack of certainty with regard to the issues of democracy and human rights.72 The situation did not become much clearer leading up to the next EaP Summit in Vilnius on 29 November 2013. While negotiations with Ukraine concluded during the December 2011 EU-Ukraine Summit, the agreement initialled in March and the DCFTA part in July 2012, the signature was postponed until Ukraine could bring its domestic politics in order, including the good conduct of the forthcoming parliamentary elections in October 2012. Ukrainian leaders were increasingly isolated from the European political circles (the 2012 summit with the EU was cancelled).73 Finally, at the EU-Ukraine Summit in February 2013, Ukraine confirmed its determination to comply and a high-level political dialogue intensified with Cooperation Council taking place in June in Luxembourg, and frequent bilateral visits to Kyiv and Brussels by ministers and commissioners.74 Of crucial importance was the launch of a European Parliament Monitoring Mission set up to assess the Tymoshenko case from a legal point of view, and headed by former Polish President Aleksander

77 Kwasniewski and former European Parliament President Pat Cox. Finally, in April President Yanukovych signed a decree of pardon for the two ministers from the government of Yulia Tymoshenko – Yuri Lutsenko and Georgy Filipchuk. 75 This fact was welcomed by the EU as a sign of a good will in meeting the requirements set by the December 2012 Council. In the rest of the neighbourhood the situation also remained relatively stable with the AA negotiations concluded with Moldova, Georgia and Armenia, and initialing planned for the Vilnius Summit (Table 3). Furthermore, the Summit could mark the conclusion of the Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements with Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the offer to negotiate similar agreement with Belarus.

Table 3. Policy implementation progress by EaP country 2009-2013 Political and institutional dialogue Additional structures Ukraine -AA negotiations opened 2007, DCFTA in 2008, closed in Energy December 2011 and initialled on 30 March 2012, DCFTA part community in July 2012 on -MoU on CIB, 2010 1 February -Visa Facilitation agreement in force in January 2008 2011, (amended in July 2013);AP for lifting visa requirement in aviation November 2009 agreement negotiated -AA negotiation opened January 2010 Energy Moldova -DCFTA negotiations opened 2012 community -Initialled at Vilnius Summit -aviation -MoU on CIB, 2010 agreement -visa facilitation agreement in force in October 2007 initiated in (amended in July 2013); AP for lifting visa requirement in September January 2011 2010 Georgia -AA negotiations opened July 2010, completed July 2013, Encouraged initialled at Vilnius Summit-DCFTA negotiations opened to join the 2012 Energy -MoU on CIB, 2010 visa facilitation agreement in June 2010 Community- aviation agreement initiated Armenia -AA negotiations opened July 2010 April 2009 DCFTA negotiations opened 2012, closed 2013 advisory -MoU on CIB, 2010 group of EU -technical dialogue on visa facilitation (agreement signed experts. 2012), Readmission agreement signed in 2013, both in force Energy on 1 January 2014 community observer 2011

78 Azerbaijan -AA negotiations opened July 2010 (without DCFTA) Aviation -MoU on CIB January 2011 agreement -Visa Facilitation Agreement and the Mobility negotiations Partnership signed at Vilnius Summit launched 2013 Belarus -“What could the EU bring to Belarus?” Policy paper, 2008 -Conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council, 15 October 2012 launching European dialogue on modernisation with Belarusian society76 -Initiation of Visa facilitation agreement offered by the Commission in 2011 (to start from January 2014)

Progress seemed to be on track when, just days before the Vilnius Summit, Ukraine unexpectedly decided to suspend preparations for signing the Association Agreement, citing national security interests and the need to restore lost trade with Russia and Commonwealth of Independent States partners. In fact, the first warning sign had come already on 3 September 2013 when Armenia suddenly renounced its agreement with the EU, preferring instead to join the Russian-led customs union (thereby excluding the possibility of a free trade agreement with the EU). As noted by Emerson (2014), the move was announced by President Sargsyan following a bilateral meeting in Moscow with President Putin, and without giving any further explanation. It was also preceded only a few days earlier by Putin´s visit to Azerbaijan to cement deals worth $4 billion to supply advanced weaponry to Azerbaijan. Russia first sold weapons to Armenia’s enemy, and then warned Armenia that it could not count on Russia’s protection against these weapons if it failed to join the customs union – such is the interpretation widely made in Armenia. Moreover, as Armenians point out, the EU was unwilling to provide any kind of security guarantee, so they had no choice. Moldova and Georgia were similarly put under pressure through threats and punitive sanctions administrated by Russia´s economic, diplomatic and military levers pointing to a deliberate strategy to jeopardize the outcome of the Vilnius Summit (ibid). As a result, the outcome of the Summit was more modest than expected – Georgia and Moldova initialled Association Agreements (including provisions establishing DCFTAs) with the EU,77 while Ukraine only reiterated its commitment to signing the Association Agreement, and Armenia reconfirmed its commitment to further develop and strengthen their cooperation in all areas of mutual interest within the Eastern Partnership framework.

79 This mixed record of policy implementation with the faster integration track followed by the accession-oriented ENs and more moderate progress in the rest of the neighbourhood is reproduced in the discursive practices.78 Such cross-country differences appear already in the first views expressed by the officials of the EN countries towards the new EU initiative. As noted by Wojna and Gniazdowski (2009), while all of the ENs have generally assessed the EaP positively, seeing it as a possibility of accelerated integration with the EU, each partner expressed a different understanding of European integration and a different level of readiness to comply with EU norms and values by fostering internal reforms. Indeed, looking at the official statements of the national leaders in the EN regarding the EaP, it can be noted that in accession-oriented Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, the European discourse is more pronounced and national officials (except in Ukraine since 2010) generally express more readiness to comply with EU requirements. In fact, from the outset, the issue of membership prospects dominated the rhetoric in Ukraine and Moldova, who wanted to see the EaP as a step towards their entry to the EU. The absence of a clear reference to a European prospect within the EaP has, therefore, been met with disappointment. In Ukraine, the Orange coalition and President Yushchenko have considered that the EaP did not provide any added value; being much more advanced in terms of European integration than its fellow neighbours (with negotiations on the new agreement going on in 2007 already), Ukraine should rather be seen as a model for the EaP design. In a similar fashion, the first reaction to the EaP by the Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin openly criticised the initiative for “putting everybody to the same basket” (Danii and Mascauteanu, 2011). Soon, however, this discourse changed dramatically following the President´s turbulent retreat from power and the defeat of the ruling communist party during the July 2009 parliamentary elections.79 For the new government coalition – Alliance for European Integration – which took an explicit course on the objective of EU membership by adopting an ambitious reform agenda, the EaP turned into a stepping stone on Moldova´s road towards the EU membership. This foreign policy course was fully supported by the new President Nicolae Timofti, who emphasized the need of continuity in Moldova´s foreign policy by stating “… we have everybody watched the latest attempts by some political forces, which I think do not want the good for this country, to undermine the European course that we have chosen. I want to tell these leaders, who disregard the will of the people to go to

80 Europe, that our society has become mature enough, in order to understand that time is ripe to detach ourselves from the ghosts of the past and that our place is among the civilised countries”.80 Encouraged by EU officials81 and neighbouring Romania, the government started to implement all the reforms necessary to conclude the AA with the EU by the next EaP Summit in Vilnius in Autumn 2013, with a view of submitting as a follow-up, an accession demand. The high degree of compliance has been presented by the Moldovan officials as necessary, and in a positive light. For example, with regard to hard conditions imposed by the EU through the DCFTA negotiations, it has been emphasized that the focus should be not on the cost of reforms, but on their long term benefits, ensuring that the government sees its task in making the adaptation period smoother for local producers.82 In Ukraine however, the critical view of the EaP persisted. Commenting on the EaP Warsaw Summit, Ukraine’s foreign minister Borys Tarasyuk noted that “… the EaP has not been one of the EU’s most effective foreign policy instruments”. He specified that “during the programme’s two-and-a-half-year operation, it has not brought about any breakthroughs, either political or economic” […] “the implementation of the EaP is proceeding steadily, quietly, no surprises and the summit did not make anything better, or even specifically worse. The text of the summit’s declaration was agreed on long ago. There were no surprises in it – not unpleasant ones, nor any which would bring Kiev particular pleasure.”83 In this regard, the ascension to power of the new President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2010 has not changed the country’s foreign policy course. Like his predecessor, Yanukovych continues to insist on the recognition of a membership perspective for Ukraine84 and to declare his commitment to political and economic integration with the EU. For example, in his speech at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in April 2010, he reasserts Ukraine's European aspirations by declaring "We have a European future" and confirms some months later, "Ukraine continues to work towards integrating the European Union".85 The President’s first official visit was to Brussels and the goal of joining the EU was stipulated in the Law (for the first time) from 1 July 2010. However, in official declarations Yanukovych avoids direct reference to the EU’s norms and values. In accordance with the official approach of ‘pragmatic’ Europeanisation, he emphasises the pragmatic aspects, such as the EU’s help with the

81 implementation of the future AA or visa liberalization, while ignoring the existing tensions over the imposed EU conditionality going hand-in-hand with adherence to values. To support this position, Ukraine’s leadership presents the EU’s approach as a ‘blame and shame’ policy inspired by those member states that have never been enthusiastic about Ukraine’s further integration with the Union (Paul and Rukomeda, 2012). Like Moldova and Ukraine, Georgia also searched for recognition of its European aspirations by the EaP, but instead of insisting on membership prospects, found that the principles of differentiation and positive conditionality enshrined in the new policy initiative were sufficient for ensuring that Georgia would not be treated equally with its neighbours that were not so dedicated to European integration. As highlighted by the study of perceptions of the EaP conducted by Georgian government officials and lawmakers, there was extensive optimism towards the EaP compared to the ENP (Rinnert, 2010). From the perspective of the Georgian decision-makers, the credibility of incentives seemed to have increased significantly under the new policy initiative in terms of offering more concrete goals and rewards. It was stressed that the bilateral track of the EaP brought possibilities for Georgia that former elites “could not dream of 10 years ago.” President Saakashvili highlights this by acknowledging that EaP incentives such as further visa facilitation would be convincing and ‘real’ (ibid). The country’s commitment to democratic reforms is constantly reiterated. 86 At the same time, in terms of economic cooperation and reform agenda, the official discourse reflected a more cautious approach, favoring integration “at the rhythm beneficial for Georgia, e.g. not at any price, but considering alternative forms of membership such as, for example, Swiss type of association”.87 Indeed, Georgia’s liberal economic policies (going far beyond the Commission’s standards) could not easily be found compatible with the inflexible terms of the AA negotiations.88 Significantly, the rhetoric on the degree of desired integration and acceptance of compliance is supported every time by the corresponding vision of the EU´s geopolitical role (see Table 4). Hence, in Georgia, President Saakashvili pronounced on various occasions the importance of a European future for the countries of the region (without specifying the need of membership), making particular emphasis on the geopolitical aspect of European integration, "For the countries of the Eastern Partnership, there is no alternative to Europe. […] Our paths might look different – Georgia might embrace quicker and more steadily the European political model than

82 others – but at the end, there is no other solution than the European transformation of our societies, no other geopolitical choice than the European integration."89 Furthermore, the security and stability dimension of the EaP was seen as of exceptional importance for Georgia, and there can even be observed a certain securitization of the EaP project; in the words of State Minister Baramidze, the EaP “should pay particular attention to the […] peaceful settlement of the conflicts in the region” since “this will create the necessary conditions for successful implementation of all envisaged activities within the EaP” (Rinnert, 2010). In this light, the issue of visa facilitation, for example, is often seen as a part of the conflict resolution efforts (with the claim that the EU-Russia visa facilitation agreement, which at least partly disburdens citizens of the break-away regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia, undermines the efforts of territorial reunification of Georgia). In a similar way, in Moldova, along with the strengthening of the official strategy on EU membership, the prospects for the resolution of the Transnistria conflict are linked with the EU’s decisive role, as for example, in the form ofa ‘Marshal plan’ for the integration of a break-away region.90 At the same time, President Timofti is also seen as a compromise figure in terms of the complicated relations with Moscow. While calling on the Kremlin to pull its troops (stationed in Transnistria) out of Moldovan territory and to transform the peacekeeping operation into a civilian one under an international mandate, Timofti also expressed hope for the resolution of the Transnistrian problem within the existing 5+2 format (with Russian participation). In contrast, in Ukraine, the issue of the EU´s geopolitical role has not been very pronounced. Contrary to its neighbours pressured by unresolved conflicts, Ukraine has not looked for external security support. In fact, it already developed strong cooperation with the EU in the field of security and has joined the majority of the EU’s FP statements (Smith and Webber 2008). Instead, in the domestic discourse, in accordance, with his ‘pragmatic’ Europeanisation approach, President Yanukovych has tried to strike an East-West balance and to treat equally the Russian FP vector. For example, while stating that “We must make every effort to sign the Association Agreement in the course of the EaP Summit,” he also expressed belief that Ukraine would continue to search actively for a mutually beneficial model of cooperation with the Customs Union, “Because Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan are not only trade partners and neighbours for us, but also brotherly countries sharing centuries of common history.”91

83 Table 4. Discursive practices by the ENs (Categories defined from the results of content analysis of official statements by national leaders in the EN countries regarding the relations with the EU and the EaP policy.) Over the expected degree of Over the EU´s European integration and internal geopolitical role reform Belarus Only technical cooperation International partner Azerbaijan Socio-economic cooperation As part of Euro- Atlantic integration Armenia No official membership aspirations but Positive climate for high compliance with the EU norms and conflict resolution values (except in the political field) Ukraine Membership prospect demands but Supporting Ukraine´s limited compliance with the EU regional leadership conditionality in the rule of law ambitions Moldova Membership at any price and high European integration as compliance a conflict resolution strategy Georgia Searching for an ‘alternative form of EU as a civilizational membership’, high adherence to choice common values and selective normative compliance

Looking at the countries that did not officially declare their course on EU membership – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus – the European discourse appears much more moderate, with little or no emphasis on compliance. It refers mostly to the practical aspects of cooperation and makes a vague reflection on the EU´s associated geopolitical role. A somewhat greater presence of pro-EU rhetoric among the three countries can be found in Armenia, where the postulate of EU membership, while not being openly articulated by the authorities, is not completely excluded from the political domain since it is arguably a desire of a considerable segment of the political elite, the wider citizen population, and also the strong Armenian diaspora in Western countries (Wojna and Gniazdowski, 2009, p.166). The importance of the EaP is emphasized primarily in terms of help with internal reform. For example, in his speech at the sitting of the European People’s Party Political Assembly in November 2011, the Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan noted that “the Eastern Partnership is a vital tool that can promote the transformation process. In particular, with regard to reforms. [… ]

84 Armenia should speed up the implementation of institutional reforms. It is obvious that EU's technical and financial assistance is going to play a significant role in order to ensure rapid and substantial progress.”92 The EaP is also seen in a positive light as a new forum for multilateral cooperation on the issue of conflict resolution and as an instrument that makes it possible to stabilize the situation in the South Caucasus. Apart from expectations to reduce the danger of renewed fighting with Azerbaijan, Armenia also hopes that the EU will pay greater attention to its historical and political disputes with Turkey. As stated by the deputy minister of foreign affairs, Arman Kirakosyan, the EaP could help reduce tensions and resolve conflicts in the region. In this regard, President Serzh Sargsyan also expressed the hope that the EU would make efforts to ensure that the premises of the program were respected by all countries participating in the initiative.93 This vision contrasts with the view of Azerbaijan, which considers the necessary formats for the resolution of the Nagorno–Karabah conflict already in place (whilst the EU could take a more active role within these existing forums). In this regard, as stated by Araz Azimov, deputy foreign minister of Azerbaijan, the EaP is not adequate to address geopolitical challenges in the Caucasus (meaning also the strategic energy projects).94 Furthermore, whereas limited compliance is still implicit in the Armenian position, in Azerbaijan and Belarus, practically no reference to the EU norms and values can be found. Assessing the EaP, the Azerbaijani foreign minister only noted security, economic and humanitarian issues, while not showing any interest in reforms leading to greater democracy and rule of law.95 National officials promote the position of a ‘good neighbor’, e.g. “not asking for anything but offering mutually beneficial cooperation” (often making reference to the negative example of Turkey, a country that is close both culturally and politically, and whose efforts over many years to gain membership in the EU have thus far not produced the expected results). As noted by the official of the Azerbaijan Representation to the EU, the country is looking explicitly for cooperation in terms of concrete technical measures (such as common infrastructure projects). Belarus also pursued a very pragmatic approach towards the EaP. While cooperation at the bilateral level remained limited by the ban of Lukashenko’s entry to the EU (conditioned by the willingness of Belarusian authorities to respect the principles of democracy, the rule of law and human rights), the EaP multilateral track was

85 extensively exploited. Belarus actively participated in the EaP ministerial and informal meetings as well as in four thematic platforms.96 “This work is taking place in close cooperation with our European partners”, emphasised an official Belarusian representative. “A number of concrete project proposals in the fields of energy and transport have put forward jointly with its EU neighbours”.97 The Integrated Border Management Strategy being developed by the Belarusian border services, with the support of an EU assistance project (under the Integrated Border Management platform), takes into account the EU standards (ibid). Finally, during the Vilnius Summit, Foreign Minister Makey indicated that Belarus agreed to enter into negotiations on visa facilitation and readmission agreements, which had been offered by the EU in June 2011(negotiations launched in January 2014).98 The official discourse, however, remained openly critical. While at first the inclusion of Belarus into the EaP seemed for President Lukashenko to open a way out of the deadlock, and an acceptance of his regime, it soon became clear that the initiative was in line with the EU’s usual policy approach. As a result, the official statements voiced criticism of the EaP as both discriminatory and contradicting the principle of partnership.99 For example, as stated by Belarusian representative at the EaP Foreign Ministers Meeting “there is a need to overcome the democratic deficit problem within the EaP itself”, referring to the EaP Warsaw Summit where President Lukashenko was not invited (Belarus was represented by the Ambassador of Belarus to Poland, Victor Gaisenok).100 In order to justify this position and respond to the EU’s isolation policy, President Lukashenko continued with his traditional rhetoric of Belarusian national independence, which served well for legitimising his regime. Commenting on the Belarus non-participation in the Warsaw summit, he stated, “The Poles would love to see their eastern border next to Minsk. I will tell them that their attempts to steal part of Western Belarus from us will fail as long as I live and work as the president of the country. Our country is single, united and indivisible. There is no sense in trying to force us. If you want, we could be partners instead.”101 All in all, apart from isolated statements relative to particular EaP events, the European rhetoric is semi-absent from the Belarusian political scene, and practically no reference to the EU´s geopolitical role has been made in the official statements. In such a way, along with the weakening vision of the degree of desired integrations in the EN countries with no membership aspirations, the vision of the EU’s geopolitical

86 role is also gradually becoming less positive in Armenia, somewhat more reserved in Azerbaijan and non-existent or even negative in Belarus.

5.3 Explaining EIPs: regime transition and elites’ interests

As can be seen from the previous section, the EIPs have been very uneven across the EN, ranging from simple issue-based cooperation to aspirations for stronger forms of integration in line with the EU accession conditionality. These differences, as it has been argued earlier, can be explained by looking at the interests of the ruling elites and by considering their progress in regime transition since the launch of the EaP. According to our hypothesis, there exists a direct dependency between the manifested EIPs and the degree of transition in respective countries. Indeed, if we look at the state of transition in the EN countries (as assessed by the Nation in Transit report of the Human Rights Watch) we can observe that a more advanced transition corresponds to a stronger EIP and vice versa (as demonstrated by Figure 7). Hence, in Belarus the low degree of transition reflects the weakest progress in European integration across the EN, while the higher democracy indexes achieved in Georgia and Moldova correspond to the most advanced levels of relations with the EU under the EaP. Looking in greater detail at the process of democratic transition in the EN (as reflected by the transition indexes in Table 5), we can now gain further insights as to which particular interests of the ruling elites define the presence of either functional or regime survival logic in the EIPs formation process.

Figure 7. European Integration Preferences of the ruling elites in the Eastern neighbourhood 2013 State of democratic transition (by Human Rights Watch) 102

87 Georgia Moldova Ukraine

Armenia

Azerbaija Belarus

European integration practices

Georgia Georgia is rated the most advanced in terms of democratic transition among the ENs, with democratic ratings that have been ameliorating steadily since the launch of the EaP. A particular achievement was the parliamentary elections in October 2012 where, for the first time in the post-Soviet era, an opposition party came to power in the course of the democratic election and not as a result of the public protests or revolutions contesting the official election results. In fact, the country experienced political consolidation: the new government was elected with a strong public mandate; the political opposition remained vibrant, strong, and credible; the judiciary was less pliant; and the media environment was lively.103 The presidential elections a year later also saw a victory of the Georgian Dream candidate and a smooth hand-over of power from Saakashvili (after his nine year rule) to the new president, Guiorgui Margvelachvili, marking a second step in the democratic transition of power in Georgia.104 As stated by the election observation mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), the pre-electoral environment in 2013 was even less tense and polarised than it had been before the parliamentary elections and voters were able to express their choice freely. While the new regime has openly confronted the former ruling elites, there has been no major change in EIPs, indicating their stable character. Initially, the coming to power of the new Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, as a result of the victory of the Table 5. Democratic transition indexes* across the Eastern Neighbourhood from 2004 to 2013 Source: Nations in Transit Reports.

88 Country / Year of 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 report** Georgia 4.96 4.79 4.93 4.93 4.86 4.82 4.75 4.68 Saakashvili 2003-2013 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ Transitional government - Hybrid Regime Moldova 5.07 5.00 5.07 5.14 4.96 4.89 4.82 4.86 Voronin 2001-2009 ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ Timofy 2012- Transitional government Hybrid Regime Ukraine 4.50 4.25 4.39 4.39 4.61 4.82 4.86 4.93 Youchenko2004-2010 ↑ ↓ - ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ Yanukovich 2010-2013 Transitional government Hybrid Regime Armenia 5.18 5.21 5.39 5.39 5.43 5.39 5.36 5.36 Sargsian 2008-2013 - ↓ ↓ - ↓ ↑ ↑ - Semi-consolidated authoritarian regime Azerbajan 5.86 6.00 6.25 6.39 6.46 6.57 6.64 6.68 Aliev 2001- ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ Consolidated regime Blarus 6.64 6.71 6.57 6.50 6.57 6.68 6.71 6.71 Lukashenko 1999- ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ - Consolidated regime *Numeric ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of democratic progress. **each report covers the developments during the previous year

Georgian Dream coalition in October 1012, was followed by a difficult period of co- habitation, i.e. sharing power with United National Movement (UNM) rival President Saakashvili. At the time, the Georgian political landscape was often described in terms of chaos and polarisation – Ivanishvili came into politics by positioning himself in clear opposition to the ruling President, criticizing the pathological Georgian need for messiahs and the perverse over-personalisation of politics in which everyone is known by their first name and personality trumps policy.105 Known as probably the world’s cleanest post-Soviet oligarch and a philanthropist, he openly confronted with Saakashvili, accusing him of creating a government that had gone mad with power, having trampled the constitution, amassed fortunes and ruthlessly suppressed any challengers. “This is a government who built a machine of repression, replete with systemic sexual abuse in prisons and an entire philosophy of governing through punishment, and who recklessly allowed themselves to be drawn in to an unwinnable

89 war with Russia,” 106 Ivanishvili said. He pledged to bring change by leading his broad- based coalition to power, creating the institutions needed for a truly free society to take hold, and then retiring into obscurity.107 In his turn, Saakashvili openly blamed the new PM for losing the European choice, stating that, “Those anti-European forces, which are now operating, will corner us into the situation where we have no other option rather than to crawl on our knees back to our invaders.”108 Ivanishvili responded that Georgia’s foreign policy “should not be directed toward performing the role of a strategic player in the process of ongoing confrontations on a global and regional scale”, and insisting that “...the Georgian side has its share of responsibility for letting things the way they developed” in the lead up to the August war. He added that, “It is in the interests of Georgia that it should not be among the contentious issues in the relations between the West and Russia.”109 While affecting the view of some officials in the European Parliament110, this rivalry did not shake the steady Georgian progress on the way to European integration. Despite the differences in political platforms of the changing leaders, European integration remained an integral part of the country´s regional strategy, and Georgia continued to deliver steadily on a busy reform and approximation agenda. Remarkably, Prime Minister Ivanishvili chose Brussels for his first foreign visit in November 2012, as did his successor, Garibashvili (his first visit to Brussels took place between the 3-4 February 2014), and the dialogue between the EU and the Georgian government in 2013 remained intensive. As noted by the EU Commissioner Füle responding to the question of how, if at all, the coming into power of the Ivanishvili government changed Georgia’s European aspiration: “Actually it has not changed European aspiration and it has not changed anything in words – I mean we are hearing from the new government the same commitments; and it has not changed also that much in the deeds – our negotiations on the Association Agreement, including economic integration part [DCFTA], are proceeding quite well, including also the discussions in the framework of visa dialogue on the visa liberalization action plan¨ (ibid). Similar course was continued by the President Giorgi Margvelashvili, elected in October 2013, who said that “Georgia is determined to advance its reforms rapidly in order to timely consolidate its political association and economic integration with the EU.”111 Closer association with the EU is also seen as the key to “peaceful reconciliation with our compatriots in occupied Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region and the reunification of our country, because it is by attraction that we will draw these

90 regions back into the Georgian state.”112 Furthermore, European integration is considered to be a factor in sustaining a less confrontational position vis a vis Russia. While calling for coordinated efforts in response to Russia’s pressure aimed at diverting Georgia from signing the AA, President Margvelashvili said: “I note that we also welcome the EU’s dialogue with Russia, explaining that the Eastern Partnership is not a policy directed against Russia but a win-win-solution that will increase economic prosperity, security and stability in our region, and will also benefit Russia.”113

Moldova In Moldova the regime transition has also brought the strengthening of the European integration preferences. The pro-EU parliamentary coalition114, in power since July 2009, demonstrated accorded actions in fostering European integration and this course was supported by the President Nicolae Timofti who took the office in March 2012. Still, the political instability continues to endanger the European course. First of all, it took almost three years to elect the President, thus limiting the ruling coalition in its ability to push an agenda of European integration. The Communists were especially implacable in their opposition to the presidential elections; under the Constitution, the president is elected by more than 60 per cent of MPs, so they blocked the process (with their 39 votes out of 101). The Communists are threatened by Moldova’s European transformation since it brings a risk of losing any control over the situation in the country and their electoral prospects. When President Timofti was finally elected115 he made a statement unusual by the standards of the post-Soviet space: “I have never been engaged in politics and will not be. I am a judge but also a person who talks to other people… Electing a president will not automatically solve all our problems but will create the conditions necessary for us to do so together.” He also said that the main thing now is to unite Moldovan society, and he believes that the only way to do so is through the idea of European integration "to which there is no alternative".116 Still, state institutions proved vulnerable to the vested interests of a few people. By the beginning of 2013 an internal power struggle, driven by “simmering rivalries, personal feuds and conflicting business interests” among the Alliance's leaders pushed the country into a deep political crisis triggering a political stand-off and an institutional meltdown. The country’s Prime Minister Vlad Filat (Liberal Democratic Party) left the Parliamentary coalition making accusation of corruption among the allies, in particular

91 the First Deputy Speaker Vlad Plahotniuc (Democratic party), leading to the no- confidence vote for his government in March 2013.117 In fact the personal conflict between Filat and Plahotniuc generated many crisis situations inside the governing alliance throughout its existence. As noted by the analyst of the Institute of World Policy in Kiev Leonid Litra (2013), the conflict between the members of the ruling Alliance Filat and Plahotniuc much resembles the conflict between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko during the “orange coalition” rule. In both cases, emotions prevail over the reason and as long as the conflicting parties are in an active phase, the non- functionality of institutions and the political volatility is very high. Litra also points out that, in contrast to Ukraine, however, in Moldova the business component has a heavy weight. Filat and Plahotniuc are some of the richest in the country, and it is not that they cannot do business, but they need to have power in order to protect their businesses. On a positive side, the analyst noted the greater progress with reforms. Indeed, the swift election of a new government in May 2013 (signalling a truce among the political elite), gave impetus to important reforms especially in the justice sector and allowed the EU-Moldova political dialogue to regain momentum with the substantive completion of Association Agreement negotiations in June. Important progress was also made on the visa liberalisation Action Plan (starting the procedure of opening the visa-free regime for Moldovan citizens in March 2014). In such a way, while the root causes of political instability in Moldova persisted, the balance of political forces remained favourable for the ruling coalition, and its European course was the ‘right horse to bid on’ in order to overcome the resistance of the Communist opposition.

Ukraine In contrast to other accession-oriented neighbours, Ukraine did not experience any rise of democratic transition since the launch of the EaP. Instead, while remaining the leader of transition in the region up until 2011 (when Georgia caught up), Ukraine’s democracy index gradually slid down from 2008 onwards. Under both President Yushchenko and President Yanukovich, the efforts to foster a European choice largely implied a ‘virtual Europeanisation’ strategy used by the oligarchic autocracy for its own benefit. By the end of 2013 however, Yanukovich had lost the equilibrium that balanced legitimacy pressures against his own oligarchic structures, a dilemma that cost him his post and pushed the country into political chaos.

92 Immediately after being elected in February 2010, Yanukovich started reinforcing presidential powers. In April 2010 he closed down the National Constitutional Council, which was set up in 2007 to work on drafting a new constitution, and in September 2010 the ruling of the Constitutional Court reinstated the 1996 Constitution (on the grounds that the constitutional amendments of December 2004 had been adopted in violation of the relevant constitutional procedure),118 giving even wider powers to the president and further weakening parliamentary control over the executive. 119 The parliamentary majority for the president – controlled Party of Regions – was also ensured thanks to the mixed electoral system in Ukraine (a mixture of majoritarian and proportional systems), with only half of the 450-strong legislature elected on the party lists and the other half occupied by majority vote in the electoral districts, where, owing to its greater command of administrative resources, the PoR could expect to secure the necessary outcomes even if it did not win the elections on party lists (Costea, 2011, p. 264). Furthermore, the new law on the Election of People’s Deputies adopted ahead of the parliamentary elections of 2012 was adapted even more to the needs of the ruling regime, and was heavily criticised for lacking transparency and inclusiveness.120 In fact, the local elections in October 2010 were already being assessed by international and domestic observers as an example of manipulating the legal framework as well as poorly administrating the electoral process.121 The President’s opponents were removed from power through a series of criminal trials. In October 2011 ex-Prime Minister Tymoshenko was sentenced to seven years in prison for abuse of office when he made a 2009 natural gas agreement with Russia. More than 20 high-level representatives of the former government were also either put under investigation or convicted, including the former Minister of the Interior Yuriy Lutsenko and former acting Defence Minister Valeriy Ivashchenko. Other former allies of Tymoshenko, including the former economy minister, fled abroad. These trials were characterized by non-transparent judicial processes, a high number of procedural deficiencies, and serious concerns regarding the lack of proper medical treatment available to detainees raising selective justice accusations from the part of the EU. Simultaneously, some measures were taken to ensure visible legitimacy for the new President. For example, in November 2010, the President established a Commission for the Strengthening of Democracy and Rule of Law which was tasked “to unite

93 efforts of the state authorities, political parties, civil society Organizations, other institutions of the civil society for the strengthening of democracy and rule of law”. Another cover-up for the lack of democratic reforms was the National Anti-Corruption Strategy adopted in October 2011. But this did not tackle some of the key outstanding issues such as the establishment of an independent anti-corruption body, the specialization and clearer distribution of tasks among law enforcement agencies, the verification of asset declarations, and the conflict of interests. Despite these precautions to guarantee the stability of his regime, the end of Yanukovich’s rule came from within of the ruling elite itself. While at the beginning of his term Yanukovich was supported by the oligarchs, the situation changed when he started to show excessive ambitions in extending the power and personal wealth of his proper ‘family’, i.e. a clan of oligarchs originating from his hometown of Donetsk. In particular, there emerged a group of young entrepreneurs, friends of the President’s son Alexander (who became Ukraine´s richest man according to Forbes), holding important economic positions in the government and the seat of Minister of Interior. Key positions in the banking sector, heavy industry, and mass media were also held by the President’s collaborators through privatizations in the state sector and new ‘not very voluntary’ acquisitions, given that the judicial, enforcement, and tax collecting authorities were controlled by the ‘family’. The only two oligarchs who remained in the Presidential entourage after the coming to power of Yanukovich were Ahmetov (Ukraine´s richest man since the year 2000), who managed to multiply his wealth during the new rule in steel industry, and Firtash, a head of the gas importing clan.122 Apart from the direct domestic oppression of the oligarchs, the policies of the new President started to act against the interests of big business abroad. Thus, apart from problems with exports to Russia ( introductionof some unexpected new sanitary norms and sanctions), powerful Russian business structures that were previously kept out suddenly entered the country. At the same time, instead of the promised green light for the European markets, the Timoshenko issue spoiled the business in Europe.123 During the parliamentary elections in October 2012, the PoR won the leading coalition in Rada but did not ensure the majority, loosing crucial seats to the newcomers UDAR (a viable alternative to the cronyism and ‘politics as usual’ of Ukraine's mainstream parties, both in the government and in the opposition headed by Klitschko) and Svoboda (a nationalistic right wing populist party).124 Left without indispensable support, the President started to reinforce his position by further pushing the remaining

94 oligarchs away from the power structures, including Andrij Klujew, Viktor Pinchuk (son-in-law of former President Kuchma), Ihor Kolomoisky, and even Ahmetov. The only resistance to the president’s power was demonstrated by Ukraine’s ‘chocolate king’ Piotr Poroshenko (the owner of the ‘Roshen’ group in the agricultural and diary industry, he proved to be less vulnerable, probably due to the weaker presence of state intervention in these sectors). As noted by the agency Rosbalt, “the era of oligarchic consensus has come to the end and in response, the oppressed part of the elite would surely support financially the opposition and political forces that could create an alternative to the rule of Yanukovich by the next elections if the situation does not destabilizes before.”125 Not surprisingly, the TV channels of the main oligarchs such as Ukraina (owned by Ahmentov), Inter (Firtash), and 5 (Poroshenko) were keen to present the Maidan events in November 2013 objectively and with particular emphasis on the European aspirations of the demonstrators. Having important trade relations with and even holding assets in (such as steel enterprises in case of Ahmetov) a number of European countries, the oligarchs took a clear pro-European position and clearly objected to Yanukovich’s refusal to sign an AA in Vilnius.126 In other words, while against the President’s exaggerated self-interest, the distant benefits of European integration have lost their weight, and the European discourse as an ideological basis has been taken over by an oppressed part of the elites to lead the popular protests in Kiev, aimed at overthrowing the Yanukovich’s regime.

Armenia In Armenia there was a similar picture of how ‘virtual Europeanisation’ culminated in a sharp U-turn from the pro-European course when President Sargsyan made his decision to withdraw from initialling the AA at the Vilnius summit. Whilst being a direct consequence of Russian pressure, this choice is also a clear confirmation of the predominance of regime survival calculations by the authoritarian regime (where the democratisation index has fallen below the pre-ENP levels). According to the Gallup International Association survey that was conducted in Armenia in 2012, even though Armenia’s citizens complain about the dire socio-economic conditions in the country, they still prefer President Serzh Sargsyan, who remains one of the most prominent political figures in Armenia (together with Prosperous Armenia Party Chairman Gagik Tsarukyan). The study demonstrated that there is no organized and united opposition in Armenia’s current political spectrum, which is perhaps why the people are likewise

95 unable to make a decision.127 In fact, the opposition in Armenia remained personality- driven and passive between elections; it challenged every national election and as a result, did not recognize the legitimacy of Armenia’s parliament, president, or constitution, losing the chance to participate in the political process. This was also the case after the 2008 presidential election which was followed by mass protests that were dispersed by police and army forces, leaving ten dead and up to two hundred wounded. As stated in the Freedom House report, the election cycle in 2012 and 2013 “will gauge the will and ability of the ruling coalition and the opposition to accept each other’s legitimacy. In order to allow for fair competition in the parliament, both sides must combat the culture of administrative manipulations and political radicalism.”128 Indeed, in 2011 the coalition and the opposition initiated a dialogue to discuss conditions for the Armenian National Congress’s participation in the elections, and mutual recognition of election results. As a result, during the parliamentary elections in May 2012 when the ruling Republican Party of Armenia won the majority of seats (44 percent of the votes), another party in the ruling coalition, the Prosperous Armenia Party, won 30 percent and a group of opposition parties, the Armenian National Congress, won 7 percent. The election was praised by the head of the observer mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, for an ‘open and peaceful’ campaign, although the campaign was marred by apparent vote buying and the enlistment of state employees to campaign for the governing party.129 All in all, Sargsyan’s regime legitimacy consolidation process was reinvigorated and in February he won a second term in office by garnering just under 59 percent of the votes. The president’s closest rival in the election, Heritage Party Chairman Raffi Hovahnissian, received 37 percent of the vote, which was much more than was received by Sargsyan’s main opponent during the 2008 elections, Ter-Petrossian, with 21.5 percent.130 The election was deemed by western observers to be administratively better than past presidential polls, albeit less competitive. According to the Commission’s Progress Report on Armenia, the February 2013 presidential elections were generally well administrated although there were concerns about the integrity of the electoral process.131 The report also stated, however, that the progress with democratic reforms remained modest: “public mistrust of the judicial system remained high and there was a lack of convincing results in the fight against corruption, including in police and judiciary. Allegations of use of torture and ill treatment in police custody were

96 reported. Further work remains necessary addressing the issues of human rights and fundamental freedoms, especially as regards the implementation and enforcement of legislation” (ibid). In such a way, the pro-European discourse pursued after the launch of the EaP reflected just the need of the authorities of the EU’s help with domestic reforms (except in the political field since it would inhibit the on-going consolidation of the Sargsyan’s regime), while low legitimacy pressures allowed a great deal of self- interest into EIPs formation. Apart from the traditional considerations that favour of security alliance with Russia (the CSTO’s military guarantees, access to Russian-made weaponry at reduced rates and support from Russia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan), the economic factor is getting stronger: Armenia’s most coveted economic assets are, to a large extent, in Russian hands (not least because the Armenian economy remains unattractive for foreign investors due to high degrees of corruption and the vested interests of oligarchs).132 For example, Russia’s Gazprom is to take over the remaining 20-percent stake in Armenia’s ArmRosgazprom, becoming the company’s 100-percent shareholder.133 In fact, the Customs Union with Russia (in the absence of Armenia’s direct borders with the CU’s members) is intended to benefit precisely these Russian companies by protecting them from international competition. Apart from nourishing the regime-sustaining structures, the alliance with Russia provides the ruling elite with swift tangible benefits such as, for example, Russia’s natural gas supply to Armenia at a price of $189 per 1,000 cubic meters (roughly half the price Russia charges to countries in Europe) and abolition of the 35-percent duty on oil products supplied to Armenia (as announced during Putin’s visit to Erevan on 2 December 2013). Against this background, Armenia’s withdrawal from the AA at the Vilnius summit does not seem unexpected, but rather marks continuity in Armenia’s EIPs. As commented by the senior analyst at the EU ISS Nicu Popescu (2013) “although Armenia may have been bullied (by Moscow), it is not unusual that Moscow did not like the idea of an à la carte partnership with Yerevan where the latter cherry-picks what it wants from the alliance whilst attempting to diversify its foreign policy. If anything, the real surprise was that Armenia managed to advance so far in its relations with the EU, openly defying Russian preferences in the process.”

Azerbaijan

97 In Azerbaijan the steady trend of consolidation of the Ilham Aliyev’s regime persisted. Following Ilham Aliyev’s reelection for a second term in October 2008, a constitutional referendum approved the removal of term limits on the presidency, a juridical restriction that would have disqualified the current president from running in the next presidential election in 2013 had it not been lifted. This move also prevents any elite challengers from standing for the presidency, although this is not a likely scenario since the present Azerbaijani elite can be characterized by continuity and coherence (Guliyev, 2008). After his re-election, Aliyev re-appointed his entire cabinet with the exception of one minister (of economic development), preserving the existing network of patron-client relationships with powerful elite groups whose fortunes depend heavily on their connections with the current leadership. Against this background, no major change in RIPs occurred. Azerbaijan continued negotiations on WTO membership (a prerequisite for the DCFTA) with little determination while trying to replace the offered Association Agreement by the Strategic Modernization Partnership with the EU, which is much softer on political reforms.134 Very limited compliance is acceptable to maintain the positive relationship dynamics with the EU. For example, in the Joint press statements at the European Council the President stated: “…Azerbaijan is committed to a policy of political reform and democratic development. We are working to strengthen the rule of law, protect political freedoms and human rights. I think that Azerbaijan has achieved significant development in the years of independence. All fundamental freedoms – the freedoms of religion, assembly, the press – are provided in Azerbaijan. There is a free Internet.”135 In the similar way, the Commission’s Progress Report noted that Azerbaijan started to show willingness to engage in some of the EU required reforms, such as in the field of public expenditure and financial accountability, statutory audits of officials and legal entities, transparency (by launching, on the basis of the "one- stop-shop" principle, the State Agency for Public Service and Social Innovations) and fight against corruption. 136

These new connotations, however, should not be overestimated since on the backdrop of a solid authoritarian system they are nothing more than signs of a ‘virtual’ Europeanisation strategy, without any significant progress.

98 Belarus The Lukashenko regime remains uncontested and keeps a strong grip over the country’s economic and social development as well as over the elites. The Presidential elections in 2010 were followed by the arrest of seven out of ten political opponents, over 600 opposition activists, and 25 journalists.137 The Parliamentary elections in September 2012 took place against an overall background of repression. The two strongest opposition parties, the United Civic Party and the Belarusian Popular Front, pulled out of the race stating that "This is our reaction to the pseudo-elections for the fake parliament" (in the words of Anatoly Lebedko, leader of the United Civic Party). Some marginal opposition parties, such as Just World and the Belarusian Social Democratic Party, did take part, but were not elected. According to Amnesty International, in addition to the eleven political prisoners in jail, authorities also detained other opposition activists ahead of the election.138 By 2013, while four political prisoners were released from prison after having served their full terms (Parfenkow, Sevyarinets, Dashkevich and Frantskevich), repressive policies continued by the intimidation of representatives from civil society, petty harassment, the dismissal of people from their jobs (e.g. active members of independent trade unions), the refusal to allow certain citizens to travel abroad, and the fining of activists or sentencing them to periods in jail.139 Against this backdrop, there has also been no change in the pragmatic nature of RIPs, with the EaP being used by President Lukashenko to yield benefits from both sides – to build up to its political capital in the relations with Russia on the one hand, and taking advantage of the EaP opportunities, on the other.

5.4 Conclusion

This case has confirmed the hypothesis about the dependency between the degree of transition in the EN countries and their EIPs. It has been demonstrated that the fostering of European integration occurs only alongside the progress in regime democratization whereas in the absence (or worsening) of regime transition there is no advancement in relations with the EU. Hence, in the autocratic regimes, EIPs remain clearly driven by regime survival interests and correspond to a rather low level of cooperation limited to technical issues

99 and reflected by a modest discourse accompanied by low expectations regarding the EU’s geopolitical role. This situation continues in Belarus where the consolidated regime has free hands in maintaining the level of European integration at the desired (low) level. Similarly, in the absence of a regime transition in Azerbaijan, EIPs have also remained stable, or can even be considered as a backlash (due to downgrading the level of integration previewed in the AA to the new agreement on Modernisation Partnership). At the same time, the first signs of ‘virtual Europeanisation’ practices point to the effort of the ruling elite to move forward in the desired direction (e.g. fostering energy infrastructure and technical cooperation) without being obliged to implement the democratic reforms that endanger the regime survival. Armenia, where democratic transition has been stagnating, also continues with ‘virtual Europeanisation’ aimed not to escape reforms, but rather to outweigh the omnipresent Russian dimension that largely ensures regime stability. In Ukraine, while the actual EIPs represent a much higher level of integration aspirations, the stumbling transition resulted in halting the well-advanced progress on the way of European integration. The legitimacy pressures were underestimated by the ruling regime while they overestimated the regime sustainability, resulting in the equivocal regional strategy and ultimately, in the regime overthrow. Positive advancement can only be observed in Moldova and Georgia where democratic transition is well on track. Here the European integration course persisted despite changes of governments, indicating a certain maturity of political systems. In Moldova practices of ‘virtual Europeanisation’ have been left behind with the turn towards full compliance aiming to gain membership perspective, since this strategy ensures legitimacy for the ruling governments. In contrast, in Georgia the highest degree of European integration in the EN is accompanied by limited compliance, meaning that the governments pursue European integration not just as an electoral guarantee, but also work on fostering the national interest of boosting the country’s economic development and social well-being. Finally, we can also observe continuity in EIPs: the countries positions on the continuum between the legitimacy pressures - regime survival interests extremes have not changed since 2004, nor after the launch of the EaP. In fact, even the arguably drastic change in Ukraine’s EIPs from being clearly pro-European (but only by ‘virtual Europeanisation’) under the Orange coalition, to refusal of normative compliance

100 while advancing practical cooperation under Yanukovich, is nothing else than a result of calculations of almost equally self-motivated elites who have chosen different means to sustain their regimes.

101 Chapter 6. Formation of European Integration Preferences in the Context of Micro-Level Regionalisation. The case of ENPI CBC

Introduction

The objective of the present case study is to determine a correlation between the EIPs at the micro-regional level and post-Soviet transition as the endogenous factor of regionalisation in the Eastern EU neighbourhood. Nine ENPI CBC Programmes at the Eastern EU borders with participation of four partner countries including Belarus, Moldova, Russia140 and Ukraine are examined. The geographical coverage of the Programmes is as follows (see annex for more details):

Kolarctic (Finland/Sweden/Norway/Russia) – KOL Euregio Karelia (Finland/Russia) – KAR South-East Finland/Russia - S-EFR Lithuania/Poland/Kaliningrad (Russia) - LPR Estonia/Latvia/ Russia - ELR Latvia/Lithuania/ Belarus – LLB Hungary/Slovakia/Romania/Ukraine - HSRU Poland/Belarus/Ukraine/ - PBU Romania/Moldova/Ukraine - RUM (under the 2004-2006 period it operated as two separate Neighbourhood Programmes: Romania/Moldova and Romania/Ukraine)

Similar to the macro-level case, the time frame is defined between 2004 and 2013. While the proper ENPI CBC Programmes were operating between 2007 and 2013, the transitional period of 2004-2006 represented by the INTERACT/TACIS/PHARE ‘Neighbourhood Programmes’ is also included as a basis for tracing the evolution in the Programmes’ implementation practices. The study will begin with an overview of the domestic structures that shape the regional strategy choices of the regionalisation actors at the micro-regional level (e.g. the opportunity structures for regional mobilization). It will be followed by the analysis of the empirical evidence of social practices emerging in the context of ENPI CBC Programmes that constitute the EIPs manifested by the CBC actors in the EU partner countries from the post-Soviet space. Finally, the explanatory part will assess the impact

102 of the state of transition in the centre-periphery relations in the countries covered by the case study on the manifested EIPs, by dwelling on the process of regional mobilization in the EN since the launch of the Programmes. Figure 8. The ENPI CBC Programmes in the Eastern Neighbourhood (Neighbourhood Programmes 2004-2006 Interreg IIIA / Phare CBC / Tacis CBC and ENPI CBC 2007-2013) Source: European Commission website.

6.1 Opportunity structures for regional mobilisation in the post-Soviet EU neighbourhood

As elaborated above, the functional logic behind RIPs at the micro-regional level is manifested through the level of regional mobilization that refers to the ability of the politically powerful actors at the regional (sub-national) level to exploit opportunities provided by the external environment, be it domestic or international. In the context of post-Soviet borders, precisely the weakness of CBC actors (i.e. the lack of regional mobilization) has been the major burdening factor for the development of CBC. In fact, looking at the domestic opportunity structures (the centre-periphery relations) it

103 appears that the hardships of post-Soviet transition have left little space for mobilization of the CBC actors. Moreover, the development of centre-regional relations in the NISs can be seen as detrimental for regional empowerment since it was clearly subordinated to the interests of preventing economic decentralization and separatism in favour of state- and nation-building. For example, in Ukraine, the regional politics have been marked by the major cleavage between the East and the West (as well as the status of the Crimean autonomy). In Moldova and Georgia the debate on the country’s administrative structure has been dominated by the issue of unresolved conflicts with break-away regions. In Belarus the state structure has been largely preserved unchanged since the Soviet times, meaning that regional and local administrations were in direct political and financial subordination from higher territorial-administrative units. Finally, in the Russian federation while the regions first accumulated extensive powers, under the presidency of Vladimir Putin the policy of building a ‘power vertical’ has brought gradual recentralization under the slogan of combating the country’s breakout. As noted by Zimmer (2007), there has been great similarity in the nature of the centre-regional relations across the entire post-Soviet space: the central governments playing the re-distribution card to gain electoral support while leaving the regions to cope with their daily problems on their own. In other words, the effective regional policy has not been a priority for central governments; at best, the policy aimed to equalize the growing contrasts in regional development through the re-distribution system. Regional powers were largely curtailed to benefit the central government, in particular in the field of economic development (and especially with regard to regions rich in natural resources that could export directly to global markets). Against this background of rather limited opportunities for regional mobilization of regional administrations, it does not come as a surprise that CBC was fostered mainly by the actors outside the state structures. As noted above, important cross-border activity has been developing among civil society networks, universities, scientific and cultural institutions all along the old and new post-Soviet borders, including in difficult circumstances of deep geopolitical divergence such as in the context of the Russian-Estonian or the Russian (Kaliningrad)-Polish borders. As noted by O’Dowd and Dimitrova (2009)141 despite the general consensus in the literature about the weakness of civil society in the EU ‘Neighbourhood’ (in principle, due to its non-institutionalised nature) these actors have been able to organize

104 themselves in order to carry out a wide range of activities and have even managed to transmit local concerns to the central powers. They took responsibility over the emerging social problems and issues ignored by the state, providing basic services to local communities. Often, the CBC was a way to compensate for the lack of domestic resources needed to deal with their obligations (Sagan, 2010). For example, as noted by Busygina and Filippov (2008, p.203) regarding the Russian North-Western regions in the Northern Dimension cooperation, the mere fact of their participation can be seen as a way to resolve their pressing problems (such as health or environmental issues) by attracting the Western money. In this sense, it can be stated that while the domestic transition process hampered regional mobilization in terms of weakness of regions’ administrative and economic powers, restrictive policies for the development of civil society actors, and, occasionally, corrupt regional elites, the CBC provided more adequate opportunities for regional mobilization. In such a way, the functional logic in RIPs formation at this level is inhibited by the low level of transition in the state-society and, particularly, centre-regional relations on the post-Soviet space. In other words, the impact of the transition factor at this level is indirect: it does not appear in terms of actors’ calculations, but as a structural limitation for regional mobilization in the context of CBC. Accordingly, progress in the democratic transition should result in more opportunities for regional mobilization (empowerment) of the micro-level actors, improving, consequently, their performance in the context of CBC. In the same way, political stagnation would imply that CBC continues to be burdened by the weakness of CBC actors.

6.2 European Integration Preferences as practices of the EU-neighbour relations within ENPI CBC

6.2.1 The EU policy instruments: the ENPI CBC as a framework for inclusive, partner-oriented practices

While assessing the ENPI CBC policy instruments it should be taken into account that (in contrast to the national level) cross-border interactions take place through a whole range of different channels (including informal ones) at various levels, engaging numerous sets of actors and cooperation structures. In such circumstances, the effectiveness of EU policy instruments depends not only on the national-level

105 institutions, but also on a variety of actors ranging from regional administrations and trans-national networks, to non-state actors, economic elites or even cultural or ethnic leaders. In terms of boundaries between the EU and its neighbourhood it implies that the modification of transactional and cultural boundaries appears of equal (or even superior) importance to the overcoming of geopolitical, institutional and legal obstacles that prevail in the process of hierarchical extension of EU governance. This means that the applied policy instruments should provide not just for concrete rewards (such as CBC programmes’ funding) but also for less tangible benefits pertinent to non-hierarchical forms of EU governance (Weber, Smith and Baun, 2007, pp. 227- 228). In this regard the official ENPI CBC documents reveal a mixed record. While introducing an inclusive approach in terms of institutional structures, the policy still lacks the appropriate implementation mechanisms that would enable the blurring of borders and the emergence of inclusive, partner-oriented patterns of cooperation in the EU-neighbour relations. On the one hand, the introduction of the inclusive institutional structures for CBC Programmes (by the Commission’s Communication of 2003) deeply enshrines the principles of partnership and joint ownership into the policy. The joint management structures (Joint Monitoring Committees and Joint Evaluation / Selection Committees) enable the actors from the EN countries to participate as equal partners in the supervision of the Programmes’ implementation, as well as in the selection of projects to be financed. Furthermore, instead of an external body contracted by the European Commission, the Programme’s implementation in the entire eligible area, including the partner states, is to be carried out by the Joint Managing Authority142 (JMA) (assisted by the Joint Technical Secretariat), established in the relevant EU Member States (usually within the ministries of regional development) (European Council, 2006). Another distinctive feature of the ENPI CBC is that it was designed to allow for the participation of grassroots actors from both sides of the border, including the regional actors in the countries of the Eastern neighbourhood. Under the TACIS CBC programme, up to 75-90% of total funding was dedicated to large-scale projects (such as border-crossing infrastructure, environmental protection or assistance for economic development),143 but under the ENPI CBC, this share was reduced to a maximum of 30%, meaning a greater focus on grassroots initiatives.144 Furthermore, according to the 2003 Communication, the focus on local ownership was also to be ensured by

106 setting the objectives in line with the INTERREG programmes, e.g. with the focus on social-economic cohesion. Exactly the same wording is used, with just one new objective being added on efficient and secure borders. These include, (1) Promoting sustainable economic and social development in the border areas; (2) Working together to address common challenges in fields such as environment, public health, and the prevention of and fight against organised crime; (3) Ensuring efficient and secure borders; and (4) Promoting local, ‘people-to-people’ type actions (European Commission, 2003b). These principles were put in practice immediately during the transitional period under the Interreg/Phare/Tacis Neighbourhood programmes and were further confirmed in the Regulation 1638/2006 laying down general provisions establishing the ENPI and covering the whole scope of financial assistance (bilateral and multilateral) to the neighbouring countries for the years 2007-2013. The Regulation emphasizes the specific nature of CBC (Title III) as based on the principle of partnership, in contrast to other areas of cooperation based on conditionality. Furthermore, it also previews a number of additional mechanisms to foster the principles of partnership and joint ownership enshrined in the policy approach (European Parliament and the Council, 2006, p.5). For example, building on the experience from the transitional period 2004-2006 under the Neighbourhood Programmes, the Regulation states the objective to “ensure further decentralization of Programme’s implementation by establishing the Branch Offices of the Joint Technical Secretariats or of the Joint Managing Authorities (JMA) on the territory of the participating regions, including in the partner countries.”145 Particular attention is also attributed to the task of strengthening the capacity of local and regional authorities in the partner countries.146 To this end, assistance and training is to be provided by a special division for ENPI CBC, established in 2007 within the EU’s INTERACT agency by stimulating expertise, sharing best practices and providing guidance on management and implementation issues.147 Support with Programmes’ implementation has also been provided by the Regional Capacity Building Initiative (RCBI) created in April 2005 (until June 2012), with the objective to help the project applicants in partner countries throughout the application process. On the other hand, the mere policy approach underlying the ENPI CBC runs into a major geopolitical controversy; as a part of the general ENPI framework148 the CBC programme represents an instrument for the implementation of the ENP’s objectives that mark the EU partners as outsiders on the policy-receiver side within a highly

107 asymmetric relationship. In the context of relations with Russia, not participating in the ENP, this is openly contradictory to the basic principle of the EU-Russia strategic partnership.149 As noted by Karen Smith (2005, p.758), the division between the insiders and outsiders in enlarged Europe creates formidable problems for the countries on either side of them not only due to the great discrepancies in the level of economic development, but also because of the legacy of the not so distant Cold War division and the dangers of erecting “the Great Wall of Europe” in an attempt to seal off the “grey zone” of disorder outside the borders of the Union. This controversy that provides little room for inclusive practices became particularly visible with the issue of border-crossing rules and the abolition of existing visa-free regimes with the ENs, such as at the borders between Romania and Moldova as well as between Poland and Ukraine and Belarus. Already during the pre-accession process ahead of the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements, the major objective was to ensure that the new border corresponded with Schengen regulations and Justice and Home Affairs acquis, and that it would become a reliable barrier against all kinds of illegal cross- border activities, including trafficking and migration (Gatev, 2008). As noted by Liikanen and Virtanen (2006), the EU lacks any real border policy, substituted instead by the pre-accession strategy whereby the candidate countries (and then also the neighbouring countries under the ENP) who ought to apply the uniform Schengen regime substitute a variety of existing regimes, tailor-made for particular circumstances of each country and/or region. The authors argue that there has been no real regionalisation of the EU border policy. Instead, the EU has been approaching the problem by opening new border crossing points and improving border infrastructures, a very lengthy process that does not always provide a solution.150 In fact, apart from the availability of border crossing points, the daily interactions between the border communities are also affected by the high cost and administrative difficulties in obtaining Schengen visas (often in a far away capital). Furthermore, as noted by Allina-Pisano (2009), the spread of practices of ‘othering’, i.e. the shaping of new regional identities where ‘us’ and ‘other’ loom over common ethnic roots and shared history, also became a phenomenon hampering the traditional cross-border links with the introduction of the Schengen regime. The ENPI does not introduce any change in this regard, although it has to be noted that the dialogue on visa liberalisation has been part of the EU-neighbours bilateral agendas since the launch of the ENP. In 2006 the EU adopted a Local Border Traffic Regulation that allows member states to negotiate

108 bilateral agreements with neighbouring countries in order to facilitate cross-border movement for social, economic and cultural exchange. Under such an agreement, a special permit can be granted to citizens living in border areas, enabling them to cross borders regularly to stay for just a few hours or for one or two days at a time within the defined territory adjacent to the border. Such agreements first entered into force between Ukraine and Hungary (January 2008) and Slovakia (September 2008) and Poland (July 2009). In 2010 it was also agreed by Moldova and Romania. In 2011, Belarus signed such agreements with Poland, Latvia and Lithuania while the Russian Federation did so with Norway and Poland (covering the whole territory of Kaliningrad and the adjacent Polish territory). Still, the complexity of the issue makes progress rather slow and from the point of view of CBC actors in the neighbour states, the actual EU performance in this regard remains low. As revealed in the study conducted by EU DIMENSIONS (2009, p. 4), CBC actors consider that “in five years following the enlargement, the EU had done little [to] enhance people-to-people contacts or to bring neighbours closer to the EU in cognitive terms (or to positively affect CBC)”. The EU policy is generally seen as “being in the EU’s interests and based on the asymmetry of power relations where the neighbouring countries have little say” (ibid). The mere size of financial allocation available to regional actors within the ENPI is also seen to mark the low level of priority attributed to regional cooperation.1 In the ENPI’s total financial package of 11.2 billion EUR, the ‘regional dimension’, including the CBC Programme together with the Inter-Regional and Regional programmes ‘East’ and ‘South’, is given only about 10% while the major share of the available financing is dedicated to bilateral assistance. Within this package the ENPI CBC 2007-2013 accounts for 690.8 million EUR or less than 100 million EUR annually for both sides of the border (European Commission, 2003b). This represents a decrease if compared to the 140 million EUR of allocations received during the transitional stage 2004-2006 under the NPs. (A total budget of NPs amounted to 425.8 million EUR with 129 million EUR set aside for the partner countries for the three years and the rest designated to the EU regions). However, in terms of allocations for the neighbour partners, there has been clearly a steady increase of financing since

1 The main discussions however arose about the amount of the contribution of the European Regional Development Fund to the CBC component and the issue of whether or not a breakdown between the two geographical regions, notably the south and east would not be needed. Against the initial EUR 15 billion suggested by the Commission. The total financial package was fixed at EUR 11.2 billion. This is, however, an increase of roughly 30 per cent in comparison to the EUR 8.5 billion for TACIS and MEDA combined for the period 2000-2006.

109 under the TACIS 1996-2000 programme where with the total budget of 110 million EUR they were receiving just around 22 million EUR annually. Apart from controversies pertinent to the policy-driven (geopolitical) nature of ENPI, the implementation rules for CBC programmes as outlined in the Regulation 951/2007 can also be seen contradicting the declared inclusive approach and revealing a rather more traditional (hierarchical) type of EU external action. Instead of following the INTERREG approach, as initially intended, the ENPI Regulation applies the legislative framework for the implementation rules from the Practical Guide to Contract Procedures for EC External Actions (PRAG), created originally as an external assistance instrument and managed by the Commission’s Directorate General on External Aid (DEVCO).151 While this was meant to ensure the application of the same rules to both sides of the border (and not just the extension of the EU’s internal rules under INTERREG programme within the European Territorial Cooperation framework), the PRAG rules are often recognized as over-complicated and inflexible for the context of CBC where local conditions have to be taken into account. In fact, as noted by NEEBOR (2010), they do not correspond either to the principle of partnership or to the realities of CBC. In such a way, despite the significant effort made by the Commission to put in place inclusive, partner-oriented policy instruments, the controversies pertinent to the geopolitical and legal boundaries are bound to impede progress. It remains to be seen, however, how strongly the persistence of these boundaries affects the daily interactions within the transactional boundary. As noted earlier, within the non- hierarchical types of governance there is no particular sequence, nor prioritisation in the process of overcoming of boundaries. For example, in the case of ENPI CBC the cultural boundary, indeed, seems to counterbalance, if not outweigh, the negative implications of the geopolitical boundary. In fact, the negative perceptions towards the Schengen regime as a divide and barrier to social and economic interaction mentioned above did not damage the cooperation attitudes of the CBC actors. According to the survey conducted by EXLINEA, the negative views of the border appeared to be related rather to the technical aspect of crossing the border (such as the long queues and inefficiency of the border guards on both sides) and not to the visa requirement as such (Scott and Matzeit, 2006, p. 127). Hence, the actors on both sides continue to perceive the border as “a genuine bridge linking both nations, facilitating an efficient economic and social cooperation” (ibid). Furthermore, the appreciation of the EU’s

110 possible role also remained generally positive – the EU is seen as an independent player, a modernizing factor and a normative force for democratic transformation (EU DIMENSIONS, 2009, p. 4). These attitudes underlying cooperation practices in the CBC context provide a solid basis for the modification of the transactional boundary, i.e. the process whereby new interaction patterns develop resulting in the emergence of new social practices.

6.2.2 The emerging social practices within the ENPI CBC Programmes

Considering the poor state of CBC across the post-soviet borders, it is not a surprise that the launch of joint Programmes under the ENPI CBC has been met with enthusiasm across the Eastern neighbourhood. The statistics of the ENPI CBC Programmes’ implementation (Table 6) show a general intensification of activity. Immediately with the start of the transitional stage by the Neighbourhood Programmes 2004-2006 almost two thousand applications were received, an increasingly high number if compared with previous years. This meant that the funding requested was double the total available finances and hence only 850 projects could be selected for implementation. All were carried out successfully, which, in itself, already represents a significant improvement of CBC considering the difficulties of the previous INTERREG and TACIS programmes (burdened by lack of coordination and chronically lacking financing, as described earlier). With the entry into force of the ENPI CBC Programmes in 2007, the competition for funding remained high. During the First Call for Proposals (running from June 2009 to November 2010) and accounting for about 20% of the total Programme’s budget, over 1300 applications were received and just 200 projects selected. Altogether, including the ongoing 2nd, 3rd and even 4th Call for Proposals as some of the Programmes, by the end of 2011 over 400 projects were approved (including the Large Scale Projects component with 40 agreed border-crossing infrastructure projects).152 Furthermore, the number of partners from the neighbouring states also demonstrates the rising interest in CBC – in 2011 there were 790 entities registered in the neighbour countries against 840 in the member states (in other words, 47% of all participants came from the non-EU countries) (INTERACT, 2011b).

111 Importantly, the share of projects’ lead partners (responsible for initiation and implementation of the project) from the neighbour countries has also been growing – while within the NPs, about 17% of projects accounted for partners from the neighbour countries (under the TACIS component), within the ENPI CBC scheme, their share rose to over 27% (INTERACT, 2011b). In order to understand this rise in the degree of engagement of partner countries, it is important to note that under the NPs projects, the partner who applied for TACIS funding did not necessarily act as lead partner. In contrast, under ENPI CBC Programmes, all applicants from the neighbour countries are lead partners. As noted by the Commission’s official from DG DEVCO, this new capacity to engage not just as participants, but also to initiate their own projects as lead partners, taking full responsibility for a project’s development and implementation, has not been easy to apprehend. It took some time for the partners from neighbour countries to realise this opportunity, and the applications to the 2nd and following Calls for Proposals demonstrate ever bigger share of partners from the neighbour countries.153 Despite this generally positive dynamic, the implementation of the ENPI CBC Programmes was difficult. From the outset, the launch of the Programmes turned out to be very slow: the first calls for proposals weren’t launched until in June 2009 (and lasted until November 2010). It then took over a year (in some cases) to evaluate the received applications and to select the projects eligible for funding. Another unexpected delay was due to the lengthy process of signing the financial agreements between the EU and the partner countries, otherwise a standard operational procedure for allowing the provision of EU funding on a multi-annual basis. As a result, the first project contracts were not signed until September 2010, i.e. more than three and a half years since the launch of the ENPI CBC (and even later for other Programmes, in particular those including Russia due to lengthy negotiations on adjustment of the financial agreement according to Russia’s own financial contribution to the ENPI CBC Programmes). While these problems could be considered as normal due to the novelty of ENPI CBC Programmes for all participants, they have created widespread frustration among the CBC actors, in particular on the EU side. For the actors on the ground it meant that for several years they remained without any financing at all. Considering that the regions at the external EU borders turned out not to be eligible for any other EU regional development funds, they started to call for allowing the implementation of the ENPI

112 CBC Programmes only on the EU side in the case of failed negotiations with the partner country.154 Others, while surviving thanks to national financing, started to fear losing their strategic partners beyond the EU borders, since they too have been left without any resources (NEEBOR, 2011). Apart from the slow start, an additional burden for Programmes’ implementation was created by the PRAG rules that proved unsuitable for the context of CBC. They did not bring the desired solution to the long-standing problem of harmonization of rules for CBC in the neighbour countries with the EU’s standards. Instead, they proved unsuitable not only because of creating difficulties for the neighbour partners, but also because of incompatibility with national legislation in the EU Member States (in the case of Finland, for example, the national legislation with regard to CBC had to be changed in order to be compatible with PRAG rules). In fact, as noted by the Network of Eastern External Border Regions, the ENPI CBC obliges the EU border regions to use the overly complicated PRAG procedures pertinent to the EU external aid policies, as part of their regional development mechanisms (NEEBOR, 2010). Against this background the engagement of the partners from neighbour countries remained rather limited. The ‘joint ownership’ did not extend to ‘shared management’ and the implementation burden was shouldered almost entirely by the JMAs and their secretariats (in the EU Member States). As concluded by the evaluation carried out by the RCBI (2009), while the partner countries have been actively involved in the development of Programmes and preparation of projects, “they are least actively involved in Programme management, with almost no involvement in JMAs, limited participation in Joint Technical Secretariats and Branch Offices (where they exist) and under-representation at Joint Monitoring Committees’ meetings”. Among the factors inhibiting the participation of partner countries, the evaluation indicated that, apart from the traditional lack of capacity and resources (such as high cost of travel for project preparation activities and difficulties to meet the co-financing requirement), there was also an unfavourable national legal, regulatory and procedural environment (ibid).

113 Table 6. Implementation of the Neighbourhood Programmes 2004-2006 (Interreg IIIA/Phare CBC/Tacis CBC) and the ENPI CBC 2007-2013. First Call for Proposals. Sources: European Commission 2008; INTERACT 2011a; the ENPI CBC Programmes’ official websites. The ENPI CBC 2007-2013 Total 1st Call for budget Proposals 2007- Interreg/Phare/Tacis Neighbourhood Programmes 2004-2006 in 2011* million (20 % of total € budget) Programme Budget No. of No. of No. of No. of ERDF/ applicat approved applicatio approve TACIS ions projects ns d in Total/ Total / projects million € TACIS TACIS /Joint Kolarctic 20.9 / 3.5 42 19 /1 /11 28.2 38 13 KOL Euregio Karelia 57.7 / 3.8 88 20 /7/5 23.2 59 11 KAR

South-East Finland/Russia 14.6 / 8 100 44 /21/23 36.2 36 12 S-EFR

Lithuania/Poland/Kaliningrad No data / 44.5 / 8 158 / 23/22 132.1 189 LPR 99 Estonia/Latvia/Russia 7.8 / 6.5 315 46 / 27 /18 47.8 226 25 ELR Latvia/Lithuania/Belarus 10.4 / 1 137 53 / 8 / 4 41.7 110 13 LLB Hungary/Slovakia/Romania/ Ukraine 36.2 /4.5 No data 135 / 9 68.6 148 48 HSRU Poland/Belarus/Ukraine/ 45.8 / 8 607/ 37 85 /5 186.2 303 18 PBU Romania/Moldova 27 / 5 384 / 64 180 / 13 126.7 RUM 423 62 Romania/Ukraine 28.5 / 6.5 309 / 45 137 / 10 RUM Over Over Total 858 / 132 202 1980 1300 *The following (second and third) Calls for Proposals have reached various stages in different Programmes and it has been impossible to obtain a complete data on the selected projects by the end of 2013.

114 At the level of applicants (potential project beneficiaries), the problem was in finding partners across borders; as one Programme website described it, ‘a harder task than finding a wife’. It should be noted that considerable effort has been undertaken by the Joint Technical Secretariats (in cooperation with the RCBI) to carry out numerous supporting events for potential beneficiaries all around the Programme territory, including information seminars (on project development, filling in the application form and preparation of the budget) as well as Partner Search Forums. Special partner search tools were introduced on the official Programmers’ websites. Nonetheless, cross-border partnerships remained difficult to conclude, in particular it was hard to ‘break the ice’ within the new cooperation areas such as energy efficiency or cooperation on improving the business environment, where no cooperation has been developed during the previous years. This is reflected by the composition of actors from the partner countries (Figure 9), with the majority of actors belonging to NGOs and regional administrations, while business associations and development bodies are represented by a very modest share. The largest group of CBC actors is traditionally represented by NGOs and other civil society organizations. Within the ENPI CBC Programmes they have generally continued to build on their previous cross-border relations. Often, they appeal to the expertise of their EU counterparts not just in dealing with concrete trans-border problems but also in gaining influence in the state–society relations, in particular looking for their experience of navigating through post-socialist transition and European integration processes. Becoming the second largest group among the project partners is a significant step forward for the regional/local authorities, in particular, against the background of their still limited participation in the Programmes’ management structures. In fact, the opportunity to carry out projects by themselves (on parity with other regional actors) instigated positive developments within the regional administrative structures. For example, in need of experience and knowledge for applying for the EU funds, the regional authorities in Belarus started to engage the NGOs (from social and environmental fields) as partners by creating governmental NGOs (GONGOs). Although this process has been often criticised as collaboration of civil society with the regime, it is also recognised that this practice contributed to the transfer of

115 European and international practices and norms into the realm of state administration in Belarus (Sahm, 2009, p. 49).

Figure 9. Composition of regional / local actors in the Neighbourhood countries Source: database of the RCBI website. Available at http://www.rcbitools.info/partners/

All these developments point to a certain rise of the ‘regional consciousness’ among the regionalisation actors in the EN. This conclusion is further supported by looking at the distribution of projects by objectives (Figure 10); the new objective of economic and social development (absent during the previous periods of cooperation) is attributed a great importance by the regionalisation actors, with 37% of selected projects (and 45% of applications). Such a high prioritization is the first effort to address the problem of a socio-economic gap across the border, a problem that is often considered to be a major obstacle to CBC at the EU external borders (Polish Ministry of Regional Development, 2006).

Figure 10. Applications and approved projects by objective. ENPI CBC First Call for Proposals.

116 Source: INTERACT 2011c, slide 6. Applications

Approved projects

Most importantly, the same rise of consciousness can be observed in the self- perceptions of the local actors. From the outset, the expectations from the EU among the regional actors in the Eastern neighbourhood have been linked not with the direct imposition of the EU rules, but with the process of constructive dialogue with civil society on a wide range of social concerns, and greater attention to the dynamics from below (EU DIMENSIONS, 2009). Furthermore, as revealed during the consultations on the future of the ENPI CBC, in the questionnaire about their preferences for the new Regulation (after 2013), the majority of respondents from the ground, including in the neighbour countries, look for “greater delegation of responsibility to the regional level” (they suggest that the Regulation should only define the basic principles, while each Programme should be

117 responsible for defining its detailed implementing rules and objectives) (INTERACT, 2011a). All in all, it can be concluded that the EIPs as manifested within the ENPI CBC Programmes can be seen as corresponding to the functional logic. The partnership- oriented nature of ENPI CBC, introducing the elements of shared regional governance, has been taken by the CBC actors in EN countries as an opportunity to foster their regionalisation strategies and has resulted in the rise of regional mobilization. Ultimately, these positive perceptions have had a beneficial effect on the state of CBC as seen in the growing number of common projects and emergence of new interaction patterns. At the same time, the weakness of CBC actors continue to burden cooperation practices within the ENPI CBC due to the restrictive nature of the domestic environment. To this end the following section will now look at the developments in the centre-periphery relations in the EN in order to find the factors preventing regional empowerment.

6.3 Explaining EIPs of CBC actors: domestic opportunities for regional mobilization in the Eastern Neighbourhood

The transition in the realm of centre-periphery relations on the post-Soviet space has been particularly slow. As mentioned earlier, all of the EN countries have very similar centralized systems inherited from overregulation and bureaucracy at state level in Soviet times, which still create obstacles to the development of local and regional authorities. While during the last years the national authorities in the EN countries started the work on the development of new legislative and institutional structures for regional development, the decentralization process has been very slow. Regional development is generally characterized by the absence of any clear and coherent regional policy framework, with numerous government policies trying to reverse the existing trends of growing disparities, spatial polarisation and fragmentation. The existing regional policies still place great stress on traditional compensatory measures, subsidies and transfers as opposed to focusing on investment, competitiveness and a multi-sector horizontal approach. In such circumstances the opportunities for regional empowerment of CBC actors remain limited.

118 Among the ENPI CBC partner countries, Russia has seen the most controversial development of its regional policy, which continues to swing between the levelling– out approach to the principle of polarised or ‘focused’ development (aimed at stimulating growth in a number of most economically-advanced regions where investment could produce the best economic effect) and back. The first ever efforts to create a national regional policy were undertaken in 2004, under the conditions of the country’s economic growth and stabilisation, when the new Ministry of Regional Development (Minregion) drafted a Concept Strategy for Socio-Economic Development of Russia’s Regions (2006), marking a radical turn away from the equalization strategy. By 2011, however, there was a switch back to the goal of a balanced socio-economic development of the regions and a reduction of regional disparities in life standards.155 National priorities of regional development remain poorly defined and continue to change between the pursuit of spatial agglomeration to equalization and back. In a meantime, one of the clearest trends is the growth of selective government interventions to promote mega-projects in certain areas as a tool of regional development, such as the 2012 APEC Summit in Vladivostok, 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi and the Skolkovo Innovation Centre near Moscow. These projects imply direct intervention by central authorities to the regional level (such as government agencies or development corporations acting on behalf of the presidential administration or the federal government) without any devolution of power to regional authorities (Kinossian, 2013). While the efforts to introduce a strategic element into regional development through the increased presence of the state might make it easier to mark priorities for CBC activities of the Russian border regions, the capacity of regionalisation actors to remains unchanged. Emblematically, as seen by the participation experience of the Russian North-Western regions in the Northern Dimension, even after being conferred with designated financial support for trans- border cooperation by the federal centre, the Russian North-Western regions still found it difficult to act on parity with their Western counterparts (Khasson, 2010). Similar to Russia, in Ukraine, despite a wide agreement on the need for greater decentralization, the situation of sub-national governments remains difficult. They often face capacity challenges, including extreme fragmentation at lower levels, making it impossible to realise economies of scale or even to perform some basic service-provision functions effectively. They tend to depend heavily on central transfers, the regional development allocation of which they find at times to be both

119 unpredictable and less than transparent, urging for reforms to sub-national public finances (Suszko 2007). The relevant legislation started to be developed with the 2005 Law on Stimulating Regional Development and the approval (the following year) of the State Strategy for Regional development to 2015. The strategy aimed at creating an enabling environment for the regions to increase their competitiveness through Regional Development Strategies, the main implementation element that all regions were to adopt. As assessed by the OECD (2013) Territorial Review on Ukraine, this ambitious agenda was not underpinned by any clear priorities or sequencing. The strategies did not contain any operational plans and were not linked to any dedicated funding or institutional mechanism to ensure performance. The State-region contracts, as a main implementation element, proceeded slowly. The State Fund for Regional Development, with the potential to provide a reliable source of funding for state- region contracts, was just created in 2012 (and only seven contracts were concluded by then). The contracts also tended to focus on the same development sectors as regional development strategies, i.e. health, education, agriculture and environment, leaving out a wide range of regional development policies (such as innovation, private sector development, entrepreneurship and labour market policy), tending to address rather the immediate social problems than stimulating longer-term growth. Moreover, the issue of regional development became over-regulated with more than twenty Ukrainian laws, five Constitutional Court decisions, an array of presidential orders, Ukrainian government decisions and acts introduced by the central executive bodies, all approved at different times, on the basis of different conceptions and aiming to solve local problems of regional development. Therefore, they are not systematic and not mutually complementary (Bila, 2013). This situation represented not only a real obstacle for forming strategic landmarks in regional development, but also created conditions for abuse and corruption by local officials and last but not least, it prevented civil society and the general population from becoming actively involved in the process of implementing regional policy at the local level (ibid). The work on the development of a single comprehensive legislative act on regional policy has been going on since 2008, just reaching the voting stage in Verkhovna Rada in 2013. The institutional framework for regional development has added to the confusion. Apart from the Ministry of Regional Development and Construction, created in 2007, policy process also includes the Council of Regions headed by the President of

120 Ukraine and comprising leading national and regional officials (2010), the Committee on Economic Reform (a consultative-advisory authority under the President) that oversees the working group on Regional Development and the Reform of Inter- budgetary relations, and the Coordination Centre for the Implementation of Economic Reform under the President of Ukraine. The coordination among these bodies has been poor with strongly sectoral approaches to planning and funding prevailing among the ministries. The Inter-Service Coordination Commission for Regional Development was established in late 2012 in the effort to address the problem, but has yet to make any real impact.156 Moldova has been most active among the ENs in aligning its regional policy with the EU standards by adopting, for example, the National Strategy for Regional Development for 2013-2015 based on the trends of EU regional development.157 Still, the situation of regional actors here remains not much different from the rest of the neighbourhood. The law on regional development was approved in late 2006 (and budgetary funds were allocated in 2008), but the institutional framework for the policy implementation suffered from similar shortcomings as in Ukraine, such as abundance of regulatory acts, unclear funding and distribution of competences among implementing bodies.158 The lack of clear delimitation of responsibilities among local and central authorities prevented the decentralization process from moving forwards while overlapping responsibilities of different levels of public administration were having a negative effect on the quality of public services (Osoian, 2008). As stated in the opinion of the Council of Europe on the modernization, reforms and administrative capacity of the local and regional authorities in the Republic of Moldova, there is a need for reform measures in this regard as well as for the implementation of a transparent, fair, credible system of local public finances, free from rigid practices and clientelism supporting an unbalanced system of discretionary distribution of budget resources to local communities159. The preparation for such administrative reform, designed to decentralize the state and thus create a basis for stronger local authorities who would further bolster the development of Moldovan civil society began in January 2012 as part of a National Strategy for Decentralization. The document proposes the transfer of certain powers from central government to local authorities, especially local councils, and offers them greater control over their budgets (including the right to set local taxes and the right to

121 retain any income generated from the lease of land or property). The effects of the reform have so far been negligible, however, mainly, due to the reluctance of local councils to take independent decisions, and of central government to give up some of its powers. The process has also been negatively affected by the politicisation of the mechanisms used to distribute central government funds to local authorities (Calus, 2013). Finally, in Belarus where a centralized administrative system allowed little change in terms of regional empowerment, the necessary legislation was not developed before 2010 (the Law on Local and Regional Authorities). While the law consolidated the role of sub-national units in the public administrative structures and even ensured the consolidation of the financing of local and regional authorities, cooperation with the central government and approximation with EU standards through the work of a Cooperation Council,160 opportunities for regional empowerment remain insignificant. In such a way, the decentralization of the regional policy, where it has started, has still a way to go before being translated into day-to-day practices of CBC. Meanwhile, the state-centric nature of the current regional policies and of the centre-regional relations in the EN countries remain the major reason for the weakness of the regional actors and for strengthening their participation in the CBC activities on equal footing.

6.4 Conclusion

This case study has confirmed the correlation between EIPs and the transition factor at the level of micro-level regionalisation in the EU Eastern neighbourhood. While, in contrast to the macro-level, the practices of CBC correspond greatly to the patterns of functional cooperation, the transition factor continues to affect EIPs by limiting the capacity of regionalisation actors in the partner countries of the EN. In particular, the poor state of transition has impeded the development of adequate regional policies, depriving in such a way the CBC actors from opportunities for regional mobilization. In this sense, the national level represents a sort of structural limitation for the strengthening EIPs of the CBC actors. To the contrary, the proper regional level appears of great significance as a source of positive change. Particularly beneficial for regional mobilization was the phenomenon of rising regional

122 consciousness among the CBC actors and the new interaction patterns in the regional administration-civil society relations. At the same time, we have observed little difference in EIPs across the EN. On the one hand, this points to a similar nature of transition processes in the field of centre- periphery relations across the EN. On the other hand, this homogeneity also reaffirms the strength of functional logic in the motivation of CBC actors. Indeed, while in some of the neighbour countries the civil society CBC actors are facing more restrictive policies, their EIPs are in no way different from those exhibited by their partners in more liberal post-Soviet states. In fact, within their domestic environment the CBC actors have managed to advocate for the need for CBC at the borders with the EU at the national level to gain a more permissive attitude of the centre and a greater margin of freedom. The importance of the EU policy practices has also been significant in changing the interaction patterns within the CBC. While not free from various shortcomings, it had allowed a leap in the participation of partners from the EN in quantitative and qualitative terms contributing greatly to their regional mobilization.

123 Chapter 7. Concluding remarks

This research had examined how the domestic factors in the post-Soviet countries from the Eastern EU neighbourhood influence the European integration process. It has been argued that RIPs in these states cannot be assessed exclusively in terms of functional rationality but should be seen as embedded in the transitional nature of the ruling regimes in place. As demonstrated through the case study of RIPs formation in the context of European integration, in the authoritarian regimes the EIPs proved to be driven essentially by the regime survival interests in the calculations of the ruling elites, while more advanced democratic transition in other post-Soviet countries corresponded to a greater presence of functional rationality. At the micro-regional level whereas the functional logic is much more present than at the macro-level as inherently pertinent to regionalisation (CBC) actors, the transition factor had also affected EIPs, even if indirectly, e.g., by limiting the capacity of the relevant actors to foster CBC. The main conclusion in terms of assessing the EU relations with its EN is that progress on the way of European integration can only be expected along the advancement of the regime transition process. Accordingly, no positive change in EIPs should be expected in such consolidated regimes as Belarus and Azerbaijan where the preferences for very limited integration with the EU (in the field of practical cooperation) correspond to particular needs within the regime sustaining mechanism. In a similar way, the virtual´ Europeanisation practices, extensively used by various regimes, serve just to disguise their self-interests behind the pro-European discourse, while, in substance, no real deepening of integration takes place. This is true regarding the EIPs in Armenia, where no official course on the EU membership has been announced, but also in Ukraine, where membership aspirations have been skilfully used by the alternating elites as a mere legitimacy gaining strategy. In fact, in the absence of deep democratic reforms in the future, there is no reason why the situation may not reproduce itself also during the presidency of Petro Poroshenko elected following the Euromaidan events of December 2013. Whereas the AA was signed in June 2014 (the process was accelerated by the EU in the view of drastic events in

124 Ukraine including Russia’s annexation of Crimea and a proxy war in Eastern Ukraine causing deaths of thousands of peaceful citizens) and rapidly ratified in order to enter into force by July 2016, it remains to be seen by the course of implementation of the AA how serious would be the government’s determination to maintain the taken commitments. It should be noted that the Association Agenda agreed in early 2015 contains for the first time since the launch of the ENP, short-term reform priorities with benchmarks, raising the chances for timely policy implementation. At present, however, the government’s concerns are rather about the Western macro-financial assistance.161 Perceptions of European integration seem to follow the usual concept with membership perspective as a cornerstone in terms of being a valuable asset for domestic discourse. For example, the President Poroshenko´s suggestion during the fourth EaP Summit in Riga in May 2015 to split the EaP sidelining the countries that have not signed the AA (Armena, Azerbaijan and Belrus) (NEU Newsletter for the European Union, 2015) points out clearly to continuity in Ukrainian EIPs. At the same time, Moldova, the success story of the 2013 Vilnius summit (and a frontrunner in terms of free movement: Moldovan citizens no longer need a visa to enter the EU), surprisingly, still does not manifest clear determination on the path to the European future either: EIPs continue to be undermined by political instability due to internal struggle within the immature elites on the background of the country´s impoverishment as witnessed by the loud corruption scandals over one billion dollar banking fraud in winter 2015- 2016 bringing outraged people to rally in anti- government protests (Seddon, 2015). Only in Georgia the degree of democratic transition had reached the state when EIPs start to represent a truly national strategy, e.g. driven by legitimacy pressures from various political and social forces (including public opinion and business groups) not linked to the regime sustaining structures. The stability of the European integration course here had not been undermined by the change of the country´s political leadership in the course of the democratic elections in 2012 and 2013. It has to be underlined that according to the findings of the present research, the progress in regime transition leads just to the strengthening of functional rationality in RIPs formation process, but not necessarily to fostering of EIPs as such. Theoretically speaking, the EN countries should not follow the same path as the leaders of European integration, Georgia and Moldova. Even alongside the transition progress, the EU offer may be seen as more attractive than other options (the Russian-led structures)

125 only if such a strategy corresponds with the existing legitimacy pressures. For example, it should not be excluded that at a time when more democratic regime takes root in Belarus or Armenia, the economic dependence on trade with Russia might render the European choice too costly, and thus, not bringing popularity even to the democratic government searching re-election.162 Members of the Russian-led economic and security structures, these countries may not be in favour of forcing the choice between the two directions. The growing popularity rates of President Lukashenko following the disturbances in Ukraine, confirm that such considerations loom large over the post-Soviet space. Of course, it is still unclear whether the EEU would evolve into an economically sustainable structure or would remain a political illusion driven by the ambition of President Putin (Popescu, 2014). In fact, ever since the launch of the EaP and especially since the Vilnius summit in 2013, Russia has been unceasingly trying to arm twist the former republics to join its integrationist structures within the Customs Union converted into the ambitious Eurasian Economic Union in May 2014 and extended to include Armenia 2015 and Kyrgyzstan in 2015. The level of political ambition of the project is surely as high as to re-unite post-Soviet space since membership has been offered to all of the former Soviet republics (Eastbook.eu 2014). All in all, while the Russian policy is in no way to be neglected, the key to the understanding RIPs is to be found in the domestic factors conditioning legitimacy pressures (or their absence) in the EN countries. As demonstrated by the present study, the importance of the external factors, be it Russian or EU policies, is relevant only to the extent it affects these domestic preconditions. The major consequence of this argument in terms of assessing EU neighbourly relations is that the issue of incentives in the EU policy should be seen in conjunction with the country´s transition. The ENP/EaP record shows that despite being an incontestable pole of attraction,, the EU has not managed to ensure the acceptance of its imposed conditionality through adequate incentives (Börzel and van Hüllen, 2014). Indeed, the findings of the present research confirm that in most of the EN countries, the ruling elites have demonstrated very selective compliance, e.g. only in the fields that do not endanger their regime-survival interests, that is to say, generally avoiding political reforms. Full acceptance of the EU imposed rules and norms can be observed only in Moldova, and this is due only to the country´s official course on the EU membership, the issue that the EaP was, in fact, supposed to avoid. As for the EaP

126 leader, Georgia, it demonstrates already a somewhat more pro-active approach to conditionality by adjusting the EU imposed rules to the needs of the country´s economic development. Clearly, the effectiveness of incentives has much to do with domestic considerations. In this regard, the long lasting dilemma of the EU neighbourhood policy between the value-based versus functional cooperation approaches seems counter-productive. While considering these approaches as mutually excluding, it is often neglected that the more flexible way of using the functional approach can also contribute to the spread of the EU norms and values and can even promote democratisation in the long run. As demonstrated by the case of micro-level regionalization, at this level the transition logic proved to be indirect, e.g. as a structural limitation to the predominantly functional logic behind actors calculations, i.e. providing a fruitful ground for the emergence of new interaction patterns contributing to the strengthening of EIPs. In other words, functional cooperation can be effective in fostering Europeanisation by means of the non-hierarchical types of governance and actors´ socialization if targeting relevant actors and promoting the adequate interaction patterns (as different from the EU´ s unilateral policy approach). In this regard, the fields of economic and societal regionalisation can also offer many opportunities since transition here goes usually ahead of the political process empowering the relevant actors to drive regionalization processes. Even ´virtual´ Europeanisation can provide a window of opportunity for promoting democratisation in the long run by the mere fact of bringing the rhetoric of European values into the domestic political debate. The emerging social practices beyond the compliance type of behaviour can foster cooperation also in the context of various international and multilateral structures, including those within the EaP. While having obvious limitations in terms of promoting democratic change, and, indeed, modest leverage for fostering the initiative, these structures, nonetheless, contain great potential in terms of providing the EU with regional leadership. This is particularly relevant to the field of security where the expectations from the EU as a security actor in its direct vicinity are high due to the context of geopolitical uncertainty and persisting internal challenges. With this mindset, a much greater variety of incentives can be put at the service of fostering European integration. The question is what kind of practices the EU is searching to promote in its neighbourhood and whether it has a real ambition of embarking its neighbours into a common integration project. All in all, the success of

127 the EU policy in the region will depend on the ability to embrace different types of regionalization together by pursuing simultaneously various regional strategies. The recent developments within the EaP already show the signs of such a flexible approach, in particular by the fact of negotiating new (although more limited) agreements with Azerbaijan and Armenia instead of a more politically constraining, but rejected AAs. Using the concept of RIPs, as was demonstrated here, these issues can be analysed in their interconnection: the EU policy practice and its acceptance (or not) by the neighbours as manifested through the emerging social practices of regionalization. The further studies of domestic factors, in such a way, can offer a wide range of explanations not only in the theoretical field, but also in a more practical sense of policy analysis or the efforts to reform the ENP/EaP. For example, the fruitful ground for exploring further these relationships can be found in the case of the EU´s Southern neighbourhood, where the absence of the EU membership possibility makes it even easier to distinguish from the outset new regionalisation practices, different from the enlargement patterns. It should be noted, that whereas in the framework of the present research the regime transition has been defined by democratic transition indexes (as a common denominator for all of the post-Soviet states), the deeper analysis (on a country basis) of the domestic factor would provide greater explanatory power.. Considering that in the case of non-democracies, the functional logic remains an ideal type, the culmination of the transition process, the study of the ruling elites´ interests’ remains of relevance even when democratic transition is well advanced and legitimacy pressures are well present. Searching re-election, politicians in power might be more inclined to favour the demands of those groups that ensure better chances in achieving this goal (more numerous or providing greater financial support etc). Clearly, there is more than one way of how legitimacy pressures are being translated into official policy choices in the transitional regimes, leaving a large field for investigating the domestic factors underlying RIPs formation processes. s. At the same time, on the other continuum, the regime sustaining mechanisms are also not fixed, and not completely void of legitimacy pressures not even in consolidated regimes,. While legitimacy pressures are usually mitigated through adequate political rhetoric and public spending, in some circumstances it might become in the interests of the proper regime to satisfy some particular pressures.

128 The larger implications of the present study for the NRA´s research agenda could be found in the application of RIPs concept outside of the European integration context. As argued throughout this investigation apart from the studies of state-driven regionalism in authoritarian or transitional states, the RIPs concept could serve well for the cases were various regionalisation actors are present alongside (or contesting) the state. In such circumstances, the key characteristics of the domestic factor in terms of state–society relations axis should necessarily be supplemented by the factor of relationship between the interests of different politically powerful regionalisation actors. For example, in rising economies business actors (such as transnational corporations) are increasingly successful in pushing their interests forward into the regional cooperation agenda. The security driven cases of regionalism, involving usually various political and military forces (domestic and international) struggling to establish or guaranty peaceful co-existence and operation, could be yet another prominent field where the use of RIPs might help to provide meaningful explanations. Such studies would definitely contribute with new evidence to the understanding of regionalism in non-democracies.

129 Annex Annex 1. Geographical Eligibility ENPI CBC 2007-2013. Land Border programmes. Source: European Commission, 2003b Programme Eligible border areas Adjoining areas Kolarctic /Russia Finland: Lappi Sweden: Norrbotten Norway: Finnmark, Troms, Nordland Finland: Pohjois-Pohjanmaa Sweden: Västerbotten Russia: Republic of KOL Russia: Murmansk Oblast, Archangelsk Oblast, Nenets Okrug Karelia, Leningrad Oblast, St Petersburg

Karelia/Russia Finland: Kainuu, Pohjois-Pohjanmaa (Northern Ostrobothnia), Pohjois- Finland: Lappi, Pohjois- Savo Russia: Murmansk, Archangelsk and KAR Karjala (North Karelia) Russia: Republic of Karelia Leningrad Oblast, St Petersburg

SE Finland/Russia Finland: Etelä-Karjala (South Karelia), Kymenlaakso, Etelä Savo (South Finland: Itä-Uusimaa, Päijät-Häme, Pohjois-Savo Russia: Republic of S-EFR Savo) Russia: Leningrad Oblast, St Petersburg Karelia Estonia/Latvia/Russia Estonia: Kirde-Eesti, Lõuna-Eesti, Kesk-Eesti Latvia: Latgale, Vidzeme Estonia: Põhja - Eesti Latvia: Pieriga and Riga ELR Regions Russia: Leningrad and Pskov Oblasts, St Petersburg

Latvia/Lithuania/ Belarus Latvia: Latgale Region Lithuania: Utenos, Vilniaus and Altyaus Apskritis Lithuania: Kaunas and Panevezys Apskritis Belarus: Minsk Oblast, LLB Belarus: Hrodna and Vitebsk Oblasts Moguliev Oblast

Lithuania/ Poland/ Russia Lithuania: Marjampolis, Taurages and Klaipedos Apskritis Poland: Poland: Slupski, Bydgoski, Torunsko-Wloclawski, Lomzynski, -Kaliningrad Gdansk-Gdynia-Sopot, Gdanski, Elblaski, Olsztynski, Elcki, Ciechanowsko-plocki, Ostroleckosiedlecki Lithuania: Altyaus, Kauno, LPR Bialostocko-Suwalski Russia: Kaliningrad Oblast Telsiu, Siauliu Apskritis

Poland/Belarus/ Poland:Bialostocko-suwalski, Ostrolecko-siedlecki, Bialskopodlaski, Poland: Lubelski, Rzeszowskotarnobrzeski, Lomzynski Belarus: Ukraine Chelmsko-zamojski, Krosnienskoprzemyski Belarus: Hrodna and Brest eastern part of Minsk Oblast, Gomel Oblast Ukraine: PBU oblats, western part of Minsk oblast (Miadel, Vileika, Molodechno, Rivnenska,Ternopilska Oblasts and Ivano-Frankivska Oblasts Volozhin, Stolbtsy, Niesvizh and Kletsk districts) Ukraine: Volynska, Lvivska and Zakarpatska Oblasts Hungary/Slovakia/ Hungary: Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg Hungary: Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén Romania/Ukraine Slovakia: Prešovský kraj, Košický kraj Romania: Maramures, Satu Mare Ukraine: Chernivetska Oblast Romania: Suceava HSRU Ukraine: Zakarpatska, Ivano-Frankivska Oblasts Romania/Ukraine/ Romania: Botosani, Suceava, Iasi, Romania: Braila Moldova Vaslui, Galati, Tulcea Ukraine: Chernivetska, Odesska Oblasts Moldova: Ukraine: Ivano-Frankivska, Ternopilska, Khmelnitska and Vinnitska RUM the whole country Oblasts

130 Annex 2. Join structures of the ENPI CBC Programmes and branch offices

Programme Joint Managing Authority National Authorities in Joint Branch Offices of (JMA ) and Joint Monitoring Committee JTS or JMA Technical Secretariat (JTS) Programme1. Kolarctic Regional CouncilWeb of site Finland - MFA / Ministry of Branch Offices of Kolarctic /Russia Lapland, Finlandhttp://www.kolarcticenpi.info/enEmployment and Economy JMA: Vadsø, NOR KOL Sweden - Ministry of Enterprise, (Kolarctic Energy and Communications secretariat) Norway - Ministry of Local Luleå, SW Karelia/Russia http://www.kareliaenpi.eu/enGovernment and Regional Murmansk (April KAR Development 2011) Arkhangelsk http://www.euregiokarelia.fi/EN/projects/Russia - Ministry of Regional Development / MFA SE 2.KareliaFinland/Russia Council of Ouluhttp://www.southeastfinrusnpi.fi/ Region, Finland - MFA Branch Office of S-EFR Finland Russia – Ministry of Regional JMA in Estonia/Latvia/Russia http://www.estlatrus.eu/eng/contacts/Development / MFA Petrozavodsk, RF 3.Poland Ministry of Regional Lithuania - Ministry of Interior, ELRLithuania Russia Development (MRD) of Russia – Ministry of Regional (Kaliningrad) Poland Development / MFA Latvia/Lithuania/ BelarusJTS in Warsawhttp://www.enpi-cbc.eu/ LLB4.South East Regional Council of South Finland - MFA Contact person in Finland Karelia, Finland Russia – MRD / MFA RF Lithuania/ Poland/ Russia http://www.lt-pl-ru.eu/news.php -Kaliningrad5.Estonia Latvia Ministry of Regional Estonia - Ministry of Interior Tartu and Jõhvi in Russia/ BSR Development and Local Russia - MRD EE; St. Petersburg, LPRNorth Governments of Latvia Leningrad oblast Poland/Belarus/ JTS in Riga http://www.pl-by-ua.eu/en and Pskov in RF Ukraine (March 2011) PBU6.Latvia Lithuania Ministry of Interior of Latvia - Ministry of Regional Daulavpills, LV Belarus Lithuania Development and Local Governments, Vitebsk, Bel /BSR South JTS - Vilnius (Regionalhttp://www.huskroua-cbc.net/ Belarus –MFA jointly with National Hungary/Slovakia/ Policy Department) Coordinating Unit for the EU Technical Assistance Programmes Romania/Ukraine7.Poland Belarus The Ministry of Regional Belarus - MFA jointly with the Co- Brest, BeL HSRUUkraine Development of Poland ordinating Unit of Belarus for the Lviv, Ukr JTS - Warsaw (Centre for European Union’s TACIS Programme, Romania/Ukraine/ European Projects) Ukraine - Ministry of Economy Moldova8.Hungary The National Developmenthttp://www.ro-ua-md.net/en/?Slovakia - Ministry of Construction and Uzgorod, Ukr; RUMSlovakia Ukraine Agency, Hungaryoption=com_content&view=article&id=60&Itemid=99hRegional Development Košice Self- Romania JTS - Budapest Romania - Ministry of Regional Governing Region , ttp://www.ro-ua-md.net/index.php?Development and Housing Sl; Satu-Mare option=com_content&view=article&id=60&Itemid=99Ukraine - Ministry of Economy County Council , Ro 9.Romania The Ministry of Regional Ukraine -Ministry of Economy, Chisinau, Ml, Ukraine and Development and Housing Moldova - Ministry of Economy and Odessa and Moldova of Romania, Department Commerce Chernivetska, Ukr; of International Territorial Cooperation, JTS – two regional Offices in Suceava and Iasi

Annex 3. Web sites of the ENPI CBC Programmes

131 132 Annex 4. List of interviews conducted in the course of the empirical research

Mission of Azerbaijan to the EU, Mukhtar Mammadov - 30/03/2012

Mission of the Republic of Belarus to the European Union and NATO, Yaroslav Vasilyev, First secretary – 5/12/2012

Mission of the Republic of Moldova to the EU, Iulian Groza, Councelor – March 2012

Network of Eastern European Border Regions NEEBOR, Zoltan Balogh, acting Head of Network - 26/05/2011

Mission of Norway to the European Union, Arve Skjerpen, Councelor for Regional and Local Affairs and Kalle Kankaapaa, Northern Dimension and Baltic Sea Cooperation Councelor, MFA Finland – November 2010

Office for a Democratic Belarus in Brussels, Olga Stuzhinskaya – September 2012

Russian Mission to the EU, Sergey Kudrjavtsev, Adviser, Regional cooperation and Northern Dimension – 30/05/2011

European Commission, March -October 2011: EuropeAid Co-operation Office, Cristing Mosneaga, Cross Border Cooperation Programme Manager and Nathalie Thiberge, RCBI Directorate General External Relations (DG RELEX), Jakub Urbanik, Policy Officer, ENP Directorate General for Regional Development (DG REGIO), Transnational and Interregional Cooperation unit, Fausta Corda, Programme Manager

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147 148 1 The policy was first introduced by the European Commission´s Communication on “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours” in 2003 and then launched with the ENP Strategy Paper in 2004. 2 For the overview of the ENP development see Dannreuther, 2004; Bechev and Nicolaidis,2010. 3 Speech by European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, Štefan Füle, “Eastern Partnership reached an important historic milestone”. Annual meeting of Lithuanian Ambassadors, Vilnius, 17 July 2014, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-555_en.htm?locale=en, accessed November 2014. 4 In fact, Eurocentrism has created a largely artificial divide between the New Regionalism Approach and the European integration theories. See Warleigh-Lack and Rosamond, 2010; Warleigh-Lack and Van Langenhove, 2010; Söderbaum and Sbragia, 2010. 5 This later process of regionalisation, despite being less formalised, may possibly have a greater role than formal institutions and has particular importance with regard to transnational cooperation and cross-border flow, such as in cross-border regions and among regional civil societies (Ibid, p. 16). 6 The debate was dominated by two major approaches, the inter-governmentalists and supra-nationalists (neo- functionalists), mirroring the controversies between the neo-realist and neo-liberalist perspectives in International Relations studies, which understand the nature of integration as either driven by interest-based calculations of rational actors or as an outcome of the created institutional structures. It was also focused mainly on the European experience while the rise of regionalism worldwide required a new conceptual toolbox (Farrell, Hettne and Van Langenhove, 2005). 7 In this light, the NRA can the seen as an attempt to better understand state-society complexes in connection with the broader theoretical debate in International Relations and international political economy on transcending “problem solving theory”, state-centric ontologies and rationalist epistemologies by moving towards a more comprehensive social science which accommodates state actors as well as market and civil society actors (Schulz, Söderbaum and Ojendal, 2001: 12). 8 According to the NRA, an empirical case should be treated from historical, interdisciplinary and comparative perspectives. For example, Schulz, Söderbaum and Ojendal (2001) argue that the focus should be made on the processes of regionalisation in various fields of activity, e.g. state, economic and societal regionalisation which allows one to trace the multi-dimensionality and pluralism of the processes taking place, creating the theoretical framework for analysis. 9 This means that regions may be defined differently within the global system at different times. For example, in accordance with their relative degree of economic dynamism and political stability or degree of “regionness” (as qualified by Hettne (2005) as core-, semi-periphery or periphery regions). 10 In fact, as argued by Schulz, Söderbaum and Ojendal (2001, p. 6) the two concepts should not be opposed. Rather, regionalism can also be defined as the urge to merge by the state, market or a wide range of civil society actors while regionalisation should then be seen as a corresponding empirical process which leads to patterns of cooperation, integration, complementarity and convergence within a particular cross-national geographical space 11 This includes a move from bi- to multi-polarity, the relative decline of American hegemony, the growth of interdependence, trans-nationalisation and globalization, fear regarding the stability of the international trading order, as well as changing attitudes towards (neo-liberal) economic development and political systems in the developing countries and in post-communist countries. 12 Leading to the conclusion that increased economic flow among members of the EU have changed the preferences of domestic actors, leading them to press for policies and institution that promote deeper integration. More recently a study within a rationalist-institutional perspective pointed out the importance of political elites’ bargaining power in accounting for institutional change (See Farrell and Heritier, 2005). 13 Mansfield and Milner (1999, p.602) noted that institutional factors sometimes create opportunities to sidestep such opposition by relying on regional or bilateral trade strategies. In fact, regional trade agreements discriminate against third parties while yielding rents for other domestic actors (who constitute a potent source of support for preferential trade agreements). In such circumstances, the attractiveness of locking in a state that is interested in making liberal economic reforms to an external mechanism is likely to grow if influential segments of society oppose reforms and if domestic institutions render policy makers especially susceptible to societal pressures. 14 In contrast to the argument that the similarity of states´ political institutions influences whether they will form a preferential arrangement, the authors also argue that a distinctive feature of the latest wave of regionalism is that the path of trade liberalization can be fruitful to spur political reform in non-democratic states, referring to the experience of the EU with Central and Eastern Europe, which shows that the existing members may influence the policies and institutions of prospective members by demanding them to institute domestic reforms prior to accession. 15 The author demonstrates that domestic politics in patrimonial regimes are shaped not just along the state-society axis, but also (and even predominantly) along structures supporting the power of the governing elites enforced through maintaining personal control and the ability to direct patronage to informal vested interests. 16 The OSCE´s presence has been mostly visible through the work in the international conflict resolution forums. Most significant event has been the Istanbul summit in 1999 considering the commitments reached concerning the removal of Russian bases from Georgia and the troops and equipment from Transnistria in Moldova. 17The consolidated integration indices of the CIS integration that comprises integration of trade, agricultural, electricity and labor markets as well as economic convergence indexes has experienced the ups and down with a drastic fall from 2004 to 2006 followed by relative stability. 18 While SCO envisaged cooperation in the political, military, economic, energy and cultural fields, the most important ingredients have been the conventional arms trade and energy relations between Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Iran as exporters and China and India as significant importers as well as the symbolic demonstration to the West of who are the powers in the region by conducting large military exercises (Aris, 2009). 19 Within this framework Russia manages to forge the resolution of the questions relevant to the common use of the Sea shelf, while also engaging Iran as well as to conclude a number of contracts in order to assure the continuous supplies from CA (Khasson, 2009). 20 Other members of EurAsEC also expressed their interest in joining the Customs Union, including the WTO member Kyrgyzstan, which noted that WTO membership does not preclude participation in regional integration groupings. 21 Initially, according to the 2003 “Wider Europe” Communication of the European Commission covered all of the new Eastern neighbours including Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine as well as Russia. Following Russia´s refusal, it has been excluded from the scope of the ENP. At the same time, the policy´s geographical coverage has been extended to the three South Caucasus states, e.g. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. 22 For more information see http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf 23 As stated in 2007 by the President´s Putin speech in Munich in 2007 announcing Russia withdraw from the Treaty of conventional arms in Europe, such issues as Kosovo´s independence and the continued NATO´s enlargement to the East as pointing out to increasingly unipolar world were the Russian efforts to change the security system in Europe are being neglected by the West. 24 Россия решила вступить в ВТО вместе с Белоруссией и Казахстаном./ Russia enters the WTO together with Belarus and Kazakhstan. Lenta.ru, 09/06/2009, available at http://lenta.ru/news/2009/06/09/wto/ 25 For more information see http://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/20060613130324.shtml 26 Vladimir Putin: ‘Novyi Intergrationnyi Proekt dlia Evrazii’, Izvestia, 3 October 2011. Available at: http://izvestia.ru/news/50276 27 Russia, Kazakhstan agree customs union minus Belarus. Euractiv.com, 31/05/2010, available at http://www.euractiv.com/east-mediterranean/russia-kazakhstan-agree-customs-news-494671 28 CIS nations reach free trade zone agreement. RT.com, 19/10/2011, available at http://rt.com/business/cis-reach- free-zone-171/ 29 The study has been conducted in the framework of project “Europeanisaing or Securitising the “Outsiders”? Assessing the EU´s partnership-building approach with Eastern Europe, Aberystwyth University 30 As a part of their new independence in foreign policy making the NISs took generally positive view of CBC. For example the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier cooperation between Territorial of Communities or Authorities (1980) was adopted as the main basis for border cooperation by Ukraine in 1993, Belarus in 1997, Moldova in1999 and Russia in 2001. 31 In the case of Finnish-Russian border a designated legal framework equipped with a special Intergovernmental Committee for cross-border cooperation (under the bilateral agreement of January 1992) provided a solid basis for fostering cross-border contacts. 32 For example, the after 2004, the Baltic Sea INTERREG III B programme included a Nord strand, e.g. covering the borders of Estonia and Latvia, and the South strand involving Latvian and Lithuanian regions and their partners. 33 In line with the major goal of the European Neighbourhood Policy to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe by promoting stability and prosperity within and beyond the Union´s old and new borders (European Commission, 2003a). 34 In this regard, many lessons were learned from the experience of the EU Northern Dimension Initiative which became recognised as a successful framework for promoting functional cooperation based on "joint ownership". See Liikanen and Virtanen (2006, pp. 113-130). 35Other explanations, however, should not be dismissed in the definition of RIPs, in particular, when referring not only to the state driven, but also to spontaneous regionalisation processes by non-state actors. 36 This includes major features of the international system in terms of patterns of governance and power distribution as well as security. Security shapes the international environment and the development of regionalism in two ways: first, the extent to which it leads to conflict over the nature of the security agenda and over the relative importance to be attached to terrorism and proliferation issues; second, the extent to which often fragile regionalist arrangements may be unable to withstand the strains imposed by direct conflict over security issues; conflicts over the securitisation of many issues that were hitherto either outside of the security realm (such a money laundering) or had security implications of indirect concern (such as migration, drug trafficking or organized crime). 37In the longer run, the choices taken in a particular historical moment determine the pace of regionalisation and may lead to the emergence of new structures in domestic or international environments and, consequently, leading to the formulation of new preferences. 38 Social structures are understood as ‘the most basic, enduring, and determinative patterns in social life’ and are defined as patterned behaviors weaved into social orders guided by the principles (rules, norms and regulations) that organise relations between actors engaged in interactions within a particular social domain. 39 A political relationship is anarchic if the units possess no authority over one another. It is hierarchic when one unit, the dominant state, possesses authority over a second, subordinate state. Any hierarchical type of relations inevitably includes the issue of their organization around a certain centre and their polarity, at the same time, centralisataion and polarity of structures might be affected by a degree of participation and the character of units engaged in this structure. 40 The author demonstrates, in particular, that such an approach appears incompatible with the macro-policy of democracy promotion. 41In particular the domestic conditions are attributed the strongest casual relevance in the case of democracy promotion since the process requires at least partly democratized political systems. 42 It is usually referred to as neo-patrimonialism. For a critical discussion of the concept of neo-patrimonialism. See Heinrich and Pleines, 2012. 43 Applying a historical perspective, the case will analyse EU-EN relations from the launch of the ENP in 2004, but the European Integration Preferences will be defined only as expressed towards the EaP. 44 There are also two sea-basin programmes at the Black and Baltic Seas where other Eastern neighbours also participate but these are not part of the present research since the high number of participants blurs the cross-country comparison. Altogether, the ENPI CBC includes 13 programmes including those in the Southern neighbourhood, e.g. the Mediterranean Sea-basin and one short sea crossing programme between Italy and Tunisia. 45 The objective of the interviews was to identify the official position towards the EaP policy in the EU partner countries . In the first part, the questions covered main policy elements, e.g. the bilateral and multilateral track, as well as regional cooperation projects. The second part concerned the comparison with the ENP policy. The third set of questions aimed to identify the expted impact of the EaP on domestic political and socio-economic development. Finally the last section concerned expectations from the EaP/ suggestions in terms of new possible areas and modes of cooperation that could be covered by the policy in the future. 46 The informal interviews aimed to obtain information on two broad areas: (1) operational structure and course of implementation of ENPI CBC Programmes, (2) impact on partners in the EN countries and their (changing) perceptions of cooperation with the EU. 47 See National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia (adopted in 2007), available at http://www.mil.am/1320693104 48 For more information see http://www.thetruthmustbetold.com/wiki-serzh-pyramid/ 49 For more information see Socor, 2006.; and McGinnity, 2010. 50 As stated in the ENP RA-EU Action Plan for 2009-2011 51 This includes a Strategy of Ukrainian Integration to the EU (of June 1998), and the Programme of Ukrainian Integration to the EU, (September 2000), complemented in 2005 by the National Programme for the Adaption of Ukraine’s Legislation and by a plethora of auxiliary programmes and guidelines to inform the public, to prepare specialists, and to arrange various measures for the fulfillment of these programmes. 52 “ Ukrainian President declares EU membership as Ukraine’s ultimate goal”, Radio Free Europe/RL Newsline, 24 February 2005, available at http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1143344.html 53 “European Neighbourhood Policy and Ukraine”. Analytical report based on nation-wide survey prepared by Centre for Social and Marketing Research SICUS 2008 for the ESRC funded project RES -061-25-0001 (Korosteleva, 2010). 54 As noted by Danii and Macsauteanu (2011, p.106), a glance at the orientation of Moldova’ f FP in the last two decades reveals barely two or three consecutive years when the government was explicitly pro-European. 55 According to qualitative studies the FP of Moldova was mainly described as ambiguous inconsistent and dual whereas its external vectors were seen as constantly oscillating between the East and the \West depending on the authorities interests at a given time. The majority 46 % saw FP as directed towards Russia, while about 14% towards the EU. In case of referendum 39 would vote for strengthening relations with both, Russia and the EU. 56 Ibid footnote 43 57 It should be noted that during the first years of Saakashvili´s rule, he has still conducted a rather cooperative relationship with Russia (relying, among other things on its support in reincorporating the separatist Adjaria region). The anti-Russian policy was adopted only when the same hard stance was adopted towards the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia leading to the 2008 war with Russia. 58 See Press Release “EU and Eastern Partnership region move forward with transport cooperation”, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do? reference=IP/11/1240&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en 59 The four Platforms cover the following areas: (1) democracy, good governance and stability; (2) economic integration and convergence with EU policies; (3) energy security; (4) contacts between people. 60 The rules guiding their programming and implementation are those set up in the ENPI Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 laying down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, O.J. L310 of 9.11.2006. 61 For example, some observers say free trade will not be a real incentive for the EaP countries, but could ultimately prove more of a threat if the EU does not liberalise trade in agricultural products (especially in the cases of countries such as Moldova, Armenia or Georgia). A trade agreement for Azerbaijan and Belarus are not even feasible since neither of the countries is a WTO member. 62 For more information see http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/platforms/2009/index_en.htm 63 The Euronest PA consists of two components: the European Parliament delegation (60 Members); the Eastern European Partners’ delegations (10 Members each –, Belarus for the time being does not take part in the Assembly’s activities). The Euronest Parliamentary Assembly meets, in principle, once a year, alternately in an Eastern Partner country and on the premises of the European Parliament (Brussels, Luxembourg or Strasbourg). 64For more information see the official web page of the Civil Society Forum available at http://eap-csf.eu/ 65 Interviews in representations of Azerbaijan, Belarus and Moldova conducted in 2012. 66 Informal EaP Dialogue in Georgia: advancing European values, 13 February 2013, available at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/fule/headlines/news/2013/02/20130213_en.htm, accessed November 2014. 67 Ukraine had opened negotiations on the new agreement with the EU in 2007( renamed into Association Agreement in 2008), e.g. already ahead of the launch of the EaP. 68For more information see http://eu21global.blogspot.com/2011/01/2011-year-for-eastern-partnership.html 69 Implementation of the Eastern Partnership: Report to the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers, December 13, 2010, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/docs/eap_meeting_foreign_affairs_131210_en.pdf, accessed November 2014. 70 For more information see “Diplomatic fiasco mars Warsaw summit”, Euractiv.com, 03/10/2011, available at http://www.euractiv.com/europes-east/diplomatic-fiasco-mars-warsaw-su-news-508077 71 Apart from the statements by the EU officials, a number of the EU Member States, including Ukraine´s traditional supporter such as Poland, stated they will not ratify the agreement if Tymoshenko is not released. See “EU-Ukraine association agreement: Kiev must respect the rule of law”, Press Release External relations, 17-11-2011, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/en/pressroom/content/20111114IPR31469/html/EU-Ukraine-association-agreement- Kiev-must-respect-the-rule-of-law, accessed November 2014. 72 See “Belarus quits EU's Eastern Partnership initiative”, Euractiv.com, 30/09/2011, available at http://www.euractiv.com/europes-east/belarus-quits-eus-eastern-partne-news-508050 73 The Council Conclusions of 10 December 2012 reaffirmed the EU´s commitment to signing an Association Agreement including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA) as soon as Ukraine demonstrates determined action and tangible progress in three areas: actions to remedy electoral shortcomings, progress in addressing the issue of selective justice and preventing its recurrence, and action to implement reforms set out in the Association Agenda. See “Ukraine: Initialling the Association Agreement As Soon As on 27 February?”, available at http://eastbook.eu/ru/2012/02/topic-ru/economy-ru/ukraina-parafirovanie-soglasheniya-ob-assocyacyi-uze-27-fevralia/ 74 See “Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Ukraine. Progress in 2013 and recommendations for action”, Joint Staff Working Document, accompanying the document Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. European Neighbourhood Policy: Working towards a Stronger Partnership, Brussels, 20.3.2013, SWD(2013) 84 final, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/docs/2013_enp_pack/2013_progress_report_ukraine_en.pdf, accessed November 2014. 75 For more information see http://eastbook.eu/en/2013/04/material-en/featured-en/the-eu-has-praised-yanukovych-a- signal-for-lukashenko/ 76 In October 2012 the Foreign Affairs Council confirmed the policy of critical engagement with Belarus through the multilateral track and support for Belarusian people and civil society (the “European Dialogue on Modernisation”). It also recalled that the development of bilateral relations under the Eastern Partnership is conditional on progress towards respect by Belarus for the principles of democracy, the rule of law and human rights and reiterated the EU’s willingness to assist Belarus to meet its obligations in this regard. 77 The draft of the Association Agenda, the instrument that will supersede the current ENP Action Plan, was also presented and the signature of the agreements was expected in 2014 78 For the role of discourses in foreign policy making see Christiansen and Tonra, 2004. 79 In April following the failure of the Parliament to elect the new President there appeared a wave of civil unrest which subsequently became known as Twitter revolution. The events were accompanied by severe human rights violations and harsh actions by the Communist government towards more that 300 arrested protesters. 80 Head of state addresses message to Moldovan citizens on EaP Vilnius Summit, 27 november 2013. Available at: http://www.presedinte.md/eng/discursuri/mesajul-presedintelui-nicolae-timofti-cu-ocazia-summit-ului-de-la- vilnius#sthash.5JcoXxnu.dpuf 81 In October 2012, at the EU joint forum, European Commissioner Stefan Fule made a statement that Moldova deserves the prospect of membership in accordance with Article 49 of the EC Treaty. http://eastbook.eu/en/2013/03/country-en/moldova-en/moldova-12-months-with-the-president/ 82 Interview in the Representation to the EU 83 Тарасюк: Украине не стоит волноваться о темпах евроинтеграции / Tarasyuk: Ukriane should not worry about the pace of European integration, http://censor.net.ua/news/160230/tarasyuk_ukraine_ne_stoit_volnovatsya_o_tempah_evrointegratsii 84 Press office of President Viktor Yanukovych30.09.2011 14:27: We insist on prospects of Ukraine’s accession to EU be reflected in Association Agreement 85 Armandon, Emmanuelle, EU-Ukraine Relations: what developments have there been since the election of Viktor Yanukovych?, European Issue 214, available at: http://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/0214-eu-ukraine-relations-what-developments-have-there-been- since-the-election-of-viktor-yanukovych 86 See “Для Грузии жизненно важна помощь Евросоюза – Саакашвили”/ For Georgia the help from the EU is of life imortance, Newsgeorgia.ru, 21/01/2009, available at http://www.newsgeorgia.ru/politics/20090121/151082634.html, accessed November 2014. 87 “Vice PM—Georgia may accept a Swiss-style EU relationship” in, http://georgiandaily.com, accessed March 2013 88 As noted by Emerson, it seems that the Commission did not want to be bothered by the complications of a differentiated approach for one small Eastern neighbour. It refused to give an option of a simple FTA for Georgia and insisted that only a deep and comprehensive agreement, with very extensive commitments to comply with EU law, was worth doing. In also made Georgia to show its willingness to comply with a lot of EU legislation as pre-condition for the opening of negotiations. 89 As stated by President Saakashvili in his speech to the European People´s Party in December 2011. See Georgia aims to be European 'success story', 08/12/2011, available at http://www.news.az/articles/50455 90 See “Moldova’s Tenacious European Course and the Political Significance of the Eastern Partnership” by Octavian Milevschi 2011-02-15, available at http://www.easternpartnership.org/publication/politics/2011-02-15/moldova-s- tenacious-european-course-and-political-significance-easte; and Кишинев ждет от ЕС "План Маршалла" по присоединению Приднестровья к Молдавии/ Chisinau awaits the EU “Marshal Plan” for reincorporation of Transnistria, Regnum.ru, available at http://www.regnum.ru/news/1585276.html#ixzz2CWpjP5Dg 91 Press office of President Viktor Yanukovych, 27.02.2013 11:59, accessed March 2013. 92 RA Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan’s Speech at the Sitting of the EPP Political Assembly Tuesday, 8 November 2011, available at http://91.221.228.2/en/news/item/5969/ 93 Joint Statement by President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barosso, and Presidentof the Republic of Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan, Yerevan, 7 November 2008, www.delarm.ec.europa.eu; 94 See “EU's Eastern initiative 'not adequate' for Azerbaijan”, 03 November 2010, available at http://www.euractiv.com/east-mediterranean/eus-eastern-initiative-adequate-news-499387 95 “ В рамках "Восточного партнерства" приоритетными для Азербайджана будут вопросы безопасности, экономического и гуманитарного сотрудничества - глава МИД Азербайджана”, 27.02.2009, http :// hayinfo . ru / ru / news / world /49572. html 96 In 2013 Belarus participated in most meetings and activities in the framework of the EaP: Foreign ministers meeting in Brussels in July, the first Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial meeting in Luxembourg, Transport Ministerial meeting in Luxembourg in October, Ministerial Conference on Culture in Tbilisi in June, as well as the Informal EaP dialogue on education in Tbilisi in February and in Yerevan in September. Minister of Economy participated in the Business forum organised as a side event of the Vilnus Summit. 97 The official at the Representation of Belarus to the EU mentioned such projects as sea access in Latvia, or participation in the Odessa-Brodi pipeline 98 For more information see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-222_en.htm ENP package 99 For more information see http://eastbook.eu/en/2013/02/material-en/news-en/belarusians-at-the-eap-summit- interview-with-alexander-papko/ 100 Об участии Сергея Мартынова во встрече министров иностранных дел стран-партнеров Восточного партнерства/ On participation of Sergei Martinov in the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EaP countries 24/07/2012, available at http://mfa.gov.by/print/press/news_mfa/a9056baa27f319b0.html 101 See “Belarus thankful for support at Eastern Partnership summit” 30.09.2011, available at http://news.belta.by/en/news/president?id=659714 102 Nations in Transit 2013 is Freedom House’s comprehensive, comparative study of democratic development in 29 countries from Central Europe to Eurasia. It measures progress according to the following indicators: electoral process, civil society, independent media, national democratic governance, local democratic governance, judicial framework and independence, and corruption. 103 See “Living Together Doesn't Mean You're in Love. Why Georgia offers an important argument for the virtues of divided government.” FP.com, by Michael Cecire and Laura Linderman, July 16, 2013, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/07/16/living_together_doesn_t_mean_you_re_in_love, accessed November 2014. 104 The inauguration of the new president on 17 November 2013 also marked the entry into force of a new constitution introducing the parliamentary system. 105 For more information see http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/mikheil-saakashvili-bidzina-ivanishvili- and-why-whoever-wins-in-georgia-its-time-to-stop-dreaming-8192949.html 106 See “Ivanishvili warns power-sharing is no rose garden” by Democracy and Freedom Watch staff, March 14, 2013, available at http://dfwatch.net/ivanishvili-warns-power-sharing-is-no-rose-garden-76476, accessed November 2014. 107 Following the Presidential elections in 2013, Prime Minister Ivanishvili stepped down on and handed over the post to the former Interior Minister, Irakli Garibashvili. 108 See “Saakashvili Slams Ivanishvili for Confronting EPP”, Civil Georgia, Tbilisi, 18 March 2013, available at http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=25859 109 For more information see the 14-point inter-party agreement on FP available at http://www.jamestown.org/regions/thecaucasus/single/? tx_ttnews[pointer]=8&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40489&tx_ttnews[backPid]=641&cHash=dba6a974b9f27cf2d1b41f9a6304a 36e#.U8EsAFnPxLM 110 In particular, this view was shared by some EU officials in the European Parliament, (the EPP group in particular) who sent in March 2013 an open letter PM Ivanishvili, (signed by 23 members of the EP) accusing him of drifting Georgia away from Europe. 111 The statement was made with regard to the EU’s “more-for-more” approach, calling also for a donors’ conference in 2014 in Brussels to support Georgia’s intensive efforts 112 For more information see http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26041 113 For more information see http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26744 114 The Alliance for European Integration is composed by the Liberal Democratic Party, Democratic Party and Liberal Party. 115 When the coalition of the Alliance for European Integration was joined by three socialists who had left the Communist Party faction (the Dodon group) and independent MP Michai Godea. 116 See “A European Integration Champion That Satisfies the Kremlin”, The Ukrainian Week, April 20.2012, by Yuriy Raykhel, , available at http://ukrainianweek.com/World/47923, accessed November 2014. 117 See “Moldovan parliament passes vote of no confidence in Filat government”, available at thttp://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/05/us-moldova-government-vote-idUSBRE9240FU20130305? feedName=worldNews&feedType=RSS, accessed November 2014. 118 Subsequently, the parliament adopted a new law on the Cabinet of Ministers as well as amendments to the parliamentary Rules of Procedure and to 32 other laws, aimed at bringing the legal framework in line with the 1996 Constitution. Experts consider that a number of these amendments gave even wider powers to the President and further weakened parliamentary control over the executive. 119 According to the opinion of the Venice Commission issued In December 2010, the 1996 Constitution does not provide sufficient checks and balances and encouraged the Ukrainian authorities to engage in a comprehensive process of constitutional reform based on established procedures and involving all the relevant players. 120 For more information see http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/docs/2011_progress_report_ukraine_en.pdf 121 In particular the practice of amending the electoral framework in the middle of the electoral process: in July 2010 the parliament adopted a new version of the law on local elections and in August additional amendments to that law were adopted at an extraordinary plenary session. 122 See “Кризис на Украине: Янукович и его олигархи”/ “Crisis in Ukraine: Yanukovich and his oligarchs. BBC, by Anders Oslund, 13 December 2013, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/international/2013/12/131212_ukraine_yanukovich_tycoons.shtml, accessed November 2014. 123 See "Тайная война. Олигархи против Януковича” / “Clandestine war. Oligarchs against Yanukovich”, available at http://www.mnenie-ua.com/stati/taynaya-voyna-oligarhi-protiv-yanukovicha 124 As noted by Paul and Rukomeda (2012), the main opposition party Batkivshchyna entered the race in a favorable position, (against a background of the PoR having increasingly isolated Ukraine from the West, the poor economic situation, and the Tymoshenko issue) but its campaign seems to have focused heavily on criticising the PoR rather than on presenting concrete policies. 125 See “Период "олигархического консенсуса" на Украине завешен. Семья Януковича начала поглощать "недонецких" олигархов”. Росбалт /Rosbalt, 02/11/2012, available at http://www.rosbalt.ru/ukraina/2012/11/02/1054415.html 126 Ibid footnote 134 127 See “President and Prosperous Armenia Party leader are country’s most prominent figures”, Gallup International Association poll, 02/11/2012, available at http://www.wingia.com/en/news/president_and_prosperous_armenia_party_leader_are_country_aos_mos t_prominent_figures_ae_gallup_international_association_poll/22/ 128 See “Nations in Transit 2012”, Freedom House Report by Alexander Iskandaryan, available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Armenia_-final.pdf 129 See “Supporters of President Gain in Armenian Election”, by Andrew E. Kramer, The New York Times, May 7, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/08/world/europe/armenian-parliamentary-elections- strengthen-ruling-party.html?_r=0 130 For more information see http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/Articles/2013/Armenian-Presidential-Election- One-Step-Forward-or-Two-Steps-Back.aspx 131 For more information see EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2014. ENP Country Progress Report 2013 – Armenia, MEMO, Brussels, 27 March 2014, available a http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-220_en.htm 132 According to official data, in Armenia there are approximately 1500 companies, which are fully or partly Russian and are based on the Russian capital. The number of employees in Russian companies, which top the list of major taxpayers of Armenia, reaches thousands: the power company in Armenia has 7800 employees; GazProm has 6000 employees; The South-Caucasus Railways has 4000 employees. Among the major taxpayers we should indeed mention Beeline, Viva Cell, Armenian nuclear station, which is de facto run by Russians, numerous small and medium businesses. See “Russia´s biggest capital in Armenia”, by Mikael Sahakyan, 168 hours News and analysis, January 22, 2014, available at http://en.168.am/2014/01/22/931.html 133 For more information see http://eastbook.eu/en/2013/12/material-en/information-material-en/putinout-a-show-of- armenian-solidarity-with-ukraine/ 134 For more information see http://euobserver.com/foreign/121592 135 For more information see http://en.president.az/articles/5326 05 july 2012, 11:35 Joint press statements of Presidents of Azerbaijan and of the European Council Statement by President Ilham Aliyev 136 For more information see http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/2014/country-reports/azerbaijan_en.pdf 137Human Rights defenders for free elections http://spring96.org/files/misc/finalhrdmonitoringreportonpresidentialelectioninbelarus-en.pdf 138 See "Belarus election: Opposition shut out of parliament”, 22/09/2012, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-19690249 139 For more information on ENP package see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-222_en.htm 140 Although not a part of the ENP, Russia falls under the category of partnership within the ENPI CBC (as reflected in the abbreviation). It participates in more than half of them and hence, makes an integral part of the regionalisation phenomenon under investigation. Considering also the de-politicized nature of the CBC and a great degree of uniformity in CBC processes across the post-Soviet space, it appears appropriate to keep Russia within the scope of this case study. 141 For more on the debate on civil society in the post-Soviet countries see EU DIMENSIONS Workpackage 2: state of the Debate by Liam O´Dowd and Bohdana Dimitrova Promoting Civil Society across the borders of the EU neighbourhood: debates, constraints and opportunities. Centre for International borders Research, Queen´s University, Belfast. 142 The ENPI Regulation also previews the possibly for the JMA to be located in a partner state within the Eastern neighbourhood. 143For more information on TACIS Large Scale Projects see http://www.europafacile.net/formulari/Tacis/TACIS %20CBC/Programma2000-2003.pdf 144 Guidance Note on Large-Scale Projects (LSP), available at: http://www.ro-ua- md.net/images/stories/File/LSP_Guidance_note_10_May_2009-corect.pdf, accessed May 2012. 145 By 2012 over 15 Branch Offices have been established across the whole ENPI CBC territory. For details see Table 2 in the annex. 146 In particular, they are seen as playing a crucial role in solving the problem of harmonization of national legislations with the ENPI CBC rules (European Commission, 2008). 147 For more details on Interact ENPI CBC see http://www.interact-eu.net/about_us/enpi_about_us/443/5659, accessed November 2014. 148 In fact, the ENPI represents an overarching framework covering the whole scope of financial and technical assistance to the countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy and Russia. 149 In this regard Russia emphasized that while participating in the ENPI, it is not being part of the ENP. It had also noted its financial contribution to the joint CBC programmes and its equal partner status (Blockmans, 2008). 150 While approximately half of TACIS CBC funding over the period 1996 to 2000 has been allocated to border crossings, the construction works began only in 2000. As a result, five years after the launch of the TACIS CBC programme, there has been yet no impact in this area. 151 The Practical Guide is the first sole working tool explaining the contracting procedures applying to all EU external aid contracts financed from the European Union general budget and the 10th European Development Fund. 152 See “EuropeAid, ENI Regulation and CBC Implementing rules for the period 2014-2020”. Presentation by Bodil Persson at the NEEBOR 7th Annual Conference in Kirkenäs, 6 February 2012. Available from: http://neebor.eu/files/folder58/subfolder113/43770NEEBOR_7thAnnualConference_Kirkenes2012_1_2_BodilPersson. pdf 153 Interview with the an official of the European Commission, DG DEVCO, responsible for the ENPI CBC, conducted on the 26 of October 2011. 154 Such a call was made in the open letter by the Polish EU Presidency proposing a corresponding provision to be introduced into the new ENPI regulation after 2013. 155 As stated in the draft policy “The Concept of Improving Regional Policy in the Russian Federation for 2020” prepared by Minregion in 2011 (Kinossian, 2013). 156 See “OECD Territorial Reviews: Ukraine” available at http://www.oecd.org/gov/regional-policy/territorial- review-ukraine.htm 157 See “The Government of Moldova approved a new National Strategy for Regional Development for 2013-2015”, 23.08.2013 available at http://www.blackseagrain.net/novosti/the-government-of-moldova-approved-a-new-national- strategy-for-regional-development-for-2013-2015 158 There are four institutions working under the auspices of the Ministry of Local Public Administration: the National Coordination Council for Regional Development, the National Fund for Regional Development, and deliberative regional structures - the Regional Council for Development and Regional Development Agencies. 159 See “Opinion on the modernisation, reforms and administrative capacity of the local and regional authorities in the Republic of Moldova”, by Alin Nica, Mayor of Dudeştii Noi (RO/ALDE), available at http://cor.europa.eu/en/news/regional/Pages/12172052-45fa-4e8d-8408-cbfd15305687.aspx 160 See Proceedings of the Conference of the Regional and Local Authorities for the Eastern Partnership (CORLEAP) Stakeholder conference "The Local and Regional Dimension of the Eastern Partnership" Brussels, 30 May 2012, contribution of Ms.Gerasimovich, available at http://cor.europa.eu/en/news/events/Documents/Proceedings%20of %20the%20Conference%20final_modif1.pdf 161 As noted by Dmytro Shulga (2015), the European programme director at International Renaissance Foundation, the IMF programmes (17 and 15 Bio USD for short- and medium-term) are among the most important policy guiding documents for the government for the time being. 162 For recent findings on the issue see Ademmer, E., 2015. Interdependence and EU-demanded policy change in a shared neighbourhood, Journal of European Public Policy, 22 (5) 671-689.

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