Bureaucratic Politics in the U.S

POS 6476 Bureaucratic Politics in the U.S. Spring, 2015 Thursday periods 5-7 316 Anderson Hall

Prof. David Hedge Office: 218 Anderson Phone: 273-2367 E-mail: [email protected] Office Hours: Tuesday, 9:30-11:00, Wednesday 1-2:30, and by appt

Public bureaucracies are at the very center of government and for that matter American society. This semester we will consider how bureaucracies relate to one another and their political, economic, and social environments in (primarily) the American political system. More particularly, we will examine the means by which citizens and their governments achieve (or not) accountability and control of the administrative sector. Among the topics we will consider are the growth of the administrative sector, political control of bureaucracy, regulatory federalism, and networks. A number of questions guide that analysis.

How has the administrative sector changed over the course of American history? What factors are responsible for those changes? What is the nature and source (s) of bureaucratic power in America?

What tools do various political actors use to control and oversee public bureaucracies? How effective are those tools?

What role does the bureaucratic sector play in American politics and governance?

How do the problems of accountability and control play out in a federal system of government or where responsibility for policy is shared with the private sector?

Required Texts

Richard Nathan. 1975. The Plot that Failed: Nixon and The Administrative Presidency. John Wiley. (used copies available through ebay, Barnes and Noble or Amazon.com)

David E. Lewis. 2003. Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design. Stanford University Press.

Additional readings are available on-line through the UF e-library or provided by your instructor (labeled @below).

Expectations

1. Class time will be spent reviewing the week's readings. While the readings are often extensive, I expect them to be read (and on time) and I expect you to be prepared to summarize, critique, and draw implications from each of the assigned readings (you will be asked to write a brief 1-2 page reaction paper most weeks). My role will simply be to guide the discussion. I do not intend to lecture. As with all my courses, I do not take attendance. Nonetheless I expect you to attend each class and participate in class discussion.

2. Near the midpoint of the semester I will ask you to write a synthesis paper that summarizes and critiques the literature on political control of the bureaucracy.

3. Each of you will also write a 15-page research paper on some aspect of bureaucratic life. My intention is to use some of class time most weeks to talk to each of you individually about your papers. Students will present the products of their research during the laST week of class. Your final paper is due Monday, April 27.

Grading

33% Class Participation and Weekly Reaction Papers 33% Synthesis Paper 33% Research Paper

Incompletes are only given in rare and deserving cases and at the discretion of the instructor. Student who believe that they will not be able to complete all the requirements for the course in due time have to discuss an “I” (Incomplete) grade with the instructor before the research paper is due. Students will have to sign an “Incomplete Contract” (available at http://www.clas.ufl.edu/forms/) and complete all their requirements by a set date. Students should be aware that “I” grades become punitive after one term.

Honor Code: Academic honesty and integrity are fundamental values of the University community. An academic honesty offense is defined as the act of lying, cheating, or stealing academic information so that one gains academic advantage. In the event that a student is found cheating or plagiarizing, s/he will receive a zero for the assignment and will be reported to Student Judicial Affairs. For more information, go to: http://www.dso.ufl.edu/studentguide/studentrights.php

Students with disabilities requesting classroom accommodation must first register with the Dean of Students Office. The Dean of Students Office will provide documentation to the student who must then provide this documentation to the Instructor when requesting accommodation. Anyone with a disability should feel free to see the professor during office hours to make the necessary arrangements.

Course Outline, Schedule, and Readings

January 8 -- Introduction to Course

January 15 -- The Rise of the Administrative Sector

Michael Nelson. 1982. "A Short Ironic History of American National Bureaucracy." Journal of Politics. 44:747-778. e-journal

Daniel P. Carpenter. 2001. The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy. Princeton University Press, Intro, Ch. 1,2, and). @

Steven Skownorek. 1981. Preface, Ch. 1 and Epilogue. Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920. Cambridge University Press. @

Joseph Postell. 2012. “From Administrative State to Constitutional Government,” Heritage Foundation online. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/12/from-administrative-state-to- constitutional-government

January 22 -- The Administrative Presidency

Richard Nathan. 1975. The Plot that Failed: Richard Nixon and the Administrative Presidency.

Richard Waterman. 1989. Introduction, Ch. 1,2,5, Presidential Influence and the Administrative State. University of Tennessee Press. @

David Hedge. March, 2013. "George W. Bush and Political Control of the Bureaucracy," White House Studies. @

January 29-- Congressional Control and Oversight I

Terry M. Moe. 1985. “Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB.” American Political Science Review 79 (December): 1094–1117. e-journal

B. Dan Wood and Richard W. Waterman. 1991. “The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy.” American Political Science Review. 85 (September): 801-28. e-journal

Daniel Carpenter. 1996. “Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation.” American Political Science Review. 90 (June): 283- 302. e-journal

Barry Weingast and Mark Moran.1983. "Bureaucratic discretion or congressional control? Regulatory policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission." Journal of Political Economy 91(5): 765. e-journal

Charles R. Shipan. 2004. "Regulatory Regimes, Agency Actions, and the Conditional Nature of Congressional Influence." American Political Science Review. 98 (August): 467-480. e-journal

Jason McDonald, 2010. "Limitation Riders and Congressional Influence over Bureaucratic Policy Decisions."American Political Science Review. 104 (November): 766-782. e-journal

Recommended: Robert J. McGrath. 2013. “Legislatures, Courts, and Statutory Control of the Bureaucracy Across the United States.” State Politics and Policy Quarterly. 13:373. e-journal.

Highly Recommended: Larry Dodd and Richard Scott. 1986. Congress and the Administrative State. McMillan Publishing.

February 5-- Congressional Control and Oversight II

Matthew D. McCubbins. 1999. “Abdication or Delegation? Congress, the Bureaucracy, and the Delegation Dilemma.” Regulation, 22 (2) 30 -37. e-journal

Balla, Steven J. 1998. “Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy.” American Political Science Review 92 (September): 663-673. e-journal

David Hedge and Renee Johnson. 2002. “The Plot that Failed: The Republican Revolution and Political Control of the Bureaucracy.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 12 (3) 333-351. e-journal

Jason Webb Yackee and Susan Webb Yackee. 2010. “Administrative Procedures and Bureaucratic Performance: Is Federal Rule-making “Ossified”? Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 20 (2): 261-282. e-journal

Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Control.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Fall): 243-277. e-journal

Recommended:

Matthew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwarz.1985. "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms." American Journal of Political Science. 28(1): 165. e-journal

Balla, Steven J., and John R. Wright. 2001. “Interest Groups, Advisory Committees, and Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy.” American Journal of Political Science 45, (October): 799-812 e-journal

February 12 – Presidents, Congress, and Agency Design

David E. Lewis. 2003. Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design.

February 19 --The Courts and Bureaucracy

James Q. Wilson. 1989. Chapter 15 “Courts.” in Bureaucracy: What Governments Do and Why They Do It. Basic Books. @

Kenneth Meier and John Bohte. 2007. “Judicial Controls on Bureaucratic Power,” pp. 151-156. in Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the Fourth Branch of Government. Thompson Wadsworth. @

William Gormley. 1989. Chapter 3, "Due Process" in Taming the Bureaucracy (Princeton University Press). @

Brandice Canes-Wrone. 2003. “Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of the Lower Courts.” American Journal of Political Science. 47 (April) 205-214. e- journal

Joseph Smith. 2005. “Congress Opens the Courthouse Doors: Statutory Changes Under the Clean Air Act.” Political Research Quarterly. 58 (March) 139-149. e- journal

Reginald Sheehan. 1990. “Administrative Agencies and the Court: A Reexamination of the Impact of Agency Type on Decisional Outcomes.” Western Political Quarterly. pp. 875-885. e-journal

February 26 – SYNTHESIS PAPER DUE

March 5 -- SPRING BREAK

March 12 -- Interest Groups and the Question of Capture

James Q. Wilson. 1989, Chapter 5, “Interest,” in Bureaucracy: Why Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. @

Richard Posner. 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation." The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science. 5 (August): 335-358. e-journal Jeffrey Cohen. 1986. The Dynamics of the “revolving door” on the FCC.” American Journal of Political Science. e-journal

Gordon and Hafer. 2005. “Flexing Muscle: Corporate Political Expenditures as Signals to Bureaucracy.” American Political Science Review. e-journal

Jason Webb Yackee and Susan Webb Yackee. 2006. “A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy.” Journal of Politics, Vol. 68, No. 1 (February): 128-139. e-journal

Terry Moe, 1989. "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure." in Chubb and Peterson, ed. Can Governments Govern? (Brookings, Washington, D:C) @

March 19 --Networks I – Federalism

Chubb, John, 1985. "The Political Economy of Federalism." American Political Science Review. 79: 994-1015. e-journal

Scholz, J. T. & Wei, F.H. (1986). “Regulatory Enforcement in a Federalist System.”American Political Science Review, 80, 1249-70. e-journal.

Hedge, D.M., Scicchitano, M.J., & Metz, P. (1991). “The Principal-agent Model and Regulatory Federalism.” Western Political Quarterly, 44, 1055-1080. e-journal

Woods, Neal D. (2008). “Serving Two Masters? State Implementation of Federal Regulatory Policy.” Public Administration Quarterly. 32, 571-595. e-journal

RECOMMENDED:

Bradbury, John C. (2006). “Regulatory Federalism and Workplace Safety: Evidence from OSHA Enforcement.” Journal of Regulatory Economics. 29, 221-224. e-journal. 79: 994-1015. e-journal

Wilk, Eric M. and Charles M. Lamb (2010). “Federalism, Efficiency, and Civil Rights Enforcement.” Political Research Quarterly. 1-13.

March 26 – Networks 2 - Private-Public Partnerships

Jonathon G.S. Koppell. 2003. Ch. 1-3. The Politics of Quasi-Government Hybrid Organizations and the Dynamics of Bureaucratic Control. Cambridge University Press. @

Christine A. Kelleher and Susan Webb Yackee. 2008. “A Political Consequence of Contracting: Organized Interests and State Agency Decision Making.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 19: 579-602. April 2-- Work on Papers

April 9 – Work on Papers

April 16 – Student Presentations

April 23 – Reading Day (no class)

Monday, April 27 – Research Paper Due