Information Operations

Newsletter

Compiled by: Mr. Jeff Harley US Army Strategic Command G3 Plans, Information Operations Branch

Table of Contents The articles and information appearing herein are intended for educational and non-commercial purposes to promote discussion of research in the public interest. The views, opinions, and/or findings and recommendations contained in this summary are those of the original authors and should not be construed as an official position, policy, or decision of the United States Government, U.S. Department of the Army, or U.S. Army Strategic Command.

Page ii Table of Contents

Vol. 7, no. 07 (6 – 15 December 2006)

1. Army Initiates Electronic Warfare Capability 2. DOD Needs More Than A Few Good Spectrum Managers 3. Iran Blocks YouTube, N.Y. Times 4. Blitzed by Text Messages 5. Aftermath of Chinese Network Attack 6. Department of the Army Vacancy Announcement Number: SWEI06703715 7. The Ideological Voices of the Jihadi Movement 8. US To Defend Space with Military Force 9. Russia 'At Risk of Cyberterrorist Attack' 10. President of Information Protection Company: “The West Is Not Very Highly Concerned With the Threat [Klepov] of Cyber Terrorism” 11. US Military Remains on Cyber Alert 12. Soldiers Help Town Council 13. Winning the War 14. Intelligence and Information Operations (I2O) 15. The Information Front

Page iii Army Initiates Electronic Warfare Capability By Lt. Col. Carl S. Ey, Army News, 7 December 2006 WASHINGTON (Army News Service, Dec. 7, 2006) - The Army is developing a new core competency for career Soldiers and officers interested in becoming electronic warfare specialists. "As the Army continues to face an increasingly sophisticated, learning and adaptive enemy, who will engage in asymmetric warfare characterized by irregular tactics, terror, and the use of the most deadly casualty-producing means available to them, we find ourselves needing to develop new ways to attack and defeat these adversaries," said Lt. Gen. James J. Lovelace Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. "As nation-states, both friendly and hostile, move forward into ever more technologically-complex domains, we need new tools and capabilities to better address a full spectrum of challenges." In the early stages of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, commanders quickly realized that they needed highly trained and qualified Electronic Warfare personnel within the Army. The Navy was able to step in to assist in this fight by providing trained electronic warfare operators, both commissioned and enlisted, to support ground forces. This effort proved to be such a combat multiplier that in April 2006, Headquarters Department of the Army established the Electronic Warfare Division as part the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office. The Electronic Warfare Division's mission is to oversee electronic warfare policy, programs and resources within the Army. In May 2006, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army directed G-3 to establish electronic warfare as an enduring core warfighting competency within the Army. Specifically, he directed the G-3 to develop an electronic warfare force structure and operational concepts which strengthen the Army's strategic vision and supports the ground force component commander allowing for seamless employment within the joint warfighting environment. Under the Vice Chief's guidance, the Army is planning the development of a military occupational specialty and an officer career field. These Soldiers are already embedded in units and preparing to go to Iraq and Afghanistan to do "battle hand-off" with the Navy EWOs on the ground. "The Army has come a very long way in a few months, said Col. Laurie Moe Buckhout, chief of the Army's Electronic Warfare Division. "Today, we have EW training bases at Fort Huachuca and Fort Sill turning out enlisted and commissioned Soldiers who carry the electronic warfare additional skill identifiers or ASIs of 1K and 1J tactical and operational electronic warfare operators." One of the greatest emerging warfighting domains is the electromagnetic spectrum, the largely invisible space over which radio waves, light waves, and directed energy can travel. The Army has long developed systems which depend upon the spectrum for communications, radars, targeting assets, laser and radio frequency guided munitions, Global Positioning Systems, Blue Force Trackers and all manner of sensors for collecting intelligence and information. Currently, the Army is developing a much more robust network in its Future Combat Systems program. This will connect many new manned and unmanned systems that will enhance Soldier capability and protection. "Over the years, despite its reliance on the electromagnetic spectrum, the Army has not kept pace with the development of appropriate tools and skill sets to ensure unimpeded use of this domain," Buckhout said. "Today's enemy is as sophisticated as we are - and in many cases, less tied to conventional means of warfare," she added. "This means we must poise ourselves to both defend our use of the spectrum and also to be prepared to take the fight to the enemy. One of our most important weapons in this fight is electronic warfare." Army transformation is building capabilities required to execute the full spectrum of operations required of Army organizations today and expected in the future.

Page 1 Lessons learned from these operations indicate EW to be vital for the Army to meet its full spectrum requirements; therefore, the Army is accelerating its effort to build EW capability to enhance ground combat operations. Training and Doctrine Command has been designated the Combined Arms Center as the Army's Electronic Warfare Proponent. Table of Contents

DOD Needs More Than A Few Good Spectrum Managers By Bob Brewin, Federal Computer Week, Dec. 7, 2006 ANNAPOLIS, Md. – The Defense Department’s radio frequency spectrum is an invisible and finite resource that is so critical to network-centric warfare that the Navy has allowed 250 electronic warfare officers to work with the Army to manage deconfliction issues in Iraq, said John Grimes, DOD chief information officer and assistant secretary of Defense for networks and information integration. He gave a keynote speech here at the AFCEA’s Defense Spectrum Summit Dec. 6. The Army considers spectrum management so important it has decided to develop a primary Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) for spectrum managers and expects approval of that new career field soon, Brig. Gen. Jeffrey Foley, the Army’s director of architecture, operations and space, told the conference attendees. Forces operating in Iraq need spectrum managers to meet the challenge of integrating new systems into a battlefield awash with frequency-dependent systems without conflict. That’s a challenge, he said, because conflicts are inevitable. For example, DOD found that other emitters on the battlefield were knocking out the Global Positioning System receivers used in a class of inexpensive unmanned aerial vehicles. Grimes said the use of low-cost commercial GPS receivers in the UAVs caused this interference. DOD also faces the challenge of operating high-powered jammers to take out enemy radio- controlled improvised explosive devices without disabling vital friendly systems, Grimes said. The need for frequency deconfliction and countering the IED threat are two main examples of why DOD’s spectrum management focus is on the warfighter, Grimes said. Besides creating a new primary MOS, the Army would like to have two spectrum managers in its brigade combat teams instead of one, Foley said. The Navy is also establishing spectrum management as a career path, and the Marine Corps has already designated it as a career field, Foley added. But better management alone will not resolve all of DOD’s spectrum issues, Foley said. Spectrum requirements must incorporated into the combat system development process with new policies because existing Army regulations are insufficient to ensure that spectrum requirements are handled upfront in the development process. Table of Contents

Iran Blocks YouTube, N.Y. Times By Antone Gonsalves, InformationWeek, Dec. 5, 2006 Iran is also planning to boost surveillance of "harmful" text messages, said the press freedom organization Reporters Without Borders. Iran blocked access to video-sharing Web site YouTube and the New York Times online, further escalating the country's Internet censorship, a press freedom organization said Tuesday. The latest actions are part of the country's overall strategy of creating a "digital border to stop culture and news coming from abroad -- a vision of the Net which is worrying for the country's future," Paris-based Reporters Without Borders said. Two months ago, Iranian officials banned Internet access at speeds higher than 128KB per second, saying at the time it was to prevent Web content from undermining Islamic culture among young

Page 2 people. The government has blocked the Kurdish version of Wikipedia for several months, and the English version from Dec. 1-3, Reporters Without Borders said. The online encyclopedia is often seen as a threat by governments that control Internet access for political reasons. Iran is moving closer to the heavy censorship of the Web practiced by China, the free press nonprofit said. Both countries are on the group's list of 13 countries considered "enemies of the Internet." Iran and China have objected to their inclusion, saying they are only filtering illegal and immoral content. Other countries include Belarus, Cuba, Egypt, Myanmar, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. Vafa Ghafaryan, head of Iran's Agency for the Development of Information Technology, told the country's official news agency ISNA that the government planned to boost surveillance of "harmful" text messages, Reporters Without Borders said. Table of Contents

Blitzed by Text Messages By Tom Newton-Dunn, the Sun Observer, December 11, 2006 TALIBAN fighters in Afghanistan are being bombarded by a devastating new British weapon — the text message. Intelligence chiefs find out the numbers of the enemy’s mobile phones then send them waves of messages to confuse them and destroy morale, The Sun can reveal. Texts range from simple abuse such as “We know who you are, give up” or “Go home, you’ll never beat us”. Others are disguised as messages from comrades to spread duff information. And attacks on Royal Marine commandos in lawless Helmand province are DOWN in the last month since the mind games began. The text attacks are carried out by the 15 (UK) Psychological Operations Group, based at the Intelligence Corps’ HQ in Chicksands, Beds. A military source in Afghanistan said: “If they know their fight is pointless, they are quite likely to give up.” Table of Contents

Aftermath of Chinese Network Attack From Strategy Page, 11 December 2006 December 11, 2006: The U.S. Naval War College (NWC) is still trying to repair the damage caused by a massive hack attack last month. The full extent of the penetration, and damage, is not yet known. The forensics people aren't sure when they'll be finished. What they do known so far is that the attack came from China, although the Chinese deny any involvement. Oddly enough, the attack targeted a part of the navy that did not contain a lot of current secrets. When it comes to developing new strategy, the NWC is pretty much out-of-the-loop. Very few of the CNOs (Chief of Naval Operations, what the commander of the navy is called) in the past 30 years was even an NWC grad. Most current admirals never went. Sea duty and mandatory specialist schooling seriously cut into the education options of naval officers during the Cold War and the '90s. Remember, the Navy was always deploying, while most of the Army and Air Force, and a major chunk of the Marine Corps, were essentially in garrison, during those years. The NWC students are headed for important staff and support jobs, not the key command positions. The NWC is a wonderful repository of historical information on American naval operations and planning. Even then, most of those documents are not in electronic form. Then again, it is believed that the Chinese hackers went after the NWC because their probes indicated that the cyber defenses there were weaker than at other U.S. Navy installations. That makes sense, as the navy deploys its Internet experts and security capabilities to where they will do the most good (and

Page 3 protect the most valuable information). What this attack will do, however, is provide a lot of useful information, to American security experts, on the state of the art within China's Cyber War forces. Table of Contents

Department of the Army Vacancy Announcement Number: SWEI06703715 Opening Date: December 15, 2006 Closing Date: December 29, 2006 Position: Information Operations Planner (CNA), GS-0301-13 Salary: $77353 - $100554 Annual Place of Work: US Army Space Command, Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, Plans Div, Colorado Springs, CO - DUTY LOCATION: Fort Meade, MD Position Status: This is a Permanent position. -- Full Time Number of Vacancy: Many Duties: Serve within the Information Operations (IO) Section, G-3 Plans, US Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Strategic Command (SMDC/ARSTRAT) with duty location in the Washington D.C. area (Ft. Meade, MD). Provides Computer Network Attack (CNA) expertise and deliberate and crisis action planning support to SMDC/ARSTRAT and US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and the Joint Functional Component Command Network Warfare (JFCC-NW). Assists in developing and directing operations in support of USSTRATCOM and coordinates with Army G-3 operations and directions, to ensure the availability of CNA resources to assist in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling to accomplish the mission across the full spectrum of conflict. Coordinates with Department of the Army staff agencies, as well as Major Commands, to identify equipment, system, tools, and manpower requirements for operational and contingency plans; identifies CNA requirements, capabilities, and characteristic shortfalls; and proposes concepts for CNA forces, processes and doctrine to SMDC/ARSTRAT G-3 Strategy Division and the Future Warfare Center (FWC). Under the supervision of G-3 PLEX Information Operations Branch, you will serve as a forward planner for computer network attack (CNA) at the Joint Functional Component Command (JFCC- NW), US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). The forward planner provides CNA and full spectrum IO expertise and deliberate and crisis action planning support to SMDC/ARSTRAT, USSTRATCOM, and the JFCC-NW. The forward planner will also interact with US Army CNA elements from INSCOM and 1st IO Command to ensure activities are coordinated and synchronized. This position is located at the National Security Agency, Fort Meade, Maryland. This position is projected to convert to NSPS in CY 2007. View complete announcement at https://cpolwapp.belvoir.army.mil/public/vabSelfNom/index.jsp and search on SWEI06703715. Table of Contents

The Ideological Voices of the Jihadi Movement By Chris Heffelfinger, Jamestown Foundation, 14 December 2006 It is news to few observers that thousands, even millions, of young Muslims are influenced—to some extent—by jihadi literature circulating on various Islamist websites and discussion forums. The mujahideen's use of the internet for communication, indoctrination, recruitment and public relations has been well demonstrated. Through this medium, a field of preachers and ideologues compete for the vast audience of young Muslims, attempting to sway their opinion and bring them to the "correct" practice and understanding of Islam. Those backing the global jihadi movement have succeeded in capturing this audience—perhaps more so than other contenders—and have gained a wide following of careful but loyal readers. This phenomenon was studied in-depth by the recent Militant Ideology Atlas published at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point [1]. The

Page 4 study examined the most popular texts read online from one of the websites most frequently used by al-Qaeda to host their literature—http://tawhed.ws. The literature is critical because it provides deeper motivation to the believer, who seeks ideological backing before taking action. According to the study, a group of Muslim scholars—Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Abu Basir al-Tartusi, Abu Qatada al-Filistini, 'Abd al-Qadir bin 'Abd al-'Aziz and a few other Saudi clerics—are the primary Salafi opinion-makers guiding the jihadi movement. These scholars are relied upon for their credibility since they have either been imprisoned or exiled by their home countries. They are also perceived as being true to Islam and putting the interests of Muslims before themselves, making them sincere, legitimate and incorruptible. For the mujahideen, they are portrayed as scholarly authorities and the source for doctrinal legitimacy. Surprisingly, the study found that al-Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are not highly cited in jihadi literature. They are not considered authorities in Islamic law or looked to as the ideological force behind the jihadi movement. Indeed, in the world of Salafi-Jihadi ideology, they are relatively minor players. One possible reason for this is that the two are figureheads, pioneers in carrying out successful attacks against one of the enemies of Muslims. This suggests that there is a role for charismatic leaders to bring Muslims to jihad, as soldiers to the battlefield, but there is a separate role for these Salafi scholars in setting the broader goals for the movement, the limits and terms of engagement and selecting valid and legal targets. They are, in essence, creating the Islamic legal framework for this struggle so that the basis upon which it is waged will be sound. It is then left to strategists and mujahid leaders to conduct successful campaigns within this framework. Sharia and the Larger Debate There is no single governing body for determining Islamic law in the Muslim world. Movements tend to center around persuasive and influential scholars that can grant them legitimacy in the eyes of other Muslims. This has been the case for the Salafi movement, including militant Salafis who form the global jihadi movement. Although the mujahideen are not held accountable to their constituency, they understand the need for their fellow Muslims to support their actions, provide them with funding and safe haven and ultimately be able to mobilize them when needed. Accordingly, the advice and writings of Salafi scholars carry much weight with the mujahideen and Muslim readers—regardless of their affiliation. This can clearly be seen by the readership that websites like tawhed.ws and revivingislam.com receive. For the most influential scholars of the Salafi movement, such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Abu Qatada and Abu Basir, the end goal is never jihad itself. The objective is to bring Muslims to a Salafi reading of Islam and then to deliver salvation to the global Muslim community. As such, the primary element of the literature is the meaning and implementation of the Sharia. The scholars first bring their interpretation of Islamic law on various political and social issues and present their advice on the appropriate action. The common ground among the scholars behind the jihadi movement is their rejection of Muslims living under apostate laws and political systems governing outside what God has decreed. The required response—for all, but to differing degrees and with differing tactics—is resistance. This drive to instill Islamic law into Muslim society, and ultimately recreate that society under their interpretation of the law, often translates into an endorsement for violent jihad as practiced by bin Laden and others. While there are many Muslim scholars who call for these sources of law to be the primary factors in how Muslims live, the important distinction lies in how one should confront political systems that rule by law other than Sharia. The debate over law and society is critical in jihadi literature. It establishes the framework through which young Muslims should struggle; for these scholars, it is clear their aim is not jihad, but the creation of such a society through jihad, an obligatory struggle for the believer. In this larger debate, militant Salafi scholars have a much different role than the mujahid leaders. A prime example of this is that of the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a student of al-Maqdisi from their shared time in a Jordanian prison; al-Maqdisi, however, publicly disapproved of his former student's

Page 5 tactics that targeted innocent Muslims. For them, the disagreement was a result of al-Maqdisi's understanding of the Sharia and the best interests of Muslims. Examining such relationships can allow one to understand how the internal debates among the mujahideen are framed and directed, how limits on targets are created when scholars strongly condemn a certain act (such as al- Zarqawi's hotel bombings in Amman) and how the various jihadi groups can work together under the ideological umbrella of one militant Salafi scholar, even though that scholar is not involved operationally in the groups' actions. The Key Thinkers and their Positions The main authors identified in the West Point study are all considered reliable sources for the mujahideen and their supporters when they seek a ruling on a given issue. They are generally careful and diligent in investigating questions put before them, regarding jihad or other matters, and write in a scholarly, but authoritative tone, unlike the rants heard by many mujahid leaders. In this backdrop, the scholars establish the principles for carrying out jihad—what is lawful and unlawful in their operations, and what broader goals should be kept in mind by those Muslims who answer the call to jihad. This process more often determines what course of action should be avoided, not only based on the Quran, hadith and the earliest generation of Muslims, but also based on lessons learned from past jihadi endeavors and their failings. 'Asim Tahir al-Barqawi, better known as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, is one of the most prolific contemporary jihadi ideologues and a classically trained scholar. He was born in Nablus in 1959, but has been imprisoned intermittently since the 1990s by the Jordanian authorities for his criticism of the government and calls for jihad. Al-Maqdisi is regarded as one of the highest living authorities in Islam for Salafis, jihadis and other conservative Sunni Muslims who share elements of his program. His imprisonment, however, seems to have had little effect on his scholarly output. As part of the aforementioned study, he was the most frequently cited living Salafi scholar, indicating the wide range of jihadis (from strategists to mujahideen to fellow scholars) that cite his writings. Al-Maqdisi is well traveled; he spent time in Saudi Arabia (with the scholars of the Saudi establishment) as well as in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where he spent time with and observed various mujahideen groups. He returned to Jordan in 1992, having formed his views in the previous years' travels, and denounced the rule of the royal family as being in contradiction to Sharia. Al- Maqdisi's texts are frequently aimed at the youth in Jordanian prisons and similar Muslims around the world that are encouraged to hold steadfast to the path of jihad in accordance with the principles of Islamic law detailed in his texts. To be sure, the legal arguments are lost on many of his students who lack formal Islamic legal training, but he provides contemporary examples to buttress his points. Many of his texts are in response to criticisms of jihad by other Salafi clerics, typically from the Gulf states or Saudi Arabia. Other writings include the education of the next generation of leaders, numerous issues relating to resistance to tyrannical regimes and the need to uphold the Sharia and one of his most-widely read works, the Creed of Abraham, on monotheistic faiths (which is highly critical of contemporary Christians and Jews) [2]. Through his writings on tawhed.ws, al-Maqdisi sets out the "correct" agenda for the various mujahideen groups to follow, what their intentions and objectives should be as they enter jihad, what preparation is required and what they should avoid (such as hasty actions that make the mujahideen look inept, inexperienced, or indifferent to killing innocent Muslims). There are more nuanced discussions of espionage, defining apostasy, takfir (labeling another Muslim an unbeliever), different examples of interaction with tyrannical rule and explanations of when resistance is obligatory for the believer. Yet, in the end, a clear direction is set out for the mujahideen and those who support their cause on how best to proceed. Al-Maqdisi's calls for unity are respected because of the scholarly weight behind his name and reputation. This also exposes one of the movement's weaknesses, and the shortcomings of governments confronting jihadi ideologues: a blow to his standing or a publicly lost debate would likely do much more to damage the unity of the jihadi movement than would his imprisonment.

Page 6 Abu Basir al-Tartusi is another prolific contemporary scholar of Syrian origin. He is a slightly more moderate Salafi ideologue who resides in London, more often criticizing past jihadi mistakes and urging caution and selective action. His tone is due in large part to the scrutiny he was put under following the 2005 London train bombings. He has provided scholarly arguments to back armed resistance to tyrannical rule (by employing jihadi tactics), also prefaced on the importance of Muslims living by the Sharia. Abu Qatada al-Filistini, born in 1960 in the West Bank, is another example of a Palestinian-born cleric who encourages jihad against apostate rule in accordance with the Sharia and is among the most frequently cited authors in the study. He is alleged to be a member of al-Qaeda's Fatwa Committee and is currently fighting extradition from the United Kingdom to Jordan [3]. His writings contend that, according to the Sharia, it is every Muslim's individual obligation to overthrow and expel any secular government from Muslim lands by bombing, sabotage, coup, or other means available to them that would advance the implementation of Sharia in that land. Conclusion These Salafi scholars play a critical but not widely observed role in the global jihadi movement. Ideology is often overlooked and is considered separate from the strategic and operational aspects of Islamist militancy. Yet, the scholars behind the jihadi movement set the framework for debates and provide direction that is by and large adhered to, or is at the least a determining factor in the planning of attacks. By better understanding their role in the movement, governments combating terrorism can attempt to intervene earlier in the radicalization process and ultimately work toward undermining their influence. Notes 1. The author was one of the researchers and compilers of the study. He spent 10 months cataloging the most widely read and downloaded Arabic-language texts related to jihad from tawhed.ws and conducted a citation analysis of the data. The views in this paper are those of the author, they do not represent the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense, or any other agency of the U.S. government. 2. See Militant Ideology Atlas, Combating Terrorism Center, table of contents, p. 28-29. 3. According to testimony of Jamal al-Fadl in Southern District Court of New York in February 2001. Table of Contents

US To Defend Space with Military Force By Bill Gertz, Washington Times, 13 December 2006 The United States will use military force in space to protect satellites and other space systems from attack by hostile states or terrorists, the Bush administration's senior arms-control official said yesterday. Robert Joseph, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, said in a speech outlining a new White House space policy that free access to space is a "vital" U.S. interest and that the Bush administration opposes new agreements that would limit U.S. space defenses. "To ensure free access to space ... we must continue to develop a full range of options to deter and defend against threats to our space infrastructure," Mr. Joseph said in a speech to the George C. Marshall Institute, a private think tank. The United States will "oppose others who wish to use their military capabilities to impede or deny our access to and use of space," he said. "We will seek the best capabilities to protect our space assets by active or passive means." "No nation, no non-state actor, should be under the illusion that the United States will tolerate a denial of our right to the use of space for peaceful purposes," he said. "We reserve the right to defend ourselves against hostile attacks and interference with our space assets," he said.

Page 7 U.S. officials said the comments are an indirect warning to China, which has fired a ground-based laser gun at a U.S. satellite that passed over its territory -- an event viewed as one sign of Beijing's efforts to develop space arms that can blind or destroy systems. Mr. Joseph said yesterday that a number of nations are developing weapons to "counter, attack and defeat U.S. space systems." He did not name the countries. Asked after the speech about the Chinese laser incident, he declined to comment. "In view of these growing threats, our space policy requires us to increase our ability to protect our critical space capabilities and to continue to protect our interests from being harmed through the hostile use of space," he said. The United States has become very reliant on the use of satellites for civilian communications as well as military command and control, with a large portion of government communications transiting space. The White House announced in October that President Bush authorized a new national space policy, the first since 1996, that states that the United States is committed to the peaceful use of space and rejects any nation's attempts to claim sovereignty over it. The policy also views any attempt to interfere with space systems as an infringement on the right of free passage in space, and describes space capabilities as "vital" to national interests. Mr. Joseph said yesterday that space should be regarded similarly to open seas where free navigation is a right. "If these rights are not respected, the United States has the same full range of options -- from diplomatic to military -- to protect its space assets as it has to protect its other critical assets," he said. "There is also a broad range of means, both passive and active, by which space assets may be protected or the effects of the loss of their services minimized," he said. Alternatives include non-space backup systems, satellites with onboard subcomponent replacement parts, satellite maneuvering systems to avoid threats, electronic and other system security, data encryption, and communications frequency shifts. Mr. Joseph said the United States needs to use space systems as part of a strategy to manage crises, deter conflict or "if deterrence fails, prevail in conflict." Both Russia and China have sought to introduce arms-control agreements at the United Nations designed to limit U.S. space weapons or defenses, and the Bush administration opposes the proposed agreements and talks. Mr. Joseph said the Outer Space Treaty has been a long-standing and effective tool to guide international cooperation in space. New international agreements are "unnecessary and counterproductive," he said. "We do not need to enter into new agreements; rather we should be seeking to gain universal adherence to existing agreements, including the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and we should concentrate our efforts on real threats, such as those to the nuclear nonproliferation regime which, as a consequence of actions by Iran and North Korea, are under great strain," Mr. Joseph said. Table of Contents

Russia 'At Risk of Cyberterrorist Attack' By Jeremy Kirk, PC Advisor, 14 Dec 06 A Russian computer security expert has predicted that terrorists could seek to target the country's critical infrastructure through electronic warfare, raising the stakes in the way Russia handles computer crime. While terrorists aren't believed to currently have the know-how to disrupt critical infrastructure, it would be "very dangerous" if they start learning, said Valery Vasenin, head of the Computer

Page 8 Security Department at the IISP (Institute for Information Security Problems) at Moscow State University. "I think the phenomenon of terrorism will go in this direction," Vasenin said in an interview at his office. "This is probably the most important problem for the coming years." Russian's energy grid is a possible target, which could cause widespread blackouts. The air transportation and fuel distribution systems are other possible targets, Vasenin said. Russia has experienced chilling episodes of terrorism. In September 2004, 331 people, more than half of whom were children, were killed when Chechen separatists stormed a school in Beslan. In October 2002, Chechen rebels took 850 people hostage in a Moscow theatre; 117 died after Russian forces used a poisonous gas before entering the premises. No major cyberterrorism incident in Russia has been recorded. However, the country's infrastructure is becoming more networked and less isolated than before, which could make it more vulnerable to cyberattacks, Vasenin said. "Russia, at the moment, is average in terms of computer security," Vasenin said. In Russia in the 1990s, the internet was still viewed as the domain of academics, Vasenin said. But the rapid change of technology and emergence of threats has led to greater attention to security issues, he said. Moscow State University's IISP was established in 2004 to study network security, the psychology of human behaviour and the internet, along with computer forensics and judicial issues. Russia lacks laws that clearly define computer crime, he said, making it difficult for Internal Affairs Ministry agents to investigate and bring cases. The IISP is studying other countries' computer crime laws and formulating recommendations. "They [the Internal Affairs Ministry] are somewhat unarmed," Vasenin said. "We understand we [Russia] have these problems related to legislation, just as there are worldwide problems." In June, Russia recorded 8,400 computer-related crimes, according to figures released by the Internal Affairs Ministry in October. Forty-three percent of the cases were related to online auction fraud, with the remainder comprising information theft, unauthorised access, child pornography violations and others, the ministry said. Boris Miroshnikov, who heads the cybercrime department at Russia's Internal Affairs Ministry, has called for more trained experts to handle criminal cases that often cross international borders. Miroshnikov's comments at a cybersecurity conference were published earlier this year by Moscow State University. "Do we have today a school of experts in the field of cybercrimes?" Miroshnikov told conference participants. "Unfortunately, I do not think so." Table of Contents

President of Information Protection Company: “The West Is Not Very Highly Concerned With the Threat [Klepov] of Cyber Terrorism” From Regnum News Agency (Russia), 14 Dec 06 2006 marks a kind of anniversary: 15 years of a fraud with counterfeited advice notes, one of the major frauds in the history of world banking. It was about faked credit notes. As a result, in 1991- 92, 400 billion rubles were embezzled from the Russian Central Bank. The results were really catastrophic for Russia. The unprecedented in world banking theft was ceased by joint effort of the Central Bank staff and Russian Ancort Company that in a very short time managed to elaborate and install a system of cryptographic protection of notes. As a result, despite the continuing attempts made by the crime,

Page 9 no fake credit note let take money illegally from the Russian Central Bank. A REGNUM correspondent spoke about those events with President of Ancort Co Anatoly Klepov. REGNUM: Mr. Klepov, the tragic death of Russia’s Central Bank First Deputy Head Andrei Kozlov makes us speak again on the bygone events of early 90s when the Central Bank became object of an unprecedented criminal attack known as the “fake advice notes fraud.” But only few know that you and your company were directly involved in cutting short that fraud. [Klepov] Yes, it is true that our work with the Central Bank started in 1992, at the very difficult moment, and has continued until now. Usually, cryptographic companies that provide for protection of information do not speak to the media commenting on their work with their clients in order to observe confidentiality. But now in connection with murder of Andrei Kozlov the indignation is very high. Many high-ranking officials gave their comments assessing such actions as lawlessness. The State Duma has established a special committee to investigate criminalization of banking systems, particularly in investigating this murder. MP Nikolai Leonov, speaking on TV, directly stated that Kozlov’s death was directly connected with fake advice notes, Head of the Russian Audit Chamber Sergey Stepashin said the same. I think they are right. Andrei Kozlov was really occupied with investigation of causes of those events. The thing is, the war started then is not over yet. And the problem I so important that I believe it is my duty to speak even contradictory to the official position of the Central Bank leadership that opposes my statements to the press. I will not be talking about certain details of the Central Bank protection, but I will try to analyze causes of the biggest fraud in the history of world banking in order to prevent from such events being repeated in banking as well as in other fields, state-run and commercial. Some typical mistakes committed in organization of the Central Bank information security can be seen in other institutions in Russia as well. There is no comprehensive understanding on the country today on what happened in Russia then. It is very important to prevent from such fraud taking place again and establish a solid protection against possible attacks of cyber criminals. The reality is, in 1991-92 a cyber war broke up in Russia. Management of national strategic financial resources was partially taken under control by criminal subjects, but we are still unable to define it clearly, whether it was crime or, maybe, some external forces stood behind them and tried to destabilize the situation in Russia. For some time, they had managed to take under control vast financial flows of Russia’s National Bank. What is information war? Dictionary “War and Peace in Concepts and Definitions” edited by Dmitry Rogozin gives general attributes of it: 1. Damaging information systems, processes and critically important national resources. 2. Undermining of political and social systems. 3. Massive psychological pressure upon population aimed at destabilization of society. All those attributes were present in the case with fake advice notes. Functioning of the National Bank information system was seriously damaged practically right up to suspension of financial payments in the country. Awful inflation connected with massive embezzlement undermined people’s trust in the democratic Russia, aggravated the social atmosphere. And the psychological campaign of intimidating the people with the help of the term “Chechen advice note” was necessary for them to instigate inter-ethnic discord inside Russia and for its division in the long run. From the technical point of view, all elements of information war were present. For instance, imposing false reports, listening-in and distortion of information, establishment of false points for information transmission and many other things, which now consists the gist of current high-tech information wars. REGNUM: Were information systems of the Central Bank then modern enough? How did it happen that they were so vulnerable?

Page 10 [Klepov] Problems of the Central Bank were typical enough for the whole former USSR. Information systems of the former Soviet Union were very good protected strategically – at the level government, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and others. However, on the tactical level, say, our troops in Afghanistan had great problems in information safety in Afghanistan. For instance, encoding of information in handwritten documents, by which our troops were equipped, took comparatively long time, which is critical in operation. It brought about the situation when army units exchanged information by so-called talking tables, where words like “shells” were replaced by “water-melons” and cartridges were called “cucumbers.” Under current rules, the words taken from the talking tables were to be coded by handwritten encoding documents in order not to let the enemy determine correct meaning of the words. But it is hard to imagine how this can be done during operation, so, the “fruit-and-vegetables” exchanged of information was broadcasted. Of course, in some time the enemy knew the correspondence between words and phrases and laid an ambush where wanted to. Nobody knows for sure how many our troops and officers died of it. The situation reiterated in Nagorno Karabakh and Chechen wars. Numerous stern decrees were issued to ban use of talking tables without encoding, but, alas, if technical equipment does not correspond with demand of reality, the human factor plays its tragic role. This “fruit” coding played its role in the case with fake advice notes. It can be said conditionally that protection of financial advice notes exchange between cash calculation centers was a tactical task for the Central Bank is practically the same as in the army. The whole political system generates one and the same errors, particularly, technical ones. For the chief executive a whisper in the phone hanger is encoded, and for the ranks there are inconvenient coding tables. In the USSR it became apparent in everything not only in the military. The legacy of the Soviet times – disrespectful attitudes to the people, who are fulfilling governmental tasks, be it military service or banking, which resulted in tremendous theft. In cyber war the concept of a tactical unit is completely different from the one in a usual war; often setbacks in its protection can result in losing control over strategic information resources, which happened at the Central Bank. We encountered new concepts in the sphere of information wars and the main one of them is that any information unit of our protection should be secured. Otherwise, a skilled cyber attack will give the enemy a brilliant opportunity to penetrate unnoticed our information systems and then destroy them. As Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev said recently, trillions of rubles were stolen then. Evidently, from the technical point of view it was done very professionally. What was trillions of rubles for Russia in 1991-92? Those were budget money. State-financed enterprises, first of all, defense enterprises received no money and started closing. In that period major companies ceased or suspended their functioning. Dozens of thousands of bright technologists, engineers were ousted from work. Fist of all, the military industrial complex was damaged, not only production, but scientific intelligentsia of Russia, who traditionally used to work in the defense industry. Healthcare financing and payment of pensions drastically decreased, a crisis happened to the financial system; all savings of the population “burned” in inflation. Life span decreased. Thus, if we sum up, the theft of the Central Bank in its economic consequences was comparable to a nuclear aggression against our country. It was a real cyber war, not just and act of cyber terrorism. The embezzled money was taken abroad, plants and factories were bought for it – this was the way how financial basis for cyber terrorism was laid. Criminals understood they can have incredible money with the help special technical means and started developing them. What the power of cyber terrorism is, we felt it to the full extent in Chechnya, where special equipment was applied against our troops both in the first and the second wars in Chechnya. We contributed as much as we could in fighting cyber terrorism – presented thousands of encoding units to police troops and Air Forces. Cyber terrorism is not only technical means; it often affects

Page 11 the administrative resource as well. We did not have a right to sell our encoding equipment officially in the quality our troops needed it and we could give it to them as present only. Some our governmental officials were indifferent to death of troops and officers, the main thing was not to breach the instructions that they had prepared deriving from the principle of preserving their wealth in Moscow. Naturally, cyber terrorism is not only a Russian phenomenon. For instance, al-Qaeda’s cyber terrorism ended up with September 11. There is nothing strange in it. In Afghanistan, dushmans were with great attention examining US systems of interception of our aircrafts and helicopters communication, information monitoring of military air bases including remote control of airplanes. Then, a vast interest was shown in numerous exhibitions of special equipment for interception and listening-in held in Russia in 1991-93. Combining US and Soviet technologies in the filed of conducting information wars and receiving practical experience in Chechnya, al-Qaeda’s terrorism entered the international arena. I believe that no serious terror attack has been carried out nowadays without participation of cyber terrorists. As they carry out their actions at the highest technological level, so they need to conduct preliminary research: they listen in to something, receive and process information and make general analysis to determine the weak points. It is a mistake to believe that cyber terrorism attacks only computer networks or internet. Its technical potential is much more extensive, which was shown by the recent war in Lebanon. It was not without reason, when President Putin announced at a meeting with prosecutors that cyber terrorism is the main threat for the 21st century. There are weighty grounds for it. REGNUM: Let us get back to the events of 1992. At some moment it became clear what was going on and the Central Bank leadership comprehended how it should secure its safety? [Klepov] As then-chair of the Central Bank Viktor Gerashchenko said in his speech at the seventh congress of people’s deputies, the financial system of the Central Bank was in collapse, practically it was stopped. As one could have predicted, chaos expected us, government reshuffle and so on. It became clear that we should protect ourselves immediately. But how? They were supposed to build a new well-protected system of 1,800 new branches of cash calculation centers and restore the Russian financial system soon. The Central Bank turned to us with this task. REGNUM: Why was it you? [Klepov] Because protection was to be done professionally, fast and for sure. And the most important thing: the equipment needed to be mass and not expensive. Like Kalashnikov machine gun during the war. We could provide it, as we have a production plant in Zelenograd (not far from Moscow). We elaborated a unique cryptographic protection system. Some elements of the system have no analogs in the world. Each payment under an advice note was protected by a mini electronic digital signature. The notes could be sent via telex between the cash calculation centers. It is impossible to counterfeit such payment. When the work started, the Central Bank did not trust anyone. It was an unprecedented thing for a governmental agency, but, probably, there were grounds for it. The leadership of the bank felt that someone inside the Bank was working for criminals, so they decided to produce “keys” on the first stage at our office. At next stages the Central Bank made the keys by itself. So, overall, the technical part of the assignment was done only by Ancort company. We were supposed to deliver 6,000 encoders, work out unique cryptographic solutions for 1,800 clients of the network, rules of functioning of the network and many other things to secure needed level of information protection of the Central Bank network. Our company fulfilled its duty and since December 1, 1992 protection system of the Central Bank started functioning. For more than 14 years nobody managed to counterfeit a Central Bank advice note technically. Naturally, it was very and very insecure. We had no arms, but had to wear flak jackets. We encountered face to face with our enemies. Criminals came with guns, blockaded production of encoders, so we had to take them to a safe place; they brought plenty of money to graft us,

Page 12 threatened and urged to give them the “keys.” But they were late and we told them: “Whatever you do, gentlemen, it will be in vain: the system is launched, and you will never succeed in changing it.” On the other hand, governmental agencies suddenly recollected: how without their knowledge protection of a state bank is being secured, if something happens, they can be dismissed… They started criminal proceedings against the company’s leadership on the charge of unsanctioned supply of equipment to the Central Bank. We turned for help to be protected from the crime, but we were told that of we hand over money to a very respectable governmental official, we shall have full protection. We rejected such proposals that were in conflict with our position, which is clear-cut: we do not sell and do not denounce. Those years of 1991-92 were the most controversial years of formation of the country, when the most important question was being decided whether Russia will exist or shall we enter a civil war with unpredictable results. The whole burden of protection of the Central Bank finances was put on shoulders of Russian women then. The Central Bank financial system consisted of 1,800 calculation centers all over Russia. Each center was to communicate with the others. So, each center was supposed to be equipped with a certain number of encoders and train operators how to work with them. When we asked how many they were, we were told about 5,000 people. We were to teach them how to work with encoders within two months to make the system operate. It was 5,000 female cryptographers, as mostly women were engaged in such activity at the bank. The history of the USSR and Russia has never seen this before. It is unbelievable, but the system was launched within two months, and it the major achievement of our women. Those women won the cyber war with criminals, and there were over 10,000 of them, according to the Interior Ministry information. REGNUM: The fact that the galloping inflation by the end of 1992 slowed down should be evidently considered as a sign that they managed to fill up a gap in the Central Bank protection, shouldn’t it? [Klepov] Yes, it should. But now Andrei Kozlov started investigating why those events became possible from organizational point of view. He was very intent to the problem of leak of insider information. Do you remember his statement this year on colossal downfall of Gazprom shares because of that? Cyber war has to do not only with technical issues, but with who and why permitted to do actions like this. When we investigate this, we usually come to a conclusion that people behind it were not ordinary criminals. It was very well equipped crime led y very competent persons. REGNUM: Do you have any ideas of who can it be? [Klepov] We do not know it. But what we know is that they were very professional. A cyber war cannot be considered accomplished until a thorough analysis is made on how such a system could be created that could be so easily destroyed. When we started the job to protect financial operations of the Central Bank, we saw a system that had so many gaps that it could hardly exist. REGNUM: And what about the current system? Can we be sure it was created without envisaging theft? [Klepov] Any system should be modernized and improved constantly. And at present time, the Central Bank spares no effort on it. As for general issues of protection of Russian information resources, as before the most attention is paid to protection of strategic information networks, while attacks of cyber terrorism cover the most updated and first of all mass communication networks. It is in constant search for gaps in protection shield. For example, nowadays, one of the most popular ways of cyber crime is collection of personal information. How do hackers penetrate data bases? Under information of Kaspersky Laboratory, it is done through tapping phones. It is very easy: say, a system administrator returns home from work, and suddenly he receives a call from office saying: “Our server is buzzed, tell us the password.” He answers, but his phone is tapped. Do not think that hackers are super genies. They

Page 13 stake mostly on human factor: someone wrote down the password somewhere, left the paper visible for everyone – they make money mostly on such things. Of course, they have accomplices inside. As a result, annual losses from cyber attacks total about $100 bln. Plenty of statements were made by media on the case of the Kozlov murder saying that it is necessary to do away with crime. Deputy chair of the Russian State Duma Vladimir Zhirinovsky in an interview to Ekho Moskvy Radio proposed to increase phone tapping. But none of our governmental officials ever asked themselves a question: do we have reliable personal information protection for each member of the State Duma or for Interior Ministry officers, who investigate high-profile crimes? Now and then we hear formidable reports that criminal proceedings were started on a case of an information leak from investigation of a contract murder, but at the same time we see on TV how very important persons talk by their cell phones from the site of the crime, but I never saw any special cryptographic cell phone by them. Isn’t it the main way of information leak? I think the Russian prosecution should be asked: Are our prosecutors and the investigative bodies that ate on the forefront of the fight against terrorism well protected from cyber terrorists? Are they ready for a cyber war or not, like the Central Bank wasn’t in its time? State Duma members do go abroad and use their cell phones there. Contents of their talks and their voices can be easily faked and forged statements can be released on their behalf. Won’t it hurt Russia’s prestige? Is the presidential team ready for it? Well, he does not use ordinary means of communication. But what about his personal doctor? And reporters, who accompany him? Isn’t a cyber terrorist able to compromise some of them, forging someone’s voice or somehow else? We know from mass media about permanent scandals involving unsanctioned tapping of cell phones in some Western countries. For example, in Greece and Italy even the country’s leadership was tapped. Do we have guarantees that cyber terrorists will not choose for their attacks officials of the Russian foreign ministry who work abroad? Recently the number of Russian citizens detained abroad after tapping their phones increased and the trend is alarming. Over 140 mln cell phones are now used in Russia; they provide for accessible and convenient connection. There is a special, very reliable subsystem of confidential cellular connection on the basis of Megafon operator. There is only one analogous system, in the United States. As we know, now it is used mostly by top-ranking governmental officials, although commercial companies can also join the subsystem. What does put limits on the use of it? The answer is simple: absence of a relatively low-cost crypto smart phone with confidentiality protection. It will allow to settle the task of personal information protection of dozens of thousands of police officers and civil servants, including those from the foreign ministry. Why doesn’t the State Duma establish a special group to study question of information protection of personal data for Russian civil servants because of the increasing activity of cyber terrorism? The matter is not only technical or economical, but an organizational one. We faced practically the same problem many years ago while creating our coder for the Central Bank, which was 20 times less expensive than analogous coders made by state-run companies. Now, cyber terrorism has been searching for new methods and approaches. Are we ready to withstand its attacks? REGNUM: Can cite as examples some countries where information protection system is build taking into consideration the threats you are talking about? [Klepov] Russia is here on the forefront as well. We managed to survive the first cyber war that had no analogs in international practice. The West has not felt yet the grave consequences of cyber terrorists’ attacks. I remember an interesting case. Once I told a high-ranking Arab police officer that criminals were installing cameras on cash machines to steal money and it is necessary to take measures to prevent from it. His answer was that it is impossible in a Muslim country, where theft is punished under the Sharia law. A year later cyber criminals stole $11 bln from cash machines

Page 14 with the help of cameras installed on cash machines. Besides, many Western banks use a very weak “bank-client” system in terms of protection. In some points it resembles the system of the Central Bank that was successfully hacked by cyber terrorists. Not long ago cyber terrorists started tapping phones of the UK military in Iraq and then called their relatives in Britain. It is very dangerous for families of troops, who are very concerned about their relatives. Well, cyber terrorists can forge any information, which can result in tragic consequences. The UK authorities can turn to the Russian Interior Ministry and they will be officially noted on facts of racketeering or fraud with the use of cell phones. Generally, I would say that the West is not very highly concerned with the threat of cyber terrorism. But soon they will feel this threat in its full extent. Most probably, Europeans do not comprehend yet that the situation started changing. Although, recently I read an interesting article by Magnus Ranstorp, former Director of Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews, Scotland, called “Al Qaeda Wages Cyber War against US,” where he says that al-Qaeda pays much attention to studying the cyberspace and searching for vulnerable spots in it, and the question is not whether it will wage the war, but when it will do it. REGNUM: In Russia the cyber war started as early as in 1992. Has it finished? [Klepov] We cannot state it is finished. It is not stable in Chechnya, where signs of cyber war were clearly seen. Of course, cyber terrorists are trying to apply profits earned in a criminal way in economic and political tasks. A very thorough analysis of the situation usually precedes physical conflicts. I have always stressed that Russia should be ready to withstand any attack of cyber attack. Today, in the days of information wars, it is necessary for Russia to have effective mass technical means of protection; the means ought to be made in Russia and to cost not much. Unfortunately, I did not see comprehension of this in any statement by any politician. REGNUM: What do you think, who should create mass systems of information protection, state- run or commercial companies? [Klepov] Now private companies are doing it under control of governmental agencies who certify such activity. Private enterprises are trusted already to protect state secrets, although often certification increases the price of their product. Table of Contents

US Military Remains on Cyber Alert From UPI, 12 Dec 06 WASHINGTON, Dec. 12 (UPI) -- The U.S. military remains on heightened cyber-alert as the holiday season approaches, following at least one intrusion by suspected Chinese military hackers. The Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations, a part of U.S. Strategic Command, raised the U.S. military's global cyber-alert level, or "Information Condition," from InfoCon 5 to InfoCon 4 on Nov. 17, and had no plans to lower it, Strategic Command Spokeswoman Capt. Caroline Wellman told United Press International. "We don't discuss specific details of InfoCon levels, nor why they are raised or lowered," Wellman said, adding only that they were adjusted from time to time, in part "depending upon world-wide social and political events and activities." The heightened alert came the day after the decision of the Navy Cyber Defense Operations Command to take the computer network at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I., offline following an intrusion. Cmdr. Doug Gabos, a military spokesman, told UPI the compromised network was unclassified and could not give an estimate as to when it would be back up. "They are still taking steps to mitigate the intrusion," he said, adding the compromised systems would be examined forensically for evidence about the hackers.

Page 15 The college is the home of the Naval Strategic Studies Group, which reportedly develops the service's cyber-warfare strategy. Its Web site also continues to be down. The Washington Times, which first reported the outage, said a professor at the college told his class the intrusion had come from China -- part of an increasingly aggressive cyber-war policy by the People's Liberation Army. Time magazine revealed last year the existence of what it called a "massive cyber-espionage ring" based in China that U.S. investigators codenamed Titan Rain. The congressionally mandated U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission said in its annual report last month that the Chinese military had moved its cyber warfare strategy from a defensive to an offensive posture. "Such attacks would be intended to disable defense systems that facilitate command and control and intelligence communication and the delivery of precision weapons, primary instruments for the conduct of modern U.S. warfare," the report stated. Table of Contents

Soldiers Help Town Council From News Blaze.com, 13 Dec 06 Helping the people of Iraq help themselves was the mission Dec. 5 when Soldiers of Camp Rustamiyah visited the council of al Wahida. The Soldiers of Headquarters Platoon, Troop A, 3rd Squadron, 61st Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, who are attached to 1st Cavalry Division, met with local leaders of Wahida in a combined effort to help the community overcome some of its challenges. "The mission today was to go out and interface with the local government, specifically the al Wahida Nahia (council) that is in the Midain Quada (district)," said Capt. Chris Boyer, team leader, Civil Affairs Team A, from CA Team C, 489th CA Battalion. "Al Wahida is one of the better working nahia councils. They have people showing up. They sign attendance sheets. They have agendas and set committees, which work on schools, water or electricity," said Boyer, a native of Natick, Mass. "We're going to work with them today to get an understanding of where they are, what concerns they have and security issues as well as sewage, water, electricity, trash - all the normal functions of a municipality," The meeting was one step toward helping the local government organize and become an effective force, said Lt. Col. James W. Phillips, squadron commander, 361st Cav. Squad., 2nd BCT, 2nd Inf. Div. "If you (a Soldier) are doing something without an Iraqi partner helping or doing it, then you're doing something wrong because it's their country and their problems. We're just here to help," he said. The Army's goal, Phillips said, is to help the Iraqis help themselves form local councils up to the ministry level. "We're looking to improve this town in daily steps," he said. "We're working our spheres of influence to get neighborhood representatives to come to the neighborhood council." Once the people of Iraq have civil representation, they can go about alleviating some of the problems, which currently afflict the war-torn country, Boyer said. "This was just one of our weekly meetings we go to get a face-to-face with the local leadership and find out where they're at and what they need. Then (we) assess what they need to get to the goal of a self-sustaining democracy," Boyer explained. The challenge for the Wahida council is re-establishing ties to the ministries of Iraq, located in Baghdad. "In this quada (district) there is a lot of friction between it and Baghdad because the people feel they don't get their fair share from Baghdad province. So, it's just trying to tie them back into the lifelines of the ministries as well as the money," Boyer explained. "They (Wahida council members)

Page 16 are a work-in-progress, but are leaps and bounds above some of the other governing bodies we've worked with." Though rebuilding the government of Iraq is an uphill battle, Phillip said there is still reason to think success is attainable, from the ground up. Table of Contents

Winning the War By Oliver North, Military.com, December 14, 2006 Ramadi, Iraq – "We're here to win." That’s how a U.S. Marine corporal put it when I asked him what he was doing in Iraq. He spoke looking squarely into our TV camera – a more intimidating experience for him than the RPG fire he had just faced on the streets of this beleaguered city. When I pressed this 20 year-old from the heartland of America to tell me what "winning" meant to him, he was straightforward: "That’s when these people don't need me to guard this street so their kids can go to school – when they can do it themselves.” The young corporal and I were standing outside a small elementary school in this shattered city – capital of the largest province in Iraq. Al Qaeda terrorists had told local authorities – on pain of death – not to allow this female academic institution to un-shutter its doors. Apparently, little girls learning math and science pose a significant threat to radical Islamic jihadists. Defiant parents appealed to the newly reconstituted Iraqi police for protection from the terrorists – and the police turned to LtCol Bill Jurney, commanding officer of 1st Battalion, 6th Marines. The little school is in his "A/O" – area of operations – in downtown Ramadi – a city of more than 400,000. Jurney told the police that if they would man a new security sub-station in the same block as the school, his Marines would "back-stop" the cops. Despite murderous threats from Al Qaeda thugs, the police agreed. Aided by U.S. Navy Seabees, soldiers of the "Ready First" Combat Brigade of the 1st Armored Division and the Marines of 1/6, a police sub-station was constructed, literally overnight, in an abandoned building. When the terror cell that had ruled this neighborhood for months attacked the new Iraqi police post, their battalion commander, Jabbar Inad al Namrawee, led an all-Iraqi QRF – quick reaction force – into the battle. In the ensuing gunfight, Lieutenant Colonel Jabbar was shot through the calf by an AK-47-wielding terrorist. By the time the battle was done, more than a dozen terrorists were dead and the police – who call themselves "The sons of al Anbar" – earned new respect from Ramadi's war-weary civilians. Now, little more than a week after the fight, Lieutenant Colonel Jabbar is back at work – with fresh scars on his leg. His policemen patrol this neighborhood’s streets, the little school has re-opened and Bill Jurney's Marines are providing pencils, notebooks, and backpacks to the children, as well as kerosene to heat their classrooms. Opening police stations and girls' schools on the mean streets of Ramadi may not appear to be great victories to the critics of this war. But they are precisely the kind of events that need to happen countless times for the U.S. to claim victory in Iraq. Major Scott Kish, who leads the Civil Affairs Group attached to 1st Battalion 6th Marines, notes that these actions "spawn success" because they "encourage Iraqis to take charge of their own destiny." Getting the people of Iraq to take charge of their own destiny hasn't been easy. Though the Iraqi people voted in overwhelming numbers in last December's national elections, no one in Mesopotamia – other than exiles who have returned since Saddam's demise – has experienced living in a democracy. Western institutions of civil governance and discourse are as unfamiliar to the people here as the language spoken by their liberators. It has been an especially difficult transition in al Anbar – long a stronghold of Sunni opposition to U.S. forces and more recently, the democratically elected, Shiite-led government in Baghdad.

Page 17 After the all-out, U.S.-led fight for Fallujah in 2004, Ramadi became the home base for Al Qaeda, and the call to civil war. Everyone here – Americans, Iraqis and foreign-supported terrorists – know that if Ramadi can be secured, half the battle for the future of Iraq will have been won. Despite reports in the U.S. media to the contrary – the week we arrived in Ramadi a Washington Post headline blared, "Anbar Picture Grows Clearer, and Bleaker" – the war here is being won. A predominantly Shia Army and the Sunni police now man a Joint Coordination Center with their U.S. Army and Marine counterparts. Terrorists who once engaged in hours-long gunfights with U.S. units have been reduced to planting improvised explosive devices – IEDs – and occasional sniper, rocket and mortar attacks. Ramadi is still a dangerous place but less so today than in any of our five previous trips to this city. The Iraqis and Americans working together in Ramadi have no doubt that they can prevail in this fight. But privately, they wonder if Baghdad and Washington have that same vision. One U.S. officer told me, "the Iraqi security forces have plenty of courage but some of their troops and cops out here haven’t been paid for three months. Their problems are getting beans, bullets, band-aids and bucks from Baghdad." Helping the Iraqis overcome those "five Bs" must become a priority for Washington. Brave young American riflemen have shown the Iraqis how to fight and protect civilians. Now the civil leadership in Baghdad needs to be shown how to keep their own troops fed, equipped and paid. Only then can U.S. troops be sure that they really are winning. Table of Contents

Intelligence and Information Operations (I2O) By Robert David Steele (Vivas), Monograph submitted to the 2006 Army IO Writing Contest ABSTRACT: Intelligence & Information Operations (I2O) with its foundation, Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) will demand 80% of any leader’s time henceforth. 80% of the relevant information will not be secret, online, in English, or available from the secret Intelligence Community. At the strategic level, I2O is about understanding the costs of the ten threats, the savings that can be achieved by the twelve policies, and the profits available to our Common Humanity if we help the eight challengers avoid our many mistakes. At the operational level, the next wars will not be won if we allow our selves to blur the lines between outright Lies, Propaganda or Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and Public Relations (PR) Only truth rapidly discovered, discriminated, distilled, and disseminated, will re-capture and retain the moral high ground and win World War III. This is a 100-year six-front war of belief systems at the sub-state level, waged via global coverage, real-time sense-making, and ”by name” targeting. Significantly, the socio-economics and the ideo-demographics of I2O are dramatically different from the Cold War era—bureaucrats with clearances are devalued, while citizen volunteers and international observers and experts render contributions here-to-fore impossible to access or integrate. Most of these contributions are free of cost, while creating socio-economic wealth vastly more valuable than the for-fee services of traditional vendors. I2O is means by which we save the Whole Earth. Download the complete document at http://www.oss.net/dynamaster/file_archive/061130/34232471b9ba7ed631b29cc4b607bccd/I2O %20Post-Acceptance%203.8.doc Table of Contents

The Information Front By Bill Roggio, Raw Story, December 15, 2006 Insurgent TV angers Iraqi soldiers and translators, but the information it provides may be too valuable for the US to cut off

Page 18 The information front is perhaps the most vital in what military planners now call the Long War (formerly known as the Global War on Terrorism.) It is also one on which the West is perceived as losing. As Coalition forces and the United States' Middle Eastern allies face insurgents and shadowy transnational terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere, the battle for hearts and minds is being fought on the Internet, print, cable and satellite television, and other forms of media. In Iraq, the al-Zawraa satellite television network is broadcasting insurgent propaganda 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Al-Zawraa Television was set up by Mishan al-Jabouri, a former member of the Iraqi parliament and leader of the Sunni Arab Front for Reconciliation and Liberation. Al-Jabouri is believed to have fled to Syria after being charged with corruption for embezzling government funds and with purportedly supporting al-Qaeda. An ongoing controversy exists over the network's current sponsorship. Is al-Zawraa supported by the Islamic Army in Iraq, a Baathist dominated insurgent group, or by al-Qaeda in Iraq's Mujahideen Shura Council? The distinction may be meaningless, as the two organizations have reportedly worked together in the past to conduct terrorist attacks throughout the country against Iraqi and Coalition security forces. The broadcast source of the al-Zawraa network is said to be unknown, but the Egyptian-owned Nielsat satellite network currently broadcasts the mujahideen propaganda on channel 106. Nielsat's coverage area includes the whole of the Middle East and Northern Africa. While spending time with the Military Transition Team at the Fallujah Government Center, I watched al-Zawraa along with two soldiers from the Iraqi Army, sergeants Riad and Abul Zuhrih, and two Iraqi translators, "Nick" and "Wilson." The soldiers are seasoned veterans from the 1st Iraqi Army Division and have served throughout Iraq. The interpreters (or "‘terps") must use assumed names, as they are subjected to persistent death threats. Wilson, who is from Baghdad, claims that he has had three attempts on his life. They shared with me their views on the propaganda in the al-Zawraa broadcast and its effects on the Iraqi people, describing the meaning of the images, music and voice-overs. Anti-Shia, anti-Iranian and anti-US messages Al-Zawraa has a strong anti-Shia message. The channel portrays "Sunnis fighting the occupation while Shiites do nothing." The programming, according to Sergeant Abul Zuhrih, "promotes a civil war" in the country and "makes the Shia look like Iranian stooges, betrayers of the Iraqi people." Iranian backed Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the Mahdi Army, is just one target of attacks from al- Zawraa. "The station calls Sadr and [his] militia 'gangsters,'" explained Wilson. According to both of the interpreters, "the news scroll promotes the Islamic Army of Iraq." The music is nationalist and Baathist in origin, quotes verses from the Koran, and does not contain traditional al-Qaeda or other jihadi music, messages or themes. When asked about the impact of al-Zawraa on the Iraqi people, the Iraqi soldiers and interpreters agreed al-Zawraa dispenses "effective [anti-government] propaganda." "Before, the insurgency was mysterious to the Sunnis," explained Nick. "Now it has a real face." On Zawraa, responsibility for the violence in Iraq is squarely placed on the shoulders of the Americans. The images included destroyed mosques, dead women and children, women weeping over the deaths of their families, bloodstained floors, the destruction of U.S. humvees and armored vehicles, and insurgents firing mortars, RPGs, rockets and AK-47s. Attacks from across the country were shown, taking place in Abu Ghraib, Ramadi, Fallujah, Baiji, Baghdad and elsewhere. The "mujahideen" were portrayed as freedom fighters, and were shown going through "boot camp training." Juba, the mythical Iraqi sniper, was featured prominently. The Iraqi soldiers believe he is a composite of multiple snipers.

Page 19 Most of the footage was popular, rehashed videos which are widely distributed on the Internet and in jihadi forums. I recognized many of them. The soldiers were angry at the images before them. "They destroyed my country," said Staff Sergeant Riad. "The muj are ruthless, brutal; but I'm not scared of them." The information dilemma The soldiers believed the "channel exists because of weak Iraqi government" but "no-one can or will shut it down." Although ordered shut down by the Iraqi government soon after Saddam’s conviction, the station has defied the ban and continues to operate undeterred. The soldiers and terps were certain where the broadcast originated. "This starts from Syria," insisted Nick. "We want it shut down." While the Iraqi soldiers and interpreters want al-Zawraa put out of business, members of the U.S. intelligence community disagree. According to a military intelligence officer serving in Iraq, the network provides intelligence officials with information on insurgent activities. When I'd asked senior American military and intelligence sources about shutting down pro-jihadi websites in the past, they expressed the same sentiment. We are left with a major dilemma in the modern age of information warfare. Programs like al- Zawraa provide ready and effective propaganda and recruiting material for the insurgency and terrorist organizations and demoralize both Western and Middle Eastern allies. But the intelligence gleaned from these operations may be too valuable to turn off the tap. Table of Contents

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