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What drives indigenous corporations in the developing world to engage in CSR as a management strategy? Case study of the sugarcane and ethanol industry in the Cauca Valley, Colombia
Isabella Mariño Rivera
August, 2010 CONTENTS
I. Introduction
II. Conceptualising CSR
III. Case study of the sugarcane and ethanol industry in the Cauca Valley, Colombia
1. Social, economic and political context of the industry
a. Characterization of the industry and its socioeconomic impact on the region
b. Labour conditions of the workers in the industry
c. 2005 and 2008 strikes and the political context of the sector
2. History of CSR in the sector
a. From corporate social awareness to corporate responsibility
b. Moving forwards: regional and enterprise-based efforts to achieve corporate citizenship
i. The Regional System of CSR and the Global Compact
ii. Riopaila-Castilla S.A. and Manuelita S.A.
iii. Asocaña and the certification process with Better Sugarcane Initiative
IV. Discussion
1. The “CSR System” in the sugarcane industry
2. Key drivers of CSR management strategies
V. Conclusions
2 “There can not exist a “healthy” corporation in a “sick” society” Manuel Carvajal
I. Introduction
Within the context of globalization, factors such as privatization, capital mobilization, private foreign investment flow and trade liberalization have propelled non-state actors like corporations towards great prominence (Koenig-Archibugi, 2005). In the world today, 51 of the 1000 largest economies are business enterprises, while only 49 are countries (Anderson & Cavanagh, 2000). Hence, there has been a paradigm shift: today firms are essential to the development and protection of Human Rights (HR), and are expected to act as necessary partners to governments and international organizations in their promotion and respect (IBLF, 2005).
Nevertheless, corporations are not legally compelled to act under guidelines of the United Nations (UN) HR framework. This in turn, alongside globalization, has created a governance gap in enabling a permissive environment for wrongful acts by companies without proper sanctioning or reparation. To this day, International HR Law has not been able to cope with the challenge of overcoming its state-centric approach and the private-public divide built under the Westphalia system (Alston, 2005).
Hence, the main objectives of the Business and HR predicament lie in tackling theses deficiencies in the global order. The corporate HR movement has debated between advocating for voluntary or regulatory regimes, differentiating between corporate “responsibility” and “accountability” (Clapham, 2006)1. Amidst this discussion, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has evolved as a tool of the voluntary regime, based on the
1 There is a current debate between voluntary and regulatory initiatives to control corporate activity. For further reading see: International Council on HR Policy (2002); Chandler (2003); Van der Putten (2003); Koenig-Archibugi (2005), Villiers, (2005) Weissbrodt & Kruger (2005); McLeay (2006) and Corkin (2008).
3 assumption that HR is part of the taxonomy2 of business responsibilities (Blowfield & Murray, 2008).
Although CSR policies are supposedly adopted in a voluntary manner, the reality is private businesses are in the centre of a “System of CSR Promotion and Advocacy”, determined by a number of drivers, pressures and incentives, shaped by diverse sources and actors (Haslam, 2004). Hence, the business case3 for CSR differs between developed countries and emerging economies; the current corporate responsibility priorities of Latin American companies are different to their United States or European counterparts (Ethical Corporation, 2005). Drivers of CSR engagement are one of the key elements that differentiate emerging economies from the developing world. Thus, identifying these differences contributes to the HR movement in two ways: by determining the pressure points where the CSR agenda can be better moved forward in developing countries aiming to close the implementation gap between standard setting and compliance, and by shaping the characteristics of the CSR agenda to local needs. Given that literature on business and HR has focused mostly on finding ways to strengthen regulatory schemes, this research intents to contribute to the other side of the debate, seeking to strengthen the voluntary regime in regards to a particular group of corporations: enterprises originated and based on developing countries, particularly Latin America.
Moreover, operations by indigenous firms4 in developing countries5
2 Blowfield and Murray (2008) define the “taxonomy” of business responsibilities as “the multitude of ways in which business impacts upon, and is affected by, the rest of society (…) this differs according to the type of company, the moment in history, the nature of the industry, and the geopolitical context”. 3 What is meant by “the business case” is the demonstration that there is a positive correlation between CSR and business performance, increasing the likelihood that CSR practices will be adopted (Blowfield & Murray, 2008). 4 “Indigenous corporations” in this paper will refer to large, medium and small enterprises with a local origin, in contrast to TNC that are home-based in developed countries, but operate in emerging economic contexts. 5 Acknowledging the contested nature of the classification of countries as “developed” or “developing”, the term will be used here in reference to nations that according to the World Bank´s country classification correspond to low-income and middle-income countries. Terms such as “global south” and “emerging economies” will also be used in this sense. For the complete classification, go to: http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications (Accessed 26 July 2010).
4 unfold in particular contexts such as rapidly expanding economies, regardless of constituting the scenery where social and environmental crises are more intensely felt due to globalization. Hence, these settings denote distinctive challenges when compared to those faced in the developed world, particularly due to the task enterprises are expected to have in triggering development within contexts of scarcity (Jeppesen, 2006). The later is particularly relevant in Latin America, where 128 million people live on less than two dollars a day and governments face impediments to fulfil socio-economic and environmental needs (Peinado-Vara, 2006).
Therefore, this research aims to shed light on why indigenous third world country corporations uptake CSR policies. CSR in developing countries is a new research field emerging as enterprises in the global south are increasingly concerned with the social and environmental impact of their operations (Lund-Thomsen et al, 2006). Until today, studies on the matter have focused for the most part on the relationship between indigenous business and transnational corporations (TNCs) or the role of CSR in international development, mostly from a normative perspective (Jeppesen, 2006)6. Moreover, Latin America has been widely excluded of this incipient progress in English speaking publications and no country-based study has been carried-out on Colombia.
However, the few papers published on the subject can be said to conclude: i) external drivers such as international standardization, investment incentives, market access and supply chain imposition by TNCs are significant in fostering CSR practices in the region; ii) cultural tradition and corporate philanthropy are the most important internal driver, based on ethical and religious components; and iii) the role of civil society and governments in shaping CSR is scarce7.
6 In this regard, see: Blowfield & Frynas (2005) and the special issues on CSR and development that have been published by the Journal of Corporate Citizenship (issue 24, 2006), International Affairs (issue 81 (3), 2005), and Development (issue 47 (3), 2004). 7 In this regard, see: Baskin (2006), Muro (2006) Peinado-Vara (2006), Vives (2006), Wyzig (2006), Vives (2005), Correa (2004), Gutiérrez & Jones (2004), Haslam (2004), and Barret (2002).
5 Hence, this research was specifically undertaken to test the aforementioned claims. It follows the case-study methodology analysing the case of the sugarcane and ethanol industry in the Cauca Valley. Empirical data was gathered from 22 semi-structured in depth interviews conducted in Cali, Colombia with executives from Manuelita S.A., Caicedo Gonzales Foundation (CGF), National Association of Sugarcane Growers (Asocaña), workers from the plantations, and academics that have written on the sector and the social problems that surround it. The interview data was complemented by a review of relevant literature and documentary evidence; documents such as internal organizational policies, academic publications and newspaper articles were also gathered. Research for academic publications was done in three local universities: two that are business- focused institutions (Universidad Javeriana de Cali, Universidad ICESI), and a third one that takes highly critical positions against the sector (Universidad del Valle).
The paper will first introduce a theoretical framework on CSR (II); after which the case study of the sugarcane and ethanol industry in the Cauca Valley is presented (III). Furthermore the paper discusses the case study concluding that internal social and political circumstances are more determinant than external drivers for corporations to engage in CSR strategies (IV), and ends suggesting the need for contextual analysis and implementation of CSR strategies, proposing new avenues of research on the topic (IV).
II. Conceptualising CSR
A brief explanation will be made on the concepts of CSR. On one hand, for the purpose of this paper CSR should be understood to mean:
6 “The practices that are part of the corporate strategy which complement and support the main business activities, explicitly seek to avoid damage and promote the well-being of stakeholders by complying with the law and voluntarily going beyond it”. Stakeholders in this case include clients, suppliers, employees, community, government and the environment” (Peinado-Vara, 2006).
A second point that needs to be clarified is that “contemporary” CSR management is a function of strategic planning including fours elements: 1) building effective relationships with its stakeholders under the understanding that the firm is an organisation embedded in a complex web of relationships and an integral part of society; 2) it has a clear purpose; 3) a strategy must be put in place; and 4) adequate systems and processes are created (Blowfield & Murray, 2008).
Additionally, the levels of engagement a company has to CSR policies can be expressed as a continuum, described in the following stages; 1) “corporate social awareness”, when a corporation is gradually understanding the extent of its stakeholders and invests in episodic philanthropic initiatives through foundations; 2) “corporate social responsibility”, when initiatives link corporate decisions to ethical values and acknowledge stakeholders; 3) “corporate social involvement”, meaning the corporation moves away from its advocacy role, and starts making strategic alliances with NGOs and governmental agencies to make changes. Nevertheless, these activities have not yet been included in the management process; and 4) “corporate citizenship”, when CSR is part of the business norms and strategies. Hence, the company as a whole assumes a leadership role promoting cross-sectorial cooperation and discloses what it is doing on the area (Barnett, 2002). Although it is difficult to determine when a company is “socially responsible”, the corporations vision, mission, strategic drive, structure management of concerns, and stakeholder relationships and reporting will be the criteria observed to establish the level of engagement a company has in modern CSR practices (Blowfield & Murray, 2008).
7 Finally, this paper will base its analysis and discussion chapters on two analytical frameworks: Haslam´s “CSR System” for Latin America, and Visser ´s classification of drivers for CSR in developing countries.
Haslam´s “System of CSR Promotion and Advocacy” theorizes the key actors, relationships and influences on the development of CSR in the region. As every other publication on the topic, it argues that considerable impetus behind the promotion of CSR comes from foreign demands, particularly from private foundations, multilateral agencies, and TNCs. It describes a set of interactions that occur between three levels: the national (where the company is located), the home country (which applies only if the firm has links to TNCs), and the international system. Figure 1 represents these relationships, with larger arrows indicating greater pressure and influence (Haslam, 2004).
Figure 1: CSR System in Latin America Source: Haslam, 2004
On the other hand, Visser´s framework describes a set of drivers, making a distinction between internal and external, the former defined as pressures within the country, while the later having a global origin. Amongst internal drivers, Visser includes: a) cultural tradition, understood as philanthropic
8 business ethics and community rooted practices, b) political reforms, offering the example of how political transformation in Latin America since the 1980s have shifted the role of business towards greater responsibility for social and environmental issues; c) economic priorities in the environment in which firms operate; d) governance gaps as a consequence of weak governments that fail to provide adequate social services; e) crisis response, represented in catastrophic events, for example; and f) market access, conceiving CSR as an enabler for companies in emerging economies to access markets in the developed world.
Moreover, Visser characterises external drivers as: a) international standardization, some of which are imposed by multinationals striving to achieve global consistency among its subsidiaries and operations in developing countries (Baskin, 2006); b) investment incentives, given that CSR is serving as a signalling device for developing countries aiming to assess foreign investment proposals; c) stakeholder activism by groups such as development agencies, trade unions, international NGOs and business associations, local NGOs supported by global networks, and the media; and d) supply chain, conceived as the pressure set upon small and medium-sized companies as part of the supply chains of multinationals. A good example of this is the ethical trading initiative. Visser´s proposal is observed in Figure 2.
INTERNAL DRIVERS
Political reform Crisis response Cultural tradition
CulturaS Governance gaps Socio-economic priorities Market access meT grrt Tr International standardization Supply Chain 9 Investment incentives Stakeholder activism
EXTERNAL DRIVERS
EXTERNAL DRIVERS INTERNAL DRIVERS
Political reform Crisis response Cultural tradition
CulturaS Governance gaps Socio-economic priorities Market access meT grrt Tr International standardization Supply Chain
Investment incentives Stakeholder activism
EXTERNAL DRIVERS
EXTERNAL DRIVERS
Figure 2: Drivers of CSR in developing countries Source: Visser, 2008
Hence, the following case study aims to assess the aforementioned frameworks, analysing the detailed socio-economic and political context and the development of CSR practices in the Cauca Valley in Colombia.
III. Case study of the sugarcane and ethanol industry in the Cauca Valley, Colombia
1. Social, economic and political context of the industry
a. Characterization of the industry and its socioeconomic impact on the region
The Cauca Valley is one of the most prosperous regions in Colombia particularly since the midst of the XX century. Its economy contributes to 11% of national gross domestic product (GDP), and according to the Report of the UN Development Program (UNDP) published on the region in 2008, the Human Development Index is of 0.80, national second highest. Nevertheless, as in the rest of the country the social inequalities remain high, with a Gini coefficient of 0,51 (PNUD, 2008).
10 There are five strategic economic activities: fruit pulps, maquila, health services, logistic services, and sugar production. The later accounts for 6% GDP in the region (Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2004). The production of sugar began with Manuelita in 1864, expanding between 1920- 1940 when other twelve sugar mills began operating; particularly Riopaila- Castilla (Riopaila) which was founded in 1925. In 1959 the Sugarcane Growers' Association (Asocaña) was created under the purpose of promoting, maintaining and improving the conditions of private enterprises in the sugar sector. That same year the production expanded internationally, when United States closed its markets with Cuba, and Colombia entered the International Sugar Organization (Ramos, 2005). A second boom of sugar export developed in the 1990s as a consequence of economic liberalism policies that aimed to export agricultural products considered internationally competitive. A further step in the industry was taken in 2002 when Colombia’s ethanol program was put in place, grounded on law 693/01 that mandates a mix of 10% bio fuel with regular gasoline. Hence, when the law went into effect in 2005, sugarcane based ethanol production began in 5 mills, aiming to supply the demand on cities with more than 500, 000 inhabitants. In summary, the sugar business today is a cluster composed of 13 mills, food and beverage companies, alcohol and liquor producers, energy plants, sucrochemical corporations and soda companies, amongst others (Dueñas et al, 2007).
The socioeconomic impact of the industry is fundamental in the lives of inhabitants of the Cauca Valley: 21 towns in the region live out of growing and harvesting sugarcane, it employees 5, 809 direct workers, and 87, 978 workers along its supply chain (Arbeláez, 2010). The industry has the greatest impact on the families of the 12, 000 workers involved in the manual harvesting of sugarcane (“sugarcane workers”, “workers” or “corteros”). For the most part, Afro-Colombians and indigenous population constitute these communities, much of whom have migrated due to the levels of violence in the Pacific Region, are not educated, live under extreme conditions of poverty, and know of sugarcane harvesting as their only economic source. As an example, only 38% of a group of 817 randomly surveyed corteros know how to read (Asocaña, 2009).
11 The sugarcane industry transformed throughout international and domestic economic crisis, particularly by mid-1990s when the economy slowed and by 1999 the country fell into its first recession since 1929. This was a drawback for the industry at that time, producing sugar five times more expensive than the average international price (Lemus, 2010). After some years Colombia overcame the crisis, positioning as the 10th exporter of sugar amongst 80 countries, Brazil being the first producer and exporter in the world (Arbeláez, 2010). However, the industry is in need of moving onwards to become sustainable and more competitive. Mechanizing the harvesting process is a necessary step for two reasons: reducing the costs of production and being environmentally responsible. Currently, Colombia pays the highest price in the world for manual harvesting, having mechanized only 10% of its production, loosing competitiveness against Brazil (Asocaña, 2008). Additionally, in the process of hand harvesting the field needs to be set on fire, producing ash which has devastating effects on neighbouring populations and the environment (Dávalos, 2007). Nevertheless, the course of action of mechanizing has been slowed down by the industry due to the social impact it would have on the economy of the region (Jaramillo, 2010).
b. Labour conditions of workers in the industry
Out of the total number of workers of the industry, 31% are employed directly by the companies, 23% are hired by sugarcane growers to work at the plantation fields, 11% are hired by independent contractors for various tasks, and 33% are corteros subcontracted through associated labour cooperatives (cooperatives).
Sugarcane workers were not always hired through cooperatives. They were traditionally employed under a paternalistic scheme, and the industry embraced them almost as family members. The process of “flexibilizing” labour standards began in the mid 1990s as a response to the challenges of globalization and the economic crisis at that time in Latin America, caused by
12 economic liberalization At that point in time, the industry had two choices in order to subsist: either become more productive or reduce its costs of production, choosing the later (Ortiz, 2007).
Consequently, in the mid 1990 sugarcane workers were hired through contractors, compelled to constitute associative working enterprises (in Spanish, empresas asociativas de trabajo), and in 2002 the legal figure of cooperatives was introduced by the national government to incentive labour flexibilization in the aftermath of the economic crisis, hoping to bring down the unemployment figure (Castaño, 2008). The expansion of this phenomenon was observed particularly as the next century moved in, when cooperatives associating sugarcane workers increased from 17 in 2002 to 82 in the next three years. Until 2005, cooperatives were not even administered directly by the workers, but by the same contractors that used to outsource their services in the past (Urrea, 2007).
The consequences of outsourcing the services of sugarcane workers meant a 9% reduction in the cost of sugar production since the company was no longer compelled to pay for its workers pension, healthcare and other benefits (Salazar, 2010). Nevertheless, for the workforce this lead to a great loss on many fronts: on the one hand they had to assume their new role as entrepreneurs, finding themselves administering the cooperatives with neither education nor knowledge on the subject (Gómez, 2010). Additionally, their income was reduces, although the industry has contested this claim (Arbeláez, 2010). Finally, this process affected the trade union movement and the workers´ capacity to bargain in favour of their conditions, since they are no longer employees of the companies and thus lost their legal right to take part in trade union activities (Urrea, 2007).
c. 2005 and 2008 strikes and the political context of the sector
13 The sector’s political background has evolved in past years, mainly due to the production of ethanol as part of the core business of 5 of the 13 plantations in the region, allowing novel stakeholders to arrive on the scene.
A historic actor within the political context of the industry are trade unions; most companies in the sector have dealt with the presence of two types: Sintracañaizucol, affiliated to the politically driven left-winged federation Central Union of Workers (CUT), and Sintracañabal, affiliated to the Confederation of Workers of Colombia (CTC), characterized as a business- union. Both federations are affiliated to the International Trade Union Organization (ITUC), and have a protracted history in Colombian trade union movement. The number of members of Sintracañaizucol has been heavily diminished due to the process of contracting out sugarcane workers. Hence, the leading union in the industry today is Sintracañabal (Aricapa, 2006).
Although some scholars argue the industry has greatly manipulated unions in its favour (Caicedo, 1982), heavy strikes have determined the labour relations. Two strikes to remember were the ones in 1974 and 1976 in Riopaila plantation, both of which are kept in the collective memory of workers (Lemus, 2010). Nevertheless, the most significant events that shape the current political context of the industry were lived in 2005 and 2008.
In 2005 the grievances workers had accumulated for years erupted in the shape of isolated strikes in five of the plantations. Lasting only a few days and with little coverage from the media (El Tiempo, 2005), workers demanded better pay, shorter working hours, better housing and educational facilities for them and their families, and a formal work contract with labour and union rights, a claim that could not be fulfilled by enterprises due to financial circumstances of the business. The settlement achieved between companies and workers abolished the contractors and the corteros were allowed to run cooperatives by themselves (Aricapa, 2006). A second consequence of the strike was the foundation of Sinalcorteros, an industry union affiliated to the CUT, which started gaining political power due to its alliance with political
14 leaders in the region (Mancilla, 2010). Unlike this, the reaction of the industry to the strike was anything but strategic: every form of dialogue between companies and their workers was destroyed, no grievance solving- mechanism was left standing (Gómez, 2010) and the mechanization process was accelerated (Muñoz, 2010).
Evidently grievances amongst workers grew to the point of causing a general 54 day-strike in 2008 of over 19, 000 corteros, causing economic losses of about US 1700, 000 for the industry as well as a social crisis in 12 cities of the region. The whole economic cluster was boycotted and even the price of gasoline increased in 4.1%. The demands of workers were the same as in 2005: labour contracts, correct weighing and the right price for cane that had been cut, the increase in wages, measures for workers suffering disability due to the working conditions and rights to health, education and housing. This time around however, the drivers behind the strike, the actors engaged, and the consequences for corporations were without precedent (Semana, 2008).
The origins of this strike are grounded on contacts made by Jose Oney Valencia in October 2007 with Alexander López, a congressman of the left- winged party in Colombia, Alternative Democratic Pole. He explains; “we were enthusiastic about meeting a parliamentary who was genuinely interested in our case (…) we are still in touch with him today, he is the only public figure that has created awareness of our working conditions” (Valencia, 2010). On the contrary, for the industry it was clear that politicians and unions were only interested in votes and gaining affiliates, promising a mass of uneducated and vulnerable workers unachievable aims like a formal work contract (Salazar, 2010).
The 14 of June 2008, a HR NGO called “Corporación Humanidad Maestra Vida” organized a public hearing in the town of Pradera, where both HR and environmentalist activitists gathered, the former to demand improvement in the working conditions of corteros, the later campaigning against the production of ethanol in the context of the global food crisis. At
15 that time, Senator López was the President of the HR Commission in Congress and a few of his party-colleagues were present that same day (Ecoportal.net, 2008). One month later, Sinaltrainal, Sinalcorteros and the CUT presented a list of bidding terms and conditions to Asocaña, that refused to sit and negotiate the list of claims arguing that sugar refineries had not entrusted them with the function of engaging in collective bargaining on their behalf. Further on, September the 5th workers marched to Cali, capital city of the Cauca Valley, claiming they were “replaced by machines” (El Tiempo, 2008), after which the movement blocked the entrance to some of the plantations, causing violent confrontations with the police on the 25 of September (El Tiempo, 2008). On October 1st, wives and children of the workers also marched to Cali and various left-winged political leaders contributed to the cause by providing food and basic supplies to the workers and their families. The press informed the Venezuelan Government of Hugo Chávez was funding some of the aid (El Tiempo 2008), and Government officials publicly claimed that “dark” forces were manipulating the workers, clearly making reference to left-winged guerrilla groups (ILO, 2009).
Settlements between workers and the industry were achieved in November that same year. Compared to 2005, the power and support for the worker’s cause had changed: while in 2005 the strike was hardly covered by the press, in 2008 the strike was centre-stage in the media, new stakeholders were engaged, resulting in unexpected domestic and international consequences for the workers movement and the industry. Hence, the struggle of the corteros can be described as a meeting point for many key concerns of diverse social movements in Colombia: anti-capitalist fighting against the sugarcane oligopoly, class struggle, fighting a business owned and run by few traditional families in the region, inequalities due to the unfair distribution of land, racial tensions given that sugarcane workers are mostly indigenous and afro, and the struggle for vindicating labour, human and environmental rights.
As a conclusion on this chapter, it is important to emphasize three main consequences the 2008 strike brought for workers, the Colombian
16 government and the industry. Foremost, the workers were empowered as a social movement allowing the strengthening of their union. The leaders of the strike founded the “14 June Movement”, in commemoration of the 14 June 2008 when the public hearing to inform of their claims was held (Valencia, 2010). Furthermore, Sinalcorteros expanded from 870 members to 3 thousand affiliates in the aftermath of the strike. Finally, the National Union of Food Industry Workers (Sinaltrainal) engaged in the struggle. Known for filing a lawsuit in 2001 in a Miami district court against Coca-Cola for the murder of several union members (Business and HR, 2010), Sinaltrainal sent a complaint to the International Labour Organization (ILO) in September 2008, alleging the violation of the right of personal freedom due to the violent repression of the strike by the public authorities of the work stoppage, and the refusal of Asocaña and the companies to negotiate the list of claims presented by the trade unions. Thus, in Case no. 2668 the Committee on Freedom of Association of the ILO analyzed the use of excess of power by public authorities, and requested the Colombian government to “ensure that Sinaltrainal is able to engage in collective bargaining at least on behalf of its members and asks the Government to keep it informed in this respect” (ILO, 2009).
Finally, the strike raised the attention of key international actors and stakeholders. The “Global Labour Movement” including the ITUC, the American Federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), the Canadian Labour Congress, and the European Parliament sent letters to the Colombian Government supporting the worker’s demands (The Canada-Colombia Project, 2008). All of the above are crucial actors for national interests, due to their advocacy against the negotiations of free-trade agreements with Colombia.
2. History of CSR in the sector
17 In resemblance to the global trend, corporations in Colombia engage in CSR policies on a voluntary basis. According to surveys made by the National Association of Industries (ANDI) between 2003 and 2008, corporations in Colombia invested an average of 2.8 of their profits on what they characterize as CSR. Although 61% of this amount was destined to financial donations, by the year 2008 64.5% of the 210 medium and big enterprises assessed had a CSR strategy, 27.6% had signed-up to the Global Compact, and 59% aimed their activities towards achieving Millennium Development Goals (MDG) (ANDI, 2009). Despite these accomplishments, there is still a long way to go to build corporate citizenship. The aim of this section is to describe the process the industry in the Cauca Valle has gone through to engage in CSR as a management strategy, focusing on the sugarcane sector, and analysing the CSR programs of the most committed enterprises: Manuelita S.A. (Manuelita) and Riopaila & Castilla S.A. (Riopaila).
a. From corporate social awareness to corporate responsibility
Philanthropy and community investment have been a tradition in the agricultural business in the region since mid XIX century (Laverde, 2005). A diagnose of regional CSR patterns carried out by ANDI on 135 corporations, proved that by 2005 these firms used philanthropy and CSR as interchangeable terms, their key stakeholders were both the community and their employees, and an average of 62.2% of the funds directed to financial donations were destined to education projects. The main flaws in their policies were the lack of strategic direction in their programs: only 46% of the enterprises had concrete goals and reports on progress, there was a critical distance between business and government agencies at local and national level, hence few alliances had been achieved. Moreover, in most cases corporations had not mapped the impact of community investments (Paz & Benítez, 2007).
The development of CSR in the sugarcane sector is a good representation of this trend. At the time when sugar refineries were growing in
18 the region, there was insufficient presence of government agencies, hence corporations in alliance with the Catholic Church had to provide their communities and employees with health services and education (Lemus, 2010). Riopaila trained their workers in technical skills to supply the mills with human resources, and Manuelita S.A. contributed by funding housing projects and building recreational centres. Nevertheless, this scheme was paternalistic and made workers dependent of the industry, rather than promoting self- sufficiency and free will amongst the corteros (Jaramillo, 2010).
However, social foundations have played a very important role in the progress of CSR in the sector. In 1957, Riopaila founded Caicedo Gonzalez Foundation (CGF) grounded on the Christian spirit of charity. Its chief executive officer characterizes the period between 1957 and 1989 as “Philanthropic”, what Barret would classify in the continuum as “corporate social awareness” (Fundación Caicedo González, 2010). A second phase developed between 1989 and 2000, triggered by external pressures of the community and the workers due to the crisis of the sector in the 1990s and the process of labour flexibilization. Thus, the Foundation worked closely with the corteros to find them other sources of income, creating the so-called “Program of Applied CSR”. Nevertheless, this step was not taken by Manuelita neither by other companies in the sector, which mistakenly conducted their flexibilization processes without diagnosing the impact it would have on the workers or the community (Montoya, 2010).
b. Moving forwards: regional and enterprise-based efforts to achieve corporate citizenship
The first decade of XXI century was significant for the development of CSR as a management strategy in the region. First, the innovative “Regional System of CSR” was designed and set to work, and Manuelita and Riopaila both structured proper CSR management systems defined by a targeted strategy, proper stakeholder engagement, construction of tactical alliances, standard implementation, certification and reporting.
19 i) The Regional System of CSR and the Global Compact
The Social Committee of the ANDI conformed by social foundations (amongst them CGF) began working in March 2002, aiming to gather efforts in order to address the most urgent social needs in the region. Their initial task was to engage industries of the economic cluster in the process of constituting a Regional System of CSR. By 2003 they had designed a plan with the purpose of enhancing the social commitment of the private sector with the society at large. The first three goals achieved were the design of “The Colombian Guidelines to CSR”, the identification of public and private scenarios were they could contribute and the diagnose of CSR practices in the region in 2003 and 2005 (ANDI, 2009b). After a process of 6 years of consultancies, training and creating awareness on the subject the next step was taken, and the pilot project began with 23 mid-large companies of every sector engaged in structuring CSR programs as management strategies (Riopaila and Manuelita were the only sugar refineries initially involved). This second phase is currently being financed and coordinated by COMFANDI, the main Family Compensation Fund in the region, expecting to engage 100 corporations in this initiative and looking forward to create alliances with strategic stakeholders.
By the end of year 2008 the Committee of CEOs of Enterprises Working for a Socially Responsible Region was put into place. This new institution aims to “Align, strengthen and support public and business strategies aiming to achieve the MDG and UNDP policy recommendations for the region”. In 2009 the corporations represented in the Committee made official their commitment to the process by joining the UN Global Compact (GC)8 (Sistema Regional de Responsabilidad Social, 2009). Until today, 5 out of the 13 sugar refineries in the region have adhered to the GC (Manuelita, Riopaila, Maria Luisa, Pichihí and Mayagüez).
8 The UN Global Compact is defined as “a strategic policy initiative for businesses that are committed to aligning their operations and strategies with ten universally accepted principles in the areas of HR, labour, environment and anti-corruption” (UN Global Compact, 2010).
20 The terms of the adherence to the GC were contested amongst the aforementioned corporations due to Principle 3, which states that; “Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining”. Given the recent strike in the sugarcane sector, the signatory corporations adhered to the GC interpreting the aforesaid wording (Garrido, 2010). Consequently, there were opposed reactions to the adherence: while executives expressed this was the first time they came close to HR normative and thought of this process as an opportunity to comply with such standards (Vélez, 2010), interviewees from social foundations communicated their concern for the “instrumental” use of the GC logo as a “green washing” strategy (Lemus, 2010), an opinion the academy agreed on (Álvarez, 2010). The fact that the GC was joined by sugar refineries a few months after 2008 strike is a matter of analysis that will be discussed further on.
An additional positive consequence of this process is the leadership the ANDI gained as a promoter of the GC in Colombia. Based in Bogotá, they manage the Colombian focal point in the Latin American network 9, and are advocating constituting a second focal point in Cali (Parra, 2010).
Despite of the regional effort to engage in CSR strategies, each corporation has lead a particular process to achieve this, given specific drivers and interests. The process followed by Riopaila and Manuelita will be described next.
ii) Riopaila-Castilla S.A and Manuelita S.A.
9 GC Local Networks are cluster of participants that get together to advance the GC and its principles within a particular region, aiming to: root the GC within local and cultural-specific contexts, facilitate the progress of implementation of the 10 principles, and create opportunities for multi-stakeholder engagement (UN Global Compact, 2010).
21 Riopaila and Manuelita were chosen to represent the evolution of CSR in the sugarcane sector given their commitment to the region and their communities, but also due to the differences amongst each.
Previous to properly structuring its CSR program, Riopaila had already engaged in elaborating sustainability reports in 2007 and 2008. Nevertheless, it was not until 2008 the corporation followed a detailed consultation process with a Chilean CSR firm, AxisRSE, in the context of the consolidation of the Regional System of CSR. In 2009 they published their third sustainability report following Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI) standards and introduced their newly designed strategy of CSR. The mission of the corporation was defined as “Being perceived by our stakeholders as the most socially responsible agro industrial enterprise in Colombia”. The business charter of values can be summarized in its commitment to ethics, and the respect and promotion of HR, and as of stakeholder identification, the consultancy carried- out identified both the internal (employees, cooperative-affiliates and shareholders) and external (customers, suppliers, the community and the government) stakeholders. The adherence to the GC was significant for Riopaila, committing to inform their 2010 sustainability report on their level of compliance to the 10 principles (Fundación Caicedo González, 2010).
Due to the nature of their business, Riopaila acknowledges the importance of their relationship with the community and the corteros, prioritizing these stakeholders in the social component of their CSR program. Hence, it was only until 2009 that the contribution of the CFG was articulated in the CSR management structure. The CFG has two main schemes responding to this group: strategic social investment focusing on education, housing and income-improvement for the corteros; and financial donations, focused on short-term benefits and responding to immediate demands, in the area of education, heath, leisure and well-being of their employees (Fundación Caicedo González, 2010).
The Chief Executive Officer of CGF explains the process to consolidate their CSR strategy:
22 “Although the foundation had informed the company of the relevance of structuring proper policies that targeted the needs of specific stakeholders, it was not until the strike in 2005 that executives became aware of the importance of engaging with both workers and community in a planned manner. The recognition of workers and employees in this industry has always been a consequence of social demands. This sector has always acted reactively to external drivers” (Lemus, 2010).
In regards to the adherence to the GC she explains the industry had discussed the subject since 2007 when the GC was introduced in Colombia. Nevertheless, “it was only after the 2008 strike and the unexpected negative consequences it brought for the industry that we joined the Global Compact. The claim sent to the ILO arguing the industry violated union rights also triggered the adherence” (Lemus, 2010).
The story of Manuelita is slightly different. On one hand, there was no actor playing the role the CGF had in Riopaila and during the labour flexibilization process. Hence, workers, their families and the community were no longer targeted in their policies due to the fear of lawsuits claiming the existence of a labour relationship between former employees and the company (Montoya, 2010). Therefore, while the CGF built a program to accompany the corteros in the outsourcing process, Manuelita deliberately “abandoned” this key stakeholder at that time.
Additionally, given the diversification of the business to other products such as shrimps, mussels and palm oil, as well as the expansion of sugar production to ventures in Peru and Brazil, in 2005 the enterprise was structured into a holding company named Manuelita Investments S.A. (IMSA). Since then, business decisions are determined by the internationalized holding and not directly by the sugar refinery. According to the former Human Resource Director, the business started to acknowledge the importance of dealing strategically with its surroundings in 2006 after the 2005 strike, “particularly given that our raw material is growing in 25, 000 hectares
23 inhabited by a lively community” (Salazar, 2010). Nevertheless, until 2008 Manuelita´s CSR strategy was based on a program of random financial investments lacking strategic direction, largely focused on philanthropy (Ocampo, 2010).
In April 2008 a new Chair took over IMSA, bringing renovation to the management strategy, willing to revise the policies on financial donations and CSR. In June that same year Manuelita started a consultancy with “Compartamos”, a Colombian firm specialized in CSR and community engagement. The strategy designed and set to work in 2009 involves only two strategic stakeholders: workers (including cooperative-affiliates) and the community. They are aware that a proper CSR policy should be inclusive of other external stakeholders, but have prioritized the aforementioned mainly due to the negative consequences of 2008 strike on the sector (Montoya, 2010). The structure of their sustainable development program is dived in three main areas: i) The identification and address of unfulfilled basis needs; ii) The generation of alternative income; iii) Environmental leadership. These tasks are in progress due to alliances with Carvajal Foundation and COMFANDI (Salazar, 2010).
Furthermore, Manuelita is preparing its first sustainability report in 2012 following GRI standards. They are aware of the compromise they must fulfil with the GC, and have started working on their first report due at the end of 2010. From the interviews held, it is possible to conclude their executives are less familiarized with the 10 principles of the GC than executives in Riopaila. It is important to mention they are currently auditing their supply chain on labour standards and child labour (Montoya, 2010).
Finally, executives are aware of their mistakes in the past in regards to strategic stakeholders and acknowledge the influence the social mobilization had on the turnout of the CSR policy. The Director of Human Resources from IMSA explains the initiative of designing a proper CSR strategy was prior to the strike, but recognises the events in 2008 triggered the input the top management of the company has put on the projects for both the community
24 and the corteros (Ocampo, 2010). The academy shares this view, acknowledging the contribution the renewed direction of the holding had on this process (Muñoz, 2010).
Hence, it is possible to conclude Riopaila has in place and running a much more structured and comprehensive CSR strategy, while Manuelita is still on its way towards achieving the programs designed, and has not yet developed a sufficiently comprehensive scheme. Nevertheless, in both cases what is relevant is the timing of the process, which by no coincidence overlaps with both 2005 and 2008 strikes.
iii) Asocaña and the certification process with Better Sugarcane Initiative
Asocaña is an additional actor in the system of CSR of the sugarcane sector. Although it does not deal directly with every internal and external stakeholder of the industry, it is responsible for articulating alliances between corporations, and international and governmental agencies in order to advance a challenging social agenda in the region. In 2009 they structured an ambitious CSR policy envisioning results for 2015, expecting to contribute towards: i) Upgrading the quality of life of the community in accordance to the MDG; ii) Making an effective use of resources in the region; iii) Positioning the sugarcane sector as the main driver of development in the Cauca Valley. To achieve this, they aim to focus on 5 strategic actions: i) Adhere to the GC; ii) Tighten-up alliances and generate trust; iii) Education; iv) Strengthen social networks; and v) Respect for the environment (Asocaña, 2008).
The first step accomplished was joining the GC as an association in 2009. Furthermore, the component of their CSR policy regarding social intervention is focused on two MDG: education and poverty reduction, which they are advancing in alliance with various strategic stakeholders. On one hand, their CSR policy is based on a study developed by Universidad Javeriana describing the socioeconomic condition of corteros and their families. Moreover, they are working with the ILO campaigning against child
25 labour in sugarcane plantations and have recently started a project with the UN Office of the High Commissioner of HR (OHCHR) and the governmental agency Acción Social for the return of displaced communities to the Pacific Coast. Additionally, the National Training Service (SENA) is supporting the education component.
Beside the aforementioned initiatives that overlap with efforts lead by individual corporations and COMFANDI, Asocaña is coordinating the certification of 5 sugarcane refineries by Better Sugarcane Initiative (BSI), amongst them Riopaila and Manuelita (Calero, 2010). The driver of that process was the need to access global markets like European countries, given the negotiations and future signature of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and Colombia.
Nevertheless, certification processes are not new for the industry: as suppliers of TNCs such as Cadbury Adams, Coca-Cola and Kraft Foods, both Manuelita and Riopaila have been subject to social auditing (Montoya, 2010). However, achieving a certification by BSI requires demonstrating the production of sugar under the compliance of a global metric standard aimed to reduce social and environmental impacts whilst maintaining or enhancing the economic status of farmers (BSI, 2010), a challenge the industry had not undertaken before.
Hence, this chapter has described the process followed by regional and corporate actors to engage in modern CSR policies. The discussion next intends to connect such evolution with the socio-economic and political context in the Cauca Valley, in order to determine whether; i) external drivers such as international standardization, investment incentives, market access and supply chain imposition by TNCs are significant in fostering CSR practices in the region; ii) cultural tradition and corporate philanthropy are the most important internal drivers, based on ethical and religious components; and iii) the role of civil society and governments in shaping CSR is scarce.
26 IV. Discussion
1. The “CSR System” in the sugarcane industry
In order to determine the drivers of CSR, it is important to introduce the version of Haslam´s CSR System applied to Colombia, particularly based on the present case study. As it will become evident further on, there are wide differences in terms of actors, pressure points and the arrow flow, an indication of the flaws Haslam´s proposal has once it is applied to a particular context. It relevant to recall arrows represent both the direction of influence as much as the relevance of the relation.
Multilateral Organizations (ILO, The International UN) The National Political System system
Asocaña National HR and Government environmental NGOs
ANDI Local firm Trade Unions
COMFANDI Social movements Social and political foundations parties Academic
The Global International NGOs Market TNCs System Global Trade Government Unions Trade Unions
Figure 3: CSR System in the sugarcane industry
The relevance of actors and connections within the system is defined primarily on the national level where there is a four-way relationship between the sugarcane growers association, COMFANDI, ANDI and the corporations, explained by the fact that programs lead by Asocaña, COMFANDI and the firms complement each other. As well, COMFANDI is the head of the
27 Regional System of CSR in the Cauca Valley, being a significant actor for the promotion of CSR in close relationship with ANDI. Hence, the program of CSR in each sugarcane refinery must be understood and analyzed in relation to the initiatives lead by these other organizations.
Furthermore, there are three other sets of actors which pressure the local firm to be socially responsible and have been strategic drivers of the sector’s CSR policy: social foundations (particularly CGF), the academy and the “cluster” of civil society actors represented by HR and environmental NGOs, trade unions and social movements. Although pressure from the academy has been relevant until now due to publications by the Universidad del Valle, it could be strengthened. The Javeriana and ICESI Universities as business- focused institutions have supportive corporations, mediating between the community and the enterprise, contributing to the analysis of the social context. Moreover, trade unions and local NGOs are influenced from outside the national sphere by the support and funding from international NGOs, foreign trade unions like the AFL-CIO and the ITUC.
A first source of external pressure originates in multilateral organizations that advocate in favour of their interests upon Asocaña, which serves as a mediator between national/international public/private expectations. Some of the initiatives funded by multilateral organizations are the ILO program for child labour eradication and the OHCHR program that strives to return corteros to their communities in the Pacific Coast.
Moreover, two additional sources of external pressures determine the engagement of the corporations in CSR policies: indirect demands imposed on the firm due to the pressures from international organisms and governments on the local government, as well as requirements directly enforced by TNCs. On one hand, the Colombian State is pressured by multilateral organizations due to the commitment it has to international agreements, particularly labour treaties enforced by the ILO. Additionally, advocates of labour and HR like the AFL-CIO and the European Parliament pressure both the United States and the European Union to impose standards
28 on the Colombian government in order to sign bilateral agreements. Hence, the government takes measures to comply with such demands by enacting laws and shaping public policies, but also by requiring a socially responsible behaviour from corporations. Nevertheless, the relationship between the national government and the firm is represented in the system by a skeletal arrow due to the fact that the sugarcane and ethanol sector is a priority for the national economy and to this day has received more benefits than impositions from the central government.
The third form of external pressure is imposed directly on the firm by TNCs. In this case, although sugarcane refineries have an arm’s length relationship with TNCs solely as their supplier, the CSR Codes of TNCs are extended to their supply chain, expecting local partners to meet their CSR requirements. Examples of this are the social audits Coca-Cola and Kraft have imposed on Manuelita and Riopaila which are explained by the pressure imposed on them by trade unions such as Sinaltrainal.
Consequently, there are significant differences in the interactions and actors present in the Figure representing the sugarcane sector and Haslam´s original “CSR System”. On one hand, modifications were done in regards to the relations and their flow and even the local/global/international systems were named differently due to the actors present in the local scene. Furthermore, both actors and relations were excluded since they are not present on this particular case study, such as business NGOs and private foundations. In this case, social foundations can be said to have the functions of business NGOs, promoting CSR programs amongst the sector and the region.
Nevertheless, there are some characteristics described in Haslam´s System that are equally identified in this case study. As the diagram shows, there is an important influence of international actors on the national system. The next section will determine if the so-called “external drivers” are the main factors that have triggered the CSR agenda in the sugarcane sector.
29 2. Key drivers of CSR management strategies
The System of CSR designed for this case study is an important tool to visualize the complex web of social, political, economic relationships and interests corporations are embedded in. It also helps determine the drivers present in the industry that have lead corporations to engage in CSR as strategic management policies. Hence, this section aims to present the drivers identified in the case study following Vissers´s classification, in order to conclude whether the three general assumptions presented on the literature apply to this specific context.
On one hand, cultural tradition represented in philanthropy and Catholic faith has been a significant driver for the industry to engage with its workers and communities in an unsystematic and indiscriminate manner. A second driver at the stage of “corporate social awareness” is governance gaps, due to the underdevelopment of the region at the time when sugar refineries were expanding and the paternalistic view corporations had of their role in society. Both of these “internal” drivers are diagnosed in literature on the subject, particularly in papers by Peinado-Vara (2006) and Gutiérrez and Jones (2004).
It was precisely this altruistic spirit that lead corporations to create social foundations, some of which have lead the process started in 2002 towards the creation of the Regional System of CSR for the Cauca Valley, engaging not only Manuelita and Riopaila, but many other sugar and ethanol producers in the process of designing and putting in place modern CSR strategies.
Nonetheless, a different set of drivers has determined the engagement of the industry in modern CSR policies, aiming for “corporate citizenship” (Barnett, 2002). As observed in the abovementioned “System of CSR”, there are various external and internal pressures that have influenced this process.
30 Primarily, there are external drivers represented in investment incentives, for although executives from the business were aware of the need to be perceived as “socially responsible” by the global community, it was only in the aftermath of the 2008 strike when this factor became a driver, due to negative publicity against the sector. To mention an example, Manuelita envisioned change also in an effort to be perceived as socially responsible by its partners in business in Peru and Brazil where they had recently expanded their operations (Montoya, 2010). A second outside driver described by Visser is the supply chain, represented in the social audits applied on Manuelita and Riopaila by TNCs. Nevertheless, in this case CSR codes and standards cannot be characterized as “drivers” for CSR, rather than as mechanisms of instrumental use by the industry to “green wash” its image after the strike; it is not a coincidence the desire of the industry to join the Global Compact as was argued before and to start reporting only until 2008 with GRI Sustainability Reporting Guidelines.
In regards to market access, although Visser characterizes it as an “internal” driver, in this case it must be defined as an external driver determined by pressures from governments in the developed world and global trade unions. For the sugarcane industry and various other sectors in the national economy, the negotiations and signature of free-trade agreements with both the United States and the European Union are significant for accessing new markets, particularly after Venezuela blocked trade with Colombia. As aforementioned, the requirements made to the Colombian government for the negotiation of these agreements include the respect for HR and union rights, demands that have been imposed on the companies. Hence, market access has been a way to create awareness on the industry of global standards on sustainability.
In regards to internal drivers, socio-economic priorities acknowledged by the UNDP in its regional Human Development Report in 2008 made corporations aware of the role they have to play in the region, leading them to shape the Regional System of CSR.
31 Finally, stakeholder activism must be described as the most significant driver of CSR as management strategies in the sugarcane sector. Visser classifies it exclusively as an “external” driver, mainly due to the global origin of the stakeholder groups he claims to be the most powerful activists of CSR. Nevertheless, the former framework excludes actors present in the local scene: national HR and environmental NGOs, trade unions and social movements are of local origin and constitute the main players leading the strike between 2005 and 2008. However, given that global forces were determinant for the internationalization of the strike, this driver will be classified as two-fold (internal and external).
But why was stakeholder activism such a significant driver? Mainly because the strike allowed the sector to acknowledge its errors, based on a lack of a stakeholder engagement strategy and an adequate CSR policy. The industry made three prominent mistakes, it: i) took for granted its role in the development of the region and did not think of its “paternalistic” relationship with locals as an asset; ii) abandoned the community at a time of transition when the labour flexibilization started, allowing social forces to empower workers as political actors for the left-winged party; iii) did not diagnose the new stakeholders that would arise when the business expanded towards ethanol production. Hence, both strikes were significant for the process towards corporate citizenship: in 2005 it made companies aware of the social problem they had created due to the labour flexibilization process, but it was not until 2008 when the many local and international pressures described fell upon the industry, making corporations react enabling proper CSR programs. It is a fact that both Manuelita and Riopaila had started consultancies to design such strategies, but the strikes speeded-up these processes and re- oriented their main targets. Today, the components of Manuelita and Riopaila ´s modern CSR programmes have the corteros and their communities in centre stage, a relevant signal of the importance both strikes had on the industry.
To conclude, the three arguments that shaped the premises of this research must be revised. On one hand, during the first decade of this century
32 a diverse number of drivers demanded the action of the industry to engage in modern CSR strategies: socio-economic priorities (internal), market access (external), international standardization (external), supply chain (external), investment incentives (external), and stakeholder activism (internal/external). Although external drivers outnumber internal ones, the relationships observed in Figure 3 intent to prove that despite the fact that the sugarcane industry is certainly under pressure due to globalization and international demands, the stress set upon the sector after 2005 and 2008 strikes is at the core of the seriousness with which CSR policies have been adopted today.
Moreover, cultural tradition and corporate philanthropy were important drivers for what is classified under Barret´s continuum as “corporate social awareness”, although these do not correspond to drivers of contemporary CSR policies that could lead to corporate citizenship. Religion and tradition left their legacy in the shape of social foundations, which act as key actors of the CSR System today. Finally, it is true that the role of governments in shaping CSR is scarce in Colombia and there are still actors amongst civil society that have not engaged in the process, such as consumers and business NGOs. However, social movements, local and international NGOs and trade unions were strategic players in the game of pushing the sugarcane industry forward.
V. Conclusions
Corporations are intertwined in a complex web of relationships and thus, trying to distinguish between the economic and social ends of business activity is useless. As the case study demonstrated, economic decisions have social consequences, a reality that supports the claim that enterprises, regardless of their size and income, have responsibilities towards their stakeholders and the social, political and environmental context they operate in.
Furthermore, enterprises in the developing world are embedded in a “CSR System” specific to the actors, relations, pressures and incentives present in
33 their contexts. Consequently, literature on CSR in Latin America has made generalized claims based on secondary source research, trying to look at the “big picture”, ignoring how social, economic and political circumstances are sawn together. To illustrate the argument, both Haslam and Visser´s frameworks were proven wrong under the case study, demonstrating there is no universal understanding or model of CSR that can serve every context.
Moreover, the findings of this case study open an opportunity for corporate HR practitioners. In comparison with Haslam and Visser´s frameworks of analysis, the CSR System for the sugarcane sector was missing in both cases the presence of business NGOs. Another opportunity blossoms for consumer groups that could be more active in demanding goods produced under sustainable conditions and for scholars that could support the demands of stakeholder groups with scientific evidence, or work side by side with the industry towards achieving corporate citizenship.
Finally, there are some topics of interest that could serve as avenues for further research on the subject. On one hand, a few years from now it would be relevant to study if the perception by business leaders on the relationship between business and HR has changed. Up until today, the awareness around the topic is scarce and mostly informed due to the GC and BSI standards, but there was still a negative response from corporate executives whenever the topic was brought up during the interviews. A possible explanation for this relies on how the protracted civil conflict in Colombia has shaped HR as a discourse from left-wing guerrilla groups exclusively.
A second topic would be the GC “effect” in the industry. Will it be used instrumentally for “green washing” purposes, or will the industry engage fully in complying with its standards?
Thus, the business case for CSR in the sugarcane sector today is the need for a “healthy” community in order to have a successful corporate environment; hence the touchstone of good CSR management has been
34 reached. The avenue to move onto corporate citizenship might burst with obstacles, but the enterprises have learned how to listen, and the workers have made themselves be heard, consequently a more peaceful evolution towards corporate citizenship for the business can be foreseen.
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