Indo-Pacific Region s1

Lecture 1:

Introduction: From Australasia to the Indo-Pacific Region

Topics: - 1. Regional Frameworks for Foreign Policy 2. Modern Australia's Origins 3. Calibrating Regional Roles 4. From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific 5. Transitional Dynamics in Foreign and Security Policy 6. Bibliography and Resources

1. Regional Frameworks for Foreign Policy

This subject is concerned with Australasia, the Asia Pacific, and the Indian Ocean region. While Australia has sought to engage (and at times disengage) from East Asia, there has also been a growing awareness of the important of South Asia and particularly India from 1991. On this basis, it is possible to speak of a wider Indo- Pacific region. The term Indo-Pacific may be unfamiliar to you. 'Indo-Pacific' is shorthand for the wider region of the Asia-Pacific area plus South Asia and the Indian Ocean region: hence Indo + Pacific. This is the key area in which much of Australia's current foreign policy, trade and security issues are carried out (though as we shall see, the influence of Great Britain, Europe and Middle Eastern affairs have become more important over the last four years).

Understanding the foreign policy or domestic realities of any Asia-Pacific nation today is not possible with looking at the wider regional environment. The same applies if we tried to look at modern Indonesia, Thailand, or India. They would make little sense if the impact of the region, of regional organisations, and great powers that interacted with them, were not taken into effect. This approach is also particularly significant in light of the changes which have taken place in the Asian-Pacific region over the last 30 years, and the changes which are expected to transform South Asia (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh) over a similar period in the future.

Now, more than ever, it is appropriate to study nations in their regional setting (Ohmae 1993; Chubin 1989; Acharya 2001). Of course, nations have unique historical experiences and cultural bases which set them apart from their neighbours. On the contrary, the Indo-Pacific is very diverse. We will see this more clearly in later weeks when we compare Indonesian and Australian experiences of national identity. Nonetheless, over the last fifty years these diverse nations have been a period of intense interaction and complex interdependence, often based in part on complementary capacities and resources.

1 Australia can be described with some accuracy as the 'odd man in', i.e. a mainly European nation now interacting closely with Southeast Asia and East Asia, and trying to cope with the implications of this for its future economic, foreign affairs and security policies. Australia has been trying to draw closer to East Asia, through its dialogue with the ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), its strong initiatives in the formation of APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) and its strong economic engagement with Japan, China and South Korea. Through 1998- 2004, there has been some drawing back from this role, with strong bilateral interests in engaging the U.S. and EU, and some recognition that there are dangers in becoming too reliant on the presumed stability of Australia’s engagement with East Asia. Ongoing security concerns in North-Asia (especially North Korea), the perception of a more complex relationship with Indonesia, and fears of transnational terrorism as a destabilising factor for Southeast and South Asia have somewhat altered the direction of Australian foreign policy since 2001.

Australia’s ‘Pacific’ Backyard? How should we define the subregions of the Indo- Pacific? (Map Courtesy PCL Map Library)

Furthermore, from 1997 Australia under the Howard government began to emphasise that it could not just focus on multilateral affairs (interactions with multi-national groups and organizations), but would boost bilateral relations. The relations to be particularly emphasized, were those with the U.S., Japan, China and Indonesia (See DFAT 2004; 1997). All these countries are in the Indo-Pacific region. Likewise, Australia’s last Defence Review emphasised the importance of stability in our immediate region, and a high level of engagement with regional security networks as part of Australia’s defence (Department of Defence 2000). From 2001 this

2 relationship was focused even more strongly on the United States, both in terms of trade negotiations, foreign investment flows, and in strong alignment with the U.S. security agenda in relation to the ‘war on terror’ and the invasion of Iraq. One of the current debates has been whether this has set back earlier engagement strategies, e.g. dialogue with ASEAN. However, as well shall see, the underlying political realities may be different than the domestic use made by politicians of some these issues. (whether on Malaysia, Indonesia, or Australia). Beyond this, Australia has also taken up the idea of building coalitions of shared interest, a policy designed to gain flexibility but also clearing influenced by U.S. strategies. This has been expressed as: -

Coalition building - putting together a group of countries to pursue shared objectives on specific issues and thereby enabling Australia to achieve more than it could alone - will play an even more important role in achieving Australia's foreign and trade policy objectives over the next fifteen years. Coalition building is closely linked to bilateral relationships. It is frequently through bilateral relationships that coalition partners are identified and strategies developed. Much of the work of coalitions requires the familiarity, access and ease of communications afforded by sound bilateral relationships (DFAT 2004a).

Nonetheless, for a ‘medium’ power with high reliance on international trade and engaged in a wide range of international activities, there are still clear benefits from a regional framework for pursuing progressive change in Australasia and the Indo- Pacific. In many ways, regional trends and regional organisation can act as paths of influence, host institutions that tend to create converging codes of conduct, and act as ‘leverage multipliers’ in some cases (for neo-institutional approaches, see Ravenhill 1998). In this session, we will explore the regional context and some of the key aspects of Australian national identity. This subject will focus on Australia in the Indo-Pacific region, especially East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific. Secondary themes will include the role of great powers such as the U.S. and China, and prospects for development among Indian Ocean nations.

Today, however, I will briefly outline some of origins of Australia as a nation, and briefly position this experience against the emerging international order in the Indo- Pacific area. The subject will move out from Australian policy orientation to look in detail at Indo-Pacific institutions and trends, then move back to asses critical prospects for assessing current regional agenda.

The lecture series for 2004 focuses on: -

Week 1: Introduction: From Australasia to the 'Indo-Pacific' Region

Week 2: Australian Foreign Policy: From Commonwealth Servant to Regional Player

Week 3: Nationalism and Identity: Australia, Indonesia and East Timor

Week 4: An Asia-Pacific 'Concert-of-Powers' or Strategic Imbalance?

Week 5: Australian Defence Policy: Old Methods and New Threats

3 Week 6: ASEAN Plus?: The Drivers of Open Regionalism

Week 7: Asia-Pacific Patterns of Transnational Transition: Foci of Instability and Underdevelopment

Week 8: The Meeting of Cultures in the South Pacific (Guest Lecturer)

Week 9: The Not-So-Peaceful South Pacific (Guest Lecturer)

Week 10: South Asia and the Indian Ocean: Cooperation or Institutionalised Conflict?

Week 11: Models of Regional Engagement and Competing Regionalisms

Week 12: Future-Directed Policies for the Asia-Pacific Region

2. Modern Australia's Origins

It is important to look back into the use made of earlier history and myth in shaping both national identity and regional outlooks. Thus it is appropriate to consider the unusual character of white Australia's origins. W. J. Hudson explains this well through the use of a hypothetical scenario:

Take the elementary facts of white settlement which ultimately produced the Australia we know late in the twentieth century. They are in truth utterly bizarre but now so taken for granted by Australians as to lack much impact on them, and to freshen them one must resort to the hypothetical. If today Japan were to establish a colony of settlement in sub-Saharan Africa, and if the colony developed into a tolerably prosperous state in its own right while remaining distinctively and deliberately Japanese in ethnic composition and tradition, and while retaining the Japanese emperor as its head of state, we would be agog. If a powerful black African state somehow were to colonise Siberia, and in time evolved into a prosperous and independent black state in East Asia, we would be no less agog. Yet this is the nature of modern Australia's origins: a powerful white island state off the west coast of northern Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries colonised a region deep in the South Pacific on the other side of the world - a region then inhabited by militarily weak black communities. Australia (like New Zealand) is a curiosity in just the same way that a Japanese state in central Africa or a black African state in north-eastern Asia would be curiosities. (Hudson 1992, p6)

There are a number of features in Australian experience that are often cited as influencing national identity and foreign policy. It is not possible to go into detail on them all (we will discuss these further in later sessions, e.g. Clarke 1992). However, as well shall see, these issues are a contested ground, in which political correctness, counter claims, identity politics and revisions (by either radicals or neo-conservatives) are often fought out. These debates are so intense that they have sometimes been dubbed the 'history wars' (see Vincent & Land 2003; Manne 2003; Windschuttle 202). They have a strong impact on defining national interest, which is still a rather fuzzy and loosely-defended set of goals within government policy (see Camilleri 2003), in legitimating aspects of foreign policy, and influence regional engagement. A brief list of standard features would include: -

4 1) Prior to 1788 (the first white settlement), there was an extremely long human presence on the continent, and a complex linguistic and religious culture extending back for at least 40,000 years (estimates may be pushed back as far as 60-100,000 years). This was a unique culture, the 'Aborigines', who claim that they never migrated to this land, but were created here as part of the Dreamtime (Barlow 1987; Edwards 1987; Hiatt 1978). This culture has never been fully accepted by white culture - indeed, until the Mabo decision (made by the High Court in 1992), Australia was declared prior to this time to be terra nullius, suggesting that the land was not effectively occupied, and that European settlers coming into it settled it peacefully. This legal fiction deprived the indigenous people of any residual rights under British law as a defeated group who had continuous occupation of the land. The role of indigenous culture at the national level remains controversial today, and reconciliation limited.

2) British occupation of Australian land had to be fought for, and certain tribes put up a determined struggle over decades (including the use of guerrilla warfare), to resist occupation of their homelands. However, the Australian aboriginal peoples, comprising hundreds of tribes, we not unified, and in the end were displaced and marginalised almost completely by white settlement. Indigenous leaders have always maintained that this action was unjust, and indeed genocidal, both culturally and in terms of the population destroyed by warfare, execution, imprisonment and disease (see Rose 1994), a view that would surprise and offend many white Australians. Today, the issue of reconciliation, proposals for a formal treaty, and the proper representation of the indigenous people remains a major political issue (e.g. 2004 disbandment of ATSIC, the Aboriginal and Tortes Strait Island Commission).

3) From the perspective of European settlers, however, something different was happening. Historical reports largely glossed over or ignored the implications aboriginals were treated. Instead, a different kind of struggle was glorified and romanticised in historical and fiction accounts, in music and poetry. The settlers thought of themselves taming a wide fierce land, building homesteads, fighting flood and fire, building up an independent way of life which brought prosperity in a fairly egalitarian society (see Willis 1993, this is also one of the main images revealed in pre-World War II Australian cinema). This perception was not entirely false: immigration from Europe into the Americas, Africa, New Zealand and Australia opened up new horizons for the poor and displaced in Europe (see Wolf 1982), as well as places where oppression for political and religious reasons could be escaped. Migrants included convicts, soldiers, free settlers, and even political prisoners (especially the Fenians from Ireland in the first half of the 19th century). These images were then joined to the image of Australia as a lucky land, a land of opportunity, with a small population, large resources and lots of sunshine. This partly true myth continued down through the 1960s, and was only undermined by the slowing down of the Australian economy in the 1980s. In part this sense of privilege still influence current debates on immigration and who should be allowed to stay in the country, with a strong sense of excluding groups who seem alien or dangerous (for the use of these images in recent immigration debates, see McMasater 2002). Indeed, Bereson and Matheson, and Yuan Chung- Ming argue that this anxiety was one of the main factors behind federation (McMaster 2002, pp130-134; Yuan 1983, p60; Bereson & Matheson 1992).

5 Taken, however, within the broader geopolitical context of the time, this 'fear' thesis cannot be dismissed. Australian settlers were worried by Asian immigration issues, and also by the imperial expansion of other European nations in the Asia-Pacific region, e.g. France and then Germany. On this basis, Australian identity was based on a specific connection to Mother Britain, included definite racial categories that excluded 'others', and on an egalitarianism based on sameness (Murdolo 2002; McMaster 2002, p135). In the 21st century, we can ask whether these images still help Australia adapt to its region, and fit in with the new global economy.

4) Although this experience did build up a sense of independence from authority (common in frontier areas, e.g in the 'wild west' of America and the 'wild far east' in Siberia), Australian consciousness never fully escaped the apron-strings of Imperial Britain. There was a strong sense of Republicanism in 19th century Australia e.g. the Eureka Stockade as a form of protest, as well as the writings of some Republican thinkers and writers. This was partly due to the influence of non-English and Catholic migrants, especially the Irish. From the time of Federation of the Australian States in 1901, however, Australia seemed to revert to a strongly pro-British policy. This was based on economic considerations, on the manifest power of Britain, especially her navy, to defend Australia, and on a strong trade dependency, with Britain the main buyer of Australia primary products, especially wool. It was also based on a sense of fear that Australia was not safe from the greed of other European powers, or from 'Asian threats', e.g. from Imperial China or Japan. For the first thirty years of the 20th century Australia would proudly see itself as a member of a great Commonwealth of English speaking nations which straddled the globe. In a very real sense, Great Britain was still ‘home’ to many Anglo-Australians. Federation itself was pretexted on this sense of vulnerability, and some see current defence, migration and security policies partly linked to a new sense of vulnerability that has emerged over the last decade.

Pioneers? Australia was viewed by immigrants as a land of opportunities and plentiful resources.

6 (Timber cutters, circa 1910, from the Goldsmith Photo Archive)

5) It was in this context that Australia experienced her first major modern wars. As an ally of Britain, the Australian government arranged expeditionary forces to support the motherland in the Boer War (in South Africa), in World War I and World War II. In was during this period that other aspects of Australian identity were cemented. The ANZAC experience (the Australia and New Zealand forces that fought in the disastrous Gallipoli campaign and then in the Middle East against Turkey in World War I) reflected back to Australia the notion of a small brave country, and reinforced notions such as bravery, individuality and 'mateship'. The fact that the Gallipoli campaign itself was a disaster, with incredibly high casualties, did generate some anti-British feeling, but was soon moulded back into part of the loyal imperial myth. These ANZAC vales have been resurrected in relation to Australia’s involvement in East Timor, Iraq and the Solomon Islands, with both the main political parties seeking to mobilise support for and concern over these deployments (see Verrier 2003).

An Anzac's World War I Photos: Turkish Prisoners An Anzac's World War I Photos: 'Trained (1916, Middle East, Goldsmith Photo Archive) Horse' (1916, Mounted Infantry, Goldsmith Photo Archive)

6) What remained with Australia from these experiences was also a sense of dependency. At first, this dependency was on Britain. With the experience of World War II, especially the unexpected fall of Singapore to the Japanese, this dependence was moved onto the United States. The United States then became the major protector and ally of Australia, underscored by her intervention in the Coral Sea against Japanese forces, and her general dominance in the Pacific. This continued during the Cold War period, with treaty arrangements such as ANZUS directly linking Australia's foreign policy and defence policy to that of US. It was partly in this context that Australian forces became involved in the Korean War, in the Vietnam War, and naval forces were also dispatched in support of the Desert Storm against Iraq, and into Afghanistan and Iraq, in theory, as part of the ‘war on terror’. There are real costs to this ‘insurance policy’ approach, and it is cannot be assumed that Australian and American interests and values always coincide (see further Camilleri 2003).

7 So is modern Australia an oddity, a freak of history? Or should Australians persist in the celebration of their idiosyncrasies (e.g. a Queen in a remote country, pride in a ex- convict heritage)? This seems to relate to an underlying problem of national identity - the problem that, in the past, the persistent consciousness of threat came from Australians not really feeling themselves to constitute a nation with a distinct culture. 'Even our history might be regarded as a derivation or a continuation, in a foreign place, of someone else's history.' (Chiddick & Teichmann 1977, p85). In the 21st century, it is more the issue of regional identity, and the role that Australians see themselves playing in global affairs that has become disputed. In 21st century, the view of Australia as still uncertain in its identity is outdated, and greatly underestimates the forward planning of recent Australian governments, as well as an emerging sense of international confidence held by many Australians.

3. Calibrating Regional Roles

At a public lecture for the Australian Institute of International Affairs in Brisbane in 1991, former Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, also made some observations on Australia's national and international maturity (Whitlam 1992). Of particular pertinence is the following:

Australia's interests in the world can sometimes be best or only advanced by domestic action. This is what I mean by national maturity. More often, Australia's interests in the world can sometimes be best or only advanced in association with other countries. Hitherto this association has principally been with historic allies. Henceforth it must increasingly be within organisations whose members include countries in our region and, better still, in all regions. This is what I mean by international maturity. (Whitlam 1992, p42)

It is precisely such sentiments that have come to fruition between 1992 and 2004. Australia is now an extremely active regional player in international affairs and in multilateral organisations. Australia, along with Japan, was instrumental in setting up APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), has played a fairly strong role in debate over resolving disputes in Cambodia, and has been a very active dialogue partner in the ASEAN Region Forum (ARF), which has begun to discuss regional security issues.

Australia from 1999 also became deeply involved in a humanitarian mission (International Force for East Timor INTERFET, in support of UN Assistance Mission in East Timor, UNAMET) in East Timor, an action that will have long term implications militarily and economically. Aside from an immediate lift in defence of approximately one billion dollars annually over a four year period, this engagement indicated a serious commitment to human rights and independence in the small community of East Timor (population approximately 800,000). However, this engagement also triggered several costs that needed to be calibrated in international terms, including: -

a) The early real risk of possible conflict with the Indonesian army (TNI) and pro-Indonesian militias. Although major conflicts were avoided, a presence of over 11,500 troops was needed to maintain stability, with this then being dropped to 3,500, with plans to further reduce this to only three hundred

8 troops during the year, with the UN mandate being extended six months from May 2004.

b) Serious tensions emerged with Indonesia, with a ‘chill’ factor entering into Australia-Indonesia for several years, with this only being eased over the last two years.

c) Concern has been expressed that East Timor will remain for decades a weak state will be dependent on international aid and support, with poverty and unemployment becoming major programs in contrast to the past fears of militia activity.

d) Debates over the relative share of oil resources between Australia and East Timor in the East Timor gap.

e) Concerns through early 2003 of earlier possible abuse of prisoners by Australian armed forces, and issue that was found in general unsubstantiated by an internal investigation. However, the details of the investigation have not been made fully public.

f) Claims (by Lieutenant-Colonel Lance Collins) through early 2004 that a lobby within the Australian government and intelligence services, especially the Defence Intelligence Organisation (the DIO), was substantially pro- Indonesian, slow to be alert to militia violence from 1998 (Kerin 2004), and did adequately follow up of human rights abuses by the Indonesian authorities. Part of the cross impact here is that some of these charges might be directed at retired Indonesian general Wiranto, who has sought to enter future Presidential elections in Indonesia (Antara 2004).

This example (to be looked at further later in the subject) clearly indicates that foreign policy initiatives that have regional impact need careful calibration, both in relation to human and resource costs, but also in relation to ongoing responsibilities after the initial intervention.

In fact, Australia would like a larger role regionally, e.g. involvement in the ASEM (Asia-Europe meetings, first held in March 1996 and active through 2002). In spite of some initial support from Thailand, Australia has not been accorded a seat in this inter-regional dialogue process. Likewise, through late 2003, Australia also sought a status comparable to the ASEAN-Plus-Three process, thereby hoping to gain virtual parity with this special dialogue process between Southeast Asia, China, Japan and South Korea. This request was not accepted, partly due to Indonesian concerns. Indeed, it is possible that Australia has been somewhat too forward in doing this, alarming some regional states, e.g. Malaysia and more recently Indonesia. In general, however, it would be correct to regard Australian foreign policy through 2001-204 as becoming more assertive, but working across bilateral, multilateral and coalition fronts.

9 4. From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific

One of the key factors behind Australia's vision of itself has been the radical changes occurring in Asia as a whole. A great deal has been written in recent years about the 'miracle' of economic growth in East Asia down to 1996. The terms Asia-Pacific and Pacific Rim have become part of everyday language from Melbourne to Jakarta to Seattle to Tokyo to Beijing. In part this is due to the straightforward economic growth and modernisation of most of these nations. A debate has raged, however, over both the causes and meaning of this economic growth, especially after the financial crisis of 1997-1998. Background factors include: -

1) A straightforward economic interpretation based on a 'lift-off' effect once these economies were retooled after the end of World War II. The idea here was that once warfare was reduced, most of nations could begin developing their economies, and went through rapid industrialisation and agricultural development (the 'green revolution'). Their high growth through the 1980s and early 1990s was based on their catching up with the already developed nations (hence the term NIC, Newly Industrialised Country).

2) Some see this economic growth as based on cultural factors. The heart of this argument has centred on the idea of a unique post-Confucian culture which respects hard work, political authority, 'rule-by-man' and education. From this viewpoint, all the post-Confucian cultures in Asia (China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore) have been able to mobilize themselves more effectively than most nations, and are not burdened by the indecisiveness or welfare-state requirements of Western liberal democracies (Chan 1990; Little & Reed 1989; MacFarquhar 1980). This model has been broadened to include the notion of an emerging shared Asian consciousness, which includes much of East and Southeast Asia (Sopiee 1995, pp190-191).. This view has been criticised on a large number of grounds, including a lack of rigour in demonstrating any hard correlation between cultural factors and economic performance (See for example He 2004; Dupont 1996 & Villegas 1996; Dellios 1996). Furthermore, such notions can be used as excuses to slow down democratic and liberal reforms. Over the last decade a group of Southeast Nations are opting for greater political openness, e.g. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. However, this has not automatically led to stability, as indicated by political turmoil in Indonesia and the Philippines, so that the issue of transition to stable democratic systems becomes very important (see Ananta 2003).

3) The return to a more natural Asian economy, based on its huge population, agricultural and resource bases (Garran 1996). From this perspective, Japan, China and Southeast Asia (taken as a whole) have all the necessary physical and human resources for 'Comprehensive National Strength'. If so, there is nothing unnatural about the growth in the Asia-Pacific, which until recently was tied down by corrupt kingdoms (e.g. the Manchu dynasty of China), held down by European colonialism, suffered serious civil wars, and was devastated by World War II, then used as an arena for proxy wars by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. during the Cold War. Without these impediments, Asia is now able to fully participate in world affairs as a group of modernised but distinctive

10 cultures. However, serious financial and political problems have emerged in some regional countries, e.g. Indonesia, Malaysia and Pakistan, and it is not clear whether all these countries are well adapted to the new globalising world economy. Both PRC and Japan have strong economic potentials, but have been hampered by a range of factors from translating this strength into regional leadership.

4) A less rigorous but quite popular model has been the 'rise and fall of empires' approach. Made immortal by Gibbon's classic study of the Roman Empire, modern writers like P.M. Kennedy (1987) have applied economic versions of this model to suggest that several European nations have peaked and declined. From this viewpoint it is now the time for U.S. power to decline, in favour of Japan or China. Although loosely persuasive, the model is less able to predict which 'superpower' will emerge next. Furthermore, the U.S. remains the world's most powerful economy and the only true military superpower. Indeed, it still retains power-preponderance regionally and seems able to structure a network of bilateral alliances across the Asia-Pacific region (for the implications, see Bell 2003; Tow 1997). Nonetheless, the 'rise and fall of great powers' approach has been used to help explain the very difficult relations between China and the U.S., which are likely to be central to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region in the next decade (we will look at this in week 4).

All these explanations are likely to be partly true. There are a number of other important factors which need to be mentioned. The Asia-Pacific region in recent years has also been brought together by a certain level of regional cooperation. Aside from ASEAN and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation process), since 1993 the region has seen a certain level of economic cooperation between the major economies of Asia-Pacific. Likewise, the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) and ASEM (Asia- Europe) forums have also developed a conscious awareness of an Asia-Pacific which can cooperate on certain goals. This cooperation is complicated by certain rivalries, e.g. China and U.S. tensions, but has so far not broken down. In large measure this has been due to the recognition of the complementarity and interdependence of the economies in the wider region. Moreover, the experience of several horrific Asian wars (World War II, the Korean conflict, two wars in Vietnam and the civil war in Cambodia) has also shown the real cost of straight-forward power politics, even to the victors. Likewise, the act of small groups of terrorists or insurgents, whether operating in India, Indonesia, or southern Thailand has been able to involve major regional fears of future instability. On this basis, the region is a security complex (following Buzan 1997), but has not yet be able to forge a genuine security community in which mutual threats are solved through cooperation (see Acharya 2001), though through late 2003 ASEAN has proposed the development of such an agenda within Southeast Asia. In such a setting, human security and human rights will continue to be at risk.

One area of ‘underdevelopment’, moreover, has been the connection of South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka) to the broader East Asian and Australasian setting. The question of whether 'India Turns East' is complicated by many factors. Earlier Chinese-Indian conflicts have not resulted in recent conflict between China and India, but tensions do remain. Rather, this competition has been limited to some concerns over Chinese economic penetration into Burma, and an awareness of the Chinese strategic presence, including ballistic missiles stationed in

11 Tibet. However, Indian strategic analysts have always been much more concerned about Pakistan, about internal security, and the ongoing civil war in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, while India has been locked into a game of diplomatic and strategic manoeuvre with Pakistan, this has made cooperation with states such as China, Malaysia and Indonesia (with their large Islamic populations) rather complex. In late 1996 and early 1997 there were some positive signs, with India and China entering into more friendly relations, and with hopes of meetings between Indian and Pakistani foreign ministerial officials. In 1998 this progress was halted by the policies of the newly elected BJP (the Bharatiya Janata Party), and by the decision of India to conduct declared nuclear tests, thereby moving from a threshold power to a nuclear power. This move was soon mirrored by nuclear tests in Pakistan. Renewed tensions almost resulted in war through late 2001 and early 2002. It is not yet clear whether Pakistan and India can readily improve their relationship in the near future (see lecture 10). At present, the development of nuclear weapons in South Asia has made the region much more important to Russia, China, Japan, the U.S. and Australia, with de facto acceptance of nuclear status, but there is no guarantee that this will lead to greater stability (see Hewitt 2000; Limaye 2000). Likewise, although the new government in India has signalled through May 2004 that it will seek to continue dialogue with Pakistan, there it seems the region will remain locked up by this ongoing conflict for the medium term, whether ‘hot’ (military threat) or ‘cold’ (diplomatic tensions). India, in particular, has established a strong dialogue with countries such as Singapore and Malaysia, is a dialogue partner with ASEAN, and its part of the ASEAN Regional Forum. Some indirect moderation of tensions has occurred between India and China through these regional organisations, with both India and China agreeing to ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) through late 2003, committing both to resolve disputes peacefully.

Furthermore, there has been surprisingly little diplomatic or economic cooperation between India and Australia. In the future, however, there is a distinct possibility that India might find a stronger role for itself in relations with Southeast Asia, Australia, the U.S., and possibly even China and Japan. If so, a truly integrated Indo- Pacific region might emerge at the political and cultural levels. Certainly Australia, as a nation facing two major oceans (the Indian and Pacific) and one major peninsula to the north (Southeast Asia), would be unwise not to develop a constructive 'westward' policy. It is in this context that an Indian Ocean cooperative group has also been suggested to balance APEC for the Asia-Pacific. Although this remains an organisation with limited roles and members (IOR-ARC, The Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation, see lecture 10), it suggests an interesting way to link some African, Middle Eastern, South Asian, some Southeast Asian nations and Australia into a more cooperative framework.

5. Transitional Dynamics in Foreign and Security Policy

Australia before 1972 used to view itself as a white Australia, firmly attached to a British heritage, to European culture, and protected by an American alliance. No longer a Dominion in the proud British Empire, it was still part of a Commonwealth of nations distinctly influenced by the English heritage culturally and institutionally. Australia largely defined itself by the 'otherness' of those around it, and whom it often

12 feared. China, Japan, Indonesia, and even indigenous aboriginals formed part of an earlier negative definition of identity.

Australia is now firmly entrenched in the Asia-Pacific regional system. Its major trading partners include Japan, the U.S., China, South Korea, and ASEAN nations, with Britain and Europe being less important than before. Australia was a foundation member of APEC, has been an active dialogue in the ASEAN regional meetings, and has engaged in proactive diplomacy over Cambodia. Australia was also one of the first nations to enter into diplomatic relations with the PRC (People's Republic of China), and has also made strong pro-Japanese statements in relation to its stance on trade and security issues.

Through the 1990s, both Labour and Coalition viewed their economic and diplomatic interests being closely tied to the Asia-Pacific region. This engagement has led to some 'Asianisation' of Australian affairs, but not in the sense of Australia becoming Asian culturally, nor on the basis of Asian ethnic immigration (less than 5% of Australians have emigrated from Asia). Rather, the Australian government, and Australia's education, business and administrative elites have accepted that Australia's need to engage diplomatically and economically with East and then South Asia. There has also been a relatively wide acceptance of this in the public arena, supported by some growing interest in Asian affairs and Asian cultures. This remains true in spite of occasional outbursts of xenophobia and calls for a stop to Asian immigration, sparked off by small radical groups.

Many take this transformation for granted. Australia's relationship with Southeast Asia can accurately described as one of 'comprehensive engagement' (Evans & Grant 1995, pp195-8). Yet this is a complete revolution in the Australian perspective. I would prefer to call this a 'regionalisation' of Australian perspectives, not an 'Asianisation' (contra Sheridan 1995, p10). Moreover, the setting among different areas of engagement (Northeast and Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Pacific Islands, the special relationship with the U.S.) has not yet fully stabilised. There is also a real possibility of over-reach, with ambitious foreign and security policies for which a country such as Australia has not developed adequate human or physical resources.

Through 2001-2004, critical choices have emerged for both Australia, regional neighbours and organisations. These issues include: -

1) The degree to which the region can meeting ongoing and new transnational challenges, including international terrorism (see Singh 2004), drug and arms flows, people smuggling, uncontrolled migration flows, transboundary environmental degradation, transnational organised crime and international piracy. These issues have emerged has a major complication within ASEAN, as well as among bilateral partners, e.g. Indonesia and Australia, China and Australia etc. There has also been a recognition that weak or failing states (see Wainwright 2003) are, or might become, foci for such activity, ranging from drug networks, to international money laundering through to un-regulated issuing of passports (factors of concern in relations to states as diverse as Burma, Indonesia, the Solomon Islands, and East Timor).

13 2) The roles that different regional organisations play in the region, and the different types of regionalism they try to establish, e.g. based on economics, security concerns, or shared value systems (see He 2004; Acharya 2001). Here, patterns of exclusion and inclusion will affect how these organisations are viewed, e.g. whether ASEAN can still steer the wider agenda of the ASEAN Regional Forum (the later Forum includes great powers such as PRC, Japan, and the superpower the U.S.).

3) The interaction among level of democratisation, developmental strategies and human rights in the broadest sense has begun to emerge, with widely varying outcomes across the region. Thus, even as Indonesia both democratised and decentralised from 1998-2004, there were also patterns of increased poverty and report of local corruption that undermined some of these political benefits (see Ananta 2003). The worst case scenario is a combination of poverty, unequal wealth distribution, authoritarianism, and corruption, with limited options for peaceful reform (as in Burma), but no magic model of development can be posited for different middle range countries. In the case of Thailand, for example, with strong democratisation and improvements in the national economy, rural and sub-regional pockets of entrenched poverty remain a major focus for local discontent (see McCargo 2002).

4) The way that nations and regional groups engage in the wider processes of economic, informational, and rule-based globalisation. For Australia, this has led to a recognition of the large number of players engaged in international activities (second-track and multilateral diplomacy, as well as transnational business and interest groups), as well as greater enmeshment in multilateral agreements (see Wesley 2002). This has lead to a more complex management and informational task which cannot be steered by governments alone. Issues ranging from environmental policy, through to asylum seekers, and the role of near global-level agencies such as the WTO and IMF take on greater significance but are less amenable to modification by individual states.

You might like to think of what features need to be added to this list as we consider prospects for the 2004-2020 period. We will explore these themes in later lectures, at first working out from a more detailed assessment of Australia’s foreign affairs and security policy, and then to an assessment of key regional organisations, including ASEAN, the ASEAN-plus-three and the ARF in the middle of the subject, then move onto alternative patterns of regional organisation in the latter part of the subject.

6. Bibliography and Further Resources

Useful Resources

A fair newspaper with International and Australian coverage is the Sydney Morning Herald, which can be found at http://www.smh.com.au/index.html

The Pacnet Newsletter has a wide range of brief but up-to-date articles on issues that affect Asia and the Asia-Pacific region, located at:

14 http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pacnet.html

The Nexis news database provides comprehensive access to global news- services, searchable on multiple criteria (located off the Bond Library Databases webpage).

The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, India, publishes the journal Strategic Analysis, which gives a very good run down of Asian international relations, foreign affairs and defence issues. It is located at: http://www.idsa-india.org Issues from 2003 and earlier are available full text on line.

Voluntary Further Reading

If want to take any of these issues further, you might look at:

ACHARYA, Amitav Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, London, Routledge, 2001 COTTON, James “The Near North, the East Asian Hemisphere, the Asia- Pacific: Seeking Direction in Australian Foreign Policy”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 58 no. 1, March 2004, pp143-156 DOBELL, Graeme Australia Finds Home: The Choices and Chances of an Asia Pacific Journey, Sydney, ABC Books, 2000 KEATING, Paul Engagement: Australia faces the Asia-Pacific, Sydney, Macmillan, 2000 KNIGHTLEY, Phillip Australia: A Biography of a Nation, London, Jonathan Cape, 2000 LOVELL, David W. Asia-Pacific Security: Policy Challenges, Singapore, ISEAS, 2003 MAIDMENT, Richard & MACKERRAS, Colin (eds.) Culture and Society in the Asia-Pacific, London, Routledge, 1998 McMASTER, Don Asylum Seekers: Australia's Response to Refugees, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 2002 SINGH, Daljit & CHIN, Kin Wah (eds) Southeast Asian Affairs 2003, Singapore, ISEAS, 2003

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