Forsskål and the Interpretation of Article 23 Author(S): C
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Forsskål and the Interpretation of Article 23 Author(s): C. Jeffrey Reviewed work(s): Source: Taxon, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Feb., 1985), pp. 144-147 Published by: International Association for Plant Taxonomy (IAPT) Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1221579 . Accessed: 23/07/2012 03:34 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. International Association for Plant Taxonomy (IAPT) is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Taxon. http://www.jstor.org FORSSKAL AND THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 23 C. Jeffrey' Summary Article 23 is shown to be equivocal with respectto the validity of specificnames publishedin the 'FloraAegyptiaco-Arabica' of ForsskAl(1775) and similarworks. Burdetand Perret(1983) have concludedthat, under the provisionsofArt. 23.6(c)of the International Code of BotanicalNomenclature (Voss et al., 1983), all the specificnames first publishedin certain worksof Asso, Aublet,Forsskil and Grimmmust be regardedas not validly published,on the grounds thatthese areworks in whichthe Linnaeansystem of binarynomenclature for speciesis not consistently employed.Their interpretation of this Articleis supportedby Friiset al. (1984), who rightlyemphasize the undesirablenomenclatural consequences of such a conclusion and invite comments as to how they might best be avoided. Greuter(1984) however disagreeswith the conclusionsof these authors, arguingthat it is neither the intention, nor the implication, of Art. 23.6(c) that all the species in a work must be designatedby Linnaeanbinomials, but that only the named species need be. We arethus confrontedwith two differentinterpretations of Art. 23.6(c),and it is necessarytherefore to examine Art. 23 to identify the featuresresponsible for such equivocation. Study of the papersof Burdetand Perret,Friis et al. and Greuterreveals that there are three areas of doubt with respectto Art. 23 and that they concernthe terms 'name', 'epithet'and 'consistently'. These will thereforebe examined in turn. The Meaning of 'Name' Art. 6.6 states that, unless otherwiseindicated, the word 'name' as employedin the Code means a name that has been validly published. Unfortunately,the Code largely ignores this provision of otherwiseindication; for example, the word 'name' in Art. 32 cannot be interpretedas 'a name that has been validly published'without makingnonsense of the whole Article. Friis et al. concludethat Art. 6.6 implies that names may be either validly publishedor invalidlypublished and that therefore a species may be 'named'in a work irrespectiveof whetheror not the name of the species has a form which complies with the provisions of Art. 23. This conclusion is certainlysupported by the broad sense in which we must interpretthe word name as being employed in Art. 32. They thus conclude that, under the Code, the fact that a species is not binary-namedin a work does not imply that it is un-named.Friis et al., like Burdet& Perret,therefore consider that if a publishedwork includeseven only one name that is not binary(and which is thereforeinvalid underArt. 32.1), then all the names in that work are to be regardedas not validly publishedunder Art. 23.6(c). On the other hand, Art. 23.1 defines the name of a species as a binarycombination consisting of the name of the genus followed by a single specific epithet. Leaving aside for the moment what is meant by 'a singleepithet', we may concludethat it followstherefore that any otherkind of designation of a species is not to be regardedas a name in the sense of Art. 23.1, but must be regardedas a means of referenceto an un-named species in the sense of the Code. Thereforeany species so designated must be consideredto be an un-namedspecies in the sense of Art. 23.1, its designationto consist of words not intended as "names" under Art. 23.6(a), and thereforeits post-initial terms not to be regardedas specificepithets underArt. 23.6. On this interpretation,which is the one implicit in the argumentof Greuter,the cases fallingunder Art. 23.6(c) are eitherworks in which all species are un- named in the sense of Art. 23.1 or works in which there is a mixture of binary-namedspecies and un-namedspecies otherwisedesignated. It follows that in the latter,insofar as the named species in this sense areconcerned, the Linnaeansystem of binarynomenclature must be regardedas consistently employed. Thus any work in which even only one species is given a properLinnaean binomial, and the rest designatedin otherways, must be regardedas consistentlyusing the Linnaeansystem of binary nomenclaturefor the species it did in fact name. Thus we have two conflictinginterpretations of Art. 23.6(c), one, that a work in which only one speciesdesignation is not binarycannot be regardedas a vehicle of valid publicationof specificnames, the other, that a work in which at least one name is binary can be regardedas a vehicle of valid publicationof the binaryspecific names it does contain. EitherBurdet and Perretand Friis et al. are The Herbarium,Royal Botanic Gardens,Kew, Richmond,Surrey, UK. 144 TAXON VOLUME 34 right, in which case, as Greuterpoints out, the nomenclaturalconsequences would be disastrous,or Greuteris right,in which case the Article is virtuallymeaningless. There is no logical half-wayhouse (Greuter,to his credit, tries to inhabit a commonsensicalone!). The only unequivocalconclusion is that the presentwording of the Article is unsatisfactory. The Meaning of 'Epithet' This conclusion is reinforcedby considerationof the use of the term epithet in Art. 23. As Friis et al. point out, Art. 23.1 rules that if an epithet consists of one or more words, these are to be united or hyphenated,and this seems to be in conflict with Art. 23.6(c), for the Code gives no guidanceon how to distinguishbetween phrasesintended as single specificepithets but consistingof two or more separatewords when originallypublished, and the post-genericterms of otherdesignations not intended as specific epithets. Example 1 of Art. 23 makes it seem that by epithet, it is the equivalent of a Linnaeannomen triviale that is implied.Also, Art. 23.6 rulesthat wordsnot intended[by their authors] as epithets are not to be regardedas specific epithets. Together, these two provisions imply that designationsof species consistingof a genericname followed by one or more words not intendedas specific epithets (such as provisional designationsof species by numbers,letters, vernacularsor de- scriptivephrases, and Linnaeannomina specificalegitima and comparablepolynomials, consisting of a generic name followed by a descriptive phrase of one or more words) are not to be regardedas specificnames. Furthermore,Example 10 implies that designationsof species consistingof a generic name followed by a double or multiple epithet of two or more separatewords that have no mutual relationship(other than grammatical)are also not to be regardedas specificepithets, though as Donk (1962) points out, they are not to be confusedwith biverbalor multiverbalepithets which, as Example 1 makesclear, are to be regardedas specificepithets and are,under Art. 23. 1, to be unitedor hyphenated (as appropriateto the provisions of Art. 73). It is clearthat the distinctionsbetween these differentcategories of designationsare important,and they couldwith advantagebe set out moreexplicitly in the Article.As shownbelow, they areparticularly relevantto any considerationof the work of ForsskAl(1775). The Meaning of 'Consistently' Murray(1893) gives threesenses in whichthe wordconsistently can correctlybe used-in accordance or compatibly with something;in accordancewith itself; or uniformly,with persistentuniformity. Clearly,in Art. 23.6(c), it cannot be understoodas being employed in either of the first two senses; otherwise, I could consistently employ Linnaeanbinary nomenclatureif I used it for every other species, or every tenth species, or for species occurringin Africa, in any account I wrote, provided only that I pointed out in the work that I intended to do so. It can be taken as employed in only the thirdsense, i.e., constantly,exclusively, without exception. Thus, in contrastto whatGreuter concludes, the Frenchversion of the Code does renderthe intendedmeaning accurately ('d'une fagon constante'), and the works of Asso, Aublet, Forsskil and Grimm cannot be excludedfrom the categoryof works not consistentlyemploying Linnaeanbinary nomenclature on such semantic grounds.In view of the uncertaintygenerated, however, it would perhapsbe better to revise the wordingof the Article such that the word consistentlyneed no longerbe employed. The Workof Forsskdl(1775) It would also be an improvementif the Articledistinguished more clearly,and dealt with in separate sections, the differentcategories of worksto which Art. 23.6(c) applies,and which were distinguished by Greuter.The firstcategory consists of works Pre-Linnaeanin the sense that they do not have a set of Linnaeanbinary names but only descriptivepolynomials or nomina specificalegitima, amongst which, by chance, one or more may be reducedto a single word. As Greuterstates, these are ruled out under Art. 23.6(a). The second