Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979
Annual Report 2013–14 ISBN 978-1-925118-83-4
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Enquiries regarding the licence and any use of this document are welcome at: Business Law Branch Attorney-General’s Department 3–5 National Circuit BARTON ACT 2600 Telephone: 02 6141 6666 [email protected] CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 CHAPTER 1 – TELECOMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTION 7
KEY LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 2013-14...... 7 KEY JUDICIAL DECISIONS 2013-14...... 7 KEY POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 2013-14...... 8 MORE INFORMATION...... 9 INTERCEPTION WARRANTS...... 10 SERIOUS OFFENCES...... 10 ELIGIBLE JUDGES AND NOMINATED AAT MEMBERS...... 13 APPLICATIONS FOR AND ISSUE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTION WARRANTS...... 13 NAMED PERSON WARRANTS...... 21 B-PARTY WARRANTS...... 24 DURATION OF WARRANTS...... 26 ELIGIBLE WARRANTS...... 29 INTERCEPTION WITHOUT A WARRANT...... 30 MUTUAL ASSISTANCE...... 31 NUMBER OF INTERCEPTIONS CARRIED OUT ON BEHALF OF OTHER AGENCIES...... 31 TELECOMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTION EXPENDITURE...... 33 EMERGENCY SERVICE FACILITIES...... 34 SAFEGUARDS, CONTROLS AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS...... 35 COMMONWEALTH OMBUDSMAN—INSPECTION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTION RECORDS...... 36 COMMONWEALTH OMBUDSMAN’S SUMMARY OF FINDINGS...... 37 COMMONWEALTH OMBUDSMAN’S FINDINGS FOR INDIVIDUAL AGENCY...... 37 CHAPTER 2—STORED COMMUNICATIONS 41
EFFECTIVENESS OF STORED COMMUNICATIONS WARRANTS...... 43 PRESERVATION NOTICES...... 44 MUTUAL ASSISTANCE...... 46 COMMONWEALTH OMBUDSMAN—INSPECTION OF STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACCESS RECORDS...... 46 CHAPTER 3—TELECOMMUNICATIONS DATA 49
EXISTING DATA—ENFORCEMENT OF A CRIMINAL LAW...... 51 EXISTING DATA—ENFORCEMENT OF A LAW IMPOSING A PECUNIARY PENALTY OR THE PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC REVENUE...... 55 PROSPECTIVE DATA AUTHORISATIONS...... 59 DATA AUTHORISATIONS TO LOCATE MISSING PERSONS...... 60 DATA AUTHORISATIONS FOR FOREIGN LAW ENFORCEMENT...... 61 CHAPTER 4—FURTHER INFORMATION 62 APPENDIX A—LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES 63 APPENDIX B—INTERCEPTION AGENCIES UNDER THE TIA ACT 66 APPENDIX C—ABBREVIATIONS 67 APPENDIX D—CATEGORIES OF SERIOUS OFFENCES 68
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 Act Annual Report 2013–14 sets out how eligible Commonwealth, State and Territory government agencies have used the powers available under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (the TIA Act) between 1 July 2013 and 30 June 2014.
The primary function of the TIA Act is to protect the privacy of the communications of people who use the Australian telecommunications network. Law enforcement agencies’1 use of interception powers under the TIA Act is independently overseen by the Commonwealth Ombudsman and equivalent state bodies.
The TIA Act provides a legal framework for national security and law enforcement agencies to access the information held by communications providers that agencies need to investigate criminal offences and other activities that threaten safety and security.
Serious and organised criminals and persons seeking to harm Australia’s national security, routinely use telecommunications service providers and communications technology to plan and to carry out their activities. Some activities, including child pornography, are predominantly executed through communications devices such as phones and computers.
Legislative reforms This 2013–14 annual report contains reports on three ‘eligible authorities’2 under the TIA Act created by an amendment to the TIA Act during the 2012–13 reporting period. These new eligible authorities are the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission (Victoria), the Victorian Inspectorate, and the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (South Australia).
Key judicial decisions This 2013–14 annual report contains two decisions from courts in South Australia and Western Australia. These decisions relate to provisions in the TIA Act dealing with notifying a carrier of the issue of a warrant and exempt proceedings.
Policy developments There were two inquiries during the 2013–14 reporting period:
the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Reference Committee Inquiry into a comprehensive revision of the TIA Act with regard to two particular recommendations3
1 An ‘enforcement agency’ is broadly defined to include all interception agencies as well as a body whose functions include administering a law imposing a pecuniary penalty or administering a law relating to the protection of the public revenue. 2 Eligible authorities can access information obtained under telecommunications interception warrants and can be declared by the Commonwealth Attorney-General to be an interception agency (subject to being satisfied that the requesting State has met the preconditions in section 35 of the TIA Act). 3 a. the recommendations of the Australian Law Reform Commission For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice report, dated May 2008, particularly recommendation 71.2; and b. recommendations relating to the Act from the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security Inquiry into the potential reforms of Australia’s National Security Legislation report, dated May 2013.
P a g e | 4 the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee Inquiry into the Telecommunications Amendment (Get a Warrant) Bill 2013.
Key findings
In 2013–14, issuing authorities issued 4,007 interception warrants, a decrease of around 5 per cent from 2012–13, when 4,232 warrants were issued. Interception warrants are highly privacy intrusive and are only sought when operationally necessary.
During 2013–14, information obtained under interception warrants was used in:4
o 2,938 arrests
o 4,008 prosecutions
o 2,210 convictions.
In 2013–14, 77 enforcement agencies made 334,658 authorisations for the disclosure of historical telecommunications data. Of these, 324,260 authorisations were made to enforce a criminal law. This compares with 330,798 data authorisations made by 73 enforcement agencies in 2012–13, of which 320,032 authorisations were made to enforce a criminal law (a 1.3 per cent increase from 2012–13). A total increase of 1.2 per cent is significantly less than the previous reporting period. In 2012–13 around 9.8 per cent more authorisations were made than in 2011–12.
In 2013–14, 139 B-Party warrants5 were issued, around 16 per cent more than in 2012– 13. Around 10 per cent of these warrants were issued with conditions or restrictions.
In 2013–14, 999 named person warrants were issued, a 12 per cent increase from 2012– 13. The increase is consistent with fluctuations associated with operational demand (between 2011–12 and 2012–13 there was a 28 per cent increase in the number of named person warrants issued).
In 2013–14, law enforcement agencies made 153 arrests, conducted 176 prosecutions and obtained 144 convictions based on evidence obtained under stored communications warrants.6
In 2013–14, consistent with the last reporting period, the majority of named person warrants were for the interception of between two to five telecommunications services.
During the reporting period the Commonwealth Ombudsman conducted six inspections of the interception records of the ACC, ACLEI and the AFP (two inspections for each agency).
The Ombudsman found that there continued to be a high level of compliance with the telecommunications interception provisions of the TIA Act and that agencies were
4 These figures provide an indication about the effectiveness of interception, rather than the full picture, as, for example, a conviction can be recorded without entering intercepted information into evidence. 5 A B-Party warrant is an interception warrant that enables an interception agency to intercept the communications of a person who is communicating with a person suspected of involvement in a serious offence. 6 These figures provide an indication about the effectiveness of interception, rather than the full picture, as, for example, a conviction can be recorded without entering intercepted information into evidence.
P a g e | 5 cooperative with inspections and receptive to suggestions for improvement.
Telecommunications interception Accessing content, or the substance of a communication—for instance, the message written in an email, the discussion between two parties to a phone call, the subject line of an email or a private social media post—without the knowledge of the person making the communication is highly privacy intrusive and, under the TIA Act, can only occur under an interception or stored communications warrant, or in certain limited circumstances such as a life-threatening emergency. Interception is subject to significant limitations, oversight and reporting obligations and the annual report is an important part of this accountability framework.
Lawful interception is an effective investigative tool that supports and complements information obtained through other methods. In many cases, the weight of evidence obtained through telecommunications interception results in defendants entering guilty pleas, thereby eliminating the need for the intercepted information to be introduced into evidence.
Telecommunications data A critical tool available under the TIA Act is access to telecommunications data.7
Telecommunications data is often the first source of lead information for further investigations, helping to eliminate potential suspects and to support applications for more privacy intrusive investigative tools including search warrants and interception warrants. For example, an examination of call charge records can show that a potential person of interest has had no contact with criminals being investigated.
Data gives agencies a clear method for tracing all telecommunications from end-to-end and can also be used to demonstrate an association between people or to prove that two or more people spoke with each other at a critical point in time (such as before the commission of an alleged offence).
Access to telecommunications data is regulated by Chapter 4 of the TIA Act, which permits authorities or bodies that are an ‘enforcement agency’ under the TIA Act to authorise telecommunications carriers to disclose telecommunications data where that information is reasonably necessary for the enforcement of the criminal law, a law imposing a pecuniary penalty, or the protection of the public revenue. All interception agencies are also enforcement agencies as well as authorities or bodies whose functions include administering a law imposing a pecuniary penalty or administering a law relating to the protection of the public revenue.
Under the TIA Act, all enforcement agencies can access historical data8 and criminal law- enforcement agencies can also access prospective data9.
This annual report is organised into three main chapters: chapter 1 focuses on interception warrants, chapter 2 reports on stored communications, and chapter 3 deals with telecommunications data. 7 Telecommunications data is information about a communication, such as the phone numbers of the people who called each other, how long they talked to each other, the email address from which a message was sent and the time the message was sent. 8 Historical data, also known as existing data, is information that is already in existence when an authorisation for disclosure is received by a telecommunications carrier. 9 Prospective data is telecommunications data that comes into existence during a period of time in which an authorisation is in force.
P a g e | 6 The TIA Act is available online at
The primary function of the TIA Act is to protect the privacy of the communications of people who use the Australian telecommunications network by making it an offence to intercept communications, subject to limited lawful exceptions. Under the TIA Act, communications cannot be intercepted while they are passing over the Australian telecommunications system, except as authorised in the circumstances set out in the TIA Act.
Definition
The term ‘interception agency’ is defined in section 5 of the TIA Act and is limited to agencies such as the Australian Federal Police and state police forces eligible to apply under Part 2–5 of the TIA Act for an interception warrant.
Key legislative developments 2013–14
New interception agencies under the TIA Act In the 2012–13 reporting period, the Telecommunications Interception and Other Legislation Amendment (State Bodies) Act 2012 (the TI State Bodies Act) amended the TIA Act to add the following agencies as ‘eligible authorities’ under the TIA Act:
the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission (Victoria) (the IBAC)
the Victorian Inspectorate
the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (South Australia) (the ICAC (SA)).
Eligible authorities can access information obtained under telecommunications interception warrants and can be declared by the Commonwealth Attorney-General to be an interception agency (subject to being satisfied that the requesting State has met the preconditions in section 35 of the TIA Act).
The IBAC became an interception agency on 10 February 2013, when it replaced the Victorian Office of Police Integrity. The 2013–14 Annual Report contains the first full year of reporting information about the IBAC. The ICAC (SA) became an interception agency on 1 September 2013 and information in this annual report about the ICAC (SA) relates to that time period. Consistent with powers available to other state oversight bodies, the Victorian Inspectorate is not an interception agency.
Key judicial decisions 2013–14
Notification of the issue of a warrant In R v Scarpantoni (No 2) [2013] SADC 70 (22 May 2013), the District Court of South Australia followed the reasoning of the Western Australia Court of Appeal in Geldert v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 226 (9 November 2012) that, where there is a valid warrant, there is no requirement for the service of a certified copy of the warrant to be a precondition to the agency’s authority to commence interception. Notification to the carrier is the means by which the carrier can commence doing what it is required to do to facilitate the interception of the communications
P a g e | 7 by the officers of the agency.
The court found, provided that the carrier has been informed of the issue of the warrant, the carrier did not also require the certified copy in order to commence the interception. The requirement to provide a certified copy of the warrant was to provide an audit trail and underpinned the accountability and reporting obligations in the Act, rather than a necessary part of notification to the carrier.
Geldert v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 226 (9 November 2012) rejected the judgments in The State of Western Australia v Tanevski [No 5] [2012] WADC 64 (Tanevski No 1) and The State of Western Australia v Tanevski [2012] WADC 87 (Tanevski No 2). In those cases, the WA District Court of Western Australia considered the notification and authorisation provisions in relation to stored communications warrants (sections 121 and 126) and telecommunications service warrants (sections 47 and 60) respectively. The court held that the process for notifying a carrier of a stored communications (Tanevski No 1) or interception warrant (Tanevski No 2) required the agency to provide a certified copy, in addition to informing the carrier of the warrant.
Exempt proceedings In Sands v State of South Australia [2013] SASC 44, the Supreme Court of South Australia determined that certain intercepted conversations were admissible in a claim for defamation as the proceeding related to the ‘alleged misbehaviour, or alleged improper conduct, of an officer of the Commonwealth or of a State’.
The defamation claim in Sands was based on an allegation that the police had acted unlawfully, maliciously and in breach of their statutory duties in the course of the investigation by leaking information to a journalist that identified the plaintiff as the primary murder suspect.
The Supreme Court distinguished the narrower construction in Kizon v Palmer (1997) 72 FCR 409, which found that a proceeding relating to ‘alleged misbehaviour, or alleged improper conduct, of an officer of the Commonwealth or of a State’ referred to alleged misbehaviour or improper conduct of a kind commonly associated with disciplinary action against an employee or office- holder, such as dismissal, removal from office or other sanction.
The Court found that amendments to the definition of ‘exempt proceeding’ in section 5B of the TIA Act, which were made after the Kizon decision, together with the phrase ‘any other proceeding’ in subsection 5B(1)(f), brought the current proceedings within the TIA Act. The foundation of the defamation claim was that the police acted unlawfully, maliciously and in breach of their statutory duty, allegations that could lead to disciplinary or criminal charges.
The Court also considered that the intercepted conversations were admissible on the basis that the material had previously been admitted in an earlier proceeding. Under the TIA Act, lawfully intercepted information that has been given in evidence in a previous proceeding can subsequently be given in evidence in any proceeding (section 75A of the TIA Act).
P a g e | 8 Key policy developments 2013–14
Senate inquiry into the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 On 12 December 2013, the Senate referred the following matter to the Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee (the References Committee) for inquiry and report:
Comprehensive revision of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (the Act), with regard to:
a. the recommendations of the Australian Law Reform Commission For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice report, dated May 2008, particularly recommendation 71.2; and
b. recommendations relating to the Act from the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security Inquiry into the potential reforms of Australia’s National Security Legislation report, dated May 2013.
The Attorney-General’s Department made a submission to the inquiry, a copy of which can be found online at
In its submission, the department welcomed the current inquiry and reiterated the relevance of the issues raised by the department in its submission to the 2012–13 Inquiry into Potential Reforms of Australia’s National Security Legislation by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (the PJCIS).
The References Committee released its report on 24 March 2015, a copy of which can be found online at
Senate inquiry into the Telecommunications Amendment (Get a Warrant) Bill 2013 On 20 June 2013, the Senate referred the Telecommunications Amendment (Get a Warrant) Bill 2013 (the Bill) to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee (the Legislation Committee) for inquiry and report by 31 October 2013.
The Bill sought to amend the TIA Act to require law enforcement and national security agencies to obtain a warrant to access telecommunications data.
The Legislation Committee received 18 submissions from government agencies and community organisations. The Attorney-General’s Department made a submission to the inquiry, a copy of which can be found online at
The department’s submission noted that, if enacted, the Bill would significantly affect the ability of law enforcement and national security agencies to perform their legislated roles.
On 5 August 2013, the Governor-General prorogued the 43rd Parliament and dissolved the House of Representatives (a Federal election was held on 7 September 2013). On 20 August 2013 the
P a g e | 9 Legislation Committee wrote to the President of the Senate advising that, consistent with the general approach adopted by other Senate committees to inquiries during elections, the Legislation Committee had resolved not to continue its inquiry into the Bill.
More information Further information about telecommunications, interception and privacy law can be found at:
Attorney-General’s Department
Department of Communications
Commonwealth Ombudsman
Office of the Australian Information Commissioner
Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman
Australian Communications and Media Authority
During the reporting period interception warrants were only available to 17 Commonwealth, state and territory agencies including:
ACC, ACLEI and AFP
State and Territory Police, and
State anti-corruption agencies.
A full list of the agencies able to obtain an interception warrant is provided in Appendix B.
Serious offences Interception warrants can only be obtained to investigate serious offences. Serious offences generally carry a penalty of at least seven years’ imprisonment.
Serious offences for which interception can be obtained under the TIA Act include murder, kidnapping, serious drug offences, terrorism, offences involving child pornography, money laundering, and offences involving organised crime.
In the 2013 report Organised Crime in Australia, the Australian Crime Commission (the ACC) assessed the overall risk to Australia from organised crime as high10 and estimated the cost to Australia of organised crime such as identity crime, money laundering, fraud, cybercrime, drug trafficking and people smuggling at $15 billion per year.11
10 ACC, Organised Crime in Australia 2013, www.crimecommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/files/ACC %20OCA%202013.pdf, p. 12 11 ACC, Organised Crime in Australia 2013, p. 6.
P a g e | 10 The information provided in Table 1 illustrates the important role telecommunications interception plays in investigating serious crimes. Consistent with previous years, in 2013–14 agencies obtained the majority of warrants to assist with investigations into serious drug offences (1,772 warrants). Loss of life or personal injury offences were specified in 624 warrants and 447 warrants related to murder investigations. Organised crime was specified as an offence in 246 warrants. The total number of offences is typically larger than the total number of warrants issued as warrants can be issued to investigate more than one serious offence.
Information about the serious offences covered under each category of serious offence set out in the first column of Table 1 is provided in Appendix D.
P a g e | 11 Table 1: Categories of serious offences specified in telecommunications interception warrants— ss. 100(1)(f), 100(1)(g), 100(2)(f) and 100(2)(g) L 2 6 A 5 0 4 1 7 6 5 8 9 7 3 2 4 1 - - - T 3 2 8 8 2 2 3 4 4 0 5 2 7 4 6 5 8 , , 2 2 6 2 4 2 1 1 O 1 4 T ) C A A ------6 6 S C ( I
C 3 6 ------A 3 1 1 B I
L 0 7 A 3 7 8 5 5 3 ------1 6 1 O 0 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 W P 3
L 6 C 6 9 5 ------2 9 1 1 3 O I 7 4 5 5 P V 1 S A T 4 5 ------9 2 2 L 3 O P
L 0 3 8 A ------1 7 9 1 1 O 3 4 6 S P 1
L 4 7 D 9 1 2 ------1 4 0 O 0 L 1 2 5 2 P 3 Q C 9 5 ------I 2 4 2 3 P
L 3 3 T ------3 7 O 3 4 N P
4 L 9 0 6 2 1 W 8 2 5 2 9 - - - - - 5 5 1 6 4 8 8 6 6 O 1 3 3 5 5 5 S 4 1 1 4 , P N 1
1 0 W C 1 1 6 2 ------5 3 3 3 6 1 4 5 1 S C 2 3 N ) C W 1 1 A ------S 2 C 2 N I ( )
D C 2 4 8 ------2 L C 1 2 3 Q C ( )
C A 0 4 ------4 C 6 6 W C ( 1 P 1 3 2 1 0 6 2 8 4 - - - - - 2 3 3 9 5 7 9 5 F 6 2 1 4 1 2 2 1 4 1 A 9 I E 7 9 L ------2 3 3 C A 3 C 5 5 ------3 3 C 5 1 2 A 2
P a g e | 12 CATEGORIES OF OFFENCESTOTAL Eligibility to anEligibilityinterception issue warrantto been nominated theby Attorney-Generalto warrants. issue A nominatedmember AAT is a deputy president, senior member or member the of who AAT has members of: Attorney An eligible judge is judge hasa who consented in writingand been declared by the Appeals Tribunal (AAT) member. Table shows 2 that in 2013–14were there 80 issuingauthorities. An interception warrant may be only by issued eligible an or aJudge nominated Administrative ACC SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS 235 Table 2: Table and nominated AAT Members to issuetointerception nominated warrants—s. 103(ab)Membersand telecommunications AAT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 2 the Federal Court. Circuit the Family of Court Australia the Federal of Court Australia - General be to eligible an Injudge. the reporting period, eligible judges included Availability of Federal Court Judges, Family Court Judges, Federal Circuit Court Judges CourtCourt Court Federal FamilyCircuit of Judges, Availability Judges, Federal ASSISTING A PERSON TO ESCAPE OR DISPOSE OF PROCEEDS 43
BRIBERY OR CORRUPTION; OFFENCES AGAINST SS 131.1, 135.1, 142.1, 142.2, 148.2, 268.112 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE 220
CARTEL OFFENCES -
Issuing authority Issuing CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENCES 8
CONSPIRE / AID / ABET SERIOUS OFFENCE 62
CYBERCRIME OFFENCES 8
KIDNAPPING 54
LOSS OF LIFE OR PERSONAL INJURY 624
MONEY LAUNDERING 231 Number eligibleNumber MURDER 447
ORGANISED OFFENCES AND/OR CRIMINAL ORGANISATIONS 246
PEOPLE SMUGGLING AND RELATED -
SERIOUS DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND/OR SERIOUS ARSON 105
SERIOUS DRUG OFFENCES AND/OR TRAFFICKING 1,772 e g a P
SERIOUS FRAUD AND/OR REVENUE LOSS 81 | 13 TELECOMMUNICATIONS OFFENCES -
TERRORISM OFFENCES 158
TOTAL 4,296 Federal Court judges 11 Family Court judges 7
Federal Circuit Court judges 33
Nominated AAT members 29
Before issuing an interception warrant the authority must be satisfied that:
the agency is investigating a serious offence
the gravity of the offence warrants the intrusion into privacy
the interception is likely to support the investigation.
Applications for and issue of telecommunications interception warrants Tables 3 and 4 set out information about the number of eligible judges and nominated AAT members and the agencies to which they issued warrants. In 2013–14, issuing authorities issued 4,007 interception warrants, a decrease of around 5 per cent from 2012–13, when 4,232 warrants were issued. Interception warrants are highly privacy intrusive and are only sought when operationally necessary.
P a g e | 14 Table 3: Number of telecommunications interception warrants issued by Federal Court judges, Family Court judges, Federal Circuit Court judges and nominated AAT members—s. 103(ab) Issuing authority Nominated Family Court Federal Court Federal Circuit Agency AAT judges judges Court judges members ACC - 2 17 234 ACLEI - - 20 5 AFP 13 105 56 510 CCC (WA) 7 - - 57 CCC (QLD) - - 3 35 ICAC (NSW) - - - 21 NSW CC - - - 349 NSW POLICE - - 105 1,409 NT POLICE12 - - 23 20 PIC - - - 35 QLD POLICE - - 227 77 SA POLICE13 - 6 15 111 TAS POLICE - - - 35 VIC POLICE - - - 188 WA POLICE 196 - - 104 IBAC - - - 16 ICAC (SA) - - - 6 Total 216 113 466 3,212
12 NT Police has advised the Attorney-General’s Department that the 2012–13 report should be revised to note that 21 warrants were issued by AAT members, 2 warrants were issued by Federal Court judges and 48 by Federal Circuit judges. 13 SA Police has advised the Attorney-General’s Department that the 2012–13 Report should be revised to note that 124 warrants were issued by AAT members, 1 warrant was issued by a Federal Court judge and 1 warrant was issued by a Federal Circuit Court judge.
P a g e | 15 Table 4: Applications for telecommunications interception warrants, telephone interception warrants and renewal applications—ss. 100(1)(a)-(c) and 100(2)(a)-(c)
Telephone Applications for Renewal Relevant applications for Agency warrants applications15 statistics warrants14
12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 Made 195 253 - - 36 25 ACC Refused/withdrawn ------Issued 195 253 - - 36 25 Made 10 25 - - 3 17 ACLEI Refused/withdrawn ------Issued 10 25 - - 3 17 Made 640 690 - - 149 143 AFP Refused/withdrawn 6 6 - - - - Issued 634 684 - - 149 143 Made 17 67 - - - 23 CCC (WA) Refused/withdrawn - 3 - - - - Issued 17 64 - - - 23 Made 26 38 - - 2 7 CCC (QLD) Refused/withdrawn ------Issued 26 38 - - 2 7 Made 5 21 - - 1 8 ICAC (NSW) Refused/withdrawn ------Issued 5 21 - - 1 8 Made 417 349 - - 105 71 NSW CC Refused/withdrawn 1 - - - - - Issued 416 349 - - 105 71 Made 1,846 1,519 70 57 182 197 NSW POLICE Refused/withdrawn 7 5 1 - - - Issued 1,839 1,514 69 57 182 197 Made 71 43 - - 2 4 NT POLICE Refused/withdrawn ------Issued 71 43 - - 2 4 Made 70 35 - - 35 8 PIC Refused/withdrawn ------Issued 70 35 - - 35 8 Made 292 308 - - 36 33 QLD POLICE Refused/withdrawn - 4 - - - - Issued 292 304 - - 36 33 Made 126 132 - 3 6 9 SA POLICE16 Refused/withdrawn ------Issued 126 132 - 3 6 9 Made 23 35 - - 1 6 TAS POLICE Refused/withdrawn ------Issued 23 35 - - 1 6 Made 233 188 19 15 21 7 VIC POLICE Refused/withdrawn 1 - - - - - Issued 232 188 19 15 21 7 Made 276 300 1 - 28 44 WA POLICE Refused/withdrawn ------Issued 276 300 1 - 28 44 Made - 16 - - - 1 IBAC Refused/withdrawn ------Issued - 16 - - - 1 Made - 6 - - - - ICAC (SA) Refused/withdrawn ------Issued - 6 - - - - Made 4,247 4,025 90 75 607 603 Total Refused/withdrawn 15 18 1 - - - Issued 4,232 4,007 89 75 607 603 In exceptional circumstances an issuing authority can issue an interception warrant that
14 Telephone applications are part of the total application of warrants. 15 A renewal is a warrant that is issued for an existing warrant that is still in force 16 SA Police has advised the Attorney-General’s Department that the 2012–13 figure should be revised up from 121 warrants to 126 warrants.
P a g e | 16 authorises entry on to premises to carry out telecommunications interception. An issuing authority can only issue such a warrant if satisfied that it would be impracticable or inappropriate to intercept communications by less intrusive means. Agencies only use this type of warrant on rare occasions. One warrant was issued in 2013–14 (see Table 5).
Table 5: Applications for telecommunications interception warrants authorising entry on premises —ss. 100(1)(d) and 100(2)(d)
Warrants authorising entry Agency Relevant statistics on premises 12/13 13/14 Made 11 - AFP Refused/withdrawn - - Issued 11 - Made 1 1 CCC (WA) Refused/withdrawn - - Issued 1 1 Made 1 - NSW CC Refused/withdrawn - - Issued 1 - Made 13 1 Total Refused/withdrawn - - Issued 13 1
An issuing authority can place conditions or restrictions on an interception warrant. Figure 1 provides information about the use of warrants issued with conditions or restrictions. In 2013–14, 84 interception warrants were issued with a condition or a restriction, 25 per cent less than the last reporting period (in 2012–13, 112 warrants were issued with a condition or a restriction).
Figure 1: Telecommunications interception warrants issued with specific conditions or restrictions —ss. 100(1)(e) and 100(2)(e)
P a g e | 17 Effectiveness of telecommunications interception warrants The information provided in this section should be interpreted with some caution, particularly in presuming a relationship between the number of arrests, prosecutions (which include committal proceedings) and convictions in a reporting period. An arrest recorded in one reporting period may not result in a prosecution until a later reporting period. Any resulting conviction could be recorded in that or a subsequent reporting period. Additionally, the number of arrests may not equate to the number of charges laid as an arrested person may be prosecuted and convicted for a number of offences, some or all of which may be prosecuted at a later time.
The tables may also understate the effectiveness of interception in so far as, in some cases, prosecutions may be initiated and convictions recorded, without the need to give intercepted information in evidence. In particular, agencies continue to report that telecommunications interception effectively enables investigators to identify persons involved in and the infrastructure of, organised criminal activities. In many cases, the weight of evidence obtained through telecommunications interception results in defendants entering guilty pleas, thereby eliminating the need for the intercepted information to be introduced into evidence.
In 2013–14 there were 2,938 arrests, 4,008 prosecutions and 2,210 convictions based on lawfully intercepted material.
The following table shows the number of arrests made by law enforcement agencies over the past two years on the basis of lawfully intercepted information.
Table 6: Arrests on the basis of lawfully intercepted information—ss. 102(1)(a) and 102(2)(a)
Arrests Agency 12/13 13/14
ACC 62 105 ACLEI 6 10 AFP 296 209 CCC (WA) 0 1 CCC (QLD) 32 10 NSW CC 91 139 NSW POLICE 1,162 1,181 NT POLICE 58 47 PIC 15 50 QLD POLICE 537 437 SA POLICE 109 121 TAS POLICE 7 57 VIC POLICE 338 254 WA POLICE 238 317 Total 2,951 2,938
P a g e | 18 CASE STUDY: CORRUPTION AND CRIME COMMISSION (WA)
A former detective sergeant with the Western Australia Police Service (WA Police) has been jailed in what a magistrate described as ‘particularly serious’ offences relating to breaches of the TIA Act.
In 2013–14, the Corruption and Crime Commission of Western Australia (the Commission) secured multiple convictions against the former officer, including a conviction for contravening the TIA Act’s prohibition for communicating interception warrant information.
After a five month investigation by the Commission into offences that occurred between 2008 and 2013, the former officer was charged with a total of 17 offences. These included one count of unlawful dealing in interception warrant information, 15 counts of unlawful use of a restricted-access computer system and one count of supplying an audio-visual recording of an interview. The former officer was charged in August 2013 and sentenced to nine months imprisonment in September 2014.
The officer was involved in a personal relationship with a lawyer to whom he communicated two affidavits: one relating to a telephone interception warrant and the other to a surveillance devices warrant, both of which contained interception warrant information. The lawyer was not involved in the WA Police investigation.
The Deputy Chief Magistrate noted that the disclosure of the interception warrant information had the potential to seriously compromise investigations, as the documents would normally be the subject of a non-disclosure order. In sentencing the former officer to nine months imprisonment for these offences, the Deputy Chief Magistrate acknowledged that any term of imprisonment for a former officer ‘would be difficult’ but stated that it was the only way to deal with the gravity of the offences.
The following tables show the number of prosecutions and convictions in which lawfully intercepted information was given in evidence by each of the law enforcement agencies. More information about the offences listed in these tables is provided at Appendix D.
P a g e | 19 Table 7: Prosecutions in which lawfully intercepted information was given in evidence L 0 8 A 1 5 8 0 3 4 5 5 9 4 6 8 6 0 - - T 1 5 6 4 1 7 5 9 0 2 1 2 4 1 2 7 7 3 2 , , 2 5 5 O 2 4 T
A 4 8 5 W 2 ------7 8 7 4 0 1 1 L 2 5 8 O P
C I 5 2 6 7 0 V ------0 1 4 9 8 8 0 4 7 3 L 2 1 4 O P S A T ------L O P
A 7 S 0 1 0 ------1 7 3 8 7 L 2 1 8 1 1 O P
D L 0 9 7 8 ------Q 5 4 7 4 3 4 3 L 1 1 3 O P
T N ------1 2 3 L O P
W 1 6 S 5 0 4 8 4 5 2 3 6 8 4 ------3 8 3 1 4 7 8 N 0 2 2 1 4 2 1 8 , 1 2 2 L , 1 1 O P
W 1 2 S 9 4 ------1 3 0 2 4 1 1 N 1 1 C C C A C I ) ------1 6 7 W S N (
C C C 2 3 ) ------1 2 2 D L Q (
C C C 1 ------4 7 1 9 ) 2 A W ( 0 P 9 5 3 ------0 1 9 1 1 6 4 1 F 9 1 4 1 A 1 I E L ------1 4 5 C A C 1 ------2 9 C 1 A
P a g e | 20 CATEGORIES OF OFFENCES TOTAL
ACC SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS -
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 1
ASSISTING A PERSON TO ESCAPE OR DISPOSE OF PROCEEDS 5
BRIBERY OR CORRUPTION; OFFENCES AGAINST SS131.1, 19 135.1, 142.1, 142.2, 148.2, 268.112 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE
CARTEL OFFENCES -
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENCES 24
CONSPIRE / AID / ABET SERIOUS OFFENCE 44
CYBERCRIME OFFENCES 15
KIDNAPPING 26
LOSS OF LIFE OR PERSONAL INJURY 271
MONEY LAUNDERING 78
MURDER 76
ORGANISED OFFENCES AND/OR CRIMINAL ORGANISATIONS 555
PEOPLE SMUGGLING AND RELATED 6
SERIOUS DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND/OR SERIOUS ARSON 35
SERIOUS DRUG OFFENCES AND/OR TRAFFICKING 2,230
SERIOUS FRAUD AND/OR REVENUE LOSS 20 e g a P TELECOMMUNICATIONS OFFENCES 4 1
| TERRORISM OFFENCES 21 OTHER SERIOUS OFFENCES 598 4,008 TOTAL Table 8: Convictions in which lawfully intercepted information was given in evidence L 7 0 A 9 9 1 5 1 6 4 3 8 6 9 - - - - - T 4 9 7 4 4 9 1 2 2 1 1 8 3 1 1 2 , , 2 4 O 1 2 T
A 6 3 1 W ------2 4 4 5 2 2 8 L 1 3 4 O P
C I 4 3 8 4 1 V ------8 1 4 4 4 5 5 4 2 8 L 1 3 O P
A S 2 ------1 9 2 L 1 O P
D L 0 9 7 8 ------Q 7 2 7 4 3 4 3 L 1 1 3 O P
T N 4 7 ------3 L 2 2 O P
W S 7 0 6 0 8 9 ------0 4 2 9 7 2 7 7 7 N 9 2 1 1 4 1 L 7 O P
W S 5 3 ------1 3 4 8 2 7 N 9 C C C A C I ) ------1 5 6 W S N (
C C C 2 3 ) ------1 2 2 D L Q (
C C C 1 ------4 7 1 9 ) 2 A W ( P 1 3 1 ------4 2 4 1 F 2 1 4 A I E L ------1 4 5 C A C ------3 C 3 A
P a g e | 22 CATEGORIES OF OFFENCES TOTAL
ACC SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS -
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE -
ASSISTING A PERSON TO ESCAPE OR DISPOSE OF PROCEEDS 4
BRIBERY OR CORRUPTION; OFFENCES AGAINST SS131.1, 13 135.1, 142.1, 142.2. 148.2, 268.112 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE
CARTEL OFFENCES -
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENCES 9
CONSPIRE / AID / ABET SERIOUS OFFENCE 11
CYBERCRIME OFFENCES 7
KIDNAPPING 4
LOSS OF LIFE OR PERSONAL INJURY 88
MONEY LAUNDERING 36
MURDER 19
ORGANISED OFFENCES AND/OR CRIMINAL ORGANISATIONS 299
PEOPLE SMUGGLING AND RELATED 4
SERIOUS DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND/OR SERIOUS ARSON 16
SERIOUS DRUG OFFENCES AND/OR TRAFFICKING 1,257
SERIOUS FRAUD AND/OR REVENUE LOSS 24 e g a P
TELECOMMUNICATIONS OFFENCES - |
23 TERRORISM OFFENCES -
OTHER SERIOUS OFFENCES 419 2,210 TOTAL Named person warrants A named person warrant can authorise the interception of telecommunications services (such as a landline or mobile service), and in certain circumstances, telecommunications devices (such as a mobile handset). Before issuing a named person warrant an issuing authority must take into account: how much the privacy of any person would be likely to be interfered with
the gravity of the offence
whether the interception will assist in the investigation
the extent to which methods other than using a named person warrant are available to the agency.
The following tables and figures show that in 2013–14, 999 named person warrants were issued, a 12 per cent increase from 2012–13. The increase is consistent with fluctuations associated with operational demand (between 2011–12 and 2012–13 there was a 28 per cent increase in the number of named person warrants issued).
P a g e | 24 Table 9: Original applications for named person warrants, telephone applications for named person warrants and renewal applications—ss. 100(1)(ea) and 100(2)(ea)
Telephone Applications for Renewal applications applications for named person for named person Relevant named person Agency warrants statistics warrants warrants 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 Made 124 168 - - 30 22 ACC Refused/withdrawn ------Issued 124 168 - - 30 22 Made 3 4 - - 2 1 ACLEI Refused/withdrawn ------Issued 3 4 - - 2 1 Made 290 318 - - 96 106 AFP Refused/withdrawn 5 3 - - - - Issued 285 315 - - 96 106 Made 3 2 - - - 1 CCC (WA) Refused/withdrawn ------Issued 3 2 - - - 1 Made 9 13 - - 1 6 CCC (QLD) Refused/withdrawn ------Issued 9 13 - - 1 6 Made 96 145 - - 19 32 NSW CC Refused/withdrawn ------Issued 96 145 - - 19 32 Made 132 105 - - 27 25 NSW POLICE Refused/withdrawn ------Issued 132 105 - - 27 25 Made 2 3 - - - - NT POLICE Refused/withdrawn ------Issued 2 3 - - - - Made 3 - - - 1 - PIC Refused/withdrawn ------Issued 3 - - - 1 - Made 42 42 - - 7 6 QLD POLICE Refused/withdrawn - 1 - - - - Issued 42 41 - - 7 6 Made 32 25 - - 1 - SA POLICE Refused/withdrawn ------Issued 32 25 - - 1 - Made 1 9 - - 1 4 TAS POLICE Refused/withdrawn ------Issued 1 9 - - 1 4 Made 69 44 1 1 8 1 VIC POLICE Refused/withdrawn ------Issued 69 44 1 1 8 1 Made 94 117 - - 15 26 WA POLICE Refused/withdrawn ------Issued 94 117 - - 15 26 Made - 8 - - - 1 IBAC Refused/withdrawn ------Issued - 8 - - - 1 Made 900 1,003 1 1 208 231 Total Refused/withdrawn 5 4 - - - - Issued 895 999 1 1 208 231
Under the TIA Act, issuing authorities can issue a warrant with conditions and restrictions about interceptions under the warrant. In 2013–14, 17 named person warrants were issued with a condition or restriction. In 2012–13, 12 named person warrants were issued with conditions or restrictions.
P a g e | 25 Figure 2: Named person warrants issued with conditions or restrictions—ss. 100(1)(ea) and 100(2)(ea)
Consistent with the last reporting period, in 2013–14 the majority of named person warrants were for the interception of between two to five telecommunications services.
Table 10: Number of services intercepted under named person warrants—ss. 100(1)(eb) and 100(2)(eb) Relevant statistics Agency 1 service only 2 – 5 services 6 – 10 services 10+ services 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 ACC 31 47 63 106 20 12 6 - ACLEI - 2 3 2 - - - - AFP 61 44 133 195 27 23 7 2 CCC (WA) - - 1 1 1 - 1 1 CCC (QLD) 1 5 8 6 - 2 - - NSW CC 34 51 57 82 2 8 3 1 NSW POLICE 31 29 64 59 11 11 - - NT POLICE - - 1 1 1 1 - 1 PIC ------3 - QLD POLICE 8 8 29 27 3 6 2 - SA POLICE 5 4 22 18 7 2 - - TAS POLICE - - - 7 - 2 1 - VIC POLICE 11 8 54 32 4 4 - - WA POLICE 20 33 66 74 8 10 - - IBAC - - - 6 - 2 - - Total 202 231 501 616 84 83 23 5
P a g e | 26 In 2013–14, a total of 2,745 telecommunications services were intercepted under service-based named person warrants.
Figure 3: Total number of services intercepted under service-based name person warrants— ss. 100(1)(ec) and 100(2)(ec)
Table 11: Total number of services and devices intercepted under device-based named person warrants—ss. 100(1)(ec) and 100(2)(ec) Services Devices Agency 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 ACC - - 17 19 AFP - - 66 60 NSW CC - 1 2 5 NSW POLICE 32 10 26 13 Total 32 11 111 97
Under the TIA Act, agencies can apply for a named person warrant in relation to telecommunications devices, where a device or devices of interest can be identified. Table 11 shows, consistent with previous years, that in 2013–14 device-based named person warrants were used by only a few agencies.
B-Party warrants Definition
A ‘B-Party warrant’ is a warrant that enables an interception agency to intercept the communications of a person who is communicating with a person suspected of involvement in a serious offence.
An issuing authority can issue a B-Party warrant, but only if there are no other practicable methods of identifying the telecommunications services of the person involved in the offences, or if interception of communications from that person’s telecommunications services would not otherwise be possible.
P a g e | 27 Table 12 shows that in 2013–14, 139 B-Party warrants were issued, around 16 per cent more than in 2012–13. Around 10 per cent of those warrants were issued with conditions on restrictions (see Table 12).
Table 12: Applications for B-Party warrants, telephone applications for B-Party warrants, and renewal applications—ss. 100(1)(ed) and 100(1)(ed) Renewal Telephone Applications for applications for Relevant applications for B- Agency B-Party warrants B-Party statistics Party warrants warrants 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 Made 1 - - - - - ACC Refused/withdrawn ------Issued 1 - - - - - Made 2 11 - - 1 10 ACLEI Refused/withdrawn ------Issued 2 11 - - 1 10 Made 34 62 - - 21 18 AFP Refused/withdrawn ------Issued 34 62 - - 21 18 Made 3 - - - - - CCC (WA) Refused/withdrawn ------Issued 3 - - - - - Made 1 6 - - - 1 NSW CC Refused/withdrawn ------Issued 1 6 - - - 1 Made 71 57 20 8 4 - NSW POLICE Refused/withdrawn 1 - 1 - - - Issued 70 57 19 8 4 - Made - 3 - - - 1 SA POLICE Refused/withdrawn ------Issued - 3 - - - 1 Made 6 - - - - - QLD POLICE Refused/withdrawn ------Issued 6 - - - - - Made 2 - - - - - VIC POLICE Refused/withdrawn ------Issued 2 - - - - - Made 1 - - - - - WA POLICE Refused/withdrawn ------Issued 1 - - - - - Made 121 139 20 8 26 30 Total Refused/withdrawn 1 - 1 - - - Issued 120 139 19 8 26 30
P a g e | 28 Table 13: B-Party warrants issued with conditions or restrictions—ss. 100(1)(ed) and 100(2)(ed)
Applications for B-Party Agency warrants 12/13 13/14 ACLEI 2 11 AFP 3 - NSW POLICE 1 2 Total 6 13
Duration of warrants Under the TIA Act, a telecommunications interception warrant, other than a B-Party warrant, can be in force for up to 90 days. Under section 57, the chief executive of an agency may revoke a warrant at any time and must revoke a warrant if they are satisfied that the conditions for issuing the warrant no longer exist. Table 14 sets out the average length of time for which interception warrants—including renewals, but not including B-Party warrants—were issued and the average length of time they were in force.
P a g e | 29 Table 14: Duration of original and renewal telecommunications interception warrants—ss. 101(1) (a)-(d) and 101(2)(a)-(d)
Duration of original Duration of renewal of telecommunications interception telecommunications interception warrants warrants Agency Average period Average period Average period Average period specified in warrants in force specified in warrants in force warrants (days) (days) warrants (days) (days)
ACC 88 51 90 58 ACLEI 77 62 64 57 AFP 80 49 90 74 CCC (WA) 59 48 69 46 CCC (QLD) 69 60 85 70 ICAC (NSW) 86 64 80 57 NSW CC 53 89 86 71 NSW POLICE 67 48 72 56 NT POLICE 87 56 90 82 PIC 70 85 65 62 QLD POLICE 61 43 61 56 SA POLICE 81 63 84 66 TAS POLICE 55 46 60 56 VIC POLICE 79 56 90 54 WA POLICE 89 54 90 56 ICAC (SA) 57 35 - - IBAC 86 72 90 - Average 73 58 79 61
P a g e | 30 Under the TIA Act, a B-Party warrant can be in force for up to 45 days. The following table sets out the average length of time for which B-Party warrants and renewals of those warrants were issued and the average length of time they were in force.
Table 15: Duration of original and renewal B-Party warrants—ss. 101(1)(da) and 101(2)(da) Duration of original Duration of renewal of telecommunications B-Party warrants telecommunications B-Party warrants Average period Average period Average period Average period Agency specified in warrants in force specified in warrants in force warrants (days) (days) warrants (days) (days)
ACLEI 45 45 45 42 AFP 41 32 45 43 NSW CC 44 44 45 45 NSW POLICE 36 24 - - SA POLICE 44 32 44 32 Average 42 35 45 41
A final renewal means a telecommunications interception warrant that is the last renewal of an original warrant. A final renewal is recorded as the number of days after the issue of the original warrant that the last renewal of the warrant ceases to be in force.
The categories of final renewals are:
90 day final renewal—a last renewal that ceases to be in force more than 90 days but not more than 150 days after the date of issue of the original warrant
150 day final renewal—a last renewal that ceases to be in force more than 150 days but not more than 180 days after the date of issue of the original warrant
180 day final renewal—a last renewal that ceases to be in force more than 180 days after the date of issue of the original warrant.
Table 16 provides information on the number of final renewals used by agencies.
P a g e | 31 Table 16: Number of final renewals—ss. 101(1)(e) and 101(2)(e) 90 days 150 days 180 days Agency 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 ACC17 9 9 9 9 8 1 ACLEI - - - 1 1 3 AFP 22 64 4 2 28 23 CCC (QLD) 1 - 1 - - 2 ICAC (NSW) 1 1 - 2 - 2 NSW CC 5 12 19 27 24 15 NSW POLICE 72 79 25 48 14 34 PIC - 4 28 - - 3 QLD POLICE 14 14 12 4 1 3 SA POLICE 2 6 - - - 1 TAS POLICE - 5 - - - - NT POLICE - - - 1 - - CCC (WA) - 6 - 1 - 2 VIC POLICE 8 2 - - - - WA POLICE 9 - 17 30 1 1 Total 143 202 115 125 77 90
Eligible warrants Definition
An ‘eligible warrant’ is a warrant that was in force during the reporting period —not necessarily a warrant that was issued during the reporting period—where a prosecution was instituted or was likely to be instituted on the basis of information obtained by interceptions under the warrant.
Table 17 indicates what percentage of each agency’s total warrants in force during the reporting period were eligible warrants.
Table 17 sets out the number of eligible warrants issued to agencies during the reporting period and the percentage of warrants issued to agencies that were eligible warrants.
17 The ACC has provided revised figures for the 2012–13 reporting period. Table 13 provides these new figures.
P a g e | 32 Table 17: Percentage of eligible warrants—ss. 102(3) and 102(4)
Total number of Number of Agency % warrants eligible warrants ACC 192 124 65 ACLEI 32 8 25 AFP 458 245 53 CCC (WA) 66 37 56 CCC (QLD) 42 15 36 ICAC (NSW) 21 7 33 NSW CC 411 366 89 NSW POLICE 1,579 1,222 77 NT POLICE 50 22 44 PIC 35 13 37 QLD POLICE 337 322 96 SA POLICE 132 87 66 TAS POLICE 34 24 71 VIC POLICE 205 150 73 IBAC 16 10 63 ICAC (SA) 6 3 50 WA POLICE 339 191 56 TOTAL 3,955 2,846 72
Interception without a warrant Under the TIA Act, agencies can undertake interception without a warrant in limited circumstances, for example, where there is a serious threat to life or the possibility of serious injury. Table 18a reports on interceptions under subsection 7(5) of the TIA Act, which relates to situations where the person to whom the communication is directed consents to the interception. Table 18b reports on subsection 7(4) of the TIA Act, which relates to situations where an officer of the agency undertaking the interception is a party to the communication. There were no interceptions under subsection 7(4) of the TIA Act in 2011–12 and 2012–13.
P a g e | 33 Table 18a: Interception without a warrant—s. 102A Consent where person likely to receive communication from person who has: Committed an act that Threatened to take, Threatened to kill or Threatened to cause Agency has or may result in endanger, or create seriously injure serious damage to loss of life or serious serious threat to own another property personal injury life/safety 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 AFP - - 1 5 - - - - Total - - 1 5 - - - -
Table 18b: Interception without a warrant—s. 102A Agency is a party to the communication and has reasonable grounds for believing person likely to receive communication from person who has: Committed an act Agency that has or may Threatened to kill or Threatened to cause Threatened to take, result in loss of life or seriously injure serious damage to endanger, or create serious serious personal another property threat to own life/safety injury 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 AFP - - - 5 - - - - NSW POLICE ------1 Total - - - 5 - - - 1
Mutual assistance Section 102B of the TIA Act requires that the annual report include information about the number of occasions on which lawfully intercepted information or interception warrant information was provided to a foreign country under paragraph 68(1) or section 68A of the TIA Act in connection with an authorisation made under subsection 13A(1) of the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987. Consistent with the 2012–13 reporting period, agencies reported that no information was provided under these provisions in 2013–14.
Number of interceptions carried out on behalf of other agencies The TIA Act supports the ability of interception agencies to cooperate and to work collaboratively by enabling one interception agency to carry out interception on behalf of other agencies. Typically this occurs when a larger agency assists a smaller agency to intercept to reduce the costs of the smaller agency.
P a g e | 34 Table 19: Number of interceptions carried out on behalf of other agencies—s. 103(ac) Interception carried Interception carried Number of out by: out on behalf of: interceptions: ACC ACLEI 10 ACC CCC (QLD) 49 AFP ACLEI 40 NSW POLICE NSW CC 1 VIC POLICE TAS POLICE 40 IBAC ICAC (SA) 3 Total 143 198
P a g e | 35 Telecommunications interception expenditure Table 20 below provides information about the total expenditure (including expenditure of a capital nature) by interception agencies on telecommunications interception warrants and the average expenditure (total warrant expenditure divided by the number of warrants issued) per warrant. The average cost per warrant is significantly affected by capital expenditure (which can vary significantly, for instance, due to a capital upgrade program) and the number of warrants issued, meaning that smaller interception agencies typically have higher average costs as they apply for less warrants.
Table 20: Total expenditure incurred by each agency in connection with the execution of telecommunications interception warrants and Average expenditure per telecommunications interception warrant—ss. 103(a) and 103(aa) Agency Total expenditure ($) Average expenditure ($) ACC 7,210,000 28,498 ACLEI 787,497 31,500 AFP 10,541,869 15,412 CCC (WA) 1,431,412 22,366 CCC (QLD) 1,493,116 39,293 IBAC 1,454,405 90,900 ICAC (NSW) 252,289 12,014 NSW CC 3,072,249 8,803 NSW POLICE 6,805,841 4,495 NT POLICE 925,139 21,515 PIC 1,498,153 42,804 QLD POLICE 4,741,294 15,596 ICAC (SA) 45,420 7,570 SA POLICE 2,961,807 22,438 TAS POLICE 557,000 15,914 VIC POLICE 6,670,207 35,480 WA POLICE 3,467,883 11,560
Table 21 provides a breakdown of the total recurrent costs of interception over the reporting period. As agencies do not necessarily treat or record particular items of expenditure in the same way, caution should be exercised in comparing costs incurred by individual agencies.
P a g e | 36 Table 21: Recurrent costs of interceptions per agency Administrative Capital Interception Agency Salaries Total ($) support expenditure costs ACC18 5,877,274 158,635 192,224 980,807 7,208,940 ACLEI 611,203 140,820 - 35,473 787,496 AFP 8,103,605 174,597 1,760,955 502,712 10,541,869 CCC (WA) 1,046,391 7,906 296,853 80,262 1,431,412 CCC (QLD) 928,879 132,054 - 432,182 1,493,115 ICAC (NSW) 194,563 - - 57,726 252,289 NSW CC 2,033,475 - 345,056 693,718 3,072,249 NSW POLICE 5,252,529 118,379 - 1,434,933 6,805,841 NT POLICE 672,126 - 123,459 129,554 925,139 PIC 1,248,038 - - 250,115 1,498,153 QLD POLICE 3,097,332 614,886 281,380 747,695 4,741,293 SA POLICE 2,302,870 261,661 198,581 198,695 2,961,807 TAS POLICE 400,000 50,000 60,000 47,000 557,000 VIC POLICE 5,370,790 241,491 59,048 998,878 6,670,207 IBAC 1,122,373 54,962 93,200 183,870 1,454,405 ICAC (SA) 3,840 - 17,280 24,300 45,420 WA POLICE 3,099,492 204,757 - 163,634 3,467,883 Emergency service facilities Table 22 sets out the number of places that have been declared under the TIA Act to be emergency service facilities. Under the TIA Act, listening to or recording calls to and from a facility declared by the Minister to be an emergency service facility is not interception. This exemption ensures that emergency services can assist emergency callers and respond to critical situations as quickly as possible, without the need to first obtain a caller’s consent to recording of the call.
18 The ACC has advised the Attorney-General’s Department that the 2012–13 recurrent cost should be revised up from a total amount of $6,586,933 to $6,640,761.
P a g e | 37 Table 22: Emergency service facility declarations Emergency Fire State/territory Police Ambulance services Despatching brigade authority NEW SOUTH WALES 8 97 7 - 4 VICTORIA 18 - 30 3 22 QUEENSLAND 21 12 6 - 12 WESTERN 1 2 2 2 4 AUSTRALIA SOUTH AUSTRALIA 3 2 1 - 3 TASMANIA 1 2 1 - 2 AUSTRALIAN 3 - - - 3 CAPITAL TERRITORY NORTHERN 2 - 1 1 4 TERRITORY Total 57 115 48 6 54
Safeguards, controls and reporting requirements The TIA Act contains a number of safeguards, controls and reporting requirements in relation to interception, access to stored communications and disclosure of telecommunications data including:
the heads of interception agencies provide the Secretary of the Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) with a copy of each telecommunications interception warrant
interception agencies report to the Attorney-General, within three months of a warrant ceasing to be in force, detailing the use made of information obtained by the interception
the Secretary of the AGD maintains a General Register detailing the particulars of all telecommunications interception warrants. The Secretary of the AGD must provide the General Register to the Attorney-General for inspection every three months
the Secretary of the AGD maintains a Special Register recording the details of telecommunications interception warrants that do not lead to a prosecution within three months of the warrant expiring. The Special Register is also given to the Attorney-General to inspect.
Law enforcement agencies’ use of interception powers under the TIA Act is independently overseen by the Commonwealth Ombudsman and equivalent state bodies.
At least twice a year the Commonwealth Ombudsman must inspect the records kept by the ACC, ACLEI and the AFP relating to interceptions and the use, dissemination and destruction of intercepted information.
The Commonwealth Ombudsman is required under the TIA Act to report to the Attorney-General about these inspections, including information about any deficiencies identified and remedial
P a g e | 38 action.
State and Territory legislation imposes similar requirements on State and Territory interception agencies regarding their use of interception powers.
While the Commonwealth Ombudsman is responsible for inspecting the records of the ACC, ACLEI and the AFP in relation to interception, the relevant state or territory Ombudsman generally undertakes this function for State and Territory agencies. The reports of the inspections of the declared state and territory agencies are given to the responsible state or territory Minister who provides a copy to the Commonwealth Attorney-General.
The Commonwealth Ombudsman also conducts regular inspections of records in relation to access by enforcement agencies (including both Commonwealth and state agencies) to stored communications and reports to the Attorney-General on the results of those inspections.
Commonwealth Ombudsman—inspection of telecommunications interception records During the reporting period the Commonwealth Ombudsman conducted six inspections of the interception records of the ACC, ACLEI and the AFP (two inspections for each agency).
The Ombudsman found that there continued to be a high level of compliance with the telecommunications interception provisions of the TIA Act and that agencies were cooperative with inspections and receptive to suggestions for improvement.
Overall, the Ombudsman considered that agencies demonstrated a good understanding of the Act’s requirements, with all agencies found to be compliant with the majority of the Ombudsman’s inspection criteria. The Ombudsman’s inspection criteria (see Figures 4 and 5) are:
Were restricted records properly destroyed (s79)?
Were the requisite documents kept in connection with the issue of warrants (s80)?
Were warrants properly applied for and in the correct form (s49)?
Were the requisite records kept in connection with interceptions (s81)?
Were interceptions conducted in accordance with the warrants (s7) and was any unlawfully intercepted information properly dealt with (s63)?
P a g e | 39 Commonwealth Ombudsman’s summary of findings
Table 23: Summary of findings from the two inspections conducted at each agency during the reporting period Criteria ACC ACLEI AFP Ss7 and 63 – Interceptions Nothing to conducted in accordance with Nothing to indicate indicate Nothing to warrant, any unlawful information otherwise otherwise, with indicate otherwise properly dealt with one exception19 S49 – Warrants in the correct form Compliant except Compliant, except Compliant except for issues noted20 for issue noted21 for issues noted22 S79 – Restricted records properly Not assessed as Not assessed as destroyed Compliant no records no records destroyed destroyed S80 – Requisite records kept in Compliant, except Compliant, except Compliant connection with issue of warrant for issue noted23 for issue noted24 S81 – Requisite records kept in Compliant, except Compliant Compliant connection with interceptions for issue noted25
Further information about the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s telecommunications interception inspection criteria is outlined in Figure 4 and 5 below.
Commonwealth Ombudsman’s findings for individual agency
ACC No recommendations were made as a result of either of the two inspections of the ACC.
The Ombudsman acknowledged the commitment of the ACC to ensuring and improving agency compliance with TIA Act. In April 2014, the ACC introduced a compulsory online e-Learning module that staff will be required to undertake prior to being able to apply the provisions of the TIA Act.
19 Intercepted information from one warrant was not quarantined after ACLEI identified that the telecommunications number was no longer being used by the person listed on the warrant. ACLEI advised the Ombudsman it has taken measures to address this. 20 Two warrants had minor errors. The ACC self-disclosed that one warrant was not issued for a serious offence as it was not an ACC special investigation, one warrant referred to serious offences not listed in the affidavit and two warrants stated incorrect expiry dates. All self-disclosed warrants were voluntarily revoked. 21 Four warrants referred to ‘issuing authority’ rather than eligible Judge or nominated AAT member. 22 In eight instances, one self-disclosed and voluntarily revoked, warrants were not in the prescribed form. The AFP has advised the Ombudsman that training is ongoing. The AFP self-disclosed that two warrants were issued for longer than 90 days and one warrant was issued without an issue date. These warrants were voluntarily revoked. 23 A new warrant was given the same warrant number as the warrant it replaced. The ACC subsequently informed the Attorney-General’s Department about the additional warrant. 24 In one instance, only a certified copy of the warrant was kept on file. 25 In one instance, the particulars relating to the use of legally intercepted information were not kept.
P a g e | 40 ACLEI No recommendations were made as a result of either of the two inspections of ACLEI.
The Ombudsman noted in relation to one warrant that interception continued ten days after the carrier subscribed the telecommunications number to a different person (it appears the carrier did not advise ACLEI of the change). Initially, intercepted information not associated with the target was not quarantined and was still available to investigators. The Ombudsman reported that ACLEI advised that the information was not provided to investigators or used during ACLEI hearings and following the Ombudsman’s inspection was quarantined. ACLEI advised the Ombudsman that it has since addressed this issue.
AFP No recommendations were made as a result of either of the two inspections of the AFP.
The Ombudsman noted several instances where warrants were not in the prescribed form. The Ombudsman reported that in conjunction with ongoing training, the AFP was reviewing the prescribed forms to ensure key areas to be completed in the form were clear.
P a g e | 41 Figure 4: Commonwealth Ombudsman’s Telecommunications Interception Inspection Criteria
P a g e | 42 Figure 5: Other matters reportable under s.85
P a g e | 43 CHAPTER 2—STORED COMMUNICATIONS
Authorities and bodies that are ‘enforcement agencies’ under the TIA Act can apply to an independent issuing authority for a stored communications warrant to investigate a ‘serious contravention’ of the law.
Definition
An ‘enforcement agency’ is broadly defined to include all interception agencies as well as a body whose functions include administering a law imposing a pecuniary penalty or administering a law relating to the protection of the public revenue.
Stored communications include communications such as email, SMS or voice messages stored on a carrier’s network. In 2013–14, stored communications warrants were issued to several interception agencies and ASIC and Customs.
Definition
A ‘serious contravention’ includes:
serious offences (offences for which a telecommunications interception warrant can be obtained) offences punishable by imprisonment for a period of at least three years offences punishable by a fine of least 180 penalty units (currently $30,600) for individuals or 900 penalty units (currently $153,000) for non- individuals such as corporations.
P a g e | 44 Table 24: Applications and telephone applications for stored communications warrants—ss. 162(1) (a)-(b) and 162(2)(a)-(b)
Telephone applications Applications for stored for stored communications communications Agency Relevant statistics warrants warrants
12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 Made 10 4 - - ACC Refused/withdrawn - - - - Issued 10 4 - - Made - 3 - - ICAC (NSW) Refused/withdrawn - - - - Issued - 3 - - Made 44 39 - - AFP Refused/withdrawn - - - - Issued 44 39 - - Made - 3 - - ASIC Refused/withdrawn - - - - Issued - 3 - - Made - 1 - - CCC (WA) Refused/withdrawn - - - - Issued - 1 - - Made 1 1 - - CCC (QLD) Refused/withdrawn - - - - Issued 1 1 - - Made 8 12 - - CUSTOMS Refused/withdrawn - - - - Issued 8 12 - - Made 3 8 - - NSW CC Refused/withdrawn - - - - Issued 3 8 - - Made 233 233 - 1 NSW POLICE Refused/withdrawn - - - - Issued 233 233 - 1 Made 15 5 - - NT POLICE Refused/withdrawn - - - - Issued 15 5 - - Made 4 4 - - PIC Refused/withdrawn - - - - Issued 4 4 - - Made 101 107 - - QLD POLICE Refused/withdrawn - 1 - - Issued 101 106 - - Made 11 21 - - SA POLICE Refused/withdrawn - - - - Issued 11 21 - - Made 47 52 - - TAS POLICE Refused/withdrawn - - - - Issued 47 52 - - Made 26 47 - - VIC POLICE Refused/withdrawn - - - - Issued 26 47 - - Made 59 32 1 - WA POLICE Refused/withdrawn 1 - - - Issued 58 32 1 - Made 562 572 1 1 Total Refused/withdrawn 1 1 - - Issued 561 571 1 1
P a g e | 45 Effectiveness of stored communications warrants In 2013–14 law enforcement agencies made 153 arrests, conducted 176 proceedings and obtained 144 convictions based on evidence obtained under stored communications warrants.
Table 25: Number of arrests, proceedings and convictions made on the basis of lawfully accessed information—s. 163(a)-(b) Arrests Proceedings Convictions Agency 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 ACC 1 15 - 8 - - AFP 18 23 12 19 3 1 ASIC - - - - 3 - CCC (WA) - - - 2 - 2 CUSTOMS - 4 - 1 - 1 NSW POLICE 56 51 123 138 46 121 NT POLICE 6 2 - - - - QLD POLICE 18 23 4 - 4 - TAS POLICE 15 1 6 1 5 1 VIC POLICE 10 21 5 3 4 16 WA POLICE 8 13 2 4 - 2 Total 132 153 152 176 65 144
In 2012–13 law enforcement agencies made 132 arrests, conducted 152 prosecutions and obtained 65 convictions based on evidence obtained under stored communications warrants.
Care should be taken in interpreting Table 25 as an arrest recorded in one reporting period may not result in a prosecution (if any) until a later reporting period. Any resulting conviction may be recorded in that or an even later reporting period. Preservation notices Under Part 3-1A of Chapter 3 of the TIA Act, certain agencies can give a preservation notice to a carrier requiring the carrier to preserve all stored communications held that relate to the person or telecommunications service specified in the notice. The carrier is required to keep the stored communications while the notice is in force, which allows a period of time for enforcement agencies to obtain a warrant to access them. The purpose of the preservation notice is to prevent the communications from being destroyed before an agency can obtain a warrant to access the information.
The TIA Act provides for two types of preservation notices:
domestic preservation notices —which cover stored communications that might relate either to a contravention of certain Australian laws or to security
foreign preservation notices—which cover stored communications that might relate to a contravention of certain foreign laws. Only the AFP can give a foreign preservation notice to a carrier. The AFP can only issue a notice if a foreign country has requested the preservation of stored communications that relate to the contravention of certain foreign laws.
Domestic preservation notices must be revoked if the stored communications relating to the person or telecommunications service specified in the notice are no longer under investigation.
Foreign preservation notices must be revoked if 180 days has lapsed since the carrier was given the notice and the foreign country has not made a request to the Attorney-General for access to those communications in that time period or if the Attorney-General refuses the request to access the communications.
In 2013–14, 1,511 domestic preservation notices and 467 domestic preservation revocation notices were issued (see Table 26).
The Ombudsman has functions in relation to preservation notices given by issuing agencies (other than the Organisation) and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security has functions in relation to preservation notices given by the Organisation.
47 | P a g e Table 26: Domestic preservation notices—s. 161A(1)
Domestic Domestic preservation preservation Agency notice notice revocations issued issued
ACC 40 2
AFP 170 79
ASIC 143 4
CCC (WA) 1 -
CCC (QLD) 33 7
NSW ICAC 8 -
NSW CC 7 1
NSW POLICE 318 55
NT POLICE 36 16
PIC 8 -
QLD POLICE 353 136
SA POLICE 64 43
TAS POLICE 133 85
VIC POLICE 75 11
CUSTOMS 23 1
ACLEI 9 4
WA POLICE 90 23
Total 1,511 467
Under section 161A(2) of the TIA Act the AFP is required to report on foreign preservation notices. In 2013–14, the AFP reported that six foreign preservation notices and no foreign preservation notice revocation notices were issued.
48 | P a g e Mutual assistance The Cybercrime Legislation Amendment Act 2012 along with the Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation Amendment Act 2012 inserted reporting requirements into the TIA Act about mutual assistance requests. These requirements have been included in this Annual Report.
Table 27: Mutual assistance and stored communications warrants—s. 162(1)(c) Number of stored Number of stored communications Number of stored communications warrants applied for as a communications warrants issued as a Agency result of mutual warrants refused result of mutual assistance assistance 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14
AFP 6 - - - 6 - Total 6 - - - 6 -
Section 163A of the TIA Act provides that the annual report must provide information regarding the number of occasions in which lawfully accessed information or stored communications warrant information was provided to a foreign country under the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (the Mutual Assistance Act). In 2013-14 there were no occasions on which this information was provided to a foreign country under the Mutual Assistance Act.
Commonwealth Ombudsman—inspection of stored communications access records During the reporting period the Commonwealth Ombudsman inspected the preservation notices and stored communications access records of 17 enforcement agencies. The inspections are on the basis of a full year, and for this reason, the Ombudsman’s inspections of the enforcement agencies related to 2012–13 records.
During the 2013–14 inspection period, the Ombudsman noted that agencies have implemented the Ombudsman’s previous suggestions and recommendations, updating relevant policies and procedures to help staff to comply with the TIA Act. The Ombudsman’s inspection criteria are:
1. Were destructions properly conducted (sections 150 and 151(e))?
2. Were records properly kept (sections 150A and 151)?
3. Were preservation notices properly given (sections 107H(2), 107H(3), 107M, 107N, and 107S)?
4. Were preservation notices properly revoked (sections 107L, 107M, 107R and 107S)?
5. Were warrant applications properly made and warrants in the correct form (sections 113, 5E, 6B, 116(1)(d), 116(1)(da), 6DB, 118, and 119(5))?
6. Were warrants properly revoked (sections 122 and 123)?
7. Were conditions and restrictions on warrants adhered to (section 117)?
49 | P a g e 8. Was the authority of the warrant only exercised by an authorised officer and was lawfully accessed information only communicated to authorised officers (sections 127(1) and (2), and 135(2))?
9. Were stored communications accessed in accordance with the Act (sections 108, 117 and 119) and were any unlawfully accessed stored communications properly dealt with (section 133)?
Overall During 2013–14, the Ombudsman noted that most agencies displayed a positive attitude towards compliance and had adopted the Ombudsman’s suggestions from 2012–13. In particular, the Ombudsman noted that agencies have implemented measures to assure themselves that they are only dealing with lawfully accessed stored communications provided by carriers.
During this period the Ombudsman also conducted his first inspections of agencies’ preservation notice records.
Record keeping compliance Most agencies were assessed as compliant with the record keeping requirements relating to preservation notices and stored communications warrants under sections 150A and 151 of the TIA Act; however the Ombudsman made a small number of formal recommendations to agencies that they improve their record keeping procedures. The Ombudsman reported that agencies were generally responsive to these recommendations.
Preservation notices The Ombudsman identified a number of instances where preservation notices were not given and revoked in accordance with the TIA Act. As a result, the Ombudsman made a number of suggestions to agencies that they improve their processes to improve compliance with the TIA Act. The Ombudsman reported that agencies were generally responsive to these suggestions.
Destructions The Ombudsman reported that most agencies destroyed records under section 150 of the TIA Act, but that a number of these agencies were assessed as not compliant with certain provisions under section 150. Issues arose from reports not being submitted to the Attorney-General or destructions not occurring in accordance with the TIA Act. In some of these instances, the Ombudsman noted that agencies had destroyed the information for purposes such as limiting the use and disclosure of accessed stored communications.
Applying for warrants Based on the records made available at four of the inspected agencies, the Ombudsman identified deficiencies in the information provided to issuing authorities. Some agencies agreed with the Ombudsman’s findings and in response advised of appropriate actions while others advised that they were satisfied that sufficient information was provided.
Dealing with accessed stored communications provided by carriers During 2013–14, the Ombudsman again identified a number of instances where it appeared that stored communications that were not sent to or by the person named on the warrant were accessed by carriers and provided to several agencies, and where carriers had accessed stored
50 | P a g e communications after the relevant warrant had already expired. The Ombudsman reiterated to agencies the importance of “screening” all stored communications they receive from carriers to ensure that they are only dealing with lawfully accessed information.
Figure 6: Commonwealth Ombudsman Stored Communications Inspection Criteria
51 | P a g e 52 | P a g e Figure 7: Commonwealth Ombudsman Preservation Notice Inspection Criteria
53 | P a g e CHAPTER 3—TELECOMMUNICATIONS DATA
Access to telecommunications data is regulated by Chapter 4 of the TIA Act which permits enforcement agencies to authorise telecommunications carriers to disclose telecommunications data where that information is reasonably necessary for the enforcement of the criminal law, a law imposing a pecuniary penalty, or the protection of the public revenue.
Definition
An ‘enforcement agency’ is broadly defined to include all interception agencies as well as a body whose functions include administering a law imposing a pecuniary penalty or administering a law relating to the protection of the public revenue.
In 2013–14, 77 enforcement agencies made historical data authorisations.
Access to telecommunications data is a critical tool for investigating criminal offences and other activities that threaten community safety and security.
Definition
‘Telecommunications data’ is information about a communication—such as the phone numbers of the people who called each other, how long they talked to each other, the email address from which a message was sent and the time the message was sent.
Data is often the first source of lead information for further investigations, helping to eliminate potential suspects and to support applications for more privacy intrusive investigative tools including search warrants and interception warrants.
Under the TIA Act, all enforcement agencies can access historical data and criminal law enforcement agencies can also access prospective data. Disclosure of telecommunications data must be approved by an authorised senior officer of the relevant enforcement agency.
Definitions
‘Historical data’, also known as ‘existing data’, is information that is already in existence when an authorisation for disclosure is received by a telecommunications carrier.
‘Prospective data’ is telecommunications data that comes into existence during a period of time in which an authorisation is in force.
Only agencies recognised under the Act as being a ‘criminal law enforcement agency’ can authorise the disclosure of prospective data. During the reporting period, a ‘criminal law enforcement agency’ meant all interception agencies and Customs.
A criminal law-enforcement agency can only authorise the disclosure of prospective data when disclosure is considered to be reasonably necessary for the investigation of an offence punishable by imprisonment for at least three years. A prospective data authorisation comes into force once the relevant telecommunications service provider receives the request and is effective for 45 days or less.
54 | P a g e Existing data—enforcement of a criminal law Tables 28, 29, 30 and 31 provide information on agency use of historical data authorisations to enforce the criminal law.
Table 28: Number of authorisations made by a Law Enforcement Agency for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a criminal law—s. 186(1)(a) Authorisations Agency 12/13 13/14 ACC 3,789 5,447 ACLEI 2,594 2,244 AFP 25,582 21,358 CCC (WA) 1,538 1,804 CCC (QLD) 7,646 10,896 IBAC 20 321 ICAC (NSW) 575 933 NSW CC 3,120 3,294 NSW POLICE 119,705 111,889 NT POLICE 3,308 10,182 OPI 71 - PIC 1,771 1,475 QLD POLICE 41,120 35,663 SA POLICE 9,119 8,504 TAS POLICE 8,701 9,921 VIC POLICE 64,458 63,325 ICAC (SA) -1 16 WA POLICE 19,812 27,315 Total 312,929 314,587
In 2013–14, enforcement agencies made 324,260 data authorisations to enforce the criminal law. This was an increase of 4,228 or 1.3 per cent from the previous reporting period.
55 | P a g e CASE STUDY: AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE
Telecommunications data has played a pivotal role in bringing to justice an individual involved with child exploitation.
In February 2014, the Australian Federal Police received information regarding a person suspected of uploading suspicious photographs to an image-sharing website. Two different IP addresses were used by the suspect and requests were submitted to the relevant telecommunications companies to identify the users of the IPs. Data was not available for one of the IP addresses; however, data relating to the second IP address identified a subscriber and a location. The subscriber details provided by the telecommunications company gave police sufficient information to obtain search warrants, which led to the discovery of a large volume of child pornography material and information indicating possible abuse. The individual in possession of the material was subsequently arrested.
56 | P a g e CASE STUDY: VICTORIA POLICE
Telecommunications data has provided Victoria Police with the information to bring about the successful arrest and prosecution of individuals involved in a series of previously unsolved crimes.
In 2012, a person was the target of sustained racially motivated violence which included the fire-bombing of the victim’s business on two occasions. Although the victim was able to suggest a suspect police did not have enough evidence to arrest that person. CCTV footage of both fire bombings identified the vehicle used by the offender/s. The same vehicle was found burnt out the day after the owner had reported to police that the vehicle had been stolen. The crimes remained unsolved and were handed to an investigation team for review during the first half of 2013.
The investigation team accessed the telecommunications data of the owner of the stolen vehicle and analysis of this data revealed that the owner of the stolen car had been in contact with the arson suspect during the time his car was stolen, and during the times the arson was committed. The data also contradicted the statement the vehicle’s owner had made to police about the theft of his vehicle.
Close analysis of the CCTV footage showed that as the offender was in the process of lighting the fire, his mobile phone rang in his pocket, causing him to turn it off. The time on the CCTV footage and the time of the phone call (based on the telecommunications data received) showed that the owner of the vehicle made a hang-up call to the offender at the exact moment the offender grabbed his phone and turned it off. Further to this, the call charge records showed that this crucial call passed through a cell tower located only 50 to 100 metres from the victim’s business.
The call charge records were used to identify two further suspects from both arsons, and exculpated suspects from other violent offences the victim had suffered. Information provided by these records resulted in the identified offenders being charged with arson and associated offences, and both subsequently pleaded guilty to the charges.
57 | P a g e Table 29: Number of authorisations made by a Commonwealth Enforcement Agency for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a criminal law—s. 186(1)(a) Authorisations Agency 12/13 13/14 ACCC 134 10 AUSTRALIAN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY 2 3 ASIC 1,336 1,771 AUSTRALIAN TAXATION OFFICE 493 277 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY 4 - CUSTOMS 3,902 6,196 DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE 84 84 DEPT. OF DEFENCE 14 25 DEPT. OF FAMILIES, HOUSING, COMMUNITY SERVICES AND 4 - INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS DEPT. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE 84 - DEPT. OF HEALTH 76 38 DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES 1 - DEPT. OF IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION26 158 107 DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES - 1 DEPT. OF THE ENVIRONMENT 9 13 AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL SECURITY AUTHORITY 111 128 Total 6,412 8,653
26 The 2012–13 figures have been revised to include information about the Department of Immigration and Border Protection. This information was not included in the original report.
58 | P a g e Table 30: Number of authorisations made by a state or territory enforcement agency for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a criminal law—s. 186(1)(a) Authorisations Agency 12/13 13/14 BANKSTOWN CITY COUNCIL 5 - CORRECTIVE SERVICES NSW 69 52 CORRECTIONS VICTORIA - 389 DEPT. OF COMMERCE (WA) 116 78 DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENT AND PRIMARY INDUSTRIES (VIC) 349 347 OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENT & HERITAGE (NSW) 106 47 RSPCA QUEENSLAND 8 - RSPCA VICTORIA 23 64 TRANSPORT ACCIDENT COMMISSION (VIC) 1 8 NSW ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AUTHORITY - 5 WORKCOVER NSW - 4 THE HILLS SHIRE COUNCIL - 1 VICTORIAN WORKCOVER AUTHORITY 14 25 Total 691 1,020
Table 31: Total number of authorisations made for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a criminal law—section 186(1)(a) Authorisations Agency 12/13 13/14 No. of authorisations made by a Law Enforcement Agency 312,929 314,587 No. of authorisations made by a Commonwealth Agency27 6,412 8,653 No. of authorisations made by a State or Territory Agency 691 1,020 Total 320,032 324,260
Existing data—enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty or protecting public revenue Tables 32, 33, 34 and 35 provide information on agency use of historical data authorisations in the enforcement of a law that imposes a pecuniary penalty or protects the public revenue.
In 2013–14, enforcement agencies made 10,398 data authorisations to enforce a law that imposes a pecuniary penalty or protects the public revenue. This was a decrease of 368 authorisations or 3.4 per cent from the previous reporting period.
Table 32: Number of authorisations made by a law enforcement agency for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty or the
27 This figure has been revised to include information from the Department of Immigration and Border Protection.
59 | P a g e protection of the public revenue—s. 186(1)(b)
Authorisations Agency 12/13 13/14 AFP 99 36 NSW POLICE 6,300 5,324 NT POLICE 2 4 QLD POLICE 110 239 SA POLICE - 2 CCC (QLD) - 11 TAS POLICE 67 764 Total 6,578 6,380
Table 33: Number of authorisations made by a Commonwealth Enforcement Agency for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty or the protection of the public revenue—s. 186(1)(b) Authorisations Agency 12/13 13/14 ACCC 155 31 AUSTRALIAN HEALTH PRACTITIONER REGULATION AGENCY 20 23 ASIC 114 110 AUSTRALIAN TAXATION OFFICE 138 66 AUSTRALIA POST 375 810 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY 3 - CLEAN ENERGY REGULATOR 1 1 CUSTOMS 120 156 DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE 8 - DEPT. OF DEFENCE 127 94 DEPT. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE 67 227 DEPT. OF HEALTH 1 - DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES 628 339 DEPT. OF IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION 14 - DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES - 1 FAIR WORK BUILDING & CONSTRUCTION 1 7 NATIONAL MEASUREMENT INSTITUTE - 1 TAX PRACTITIONERS BOARD 61 - Total 1,833 1,866
60 | P a g e Table 34: Number of authorisations made by a state or territory enforcement agency for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty or the protection of the public revenue—s. 186(1)(b) Authorisations Agency 12/13 13/14 ACT REVENUE OFFICE 6 3 BANKSTOWN CITY COUNCIL 5 7 CITY OF DAREBIN - 1 CONSUMER AFFAIRS VICTORIA 187 120 CONSUMER AND BUSINESS SERVICES (SA) 209 153 DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FORESTRY 33 25 (QLD) DEPT. OF COMMERCE (WA) 84 87 DEPT OF ENVIRONMENT AND HERITAGE PROTECTION 55 32 (QLD) DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENT & PRIMARY INDUSTRIES (VIC) 51 - DEPT. OF FISHERIES (WA) 101 113 DEPT. OF JUSTICE (VIC) - 16 DEPT. OF MINES AND PETROLEUM (WA) - 2 DEPT. OF PARKS AND WILDLIFE (WA) 87 6 DEPT. OF PRIMARY INDUSTRIES (NSW) 197 226 HARNESS RACING NEW SOUTH WALES 12 7 HARNESS RACING VICTORIA - 3 HEALTH CARE COMPLAINTS COMMISSION (NSW) 15 20 IPSWICH CITY COUNCIL 6 21 KNOX CITY COUNCIL 5 5 LEGAL SERVICES BOARD (VIC) - 9 NSW FAIR TRADING 740 758 OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING (QLD) 257 252 OFFICE OF LIQUOR AND GAMING REGULATION (QLD) 2 3 OFFICE OF STATE REVENUE (NSW) 137 127 OFFICE OF STATE REVENUE (QLD) 5 1 OFFICE OF THE RACING INTEGRITY COMMISSIONER (VIC) 15 10 RACING AND WAGERING WESTERN AUSTRALIA 10 18 RACING NSW 14 16 RACING QUEENSLAND 28 4 REVENUE SA 18 17 ROADS AND MARITIME SERVICES (NSW) 4 - RSPCA SOUTH AUSTRALIA 1 - RSPCA QUEENSLAND - 19 STATE REVENUE OFFICE VICTORIA 40 53 TASMANIA PRISON SERVICE 15 - WORKCOVER NSW 1 - VICTORIAN WORKCOVER AUTHORITY - 17 WYNDHAM CITY COUNCIL 15 1 Total 2,355 2,152
61 | P a g e Table 35: Total number of authorisations made for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty or protecting public revenue—s. 186(1)(b) Authorisations Agency 12/13 13/14 No. of authorisations made by a Law Enforcement Agency 6,578 6,380 No. of authorisations made by a Commonwealth Agency 1,833 1,866 No. of authorisations made by a State or Territory Agency 2,355 2,152 Total 10,766 10,398
62 | P a g e Prospective data—authorisations Tables 36 and 37 set out information about the use of prospective data authorisations during the reporting year.
Table 36: Prospective data authorisations—s. 186(1)(c) Days Number of Actual days in Authorisations Agency specified authorisations made force discounted in force ACC 1,075 29,774 19,030 73 AFP 1,037 33,691 22,174 145 IBAC 189 8,420 5,601 38 CCC (WA) 47 1,613 1,136 1 CCC (QLD) 394 7,246 6,189 51 CUSTOMS 144 169 163 1 ICAC (NSW) 30 1,350 1,002 1 NSW CC 770 27,849 20,166 75 NSW POLICE 567 21,484 13,235 33 NT POLICE 334 15,030 14,534 13 ACLEI 8 66 21 7 PIC 146 5,885 4,741 15 QLD POLICE 3,857 163,233 127,006 414 SA POLICE 260 10,995 7,613 19 TAS POLICE 166 7,470 4,407 17 VIC POLICE 3,339 48,668 30,666 53 WA POLICE 752 33,840 24,429 79 Total 13,115 416,783 302,113 1,035
The number of authorisations made by a criminal law-enforcement agency for access to specified information or documents that come into existence during the period for which an authorisation is in force is continued in Table 37.
The table also outlines the number of days the authorisations were to be in force and how many days they were actually in force as well as providing the number of authorisations still in force at the end of the reporting period.
Table 38 provides information about the average number of days the authorisations were specified to be in force and the average actual number of days they remained in force.
63 | P a g e Table 37: Average specified and actual time in force of prospective data authorisations Average period Average period Agency specified actual 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 ACC 35 28 24 19 ACLEI - 8 - 21 AFP 32 32 27 25 CCC (WA) 41 34 35 25 CCC (QLD) 24 18 20 18 CUSTOMS 1 1 1 1 IBAC 44 45 - 37 ICAC (NSW) 44 45 33 35 NSW CC 36 36 32 29 NSW POLICE 38 38 25 25 NT POLICE 45 45 42 45 OPI 44 - 44 - PIC 41 40 37 36 QLD POLICE 39 42 32 37 SA POLICE 41 42 36 32 TAS POLICE 45 45 29 30 VIC POLICE 39 15 28 9 WA POLICE 45 45 30 36 Average 37 33 30 27 Data authorisations to locate missing persons Under section 178A of the TIA Act, the AFP and state police forces can authorise the disclosure of telecommunications data to help find a missing person.
Table 38: The number of authorisations made for access to existing information or documents for the location of missing persons—s. 178A Authorisations Agency 12/13 13/14 AFP 45 55 NSW POLICE 570 1,097 NT POLICE 17 36 SA POLICE - 33 TAS POLICE - 155 QLD POLICE 263 652 Total 895 2,028
64 | P a g e Data authorisations for foreign law enforcement The TIA Act also requires the AFP to report on data authorisations made in relation to foreign law enforcement. In 2013–14, the AFP made 19 data authorisations for access to historical information to enforce the criminal law of a foreign country.
Following these requests, the AFP made 17 disclosures to foreign law enforcement agencies. Information was disclosed to the following countries: France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong (The Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China), Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sri Lanka and Singapore.
65 | P a g e CHAPTER 4—FURTHER INFORMATION
For further information about the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 please contact the Attorney-General’s Department:
Electronic Surveillance Policy Branch Attorney-General’s Department 3-5 National Circuit BARTON ACT 2600
(02) 6141 2900
More information about telecommunications interception and access and telecommunications data access can be found at
Previous copies of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 Annual Report can be accessed online at
66 | P a g e APPENDIX A—LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES
Tables Table 1: Categories of serious offences specified in telecommunications interception warrants— ss. 100(1)(f), 100(1)(g), 100(2)(f) and 100(2)(g)...... 12 Table 3: Number of telecommunications interception warrants issued by Federal Court judges, Family Court judges, Federal Circuit Court judges and nominated AAT members—s. 103(ab)...... 14 Table 4: Applications for telecommunications interception warrants, telephone interception warrants and renewal applications—ss. 100(1)(a)-(c) and 100(2)(a)-(c)...... 15 Table 5: Applications for telecommunications interception warrants authorising entry on premises —ss. 100(1)(d) and 100(2)(d)...... 16 Table 6: Arrests on the basis of lawfully intercepted information—ss. 102(1)(a) and 102(2)(a).....17 Table 7: Prosecutions in which lawfully intercepted information was given in evidence...... 19 Table 8: Convictions in which lawfully intercepted information was given in evidence...... 20 Table 9: Original applications for named person warrants, telephone applications for named person warrants and renewal applications—ss. 100(1)(ea) and 100(2)(ea)...... 22 Table 10: Number of services intercepted under named person warrants—ss. 100(1)(eb) and 100(2)(eb)...... 23 Table 11: Total number of services and devices intercepted under device-based named person warrants—ss. 100(1)(ec) and 100(2)(ec)...... 24 Table 12: Applications for B-Party warrants, telephone applications for B-Party warrants, and renewal applications—ss. 100(1)(ed) and 100(1)(ed)...... 25 Table 14: Duration of original and renewal telecommunications interception warrants—ss. 101(1) (a)-(d) and 101(2)(a)-(d)...... 27 Table 15: Duration of original and renewal B-Party warrants—ss. 101(1)(da) and 101(2)(da)...... 28 Table 16: Number of final renewals—ss. 101(1)(e) and 101(2)(e)...... 29 Table 17: Percentage of eligible warrants—ss. 102(3) and 102(4)...... 30 Table 18a: Interception without a warrant—s. 102A...... 31 Table 18b: Interception without a warrant—s. 102A...... 31 Table 19: Number of interceptions carried out on behalf of other agencies—s. 103(ac)...... 32 Table 20: Total expenditure incurred by each agency in connection with the execution of telecommunications interception warrants and Average expenditure per telecommunications interception warrant—ss. 103(a) and 103(aa)...... 33 Table 21: Recurrent costs of interceptions per agency...... 34 Table 22: Emergency service facility declarations...... 35 Table 23: Summary of findings from the two inspections conducted at each agency during the reporting period...... 37 Figure 4: Commonwealth Ombudsman’s Telecommunications Interception Inspection Criteria...39 ...... 39 Figure 5: Other matters reportable under s.85...... 40 Table 24: Applications and telephone applications for stored communications warrants—ss. 162(1)(a)-(b) and 162(2)(a)-(b)...... 42 Table 25: Number of arrests, proceedings and convictions made on the basis of lawfully accessed
67 | P a g e information—s. 163(a)-(b)...... 43 Table 26: Domestic preservation notices—s. 161A(1)...... 45 Table 27: Mutual assistance and stored communications warrants—s. 162(1)(c)...... 46 Table 28: Number of authorisations made by a Law Enforcement Agency for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a criminal law—s. 186(1)(a)...... 51 Table 29: Number of authorisations made by a Commonwealth Enforcement Agency for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a criminal law—s. 186(1)(a)...... 54 Table 30: Number of authorisations made by a state or territory enforcement agency for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a criminal law—s. 186(1)(a)...... 55 Table 31: Total number of authorisations made for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a criminal law—section 186(1)(a)...... 55 Table 32: Number of authorisations made by a law enforcement agency for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty or the protection of the public revenue—s. 186(1)(b)...... 56 Table 33: Number of authorisations made by a Commonwealth Enforcement Agency for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty or the protection of the public revenue—s. 186(1)(b)...... 56 Table 34: Number of authorisations made by a state or territory enforcement agency for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty or the protection of the public revenue—s. 186(1)(b)...... 57 Table 35: Total number of authorisations made for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty or protecting public revenue—s. 186(1)(b) ...... 58 Table 36: Prospective data authorisations—s. 186(1)(c)...... 59 Table 37: Average specified and actual time in force of prospective data authorisations...... 60 Table 38: The number of authorisations made for access to existing information or documents for the location of missing persons—s. 178A...... 60
68 | P a g e Figures Figure 1: Telecommunications interception warrants issued with specific conditions or restrictions —ss. 100(1)(e) and 100(2)(e)...... 16 Figure 2: Named person warrants issued with conditions or restrictions—ss. 100(1)(ea) and 100(2) (ea)...... 24 Figure 3: Total number of services intercepted under service-based name person warrants— ss. 100(1)(ec), and 100(2)(ec)...... 25 Figure 4: Commonwealth Ombudsman’s Telecommunications Interception Inspection Criteria...38 Figure 5: Other matters reportable under s.85...... 39 Figure 6: Commonwealth Ombudsman Stored Communications Access Inspection Criteria...... 47 Figure 7: Commonwealth Ombudsman Preservation Notice Inspection Criteria...... 48
69 | P a g e APPENDIX B—INTERCEPTION AGENCIES UNDER THE TIA ACT
Commonwealth agency or state Date of s.34 declaration eligible authority
Australian Commission for Law Not applicable Enforcement Integrity
Australian Crime Commission Not applicable
Australian Federal Police Not applicable
Corruption and Crime Commission 26 March 2004 (Western Australia)
Crime and Corruption Commission 7 July 2009 (Queensland)
Independent Broad-based 18 December 2012 Anti-corruption Commission (came into force 10 February 2013) (Victoria)
Independent Commission Against 6 June 1990 Corruption (New South Wales)
New South Wales Crime 30 January 1989 Commission
New South Wales Police Force 30 January 1989
Northern Territory Police 25 October 2006
Police Integrity Commission 14 July 1998 (New South Wales)
Queensland Police Service 8 July 2009
Independent Commissioner against 17 June 2013 Corruption (South Australia) (came into force 1 September 2013)
South Australia Police 10 July 1991
Tasmania Police 5 February 2005
Victoria Police 28 October 1988
Western Australia Police 15 July 1997
70 | P a g e APPENDIX C—ABBREVIATIONS
AAT Administrative Appeals Tribunal ACC Australian Crime Commission ACCC Australian Competition and Consumer Commission ACLEI Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity AFP Australian Federal Police AGD Attorney-General’s Department ASIC Australian Securities and Investments Commission ATO Australian Taxation Office CAC Communications Access Co-ordinator CCC (WA) Corruption and Crime Commission (Western Australia) CCC (QLD) Crime and Corruption Commission (Queensland) Customs Australian Customs and Border Protection Service DIBP Department of Immigration and Border Protection IBAC Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission (Victoria) NSW CC New South Wales Crime Commission ICAC (NSW) Independent Commission Against Corruption (New South Wales) NSW Police New South Wales Police Force NT Police Northern Territory Police OPI Office of Police Integrity (Victoria) PIC Police Integrity Commission (New South Wales) PIM Public Interest Monitor PJCIS Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security QLD Police Queensland Police Service ICAC (SA) Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (South Australia) SA Police South Australia Police TAS Police Tasmania Police Telecommunications Telecommunications Act 1997 Act TIA Act Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 VIC Police Victoria Police WA Police Western Australia Police
71 | P a g e APPENDIX D—CATEGORIES OF SERIOUS OFFENCES
Serious offence category Offences covered ACC special investigation TIA Act, s5D(1)(f): ACC special investigation Administration of justice TIA Act, s5D(8)(b): offences against ss35, 36, 36A, 37, 39, 41, 42, 43, 46 or 47 of the Crimes Act 1914 Assist escape punishment / TIA Act, s5D(7): assisting a person to escape dispose of proceeds punishment or to dispose of the proceeds of a serious offence Bribery or corruption; TIA Act, s5D(2)(vii), bribery or corruption; TIA offences against ss131.1, Act, s5D(8)(a): offences against ss131.1, 135.1, 135.1, 142.1, 142.2, 148.2, 142.1, 142.2, 148.2 or 268.112 of the Criminal 268.112 of the Criminal Code Code Act 1995 Cartel offences TIA Act, s5D(5B): cartel offences Child pornography offences TIA Act, s5D(3B): child pornography offences Conspire / aid / abet serious TIA Act, s5D(6): conspiring to commit or aiding offence or abetting the commission of a serious offence Cybercrime offences TIA Act, s5D(5): cybercrime offences Kidnapping TIA Act, s5D(1)(b): kidnapping TIA Act, s5D(2)(b)(i) and (ii): serious personal Loss of life or personal injury injury, loss of life Money laundering TIA Act, s5D(4): money laundering Murder TIA Act, s5D(1)(a): murder TIA Act, s5D(3): offences involving planning and Organised offences and/or organisation; s5D(8A) and (9), criminal criminal organisations organisations People smuggling and related TIA Act, s5D(3A): people smuggling, slavery, sexual servitude, deceptive recruiting, trafficking in persons Serious damage to property TIA Act, s5D(2)(b)(iii) and (iiia): serious damage and/or serious arson to property, arson Serious drug offences and/or TIA Act, s5D(5A); s5D(2)(b)(iv): serious drug trafficking offences, drug trafficking; TIA Act, s5D(1)(c): import or export border controlled drugs Serious fraud and/or revenue TIA Act, s5D(2)(v) and (vi): serious fraud, serious loss revenue loss Telecommunications offences TIA Act, s5D(5)(a): telecommunications offence Terrorism offences TIA Act, s5D(1)(d), 5D(1)(e): terrorism offences
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