Power and Participation in the Production of Boundary Objects
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Power and Participation in the Production of Boundary Objects
Robyn Thomas1 Cardiff Business School Cardiff, UK CF10 3EU Email: [email protected] Tel: +44-29-2087-5724
Leisa D. Sargent Department of Management & Marketing University of Melbourne Parkville Victoria, 3010 Australia Email: lsargent unimelb.edu.au Tel: +61-3-8344-5576
Cynthia Hardy Department of Management & Marketing University of Melbourne Parkville Victoria, 3010 Australia Email: [email protected] Tel: +61-3-8344-3719
1 Robyn Thomas would like to acknowledge the support of the UK Economic and Social Research Council’s Advanced Institute of Management in funding this research, award number: RES-331-25- 3009 for fellowship funding received during the period of this research.
1 Power and Participation in the Production of Boundary Objects
Abstract
The research on boundary objects emphasizes how they allow actors from different “social worlds” to reconcile different meanings and produce shared understandings, in turn, enabling cooperation and the transformation of knowledge. Research has also indicated that this process should involve the participation of all the relevant groups in the co-construction of meaning; otherwise the designated artifact may fail to become a boundary object-in-use. Our study examines how meaning was negotiated in the case of a particular artifact – a culture toolkit – which was intended to secure cooperation among members from different parts of a telecommunications company in the development and implementation of a new customer-oriented culture. By conducting a detailed, real time analysis of how the meaning of this designated boundary object was negotiated in a workshop, we show how different patterns of participation in negotiating meaning influence whether an artifact becomes a boundary object-in-use. Further, we show how these patterns of participation arise from the different strategies used by senior managers and their subordinates to exercise power associated with their respective vertical positions.
Key Words: Boundary objects, negotiation of meaning, power
2 Introduction
Over the last 25 years, the concept of boundary object – as delineated by Star and Griesemer
(1989) and associated with scientific research – has transcended its own boundaries, becoming employed in the study of areas such as project management, organizational learning and knowledge management. The concept is attractive to management theorists because it represents an important means of achieving collaboration. Boundary objects can be used to solve “heterogeneous problems” through the way in which they “sit in the middle” of a “group of actors with divergent viewpoints”
(Star, 1988: 46). Star & Griesemer (1989) examined how boundary objects such as specimens, maps and fields notes helped to bring about cooperation among professional scientists, amateur collectors, trappers, and university administrators in setting up a museum of vertebrate zoology. Since then, a wide range of different artifacts have been studied – Gantt charts, engineering drawings, physical prototypes, maps, databases, accounting systems, and computer software – for their ability to bring about cooperation in business settings, especially among members of different horizontal functions.
This research emphasizes the importance of meaning i.e., the boundary object allows actors from different “social worlds” to reconcile their different meanings and produce shared understandings which, in turn, enables them to cooperate (Bechky, 2003a). This process occurs as diverse groups “fill in content and interpretations [of the boundary object] and negotiate as they see fit” (Yakura, 2002:
968). In other words, a designated artifact becomes a boundary object-in-use (Levina & Vaast, 2005) only if its meaning is negotiated through a process in which all the relevant groups participate (Star,
1988; Star & Greisemer, 1989; Carlile, 2004; Sapsed & Salter, 2004). In order to learn more about how the negotiation of meaning affects whether an artifact becomes a boundary object-in-use, we conducted a detailed, real-time analysis of the negotiations around a designated boundary object. The artifact in question was a culture toolkit, comprising a brochure, video and workshop template, and intended to secure cooperation among members from different parts of a telecommunications company in the development and implementation of a new customer-oriented culture.
Our findings suggest that different patterns of participation among a range of actors in these negotiations help to explain whether an artifact becomes a boundary object-in-use. In our case, when
3 participation was distributed and a range of participants contributed to the co-construction of meaning
– which we refer to as “processual plasticity’ – the artifact became a boundary object-in-use. Our study suggests that this processual plasticity depends upon the use of strategies by both superiors and subordinates in exercising power to influence the negotiation of meaning. Depending upon the strategies employed by superiors and subordinates, this processual plasticity can be lost.
Our study makes a number of contributions. First, it indicates that an artifact cannot simply be designated as a boundary object; if it is to be a boundary object-in-use, it must be continually “worked on” by all participants all the time in order to maintain processual plasticity. By identifying different strategies used by senior managers and their subordinates, we also show how processual plasticity requires senior managers to redress the power advantages embedded in their superior vertical position; while middle managers must also exercise or exploit the power associated with their position in the hierarchy. In this way, we extend the work of Levina and Vaast (2005) to show how a boundary object-in-use results from the interplay between senior and subordinate members, and not just the
“top-down” work of designated or informal boundary spanners. Second, we identify strategies that disrupt processual plasticity and result in meaning becoming reified, and show how such strategies can escalate during the course of the negotiations. At this point, the artifact no longer acts as a boundary object, but instead serves as a means of control as senior managers, consciously or unconsciously, use their position in the hierarchy to undermine the very artifact intended to function as a boundary object.
In this way, our study builds on previous work which has found that the failure of boundary objects is often explained by horizontal, functional and occupational power relations i.e., as a result of competition among functions or departments (e.g., Bechky, 2002b; Carlile, 2004: Henderson, 1998) to show the effects of vertical power relations and direct line authority. Finally, we build on Carlile’s
(2002: 452) work that shows that a boundary object that is effective at one stage “can falter when taken to another setting.” We show how the same artifact can slip in and out of functioning as a boundary object i.e., an artifact can function as a boundary object-in-use and serve as a means of control, depending on the way in which actors participate in the negotiation of meaning.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We first examine the organizational and management literature on boundary objects. We then introduce our case study and explain our
4 methods of data collection and analysis. Third, we present our findings. Finally, we discuss their implications for research and practice.
The Emergence and Development of Boundary Objects
Research on boundary objects initially examined the way in which scientific work is conducted by diverse groups of actors, such as researchers from different disciplines, amateur and professional scientists, as well as administrators and technicians. Objects, methods, findings and theories mean different things in these different worlds, and as a result, different meanings – and tensions – must be reconciled if cooperation is to ensue. “Simply put scientific work is heterogeneous.
At the same time science requires cooperation” (Star & Griesemer, 1989: 387). The same is true of management, which requires collaboration among actors from different groups, departments and organizations (Gerson & Star, 1986). Like science, management inhabits “multiple social worlds” and requires “intersectional work” because “new objects and methods mean different things in different worlds [and] actors are faced with the task of reconciling these meanings if they wish to cooperate”
(Star & Griesemer, 1989: 388). For example, individuals from different parts of a company may have very different ideas regarding, for example, who the customer is (Sturdy & Fleming, 2003), what constitutes innovation (Dougherty, 1992), or what project deadlines involve (Yakura, 2002).
Accordingly, they create their own representations, investing them with meanings that suit their needs and reflect their backgrounds. However, these representations must be reconciled if individuals are to cooperate (Gerson & Star, 1986) and collective action is to ensue (Hardy, Lawrence & Grant, 2005).
Boundary objects provide an important means of translating such multiple, overlapping but divergent representations in ways that accommodate both diversity and synergy because they “inhabit several intersecting social worlds and satisfy the informational requirements of each of them” (Star &
Griesemer, 1989: 393). In this way, they provide a locus for communication, conflict, and coordination” (Yakura, 2002: 968), and create “the common ground that leads to shared understandings” (Bechky, 2003a: 326). They allow “actors with diverse goals” to work together
(Briers & Chua, 2001: 241-2) and promote “the sharing of knowledge in practice between diverse groups” (Sapsed & Salter, 2004: 1515). Given their potential, it is not surprising that boundary objects
5 have sparked considerable interest in areas such as project management and new product development, where cooperation among diverse groups is deemed vital. The interest in boundary objects is also linked to the growing use of practice-based approaches in knowledge management and organizational learning, according to which information is not universal, individual and explicit; rather, it is situated, social and tacit (Gherardi, 2000; Yanow, 2000). Instead of conceptualizing learning as something that goes on inside peoples’ heads, knowledge is produced as actors participate as members of
“communities of practice” (Brown & Duguid, 1991; Lave & Wenger, 1991), collectively making sense of information in ways that enable action (Weick, 1995). Boundary objects help in this process by tying together individuals who come from different departments, functions or locations.
Participation and Boundary Objects
The artifacts that constitute boundary objects have no intrinsic meaning – artifacts are
“experienced differently by different individuals and differently by the same individuals depending on the time or circumstance” (Orlikowski, 2000: 408).They require interpretation (Yakura, 2002) and are
“brought to life … through social interaction” among a range of different actors (Briers & Chua, 2001:
240). It is this looseness or ambiguity of meaning that enables them to function as boundary objects – by allowing different groups to read into them meanings that make sense to them (Bechky, 2003a).
Boundary objects may provide informational support but denote no intrinsic meaning.
They are, in this sense, empty vessels to be filled with whatever is the preferred local
beverage. Boundary objects facilitate the reading of alternative meanings by different
groups (Sapsed & Salter, 2004: 1519).
In this way, boundary objects are “plastic enough to adapt to local needs” and “robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites” (Star & Griesemer, 1989: 393); they are “weakly structured in common use” and “strongly structured in individual use”; they are “concrete and abstract”, “specific and general” and “conventionalized and customized” (p. 408).
These tensions enable boundary objects to supply “concrete means of representing different functional interests and facilitating their negotiation and transformation” (Carlile, 2004: 559). In other words, there must be sufficient convergence of meaning to make the boundary object recognizable to the different groups – and able to serve as an effective means of communication across boundaries;
6 but, at the same time, ambiguity and diversity of meaning are also crucial. Ambiguity allows different groups to read preferred or familiar meanings into the boundary object, making cooperation with other actors appealing; while the multiple, diverse meanings that come from the involvement of different groups help to generate new knowledge and learning. Some form of convergence in relation to these diverse meanings is also necessary to produce the shared understanding and common ground (Bechky,
2003a). In this way, effective boundary objects establish a “shared language for individuals to represent their knowledge; provide the means for individuals “to learn about their differences and dependencies across a given boundary”; and facilitate “a process of transforming current knowledge
(knowledge that is localized, embedded, and invested in practice) so that new knowledge can be created” (Carlile. 2002: 452-3).
Star and Griesemer (1989: 412) emphasize that, in the case of boundary objects, meaning should be collectively negotiated because each social world “has partial jurisdiction over the resources represented by that object.” In other words, for a boundary object to be effective in sharing learning, generating knowledge and securing cooperation, actors from all the worlds that it is intended to link must be involved (Carlile, 2004). If the boundary object is neglected by one of the communities it is intended to bridge, it is likely to fail (Sapsed & Salter, 2004). The production of boundary objects therefore depends on distributed participation – where meaning is developed through all participants actively taking part in the negotiations around meaning – and a connection to or mutual recognition of other participants (cf. Handley et al., 2006).
Widely distributed participation can, however, be difficult to achieve. For example, work on communities of practice has noted that some actors may limit the participation of others (Handley et al., 2006) and that individuals may even voluntarily constrain their own participation (Roberts, 2006).
Given that participation in the negotiation of meaning is equally central to the conceptualization of boundary objects, our first research question is: what different patterns of participation occur in the negotiation of meaning of boundary objects; and how do they arise?
Power and Boundary Objects
In advocating the collective negotiation of meaning, Star and Griesemer (1989: 389) argue that each participant “must maintain the integrity of the interests of the other audiences”. However, the
7 negotiation of meaning is widely recognized to be a process in which actors exercise power (Deetz &
Mumby, 1990; Hardy & Phillips, 2004). Recent work on boundary objects has also drawn our attention to the need to consider power (Boland & Tenkasi, 1995; Carlile, 2002; Levina & Vaast 2005;
Sapsed & Salter, 2004). Henderson (1998: 146) notes that, because boundary objects can be read in different ways, they have “political possibilities … multiple readings can both facilitate collaborative work and contribute to conflict among collaborators.” Even the apparent resolution of different meanings “does not mean consensus. Rather, representations, or inscriptions, contain at every stage the traces of multiple viewpoints, translations and incomplete battles” (Star & Griesemer, 1989: 413).
The development and implementation of new knowledge often has negative consequences for other organizational members, and therefore the success of a boundary object is linked to political as well as practical skills (Carlile, 2004); and boundary objects may be used, not purely for technical purposes, but also “as a means of representing and instigating difference and conflict” (Bechky, 2003b: 724).
Most of the empirical work to date has focused on the effects of power related to the horizontal or functional relations among different specialist groups (e.g., occupations, professions, and departments) as they compete for control over tasks and knowledge. As Henderson (1998: 146) has noted in relation to differences between research and development and manufacturing functions:
“Diverse orientations can also potentially lead to out-and-out conflict when readings are based not only on different specialty orientations and background experience, but also on departmental politics and distrust”. Carlile (2004: 566), in noting the dominance of one particular form of boundary object, attributed it to power and status differentials between marketing and safety functions: since the two groups did not occupy “politically equal positions in representing their knowledge to each other”
(Carlile, 2004: 565), they did not exert the same influence over the boundary object. Bechky (2003b) has examined power relations between occupational groups and found that the greater status, authority, and expertise of engineers in relation to technicians and assemblers led to situations where, rather than acting as a boundary object, artifacts were used to exercise control over work, solidify occupational status, and maintain jurisdiction over tasks.
In being used in organizations, boundary objects do not only bridge horizontal or functional boundaries, they also bridge vertical ones, involving direct line authority. For example, the particular
8 artifact that is designated to be a boundary object is typically selected by actors who “hold positions of power” (Levina & Vaast, 2005: 341). Henderson (1998), in describing the top-down application of
TQM in a call centre, noted that “politics in the form of management prerogatives can be built into” boundary objects, with adverse effects on “creativity and innovation.” Revisiting Yakura’s (2002) work, Sapsed and Salter (2004) argue that while timelines may offer potential as boundary objects because of the different meanings that can be read into them, they are also used as a form of managerial control. Despite their potential importance, vertical power relations between senior managers and their direct subordinates have not so far been studied systematically in the case of boundary objects, even though these “relational dynamics” (Bechky, 2003b: 749) are likely to influence the nature of participation in the negotiation of meaning and may differ from those associated with horizontal, functional relations. In addition, these relational dynamics are reciprocal and not simply “top down.” Therefore the use of power by both superiors and subordinates must be examined for its effects on the designated boundary object. Hence, our second research question is: do groups draw on vertical power relations to influence the negotiation of meaning of boundary objects and, if so, how?
Methods
The Case Study
Our study concerns the use of boundary object during a company-wide culture change program at UTel2 – a pioneer in licensing open-standard GSM/GPRS, EDGE and WCDMA3 technology to manufacturers of mobile phones and other mobile communication devices. At the time of the study, UTel employed approximately 1,500 employees, most of whom were located at the
European Head Office, with the remainder working in sites in UK, Europe, Asia and North America.
The company had been formed in 2001, when it was “spun off” from being an internal division of
GlobalTel, a global telecommunications company that was undergoing major restructuring and redundancies at the time as a result of low cost competitors and lower growth in the mobile phone market worldwide. As an independent organization, UTel changed from being part of a much larger
2 The name of the company and other details have been disguised. 3 GSM - Global system for mobile communication, GPRS – General packet radio system, EDGE – Enhanced data rates for global enhancement, WCDMA – Wideband and code-division multiple access.
9 company that made mobile phones for the end-user to one that sold “knowledge” to mobile phone manufacturers. Its success now hinged on the replacement of the existing engineering focus, which stemmed from its previous position as a unit that interacted primarily with other divisions within
GlobalTel, with a customer oriented culture that focused on the new customer – no longer the end-user of the phone but other companies who manufactured and sold phones.
Senior management, together with external consultants, had devised a cultural change program designed to secure cooperation from employees in building a new or “target” culture.
To ensure success … [the company] has to make a concerted effort to build a strong
company culture … [which] also has to take our customers’ values and expectations
into account … Everyone has to contribute to create a strong company culture by
participating in our “new target culture program” … characterized by global
teamwork where all the pieces fit snugly together (company document).
The culture program revolved around a series of around 80 workshops that were to be systematically rolled out throughout the company.
An artifact – a culture toolkit which consisted of a brochure, a video, and a workshop template
– was integral to each workshop. It provided a broad framework for discussing the nature of the new culture and how it was to be implemented. The brochure was titled: UTel’s Target Culture: involving every employee. The target culture was specified in broad terms – in relation to four drivers of business success (unity in team work; technological innovation; excellent customer service; and leadership); four shared values (trust, empowerment, commitment, and quality); and the company’s mission: “to make our customers first, best and profitable through innovation, quality and commitment”. It emphasized that managers and employees should “build a [not “the’] culture together” … “as part of a team” as all employees attended the workshops. In this way they could
“complete the picture of our target culture … and “how it affects us individually.” The brochure also stated that “another purpose is … to agree on action” on how the new culture was to be implemented.
The ten-minute video was of a conversation between the CEO and another senior manager in a question and answer session about the culture change program. It explained that the need for a new culture was important and briefly explained the drivers and the values. The workshop template
10 provided instructions on how each workshop was to be run. They lasted for half a day and involved the following set of activities: (a) a presentation of the target culture, using the brochure and accompanying video; (b) a discussion of the relevance of the target culture to the particular group attending the workshop; and (c) exercises to build agreement on actions to be taken to implement the target culture. The aims were: agreeing the content of the target culture; understanding how the target culture affected individual employee and teams; agreeing the implementation of the change program.
An initial round of workshops was held with middle managers from different parts of the company. These workshops were led by head office and senior site managers and involved middle managers from different engineering and support staff functions. Each of these middle managers was then required to replicate the workshop with their own subordinates – using the same culture toolkit – to structure activities and discussion of another 80 workshops involving several hundred employees.
Site Selection
We selected this case study for a number of reasons. First, boundary objects are used to bring about cooperation – to create “the common ground that leads to shared understandings” (Bechky,
2003a: 326); to ensure “coherence and cooperation” (Star & Greisemer, 1989: 391); and to help
“actors with diverse goals” to work together (Briers & Chua, 2001: 241-2). The aim was for the culture toolkit to bring together employees from different levels, sites, departments, and teams to cooperate in the development and implementation of the new culture. The CEO was quoted in the brochure: “I cannot reach this goal on my own and our managers cannot take all the responsibility by themselves. Everyone has to contribute to create a strong company culture by participating in our
“new target culture program.” If cooperation did not ensue, the new culture would be hard to implement.
Second, the culture toolkit was expected to “maintain a common identity across sites” (Star &
Griesemer 1989: 393) in that it was to be used in all the workshops with middle managers who would, in turn, use it in the subsequent workshops with their subordinates. The brochure stated:
“Approximately 80 workshops will be run by local managers. In order to run these workshops a
‘culture toolkit’ will be used”. In this way, it was expected that the culture toolkit would be recognizable to different groups and symbolize a common structure (Levina & Vaast, 2005) through,
11 for example, the way the template specified how the workshops were to be run. The culture toolkit thus provided a broad framework for the workshop to facilitate discussion over the nature of the new culture and how it was to be implemented.
Third, at the same time as having a common identity, boundary objects are “weakly structured in common use” (Star & Griesemer, 1989: 408). They provide “informational support but denote no intrinsic meaning” so they can generate and accommodate “alternative meanings by different groups”
(Sapsed & Salter, 2004: 519). So, although the brochure stated that: “the ‘culture toolkit’ can be used as a tool to facilitate UTel’s target culture workshops” and to agree on “implementation activities”, the exact nature of the culture and implementation activities was not specified.
These characteristics add up to an artifact – the culture toolkit – clearly being designated as a boundary object. It was expected to become a boundary object-in-use that would be symbolically incorporated into “ongoing dialogue” and the “practices of diverse fields” (Levina & Vaast, 2005:
340-1). In this way, the culture toolkit would form the basis of the practices of an ongoing series of workshops and, in so doing, generate discussion and, eventually, agreement about the nature of the new culture and the activities by which it could be successfully be implemented. In Carlile’s (2002:
353), terms, it represented an object whereby individuals could “represent, learn, negotiate, and alter the current knowledge [in relation to the new culture] and create new knowledge [of the new culture and its implementation] to resolve the consequences identified.”
Data Collection
Background information on the culture change program was gathered through the collection of company documents such as reports, press releases, etc; preliminary interviews were conducted, and a copy of the culture toolkit was obtained. Following this, a workshop, conducted according to the template in the toolkit, was observed by one of the authors, recorded and fully transcribed. The workshop lasted three hours and was attended by three head office managers, two senior managers from the UK plant, and 31 middle managers – support staff managers and senior software and hardware engineers (who ran project teams). The participants represented a mix of ethnic groups; ranged in age from early 30s to mid 40s; and were predominantly male (three females were present). A senior site manager from the UK plant started the session by welcoming participants and introducing
12 his superiors from Head Office, one of whom provided an overview of the outline and goals of the workshop. Another senior manager made a power-point presentation that described his interpretation of the local culture and its strengths and weaknesses, followed by a discussion involving participants regarding whether this interpretation was accurate. Following a coffee break there was a discussion about the mission statement specified in the brochure, and the video was shown. Then participants then completed a “stop/start/continue” exercise to identify one behavior that was hindering cultural change and needed to be stopped; one new behavior that needed to be started; and one existing behavior that should be continued, the results of which were collected by the head office managers.
The workshop concluded with a discussion of how to implement the culture change program.
Semi-structured interviews, between 75-105 minutes in length, were also conducted with eighteen of the participants within six months of the workshop. They were recorded and transcribed verbatim. The interviews were principally designed to follow up on the key debates and issues that surfaced during the workshop. Interviewees were asked for their views on current culture at the company; the need for a customer orientation; who they thought the customer was; the culture change program, workshop and toolkit; and the development and future of the company in general.
Data Analysis
Boundary objects are a means of symbolic communication (Star, 1988) and, as a result, the negotiation of meaning is not confined to the form of the specific artifact,4 but also extends to the broader knowledge represented by the artifact. For example, while Yakura’s (2002) study provides evidence of some negotiations over the form of a certain gantt charts, these artifacts provided a locus for much broader negotiations among different employees around what they meant for scheduling, allocating, synchronizing, billing and budgeting decisions. It was the negotiation of the different meanings of these themes by participants that enabled the gantt chart to act as a boundary object.
In this study, we therefore focused our analysis on two sets of negotiations in the workshop:
(a) a customer focus as part of the new culture; and (b) the implementation of the new culture. We
4 The form of the artifact may not therefore be particularly important. For example, early atlases of the brain served as a means of communicating across clinical and research worlds, even though they “in fact described no brain” (Star, 1988: 49). Similarly, (Star & Greisemer, 1989: 410) give the example of the use of a species as a boundary object “which in fact described no specimen.”
13 selected them for the following reasons.5 First, they represented the two key “knowledge boundaries”
(Carlile, 2002) that the culture toolkit was expected to bridge insofar as it was intended to establish agreement on the nature and implementation of a new culture. Second, they were clear priorities. They were mentioned in the brochure and the video as important issues requiring cooperation from different parts of the company; in the template as specific components to be covered during the workshop; and in the opening address of the workshop. Third, our preliminary analysis indicated that two sets of negotiations differed markedly – there appeared to be a greater degree of participation with customer focus than with implementation. Thus there was the additional advantage that, by comparing these two particular sets of negotiations in more detail, we could pursue “transparently observable” processes
(Eisenhardt, 1989: 537) related to our interests in participation and power.
We made a detailed examination of these two sets of negotiations i.e., the interactions in which the meaning of customer focus and implementation was debated, contested and/or agreed. We first extracted all the instances of talk about customer focus (Appendix 1) and implementation
(Appendix 2) from the workshop transcript. We placed all the relevant discussion in chronological order and identified who made each individual intervention i.e., a specific statement or interjection
(recorded in the first column of the Appendices).6 We then tracked how the negotiations over meanings unfolded during the workshop (recorded in the second column of each of the Appendices) by examining: (a) the development of different meanings or arguments within the negotiations over time; (b) the order or flow of interventions; and (c) when and how the negotiations of meaning ended.
We also noted instances where: (d) interventions built on earlier interventions; (e) instances of disagreement with earlier interventions; (f) instances where different groups engaged with each others’ meanings in an iterative manner; and (g) polarized discussions. This analysis is represented in Figures
1 and 2, and these two sets of negotiations are discussed in detail in the findings section.
Our comparison indicates significant differences in the two sets of negotiations – in the one, participation is distributed relatively widely and in the other, it is not. We then returned to the data to
5 We found no evidence of negotiations over the form of the culture toolkit. We therefore went on to consider the negotiation of “what the object means in the given context” (Levina & Vaast, 2005: 340). 6 Individuals are coded according to their group membership, which included: head office managers who worked out of the European headquarters; senior managers at the local site; and three groups of middle managers – software engineers, hardware engineers and support staff (e.g., HR, finance, sales & marketing).
14 try to find out why such a difference existed. We found little evidence that the differences were explained by horizontal or functional power relations i.e., major divisions among different occupational groups. In fact, the three groups of hardware engineers, software engineers and support staff managers seemed to agree with each other much of the time. For example, in the negotiations around customer focus, while a support staff manager initially mentions that a commercial – rather than a customer – focus is needed [#9 in Appendix 1], this is subsequently supported by engineers
[#20 in Appendix 1]. Similarly, the three groups were united in their support for implementation to mean specific measurable outcomes. We examined the interview transcripts to investigate whether or not participants’ experiences were consistent with this analysis. They also indicated that participants felt that the workshop discussions had enabled the sharing of insights across horizontal boundaries.
Having accounted for horizontal relations, we turned to the analysis of vertical power relations in order to answer our second research question. We reexamined the data to conduct a more finely grained analysis of how senior managers (head office managers and senior site managers) and middle managers (software engineers, hardware engineers and support staff) intervened in relation to each other and whether this varied between the two sets of negotiations regarding participation patterns in the workshop and how meanings were negotiated. As a starting point we used the strategies identified by Bechky (2003a), who describes “discounting”, “blocking” and “rebuffing” strategies by engineers to restrict the participation of assemblers, as well as the use of “challenging” by assemblers; and by
Carlile (2002), who mentions “challenging”, “negotiating”, and “proposing” new ways of product development. We then added, deleted and refined the categories in an iterative process as we scrutinized our data and conducted both a “top-down” analysis (i.e., how senior managers interacted in relation to middle managers; see column 3 in the Appendices), as well as a “bottom-up” analysis (i.e., how middle managers interacted in relation to middle managers; see column 4 in the Appendices). We identified a discrete number of strategies (discussed in more detail later) employed by the two different groups. We then compared how these strategies were used in the two sets of negotiations.
15 Findings
Participation in Negotiations
In the first set of findings, we examine the different patterns of participation found in the two sets of negotiations.
Negotiations around customer focus
The meaning of customer focus was negotiated – and contested and challenged – by the participants during the course of the workshop. Four main strands to these negotiations can be observed, each relating to a different meaning of “customer focus”. They are: (a) who is the customer, a discussion that ended prior to the conclusion of the workshop with some agreement over the customer being an external business; (b) the nature of the relationship with the customer, which ended around a need for honesty although this meaning was taken up and superseded by other discussions around the need for a commercial focus; (c) are we customer focused, which concluded in general agreement that the UK site was customer focused although, again, this meaning was superseded by the need for a commercial focus; (d) the need for a commercial focus which, despite being introduced quite late in the workshop, out-lived the other negotiations to reach relative agreement about what a commercial focus entailed. In this section, we describe these negotiations, as summarized in Figure 1.
—Figure 1 near here—
At the start of the workshop, in the opening address, the need to achieve a “common understanding” of customer focus is introduced by a senior manager: “It’s important that we have a strong UTel culture in this organization to be customer focused, we need to actually get a common understanding… and hopefully feed back any concerns and issues that may crop up.” Another head office manager then puts forward a number of suggestions on how customer focus might be defined and understood in terms of a relationship with the customer [#1].7 At this point, a senior manager seeks clarification on who is the customer and whether they are talking about the end-user (the person who buys and uses the phone) or another business (i.e., the customer is another company that sells the phone) [#2]. This comment triggers a lively debate among the engineers concerning who is the customer, following which one of the head office managers attempts to return to the nature of
7 The numbers in square brackets provide a cross reference to Figure 1 and Appendix 1.
16 relationship with the customer – one in which the customer is dominant and UTel merely provides advice [#3]. This triggers another question about who is the customer and, if it is a business-to- business relationship, how it should be conducted [#4].
One of the software engineers then challenges the assumption that the UK site is not already customer focused. A software engineer asserts:
I believe that we’re [local site] customer-oriented. I think we are customer focused as
an organization and we have been all the way through even in our history. I think
we’re a customer-focused organization. [#5]
A debate ensues over whether or not the UK site is more or less customer focused compared to head office, resulting in the discussion shifting away from the nature of the relationship with the customer to claims that UK site already is customer focused. This claim is disputed by some participants [#6], but supported by a senior manager as well as software engineers, in particular, who emphasize their existing close relationship with their customers. During this debate, the discussion returns to who the customer is, which becomes further complicated as the end-user is equated with business [#7]. The claim that the UK site is already customer focused reemerges [#8].
At this point, the importance of a customer focus is challenged at a more fundamental level as one of the support staff argues that there is a need for a commercial focus [#9]:
We are very driven by engineers and the technology…people do get caught up with
developing incredible products that are fantastic with loads of features but from a
commercial focus aren’t really needed ... as an organization we’re not necessarily as
commercially and business focused as we need to be [manager, support staff].
This comment is followed by a long silence and eventually, an engineer attempts to shift the emphasis away from the accusation that they lack a commercial focus by arguing that it is sales and marketing staff who are responsible for the customer [#10], but the discussion quickly returns to the need for a commercial focus [#11]; and that while engineers may be close to the customer, this is not helpful unless they have a commercial focus. Laughter breaks out at a comment made by a support staff manager that “we can’t agree!” on what customer focus is; followed by a software engineer asking for a show of hands on who believes that they are already customer focused [#12], which sparks off
17 another debate on who is the customer [#13]; the nature of the relationship; and whether the company already is customer focused.
This discussion around who is the customer initially returns to the earlier dichotomy i.e., the end-user of the phone or the business that sells the phone. It then arrives at a denouement that, while they may already be customer focused, they could be more so [#14], interspersed with a discussion around the nature of the relationship between the company and the customer, which should be interactive [#15]. The debate about who the customer is continues but instead of end-user vs. business, it switches to internal vs. external customers [#16]. Throughout this discussion, the debate that the company is already customer focused reappears, with some tempering of the claim that the company is already customer focused [#17].
All I used to hear from the guys in [another part of the former organization] was
“those bastards in [the UK site] never tell us anything. They’re secretive, they keep it
all to themselves, they won’t talk to us, they tell us lies, they won’t tell us where they
are on the project”. So how does that all fit together? [hardware engineer].
Another hardware engineer returns to the relationship with the customer, questioning whether the customer should be dominant, given that they are “just as confused in terms of what the market’s going to do as we are.” The debate then centers on whether the customer or company should be dominant [#18].
Following this debate, the video presentation returns to the issue of customer focus, defined in terms of an honest relationship [#19]. After the video, the stop/start/continue exercise is conducted and the need for a commercial focus re-emerges [#20], initiated by support staff managers but also supported by engineers. A gradual consensus develops regarding the definition of a commercial focus i.e., as being financially aware and helping the company to be profitable.
Commercial … to me means … UTel profitability. And it doesn’t matter a hell of a lot
about customer profitability, customer on time, customer this, customer that and
customer the other, I have never yet heard an UTel manager say “we’ve got to make a
lot of money” [support staff manager].
By the end of the discussion, the group has come to an agreement that a customer focus is less
18 important than the need for a commercial focus.
Negotiations around Implementation
In contrast with the negotiations around customer focus where different groups built on and developed the meanings proposed by others, the negotiations around the meaning of implementation were much more polarized, with middle managers proposing one set of meanings and senior and head office managers attempting to impose their definition of implementation on the workshop participants.
Despite a head office manager initially presenting the workshop as an opportunity to identify the actions required for implementation collectively, subsequent contributions to the debate by head office managers were all attempts to fix the meanings of implementation around their predetermined program. Here implementation was defined in terms of the next step, being a continuation of the workshops to create awareness of the existing culture, the outcomes of which were to be decided by
Head Office on how to proceed. Contrasting with this, the engineers tried to fix the meaning of implementation in terms of local actions which require among other things, clear direction, road maps, and time lines.
—Figure 2 near here—
Figure 2 shows the flows of debate around the meanings of implementation. At the start of the workshop, a head office manager sets out one of the workshop’s aim being to arrive at a collective identification of the actions to be taken to implement the culture change program at the local site
[#1].8 Fifty minutes later, a software engineer picks up the issue of implementation, suggesting that it requires a clear direction, something which is currently lacking: “we need to know where we’re going
… how we fit in, making sure the whole things hangs together” [#2]. A software engineer then suggests that, rather than a lack of direction, the issue is a lack of information [#3] although this is countered by another software engineer as the discussion returns to a lack of direction [#4]. At this point, a head office manager tries to divert the debate by arguing that it is difficult to establish a clear direction [#5]. Another engineer attempts to press the head office manager for implementation to be defined in terms of the need for direction [#6]. Some frustration is expressed during this discussion by the engineers. As one asks, “We’re having this discussion about [direction] but what’s the purchasable
8 The numbers in square brackets provide a cross reference to Figure 2 and Appendix 2.
19 point?” A senior manager attempts to clarify the debate at this point by questioning whether issue they are debating is in relation to implementation being about setting time frames [#7]. A software engineer returns to the issue of implementation requiring locally agreed direction [#8]. A senior manager switches the issue to argue that implementation involves an awareness of the culture at the different sites [#9]. At this point, a support staff manager draws attention to the power of Head Office: “You know it’s them and us and we always have to do what [Head Office] says.” The head office manager responds by closing down the debate and attempts to block further challenges by invoking the CEO:
The mission we have now is to send to [the CEO] and to the management team the
actions or the current culture that we identify within each site. [The CEO] is very
interested … in this work. We have been running culture workshops now in [the
various sites] and he has gone through the material with myself and sometimes with
[another head office manager]. Now he really wants to see what kind of culture you
have here and that’s the first step [head office manager].
This head office manager then defines implementation in terms of the first step being an increased awareness of the existing culture, which is immediately reinforced by another head office manager.
At this stage, the video is shown: it defines implementation in terms of the next step, which was to involve everyone [#10]. Following the video, a software engineer asks for feedback on whether actions identified in previous workshops were implemented. In response, a head office manager returns to implementation as collectively identified actions to be taken at the local site [#11]. Later, a software engineer again raises the issue of implementation requiring direction [#12]. A discussion ensues among the engineers that link direction to: long-term costs, timescales, information and empowerment, and the need for road maps. However, this definition is ignored by a head office manager, who returns to implementation as requiring further workshops [#13]. The discussion, among senior managers, turns to the culture kit, as directives are issued for the specific timing and conduct of subsequent workshops [#14]. In this way, talk is diverted from the need for a clear direction into instructions about the process for conducting future workshops:
You should have … the video … I will email you the slides that we presented today
[and] the agenda for the three hour meeting that you’ll have with your staff; going
20 through the stop start in the workshops, that’ll be in your slides; instructions on how
to run the discussions; and also the template for the stop start workshops. The
templates that we want you to work on are template two and template four, those two
templates once you’ve conducted the workshops with your staff. I need them in by the
end of August. So you need to conduct your workshops with your staff by the end of
August. At the end of August I send all my information to [Head Office] who will
make a presentation to [the CEO]. Have you got brochures for everyone? [senior
manager]
Later, the engineers return yet again to the need for a road map; milestones and action plans as a necessary part of implementation [#15]. At this stage, an engineer takes up the definition of implementation as next step – not in terms of future workshops or greater cultural awareness, as suggested previously by a senior manager, but in terms of setting action plans;
It’s just [we need] some plan going forward rather than being an isolated activity…
the bit that’s missing to my mind is what the next steps are? We do this but then
what’s the next step? [software engineer]
In response to this, there is a strong assertion of control (“Well what we [Head Office] have decided is that we will…) as a head office manager defines next steps as reports and actions to be decided by
Head Office, thus contradicting an earlier point that actions are to be collectively identified [#16]. A hardware engineer returns to the need for a time line [#17], while a head office manager returns to the first step being the need to conduct further workshops by August [#18]. The same manager refers to possible job losses: “We don’t know if you’re going to be here in 2003-2004”. Yet again, a software engineer raises the issue of the need for road maps [#19] and, again, a head office manager defines implementation in terms of a set of activities decided by Head Office [#20]. This is reinforced by another head office manager who returns to the first step requiring greater cultural awareness, emphasizing process, rather than activities, and setting out instructions for timing, reports, and noting that decisions will taken by Head Office [#21]. There is another attempt to define implementation in terms of time lines and success criteria by a support staff manager [#22]:“what’s the success criteria?” Measurement is dismissed as unfeasible by a head office manager (contradicting the earlier
21 video) [#23]. A hardware engineer returns to the original definition of implementation, reminding the participants that it was defined as collective actions to be taken by the local site [#24]. This is directly refuted by a head office manager, thereby contradicting the opening statement at the start of the workshop and the message from the CEO in the video, by saying: “that’s not the actions that you should be doing [in the local site]” [#25].
In comparing the two sets of negotiations, we see quite contrasting patterns. Customer focus is associated with a high degree of participation – both middle and senior managers contribute to the construction of meaning. Thus the culture toolkit was used to frame a discussion in which a range of managers participated in different arguments, relating to the need for, and definition of, customer focus. There is little evidence of domination by senior managers: middle managers made three quarters of the total number of interventions and the final meaning – i.e. the need for a commercial focus – was the result of a collective negotiation by middle managers, rather than being imposed by senior managers. Participants regularly built on earlier interventions to develop an understanding of what was a customer focus, who the customer was, and whether or not they were already customer focused. Further, these separate meanings built on each other to construct the need for a commercial focus. Thus middle managers appear to have contributed to the negotiations of meaning in a participative and distributed set of negotiations. Through this distributed pattern of participation, the culture toolkit acted as a boundary object-in use, helping to transform the knowledge concerning the need for a customer focus – and whether there already was one – into the need for a commercial focus.
This can be sharply contrasted with implementation, where the evidence suggests that senior managers tried to impose meaning. Instead of participants building on earlier interventions, there was a far higher incidence of interventions that refuted or challenged opposing meanings. Senior managers returned time and time again to the process of implementation (the continuation of the workshops), while middle managers continued to emphasize the need for actions and measurable outcomes. There is little evidence of the co-construction of a collective meaning and, instead, two increasingly polarized meanings were supported by the different groups. In this regard, the culture toolkit failed to act as a boundary object-in-use. It may have established a shared language for individuals to represent their knowledge about implementation to each other; and it may have provided a way for participants
22 to learn about their differences and dependencies regarding implementation but, since neither group was willing to change their meaning of implementation, knowledge was not transformed (cf. Carlile,
2002).
Vertical Power Relations and Boundary Objects
In the second set of findings, we investigate the role played by vertical relations in influencing the two outcomes discussed above. We start by identifying the strategies adopted by each group
(senior managers and middle managers)9 to shape meaning. We noted 11 strategies used by senior managers; and seven strategies used by middle managers (see Table 1). We then examined how these strategies helped or hindered the ability of the culture toolkit to act as a boundary object-in-use.
—Table 1 near here—
The senior managers used different strategies in the two sets of negotiations. With respect to customer focus, the dominant strategy was building, where senior managers engaged with, elaborated and developed meanings proposed by middle managers. There was also evidence of frequent affirmation of the middle managers’ contributions and senior managers regularly sought clarification of middle managers’ meanings. There was only one incident where a senior manager attempted to dismiss the meaning proposed by a middle manager. With respect to implementation, dominant strategies were stalling – statements that suspended or deferred the negotiation of meaning; dismissing
– rebuffing or ignoring alternative meanings proposed by middle managers; and the reiteration of meanings proposed by their senior colleagues. Senior managers regularly deployed authority by drawing on their position in the hierarchy to silence middle managers; invoked hierarchy by referring to the top echelons of the organization to back up their meaning; and, in one case, used the threat of job losses. Finally, senior managers reified the artifact, by presenting the culture toolkit as having a non-negotiable and fixed meaning in relation to implementation i.e., it meant the continuation of the workshops and in the form dictated by the culture toolkit and according to the specified deadlines.
Middle managers used different strategies. With respect to customer focus, the most frequently used strategy was advancing – engaging with, elaborating and developing meanings proposed by senior managers. Middle managers did challenge meanings offered by senior managers 9 To simplify the analysis, head office managers and senior site managers were categorized as “senior managers” and engineers, hardware engineers and support staff were combined into one group of “middle managers”.
23 and, importantly, it was a middle manager who proposed the new meaning of commercial focus, which was taken up by other middle (and senior) managers, and which survived through to the end of the workshop. Middle managers regularly reinforced their meanings and tried to uphold the meanings proposed by other middle managers. In contrast, implementation was very different. There was no evidence of advancing, and the most common strategies were reinforcement; undermining, where middle managers made critical statements of senior managers to discredit their meanings; challenging senior managers’ meanings; and upholding the meanings offered by fellow middle managers. Finally, there were several incidents where senior managers were held to account i.e., middle managers demanded actions from senior managers that would contradict their proposed meaning of implementation and/or questioned a lack of action on the part of senior managers in ways that discredited their meaning.
The comparison of these strategies provides a number of insights. First, different strategies have implications for the pattern of participation in the negotiations around the meaning of the boundary object. Some strategies appear more likely to be associated with wider participation in negotiations, as a result of which meaning is more likely to be collectively constructed, common ground established and knowledge transformed e.g., building, advancing, affirming, clarifying, and proposing. Other strategies seem to be more likely to be used to constrain participation in negotiations and to impose or entrench a preferred meaning e.g., stalling, dismissing, reiterating, deploying authority, invoking hierarchy, threatening, undermining and holding to account. Some strategies, such as challenging, reinforcing and upholding, may be used both to open up and constrain participation.
For example, if middle managers are to participate meaningfully in the negotiations, some challenges may be necessary if new meanings are to emerge; in addition, upholding and reinforcing may be a way to ensure that a meaning establishes a foothold so that it can subsequently be advanced and built upon.
Conversely, repeated challenges may be used by middle managers to defend or entrench existing meanings, while upholding and reinforcing could be a way for middle managers to mount a collective resistance to senior managers’ meanings. Finally, some strategies may appear to be associated with opening up participation but are, in fact, meaningless except within the context of the other strategies e.g., both sets of negotiation started with an explicit invitation for middle managers to participate but
24 very different participation patterns emerged in the subsequent negotiations.
Second, strategies engage with vertical power relations in different ways. Those strategies associated with the collective construction of meaning tended to break down or blur – if only temporarily – vertical boundaries. For example, when used by senior managers, building, affirming and clarifying are important ways to redress the hierarchical differences and to give subordinates a clear voice in the discussions, as indicated in the follow up interviews. The negotiations about customer focus, the workshop had been “an opportunity for them to give their two-pence worth”
(middle manager); and “for the management … to actually take notice of what’s going on in the other sites” (senior manager). In contrast, many of the strategies associated with constrained participation reinforce and reproduce the power embedded in vertical relations. For example, when senior managers stalled, deployed authority, invoked hierarchy, and made threats, they were both exercising and reinforcing their superior position in relation to their subordinates. Again, this was commented on in the follow-up interviews as middle managers said how “disappointed” they felt about their inability to challenge the process of implementation: “I don’t think there’s anything I can say or do that would get anything changed in the process”; and: there was “no statement in there that said we are going to use the information that you give us and you are going to change things”. Implementation decisions had been “passed down” and Head Office “wanted to keep control” of these activities.
Middle managers also drew on power related to their position in relation to their superiors. For example, upholding and reinforcing draws on the group support of other middle managers which cuts across horizontal differences. Similarly, when middle managers hold account senior managers to account, they are turning the greater responsibility of their superiors against them by demanding particular actions or criticizing inaction.
Discussion and Conclusions
We sought to answer two research questions regarding patterns of participation and the influence of vertical power relations: The first was: what different patterns of participation occur in the negotiation of meaning of boundary objects; and how do they arise? Our study shows two different patterns of participation. One pattern involved a high degree of participation as both middle
25 and senior managers contributed to the negotiation of meaning, and participants regularly built on earlier interventions to develop shared understandings. This pattern of distributed participation occurred through an interplay between strategies of building, affirming and clarifying by senior managers and, on the part of middle managers, advancing, backed up with the use of challenging, reinforcing and upholding. Through these strategies, the artifact helped to interweave and integrate meanings proposed by different actors into a shared understanding, whereby the need for a customer focus was transformed into a need for a commercial focus. The second pattern involved constrained participation and was associated with attempts to impose preferred meanings, as a result of which the same artifact failed to break down the boundary between two different meanings of implementation.
Instead polarization occurred as senior managers used a series of strategies to constrain the participation of their subordinates; middle managers challenged and undermined senior managers’ meanings and, while they upheld and reinforced their own meanings they failed to advance them.
The second research question was: do groups draw on vertical power relations to influence the negotiation of meaning of boundary objects and, if so, how? Our study shows that vertical power relations are significant in the negotiation of meaning of boundary objects, and in complex ways. The strategies used by senior managers in relation to customer focus tended to soften or redress their privileged position. In addition, our findings indicate that subordinates must also exercise power if they are to participate in the co-construction of meaning. Strategies such as upholding, reinforcing and challenging, as long as they are combined with advancing, appear necessary if middle managers are to establish new meanings long enough for them to be become meaningful to – and be taken up by – the larger group, including the more senior managers. In relation to implementation – and in the absence of advancing – these same strategies became weapons with which to resist senior managers’ use of strategies that clearly capitalized on and exploited their superior position in the hierarchy.
Our study makes four contributions. First, in using our novel analysis of the real time negotiation of meaning we are able to illustrate how a designated boundary object becomes a boundary object-in-use i.e., through processual plasticity (involving distributed participation and the co-construction of meaning). In this way, we show that it is the practice of negotiating that determines the success of the artifact in becoming a boundary object-in-use. We also show how the strategies
26 identified earlier – and employed by both senior and subordinate participants – help to sustain processual plasticity. In this regard, we extend Levina and Vaast’s (2005) work on the emergence of a boundary object-in-use to emphasize the additional significance of “bottom-up” strategies by subordinates. In other words, whether or not an artifact becomes a boundary object-in-use depends upon the interplay between the strategies used by senior and subordinate members, and not just the
“top-down” work of designated or informal boundary spanners. Our study also shows how the deployment of power by a wide range of participants can bring about the co-construction of meaning, cooperation and the transformation of knowledge, which conforms to a view which sees power as facilitative i.e., power is used “to” achieve collective outcomes (Clegg, Courpasson & Phillips, 2006).
A second contribution concerns our elaboration of Carlile’s (2004) point that actors do not necessarily occupy equal positions in representing their knowledge to each other. We complement
Bechky’s (2003b) work which shows how professional and positional power can prevent artifacts from becoming boundary objects-in-use, to illustrate the way in which vertical power relations and line authority can impinge upon the ability of artifacts to become boundary objects-in-use.
Specifically, our findings show how power was exercised by senior managers over their subordinates by deploying the authority directly related to their position; exercising coercive power through the use of threats; using their political access to more senior managers to invoke hierarchy; and drawing on their position to stall the negotiation of meaning and dismiss meanings not suited to their tastes.
Subordinates are not totally powerless in relation to their superiors and can draw on sources of power to resist by, for example, using group support to reinforce and uphold; expertise to undermine; and their subordinate position to hold their superiors to account. This pattern conforms to a more negative view of power i.e., the use of power by an actor “over” another (Clegg, Courpasson & Phillips, 2006).
Third, we also show the complexity involved in assessing whether or not a designated artifact successfully emerges as boundary object-in-use. In our case, there was both a “break though” in identifying and securing commitment to the need for a commercial focus in the new culture; and a
“stalemate” concerning the actions that should be taken to implement this new culture. Thus, whether an artifact becomes a boundary object-in-use may not be influenced so much by the characteristics of the artifact e.g., objects, models and maps rather than standardized forms and methods or repositories
27 (Carlile, 2002), tangible rather than verbal artifacts (Bechky, 2003a), or the use of artifacts with particular visual imagery (Yakura, 2002); or even by the particular setting in which the boundary object is located, such as the stage in the process or the participants who are involved (Carlile, 2002).
Instead, the success or failure of a particular artifact may have more to do with the processes whereby its meaning is negotiated. It therefore follows that – in some cases at least – the same artifact can slip in and out of functioning as a boundary object, depending on the way in which actors participate in the negotiation of meaning. In our case, the culture toolkit enabled participants to represent their different knowledge about the existing culture to each other – so while senior managers started off by arguing a customer focus was needed, middle managers countered that it already existed. The toolkit gave them a language and a process with which to represent this different knowledge about the culture and enabled participants to learn about these differences. Most importantly, it enabled the transformation of knowledge – from a customer focus to a commercial focus. However, this was not the case with implementation, where there is no evidence of transformation. Thus it appears possible to engage in strategies to encourage processual plasticity in relation to some issues, while adopting different strategies that reify the artifact and defend particular meanings in relation to others. This makes answering the question of whether a designated artifact has become a boundary object-in-use a rather complex task.
A fourth contribution is derived from our methodology, which could inform practice-oriented approaches more generally. In following the practice-based approach advocated by Levina and Vaast
(2005: 340) by focusing on “the ongoing use of an artifact by agents within a specific social context that generates the artifact’s social characteristics and gives it meaning”, we have conducted a detailed, real time analysis of the negotiation of meaning in practice. In addition to the communities of practice literature, there is considerable interest in practice among strategy researchers. In the same way as
Jarzabkowski (2004) notes that strategies are not something organizations “have” but something that actors “do”; so too are boundary objects. Strategy includes “all the work involved with formulating, implementing and communicating corporate strategies” (Whittington et al., 2003: 397) and “embraces the interactions and interpretations from which strategic activity emerges over time (Jarzabkowski,
2003: 24). Many of these interactions and interpretations occur in meetings – board meetings,
28 committees, strategic retreats – not unlike our workshop. Accordingly, our methodological approach provides the basis for a detailed interpretive analysis that could be used to unpack complex processes of meaning construction that occurs in settings where knowing and practice are mutually constituted.
As Orlikowski (2002: 252-3) has pointed out “knowing cannot be understood as stable or enduring.
Because it is enacted in the moment, its existence is virtual, its status provision”. Our methodology provides one way to show how knowing – or, in our terms, meaning – changes over time.
Our study has a number of practical implications. It shows how the processual plasticity associated with a boundary object-in-use requires considerable work, and comes from the enactment of strategies that both “soften” downward power relations and, simultaneously “toughen” upward power relations: toughening without softening is likely to lead to confrontation and stalemate; while softening without toughening may reflect disengagement and “going through the motions” (cf.
Handley et al., 2006). Senior managers therefore need to adopt strategies that reduce the impact of downward vertical power relations in negotiating meanings if they genuinely wish to achieve collaboration and transform knowledge. We do not suggest that the strategies identified here are the only ones that can be used, but they do provide a basis from which managers can start to develop strategies to increase the likelihood that the artifacts do serve their designated function and become boundary objects-in-use.
Our study also indicates that it is important for senior managers to realize that as subordinates exercise power in order to influence the negotiation of meaning, they may not necessarily propose or support meanings that are consistent with the meanings that senior managers have in mind. In such cases, there may be a tendency for senior managers to “push back” and reinforce their power position, as happened with implementation. Our study indicates that this reaction intensified over time and in response to the refusal of middle managers to give way on the meaning of implementation – towards the end of the workshop, senior managers started to “bundle” strategies as they sought to dismiss a middle manager’s contribution, make a threat and invoke hierarchy all at the same time. The use of strategies to constrain participation and impose meaning may thus emerge as an automatic defense mechanism in response to the use of power or the promotion of particular meanings by subordinates.10 10 As such, the strategies that we have identified are necessarily deliberate – they may also be emergent (cf. Mintzberg. 1985).
29 To maintain a boundary object-in-use therefore requires senior managers to surrender some of their control and to face the consequences of potentially unpalatable outcomes arising from the meaning construction of subordinates. It also means that senior managers have to create a safe environment in which subordinates feel that they can exercise power without retaliation.
Our study has a number of limitations. First, the main focus is a three-hour workshop and, while we conducted follow-up interviews, we were not able to study what happened in other workshops or the outcome of the culture change program. We felt that such a focus was necessary in order to conduct the in-depth, finely grained analysis of the construction of meaning, but we realize that it prevented other avenues being explored. Second, we were only able to interview half of the workshop participants to follow up on the workshop. This was due primarily to logistical reasons, with some participants being away from site or unavailable due to work pressures at the time when the interviews were scheduled. However, we noted considerable convergence in the interviews that we did conduct to support our findings. Third, to simplify the analysis, we combined senior managers from head office with those from the local site. While our analysis indicates that there was a great deal of agreement among them, one can clearly imagine situations where there are divisions among different senior managers. It is important therefore to realize that senior managers are not a homogenous group.
We have successfully extended the understanding of power in relation to boundary objects, through our focus on power relations at the micro level. There is, however, a need for future studies of boundary objects to analyze how power relations at the macro level affect boundary objects. First, future research might include the wider socio-economic climate of capitalist relations (cf. Contu &
Willmott, 2003) to consider how they influence patterns of participation and the use of power. In our case study, the workshop took place against a backdrop of major organizational restructuring and job losses for engineers, as well as a downturn in the telecommunications industry. As a result, job insecurity was a continual concern for the middle managers and their participation might have motivated by a desire to present a positive and legitimate identity to senior management and insure against job loss. Second, future research might consider the influence of power relations in the larger organization and how they are used to structure the negotiation of meaning. Participants have to work within the constraints laid down in the way in which the boundary object is set up. As Kunda (1991:
30 219) points out, management “sets the stage, provides the rhetoric, and reserves the right to the final word in these interpretive struggles.” Such “mobilization of bias” constitutes an important use of power (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962). Third, it is also important to realize that our study focuses on skilled middle managers in a knowledge intensive firm – unskilled, blue collar workers may have far less recourse to the strategies employed by our middle managers. Therefore future research could examine the different strategies used by lower level employees in relation to collaboration (“power to”), as well as in the form of resistance (“power over”); in this case power exercised by subordinates to resist the demands of senior managers.
To conclude, a significant amount of work has examined how boundary objects are used to bridge boundaries in the every day work practices of the organization (Orlikowski, 2002), such as the use of boundary objects on the production floor (Bechky, 2003a) and ongoing product development
(Carlile, 2002; 2004). Levina and Vaast (2005) have expanded this to the use of boundary objects in projects to introduce new communication technologies. Our study opens up the contexts in which boundary objects might be used even further – as part of organizational change programs, which so far have not attracted much attention. Given the pervasiveness of organizational change initiatives and their dependence on cooperation across organizational boundaries, it is important for researchers and practitioners alike to understand what enables an artifact to become a boundary object-in-use.
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33 Table 1: Strategies of Senior and Middle Managers
STRATEGY11 DESCRIPTION OF INTERVENTION BY SENIOR MANAGERS Inviting Statements which encourage participation by middle managers in negotiation of meanings. Affirming Statements agreeing with meanings put forward by middle managers. Clarifying Questions asked of middle managers to open up negotiation of meanings. Building Statements which engage with, elaborate and develop meanings put forward by middle managers. Stalling Statements which serve to suspend or defer the negotiation of meanings. Dismissing Statements which serve to rebuff or ignore alternative meanings. Reiterating Statements which return to and repeat meanings already proposed by senior managers. Deploying Authority Statements which contain directives that eliminate meanings proposed by middle managers. Invoking Hierarchy Statements which refer to superiors in order to justify the elimination of meanings proposed by middle managers Threatening Statements which refer to potential sanctions in order to eliminate meanings proposed by middle managers. Reifying the Artifact Statements which invoke the culture toolkit to represent a particular, non- negotiable meaning STRATEGY DESCRIPTION OF INTERVENTION BY MIDDLE MANAGERS Proposing Statements which introduce a new meaning. Advancing Statements which engage with, elaborate and develop meanings proposed by senior managers or/and other middle managers. Challenging Statement which reject or critique meanings proposed by senior managers. Upholding Statements which express support for meanings proposed by other middle manager. Reinforcing Statements which return to and repeat meanings already proposed by middle managers. Undermining Statements which are critical of senior managers in order to discredit their proposed meanings. Holding to account Statements which demand action from senior managers (or question a lack of action) in way that discredit their proposed meanings
11 Different terminology is deliberately used to distinguish interventions by senior managers from interventions by middle managers in order to facilitate the analysis.
34 Figure 1: Summary of Negotiations around Customer Focus12
MINS
10 1 Customer Focus = relationship [SM]
2 Who is the customer? [SM]
20 Another End user business 3 Customer is dominant [SM] 30 4 Who is the customer? 5 We [UK site] 6 We are not Another business? [MM] are customer customer focused [MM] focused [MM]
7 Who is the 50 customer? End user = business 8 We [UK site] are [MM] already customer focused [MM] 9 We need to be commercially focused [MM] 60 10 Who is responsible for being customer 11 focused? [MM] We all need to be commercially focused [MM]
12 We are 13 Who is the customer customer? [MM] 80 focused [MM]
End user? Another 14 We are customer business? focused but could be more so [MM] 110 15 Customer relation is interactive [MM] 16 Who is the customer? [MM]
17 Tempered claim of 130 Customer Customer customer focus [SM] is internal is external 18 Company or customer as dominant? [MM]
160 19 Honest relationship 20 Commercial focus = with customer [SM] financially and profits 180 aware [MM]
TIME Who is the Customer focus = Are we customer We need to be customer? relationship focused? commercially focused
* SM = Senior Manager, MM = Middle Manager
12 Left axis numbers refer to time i.e., minutes after the commencement of the workshop; the light, dashed arrows indicate the order of interventions, which are numbered; the bold arrows indicate the development of the different meanings. The phrases at bottom of the figure refer to the different meanings proposed and developed during the workshop.
35 Figure 2: Summary of Negotiations around Implementation13
Time (Mins.) 10 1. Actions for local implementation collectively identified [SM] 50 2. Implementation needs direction [MM]
3. Need for better information [MM] 4. Implementation needs direction [MM] 5. Direction is difficult [SM] 6. Implementation needs direction [MM] 7. Need for time frames [MM] 60 9. First step is awareness 8. Implementation of the culture [SM] 80 needs direction [MM]
10. Next step is to involve everyone [SM]
11. Actions for local implementation collectively identified [SM] 12. Implementation needs direction: 120 long term costs, timescales, 13. Need for further information and road maps [MM] workshops [SM]
14. Directives given on 15. Need for: road maps, timing and conduct of 150 milestones and action plans workshop [SM] [MM] 16. Next steps as reports - actions decided by HO [SM] 17. Need for time lines [MM] 18. First step is further workshops [job losses flagged 19. Need for road map up] [SM] [MM] 20. Activities decided by 160 Head Office [SM]
22. Need for time lines 21. First step is culture and success criteria awareness: instructions on [MM] timing, reports and decisions by Head Office [SM] 23. Direction is 170 Unfeasible [SM] 24. Actions to be decided locally 25. Actions not [MM] decided locally [SM] Implementations as specific Implementation as collectively Implementation as continuation TIME measurable outcomes defined actions of workshops
SM = Senior Manager, MM = Middle manager
13 Left axis numbers refer to time i.e., minutes after the commencement of the workshop; the light, dashed arrows indicate the order of interventions, which are numbered; the bold arrows indicate the development of the different meanings. The phrases at bottom of the figure refer to the different meanings proposed and developed during the workshop.
36 Appendix 1: Negotiations around Customer Focus Text from Workshop14 Negotiation of Meaning Interventions by Senior Interventions by Managers Middle Managers SSM1: it’s important that we have a strong UTel culture in this The importance of a customer SM invites participation organization to be customer focused, we need to actually get a focus is introduced by a senior from MM. common understanding… and hopefully feed back any concerns manager. [1] and issues that may crop up [...] HO2: coming up with solutions for customers…sorting out A head office manager offers a customers’ problems… So being able to help our customers? range of customer relationships in seeking to define customer focus SSM1: I have a couple of questions for you, we talk about the A senior manager asks whether consumer market but our market really is the business-to- the customer is the end-user vs. business market. It’s our customers who are the people that are a business. The issue becomes dealing with consumer market. who is the customer? [2] HO2: Yes you could say that the consumer market is our customer’s market, so it’s not our market. SSM1: So yeah the focus from our point of view is much more the business-to-business type sales. […] HO1: … so it’s really up to the customer: if he wants to put in as The head office manager you say the game or horoscope or a lap-top synchronization. I returns to the customer mean that’s for our customers to decide … you have to relationship in which the understand the end customer. customer is dominant. [3] [...]
14 HO= head office manager; SSM= senior site manager; SS = support staff manager; SE = software engineer; HE = hardware engineer; SM = senior manager (includes HOs and SSMs); MM = middle managers (includes SEs, HEs, and SSs). The number beside each participant indicates the order in which the person first participates in the discussion.
37 SE1: I wonder if there’s an opportunity to re-visit the mission A software engineer asks who MM advances SM’s statement? I think we should be making sure that our customers the customer is and whether it meaning. are business-to-business customers and we should be fitting in is another business. [4] when they want to launch. Now when a customer walks through the door he wants to hear that - he’s got a date in his mind, if we can hit that date - whether it’s first in the market or not, he makes that decision but we should just ensure that we hit their project dates. HO2: Good point so it’s in your own time, rather than first. SM affirms and builds on contribution by MM. SE1: Yeah. Absolutely. Absolutely we get customers at the door, if you could say you could get six weeks better then they may drop one function if you can offer it six weeks earlier than any other competitor. HO2: Right, very good point. SM continues to affirm. […] SE1: I believe that we’re [local site] customer-oriented. I think A software engineer argues that MM challenges meaning we are customer focused as an organization and we have been all the UK site is customer proposed by SMs. the way through even in our history. I think we’re a customer- focused. There is a shift from focused organization defining the nature of the relationship with the customer to claims that UK site already is customer focused. [5] HE1: I struggle with that one. SE1: You struggle with that one? HE1: Because I don’t think nowadays we’re close enough to the customer, you know, I think when we were GlobalTel it was easy because we actually had customers. SSM1: What do you mean by the customers? SM seeks clarification over meaning. HE1: External customers I think it would have to be to be honest A debate follows in which … we’re miles away from the customer and have been for quite software engineers emphasize a few years now, so I’d kind of struggle with that. their existing close relationship with customer; this is disputed by some other participants. [6]
38 SSM1: I don’t agree with that. SM attempts to dismiss.
SE2: Suppose it depends on your point of view MM upholds meaning. SE3: Probably does SE4: I think certainly from the software environment we’re very close to customers at the moment … I agree with [SE1] on that one. HO2: But maybe you mean different things with customers, my The discussion returns to who SM seeks clarification and interpretation is that when you say customer you mean the end- the customer is. [7] builds on MM’s user. contribution.
SE1: Yeah, I think I do. HE2: But who is our end-user, I mean the case of [X customer] Further confusion over who the MMs advance each for example or any of the other customers – they are our end- customer is, as end-user is others’ meanings. user aren’t they? equated with business. HE3: Absolutely yeah, we are a business-to-business organization. SE3: So I think we are focused on our customer’s needs and how Claim that UK site already is we can address them. customer focused reemerges. [8] SS2: But you also need to look at the different streams of being The importance of customer MM proposes new customer focused and commercially focused, I’m not sure that as focus is challenged; instead meaning. an organization we’re necessarily commercially aware … there is a need for a commercial focus. [9] SSM1: That’s a valuable point. Some of us need to be more SM affirms and builds on business aware, don’t we? this new meaning. SS2: … we are very driven by engineers and the technology and some of the phones are geared towards engineers and not-end- users and non-technical people like myself. And people do get caught up with developing incredible products that are fantastic with loads of features but from a commercial focus aren’t really needed. So I don’t think as an organization we’re not necessarily as commercially and business focused as we need to be. [Long silence] SE5: But it’s the job of sales and marketing to go out and assess There is an attempt to shift to
39 what’s the end-users really want in terms of features and feed emphasis to who is responsible that back? for the customer. [10] SSM2: As an organization as we’re expecting a lot of our The discussion returns to the SM builds on new meaning. engineers and project managers to be going out to our customers need for a commercial focus: and putting those deals and contracts in place. But the engineers regardless of whether the who are going out and meeting customers need to be engineers are close to the commercially aware. They need to be aware of the contracts customer, they still need to be they’re putting in place and the implications of the contracts commercially aware. [11] because if we don’t meet them we annoy our customers and they disappear. SSM1: I don’t think that’s happening though, I don’t think we’re putting engineers in front of customers who aren’t adequately trained… SS1: I think we’re in a transitional period at the moment. SSM1: So it’s an issue of customer focus? SM seeks clarification. SS2: We can’t agree! [laughs] Managers admit there is no agreement on what customer focus means. SE1: Can we have just a hands-up? Who thinks we are customer A software engineer returns to MM reinforces meaning. focused just … [Many hands go up]. So we’re about sort of sixty his claim that they are already percent would you say that think we are customer focused. customer focused. [12] SE2: I think we have a perception we’re customer focused. Other MM uphold this […] meaning. SE1: So I believe that we are customer focused, this is my perception, that we are customer focused but obviously we need that to improve. But it is a value and it is something that we already have in place. HE4: I think it’s an important point that we are customer The discussion returns to who focused. I think there is some confusion about who the customer is the customer – end-user vs. is. business; the claim that the company already is customer focused continues. [13] SSM1: I would go further than that, we are internally [focused] SM builds on MM meaning. and when we [deal with] our internal customers we try to deliver that as well.
40 SE1: I’m going to put that [point] down on the board, is that all MM reinforces his right? earlier meaning. HE4: Yeah sure but … I think the whole organization needs to know who the customers are. Is it the end-user? Is it the operators? Is it you know the people we’re actually selling to? SSM1: The people that are actually paying the invoices that we SM builds on MM meaning. send to them [are] the business-to-business interface. It’s not Joe Public on the street, that’s their customer effectively although we need to have an appreciation of what’s going on out in the market. SS3: I think there’s confusion in some people’s minds MM advance SM’s meaning. SE1: I think it’s important to recognize that we are still learning Some tempering of the claim how to be a platform provider and you know we’re not there yet. that they are already customer focused with the recognition that they could be more so. [14] SE3: I agree I think [SE1] is right here as well. The thing is that we are customer focused but just lack a certain number of organizational, structural and sometimes procedural elements that would make it work better. HE4: I’m a little bit unsure what we’re talking about when we Discussion returns to the nature talk about customer focus, are we talking about delivering of the relationship as precisely what our customers are asking for or are we talking interactive. [15] about having an interactive discussion with them to understand what the market really wants and setting our mission on that basis … I think that’s missing, having this discussion with a customer and saying well this is what we’re going to deliver … I don’t think as an organization we’ve got that interactive discussion, we make lots of promises to all our customers but we don’t seem to prioritize things … we just promise. SE5: As I see it, we’ve got a customer focus for internal and The discussion returns to who external. A lot of people go out and actually talk to the is the customer but instead of customers and they actually focus on satisfying their customers’ end-user vs. business, it needs. So depending where you are, what level you are, you have switches to internal vs. a focus on customer needs. external. [16]
41 HE4: I think internally we do have customer focus but I think it’s this interaction with our external customers that seems to be lacking HE5: Can I chuck another brick into the customer cultural pond … and see what happens ... if I go back two years to when we were bigger …All I used to hear from the guys in [another part of the former organization] was “those bastards in [the UK site] never tell us anything. They’re secretive, they keep it all to themselves, they won’t talk to us, they tell us lies, they won’t tell us where they are on the project”. So how does that all fit together? [some laughter] […] SSM1: What you seem to be saying is there’s the internal view More tempering of the view SM clarifies MM meaning. which seems to be wonderful and the external view has a slightly that they believe that are different tinge to it. already customer focused but not all (external) customers might agree. [17] HE5: … [I remember] some of the things that used to be said and MM’s continue to it was rude. I just wondered you know all of a sudden advance meaning. everything’s different now isn’t it you know and we’re great with our customers and we tell them everything. SE1: No we haven’t said that, you’re actually adding to the story aren’t you. SSM1: … we may believe we’re a customer focused SM builds on meanings. organization … [but] there’s always two sides to a story and we ought to try and get what our customers think of us rather than what we just think ourselves. […] HE4: Well I’m struggling to find the … point of talking to the Discussion shifts back to the customers. I don’t believe the customers have any more idea relationship but views vary than we do of where they want to go … They have a kernel of an over whether the customer or idea but I think they’re just as confused in terms of what the the company should be market’s going to do as we are… dominant. [18] […] SS3: What you’re saying is that we should make up our minds
42 and then believe in ourselves. […] HO2: That’s exactly what we do, because our customers … have SM affirms and builds on their own ideas about what will be the developments ... I think meaning. it’s easier when you’re ahead of your customers and you can have a decision because then you can act as if you know what you’re doing and your customers will be confident. […] HE5: … the customer decides “Oh I’m not really quite sure if I want that, or this or that” and we’re suddenly knocked right off course and that has major implications in terms of our development cycles […] HO3 [in video presentation]: We talk to the customers; the key The video presentation returns thing is having good relationships with customers to give them to the issue of customer focus, good support to make them feel that we are good suppliers to defined in terms of an honest them… we can also talk freely … to our customers therefore we relationship. [19] can talk about the problems and we can be honest. […] SE3: Just one thing on that openness, I think it’s right in respect A software engineer questions MM challenges of platform development [but] … we need to be careful about the value of honesty within the meaning. this openness and giving out information - that can be misleading customer focus relationship. in my view… HO1: Good point. SM affirms contribution. […] SE1: So we need to continue our customer focus Stop/Start/Continue Exercise is MM reinforces meaning. conducted. SS4: I think we’ve all agreed we need to improve our The need for a commercial MM reinforces meaning. commercial awareness not our customer focus focus rather than a customer focus, re-emerges, initiated by support staff managers SS2: we need to be more business focused MMs start to advance [General agreement: “yeahs” and nodding of heads] meaning. SE6: What’s the interesting thing with all this culture stuff is that and is also supported by there is nothing anywhere about things that matter from our point engineers. [20]
43 of view, like profitability and, and our commercial focus. SE4: Exactly HE4: Yeah SS3: And if we’re going to start anything, I would love to see some commercial focus… SE1: Is this a ‘start’ or a ‘continue’? SS3: I’d say START having a commercial focus as I am pretty convinced we don’t have one. HE1: Thinking about the meeting last week, there were people there from engineering and people from the commercial part and so I think that the people who need to have commercial awareness. SSM3: Certainly from an HR point of view, I think we don’t SM builds on MM’s have the commercial awareness that we should have. There are meaning. some managers who are OK but there are some who have no idea about how the money is earned on a project – and I don’t see that as being commercially focused. SS4: Yeah – I think we need to decide what we mean by A commercial focus is defined MM’s continue to commercial. Commercial… to me means being about UTel as being financially aware and advance meanings. profitability. And it doesn’t matter a hell of a lot about customer helping the company to be profitability, customer on time, customer this, customer that and profitable. customer the other, I have never yet heard an UTel manager say “we’ve got to make a lot of money” SE1: So START to become aware of the bottom line SS5: Yes, START to become profit focused within UTel […] SE5: I think that if we have an appreciation of what the end user wants… SE6: …It’s good that our business customers share our vision
HE5: that could be very naïve – we could lose our customer focus by concentrating on what the end user wants SE5: No, I am not saying that – we need to find out what is of importance to the end user
44 HE5: I have to say that I totally disagree because I think it was wrong… we deliver a product to the people who actually need it, we charge them and we move on. We do not get embroiled in what we think they need SE7: At the end of the day, if they have a choice of platforms and they do, [then they can choose] SE1: so have we done that one? The importance of customer [Discussion moves on to other matters] focus has now been replaced by the need for a commercial focus. Flip chart from exercise states: . STOP – unrealistic time scales; START – profit focus; CONTINUE – improve commercial focus SSM2: We should start being profit focused, then we also had a Senior manager affirms slight debate about somebody mentioned that we should meanings. probably start getting to grips with end user awareness and have more end user forums and get together and find out what end users want, but we didn’t all agree on that one. We should continue to improve the commercial focus of the organization because if you’re long term from a commitment point of view we need to be committed to being more commercial focused. HO1: OK
45 Appendix 2: Negotiations around Implementation Text from Workshop15 Negotiation of Meaning Interventions by Senior Interventions by Managers Middle Managers HO1: … So I’m here today of course to start the implementation A head office manager states SM invites participation of our target culture program … another purpose is of course to implementation of the culture change from MM. build global commitment and agree on actions to support the program begins with the workshop; target culture. And we’re here today to learn more about your implementation is defined in terms of current culture in [the local site] but also together to identify actions to be collectively identified actions that you can take here in [the local site] to support the that can be taken at the local site. [1] target culture… […] SE1: I think one thing that’s missing [from the implementation A software engineer defines MM challenges SM’s of the culture change program] is that we need to know where implementation [2] meaning. we’re going … how we fit in, making sure the whole things hangs together … That’s a big concern really ... SSM1: Do you agree? SM seeks clarification. SE2: I can’t see how it adds up. Another MM challenges meaning. SSM1: That we have a lack of future direction or information? SE2: I think it’s more to do with information. Another software engineer suggests SM seeks clarification. MM continues to that implementation is lacking challenge meaning. information [3] SE1: I don’t think it is information actually, I don’t think anyone The first software engineer returns to MM reinforces knows [where we are going]. direction. meaning. […] SE3: I think until we make up our own mind [about where we Discussion returns to lack of are going], we are actually not very flexible … Well maybe we direction – more direction will make can transfer some of those elements [from a project] down into a implementation easier. [4] more general: This is what we’re going to do. This is what we can deliver. HO2: The problem is that it’s not easy, it’s much harder. A head office manager presents SM dismisses meaning.
15 HO= head office manager; SSM= senior site manager; SS = support staff manager; SE = software engineer; HE = hardware engineer; SM = senior manager (includes HOs and SSMs); MM = middle managers (includes SEs, HEs, and SSs). The number beside each participant indicates the order in which the person first participates in the discussion and is not necessarily the same individual as in the negotiations around customer focus.
46 direction as being difficult. [5] SE3: I didn’t say it was easy. MM undermines SM’s meaning. HE1: Do you feel that we are [easily] knocked right off course MM reinforces and that has major implications in terms of our development meaning. cycles, programs etc., etc., etc. I mean if we can have a kernel, a solid internal idea of what we need, and we’re going get this, and we’re going to get that…. HE2: But what is the purchasable point there [HE1]? We’re A hardware engineer returns to having this discussion about [direction] but what’s the definition of implementation as purchasable point? lacking direction. [6] SE1: It [the company’s direction] is a slightly hidden agenda. MM undermines [laughter] SM’s meaning. SSM2: But isn’t [HE2] really saying … how do we [manage] A senior manager asks whether SM seeks clarification. time frames? hardware engineer means time frames. [7] HE2: That’s the essence yeah. SSM2: And it’s quite clear? SE1: I think we need to know where we’re going at [local site, A software engineer returns to need MM reinforces first] for direction at the local site. [8] meaning. […] HO1: …What we’re trying to do is to identify what kind of A head office manager refers to need SM stalling of meaning. culture do we have in [Head Office]; what culture do we have in for awareness of culture at different [different sites in different countries] because this system is an sites. [9] ongoing process and we really must identify at each site what kind of culture, current culture we have... SSM2: But are you saying we should ask if the [Head Office] A senior manager suggests finding guys have problems with us? out what the Head Office thinks of the local site. SM1: Yeah that’s a good point and I think…
SS1: [But] you know it’s them and us and we always have to do The value of doing this is questioned MM undermines what [Head Office] says… by a support staff manager. SM’s meaning. SM1: The mission we have now is to send to [the CEO] and to A head office manager repeatedly SM dismisses MM; the management team the actions or the current culture that we invokes CEO to define invokes hierarchy; and
47 identify within each site. [The CEO] is very interested … in this implementation in terms of the first stalls. work. We have been running culture workshops now in [the step, which is awareness of culture, various sites] and he has gone through the material with myself including at this site; this is and sometimes with [SM2]. Now he really wants to see what reinforced by another head office kind of culture you have here and that’s the first step. manager. SM2: I think that there are a lot of things that can be done, the first step we need to take this and create awareness, hold these discussions, create a common language … to get the tools to move forward. […] The video is shown The video defines implementation in CEO: I think it [the culture change program] starts with terms of the next step, which is to communicating clearly to make really clear what you mean, involve everyone and to involve what you think is the new culture. The next step is to involve measurement [10] everybody through the workshops… Video ends […] HO1: when you’re conducting the workshop with your The head office manager defines SM reifies the artifact; employees you should discuss what key drivers you have in your implementation in relation to process invokes hierarchy. team… It’s also interesting to hear what strengths you have [at the local site] but we don’t have time to go through that today but you will have instructions in the culture toolkit on how to work with the different exercises. I don’t know, do you think we should go through the shared vision now [SM2]?
HO2: I think we’ve covered it fairly well. HO1: It’s gone through fairly well in the video, we don’t need to go through them. Do we have the brochure?
SSM1: It’s in the culture kit. HO1: It’s in the culture kit. OK, we’re going to divide you into three groups now and you’re going to work with two different templates. […] SE1: I wondered whether you had any feedback on the previous A software engineer asks for MM undermines stuff [about what actions came out the exercise at previous feedback on whether previous actions SM’s meaning.
48 workshops]. were implemented.
HO1: Yes … of course, we saw and talked about all these The head office manager returns to SM reiterates meaning actions. But it is now more that … we want you to help us implementation as defined in terms and reifies the artifact. identify actions that … the organisation should take … We have of collectively identified actions to be another template [for an exercise which is] more into what kind taken at local site [11] of actions could you take in [the local site] to support the target culture [… ] SE1: Sorry… Do we need to start actually defining where we are A software engineer returns to MM reinforces going – start telling people here what we’re aim to be doing, definition of implementation in terms meaning. where we’re going….what their contribution is […] of lack of direction;
SS1: [We need to] start defining where we’re going; start A discussion ensues linking direction MMs uphold each defining long-term costs to long term costs [12] others’ meanings. […] SS2: … We felt we were going very similar to what [SE1] said, Implementation linked to timescales; we should stop setting unrealistic time scales, people need to know that they can achieve what’s been put in place. … SE1: …to feel empowered people need to have the information empowerment and information; they need to know where to go to be able to move on and feel empowered… SS2…. I still think there’s a problem with people in UTel not and road maps actually understanding … who’s responsible for what areas. Empowerment? How do we empower our engineers, we need to delegate more, we employ engineers to do a job so let them just get on and do it, that’s really important … also better road maps… HO1: … you came up with very good actions. What do you Head office manager returns to SM reiterates meaning think? [turning to SSM2] If we let all employees in [local site] go implementation as further and reifies the artifact. through these exercises [templates] here in the workshop do you workshops [13] think you could work with the results to make improvements in [local site]..?
SSM2: I think the idea of this was to try and take this further into Directives for timing and conduct of
49 the organization with the line managers and they can have a subsequent workshops are issued by group to deal with [in subsequent workshops]; and maybe we can senior managers with reference to the provide some of the material that goes with it … culture toolkit. [14] SSM1: You should have … the video … Also I will email you SM stalls and reifies the the slides that we presented today [and] the agenda for the three artifact. hour meeting that you’ll have with your staff; going through the stop start in the workshops, that’ll be in your slides; instructions on how to run the discussions; and also the template for the stop start workshops. The templates that we want you to work on are template two and template four, those two templates once you’ve conducted the workshops with your staff. I need them in by the end of August. So you need to conduct your workshops with your staff by the end of August. At the end of August I send all my information to [Head Office] who will make a presentation to [the CEO]. Have you got brochures for everyone? SE2: Does this include contractors? SSM2: No it’s just permanent staff. SM dismisses. SS2: Why not contractors? We’ve got to work together, we MM challenges SM’s haven’t got that many. meaning. HO1: If you want more brochures to give your contractors that’s SM dismisses; reifies the fine but the results I want are from permanent staff … some of artifact; and uses our contractors have been with us a long time so I have no authority. problems with you going through basics with the contractors but not spending a three hour workshop with them […] HE3: Is this a priority? MM undermines SM’s meaning. SSM1: I think it’s important to note that your responsibilities as SM uses authority; team leaders, group managers are not just engineering invokes hierarchy. responsibilities, this is part and parcel to your responsibilities. [SSM2] says it has to be done. Any questions? SSM2: Don’t leave it till the end of August before you do it, it SM uses authority. would be nice to have some done beforehand so. […] HE4: What’s the context of this work, we do this work, we give Engineers return to need for road MM reinforces the results back by the end of August, and then there isn’t really map; milestones and action plans. meaning and holds
50 a road map of what actually happens … we’ve done two of these [15] SM to account. workshops now and nothing has really happened has a result of it. So what physical stuff is going to happen as a result of doing these workshops? What’s going to happen? …. SE1: For example, at the end August is there going to be a MM holds SM to presentation to hear what the issues were so everyone knows account. what they are … that would be one milestone and the next one is knowing what happened [at Head Office]. Another one could be what action plans are going to be agreed by whatever. It’s just [we need] some plan going forward rather than being an isolated activity… the bit that’s missing to my mind is what the next steps are? We do this but then what’s the next step? HO1: Well what we [Head Office] have decided is that we will, A head office manager defines next SM dismisses; invokes of course, receive the report with the actions from each site, and steps as reports; actions will be hierarchy; and stalls. the management team in [Head Office] will also decide what decided by Head Office kind of actions we will agree on and work on during the next (contradicting earlier point that coming year. So you will have a report, you will have a actions will be collectively identified) presentation during the next meeting [at Head Office]. [16] HE5: Is there some sort of time line or something ... there must A hardware engineer returns to the MM reinforces be some time line we’re working to. need for a time line [17] meaning and holds SM to account. HO1: I tried to show with the picture here [flip chart with The head office manager returns to SM reiterates meaning process on it]: we have the target up here and we are here today. implementation defined in terms of dismisses request for The first step is to try to [understand] the different current the first step, which is to conduct the timeline; stalls; and cultures within the organization today and the goal is to create remaining workshop (by August); threatens. one company, one culture but it’s also an ongoing process so we also mentions possible job losses [18] are going to work with the culture. We’re going to, of course, put the target culture into a lot of different activities. We don’t know if you’re going to be here in 2003-2004. But we have a goal to create, work as one company with one culture and we’re today and this is the road that we’re going to take. So the end of August is the first step … SE4: we need to present that road map to the team before we get A software engineer returns to need MM reinforces into this… for road map [19] meaning. HO1: …we [Head Office] have a project plan describing this in The head office manager returns to SM reiterates meaning;
51 more detail what kind of activities we will take in the future. But definition of activities as decided by dismisses; invokes it’s also important not to talk too much about the future – what Head Office [20] hierarchy; and stalls. we are going to do as the next step. We have a big challenge to work with this for the moment and we’re not going to start up a lot of different activities because I don’t think we have the time or the possibility to go through different activities. HO2: I think the first step is really to create an awareness about Another head office manager returns SM reiterates meaning; … [the] culture, and creating some common language and shared to implementation as the first step, stalls and invokes values … … we’re sort of creating a tool to move forward. And which is culture awareness; repeats hierarchy. then as [SM1] says, what will happen in August is that the result, instructions for timing; the outcome of all the different workshops … will be compiled implementation defined in terms of a into an analysis; a report that will be presented to the [head report; decisions to be taken by Head office] management in which [SSM2] and I are part of. And then Office. [21] there will be decisions taken about what the next step is. SE5: I think actually the question is, baSE4 on [HE2] question A software engineer defines time MM upholds MM’s before, what’s the success criteria? … lines in terms of success criteria [22] meaning. HO2: … I’m not sure it’s possible to put down an objective This is challenged by a head office as SM dismisses meaning. metric or measure where you determine whether you’ve infeasible. [23] succeeded or not […] HE2: Can I make a suggestion for something we could do A hardware engineer returns to MM holds SM to locally? ... when we brief our individual groups, could each original definition of implementation account. manager then take for example three or four of the actions and as actions to be decided by the local say right I’m now going to implement these within my site [24]. team….Then at least we’re showing some results from this exercise. HO1: … that’s not actions that you should be doing [in the local This is directly refuted by a head SM uses authority. site] ... office manager (contradicting the opening statement) [25]
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