Government of Yemen/Ministry of Water and Environment United Nations Development Programme/Global Environment Facility Agence Française de Développement/Fonds Français pour l’Environnement Mondial
Socotra Governance and Biodiversity Project
Mid-Term Review Report Revised version dated 16 July 2011
Prepared by: Dr. Lamia Mansour, Independent Consultant Mr. Anis Noaman, Independent Consultant 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 2 - ______
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank all the project partners who have entrusted us this challenging task of conducting an independent and objective review of this important project and provided us with all the necessary information and insights needed for completing this report.
Special thanks go to the SGBP, MoWE, EPA and UNDP staff who accepted to meet with us extensively and beyond their official working hours to allow us to grasp a good understanding of the situation in an open and straightforward atmosphere.
We hope that this report can positively contribute to the on-going efforts for the safeguard and development of Socotra and we would like to capture two quotes which summarize this report:
“The people of Socotra have always respected their natural heritage but also need to provide their children a good future” Local Socotri
“Socotra is a rare place and requires rare solutions” MoWE/EPA
Lamia Mansour and Anis Noaman 12 December 2010 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 3 - ______
Contents
Executive summary 5 Acronyms 6 1. Introduction 7 1.1. Purpose of the Mid-Term Review 7 1.2. Key issues addressed by the MTR 7 1.3. Methodology of the MTR 7 1.4. Structure of the MTR report 7 2. The project and its development context 8 2.1. Project start and period covered by the MTR 8 2.2. Project context and background 8 2.2.1. Socotra’s socio-economic context 8 2.2.2. Socotra’s institutional context 9 2.2.3. Socotra’s biodiversity context 9 2.2.4. The biodiversity conservation policy context 9 2.3. Problems that the project seek to address 9 2.4. Project configuration 9 3.Main Findings 12 3.1. Project formulation 12 3.1.1. Project complexity in implementation 12 3.1.2. Confusing replication approaches from previous interventions 13 3.1.3. Other aspects related to project formulation 15 3.1.4. Assessing the logframe and its indicators 15 3.1.5. Stakeholder participation 15 3.2. Implementation approach 15 3.2.1. Implementation approach 15 3.2.2. Stakeholders participation and coordination with other related 21 initiatives 3.2.3. Financial delivery 26 3.2.4. Rapid Management Audit 27 3.3. Results 29 3.3.1. Attainment of Outputs/Achievements of Objectives and Rating 29 3.3.2. Sustainability 30 4. Recommendations 30 4.1. Updated project logframe and Biodiversity Tracking Tool 30 4.2. Establishing an operational set up and launching the inception phase 30 4.3. Ensuring adequate stakeholders participation 33 4.3.1. Optimizing the role and functions of the Project Board 33 4.3.2. Optimizing coordination with AFD/FFEM 34 4.3.3. Activate the coordination with national and international partners 34 4.3.4. Establishing a communication strategy 35 4.4. Mobilizing Government’s parallel funding 35 5. Lessons learned 35 5.1. Success stories and lessons learned in NGOs capacity development 35 leading to sustainable livelihoods 5.2. Administrative reform at local level 37 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 4 - ______
Annexes
Annex 1.TORs Annex 2. Itinerary Annex 3. List of persons interviewed Annex 4. List of documents reviewed Annex 5. General Rating and Project Sustainability Rating Annex 6. Co-financing and Leveraged Resources Annex 7. Updated Logical Framework Annex 8. Updated Biodiversity Tracking Tool Annex 9. Planned and Proposed Budget Annex 10. ToRs for Part-time Technical Advisor 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 5 - ______
Executive summary
Project description
Context of the Socotra Governance and Biodiversity Project. Socotra is a very poor and underdeveloped region of Yemen; percentage of families living below the poverty line is over 40% and unemployment rate is up to 36%. Socotra is also an island exceptionally rich in biodiversity. Covering an area of 3,625 Km², Socotra is classified as the most important center for biodiversity within the Horn of Africa: it is one of the WWF's global 200 ecoregions, it has been designated as a Man And Biosphere reserve by UNESCO, it is listed as a World Heritage Site since 2008. The Conservation Zoning Plan (CZP), which was developed through the first UNDP intervention and was adopted by presidential decree in 2000, constitutes the basis for sustainable development and conservation of biodiversity on the Archipelago. Although this plan was developed in a consultative manner, it remains an ambitious plan which imposes on the local and central administration very strict conditions for development activities, and has created several conflicts with the local population.
Project objective. According to its project document, “this project will create a framework that internalizes biodiversity considerations into the ongoing development of Socotra through an effective spatial planning. While it is recognized that trade-offs will be made and not all of Socotra’s biodiversity can be protected, the project will allow informed decisions to be made by capable strategic planners and local resource users that acknowledge the global and local benefits of biodiversity”. The SGBP’s objective is “Biodiversity management considerations are mainstreamed effectively into the current process of decentralizing governance for development on the Socotra archipelago”. The project was submitted to GEF IV under the Strategic Objective Two: “To mainstream biodiversity conservation in production landscapes/seascapes and sectors”.
Project components. The components and outputs are the following (Grey sections reflect the additional AFD/FFEM interventions): 1. Local Governance Support through an Island wide administration operational and working in an integrated manner with local, national and international stakeholders, EPA functional assignment on Socotra and establishing a Monitoring-Control-Surveillance system for MPAs 2. Use of mainstreaming tools provided by the project to strategic planners including in the fishing sector 3. Strengthening NGOs capacity in Socotra to manage biodiversity, mobilize small grants allocated to local NGOs/CBOs and the development of training and communication material 4. Biodiversity livelihood values increased through higher revenues that local administration derive from exploitative assets of the Island, higher number of sustainable private initiatives including SMEs and higher revenues for 4 MPA 5. Project management with its PMU in Sanaa 6. Support to the fishing sector through strengthened capacity of fishermen and local administration in adoption and enforcement of sustainable fishing practice and through investments for the fishing sector 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 6 - ______
Project Duration and Budget. The project duration is 5 years, from August 2008 till July 2013. The total project budget is US$ 3.9 million; the sources of financing are as follows: GEF financing: 975,000 US$ UNDP financing: 975,000 US$ GOY parallel funding: 750,000 US$ AFD/FFEM financing: 1,187,584 US$ (as per the GoY/UNDP cost-sharing agreement, based on the bilateral agreement between the GoY/AFD signed in March 2010).
Project stakeholders. The project is executed by the Ministry of Water and Environment and its affiliated agency; the EPA. The other main project stakeholders include the Local Administration of the Hadibo and Qualansiyah Districts, Ministry of Local Administration, local NGOs and SMEs benefiting from sustainable use of biodiversity
Context of the MTR
Purpose of the MTR. This MTR was triggered by the UNDP/GEF regional technical advisor, following a supervision mission in May 2010, which highlighted, among others, the following key constraints at the level of the project: - limited progress on implementation which is correlated to limited progress towards results; - lack of a clear monitoring and evaluation system, including timely planning of a mid-term evaluation; - overlap among the development partners involved in Socotra; mainly UNDP/GEF, AFD/FFEM, German cooperation, Italian Cooperation; - Government parallel co-financing of US$750,000 are not accounted within the project configuration; - questioning regarding the roles and responsibilities of the national project coordinator and of the national project director. The Mid-Term Review serves as a means of validating or filling the gaps in the initial assessment of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency obtained from monitoring. The mid-term evaluation provides the opportunity to assess early signs of project success or failure and prompt necessary adjustments. As key issues related to the MTR seemed to be more of a management consideration, the MTR team agreed to conduct a Rapid Management Audit as part of the MTR.
Project’s start. The SGBP has witnessed an extensively lengthy development period, which started as early as 2005 and the final project document was signed in July 2008. This delayed signature of the project didn’t allow the project to initiate its activities swiftly and follow up on the momentum of previous efforts of UNDP in Socotra, the National Project Coordinator was recruited in June 2009, one year after the signature of the project.
Period covered by the MTR The duration covered by the MTR is questionable, for UNDP/GEF the project is at mid-point, 2.5 years from its signature, while in reality, the project was initiated in mid-2009, and the first AWP only signed end-2009.
Main conclusions related to project formulation
Project’s complexity in implementation. The project document provided a comprehensive but complex framework for action which has been difficult to understand by most concerned partners, leading to the lack of a clear strategic vision. The project document has only provided guiding principles and frameworks for action, rather than specific interventions and technical 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 7 - ______procedures for implementation. Given the weak technical and managerial capacities at national and local level, this has only contributed to further misunderstanding of the project strategy and hence in project implementation.
Confusing replication approaches from previous interventions. This project has shifted the intervention of UNDP from previous interventions in Socotra in a drastic way at all levels: - from an environmental conservation and community-targeted initiatives to a policy and institutional reform in local governance, - from a project working closely with EPA to one working closely with local authorities, - from a heavily subsidizing system of all concerned partners (local beneficiaries and local activities) to economically feasible development interventions. Moreover, conflicting information related to good practices and lessons learned are provided at the level of the different documents related to the previous interventions in Socotra and do not allow the consolidation and adoption of solid approaches from the previous interventions. Examples of such confusion are: - Holistic approach or extension beyond its mandate? - SCDP and DLDSP: what worked and what didn’t work?
Main conclusions related to implementation approach
Lack of a clear strategy and clear operational work plans and budget plans. Technical support to establish a clear strategy and implementation plan for the project was not deployed through an inception phase, with appropriate technical expertise to support the project in launching and implementing the project.
Inappropriate implementation structures. The project is operating with adequate administrative support, but without any of the technical functions planned as part of the project. The current implementation structure is not in line with the proposed project framework and accordingly cannot respond to the needs for the implementation of the project activities. In fact, in addition to short-term consultants, the project document has called upon the recruitment of 10 full-time technical staff.
Inappropriate technical expertise provided to the project. The following trends can be observed regarding technical expertise deployed: - The time frame for the implementation of the activities is miscalculated and over ambitious. - The project is seen as separate and disconnected components, which can be deployed independently from each other. - Lack of adoption of appropriate techniques for consultation with local partners: the organization of large workshops at local and central level is not always an appropriate technique for the mobilization of rural communities and their engagement in a policy dialogue. - The lack of provision of working papers, initial findings and conclusions has created lack of trust at the level of the local partners which were not aware of the outcomes of the project activities. - This lack in rigorous technical execution modalities lead to a major lack of understanding of the project objectives and expected results by local partners, leading to a major misunderstanding and even resistance to cooperate with the project. A technical review was made regarding the consultancies deployed to date in view of addressing the technical gaps at the level of the consultancies: 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 8 - ______
- IWA development - NGOs assessment - Legal expertise on biodiversity practices including Access and Benefit Sharing
Financial delivery
Expenditures at the level of the UNDP and GEF resources. As of November 2010, expenditures have reached 16% of the total committed funding by UNDP and GEF. To date, cost-effectiveness of the UNDP and GEF resources can be described as unsatisfactory, due to the lack of clear strategy in project implementation and limited achievements obtained from the deployment of the resources.
Expenditures at the level of the Government parallel funding. Official figures indicate that US$ 200,500 have been allocated to date by the government to the project. These funds are used as slash funds for MoWE and EPA operational costs, some of which cover directly or indirectly the project activities; it is clear that the Government parallel funding has not contributed to a large extent to the project objectives and activities.
Results
Attainment of Outputs/Achievements of Objectives and Rating. Given the lack of major achievements at the level of the different components of the projects and the assessment in the of the key outputs of the projects which have been conducted to date, the MTR assigns a General rating of “Highly Unsatisfactory (HU): severe” regarding the achievement of the project objective; which is associated to the overall weak delivery of the project outputs and accordingly lack of progress to date in meeting the project objective.
Sustainability. Given the trend in implementing the project to date, and given the weak general rating of the project, the MTR is cautious with regards to the project sustainability and assigns a Project sustainability rating of “Moderately Unlikely (MU): significant risks”. This is linked to the possible risks in implementing the proposed project strategy adequately and in meeting the project objective and outputs which are prerequisites for sustainability this project.
Recommendations
Updated project logframe and Biodiversity Tracking Tool. The MTR has confirmed that the project strategy and its Monitoring and Evaluation system proposed in the project document are still valid. An updated logframe covering the Amendments to the Project Document funded by AFD/FFEM has been made in order to align the logframe with results-based monitoring standards. The updated logframe is attached in Annex 7. The Biodiversity Tracking tool was also updated and is attached in Annex 8.
Establishing an operational set up and launching the inception phase As requested by UNDP during the discussions of the initial findings of the MTR, this section provides a chronological order of the steps needed for “initiation” of the project:
Step 1. The project technical structures should be strengthened in line with the structures of project document in order to meet its objectives and outputs. A revised budget plan has been proposed by the MTR (Annex 9. Planned and proposed budget - MTR BUDGET sheet) in line with the project document Total Budget and Workplan (TBWP) and in line with GEF CEO 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 9 - ______endorsement Annex C: Consultants to be hired. The proposed structure would require the recruitment of the following additional national staff: - Local Team Leader - 2 Local Facilitators - National GIS expert in Socotra Professional technical support in establishing the ToRs of consultants and in the provision of regular technical backstopping for project implementation, including technical reporting, should be secured. Accordingly, a Part-time International Technical Advisor should be recruited. ToRs for this position have been proposed and are attached in Annex 10. It is proposed that regular support on a basis of one month/quarter would allow the project to obtain necessary technical support.
Step2. Once the key local staff (Local Team Leader and 2 Facilitators) and Technical Advisor are recruited; an inception phase of the project should be planned and at local and central level in order for the project to be initiated with a clear vision and with the required operational set ups. It is expected that such an activity can take place in March 2011, if the national and international staff are mobilized by February 2010.
Step 3. When the project team acquires a strategic vision of the project; an operational understanding of the project can be secured. The development of an operational TBWP and a AWP for 2010 will be possible in light of the inception meeting and as part of the inception report (as per the project’s monitoring and reporting strategy described in the GEF CEO endorsement document).
Step 4. Providing an adequate infrastructure and operational system for the project team should also be address. The management audit has described major dysfunctioning in the administrative operations of the projects which should also be addressed as part of establishing the implementation set up of the project.
Step 5. Clearance of pending technical reports should be finalized in a way that a swift decision regarding their quality and accordingly their payment should be made to avoid harming the image of the project and that of its partners. MTR has provided recommendations regarding on-going consultancies. The deployment of new technical experts should be put on hold until a clear strategy is established following the inception phase of the project and the project team is fully mobilized. In order to respond to UNDP’s concerns regarding aspects related to local governance and the establishment of the IWA, additional recommendations for strengthening local governance were added in the MTR report.
Step 6. Monitoring the delivery of the NPC and of the Administrative and Finance Assistant in Sana’a is also an important management action to be taken and should be done on a clear and regular basis as per the Rapid Management Audit. In order to respond to UNDP’s concerns regarding NPC’s main weaknesses, additional recommendations regarding the ability of the NPC to improve his management skills and English writing skills were added in the MTR report.
Ensuring adequate stakeholders participation. The MTR has provided extensive recommendations on the following aspects related to stakeholders’ participation: - Optimizing the role and functions of the Project Board - Optimizing coordination with AFD/FFEM - Activate the coordination with the local, national and international partners 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 10 - ______
- Establishing a communication strategy In order to respond to UNDP’s concerns regarding the roles and responsibilities of UNDP, additional recommendations regarding the coordination with AFD/FFEM were added in the MTR report. Moreover, UNDP’s request to include Ministry of Local Administration (due to its large decentralization intervention) in the Project Board has been added to the recommendation of the report.
Mobilizing Government’s parallel funding. A clear and specific integration of the Government parallel funding in the annual project budget should be made and should indicate how funds support concretely project activities. Some of these funds should be dedicated for local activities in close coordination with the local authorities. Annex 6. Co-financing and Leveraged Resources has been filled as requested within an MTR.
Lessons learned
Success stories and lessons learned in NGOs capacity development leading to sustainable livelihoods. The MTR presents the success stories coming out of initiatives involved in capacity development of NGOs in the perspective of creating economically feasible initiatives, based on sustainable use of resources and which have continued to operate after the intervention of the donors, confirming the sustainability of the presented models. These initiatives can inform the operations of the SGBP in strengthening NGOs involvement, they cover the following sectors: - Honey bee production. - Ecotourism camps and tourist guides
Adminsitrative reform at local level. Throughout the discussions of the IWA proposal, two cases of successful local administrative reforms have been raised continuously, while the IWA report did not present them as options or describe them as lessons learned in local administrative reform initiatives in Yemen. The report presents briefly these 2 cases in the aim that they could be used by the project in informing the options and the discussion in future. The cases are the following: - The case of the Tehama Development Authority (TDA) - The case of the Special Sayoun Deputy Governor 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 11 - ______
Acronyms
ABS Access Benefit Sharing AFA Administrative and Finance Assistant AFD Agence Française de Développement AWP Annual Work Plan CZP Conservation Zoning Plan DG Director General DLDSP Decentralization and Local Development Support Programme EPA Environmental Protection Authority EU European Union FEEM Fonds Français pour l’Environnement Mondial GEF Global Environment Facility GIS Geographic Information System GoY Government of Yemen GTZ Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit HCDS High Committee of the Development of Socotra IWA Island Wide Authority MTR Mid-Term Review LAL Local Administration Law MPA Marine Protection Area MDG Millennium Development Goal MU Moderately Unlikely M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MoLA Ministry of Local Administration MoPW Ministry of Public Work MoPIC Ministry of Planning and International Corporation MoWE Ministry of Water and Environment PA Protection Area NGO Non Governmental Organization NPC National Project Coordinator NPD National Project Director SASDEMA Socotra Archipelago Sustainable Development and Environmental Authority SCDP Socotra Conservation and Development Programme SGBP Socotra Governance and Biodiversity Project RFSD Reference Framework for the Sustainable Development of the Socotra Archipelago TU Technical Unit ToR Terms of Reference TBWP Total Budget and Work Plan UNDP United Nations Development Program USD United States Dollar YIPDA Yemeni Island Development Agency 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 12 - ______
1. Introduction
1.1. Purpose of the Mid-Term Review
As per the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) policy at the project level in UNDP/GEF, a Mid- Term Review (MTR) is responsive to GEF Council decisions on transparency and better access of information during implementation and should focus on four objectives: i) to monitor and evaluate results and impacts; ii) to provide a basis for decision making on necessary amendments and improvements; iii) to promote accountability for resource use; iv) to document, provide feedback on, and disseminate lessons learned.
Mid-term evaluations are intended to identify potential project design problems, assess progress towards the achievement of objectives, identify and document lessons learned (including lessons that might improve design and implementation of other UNDP/GEF projects), and to make recommendations regarding specific actions that might be taken to improve the project.
A mid-term evaluation is expected to serve as a means of validating or filling the gaps in the initial assessment of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency obtained from monitoring. The mid- term evaluation provides the opportunity to assess early signs of project success or failure and prompt necessary adjustments.
1.2. Key issues addressed by the MTR
The main key issues addressed in the MTR were raised following the UNDP/GEF regional technical advisor supervision mission in May 2010 which highlighted, among others, the following key constraint at the level of the project: - limited progress on implementation which is correlated to limited progress towards results; - lack of a clear monitoring and evaluation system, including timely planning of a mid- term evaluation; - overlap among the development partners involved in Socotra; mainly UNDP/GEF, AFD/FFEM, German cooperation, Italian Cooperation; - Government parallel co-financing of US$750,000 are not accounted within the project configuration; - questioning regarding the roles and responsibilities of the national project coordinator and of the national project director.
The implementing agencies of the project, UNDP and AFD have indicated the same issues, with further focus by UNDP regarding the delivery of the NPC in responding to his management responsibilities. AFD had a major concern regarding the possibility to jointly implement a project with a non-cooperating and unqualified NPC.
Based on the above, the key issues related to the MTR seemed to be more of a management consideration, and accordingly, the MTR team agreed to conduct a Rapid Management Audit as part of the MTR. 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 13 - ______
On the other hand, initial discussions with the national counterparts reflected two main issues: - lack of understanding of the project concepts, such as the mainstreaming tools and ways to meet the project’s outputs including livelihood development and sustainable use of biodiversity; - a major concern regarding the support of UNDP to the project as a whole, and to the NPC in specific.
Additional issues to be addressed by the MTR included structural aspects such as the agenda of the MTR mission which was established by the project team without including initially the strategic project partners, and the fact that some local partners showed resistance to meet with the MTR team and with the project as a whole.
Regardless of the different perspectives and divergent issues addressed by the MTR, the MTR team has been able to discuss openly and objectively all aspects related to the project with all counterparts who agreed on one common issue: a successful continuation of the project for the common benefit, that of Socotra.
1.3. Methodology of the MTR
The evaluation adopted the following methodology: Review of relevant documents; which were effectively provided by the UNDP office well in advance prior to the MTR mission, thus allowing the project team to grasp a good understanding of the situation Interviews with the main national and local partners, including Board members, all representatives of the local administration, all donors involved in Socotra and all project staff and consultants. On some cases, several meetings were held with the same persons in order to validate some issues or acquire more in-depth understanding of the project. Field visits to the project sites and to potential beneficiaries were limited as the project has not initiated field interventions and in order to optimize the MTR mission availability with the key political partners of the project. Visits were however planned with some beneficiaries and local community from other projects, in order to inform the MTR findings. Two joint working meeting were organized with the project staff and representatives MoWE and EPA to discuss and update the logframe on the first meeting and to discuss and update the biodiversity tracking tool on the second meeting. These meetings proved to be very useful for all participants as it allowed a comprehensive and strategic review of the project.
The evaluation was carried out by a team of two independent consultants: an international evaluator (Team leader) and a national consultant. Overall, the timing and resources made available for the MTR were appropriate, and allowed the MTR team to respond to their ToRs.
1.4. Structure of the MTR report
The evaluation report follows the structure requested by the ToRs which on their turn are aligned with the UNDP/GEF Monitoring and Evaluation policy. The report includes the following sections: - Executive summary - Introduction 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 14 - ______
- The project and its development context - Findings and Conclusions - Recommendations - Lessons learned
Annexes prepared as part of the report are also aligned with the ToRs and include in addition to the basic requirements, the following key annexes which respond both to the UNDP/GEF M&E policy as well as to the MTR findings: - Co-financing and Leveraged Resources - Updated Logical Framework - Updated Biodiversity Tracking Tool - Proposed Budget - ToRs for Part-time Technical Advisor
2. The project and its development context
2.1. Project start and period covered by the MTR This project is the continuation of a long-term engagement of UNDP in Socotra starting as early as 1997, with a GEF funded project called the Conservation and Sustainable Use of the Biodiversity of Socotra Archipelago which ended in 2001. This first project was followed up by the Socotra Conservation and Development Programme (SCDP) which was operational from 2003 till 2008, funded by UNDP and the Italian Government.
This project has however witnessed an extensively lengthy development period, which started as early as 2005, as shown in the key milestones for project preparation below:
August 25, 2005 GoY endorsement letter November, 2005 First draft of the project document January 13, 2006 Peer review – new GEF IV started March 28, 2006 GoY endorsement letter October 26, 2006 Re-pipelining July 2, 2006 PIF submission September, 2007 PIF approved April 6, 2008 Request for CEO Endorsement/Approval - Re-Submission May 21, 2008 Project endorsed by GEF CEO
Although a final project document was signed in July 2008, this extensive development period continues to reflect negatively on most the project counterparts as a whole and on UNDP/GEF in specific.
The signature of the project didn’t allow the project to initiate its activities swiftly and follow up on the momentum and efforts of the SCDP; a whole year has passed before a National Project Coordinator was recruited in June 2009. This delay was due to the Government’s will to ensure clear coordination among the various donors and programmes implemented in Socotra, in this case, the Italian funded project was still to be clarified in order to proceed with project implementation. The duration covered by the MTR is therefore questionable, for UNDP/GEF the project is at mid-point, 2.5 years from its signature; in reality, the project was initiated mid-2009, and the first AWP signed end-2009, almost since 1 year. 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 15 - ______
2.2. Project context and background
2.2.1. Socotra’s socio-economic context Socotra is a very poor and underdeveloped region of Yemen; some key socio-economic indicators are reflected in Table 1 below.
Table 1. Key socio-economic indicators of Socotra Hadibo Qalansiyah Total population in 2009 41,073 12,467 Population growth 3.9% 4.2% Percentages of families living 41% 44% below the poverty line Unemployment rate 30% 36.6%
The main economic activities include agriculture, pastoralism and fishing; however these are based on traditional practices, which do not allow the population to improve its conditions. Tourism has witnessed a considerable increase from 527 tourists in 2004 to 3750 in 2009. However, no figures or updated assessment of the economic activities are available at the level of the project.
2.2.2. Socotra’s institutional context Socotra is part of the Governorate of Hadramout, its Governorate’s headquarters’ are in Mukalla, 400 km away from Socotra. It is composed of two Districts: Hadibou and Qalansiyah. A Director General for each district is appointed by the central Government and an elected Council exists at the level of each district.
Deconcentrated representations of the line Ministries are present at the level of each district: they are 43 in Hadibou and 15 in Qalansiyah. However, the capacity of the local authorities is very weak; their financial allocations are virtually non-existent. Again, no in-depth assessments of the institutional context were conducted to date by the project to access a better understanding of the institutional context.
2.2.3. Socotra’s biodiversity context Covering an area of 3,625 Km², Socotra is an island exceptionally rich in biodiversity as the result of two factors: (i) isolation; (ii) climate. These two factors interact to result in the evolution of unique life forms, ecosystems and landscapes. In terms of endemism, all of the terrestrial mollusks, 90 % of the reptiles (over 30 vertebrates) and 33% of the plants (307 species) are endemic to the Archipelago. Socotra is ranked among the ten most endangered island flora in the world, with spectacular plants such as dragonblood and frankincense.
2.2.4. The biodiversity conservation policy context Socotra is classified as the most important center for biodiversity within the Horn of Africa: it is one of the WWF's global 200 ecoregions, it has been designated as a Man And Biosphere reserve by UNESCO it is listed as a World Heritage Site since 2008.
The Conservation Zoning Plan (CZP) which was developed through the first UNDP intervention and was adopted by presidential decree in the year 2000; and constitutes the basis for sustainable development and conservation of biodiversity on the Archipelago. 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 16 - ______
The CZP classifies the land according to four main categories, governed by international regulations for protected areas management (referred to as the IUCN categories, also shown below for reference) as indicated in Table 2 below.
Table 2. The Conservation Zoning Plan categories Conservation Zoning Plan categories Excluded activities % of total land areas 1 - Resource Use Zone; Airport construction 23% (cf IUCN-VI) Intensive agriculture 2 - General Use Zone; None 1.4%
3 - National Park Zone; Industrial development 72.6% (cf IUCN – II) Airport construction Roads construction Intensive agriculture 4 - Nature Sanctuaries. All 2.5% (cf IUCN-I)
Although this plan was developed in a consultative manner, it remains an ambitious plan which imposes on the local and central administration very strict conditions for development activities, and has created several conflicts between the MoWE/EPA and other development institutions (including the local population) due to the strict conditions of the CZP. During the MTR interviews, local administration has confirmed that this plan is not being used locally or centrally as a basis for decision making regarding development activities. Moreover, an extensive and comprehensive Master Plan for Socotra was developed with EU funding between 2000-2002 and endorsed by Ministerial Decree in 2004. However, only few parts of this plan (such as the Roads Programme) is used as a basis for development; the Master Plan itself is not used as a basis for land-use planning in Socotra.
2.3. Problems that the project seek to address The project document has acknowledged that “A number of high profile cases have shown how difficult it is to mainstream biodiversity considerations into such a development decision-making process”. Accordingly, “this project will create a framework that internalizes biodiversity considerations into the ongoing development of Socotra through an effective spatial planning. While it is recognized that trade-offs will be made and not all of Socotra’s biodiversity can be protected, the project will allow informed decisions to be made by capable strategic planners and local resource users that acknowledge the global and local benefits of biodiversity”.
The project aims at establishing a sustainable and long-term institutional and policy process for safeguarding the rich biodiversity of Socotra; it is submitted to GEF IV under the Strategic Objective Two: “To mainstream biodiversity conservation in production landscapes/seascapes and sectors”, and more specifically under its associated Strategic Program 4: “Strengthening the policy and regulatory framework for mainstreaming biodiversity”.
2.4. Project configuration The project title is “Socotra Governance and Biodiversity Project” (SGBP), the project’s results framework is presented below: 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 17 - ______
Project Objective Biodiversity management considerations are mainstreamed effectively into the current process of “decentralizing governance for development” on the Socotra archipelago Project Components Expected Outputs 1. Local Governance -Island wide administration operational and working on Support integrated manner with local, national and international stakeholders -EPA functional assignment on Socotra - Establishing a Monitoring-Control-Surveillance system for MPAs 2. Mainstreaming Tools - Use of mainstreaming tools provided by the project to strategic planners including in the fishing sector 3. Strengthening NGO - No. of NGOs/CBOS on Socotra involved in biodiversity Advocacy management -Capacity of NGOs/CBOs on Socotra to manage biodiversity -Small grants allocated to local NGOs/CBOs by GEF SGP, COMPACT or other donors -Capacity of Socotra Conservation Fund to act as an Intermediary Support Organization - Training and communication material 4. Biodiversity Livelihood - Higher revenues that local administration derive natural Values resources from exploitative assets of the Island -No. of sustainable private initiatives including SMEs and higher income for local communities resulting from sustainable trade of biological specimens - Higher revenues for 4 MPA 5. Project management PMU in Sanaa 6. Support to the fishing - Capacity of fishermen and local administration in adoption and sector enforcement of sustainable fishing practices - Investments for the fishing sector Grey sections reflect the additional AFD/FFEM interventions
The project duration is 5 years, from August 2008 till July 2013 and its total budget is US$ 3.9 million with the sources of financing as follows: UNDP financing: 975,000 US$ GEF financing: 975,000 US$ GOY parallel funding: 750,000 US$ FFEM/AFD financing: 1,187,584 US$ (as per the GoY/UNDP cost-sharing agreement, based on the bilateral agreement between the GoY/AFD signed in March 2010).
The project is executed by Ministry of Water and Environment and its affiliated agency; the EPA. The other main project stakeholders as described in the project document are the following: The Local Administration including the Governorate based in Hadramout, the Hadibo and Qualansiyah District Directors, the Local Councils and the deconcentrated branches of the line Ministries Ministry of Local Administration Other key central Authorities such as the Ministry of Public Works and Ministry of Finance Local NGOs and SMEs benefiting from sustainable use of biodiversity 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 18 - ______
3. Main findings
3.1. Project formulation
3.1.1. Project complexity in implementation The project document provided a comprehensive but complex framework for action which has been difficult to understand by most concerned partners, leading to the lack of a clear strategic vision.
The project document has only provided guiding principles and frameworks for action, rather than specific interventions and technical procedures for implementation. In an adaptive management context, this could have been used by the project team as a way to focus on specific priorities based on needs assessment and in line with the developments within the national and local context. However, given the weak technical and managerial capacities at national and local level, this has only contributed to further confusion in the understanding of the project strategy and hence in project implementation.
As an example, the project calls for the “Use of mainstreaming tools to be provided by the project to strategic planners”. In this case, the project has only provided the principles for the development of such tools (refer to Box 1 below), but didn’t specify which tools and for which production landscapes/sectors these tool should be developed. The project document has also referred to the Biodiversity Tool Box in Australia as an example (refer to Box 1 below). The concept of mainstreaming tools remains to date complex and unclear to all project participants and partners.
In practice, the project aims at mainstreaming biodiversity in the implementation of the Conservation Zoning Plan, by improving overall regulatory planning processes such as permitting procedures and EIA or by establishing technical and legal procedures to adopt sustainable development practices at the level of key productive landscapes and production sectors in Socotra including: 1. Grazing 2. Plants Production 3. Tourism 4. Fishery 5. Solid Waste Management (this sector was added as part of the MTR as a priority sector to tackle in Socotra).
Although this is clearly delineated as part of the GEF Tracking Tool, this tool is used as a monitoring and evaluation tool within GEF and has not been used as a planning or management tool nor as an integral part of the project document. 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 19 - ______
Box 1. Description provided in the project document for the mainstreaming tools
Guiding principles for The Australian Biodiversity Toolbox mainstreaming tools in the Examples of tools developed for regions, Ministries and other SGBP project document institutions in Australia
The focus will not be on Benchmark 1 commit to change sophisticated GIS-based Benefits of Biodiversity Conservation to Local tools. The main emphases Government will be on: Australian Local Government Association Information on roles and responsibilities of Local Government in natural Developing guidelines and resource management by-laws Benchmark 2 establish baseline position Tools will provide Diagnostic Tools additional planning o Natural Resource Information, Databases and expertise on how to tackle Mapping important natural resource o Survey Methods and Guidelines management issues such as o Australian, State and Regional Plans, Strategies conservation of natural and Targets areas, and how future Benchmark 3 develop strategic approach development decisions Planning Information should take into account o Zoning - Opportunities and Examples the potential impacts on o Planning Schemes/ Provisions - Examples the environment. o Development Assessment Processes Ecosystem response tools Benchmark 4 implement and monitor Funding Opportunities Conducting rigorous Incentives & Supporting Mechanisms feasibility and sensitivity o Training, Technical Support and Materials tests to reduce the risk of o Tradeable/ transferrable development rights imposing inappropriate o Management Agreements tools. o Revolving Funds With these new tools and Benchmark 5 review and evaluate techniques, improved Environmental Portal - your gateway to Australian management practices will environment resources on the Internet be guided, in order to Greening Australia - Western Australia publications reach the expected Department of the Environment and Water Resources - improved compliance to Biodiversity Theme the CZP. Reference: http://www.environment.gov.au/archive/biodiversity/tool box/tools-resources/index.html
3.1.2. Confusing replication approaches from previous interventions This project has shifted the intervention of UNDP from previous interventions in Socotra in a drastic way at all levels: - from an environmental conservation and community-targeted initiatives to a policy and institutional reform in local governance - from a project working closely with EPA to one working closely with local authorities - from a heavily subsidizing system of all concerned partners (local beneficiaries and local activities) to economically feasible development interventions. 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 20 - ______
However, conflicting information related to good practices and lessons learned are provided at the level of the different documents related to the previous interventions in Socotra and do not allow the consolidation and adoption of solid approaches from the previous interventions.
(i) Holistic approach or extension beyond its mandate? While the Final Evaluation of the SCDP has indicated that the interventions in community development is a positive lesson learned: “Importance of a holistic approach: Each time the Mobile Clinic went to remote areas, education and awareness training was conducted as well. Lesson: helping to save lives and improving community health is a very effective vehicle to get environmental messages across to local people”; the SGBP project document has indicated the opposite: “SCDP’s extension into service delivery beyond the mandate of EPA will also limit its sustainability. Community development activities will continue to be undertaken without measuring the link between this community assistance and biodiversity outcomes, or how such assistance can be used to foster increased support for the CZP.”
(ii) SCDP and DLDSP: what worked and what didn’t work? The SCDP experience in supporting local governance is also unclear and no straightforward conclusions could be drawn from it. The Final Evaluation of the SCDP confirms that the activities related to the improving the capacities of local government were either partially or not achieved. However, the Final Evaluation report does NOT clarify the reasons or the modalities to responds to such constraints within the project.
The SCDP Final Report confirms that core teams have convened several meetings to formulate district development plans applying participatory approaches and knowledge gained through the training sessions, leading to the production of the 2005 district plans and budgets for Hadibo and Qalansia as well as the formulation of a five year (2006 to 2010) development plans for each district. The reports also clarifies that the 2005 district plans of the two districts were not adequately funded by the Government and hence no further annual plans developed and implemented. The SCDP Final Report indicates: “The establishment of an ad-hoc planning team in replacement of councils’ permanent coordination committee for Hadibu and Qalansya districts are among key implementation shortages which hindered the full attainment of project targets. The DLDSP failure to establish councils’ permanent coordination committee was strengthened by SCDP through supporting the participation of the ad-hoc local planning committees and districts focal points in several coordination meetings held in Hadramout and Sanaa”.
However, the SGBP project document indicates that the ongoing collaboration between the SCDP with the DLDSP will be intensified, the project document specifies that: “A coordinator will be appointed, reporting to the DLDSP facilitation teams on the island and to SCDP-EPA. The present initiative will operate in tandem with SCDP-EPA, and benefit greatly from its facilitating role regarding conservation and development at the local, Socotra as well national level”. Reference is also made to SCDP’s support for the solid waste collection system, implemented by the local district authorities, which is the only significant support for decentralized governance on Socotra. Unfortunately, this activity was not maintained nor continued due to disruption of funding from Hadramout Governorate.
In conclusion, it is difficult to capture SCDP’s experience in supporting local governance in collaboration with DLDSP and accordingly how the SGBP team can benefit from this experience for following up its interventions in this field. 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 21 - ______
3.1.3. Other aspects related to project formulation Several other cases of unclear approaches should also be mentioned as they have a major repercussion on the project implementation approach as will be described in the following sections, these are: 1. Calling upon the Socotra Conservation Fund (SCF) to act as an Intermediary Support Organization. 2. Island Wide Authority to become operational with local, national and international stakeholders. 3. Implementation arrangements of the project.
3.2. Implementation approach
3.2.1. Implementation approach The project implementation approach has been hindered by three key factors:
(i) Lack of a clear strategy and clear operational work plans and budget plans Though a clear and operational strategy of intervention is not spelled out in the project document, technical support to establish a clear strategy and implementation plan for the project was not deployed, through an inception phase, with appropriate technical expertise to support the project in launching and implementing the project. An inception phase is common practice in UNDP/GEF projects and an essential step of project implementation.
Although this inception phase is clearly called upon in the UNDP/GEF CEO endorsement document, this was not captured in the project document and accordingly, was not acted upon.
Accordingly, to date, the project staff and counterparts do not have a strategic vision or an operational understanding of the project. Based on this, delays in provision of work plans, budget plans, ToRs and progress reports have resulted; all project staff has confirmed lack of understanding of their mandate and accordingly their plan of action. Work plans, budget plans, ToRs and progress reports have been based on elements taken from the project document (i.e. which address the overall project framework), with limited informative and action-oriented scope of work.
(ii) Inappropriate implementation structures The project has established gradually its operational structures, providing the essential staff. The project is currently operating with adequate administrative support, but without any of the technical functions planned as part of the project.
Compared to the initial set up planned in the project document, it becomes clear that the current implementation structure is not in line with the proposed project framework and accordingly cannot respond to the needs for the implementation of the project activities. 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 22 - ______
Figure 1. Current organigramme of the project
In fact, in addition to short-term consultants, the project document has called upon the recruitment of 10 full-time technical staff as follows (also shown in Figure 2 below): At the PMU in Sanaa, the following resources were planned: - National Project Coordinator - Technical Project Assistant At the project office in Socotra, the following resources were planned: - District Facilitation Team Leader - District Facilitation Team members (4 facilitators) - Protected Area specialist - GIS consultant (part-time) - Focal point Component 2 (to be taken over by Environment Advisor of IWA) - Focal point Component 4 - Export control and monitoring expert
In addition to the above technical staff, the project document has also indicated that the Island- Wide Authority personnel should include the following staff: Executive Director, Planning Specialists, Environmental Specialist, Community Liaison Officer, Administrative Officer/Accountant, Executive Assistant/Translator, Logistics Officer. The project document clarifies that these positions are only indicative and are proposed for initial planning and budgetary purposes, and that these positions should be covered by the Government parallel financing. It is also clarified that the IWA staff should be covered by Government funds, which assures their sustainability. 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 23 - ______
Figure 2. Organigramme reflecting project staff resources in the project document
Given that the project document does not specify the exact allocation of resources in the Total Budget and Workplan (TBWP), information related to the allocation of resources had to be extracted from the GEF CEO endorsement “Annex C: Consultants to be Hired” and from the ToRs attached to the project document. Again, this complexity and the lack of a ready-made operational deployment plan have prevented a clear understanding of necessary resources to be deployed for the proper implementation of the project. Again, the inception phase could have contributed to further clarifications of this aspect.
Annex 9 (Planned and Proposed Budget - Prodoc Budget Sheet) provides an estimation of the different positions planned within the project (except for the resources allocated for the IWA which should be allocated through Government contribution). Although minor variations arise between the TBWP and the resources planned in the GEF CEO endorsement (as shown in Table 3 below), the MTR can conclude that the project document allocations at the level of each component have accounted for the project resources called upon in the CEO endorsement. These allocations will be used as a basis of the recommendations of the MTR.
Table 3. Comparison between CEO budget and project document budget for consultants BUDGET FOR NATIONAL AND TOTAL International National INTERNATIONAL CONSULTANTS Total budget for consultants in the GEF CEO 903,504 194,400 709,104 endorsement (except IWA) Total budget for consultants in UNDP Project 1,113,000 230,000 883,000 Document TBWP 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 24 - ______
(iii) Inappropriate technical expertise provided to the project Given the lack of understanding of the project strategy, the deployment of technical support for the implementation of the different project activities has also influenced the technical expertise provided through the project. The following trends can be observed and will be further detailed at the level of each consultancy in the next sections: - The time frame for the implementation of the activities is miscalculated and over ambitious. - The project is seen as separate and disconnected components, which can be deployed independently from each other. - Lack of adoption of appropriate techniques for consultation with local partners, the organization of large workshops at local and central level is not always an appropriate technique for the mobilization of rural communities and their engagement in a policy dialogue. - The lack of provision of working papers, initial findings and conclusions has created lack of trust at the level of the local partners which were not aware of the outcomes of the project activities. - This lack of rigorous technical execution modalities lead to a major lack of understanding of the project objectives and expected results by local partners, leading to a major misunderstanding and even resistance to cooperate with the project.
Three technical consultants have been deployed by the project; the following comments are made in view of addressing the technical gaps at the level of the available deliverables and optimizing project resources affected to these consultancies.
The consultancy for the IWA development One international consultant and one national consultant were recruited for a duration of 3 months in one stretch to develop a proposal for a new and functional structure for Socotra governance system through the Island Wide Authority.
The main outcomes of this consultancy were 1 background report in Arabic, 1 report covering the IWA proposal in English (the draft report of July 2010 doesn’t differ from the final report of September 2010), 2 large public consultations (one in Sanaa and one in Socotra) in addition to several working meetings with various stakeholders.
Discussions during the MTR with the national and local stakeholders have confirmed that the interviews conducted with the local partners didn’t allow a clear and a transparent presentation of the proposed administrative reform nor did the proposal reflect the views of the various partners. In fact, the MTR team has presented the proposed structure of the IWA (presented in Figure 3 below) to the different stakeholders, and observed that the perception of this structure was different depending on the functions of the counterparts.
In conclusion, this consultation has not responded to its set of requirement as it has not delivered quality analytical and in-depth assessment set forth in its terms of reference. The reports cannot be used in their actual conditions to reach an informed basis on the status of the local administration in Socotra. It is would have been appropriate in a policy process to initiate a phased-approach starting with various administrative options, and paving the road for the most appropriate institutional option which could be adopted at local and national level. Examples of administrative reforms which were investigated by the team of consultants are the Sayo’un Governorate and the Aqaba Authorities (where a study tour was organized); however, no information regarding these examples is synthesized and reflected in the reports. 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 25 - ______
Moreover, major important political gaps such as the visit of the President of Yemen to Socotra and the Presidential process for appointing a dedicated Wakil in Socoatra are completely missing in the report. And although the report indicates the Cabinet decree issued on February 12th 2008 which calls for the establishment of appropriate institutional arrangements to enhance the planning and coordination mechanisms in place in the island, however, the report recommends the appointment of the Minister of Water and Environment as a Chair of the Authority, without any consideration for a democratic or consensual agreement on this issue.
As a result, this activity has created tensions and resistance towards the project, to the level where the MTR team was not capable to meet with Qalansyah local representatives and the Socotra Parliament member through official project contacts. A meeting was only possible after providing assurances of independence of the MTR team. It is also worth noting that a large local meeting was held on 28 November 2010 in Hadibou, confirming the need to appoint a Wakil and the need for further consultations for any future steps, without the support or the participation of the project. Finally, although meetings were held with the DLDSP in the context of the IWA consultancy, the report does not allow to capture the strategy required for implementing the capacity development components of the project for the local administration. Accordingly, it is not clear how the project should coordinate with the DLDSP; especially that DLDSP has already put in place necessary support for the District Local Authorities in Hadebo and Qalansiya. In order to finalize this consultancy, the team of consultants should not only respond to their ToRs, the Socotra project should seek DLDSP’s support for clearing the report with regards to the proposed policy, institutional and individual capacity development aspects proposed in the reports; in a way that these proposals are in line with the decentralization process initiated in Yemen.
Figure 3. Organizational structure of the proposed Sustainable Development and Environmental Management Authority (SASDEMA) 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 26 - ______
The consultancy for the NGOs assessment This consultancy was deployed by 1 national consultant for duration of 2 months. An extensive assessment of all NGOs in Socotra was conducted for this purpose and can be considered of important value to the project. The classification into categories is interesting, and provides the following status: Category 1- good expertise and capacities: 6 NGOs Category 2- modest capacities: 2 NGOs Category 3- limited capacities: 3 NGOs Category 4- no capacities: 5 NGOs Category 5- very strong capacities: 2 NGOs
This is a good baseline for the capacity development components of NGOs and can be used as a capacity assessment scorecard and hence as an important indicator of the project progress. Only some additional minor processing is required to ensure that the baseline of the indicators related to outcome 3: NGO Advocacy Strengthened. This would be done by providing information related to the NGOs actually involved in biodiversity conservation. It is therefore highly recommended to call upon the consultant and follow up the cooperation in terms of the overall implementation of the capacity development plan and well as in the reporting towards the project indicators specified in Table 4 below.
Table 4. Indicators and baseline required for Outcome 3: NGO Advocacy Strengthened Indicator Baseline Target Number of NGOs/CBOs/ Number of NGOs 20 NGOs/CBOs actively involved by community development actively involved end of Year 4 associations on Socotra involved in biodiversity management Capacity of NGOs /CBOs/ Number of NGOs able to 20 NGO/CBOs to function community development function independently independently by the end of Year 4 associations on Socotra to manage biodiversity
Small grants allocated to local Number of NGOs 20 grants allocated by Year 4 with NGOs/CBOs by GEF SGP, supported by EPA/SGBP EPA/SGBP support COMPACT, or other donors to obtain funds
Capacity of Socotra SCF is not capable of Capacity of SCF to act technically in Conservation Fund to act as an acting as an Intermediary an autonomous manner as an Intermediary Support Support Organisation intermediate support organisation at Organisation end of project
A separate report regarding the Socotra Conservation Fund is also provided and can be considered as a capacity assessment for future cooperation and support to the SCF. It should be noted that SCF cannot be entrusted at this point the capacity development activities of NGOs. The MTR team has met with the SCF team and confirms the conclusions of the SCF assessment.
Capacity development should be conducted through professional trainers with extensive experience in the field of training. SCF can be positioned as a resource NGO in development of management capacities for NGOs in Socotra, but cannot be entrusted the full responsibility. A section in the Lessons Learned of the MTR report is dedicated to success stories in NGOs capacity development and should be taken into account as an implementation approach. 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 27 - ______
The consultancy for the legal expertise on biodiversity practices including Access and Benefit Sharing A team composed of one national consultant and one international consultant was recruited for 3 month. The ToRs are very ambitious as they include among other: - Evaluation and compilation of market and biodiversity analyses results as a factual base for further regulatory making process - General concept of regulation covering all appropriate regulatory measures related to biodiversity practices, including Access Benefit Sharing (ABS) - Preparation of regulation covering all aspects of marketing regulation (including authorities and their powers, certification, application system, records, ABS
This is a striking example in the deployment of an expert without conducting prior technical assessment of the areas of intervention. In fact, the proposed ToRs are impossible to respond to and cannot be completed, since the technical context related to each productive sector in which biodiversity is meant to be mainstreamed is not clear, i.e. providing regulatory incentives or barriers for biodiversity use at a time when the systems for using biodiversity are not established.
A technical assessment of the production sector under consideration: plants production, tourism sector, grazing sector, etc, is needed to provide necessary background, such as market assessment of species to be investigated; role of the local authorities in the management of the sector under consideration… These would be the preliminary steps prior to setting the regulatory frameworks.
An example of such a process is presented in Table 5 below, and it should be noted that the necessary technical expertise needed to investigate the technical content before establishing the regulatory framework are made available in the project through specialized national and international experts including a Local Economic Development Advisor, Urban/town management Advisor, Environmental Planning Advisor, Environmental Advisor…
Table 5. Phased process for the establishment of regulatory framework for mainstreaming biodiversity in the production landscape/sector: the example of sustainable tourism Process Example: Sustainable tourism Setting the institutional and MoTourism, Directorate of tourism, tourism police, EPA, tourist policy basis guides and agencies, Protected Areas camps, hotels… Tourism development plan including promotional needs… Setting the economic Economic assessments, market analysis, assessment of carrying development basis capacity… Establishing technical Establishing an ecotourism charter, establishing guidelines for procedures ecotourism… Establishing legal procedures Permitting procedures, licensing procedures, other existing regulations… Provision of training and Adoption of guidelines by service provider: guides, agencies, PA capacity building camps, hotels… Enforcement of guidelines by local authority… Provision of some Basic infrastructure for PA camps, promotional tools, visitors investments requirements center… Integrating these procedures Sustainable tourism procedures are adopted in line with the CZP in the application of the CZP 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 28 - ______
3.2.2. Stakeholders participation and coordination with other related initiatives
Project Board or Coordination Committee? The project Board has been the main platform for coordination and for stakeholders’ participation. According to the project document, members of the Board should include representatives of the following organizations: - Ministry of Water and Environment - Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation - Ministry of Local Administration - Socotra District Directors - Regional Representative GEF/UNDP - National Project Coordinator
Additional members have been invited to the Board, including EPA directors in Sanaa and Socotra and Ministry of Fisheries.
With its large membership (19 participants at the last meeting) and the need to address urgent administrative and management issues of the project at the level of the Board, the Board has not been an effective strategic and decision making body. The fact that the Board is requested to approve quarterly work plans has also prevented a more strategic and policy process to take place at the Board, and has lead some members to question the effectiveness of their participation to such meetings.
Moreover, the Board meetings have been very difficult to organize (due to changing agendas of various key members), the meetings have been extensively long and the agendas of the meetings and working documents failed to be complete and timely. Table 6 below presents a summary of the dates and venues of the Board meetings.
Table 6. Board meetings dates and key issues Board meeting dates and venue Key issues discussed 1. October 2009 in Sanaa 2009 AWP approved by MoWE 2. February 2010 in Hadibou Planning of parallel funding 3. May 2010 in Sanaa Integrating French funding in the AWP 4. September 2010 in Sanaa Presenting the IWA proposal
In conclusion, with its current membership and ToRs, the board has not been able to respond to its mandate nor did it provide an appropriate mechanism for coordination with the different project partners.
Coordination with local and national partners Formal and strategic coordination with project partners has been effected on ad-hoc basis, during the discussions with the consultants deployed by the project. Although the discussion were technical in nature, they have failed to ensure the identification and strengthening of institution and policy processes at the level of the key stakeholders involved in the project.
The project has not approached the coordination from a strategic direction, mainly due to the lack of a strategic vision of the project. Although the project is based at MoWE in Sanaa and EPA in Socotra, it is not clear which departments within either institutions are meant to cooperate with the project. 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 29 - ______
At the moment, the project is based at MoWE, however it acts as an independent unit, with regular coordination with the Director of EPA in Sanna (in his function as National Project Director) and the Director of EPA Socotra (on ad-hoc basis) and with the Minster of Water and Environment (as Chair of the Board but also to clear project ToRs, reports and other functions which are the duties of the NPD).
The project has also failed to strike a close partnership with the District Director General and the respective local administration in the two districts of Hadibou and Qalansyah. The contact with the Governorate of Hadramout are also ad-hoc and unclear.
Most alarming is the lack of coordination and effective cooperation with the UNDP Decentralisation and Local Development Support Project (DLDSP), which was supposed to be the basis for establishing a governance support strategy and action to be deployed by the project at the local level.
Needless to say that no coordination was established with other key economic development projects closely related to this project including the UNDP Fisheries development project, the Socotra roads development of the Abu Dhabi Fund, the Socotra port development of the Kuwait Fund, among others…
Coordination with international partners Several donors have joined the efforts of the conservation of Socotra; donors such as Italy, Germany are deploying extensive support for biodiversity conservation. A major delay in the approval of the 2009 AWP of the project has resulted from the need to coordinate the UNDP and Italian initiatives before their launching; this delay remains unjustifiable as the Italian project was still not finalized, while the UNDP/GEF project was already signed and approved by all parties.
Several coordination meetings were held between the donors to coordinate their initiatives and ensure complementarities between the different interventions; as the confused situation had created tension among the different donors and national partners. A lot of time and energy has been deployed to ensure the clarification and complementarities among the different donors’ initiatives.
At this point, a formal coordination mechanism for projects in Socotra has been set up with the leadership of MoWE (with extensive support from the Government of Germany funded CIM advisor). The first coordination meeting has lead in September 2010 to two main results: - Establishment of a formal coordination office “Socotra Conservation and Development Coordination Unit (SCDCU)” which will be provided with the following staff: a director of the office funded by the Italian Cooperation, an assistant funded by UNDP and technical assistance to be provided by the French Government. - A coordinated work plan has been established for the years 2010-2013 (Table 7 below) . This is a very good initiative which should be commended as it provides the different donors necessary information related to the on-going and planned activities in Socotra, and could reduce confusion and overlapping.
However, some further clarification should be provided for the long-term operation of this initiative and include: - The Socotra Coordination Unit is directly reporting to the Minister of Water and Environment and it is not clear if it is part of recently created “Unit for the Coordination of Internationally Funded Projects” (Ministerial Decree 176, dated July 2010) under the 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 30 - ______
EPA Director and the overall management of the Minister of Water and Environment. It is important to ensure that the Unit Director, who is funded by the Italian Government, will not bias the coordination activities among the various donors. - In its current detailed form, the Socotra Coordinated Work plan can lead to micromanagement, therefore impeding the strategic vision and coordination which needs to be initiated at the level of such a mechanism. It would be more opportune to establish a Strategic Workplan addressing the development and environmental conservation needs of Socotra, and follow up where each donor has responded to the development agenda of Socotra.
Table 7. Government of Yemen Coordinated Workplan for the Conservation and Development of Socotra 2010-2013 Achievement 1 Proposal of island wide authority structure and functions completed and submitted to GOY Achievement 2 A set of monitoring data collection procedures for the continuous updating of the EPA-DSS datasets Achievement 3 A monitoring data management system linked to the centralised EPA-DSS operational in each sector institution. Achievement 4 An assessment of relevant institutional staff training needs (e.g. conservation ecology, rural development economics, SEA, EIA, project cycle managment) Achievement 5 The technical capacity of relevant institutional staff improved according to Comprehensive Training Program Achievement 6 EPA-DSS datasets updated Achievement 7 Island-wide authority institutional network (EPA and Line Ministries) adequately equipped to fulfill its mandate Achievement 8 Participation of Yemen in relevant regional and global initiatives Achievement 9 Reference Framework for the Sustainable Development of the Socotra Archipelago (RFSD) and proper spatial and conservation planning Achievement 10 A set of ready-for-implementation project proposals to render operational the RFSD of the Socotra Archipelago Achievement 11 The RFSD project proposals implemented within the limit of the available budget resources Achievement 12 Strengthening NGO Advocacy Achievement 13 Biodiversity Conservation Benefits to Local Livelihoods Achievement 14 Protected Areas Management Achievement 15 Research on Ecosystem Services, Climate Change Vulnerability and the Socio- Ecological Framework of the Island System Achievement 16 Sustainable Management of Fisheries
Coordination with AFD/FFEM Given that the French Government through AFD has agreed to implement the French Government funding (from FFEM) as an integral part of the of UNDP/GEF project, coordination between the UNDP and AFD in the implementation of the project is a major factor in the successful implementation of the project.
A lot of efforts have been deployed by both parties to establish a clear basis for the administrative and technical implementation of the activities. Delays in finalization of some necessary administrative steps of the French funded components are still halting the initiation of the French 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 31 - ______funded components and merit close attention to speed up the initiation of the whole project as one entity.
To date, the basis of the coordination in this joint management of the project is not clear and some dysfunctioning has occurred as follows: - It is not clear for the NPC that the planning and reporting responsibilities of the French funded components are under his responsibilities and accordingly he has not responded positively to the preparation of joint work plans. - The level of coordination and consultation in the follow up of day to day activities and specific progress of project activities is not clear. - It is also not clear which agency has the ultimate responsibilities in the quality assurance of the different components.
This situation has already lead to extensive conflicts and tensions among the two agencies and with the NPC and unless clear and coordinated management modalities are agreed upon and respected, it will be very difficult to ensure a coordinated approach in the management of the project.
Communication and outreach One of the main achievements of the SGBP project to date can be considered to be the communication activities which also merit to be commended and followed up. The communication activities conducted to date include the following: - Project corporate design (stationery, report templates) - Project website - Awareness posters: Important Birds of Socotra, SGBP objectives, Socotra Is Not a Souvenir - Awareness brochure: Biodiversity of Socotra - Socotra Tourist Map - Socotra videos by Reuters agency - New Year’s Best Wishes 2010 (House Crow eradication) - Large public communication campaigns: Environment Days (June, October 2010) - Equator Prize 2010 - Presentation in UNDP newsletter and Media coverage
Driven by the communication officer, and with the active and full support of all the project team, the communication activities of the project have been able establish a regular and continuous cooperation with the local population.
The key communication message has addressed biodiversity conservation aspects of Socotra; two activities related to the tourism sector were developed: a tourist map and an awareness poster for tourists. A poster about the overall objectives of SGBP was produced (Figure 4 below) and is good basis for presenting the project to the concerned local and national partners. Extensive communication campaigns were implemented at the level of the schools and of the local population and were seen very positively, although no documentation of their impact through pre- and post-testing has been done.
A new website address (www.socotraproject.org) was established for the project due to the fact that MoWE had not decided yet how to manage and update the SCDP website (www. socotraisland.org). It is now decided that the SCDP website is to be used as a basis for the “Socotra Conservation and Development Coordination Unit (SCDCU)”, however, modalities for joint cooperation are not clear to date. 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 32 - ______
Although communication activities have succeeded in providing a sound basis of information to the project partners, a communication strategy and action plan focusing on the project priorities and communication needs is still missing and reflects the lack of an overall strategic vision of the project as a whole. The project should also ensure that communication activities are conducted jointly with NGOs as a way to strengthen NGOs capacity and further the ownership and sustainability of the communication activities.
Figure 4. Awareness poster regarding SGBP objectives
3.2.3. Financial delivery
Expenditures at the level of the UNDP and GEF resources Expenditures at the level of both UNDP and GEF resources as of November 2010 have reached 16% of the total committed funding by both agencies as shown in Table 8 below.
Table 8. Expenditures at the level of UNDP and GEF resources Committed 2009 By November Total % expenditures (US $) (US $) 2010 expenditures of total (US $) (US$) committed UNDP 975,000 42,293 107,355 149,648 GEF 975,000 15,096 154,250 169,346 Total 1,950,000 57,389 261,605 318,994 % expenditures 2.94 13.41 16.36 by year 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 33 - ______
For a 5-years project, expenditures should reach at least 20% per year in order to meet the project’s budget planning. Given the overall weak set up of the project, the delivery rate of 13% in 2010 is in fact very high compared to the limited achievements which the project has reached to date, and has been attained due to the deployment extensive international expertise and the study tour in Aqaba.
To date, cost-effectiveness of the UNDP and GEF resources can be described as unsatisfactory, due to the lack of clear strategy in project implementation and limited achievements obtained from the deployment of the resources.
Expenditures at the level of the Government parallel funding Official figures regarding the allocations from the Government parallel funding for the project are shown in Table 9 below and indicate that US$ 200,500 have been allocated to date by the Government of Yemen to the project.
Table 9. Allocations of the Government parallel funding for the project Committed 2008 2009 2010 Total % allocations (US$) (US$) (US$) (US$) allocations of total (US$) committed Government 750,000 60,000 78,400 62,100 200,500 26.73
Available reports from MoWE and EPA do not specify what exactly the Government funding has been allocated to, as the government reports have covered the UNDP/GEF funded activities as part of their reporting. The reports indicate that some financial allocations were provided to MoWE and EPA staff for participation to some of the project activities (selection of consultants or participation to project meetings). Government funding has also covered some operational costs of the project (telephone and internet of the PMU), guards for the MoWE in Sanaa and EPA Socotra….
In practice, these funds are used as slash funds for MoWE and EPA operational costs, some of which cover directly or indirectly the project activities; it is clear that the Government parallel funding has not contributed to a large extent to the project objectives and activities. Efforts were made to establish joint budget planning of Government funds and UNDP/GEF funds; however these efforts did not lead to the establishment of an operational joint planning system.
Moreover, it should be noted that the levels of Government allocations is not equivalent to the amounts committed as per the agreements between the Government of Yemen and UNDP/GEF. A yearly allocation of US$ 150,000 should be made to the project as parallel funding in order to meet the total commitment of US$ 750,000 in terms of Government parallel funding.
3.2.4. Rapid Management Audit
Previous support in administrative and financial management UNDP has requested that a Rapid Management Audit is conducted as part of the MTR, in view of assessing the operation and delivery of the project staff. Meetings were held with all staff members of the project in Sanaa and Socotra and findings are presented in this section.
It should be noted that UNDP had already deployed a consultant in April 2010 who provided advice and on-job-training to the project team in Sana’a and Socotra in administrative and 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 34 - ______financial management over a period of 4 weeks. Although this was very helpful in establishing a clear financial management system and providing guidance on administrative aspects of the project which need to be addressed; however, no follow up of the recommendations was conducted by the project.
Weaknesses in the administrative management of the project The administrative management system currently in place at the level of the project is very weak and the project staff conditions are not aligned with UNDP conditions and this is harmful for UNDP’s corporate image as well as for the mobilization of the project staff and in meeting the project objectives.
Project staff are working outside clear contractual agreements which should establish clear conditions of services in line with accepted practices in UNDP, including official working hours; official holidays observed; overtime entitlement, annual and sick leave entitlements; medical/death/disability coverage; etc. There is also no established system for travel authorization and settlement of F10 claims, attendance management, overtime payment or compensatory time off… A system is also needed for vehicles management, guest house management, inventory records, etc.
A large gap in the conditions (salary, health and life insurance) between UNDP staff and project staff exist and is not justifiable. Moreover, the project has not been provided with basic infrastructure and operational needs such as computer and communication costs. Project staff is using equipment with a life span value that has expired if depreciation is applied and should be considered for replacement like laptops and vehicles. This is undermining the efficient delivery of the project. Similarly, the possibility to establish solar energy should be investigated as recommended by the UNDP/GEF Regional coordinator.
Despite the difficulties, the team in Socotra is a solid and efficient team, which is reflected in the smooth support provided to all consultants, and a successful communication campaign which was launched at the local level, and which is the result of team work.
Assessment of the NPC delivery The NPC has limited management skills and experience, weak communication skills and weak English writing skills. This has lead to major delays in delivery of responsibilities, lack of clear steering and execution. However, to date, the NPC has not been provided with appropriate management and technical support nor with the implementation set up planned by the project for the delivery of his responsibilities. Moreover, the coordination mechanisms and partnerships were confused and have not allowed a clear system to be put in place. It should be noted that the NPC has mobilized his team in Socotra and has succeeded in staying as an independent and trustworthy figure towards the local partners, who are still keen to call upon him for the continued cooperation with the project to support their local needs. Accordingly, the MTR cannot conclude that the PM is not capable of meeting his ToRs and improve his delivery if the appropriate set up is provided. However, he should not be allowed to continue with this quality of work and clear milestones should be established for monitoring his delivery, for eventual decision regarding the continuation of his duties.
Assessment of the delivery of the Administrative and Finance Assistant (AFA) in Sanaa Despite a long-term experience in UNDP, the quality of AFA’s delivery is below expectation. It is clear that the AFA has no motivation, initiative or a hard-working attitude for delivery and meeting his ToRs. Except in financial monitoring, no rigorous systems has been established nor 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 35 - ______implemented at all level of his responsibilities. Moreover, dysfunctioning in the submission of financial reports and payment requests continue to be recurrent and are unjustifiable. The AFA is aware of these drawbacks on the project as a whole and on his professional progress. Accordingly, he should not be allowed to continue with this quality of work and clear milestones should be established for monitoring his delivery, for eventual decision regarding the continuation of his duties.
3.3. Results
3.3.1. Attainment of Outputs/Achievements of Objectives and Rating A summary of the achievements is presented in Table 10 below to inform the MTR general rating of the project, as requested within the MTR and following the General rating and project sustainability rating (attached in Annex 5).
Table 10. Attainment of outputs at the level of each component Project Biodiversity management considerations are mainstreamed effectively into the Objective current process of “decentralizing governance for development” on the Socotra archipelago Project Expected Outputs Attained Outputs Components 1. Local -Island wide administration operational and - A proposal for the IWA has been Governance working on integrated manner with local, prepared but does not respond to the Support national and international stakeholders project needs nor has the quality -EPA functional assignment on Socotra required - Establishing a Monitoring-Control- - EPA staff have not been involved in Surveillance system for MPAs any major activities described in the project 2. - Use of mainstreaming tools provided by - ToRs for an International Mainstreaming the project to strategic planners including in Environmental Advisor were Tools the fishing sector published but do not respond to the project’s strategy 3. - No. of NGOs/CBOS on Socotra involved - A comprehensive NGO assessment Strengthening in biodiversity management has been conducted, but didn’t focus NGO Advocacy -Capacity of NGOs/CBOs on Socotra to of NGOs involved in biodiversity manage biodiversity management -Small grants allocated to local NGOs/CBOs - A capacity building programme is by GEF SGP, COMPACT or other donors proposed but did not take into account -Capacity of Socotra Conservation Fund to the project’s strategy act as an Intermediary Support Organization - SCF cannot act as Intermediary - Training and communication material Support Organization and should only be involved when feasible 4. Biodiversity - Higher revenues that local administration - A legal expertise has been deployed Livelihood derive natural resources from exploitative without prior technical and economic Values assets of the Island assessments of the productive sectors -No. of sustainable private initiatives which should be addressed by the including SMEs and higher income for local legal expertise communities resulting from sustainable trade - No baseline values of SMEs of biological specimens currently involved in sustainable use - Higher revenues for 4 MPA of biodiversity 5. Project PMU in Sanaa PMU in Sanaa and Socotra not 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 36 - ______management operational 6. Support to - Capacity of fishermen and local - AFD components not operational yet the fishing administration in adoption and enforcement sector of sustainable fishing practices - Investments for the fishing sector Grey sections reflect the additional AFD/FFEM interventions
Given the lack of major achievements at the level of the different components of the projects and the assessment in the previous sections of the key outputs of the projects which have been conducted to date, and based on the summary of attainment of outputs, the MTR assigns a General rating of “Highly Unsatisfactory (HU): severe” regarding the achievement of the project objective; which is associated to the overall weak delivery of the project outputs and accordingly lack of progress to date in meeting the project objective.
3.3.2. Sustainability
The MTR has confirmed in earlier sections and continues to confirm that the project strategy and resources allocated to meet its objective remain valid; this is also applicable to the sustainability strategy of the project strategy, which is the result of 10 years of experience and intervention in Socotra. The project is also considered as a natural evolution of UNDP’s work in biodiversity conservation Socotra in specific and in Yemen as a whole; it is also building upon UNDP’s experience and expertise in decentralization in Yemen.
The project sets a solid and long-term strategy which will allow the benefits of the project to continue, within or outside the project domain, after it has come to an end. The project is combining capacity development at individual, institutional and policy level, together with the establishment of financial and economic instruments and mechanisms. The principle of mainstreaming of biodiversity into production sectors which is at the heart of the project’s strategy assures the sustainability of the project by default.
However, given the trend in implementing the project to date, and given the weak general rating of the project, the MTR is cautious with regards to the project sustainability and assigns a Project sustainability rating of “Moderately Unlikely (MU): significant risks”. This is linked to the possible risks in implementing the proposed project strategy adequately and in meeting the project objectives and output which are prerequisites for sustainability of this project.
4. Recommendations
4.1. Updated project logframe and Biodiversity Tracking Tool A substantive and important technical aspect of the MTR is the review of the project logframe and indicators. The MTR has confirmed that the project strategy and its Monitoring and Evaluation system proposed in the project document are still valid. An updated logframe covering the Amendments to the Project Document funded by AFD/FFEM has been made in order to align the logframe with results-based monitoring standards. The updated logframe is attached in Annex 7. The Biodiversity Tracking tool was also updated and is attached in Annex 8.
Both documents should be used a basis for the project’s monitoring and evaluation. The baseline should be established at the inception phase of the project and the indicators tracked as per the project’s monitoring plan. 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 37 - ______
4.2. Establishing an operational set up and launching the inception phase As requested by UNDP during the discussions of the initial findings of the MTR, this section provides a chronological order of the steps needed for “initiation” of the project:
Step 1. The project technical structures should be strengthened in line with the structures of project document in order to meet its objectives and outputs, as per Figure 5 below. The proposed organigramme calls for the minimum required staff resources in a way to keep the project set up aligned with the initial set up of the project document. A revised budget plan has been proposed by the MTR (Annex 9. Planned and proposed budget - MTR BUDGET sheet) in line with the project document Total Budget and Workplan (TBWP) and in line with GEF CEO Endorsement “Annex C: Consultants to be hired”. Except for the resources allocated for the IWA, all resources have been kept within the same allocations as in the project document. The proposed budget by the MTR is in line with the initial project budget as shown in Table 11 below.
Table 11. Revised budget for consultants in line with MTR findings compared to initial TBWP in the Project Document Budget for consultants (full-time and TOTAL INT NAT part-time) per component MTR SUBTOTAL PMU 469,420 192,000 277,420 PRODOC SUBTOTAL PMU 215,000 215,000 MTR SUBTOTAL COMPONENT 1 496,880 98,400 398,480 PRODOC SUBTOTAL COMPONENT 1 549,000 98,000 451,000 MTR SUBTOTAL COMPONENT 2 103,304 39,000 64,304 PRODOC SUBTOTAL COMPONENT 2 192,000 89,000 103,000 MTR SUBTOTAL COMPONENT 4 118,556 87,000 31,556 PRODOC SUBTOTAL COMPONENT 4 157,000 43,000 114,000 MTR TOTAL BUDGET 1,188,160 224,400 771,760 PRODOC TOTAL BUDGET 1,113,000 230,000 883,000
The proposed structure would require the recruitment of the following additional national staff: - Local Team Leader - 2 Local Facilitators - National GIS expert in Socotra
ToRs for the above staff are available in the project document. Moreover, in order to avoid disrupting existing structure (especially at the local level where the project is functioning well); it is possible to deploy the current Administrative officer in Socotra as a Facilitator, and convert the position of Logistic officer/driver into Administrative officer.
Moreover, the MTR considers that the project manager should not be responsible for the technical quality control of project deliverables and the national counterparts do not have the technical capacity to play such a role either. Professional Technical support in establishing the consultant’s ToRs and in the provision of regular technical backstopping in project implementation, including technical reporting, should be secured. This kind of support is deployed in many UNDP/GEF projects, especially where weak national capacities are observed (the previous UNDP projects in Socotra have called upon a full-time CTA for over 10 years). NPD and NPC should be able to select the national and international consultants in order to speed up implementation of project activities. 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 38 - ______
Accordingly, a Part-time International Technical Advisor should be recruited. ToRs for this position have been proposed and are attached in Annex 10. It is proposed that regular support on a basis of one month/quarter would allow the project to obtain necessary technical support.
Figure 5. Proposed organigramme of the project in light of MTR findings
Step 2. Once the key local staff (Local Team Leader and 2 Facilitators) and Technical Advisor are recruited; an inception phase of the project should be planned at local and central level in order for the project to be initiated with a clear vision and with the required operational set ups. It is expected that such an activity can take place in March 2011, if the national and international staff are mobilized by February 2010.
Step 3. When the project team acquires a strategic vision of the project, an operational understanding of the project can be secured. The development of an operational TBWP and a AWP for 2010 will be possible in light of the inception meeting and as part of the inception report (as per the project’s monitoring and reporting strategy described in the GEF CEO endorsement document).
Step 4. Providing an adequate infrastructure and operational system for the project team should also be address. The management audit has described major dysfunctioning in the administrative operations of the projects which should also be addressed as part of establishing the implementation set up of the project. 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 39 - ______
The attached Annex 9. Planned and Proposed Budget (OTHER COSTS sheet) provides an estimation of the operational costs as compared to those planned in the project budget and a way that the MTR proposal is in line with available budget resources. Table 12 below summarize how the operational costs required by the project are aligned with the project TBWP.
Table 12. Revised operational costs in line with MTR findings compared to initial TBWP in the Project Document Operational costs budget MTR Proposed Budget TBWP Budget (US$) (US$) Travel 100,000 200,000 Miscellaneous (including equipment and vehicles) 305,000 239,000 Training 260,000 260,000 Equipment 50,000 50,000 TOTAL 715,000 749,000
Step 5. Clearance of pending technical reports should be finalized swiftly in a way a swift decision regarding their quality and accordingly their payment should be made to avoid harming the image of the project and that of its partners. MTR has provided comments and recommendations on this issue for the following on-going consultancies: - The consultancy for the IWA development - The consultancy for the NGOs assessment - The consultancy for the legal expertise on biodiversity practices including Access and Benefit Sharing
The deployment of new technical experts should be put on hold until a clear strategy is established following the inception phase of the project and the project team is fully mobilized. This should include on-going consultancies (Legal expert) and planned consultancies (environmental expert).
Additional recommendations for strengthening local governance In order to respond to UNDP’s concerns regarding aspects related to local governance and the establishment of the IWA, the following additional recommendations were added to the MTR report: 1. the Socotra project should seek DLDSP’s support in establishing its governance activities, in line with the decentralization process initiated in Yemen 2. the Socotra project should conduct the necessary socio-economic and institutional assessment 3. a policy, institutional and individual capacity needs assessment should be conducted in order to establish the appropriate capacity development plan for the project 4. a policy process should be initiated in view of establishing the IWA in line with national and local priorities, this should be done in an appropriate phased-approach but without delaying the capacity development activities of the project.
Step 6. Monitoring the delivery of the NPC and of the Administrative and Finance Assistant in Sanaa is also an important management action to be taken and should be done on a clear and regular basis as per the Rapid Management Audit. Milestones should be established for 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 40 - ______monitoring the delivery of the NPC and of the Administrative and Finance Assistant in Sanaa as well as recommendations for upgrading the skills of the national staff of the project.
Additional recommendations regarding the ability of the NPC to improve his capacities. In order to respond to UNDP’s concerns regarding NPC’s main weaknesses, which are his limited management skills and weak English writing skills, it is recommended that the NPC enrolls in the following training programmes and provides certificates for achievements of fundamental skills as follows: 1. Prince 2 fundamental and practitioner’s certificates to improve the management skills of the NPC. 2. IELTS (International English Language Testing System) to improve the English proficiency of the NPC. The IELTS Band Score Scale 6 “Competent user” should be achieved by the NPC.
4.3. Ensuring adequate stakeholders participation
4.3.1. Optimizing the role and functions of the Project Board It would be more efficient to streamline the Board membership to the following: 1. Minister of MoWE 2. EPA Chairman as NPD 3. MoPIC 4. Ministry of Local Administration 5. Director General Qalansiyah 6. Director Genaral Hadibou 7. UNDP 8. AFD
The main functions of the Board should also be focused on the following: 1. Provide overall guidance and direction to the project. 2. Provide recommendations and orientation to the project execution 3. Approve any changes needed during project implementation. 4. Advise on key strategic & policy issues 5. Advise on exit strategy
The NPC and AFA in Sana’a should ensure adequate in the preparations, planning and reporting of the Board. Follow up of Board decisions should be tracked and reported upon at the next Board meeting. NPC should discuss all operational tasks related to the project outside of the Board; Board meetings should be kept to a maximum of 2 hours, and can be conducted on a quarterly basis as needed, but at least every 6 months.
Additional recommendation to include the Ministry of Local Administration in the Project Board UNDP’s request to include Ministry of Local Administration (due to its large decentralization intervention) in the Project Board has been added to the recommendation of the report.
4.3.2. Optimizing coordination with AFD/FFEM Clear and professional management modalities should be agreed upon and respected, to ensure a coordinated approach in the management of the project between UNDP and AFD. It is also important to clarify that the NPC is the responsible person for the implementation of the project activities under the responsibility of both UNDP and AFD. The NPC should maintain continuous communication and ensure follow up of all the requests of both agencies. 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 41 - ______
Additional recommendations regarding the coordination with AFD/FFEM. In order to respond to UNDP’s concerns regarding the roles and responsibilities of UNDP and AFD in supervising the project, the following is proposed: 1. UNDP-CO and AFD agree on mutually acceptable coordination modalities 2. M&E to be conducted by each agency in accordance with contractual agreements
4.3.3. Activate the coordination with the local, national and international partners The project coordinator should dedicate significant time and efforts for coordinating with all related interventions. Local Authorities should be at the heart of the decision making process of the project at the planning, execution, budgeting and M&E levels. Close coordination, cooperation and technical support on the modalities for cooperating with the local authorities should be sought from the UNDP decentralization project.
The NPC should support the Socotra Coordination Unit and maintain continuous and regular discussions with the Unit Director, in a way strategic and substantive coordination can be put in place. UNDP and AFD can significantly support the Socotra Coordination Unit in establishing a Strategic Socotra Coordinated Work plan implementing agencies addressing the development and environmental conservation needs of Socotra, given their experience and value added in this field.
4.3.4. Establishing a communication strategy Although communication activities have succeeded in providing a sound basis of information to the project partners, a communication strategy and action plan focusing on the project priorities and communication needs is needed to support the overall strategic vision of the project as a whole. The project should also ensure that communication activities are conducted jointly with NGOs as a way to strengthen NGOs capacity and further the ownership and sustainability of the communication activities.
4.4. Mobilizing Government’s parallel funding A clear and specific integration of the Government’s parallel funding in the annual project budget should be made and should indicate how funds support concretely project activities. Some of these funds should be dedicated for local activities in close coordination with the local authorities. Annex 6. Co-financing and Leveraged Resources has been filled as requested within an MTR.
5. Lessons learned
5.1. Success stories and lessons learned in NGOs capacity development leading to sustainable livelihoods
This section replaces success stories and lessons learned from the current project due to lack of such lessons which could be extracted from the project at this point. The MTR presents the success stories coming out of initiatives related to capacity development of NGOs in the perspective of creating economically feasible initiatives, and which are based on sustainable use of resources. These initiatives have continued to operate after the intervention of their donors, thus confirming the sustainability of the presented models.
The purpose of these success stories is to clarify the basis which was adopted by these initiatives, in order to inform the operations of the SGBP in strengthening NGOs involvement and which could be summarized by the following principles: 1. a sound basis of know-how 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 42 - ______
2. involvement of local groups in the provision of training 3. gradual support in investment and in capacity building 4. long-term intervention and support 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 43 - ______
Honey bee production. French Government support to local NGOs. Duration: 6 years, from 1998-2004.
Honey production expert
1 person from Socotra visiting France
Training (local trainer +international expert) 13 couples obtained 5 boxes
10 of the successful couples obtained 5 more boxes
100 additional persons trained (local trainer +international expert)
Ecotourism camps and tourist guides UNDP/SCDP support for establishing ecotourism infrastructure and tourist guides. Duration: 4 years, from 2004-2007.
Ecotourism expert
Guidelines on construction of camps Funding of minor camps infrastructure
7 camps are now operating in Socotra Training on cooking, fauna and flora identification (ecotourism expert)
150 tourist guides trained (local NGO + ecotourism expert) 40 tourist guides are now working in Socotra 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 44 - ______
5.2. Adminsitrative reform at local level
During the MTR, the IWA proposal has been questioned and interpreted differently by the different stakeholders who are involved in local administrative reform which the project is promoting. Throughout the discussions, two cases of successful local administrative reforms have been raised continuously, and as indicated in previous sections, the IWA report did not provide these options nor did it describe other on-going administrative reform initiatives in Yemen. This section summarizes briefly these 2 cases which have been continuously referred to during the discussions, in the aim that they could be used by the project in informing its options in future.
The case of the Tehama Development Authority (TDA) The TDA was established according to law provision number (2) for the year 1973. TDA intervened at the level of the entire Tehama region (west of Yemen), and was recently expanded to include some highland areas inside Hodiadah governorate.
The organizational Structure of TDA is composed of a chairman of the board and 7 of the governmental institutions representatives, in addition to the General Manager. The administrative offices of TDA consist of 10 main departments, 4 sub-departments and 4 service centers (media support, training and a water and plants laboratory).
TDA’s investment program is funded by the GoY and some donors. TDA’s activities focus on agriculture and water, which are the main productive sectors in Tehama. TDA is also involved in different development sectors such as: - Irrigation: including water harvesting structures; - Supporting poor families and the development of rural women; - Disaster preparedness: including protecting the agriculture areas from desert sand and floods; - Development of Animal production; - Agricultural sector: including improvement the cultivation of palm trees in nine regions; - Honey Production: TDA has developed a program to improve beekeeping and honey production and marketing, which targeted 6484 honey producers; - Water resources management, as an example TDA conducted 1014 technical study related to water resources during 1990-2004.
The case of the Special Sayoun Deputy Governor Hadramout governorate is the biggest governorate in Yemen; it covers an extensive geographical area and includes 30 districts, including the Districts of Hadibo and Qalansiyah in Socotra. The GoY has decided to establish an Executive Office for 10 of the remote districts in the Governorate. These ten districts are located in the valley and the desert of Hadramout, and the city of Sayoun was nominated to be the headquarters for the management of this region.
The government appoint a Deputy Governor for Hadramout Valley and Desert region (Decree 192 dated 2009), whereby the Deputy Governor is the director of the Executive Office of Hadramout valley and desert, and is at the same level of authority as the Governor of Hadramout. The Government also gave instructions to line Ministries and Governmental bodies to establish executive offices in Sayoun, similarly to other governorates, which will be headed by Deputy Governor for the affairs of the valley and the desert. 0c36037288b65f2fddd52eeb4fd8166e.doc - 45 - ______