1

The Ethics of Consumption and Non-Consumptioni

I. Introduction

Two facts about global consumption are particularly striking: The rich consume so much and the poor so little. So, some suggest that those of us in the developed world must change the way that we consume. These people often believe that poverty and environmental problems are

(at least partly) due to the fact that rich people are consuming a disproportionate share of the earth’s resources (Daly, 2005, Wenar, 2008). Are they right? What should we say about consumption practices that might harm the environment or violate rights? How can we figure out what to consume? This chapter focuses on these questions. It has two aims. First, to summarize, and critically discuss, some of the important literature on consumption and global justice. Second, to contribute to the debate on this important topic and suggest a possible direction for further research by defending the following claim: The moral virtues of creativity and resolve require us to try to find alternatives to what seem to be tragic choices about (for instance) what to consume.

The next section sketches some of the literature on consumption and global justice and argues that we lack a general philosophical theory that can tell us what kinds of consumption are im/permissible or required. The third section considers whether we can say more about a particular case where, it seems, consumption has some negative impacts. The fourth section argues that we can arrive at some conclusions about what to consume (and refrain from consuming) even in the absence of a complete account of what kinds of consumption are im/permissible or required. The final section concludes.

II. Review of the Literature

Perhaps the most pressing consumption problem is that some people cannot consume enough (Crocker, 1998). Some consumption is necessary for survival. Many argue that people have a human right to this much. James Nickle suggests, for instance, that people have a right against the kind of severe poverty that afflicts the majority of the world’s population (Nickle, 2

2006). Almost a billion people lack food adequate for normal functioning. About two billion cannot secure the vitamins and minerals these need (Goodland, 1998). Relatively affluent members of the world’s population may have to constrain their consumption. As Robert

Goodland reports, it is only if everyone ate a vegetarian diet, and food was well distributed, that it would be possible to feed seven billion people (Goodland, 1998).ii

More controversially, some suggest that the extent of global inequality in individuals’ ability to consume is radically unfair (Caney, 2003; Moellendorf, 2009). Some claim that poverty is exacerbated by international organizations and rich countries that sanction some poor countries’ corrupt leaders’ consumption of resources that do not rightly belong to them (Pogge,

2002). Others suggest that that rich people are responsible for prohibiting the poor from consuming, or otherwise using, a proportionate share of the earth’s resources (Sterba, 1998;

Wenar, 2008).

Some even argue that (relatively affluent) people in developed countries should be able to consume more. Jerome Segal argues, for instance, that most people in the US have unmet economic needs for things like housing, transportation, education, and economic security. He says these needs should be satisfied by higher levels of consumption and economic growth

(Segal, 1998). Moreover, some note that consumption can make people happy, stimulate the global economy, allow individuals to reinvent themselves, help groups to express their cultural values, and so forth (Sen, 1998; Strudlow & Curlow, 1998; Schudson, 1998).

Herman Daly objects to encouraging consumption because he believes it is contributing to a host of environmental problems. For Daly, consumption includes production – the total throughput of the economy (Daly, 2005). He holds that the earth’s ecosystem has limited ability to supply and absorb wastes; the economy is no longer small relative to the global ecosystem. Our consumption of fossil fuels, for instance, has exceeded the climate’s capacity to absorb greenhouse gases and is causing climate change (Gardiner, 2004; Shue, 2002; Daly, 2008). Daly believes that the marginal costs of further growth are greater than the marginal benefits. He 3 claims that welfare is negatively correlated with gross national product (Daly, 2008). So, he suggests, we should have a no-growth economy – staying within the ability of the planet to sustain our consumption. Though, Daly believes, we should support some qualitative development in poor countries.iii

Other authors, like Mark Sagoff, argue that we are not straining the capacity of the earth’s ecosystems or exploiting the global South. Sagoff holds that we can always find more efficient ways of using existing resources, find new ways of securing these resources, or find new alternatives. He says that if we are really concerned about helping the poor, we should stop protecting our markets. The North should buy more of what the South produces (Sagoff, 1997).

Nevertheless, Sagoff maintains that some kinds of consumption are morally problematic because they do not show proper respect for nature and other things of value -- like community

(Sagoff, 1997; Matthews, 1999; Wong & Hassoun, 2011). He believes that consumption may distract us from spending time with friends and family or enjoying nature.iv

Even some of those who do not complain about how much people consume worry about particular consumption practices. Some object, for instance, to consuming animal products because they are concerned about the environmental consequences of meat production – the land and pesticides used and wastes produced (Goodland, 1998). Others are concerned about animal suffering (Singer, 1975). Some worry about purchasing sweatshop, or child labor made goods because they are concerned about exploitation or suffering (Snyder, 2008; Satz, 2003; Arnold and

Bowie, 2003). All of these claims are controversial. Some suggest, for instance, that children may suffer if they are not allowed to work (Zwolinski, 2007; Schmidtz, 2002). Nevertheless, there are good reasons to worry about at least some of our consumption practices. At least when there are good alternatives for children, child labor is presumably impermissible (Satz, 2003).

Supposing, then, that at least some of our personal consumption practices are problematic,v is there a general philosophical theory that can tell us what kinds of consumption are im/permissible or required? David Wasserman provides what is perhaps the most systematic 4 attempt to arrive at an answer to this question (though he focuses only on consumption’s impact on people). In his brilliant article Wasserman appeals to traditional philosophical principles for what justifies property rights. This is a great idea because consumption is one of the things standard property rights allow us to do. Property is a bundle of rights and liberties, to (e.g.) sell, lease, use and consume goods. Moreover, Wasserman’s argument links the discussion of permissible consumption to standard debates about harm in the global justice literature. So it is worth critically discussing Wasserman’s argument as questions about permissible harm are some of the most important issues to be found in the literature to date.

Wasserman considers whether there is an interpretation of Locke’s proviso applied to the case of consumption that can explain what kinds of consumption are permissible or impermissible. He starts by considering, for instance, two versions of this proviso as it is cashed out by Robert Nozick. On one way of interpreting the proviso, consumption is impermissible if it precludes similar consumption of the same resource by others; on another interpretation, consumption is permitted if non-consumers are not worse off than they would have been if the consumption had not occurred. Non-consumers may be compensated for any lost resources or the opportunity to consume them (Wasserman, 1998, 539).vi Wasserman suggests that both of

Nozick’s interpretations of Locke’s proviso embody the idea that consumption cannot permissibly harm others. He notes, however, that there are many possible accounts of harm.

Harm may need to make people worse off than they would have been in the absence of consumption, than they would have been in a state of nature, or than they have a right to be, for instance. Wasserman thinks an adequate account of harm must include other harms from depletion of resources besides their unavailability for use. He believes, for instance, that a good account must include the harm of depletion or destruction itself.

There are, however, a host of difficult issues in proving that (any particular kind of) consumption has harmed anyone in these ways (Risse, 2005; Paten, 2005).vii It is hard to know how things would have been in the absence of a history of exploitative consumption, for instance. 5

It may not even be clear whether poor people would have been better off in the state of nature

(Risse, 2005).

Moreover, if we want to adapt an account of what justifies property rights to justify consumption, Wasserman recognizes that the relevant account of harm cannot be theory-neutral

(Wasserman, 1998; Risse, 2005). Perhaps the most promising account of harm for these purposes is one on which people are harmed if they are made worse off than they have a right to be. Any way of filling out the details of such an account will obviously be controversial, however (Risse,

2005). So Wasserman suggests considering a trustee or stewardship model of responsibility for the earth (though, he does not do much to cash out an account of stewardship). So it seems that, while Wasserman explains some ways of connecting the literature on consumption with theories of global justice, there is a lot of work left to do.

III. Considering an Illustrative Example

Perhaps we can say more about a particular case where, it seems, consumption has some negative impacts. Consider, for instance, what it takes for someone who lives in the United States to get a simple tomato for dinner. Many of the tomatoes US citizens are eating come from hybrid seeds patented in the U.S. but grown in Mexico, Holland, Belgium, or Israel (USDA, 1999). To increase the percentage of germinating seeds most are treated with chemicals like mercury. The fields where the tomatoes are grown can be hundreds of acres large and may be fumigated with chemicals like methyl bromide (USDA, 1998). When the tomatoes are grown in Mexico, they are often farmed by laborers paid the equivalent of US$.50 per hour. Even in Florida, where farm workers make about US$6.77 per hour, they often have terrible working conditions, are exposed to these toxic chemicals, and are sometimes subjected to violence or enslaved (Estabrook, 2009;

RMN, 1996). Often the tomatoes are picked green and put in plastic trays before being covered with plastic wrapping and packed in a cardboard box. The plastics are made with petrochemicals and chlorine. Some of the cardboard is probably made from trees in British Columbia that can be

300 years old (Human Economy, 1994). Once the tomatoes are boxed, chemicals like ethylene 6 may be applied to turn the tomatoes red (GEO-PIE, 2006). Then the tomatoes are sent in a refrigerated truck to a warehouse. Although today’s coolants are usually less destructive than

CFCs, many of these still negatively impact the environment (EPA, 2001). Hundreds of gallons of fuel are used to transport the tomatoes and to make the machines and vehicles used to produce the tomatoes. This fuel may have come from any number of countries around the world, and the refining and transport processes used to generate this fuel would also involve inputs from many countries. Finally, after the tomatoes are purchased, the wrappers are thrown into the trash. They must then be trucked to a disposal or incinerator facility. Many of the building materials used in manufacturing the vehicles and storage areas for the tomatoes also end up in landfills. This trash can languish for decades and sometimes centuries before breaking down. A single aluminum can is estimated to take between 200-400 years to degrade; a plastic six-pack holder might take 450 years to degrade (Bureau of Land Management, 1998.).

In reflecting on this case, on might conclude that there is reason to worry about the environmental and social impacts of tomato production, but it is not at all clear what individual consumers are responsible for in this case. Most people do not know the secret life of the tomato, or any of the other products, they purchase. Sometimes it is relatively easy to find out about, and pursue, alternatives. A quick web search allows one to learn where much of one’s food comes from, to connect with local farmers, and to support community agriculture in most places. But must consumers do any of these things? Should they stop buying the tomatoes? More generally, how much moral responsibility do individuals bear for possible negative effects of consumption?

One challenge to the claim that consumers are responsible for the negative consequences of consumption is that changing their consumption practices will make no practical difference to what happens. If they buy local organic produce, or plant a garden, the same number of conventional tomatoes will still be produced with the same consequences (Imhoff, 1996).

I am not sure this is correct. When I started buying up most of the Poblano peppers at my local grocery, I noticed that they doubled their weekly supply. The check-out machines of some 7 large corporations (like Walmart) automatically send a request to their factories for a replica of every item bought (Gallaugher, 2010). Although some purchases may have no effect on supply at all, others may have more than proportional impact. It is plausible that, as individuals, we play a large enough role in bringing about environmental damage through our consumption practices that we are responsible for changing these practices, if not ameliorating this damage. One might also hold that consumers are collectively responsible for the negative impact of their (collective) consumption but distribute responsibility for changing these practices to each of us individually.

Even when individuals cannot affect change alone, simply by refraining from consumption, they may be able to do some things like organize boycotts. Alternately, they might have to compensate for the negative impact of their consumption in other ways, e.g. by purchasing carbon offsets.

There are better challenges to the conclusion that we are responsible for the negative impacts of consumption. It may be too difficult even to determine all of the consequences of consuming all of the things we can purchase. There are so many options. Moreover, there are good reasons not to purchase many of the things available for sale and it is not reasonable to ask people to refrain from purchasing most of them. Living off the grid is not a realistic option for most people.viii

Although these, and related, issues merit sustained attention, the rest of this chapter will simply set these worries aside in order to focus more carefully on the issue of whether an individuals’ choice of whether or not to consume a tomato may, on average, have some impact on tomato production and, so, farm workers and the environment. There may be other things consumers could do – like grow their own tomatoes or buy organic tomatoes – that will have different impacts. Perhaps consumers must take these consequences into account. Even if this is so, however, it is still not clear what people should do in the case above.

One remaining problem is that if people stop purchasing conventional tomatoes, poor farmers may fare worse. This may just be one example of a terrible dilemma consumers face every day. Critics of consumption have recently focused their energy on food. They suggest that 8 we should eat less and eat differently. Slow food advocates suggest that we should buy local foods that are made in sustainable ways rather than food shipped with fossil fuels from the other side of the world. At least, those who believe that we are morally obligated to purchase local foods may have a problem. Many of the world’s poorest people survive on the agricultural produce they can sell abroad. Perhaps we, generally, have to make a terrible choice between buying local food that is better for the environment and supporting desperately poor agricultural workers in developing countries.

The rest of this chapter will consider what we can say about cases like these in the absence of a complete account of how global justice should constrain our consumption. ix It will address the question: How can we figure out what kinds of consumption are im/permissible or required? In reflecting on a few concrete cases like that above, the next section suggests that we should try very hard to avoid what appear to be tragic dilemmas – it defends a kind of utopianism about consumption. In doing so, it suggests a new line of inquiry that might advance the discussion in the future.

IV. The Argument for Creative Resolve

This section defends the following Argument for Creative Resolve:

 1) We should not do something that (for all we know) might be wrong on the assumption

that there are no good alternatives to what we are doing. For, if there are good

alternatives and we fail to find them, we may avoidably do wrong.

 Even if we do not do wrong, we must do due diligence. We must guard against the

epistemic possibility of doing wrong.

o We should not assume, for instance, that we are facing a tragic dilemma.

. We would normally do wrong in acting on any of the options in such a

dilemma – so we cannot assume that there are no good alternatives to

any of our options. 9

o How much evidence one needs before doing something that there is some reason

to believe is wrong probably depends on the moral status of the alternatives in

normal circumstances.

2) To avoid doing something wrong on the assumption that there are no good alternatives to what we are doing, we should try to find good alternatives.

 Avoiding terrible choices often requires the virtues of moral imagination and

commitment.

o People often fail morally because they do not try to find alternatives to terrible

dilemmas.

o Sometimes trying is necessary, and sufficient, for succeeding in avoiding a

terrible choice.

C) We should try to find good alternatives. That is, we should cultivate the virtues of creativity and resolve in the face of apparent tragedy.

 If this conclusion is correct, it may inform many other practical debates about how to

achieve global justice as well.

The First Premise of the Argument for Creative Resolve

Consider a common argument against ending traditional forms of child labor: x We should not try to end child labor because, if we eliminate it, children will suffer.xi A child’s next-best alternative might be prostitution, and child prostitution is impermissible.xii (This argument applies even on the assumption that if consumers refraining from purchasing child labor made goods, that will reduce child labor.)

The problem with purchasing child labor made goods on this basis alone is that one is assuming (without justification) that if we end child labor, the children we prohibit from working will suffer for our good intentions because (e.g.) their next best alternative is prostitution. Child prostitution may not be these children’s next best alternative. Even if prostitution would be these 10 children’s next best alternative holding everything else fixed, that would not show that ending child labor is impermissible. Perhaps we should end child labor and provide better jobs for adults and schools for all the children we liberate. If we do not have the resources to do this then we may have to try to find the resources to do so or come up with other options — that may be what morality requires. Though it may be the case that child labor is necessary, this claim requires empirical support.

Recall, here, that this chapter assumes that the fact that collective action is necessary to avoid many of the problems that consumption can cause does not eliminate responsibility for these problems. A single individual cannot end child labor simply by refraining from purchasing child labor made goods. Even Bill Gates may not be able to create better alternatives for all the children that would otherwise have to work in sweatshops. It might be impossible for most individuals to help the particular children that would otherwise have made the things that these individuals refrain from purchasing. Nevertheless, there are many things people can do to mitigate the (shared?) responsibility this paper presumes that they have for the negative consequences of their consumption. Even when individuals cannot affect change alone, simply by refraining from consumption, they may be able to do some things like organize boycotts of sweatshop made goods or aid organizations helping children rescued from sweatshops. A division of labor here may also be perfectly appropriate.The main argument against drinking milk is structurally similar to the argument against ending child labor in that it contains an important but undefended assumption. It asserts that if people drink milk, baby calves must be separated from their mothers. These calves will, almost invariably, be raised for veal. When baby calves are raised for veal they are often deprived of essential nutrients (Singer, 1975). Sometimes they are kept isolated in cages so small that they cannot even turn around or lie down comfortably. (In short, they suffer tremendously.) So, the argument concludes, drinking milk is morally impermissible. 11

Perhaps those who want to drink milk can respond similarly to this argument – questioning its implicit assumption. It starts from an important but undefended claim. It assumes that drinking milk will result in something that (suppose for the sake of argument) there is some reason to believe is impermissible – people raising calves for veal. It is not clear that if we drink milk, calves must be raised for veal – perhaps they could be raised as free range steer and then killed humanely.

More generally, perhaps we can say this: We should not do something that (for all we know) might be wrong on the assumption that there are no good alternatives. This just is the first premise of the Argument for Creative Resolve.

This premise can cut in both directions. To better appreciate the force of the general principle that we should not do something that (for all we know) might be wrong on the assumption that there are no good alternatives, it will help to consider the preceding cases from the opposite perspective.xiii One should not refuse to buy child labor goods on the assumption that children rescued from sweatshops will not suffer because we can provide them with an education.

It may be infeasible to provide children with an education if children lose their jobs due to people refusing to buy child labor made goods. Similarly, one should not drink milk on the assumption that it is feasible to raise milk calves for steer. It may not be. No one should do something that

(for all they know) might be wrong on the assumption that there are no good alternatives.

Even if what one is assuming would not in fact lead to incorrect moral conclusions, one should not be so presumptuous. There is reason to guard against the epistemic risk of assuming something that may lead to a morally impermissible conclusion. Suppose that it is in fact wrong to buy child labor made goods, and one could not be wrong in asserting that there are things we can do to protect children even if we refuse to purchase child labor made goods. Even so, one should not simply assume that ending child labor will benefit children. If one does so, one has not done due diligence. 12

There is an epistemic-cum-moral obligation to guard against the epistemic possibility of doing wrong. Consider an adaptation of a famous case from the literature in epistemology:

Suppose someone is hosting a party and can assert that an unmarked bottle of liquid is gin. The host realizes that if she does so, one of the party-goers may drink the liquid. What the host must do to know she is just offering another a glass of gin (and, hence, for it to be permissible to offer the glass) depends on the situation. If the host recognizes or believes that there is a non-negligible chance the liquid could be poison, she must take at least some precautions before saying it is gin.

What precautions are appropriate will depend on what grounds she has for believing the liquid may be poison. Still, the host who recognizes, or believes, that there is a non-negligible chance the liquid could be poison must do more to know, or be justified in believing, that the liquid is gin. Moreover, the host must do more to be morally justified in saying it is.

Acting on an apparent tragic dilemma may be the clearest example of the kind of moral failure against which the first premise of the Argument for Creative Resolve cautions: We should not do something that (for all we know) might be wrong on the assumption that there are no good alternatives. One should not presume that terrible tradeoffs are necessary when they may not be.xiv

For, there is something prima facie wrong about making such tradeoffs. In a genuine tragic (or terrible) dilemma, all of the options on the table would normally be unacceptable.

How much evidence one needs before doing something that there is some reason to believe is wrong probably depends on the moral status of the alternatives in normal circumstances.xv Sticking with the examples that illustrate how the obligation not to do something that (for all we know) might be wrong on the assumption that there are no good alternatives cuts in both directions, we might say this: If the proponent of ending child labor is wrong that children rescued from sweatshops will not suffer, that would be very unfortunate (because children will suffer). Causing children to suffer is prima facie morally impermissible. So there is a rather large burden on those who refuse to purchase child labor made goods to make sure that refraining from doing so does not cause suffering.xvi If those who say it is impermissible to drink milk because 13 calves will suffer are wrong, however, little may be lost (notice, no pun). There are other ways to secure calcium. So, the burden on those who accept this proposition may be less. The general idea is that the buden is heaviest on those for whom being wrong in their assumptions would cause the most moral damage.

Although it may be ridiculous to refuse to assume that some tradeoffs are necessary,xvii the requisite claim is just that if something is prima facie morally impermissible, we should resist simply assuming that it is unavoidable. In defending the final premise of the Argument for

Creative Resolve, the next sub-section will draw out some further practical lessons from this conclusion.xviii

The Second Premise of the Argument for Creative Resolve

The preceding reflections might provide some guidance about how to respond to purportedly terrible dilemmas. Suppose a strong case against drinking milk and for buying child labor made goods is made. Milk drinkers ought to stop drinking milk. Rice and soy milk provide decent alternatives. But what should we do if we suppose, for illustration’s sake, that child labor is at least prima facie wrong. If, as the above reflections suggest, we must be very careful before we assume that we have to make terrible choices, virtue may not allow us to jump to the conclusion that we are facing a terrible and unavoidable moral dilemma. We may have an obligation to try to figure out whether, all things considered, we have a moral obligation to purchase or refrain from purchasing child labor made goods. (There is no similar burden on us to determine whether it really is acceptable to refrain from drinking milk as long as there is nothing prima facie wrong about refraining from doing so.)

Or consider the tomato example discussed above. Those involved in the local food movement argue that it is better to buy local. Shipping food from the other side of the world contributes to problems like climate change as it requires a lot of fossil fuel. On the other hand, many of the world’s poorest people survive on the agricultural produce they can sell abroad. One might conclude that we have to make a terrible choice between buying local food that is better for 14 the environment and supporting desperately poor agricultural workers in developing countries. If we grow our own tomatoes or purchase local organic tomatoes, for instance, many Mexican tomato farmers may lose their jobs. The above inquiry suggests, however, that we should not assume that such a terrible choice is necessary. Perhaps we can buy local and help developing countries in other ways. If we also reduce our consumption, perhaps we can give more in foreign aid. There is good evidence that some foreign aid programs work (World Bank, 2004a; World

Bank, 2004b; Laura Rawlings and Gloria Rubio, 2005; Skoufias et al., 2001).xix Alternately, we might purchase food from poor farmers in developing countries and reduce our emissions in other ways e.g. by driving less (Hassoun, 2005). This does not mean that it will be possible to avoid making a terrible choice between buying local food that is better for the environment and supporting desperately poor agricultural workers in developing countries. Still, we should look hard for alternatives.

Avoiding terrible choices requires moral imagination and commitment. The requisite creativity and resolve is illustrated in the aforementioned response to the proponent of child labor’s assertion that children will become prostitutes if they are not employed. If we assume it is prima facie wrong to buy child labor made goods, it is important to consider whether we can help children avoid prostitution by educating the children we liberate.

Sometimes avoiding what seems, initially, to be a terrible dilemma, may be difficult.

There will, of course, be times when the costs of looking for other alternatives exceed the costs of making a terrible choice. An alternative may not exist. Still, there is a prima facie obligation to do what we can to avoid making terrible choices, even if avoiding them is very difficult, very demanding.xx

The imperative to try hard to find alternatives, should be particularly compelling if people often fail morally because they do not question their assumptions. There is significant psychological evidence that we generally fail to consider enough alternatives in making decisions.xxi Alternately, people may lack moral imagination because they take a much too narrow 15 a view of feasibility -- assuming narrow time frames and financial constraints. Most of us are used to thinking about every day business and personal problems under these kinds of constraints.

Some people also seem to have a very pessimistic view of human nature, politics, or political philosophy (Goodin, 1995, 40). For these reasons, they may not look hard enough for alternatives to what seem to be terrible dilemmas.

It is important to recognize that “the institutional structures in which groups of people live themselves shape those people’s views of both the possible and of the desirable” (Stears,

2005, 341). It is important to see that “political theory may be able radically to reshape currently prevailing political attitudes rather than simply to reflect and refine them” (Stears, 2005, 340).

To return to the child labor case, those arguing against ending child labor might show that if we just stop purchasing these goods then children will suffer. They might even show that we cannot prevent this suffering by educating children and providing jobs for parents. But perhaps they cannot rule out all feasible ways of helping children avoid this suffering without purchasing child labor made goods. Perhaps programs like Mexico’s Progressa/Opportunidades, which give scholarships to poor children who attend school, are in order. Conditional cash transfer programs like Progressa/Opportunidades may prevent child labor and help parents educate their children. xxii

One might object that if we support aid programs that help kids (or, for that matter, tomato farmers) in Mexico, we should purchase child labor made goods (or tomatoes) from other countries and thereby help other kids as well. But the point is a general one, perhaps we can support aid programs in all developing countries sufficient to alleviate the need for child labor (or working for low wages in poor conditions on Mexican tomato farms).xxiii

In short, we should try to find good alternatives to any apparent terrible dilemmas. This point applies to apparent dilemmas we face in trying to decide what to consume. It also applies more broadly. The moral virtue we lack if we do not question assumptions that may lead us to incorrect moral conclusions is a kind of creativity and resolve. xxiv We must commit to avoiding purportedly terrible and unavoidable dilemmas. The only acceptable thing to do if there is a 16 terrible and unavoidable dilemma is to act only out of necessity. Otherwise we have shown a failure of the moral imagination. Morality requires a realistic utopia in theory and in practice.

V. Conclusion

This chapter started by reviewing some of the literature on consumption. It suggested that we lack a well-cashed out general theory about what kinds of consumption are morally im/permissible or required. So, this chapter considered a new question that, along with inquiry into hard questions about individual responsibility for the negative consequences of consumption, might guide discussion in the future: “How can we figure out what kinds of consumption are im/permissible or required?” After arguing that we must not suppose we have to make hard choices about what to consume, the paper suggested that these arguments generalize to some much more controversial conclusions about how we should act in the face of what may seem to be terrible dilemmas. It suggested that we should not assume we have to make a terrible choice.

We should be careful, for instance, before consuming goods (or refusing to do so) on the assumption that consumption violates (or does not violate) rights. We should try hard to find alternatives. This paper’s conclusions about how we should deal with such apparent dilemmas may apply not only to the case of consumption; they may help us achieve global justice more broadly. 17

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(2007):689-727. i The author would like to thank Darrel Moellendorf for extensive comments. She also appreciates the feedback she received on the main argument at the Yale/Penn works in progress series, and Stanford University. She would also like to thank Sarah Wright, Paul Gowder, Aaron James, Debra Satz, Matt Frank, John Farnum, Ben Jantzen, Orsolya Reich, Allegra McCloud, Keiran Oberman, Peter Stone, Tamar Schapiro, Manuel Vargas, Eammon Callahan, and Julian Culp for comments and discussion on related work. ii To accept this conclusion, one does not need to endorse Singer’s demanding conclusion that we must give up everything that is not morally significant or comparable to help the poor (Singer, 1972). iii Daly says that the costs of protecting ourselves from overconsumption (e.g. oil spills) will also decrease. iv Sagoff would probably not agree with Juliet Schor, however, in arguing that there is reason for the government to restrict advertising and access to credit and to use taxes and subsidies to promote equality and protect the environment (Schor, 1999). Nor is it clear that all critics of consumption would agree with Lichtenburg that we consume primarily because others consume and, though there are good reasons for this, we might not suffer if everyone consumed less (Lichtenburg, 1999). v This does not include saving and investment practices (Crocker, 1998) vi Wasserman suggests that “the comparative strength of the two interpretations depends on the baseline from which we assess the harm that, under the second interpretation, needs to be compensated. If we take a broad view of the harm for which compensation is owed to include such adverse effects as the loss of natural landscapes or political autonomy, the second interpretation may turn out to be more stringent than the first, because compensation may be impossible” (Wasserman, 1998, 540). vii So, this discussion connects with other discussions in the global justice literature over different kinds of ‘harm’. (Risse, 2005; Pogge, 2002). viii There are also hard questions about merely doing vs. intending actions that do have bad consequences (or would otherwise violate rights). Though, this paper will not consider them. ix I will assume throughout that the reader is a relatively affluent member of the world’s population. x Some view child prostitution as a form of child labor, though it is not the kind of labor traditionally protected by governments. In any case, I will not include it under the purview of labor here. xi On this argument, see: (Basu & Tzannatos, 2003; Basu & Van, 1998, 423; Follesdal, 2007). Obviously it is not enough to establish that, in some case(s), child labor has hurt children to establish that it will hurt children in general, or that it will do so in the future, or that we should ban child labor. Nor is evidence about a few (small) cases enough to establish a presumption in favor of banning child labor. For discussion of what kinds of empirical evidence are sufficient to establish claims like this see: (Hassoun, 2010). xii Apparently something like this argument has also had a role to play historically in debates about child labor. See: (Kelley, 1907). Some philosophers even suggest something like this. One might, for instance, interpret Debra Satz’s main argument regarding child labor’s permissibility in this way, though I expect she intends this argument’s conclusion to be conditional upon the relevant economic facts (Satz, 2003). xiii Perhaps we need not (generally) do what we can to defend all of our truth-determining assumptions. Perhaps we only need to be clear about what we are assuming. At least, if we express appropriate regret, it might be acceptable for us to make such assumptions. To see why this objection is implausible, consider the child labor example again assuming, for illustration’s sake, that child labor is actually impermissible. The objector would, in effect, be saying this: It is okay to advance the claim that we should support child labor without defending the (avoidable) assumption that, otherwise, more children will become prostitutes. For, then, we can say we are sorry we do not live in a world with better alternatives for children. This is patently absurd. We cannot defend the fact that our avoidable presuppositions might lead to an incorrect moral conclusion, by saying that then we can express regret for the necessity of what we are assuming. The assumptions are, by hypothesis, avoidable. If we can, but do not, reject the assumptions then we should instead regret having to make them (if there is good reason to do so). If there is no good reason to assume things that may lead us to incorrect moral conclusions, then we should not be so presumptuous. xiv Something like this principle may also underly the idea that arguments establish a burden that must be met for one to reject them. Once something is said in favor of an option on the table, there may be some burden to remove it from the table. How great the burden will be will depend on how much the argument in its favor adds to the claim that it is prima facie im/permissible or obligatory to pursue or how prima facie wrong it is to neglect. I owe thanks to Aaron James for discussion on this point. xv Again, I have tried to put the point in a way that is neutral between consequentialist and deontological theories. As long as theories allow a range of moral evaluations (prohibited, permissible, required) this point should go through. Note, further, that adopting a deontological theory will not necessarily help theorists avoid making unjustified recommendations that could lead to incorrect moral conclusions. Even deontologists might wrongly suppose that the only alternative to child labor is prostitution, for instance. xvi Similarly, it is quite unfortunate if those who say children rescued from sweatshops will suffer without child labor are wrong. For child labor, presumably, causes many children to suffer because it prevents them from getting an adequate education. xvii In talking about child labor, one might echo Satz’s claim that “tradeoffs between different values are inevitable” (Satz, 2003, 223). xviii Nevertheless, even this claim alone is important. Many people have made careers considering how we should ration scarce resources on the assumption that this is necessary. Most of what goes on in the discipline of cost-effectiveness analysis is probably based on this assumption. People also assume undefended feasibility constraints all of the time. Granted, it would be difficult to demonstrate that the arguments assuming the unavoidability of things prima facie morally impermissible are as wide-spread as I believe. It is easy, however, to find examples of such arguments in the literature. Consider, for instance, an argument by Chris Brown who believes that even what some see as rather modest goals are too utopian. He says we must “admit the tragic dimension of human existence” (Brown, 2007, 5). Brown believes, “genuinely free trade clearly involves rich countries sacrificing the interests of domestic workers in the medium term while protectionism clearly damages the interests of workers in low wage countries” (Brown, 2007, 9). This requires making a terrible (he says tragic) choice between fulfilling duties to humanity and fellow citizens. It is far from obvious that we cannot completely ameliorate (absolute) poverty or that we must choose between sacrificing the interests of those in developing or developed countries. Brown provides no evidence for the proposition that the rules of trade, never mind poverty relief or political action in general, require making terrible choices (in this case between fulfilling duties to humanity and fellow citizens). He does not defend the claim that free trade “involves rich countries sacrificing the interests of domestic workers in the medium term while protectionism clearly damages the interests of workers in low wage countries” (Brown, 2007, 9). Some protectionism (even in rich countries) may harm rich workers and benefit poor workers. If the US protects its cotton industry, its textile industry may suffer because textile makers cannot purchase cheaper cotton abroad. And, while poor cotton producers may be worse off, poor textile makers may do better (because there is a greater supply of cheap cotton in poor countries, prices for cotton in poor countries may fall). There is a lot of evidence to suggest that the impacts of free trade and protectionism are not as straight-forward as Brown suggests. There is some evidence, for instance, that agricultural liberalization will benefit most developing countries but net-food-importers may suffer. For discussion see: (Hassoun, 2008a). Even if free trade does harm domestic workers and protectionism harms poor workers, however, Brown does not explain why free trade poses a terrible, unavoidable (never mind tragic) dilemma. As anti-globalization advocates suggest, e.g., by changing the ways that we consume – purchasing Fair Trade certified goods – we can help some of the global poor (World Bank, 2004a; World Bank, 2004b; Laura Rawlings and Gloria Rubio, 2005; Skoufias et al., 2001). It may also be possible to compensate domestic workers for their losses due to free trade, for example. After all, some of the institutions countries might use to do so are already in existence (Hassoun, 2008a). Trade Related Adjustment Assistance Programs are, for instance, one possibility. Brown simply ridicules this possibility. He says that when people point to the costs of protecting the poor for workers in rich countries “something strange happens. ‘Fair trade’ is suddenly about protecting jobs in both North and South; with no sense of irony, a French farmer, Jose Bove, becomes an iconic figure in the movement on the principle, apparently, that defending the Common Agriculture Policy and subsidized French farms is a way of showing that ‘the world is not for sale’” (Brown, 2007, 11). Even if institutions to compensate losers from trade did not exist, however, Brown would have to provide reason to think we could not come up with any other ways of avoiding terrible (if not tragic) tradeoffs between fulfilling obligations to domestic and foreign workers. xix For critical discussion of the literature on aid see: (Easterly, 2006). For my take on this literature see: (Hassoun, 2010). xx Perhaps this holds true only insofar as we are committed to offering public reasons for our actions. It may, of course, turn out that we have some kind of (externalist) justification for doing things that we cannot know we are justified in doing. xxi There is some evidence in behavioral economics that we fail to search long enough in looking for solutions to all kinds of problems (Bearden, 2005). We may just be used to working with what Andreas Follesdal calls a partial rather than a total or wide reflective equilibrium. A wide reflective equilibrium takes into account all of our background empirical and epistemological theories (e.g. about social psychology, human nature, biology etc.). A partial reflective equilibrium takes into account only some of these things (Follesdal, 2007, 6). xxii (World Bank, 2004a; World Bank, 2004b; Laura Rawlings and Gloria Rubio, 2005; Skoufias et al., 2001). xxiii One interesting implication of this chapter’s argument is that finding solutions to the problems our consumption practices cause may require many things that do not, at first glance, have anything to do with consumption. xxiv There may be other virtues in trying to avoid terrible dilemmas too. As Tom Hill suggests, in a slightly different context, individuals’ commitment to avoiding such dilemmas may “frame a way of life for them... Living in the faith that they can reconcile the things that they most cherish enables them to live with a virtually unqualified, self-defining commitment to each value. This, we can imagine, energizes their pursuits and motivates them to anticipate and forestall crises in which the values could not be reconciled. Also, importantly, it enables them to enjoy special relationships that are built upon the similar and reciprocal commitments of others” (Hill, 1996, 182). One might object that if we focus only on avoiding dilemmas we will not be prepared to face them when we must. But I see no reason to think we cannot both prepare for and avoid dilemmas, if necessary. If it is impossible to do both things, we may have to make a terrible choice. It would not clearly be better, however, to spend our energy preparing for emergencies rather than preventing them.