Is William Rowe Right to Suppose That Standard Theodicies Do Little to Blunt the Force

Is William Rowe right to suppose that standard theodicies do little to blunt the force of the objection to theism from ‘evil’?

Chapter one

One of the most promising objections to the greater good’s defence comes from William Rowe who argues that it is irrational to believe in the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient being (referred to throughout his paper as ‘O’) when there is so much evil on earth. Rowe begins his argument by outlining two instances of evil: the first is an example of natural evil which he terms as E1, and the second is an example of moral evil which Rowe terms as E2.1 To illustrate natural evil he tells the story of fawn that is trapped, terribly burned and lies in agony for several days before he finally dies following a natural forest fire.2 The example of moral evil Rowe uses comes from an actual case reported in the Detroit Free Press in 1986 in which a 5-year-old girl was severely beaten, raped and then strangled on New Year’s Day by her mother’s boyfriend.3 Rowe then argues that he can infer two things from these two instances of evil. Firstly, that we cannot see any good states of affairs which would justify O permitting E1 and E2, and secondly that therefore there are no good states of affairs which would justify O permitting E1 and E2. This then leads him to include that an omnipotent, omniscient being does not exist. Rowe has clarified his argument as follows:

(P) No good state of affairs we know of is such that an omnipotent, omniscient being’s obtaining it would morally justify that being’s permitting E1 or E2.4

(Q) No good state of affairs is such that an omnipotent, omniscient being’s obtaining it would morally justify that being in permitting E1 and E2.5

And this leads him to conclude what I have termed as R:

(R) An omnipotent, omniscient being does not exist.

Rowe acknowledges various objections to this argument, the main one being that his reasoning is in some way faulty. For example, one might argue that we can see the good states of affairs which would justify O permitting E1 and E2, or alternately that although we may not be able to see the good states of affairs which would justify O permitting E1 and E2, this does not lead to the conclusion that there are not any.6 In order for Rowe’s argument to be successful then, there are two things which he needs to demonstrate. First of all, he needs to show that there are no greater goods which we know of which would justify an omniscient and omnipotent being from permitting

1 William Rowe, “Evil and Theodicy,” in Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, David Basinger, Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, (Oxford University Press, 1996) p. 295

2 Rowe, “Evil and Theodicy,” p. 296

6 Rowe, “Evil and Theodicy,” p. 297 evil, and secondly he needs to show that there are no greater good’s that we do not know of which would justify O permitting evil.

To try and simplify his discussion, Rowe uses the letter ‘J’ to stand for the amount of goodness a good has. If the good state of affairs is good enough to justify O in obtaining E1 and E2 then we can say that the good has J. However, if the good state is not good enough to justify E1 and E2 then we can say that it lacks J.7 In regard to whether there are any goods that we can see that would justify O permitting E1 and E2, Rowe concludes that it is obvious that most of these good states lack J. For example, Rowe enjoys smelling a good cigar, but this clearly is not a great enough good for O to justify permitting E1 and E2.8

So what greater good’s which we know of might have J? Discovering such good states of affairs is the job of the theodicist, and Rowe considers one theodicy devised by John Hick called the ‘Soul making theodicy’ which he finds quite promising.9 I shall examine this theodicy in more detail in the next chapter and therefore will not give it much attention here, but Hick’s basic argument is that in order for us to develop into moral and spiritual beings who are capable of the deepest kind of love, evil is necessary.10 If our actions had no bad consequences then it would be impossible for us to do anything wrong, and similarly, because we would not be able to benefit anyone else, we would not be able to perform a morally right action either.11

After consideration of Hick’s theodicy, Rowe concludes that he does provide some justification for why O might permit moral and natural evil.12 However, it’s the amount of evil and the sheer excess of it which poses a problem for Rowe. He fails to see how Hick’s theodicy has given O any justification for permitting E1 and E2.13 In the case of the boyfriend who brutally raped and murdered the little girl, Rowe argues that it is ridiculous to suggest that had O prevented this from occurring, his moral and spiritual development would be frustrated.14 In the same way, Rowe argues that it would not have prevented our moral and spiritual development had the fawn not suffered for several days, even if we believe this evil occurred simply as a consequence of the operation of the natural world.15 Therefore Rowe concludes that P is true: We cannot see any good states of affairs which would justify an omnipotent, omniscient being in permitting E1 and E2.

10 John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, (Collins, 1968) pp. 360, 361

12 John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, (Collins, 1968) p. 304

15 Rowe, “Evil and Theodicy,” p. 304 Once Rowe has argued that P is correct on the basis that all the good states he can see lack J, he then suggests how we might infer from this that Q is also correct: that there are no good states of affairs at all which justify an omnipotent and omniscient being permitting E1 and E2.16 Rowe first of all explains how it might be possible that there are good states of affairs in the world that we do not know of. Taking the examples of happiness, pleasure and love, it is obvious that these are good and can easily be distinguished from bad states such as unhappiness and hatred.17 However, some states are not obviously good or bad, such as the existence of a stone. Rowe argues that this is when things become complicated because the complete list of good things would be too complex for us to understand:

We might, for example, find knowledge on the list, and respond with the recognition that it too is intrinsically good. But the complete list might well include states that are enormously complex, so complex as to tax our powers of comprehension.18

Since we do not know what these greater goods are, Rowe admits that it initially seems problematic to try and conclude that these unknown goods lack J. He acknowledges that understanding these greater goods would be as difficult for us as it would for a three year old child to understand Bayes’ theorem.19 However, Rowe holds that we can know there are no greater goods which have J, based on the fact that there are no goods which we do know about that have J. This is because we constantly make judgments about the unknown based on what we do already know.20 As Rowe puts it:

All of us are constantly inferring from the A’s we know of to the A’s we don’t know of. If we observe many A’s and all of them are B’s we are justified in believing that the A’s we haven’t observed are also B’s.21

An example of this might be Rowe’s experience of pit bulls. He argues that if every pit bull he comes across is viscous then he is justified to believe that all pit bulls are viscous.22 Rowe does admit however that there are things which would defeat this inference, for example if he found out that all the pit balls he had encountered had been trained for dog fighting.23 In light of this then, Rowe argues that the first objection of his argument (that Rowe’s reasoning in flawed) is not successful.

Chapter two of my dissertation

19 Rowe, “Evil and Theodicy,” pp. 298, 299

23 Rowe, “Evil and Theodicy,” p. 299 The most obvious objection which one might have against Rowe’s argument is that he is wrong to hold P: that no good state of affairs we know of is such that an omnipotent, omniscient being’s obtaining it would morally justify that being’s permitting E1 or E2.24 It is the job of a theodicist to demonstrate the reasons why God might permit evil on earth and many convincing attempts have been made to show these greater goods. I shall particularly focus upon the ‘soul making theodicy’ developed by John Hick who argues that the good states we know of is our ability to develop into moral and spiritual beings which would only be possible in a world containing evil. I have then also examined a theodicy developed by Swinburne. Although I find these theodicies convincing and Rowe himself agrees that they successfully show why O might permit some degree of evil on earth, I agree with Rowe that they do little to blunt the conclusion of atheism when we examine the worst examples of evil.

Swinburne

Swinburne agrees with Rowe that unless there are greater goods which would justify O permitting evil then we should accept atheism: “I conclude...bad states for which no greater-good defence can apparently be provided must count against the existence of God.”25 Therefore Swinburne tries to demonstrate the existence of such greater goods by producing a theodicy which tries to demonstrate the following things:

(a) God has the right to allow E (evil) to occur.

(b) Allowing E (or a state as bad or worse) to occur is the only morally permissible way in which God can bring about a logically necessary condition of a good G.

(c) God does everything else logically possible to bring about G.

(d) The accepted value of allowing E, given (c), is positive.26

Swinburne devotes the majority of his book Providence and the Problem of Evil defending premise (b) and (c), arguing that the good states of affairs which we can see in the world would not be possible without the occurrence of evil. Initially, Swinburne spends some time examining what he defines as ‘the good goals of creation’ which he separates into four groups: beauty, thought and feeling, action and worship. I do not have the time to consider every good state of affairs which Swinburne believes justifies God to permit evil, but will mainly examine two very good states which he particularly focuses on: the responsibility humans have for themselves and each other, as well as the greatness of being of use to another.

One of the most important greater good’s which Swinburne picks up on is human responsibility which one has for themselves as well as other people. It is good for humans to be able to have real responsibility for themselves such as by keeping healthy and choosing the people they want to be. 27

25 Richard Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of evil, (Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 29

26 Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of evil, p. 14

27 Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of evil, p. 141 The same can also be said for the responsibilities which we have for others, which is an even greater good. Humans have responsibility for their families for example, especially if they are parents. And Swinburne argues that it is very good that we are able to bring new life into the world and then help to mould the character of that individual by teaching them what is right and wrong, by helping them develop into free agents capable of making independent decisions and by hoping that one day they will do the same for their own children.28 And this responsibility for others is not simply limited to our own children or family, it also includes the societies in which we live which can be made different through teaching, community work or political campaigning.29

Swinburne argues therefore that it is very good for creatures to participate in the moulding of each other and the world, but this good would not be possible unless bad choices were also available to us.30 Although God could have created us so we could only benefit others and not harm them, if the possibility of making them unhappy were not open to us, then we would not have much responsibility for that individual as Swinburne shows: 31

If I am to have significant responsibility for you, I have to have the alternative of hurting and maiming as well as the alternative of greatly benefitting. But if free agents are to have this responsibility, there is a high probability that others will be harmed, and that often means suffering.32

Therefore, in order to have real responsibility for ourselves with all the benefits this brings, God does not stop us if we do dangerous activities such as rock climbing, smoking or taking drugs.33 And similarly he will not stop us if we harm others, so inevitably there will be some children who are neglected and abused because of the responsibility we have been given to bring humans into the world.34 And if God did step in to save such children every time a child was hurt, parents would not have the real responsibility of care.35

Another very good state of affairs which Swinburne can see is the greatness of being of use to someone else. Swinburne argues that it is good when others benefit from our experiences especially if they would not have obtained the benefit without the experience of the other. 36 And in a similar way, it is good if somebody else’s suffering benefits another, whether that be because they show sorrow, sympathy or compassion for the person suffering (all of which are

36 Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of evil, p. 103 good states), or because it allows the other agent to have free will.37 An example of this might be if someone is hurt or killed in a rail crash which then led to better signalling equipment which would prevent similar events occurring again.38 In this situation the family of the man who had the accident would take heart in the fact that he did not die for nothing.

This greater good of one being of use to another can also explain why natural evil is necessary; for pain, illness, natural disasters and other instances of naturally occurring evil can only evoke the deepest sympathy and concern if the evil is extremely bad for the one suffering it.39 It is good that we should feel sorrow and upset when our loved ones suffer and grieve for them if they die, for it shows how much we love and care for them.40 But such good feelings would not be possible in a world lacking real moral and natural evil. Swinburne holds that this great good of being of use can even justify God permitting natural evil like E1, for if a fawn is trapped and suffers terrible burns in a forest fire then other deer who witness this event will gain knowledge that they need to avoid the fire and will deter their offspring from being caught in it.41 Such animal suffering will also give animals and humans who know about it the chance to show compassion.42

In order for Swinburne’s theodicy to be successful however, he still needs to show (a) that God has the right to allow evil to occur and (d) that the good which these bad states make possible are better than the suffering endured. In response to the former issue, Swinburne argues that God does have the right to allow humans and animals to suffer so long as the periods of suffering are not too long or too bad.43 He compares God to a carer who has obligations to make decisions for someone who depends on them, and this is like the relationship between us and God.44 Since we are competent however, we should have some choice over whether we accept or reject the life which God has given us, but Swinburne argues that we have got this choice, because we are able to commit suicide.45 He then adds that God does not allow us to suffer for too long as we only live for a certain number of years and are limited in the amount we can suffer by our physiology.46

46 Swinburne, “The Problem of Evil,” pp. 89, 90 The final condition Swinburne has to satisfy in order for his theodicy to be successful is (d), that the good which these bad states make possible are better than the suffering endured. 47 Although most of his opponents would even agree with him that evil is a necessary condition for the good states he lists, it is the amount of evil which causes the problem.48 Swinburne agrees that this is not an easy question for him to answer, but suggests that deep down most people value their existence as conscious beings despite the suffering that they endure.49 He mentions suicide again, arguing that people generally do not choose to do this because they have hope that things will improve or because they value their life.50

I agree with Rowe that these theodicies fail to justify God in permitting the most horrific evils such as E1 and E2. Swinburne and Hick both seem to take a very optimistic view of evil, seeing various good states which come from suffering such as developing into moral beings, or being responsible or of use to others. However, what they fail to take into account is the fact that evil can also have the opposite effect as well, where it breaks a man’s soul. Phillips does not find Swinburne’s theodicy satisfactory for this reason, showing how evil can easily lead to more evil, especially when we consider things such as forgiveness and remorse. Although these good states are only possible when evil is committed first, it nevertheless might give the offending human agent an appetite for more, or might cause the victim of the evil to seek revenge or be destroyed by the evil.51 This idea is shown convincingly when Phillips quotes W. Somerset Maugham, who saw evil first hand on hospital wards while a medical student:

There was a school of writers who enlarged upon the moral value of suffering...They claimed that it opened to the spirit new avenues of beauty and enables it to get into touch with the mystical kingdom of God...(but) I knew that suffering did not ennoble; it degraded. It made men selfish, mean, petty, and suspicious. It absorbed them in small things. It did not make them more than men; it made them less than men.52

As we have seen, Swinburne does attempt to show that God limits the amount of suffering one can endure on earth because humans only live for a certain amount of years and the amount of pain one can suffer is limited by their physiology.53 However, I agree with Phillips that this defence seems rather perverse. If a human looses consciousness because they are suffering so much pain or die as a result of their suffering, this suggests that God has produced too much suffering for them to bear.54 The same can also be said for the people who do decide to take their own life, go into depression or

51 D. Z. Phillips, “The Problem of Evil II,” p. 113

53 Swinburne, “The Problem of Evil,” p. 89

54 D. Z. Phillips, “The Problem of Evil II,” p. 112 turn to committing evil acts themselves because of it. Phillips describes God’s earth as a finishing school, where some people are indeed made better for the suffering in the world, while others are ruined by it:

God’s finishing school is one where everyone is finished in one sense or another. Either they are well finished, educated to maturity by their experience in the moral obstacle race, or they are finished off completely by it.55

As well as rejecting the ‘greater goods’ theodicy on the grounds that it destroys life as much as a theodicist claims it enhances our responsibility and personality, Phillips also argues that the most appalling acts of evil could never be used to justify a good state of affairs, no matter how great it might be. He holds for instance that the killing of innocent people can never be justified on these grounds because this action would be more evil than the good state of affairs it brings.56 This is especially the case because such a decision to murder those innocent people would be premeditated, which is obviously a lot worse than murder committed on the spare of the moment in a burst of anger.57 Phillips explains that we do not consider the former type of murder worse because it caused the victim to suffer any more or less than he would have done if he was murdered in a state of anger, but simply because when murder is reasoned over, thought about and then justified, it takes on its vilest forms.58 And Phillips says that the same can be said of a God who allows a child to die of cancer:

If this has been done by anyone, it is bad enough, but to be done for a purpose, to be planned for eternity – that is the deepest evil. If God is this kind of agent, He cannot justify His actions, and His evil nature is revealed.59

I find Phillips’s objection to the greater good’s defence extremely convincing, and therefore agree with him and Rowe that there are no good state of affairs we know of which would justify an omnipotent, omniscient being’s permitting E1 or E2.60

The Soul making theodicy

One particularly convincing theodicy, known as the Soul making theodicy, comes from John Hick and offers one of the best examples of a greater good. The grounds for Hick’s theodicy are found in the Bible which does not shy away from the excessive amounts of evil in the world such as cruelty, torture, violence, hunger and disease.61 In fact, Hick argues that even God suffered evil as Jesus, God

56 Phillips, The Concept of Prayer, p. 92

61 John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, (Collins, 1968) p. 279 incarnate, was executed which must be the worst evil which could ever be conceived. However, even this evil, paradoxically, is one of the greatest examples of goodness known in Christianity.62

Hick begins by following the work of Hume who asks if God could have intervened into the workings of nature to create a world that was free of pain and suffering. Hick acknowledges that the answer to this question is of course yes, because God is omnipotent and can do anything.63 However Hick asks us to imagine what life would be like if God did create a world free of evil and then comes to a conclusion on whether this would be better than the world God has created, because Hick does not believe that it would.

Hick argues that a world with no evil would first and foremost have dire consequences for a man’s status as a moral being. This is because it would be impossible for us to ever do anything wrong, as no bad action or piece of ill judgement would ever have any harmful consequences.64 Hick gives various examples to demonstrate this such as the thief who stole a million pounds which then reappeared from nowhere back into the robbed safe, the man who tried to murder but had his bullet melt into thin air, and the knife blade which turned to paper when somebody attempted to attack someone else.65 Hick argues that when we contemplate such a world, we begin to see that it would not have any purpose or value.

The next point which Hick makes is that if it were no longer possible to commit a morally wrong action, then it would be impossible to commit a morally right action as well. This is because nobody would ever be able to benefit anyone else in a world where humans do not experience deprivation. 66 Hick therefore lists quite a few virtues which would become completely useless in a world like this such as self-sacrifice, courage, perseverance, skill, and honesty.67 But by far the most important virtue which would be lost in a world without evil would be love. Hick argues that the deepest form of love is that between a man and a woman which, although always encompassing a romantic element to it, develops into a much deeper love than this, where two people face the task of creating a life and family together and bear each other’s burdens throughout their life.68 Hick holds that this deep love is developed and expressed most fully when humans experience periods in their life which are difficult, and therefore he fails to see how this most valuable form of love could develop unless in a world very similar to our own.69 According to Hick then, evil is totally necessary for the existence of various good states of affairs:

69 John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, (Collins, 1968) pp. 361, 362 We have seen that, from our human point of view, this is a world with rough edges, a place in which man can live only by the sweat of his brow, and which continually presents him with challenges, uncertainties, and dangers; and yet that just these features of the world seem, paradoxically, to underlie the emergence of virtually the whole range of the more valuable human characteristics.70

A difficulty with Hick’s argument is the amount of evil in the world. Although some bad states of affairs are clearly needed to create the greater goods which Hick is talking about, it still does not explain why God would need to permit E1 and E2.

Chapter three of my dissertation:

In the last chapter of my dissertation I outlined the first objection one might have against William Rowe: that P is incorrect and there are good states of affairs which we know of which would justify God permitting evil. However, I have rejected this claim on the grounds of morality and the amount of evil in the world. In this next chapter, I shall turn to the second objection one might have against Rowe; where although the truth of P is accepted, the idea that this leads to the judgement Q is rejected, for although there are no good states of affairs which we know about that would justify an omnipotent, omniscient being permitting E1 and E2, it does not follow from this that there are no good states of affairs, as there may be some which we simply do not know about. In fact, Wykstra believes it is perfectly reasonable to hold such a view given what we know about God and as human agents with limited wisdom and understanding.

As we have seen, after Rowe has accepted the truth of P, he then argues that Q is also correct because we are justified in making judgements about the unknown based on what we do know. 71 Rowe uses the example of pit bulls: if every pit bull he encounters is vicious, then Rowe holds that this is strong evidence to suggest all pit bulls are vicious. And similarly, in the same way that we can see no greater good which would justify O permitting E1 and E2, it follows that this gives us strong evidence to believe that there are no greater goods at all which would justify O permitting E1 and E2.72 Wykstra argues that Rowe is using here a ‘seems so, is so’ argument, or what Swinburne calls ‘the Principle of Credulity.’73 This principle states that if someone believes something to be true (such as witnessing a miracle), this belief itself is a priori evidence of the truth of that belief, and therefore we should accept it as being true.74 It is only if we have counter evidence to think otherwise that we should not take the belief to be true, such as if we were knowingly under the influence of a hallucinogen when we witnessed the miracle for example.75 Swinburne holds

70 John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, (Collins, 1968) p. 362, 363

73 Wykstra, “The Human Obstacle to Evidential Arguments From Suffering,” p. 150

74 Nicola Möβner, Sebastian Schmoranzer, Christian Weidemann, Richard Swinburne: Christian Philosophy in a Modern World, (Ontos Verlag, 2009) p. 70

75 Nicola Möβner, Sebastian Schmoranzer, Christian Weidemann, Richard Swinburne: Christian Philosophy in a Modern World, (Ontos Verlag, 2009) p. 70 therefore that if we see a table in a room, then there probably is a table in the room, and in the same way, if Rowe has encountered only vicious pit bulls, then he is indeed justified to believe that they are all vicious.

However, Swinburne’s Principle of Credulity makes a distinction between ‘how things seem to be’ and ‘how things seem not to be,’ and therefore the principle does not hold in the same way for things which we cannot see or do not know.76 In order to say that there is probably no table in a room, it is not enough to simply say that it seems there is no table in the room.77 Instead, we need more evidence to make a negative claim, such as having reasons to believe that if there were a table in the room, we would have seen it.78 Although Wykstra criticises this distinction because often a positive or negative claim is only so because of how it is formulated (for example, the negative claim ‘there is no table in the room’ might be made into a positive claim by instead stating that the room is bare of empty), he nevertheless believes it holds a sound intuition about ‘does not appear claims.’79 Wykstra gives an example of such a situation in order to show why we can’t move from ‘it seems no table is present’ to ‘probably no table is present’:

Searching for a table, you look through a doorway. The room is very large – say, the size of a Concorde hanger – and it is filled with bulldozers, dead elephants, Toyotas, and other vision-obstructing objects. Surveying this clutter from the doorway, and seeing no table, should you say: ‘It does not appear that there is a table in the room’?80

Obviously in this situation anyone who lacked Superman’s x-ray vision would be unable to see the table in question, and therefore we cannot make a judgement that there is no table in the room. 81 Using such a principle then Rowe is unable to make the negative claim that there are no greater goods which would justify O permitting E1 and E2 simply because we can see no reasons.

After looking at the strengths and weaknesses of Swinburne’s Principle of Credulity, Wykstra then forms his own Principle which he calls CORNEA (the Condition of Reasonable Epistemic Access). This allows someone to decide whether they are entitled to claim that something appears a certain way based on the situation which might lead to this conclusion.82 Wykstra defines it as the following:

On the basis of cognized situation s, human H is entitled to claim ‘It appears that p’ only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, given her cognitive faculties and the use she has

81 Wykstra, “The Human Obstacle to Evidential Arguments From Suffering,” pp. 151, 152

82 Wykstra, “The Human Obstacle to Evidential Arguments From Suffering,” p. 152 made of them, if p were not the case, s would likely be different than it is in some way discernable by her.83

Although CORNEA is similar to Swinburne’s Principle of Credulity, it differs in what it demands of the person making the judgement. As well as believing something to be true and having the sensory experience which gives us evidence for this belief, Wykstra’s Principle of CORNEA also adds that there must be an evidential connection between what we are inclined to believe and the situation which leads us to come to this conclusion.84 For example, using Swinburne’s Principle of Credulity alone, a man who knows that he cannot form reliable beliefs following psychoanalysis because of traumatic experiences in his youth, would still be justified in believing that a woman he is conversing with hates him because she is not smiling.85 However, when we include the third requirement of CORNEA, the man is forced to take into account that he cannot form reliable beliefs and therefore cannot claim that the woman hates him based on the fact that she is not constantly smiling.86

Wykstra believes that if the principle of CORNEA is correct then it can be used to show that even though we may not see a greater good which would justify God permitting evil, this does not mean that there is not one. He turns again to Rowe’s example of the suffering fawn (E1), the evil of which Rowe claims serves no purpose and therefore leads him to conclude that there is no greater good. 87 However, Wykstra argues that CORNEA forces us to ask how likely it would be that we would know the greater good if there was one.88 To start with, Wykstra states that if God created us and therefore has much more wisdom and understanding than we do, then we might guess that comparing his wisdom to ours is like comparing a human adult to a one-month old baby.89 It follows that if there were some greater good’s then we would know some of them rather like a baby might understand something about its mother. However, Wykstra does not believe that we could possibly understand all the good states of affairs which would justify God permitting E1 and E2 because our knowledge is so limited:

If outweighing goods of the sort at issue exist in connection with instances of suffering, that we should discern most of them seems about as likely as that a one-month old should discern most of his parents’ purposes for those pains they allow him to suffer – which is to say, it is not likely at all.90

Finally, Wykstra argues that the existence of a theist God would actually enhance the credibility of this idea because when we think about the sort of being theism proposes, it is

84 Wykstra, “The Human Obstacle to Evidential Arguments From Suffering,” pp. 152, 153

90 Wykstra, “The Human Obstacle to Evidential Arguments From Suffering,” pp. 155, 156 acceptable that the greater goods which justify suffering would be beyond our ken given what we know of our cognitive limits.91

There are a number of reasons why someone might object to Wykstra’s argument, and I believe it is somewhat unsatisfactory because it fails to come to any tangible conclusions about God. Therefore I shall now examine the work of Marilyn McCord Adams who as well as agreeing with Wykstra that we do not know the reasons why God permits evil on earth, goes on to argue something more; namely that God’s love and divine intimacy can cancel out the evil and the need for the creature to ever know why.

A similar argument, more specifically against the case for atheism put forward by William Rowe, comes from Howard-Snyder and Bergmann, who take a similar position to Wykstra. They too agree that there is no greater good that we know of which would justify God permitting E1 and E2, because nothing we can comprehend is great enough to outweigh the badness of their suffering.92 However, they hold that Rowe is wrong to assume that this means there is no greater good at all, because we are unlikely to know of the greater goods if there were any.

Howard-Snyder and Bergmann first of all argue that Rowe’s case for atheism is relying on what they call a ‘noseeum argument,’ so named because they suggest that if you are unable to see something, it is not there:

1) So far as we can tell (detect), there is no

2) So it is more likely than not (perhaps significantly so) that there is no .93

Howard-Snyder and Bergmann agree that in some situations it is perfectly reasonable to come to such a conclusion. For example, if one was looking carefully in a refrigerator and could not find a carton of milk, then it is justified to suppose that there is not one.94 However, this argument is not justified in other situations, such as if someone was using the noseeum argument to deny the existence of extraterrestrial life.95 Although we have never detected any other life forms or any signals and codes from other galaxies, it is not reasonable to conclude that there are not any because we do not have the cognitive ability to make such a judgement.96

When we examine the noseeum arguments for evil, Howard-Snyder and Bergmann believe the same applies. Rowe makes the assumption in his writing that it is more than likely that we would detect a reason that would justify God permitting E1 and E2 if there was one.97 However, there are several

92 Howard-Snyder and Bergmann, “Evil Does Not Make Atheism More Reasonable than Theism,” p. 17

97 Howard-Snyder and Bergmann, “Evil Does Not Make Atheism More Reasonable than Theism,” p. 18 reasons why the authors believe this assumption is incorrect. First of all, God is mysterious and remains something which is largely unknown to us, meaning it is unreasonable to believe we would understand reasons why he permitted E1 and E2 if there were any.98 Second, when we examine history it is clear that our knowledge has progressed and will therefore continue to progress. If this is the case then we have to accept that there are many things we are currently ignorant of. 99

Although I agree with the above arguments that we would not know the greater goods if there were any, this simply does not seem good enough alone to defeat Rowe’s case for atheism, and again I believe this is because such a ‘beyond our ken’ argument still seems rather perverse. Phillips uses the example of a child dying from inoperable throat cancer, and explains that if there are reasons why this has to occur, then the father of that child would want to know what they are. He therefore argues: “It seems perverse to say in face of this, ‘you are not supposed to ask’.”100 Rowe also holds that since Howard-Snyder and Bergmann believe that we do not know the good states that justifies God permitting all the evil in this world, then this would apply to any amount of evil whatever, including if our life was no more than a series of agonising moments from the moment we were born to the moment we died.101 Rather than simply tackling Rowe’s argument head on then, these ‘beyond our ken’ arguments can seem nothing more than a way of theists attempting to avoid the problem of evil.

Another problem with the argument brought forward by Howard-Snyder and Bergmann which Rowe highlights is that although they are correct to infer that the noseeum argument is often flawed, especially in the case of someone using it to argue that extraterrestrials do not exist, there is a big difference between this use of the argument and his own, for although extraterrestrials may not care enough about us to want to communicate, the same cannot be said of God who obviously would know of our existence, loves and cares for us, and is able to prevent horrendous evils such as E1 and E2.102

Adams begins by examining horrendous evils, agreeing that these are what pose the real problem when we consider the existence of God.103 There are various examples of horrendous evils which Adams lists, including a woman who is raped and then has her arms axed off, psychological torture which aims to destroy someone’s personality, cannibalizing one’s own offspring and accidently killing someone you love the most.104 I believe Rowe’s E1 and E2 could also be added to this list. Adams explains that these examples of evil pose a problem because most people would agree that someone doing or suffering them would not have positive meaning in their lives.105

98 Howard-Snyder and Bergmann, “Evil Does Not Make Atheism More Reasonable than Theism,” pp. 18, 19

101 Rowe, “Reply to Howard-Snyder and Bergmann,” p. 26

102 Rowe, “Reply to Howard-Snyder and Bergmann,” p. 25

103 Adams, “Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God,” p. 211

104 Adams, “Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God,” pp. 211, 212 Adams agrees with the conclusion I have already reached that the standard theodicies which attempt to solve the problem of evil are: “powerless in the face of horrendous evils.”106 She gives the example of something Swinburne has mentioned, that God might justify the evil because it allows us to create ‘the best of all possible worlds’.107 However, Adams does not believe the traditional theodicies succeed because the instances of evil listed above could never be justified for any reason. Even if horrendous evils were necessary to create perfect world orders or moral goodness, the price God pays for these good states of affairs would be too great:

Could the truck-driver who accidently runs over his beloved child find consolation in the idea that this middle-known but unintended side-affect was part of the price God accepted for a world with the best balance of moral good over moral evil he could get?108

However, despite this, Adams does not think belief in God is irrational. Since the standard theodicies fail, Adams says that we do not know the actual reasons that God has for permitting the evil, and in fact we cannot even conceive any reason why the most horrific evils would occur.109 And our inability to understand these reasons could take three forms. The first are reasons we do have the capacity to understand, but are not informed of them. The second are reasons we would be able to understand if we simply had a larger memory or attention span, and the third are reasons which we are not cognitively, emotionally, or spiritually equipped to grasp, such as the way a two year old cannot understand its mothers reasons for taking it to have painful heart surgery in order to save the toddlers life.110 Adams says that she believes it is the third type of ignorance which explains the reasons why we cannot understand the greater goods.

However, unlike Wykstra’s argument which did not seem to lead to any conclusions about evil other than our inability to understand God’s reasons, Adams does not believe this is enough, and wants to argue that God’s love and divine intimacy with his creatures is great enough to defeat the evil and the need for creatures to understand why it occurs.111 In the same way that the two-year-old heart patient knows that its mother loves him from the way she offers him care and her presence during his ordeal, so too does God love us while we suffer.112 In fact, God’s goodness is so good that face-to-face intimacy with him is enough to engulf even the most horrendous evils, and would overcome any reasons the individual might have for

109 Adams, “Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God,” pp. 215, 216

110 Adams, “Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God,” pp. 216, 217

112 Adams, “Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God,” p. 217 thinking that his/her life was not worth living.113 Adams explores ways this could occur, coming to the conclusion that suffering on earth might be an expression of God’s character. This idea formed by Rudolf Otto holds that on earth human response to divine presence is dread and fear, and in the same way so is suffering. But in the divine life when an intimate relationship with God is good for us, a vision of him including horrendous suffering would also be good.114

Adams concludes therefore that if we take this approach, Christians do not need to worry about the fact we will never understand the suffering we endure, particularly if we participate in horrendous evils because as Adams explains: “by contrast with the best of earthly mothers, such divine intimacy is an incommensurate good and would cancel out for the creature any need to know why.”115

Chapter four of my dissertation:

As I have shown throughout my essay, there are various ways of arguing that Rowe’s objection to the greater good’s defence is incorrect. In the first chapter I outlined and then rejected the idea that one might reject P and argue that we can see the good states of affairs which would justify God permitting evil. In the second chapter I demonstrated that one might accept P but reject Q, because simply because we cannot see the good states does not lead to the conclusion that there are not any. I shall now outline the final way one might defeat Rowe’s argument, where one accepts the truth of P and agrees that we cannot see any good states of affairs which would justify an omnipotent, omniscient being in permitting E1 and E2. They would then also accept the truth of Q and agree that therefore there are no good states of affairs which would justify an omnipotent and omniscient being permitting E1 and E2. But despite this, R could still be rejected on the grounds that simply because there are no good states of affairs which would justify O permitting evil does not mean that there is no God. Someone who I believe takes this stance is Brian Davies who holds that God is not a moral agent, and therefore it is not necessary for there to be any ‘greater good’s’ in order for him to exist.

Arguing that God is not morally good initially sounds like the recently developed Protest theodicy developed by John Roth and Jewish theologians Richard Rubenstein and Arthur Cohen. 116 This theodicy studies the immense amount of tragedy, injustice and murder in the world and questions the notion that God is love, coming to the conclusion that God cannot be all good in light of such evil.117 Many believers would hold that such a theodicy is blasphemous as it goes against biblical teaching that God is all good. However, Davies’ objection is different, as rather than questioning the overall goodness of God, he simply examines the nature of this goodness, asking us what we mean

116 Daniel Migliore, Faith Seeking Understanding: An Introduction to Christian Theology, second edition (William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, Michigan/Cambridge, 2004) p. 128

117 Daniel Migliore, Faith Seeking Understanding, pp. 128, 129 when we say ‘God is good.’118 In order to form any conclusions about whether God is morally good, Davies stresses the importance of first understanding what God is, for in the same way that a scientist would not tell us something without studying it carefully first, the same can be said about studying God before we turn to the problem of evil.119 After he has developed a philosophical argument against God’s moral goodness based on what we know about God, Davies then argues that there is support for such an idea in the Bible, and finally tries to demonstrate that God does not have any duties or obligations towards humans which completes his argument.

Because inferring what God is can be extremely complicated, Davies believes that the easiest way to study God is by ruling out what God is not.120 And when we consider the fact that God created the universe, there are quite a lot of things which we can say cannot be true of God. For example, Davies does not believe that God is something the individuality of which can be distinguished from its nature. Taking the example of human beings, we can have natures because we are of a certain kind, but at the same time we are also individuals. So, although we might say that someone is human, we wouldn’t actually say that someone was human kind, for if we die other humans will still continue to have human nature.121 Since the same cannot be said of God, Davies argues that God cannot belong to any ‘kind’ and similarly cannot be said to have a body, for if this was true then God would be part of the material world and not its creator.122 Davies also argues that since God is uncaused, his essence and existence is one and the same thing, and finally states that God is not capable of going through real change.123 This is because if God causes everything to exist other than himself and therefore is responsible for the change in things which he has created, then he cannot himself be something which changes in any way.124

Another really important aspect of God which Davies wants to consider is whether God intervenes in his creation. This idea is a common belief in Christianity, since it is widely believed that miracles are caused by God intervening in the world.125 However, Davies believes this idea is an extremely odd one, arguing that it is only possible for something to intervene into a situation if it was previously absent from that situation. But if God created the universe then he is present in everything at all times and therefore it does not make sense to say that he can intervene in things.126 Davies knows that such thought about God would cause a problem for theists who believed in miracles. But if the

118 Davies, An Introduction to the Philosophy of religion, p. 47

119 Brian Davies, The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil (Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006) p. 27

120 Brian Davies, The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil, p. 62

122 Brian Davies, The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil, pp. 62, 65

126 Brian Davies, The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil, p. 75 above is correct in that God is already present in everything at all times, then although God is the cause of a miracle, it is not intervention because he is already the cause of it.127

In conclusion then, Davies summarises his argument here as follows, coming to the conclusion that God is ‘seriously odd’ and incomprehensible:128

(a) God is the source of the existence of absolutely everything other than himself.

(b) God is not an item in the universe.

(c) God acts in or on what is not divine not as something external but as a source of existence.

(d) God is not something the nature of which can be distinguished from the individual that it is.

(e) God’s nature is to exist (or, God exists by nature).

(f) God does not undergo (and cannot undergo) any real change.129

It is only after this study of God that Davies turns to the problem of evil, and argues that the above leads him to conclude that God is not a moral agent. If it is wrong to think that God exists among others, then it is impossible to see how someone who does not live in the world would be able to perform good and bad actions in it.130 Davies tries to clarify this by using the example of his cat Smokey, who can be compared to other things and whose good or bad character can be considered. However, if what Davies has said above is true, then the same cannot be said about God:

There can be no laying hands on the source of the universe’s being, and no way of comparing and contrasting it with other things on which hands can be laid...And if there is time only because there is a universe in which things change, God makes no progress and has no character...what sense can it make to talk of how well or badly God is doing?131

One obvious problem with this view is the fact that most theists believe that God is morally good and Davies’ philosophical understanding of God’s goodness still seems unbiblical.132 William Rowe for example clearly believes that God is morally good or else he would see no problem in an omnipotent, omniscient being permitting E1 and E2 despite the fact he cannot see any greater good that justifies it. Rowe states: “God’s moral goodness has long been thought to be in some way the source or standard of what it is for human life to be moral.”133

133 Brian Davies, The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil, p. 85 In response to this, Davies examines the biblical evidence suggesting that God is good, coming to the conclusion that it actually supports his claim rather than defeats it.

Many theists believe that God holds the cardinal virtues defined by Aristotle including prudence, temperateness, courage and justice.134 Davies admits that the latter of these qualities is certainly attributed to God, for the Bible frequently says that God is righteous. However, Davies denies that God being just is implying that he is a moral agent.135 For although Christians may claim that God is just, they do not mean by this that God gives others what he owes them. Davies holds that such an idea is senseless because God created creatures and therefore cannot receive gain from them and then return it.136 This idea is found at the heart of the Old Testament where the notion of God’s righteousness simply implies that God is being faithful to the covenant God made between himself and the people of Israel.137 A similar thought about righteousness is also found in the New Testament where Paul explains that God being righteous does not imply that he has to conform to certain standards.138 Rather, it is about dealing with God on the basis of what he does.139

So what about other biblical evidence which directly suggesting that God is good? To begin with, Davies argues that the Bible does not proclaim that God is good as much as one might think. The idea occurs occasionally in the Psalms, but again Davies holds that it is only implying that God is being faithful in terms of the covenant.140 And there are only two verses in the New Testament where it is written that God is good; Mark 10:18 and Luke 18:19. Both of these verses document the words of Jesus, who upon being called a ‘good teacher’ replied: “Why do you call me good? No one is good but God alone.”141 This suggests that God’s goodness is not an earthly goodness, and Davies argues that it does not seem to be attributed to God because he has fulfilled any moral obligations. Therefore, this idea that God is morally good is really only developed in post-biblical theology and philosophy.142

The final thing Davies does to try and show that God is not morally good is demonstrate that he has no obligations to treat humankind in a certain way. Humans have obligations for two reasons; either because we are bound to obey laws or because they arise due to the context of the situations we find ourselves in. However, the same does not apply for God. In the first instance, God cannot be bound by laws telling him to do anything because God is the maker of

138 Romans 9:1-30 New Revised Standard Version

141 Mark 10:18, New Revised Standard Version

142 Brian Davies, The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil, p. 101 everything apart from himself.143 Davies outlines two objections to this. To start with, one might argue that God is bound by the laws of logic and therefore also knows that there are some moral actions which he should refrain from doing. Davies responds by explaining that God is not bound by logic in the way we would understand it, such as being bound by a command.144 The second objection to this is that God is governed by the same moral laws which bind all of us such as the obligation not to murder innocent people. However, Davies defeats this objection too by showing that God is so other worldly that we cannot really make such a judgement. As well as this, it makes no sense to say that God has an obligation not to murder innocent people when murders committed on earth would not have occurred unless God somehow willed them to happen.145

The second reason why human beings have obligations and duties is because they arise ‘as part of a definitive, describable context,’ the same of which cannot be said for God.146 For example, a nurse has duties in light of doctors, death, patients, hospitals and drugs and a parent has obligations in light of children, society and family background.147 Therefore, Davis believes that it does not really make sense to suggest that God has obligations when there is no context in which he can be said to have them. Rather, Davies believes that God is the cause of duties and obligations because as a creator, he is responsible for the situations in which people find themselves.148 Someone might respond to this argument by pointing out that because God fathered us, there are certain ways in which he is bound to act towards human kind in the same way that you have obligations if you have a child.149 But Davis believes this argument would simply miss the point because God would never be able to fulfil such obligations towards his creatures. The only way he would be able to have any control over them would be by willing the existence of things, but Davies does not believe he could be obliged to do this.150

150 Davies, An Introduction to the Philosophy of religion, pp. 52, 53