Chapter 4 the Checks and Balances of a Fragmented Public Security System
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Q.A.M. Eijkman, We Are Here to Serve You! Public Security, Police Reform and Human Rights Implementation in Costa Rica CHAPTER 4 THE CHECKS AND BALANCES OF A FRAGMENTED PUBLIC SECURITY SYSTEM 4.1 INTRODUCTION During an interview on the role of public security in politics, a political scientist reflected on the traditional and contemporary checks and balances of the Costa Rican public security system: In theory, in 2006 the clientelist system ends and this will give more autonomy to the police. How it used to work was that posts at the Ministry (of Public Security) and within the police were distributed among political parties, to their supporters. This mechanism was a legacy of the civil war of 1948. It was the manner in which the triumphants maintained control. The post-1948 police was more, it was in command over legitimate force in society. Today the police are more autonomous, there are police officers with established positions and mechanisms, like a system of merits, contests, training and police experience, etc. It is very clear to the police that they should not intervene with politics. Before, there was always the fear of police autonomy. With the 1994 Police Code, the two political parties (PLN and PUSC) allowed a significant advancement and this created police autonomy, not political, but in police (operational) actions. (Constantino Urcuyo Fournier).1 In this quotation the development of public security and modern policing in Costa Rica is outlined. Throughout the 20th century, checks and balances within the public security system prevented the Ministry of Public Security and the police from becoming powerful political actors. Since the end of the civil war the government had controlled the police through political clientelism, whereas drastic public security and police reform implemented in the early 1990s created new checks and balances. Similar to the past, the goal was to prevent the police from becoming involved in Costa Rican politics. They continued to be the state agency in charge of exercising legitimate control over violence in society; yet their professional operational autonomy was no longer considered as a socio-political threat. In contrast to most other Latin American states, Costa Rica does not have an army; therefore, since the last civil war its police forces alone have been responsible for law enforcement, the maintenance of social order and national security. This apparent absence of militarismo influenced the institutional framework of public security. Historically civil-political control was exercised centrally. Fragmentation characterised 1 Male, Political Scientist at CIAPA, former PUSC Member of Parliament, former presidential advisor, Interview, 17 November 2004. 79 Q.A.M. Eijkman, We Are Here to Serve You! Public Security, Police Reform and Human Rights Implementation in Costa Rica Chapter 4 the structure of the public security system. With the new Police Code in 1994 this slowly but surely changed. Public security and policing have increasingly become a socio-political concern. Widespread public security and police reform influenced the development of public security, the police, societal perceptions and the context in which PHRS are implemented. Before discussing the Costa Rican approach to law enforcement, the roots of the contemporary public security system and especially the preventive police are reviewed. This historical overview provides a background for understanding the motives for public security and police reform. The process of implementing police professionalisation in terms of recruitment, selection and training is addressed exten- sively in the following chapter. After introducing the institutional framework, societal impressions of the police and impediments to public security and police reform in Costa Rica are outlined. 4.2 THE HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC SECURITY SYSTEM Modern policing in Costa Rica developed according to the post-civil war security situation. After 1949 the state abolished the army and reorganised its public security system. It thereby diminished the possibility of the ministers in charge of security or the police from becoming powerful political actors. Basically by abolishing the army, the government reformulated the national political vision on security. Consequently, in the 1949 Constitution the police became the state agency through which the state exercised legitimate internal and external control over violence (art. 12 Constitution). As discussed in the last chapter, Costa Rica did not really develop an integral vision on national or public security and this also affected policing. Out of fear of concentrat- ing legitimate power to use force, Costa Rica, like other Latin American countries, did not develop a coherent public security system (Rico, 1997). Instead, different security actors existed simultaneously. The Costa Rican police model was, and to some extent still is, characterised by division and differentiation. In order to protect the rule of law and prevent authoritarianism, the state dispersed legitimate power to use force. Each minister carried responsibility for its own security agency. During the 1950s and 1960s, five ministers were in charge of seven police agencies (Urcuyo, 1986).2 This diversification of police discretionary powers led to the fragmentation of public security institutions. Within the Costa Rican public security system there were several overlaps. Each police agency, for example, had its own mandate. Yet there was no legal basis for this fragmented institutional organisation 2 The Minister of Public Security was responsible for the Guardia Civil, the Immigration Police and the Detectives Unit, the Minister of Government for the Guardia Rural, the Minister of Treasury for the Fiscal Guard and the Minister of Transport for the Traffic Police. In the 1960s a security agency was established under the Minister of the Presidency and in 1973 the Judicial Police was created to replace the Detective Unit, which had previously fallen under the Minister of Public Security (Høvik and Solveig, 1985: 362; Urcuyo, 1986). 80 Q.A.M. Eijkman, We Are Here to Serve You! Public Security, Police Reform and Human Rights Implementation in Costa Rica The Checks and Balances of a Fragmented Public Security System (Volio, 1985).3 Preventive policing, for example, was the responsibility of two separate police forces. As a former Minister of Justice explained: The universal thesis of Costa Rican politics was to maintain two separate ministries; the Interior/Government and Public Security. The interior police, the urban security force; the Guardia Civil, and the exterior police, the rural security force; the Guardia Rural. By having two police agencies public security was weakened. No minister was suffi- ciently powerful to have two police agencies. As a guarantee, to prevent this from happening, they were different bodies, with different names, different uniforms and different buildings. (Fabián Volio Echeverría).4 This differentiation between urban and rural policing influenced the development of Costa Rican preventive policing. Most visibly were the differences in the operational structure and territorial dispersion of each of the seven agencies in charge of public security. Police organisa- tions like the Guardia Civil were centrally structured (Urcuyo, 1986: 19).5 Others, such as the Judicial Police, enjoyed a semi-central and the Guardia Rural a decentral structure. This related to their functioning internally as well as external inter-institu- tional coordination. The amount of autonomy for police chiefs varied per police agency. Subsequently there were severe problems related to the operationalisation of policing.6 From an organisational perspective pressing concerns were the lack of labour stability, the duplication of functions, the lack of communication and coopera- tion, the multiple command structure and the high turn over of police personnel (Zamora, 1997; Biesanz et al., 1999; Høvik and Solveig, 1985). In general there was a lack of human, material and technical resources (Urucyo, 1991/1986).7 Furthermore, from a societal perspective police officers hardly enjoyed status. As this former Minister of Public Security made clear, ‘It was not looked upon as an important job..., always very badly paid, they did not have preparation, there was no sense of unity, solidarity like in the military or a more organised police force such the Chilean Carabineros’ (Laura Chinchilla Miranda).8 Thus, organisational and societal problems were aggravated by the absence of an espiritu de corps within public security agencies. 3 This is one of the reasons why a uniform Police Code was proposed in 1994 (Legislative Assembly, Comisión de Asuntos Agropecuarios y de Recursos Naturales, Comisión Especial nombrado para que investigue todo lo relacionada con la muerte de menor Wagner Alfonso Segura Brenes, expediente 10,943). 4 Male, Lawyer at Bufete Odio & Raven, Interview, 4 November 2004. 5 Costa Rica is a centrally organised state. 6 Like in the pre civil war army, where soldiers were replaced every four years, after every election new police officers were hired (Høvik and Solveig, 1985). 7 In the 1980s Costa Rica had approximately 8,000 to 9,000 police officers. For example, the Guardia Civil consisted in 1949 of 1,200 police officers; in 1969 of 1,800 police officers; in 1978 of 4,300 police officers; in 1985 of 3,566 police officers; and in 1997 of 4,360 police officers (Urcuyo, 1986: 10-11; Neuhold, 1985: 87-88). 8 Female, political scientist, PLN