MEMORANDUM of CONVERSATION with February 24, 1947

47.02.24 (842w)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH February 24, 1947 THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR1 Washington, D.C. Top Secret

The British Ambassador, accompanied by Mr. [Herbert M.] Sichel, First Secretary of the British Embassy, was received at their request by the Secretary this morning at 9 o’clock. The Ambassador informed the Secretary that, upon instructions from his Government, he had come to hand him the two aide memoires attached hereto, one relating to Greece and the other to Turkey.2 After reading the aide memoire relating to Greece, the Secretary stated that he realized that the matter treated in it was of the utmost urgency and importance, that it would be discussed at once with the President and the Chiefs of Staffs, and that he hoped that a reply could be made in the near future. After examining the aide memoire relating to Turkey, the Secretary stated that what he had said with regard to the first note also applied to the second; that the question of Turkey would also be given the urgent attention of the United States Government. He added that the problem with regard to Turkey seemed to be somewhat different, however, from the Greek problem. The Ambassador agreed, adding that the Greek problem was undoubtedly the more urgent of the two; nevertheless, it seemed wise to the 2

British Government that the problem of Turkey should not be neglected. The Secretary said that it was his understanding that the Russians had made no move with regard to Turkey for some time and asked if the Ambassador had any ideas regarding the reasons for the Russian silence. The Ambassador said that in his opinion no foreigner knows why Russia takes or fails to take certain actions. Therefore, as an honest man, he must admit that he is not in a position to explain what is responsible for the present Soviet attitude towards Turkey. He could make guesses, but his guesses would be of no more value than those of any other person. The Ambassador emphasized the fact that neither the Greek nor the Turkish Government had as yet been informed of the decision of Great Britain that it could no longer extend financial assistance to Greece and Turkey. He added that it probably would be disastrous to give such information to the Greeks or the Turks unless they could be informed at the same time that the United States Government had definite plans to aid them.3

NA/RG 59 (Central Decimal File, 868.00/2-2447)

1. This memorandum was written by Loy W. Henderson, director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

2. Political and economic conditions in Greece had been deteriorating rapidly since the year began. As a result of increasing communist guerrilla activity--supplied from Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria--internal economic chaos, and the government's inability to meet the crisis, Greece appeared to be on the verge of imminent collapse. Dean Acheson sent the secretary a memorandum (initially drafted by Henderson) entitled "Crisis and Imminent Possibility of Collapse in Greece" which asserted that only a national coalition government and substantial aid from the United States could save the country. (See Foreign Relations, 1947, 5: 29–31.) In his memoirs, Acheson implies that Marshall saw this memorandum before he left for New York City on the morning of February 21 and "instructed me to prepare the necessary steps for sending economic and military aid." (Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department [New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969], p. 217.) Rumors of impending British troop withdrawals had previously been reported by U.S. observers in Greece. After Marshall had departed on February 21, the British Embassy in Washington made an appointment for their ambassador, Lord Inverchapel, to see the secretary on Monday, February 24. Meanwhile, the embassy sent Loy Henderson two top secret aide- mémoire stating that Great Britain would end aid to Greece and Turkey at the end of March. (These documents are in Foreign Relations, 1947, 5: 32–37.) Acheson immediately ordered the department's staff to draft reports analyzing the situation and telephoned Marshall and President Truman about the British notes. Marshall read these reports prior to his meeting with Lord Inverchapel. (Acheson, Creation, pp. 217–18. See also Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks [February 21–June 5, 1947] [New York: Viking, 1955], pp. 3–8.)

3. Shortly after noon, Marshall met with President Truman, as he normally did prior to a Cabinet luncheon, and showed him the British notes. He also gave Truman a memorandum from Acheson regarding the notes that asserted that the British were "wholly sincere in this matter and that the situation is as critical as they state. This puts up the most major decision with which we have been faced since the war." (Acheson's memorandum is in Foreign Relations, 1947, 5: 44–45. See President Truman's brief account in Memoirs, vol. 2, Years of Trial and Hope [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1956], p. 100. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal and Secretary of War Robert Patterson also participated in the discussion.)

//QUESTION FROM MAME: Should the last sentence be outside the end parenthesis?//