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PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University Nijmegen The following full text is a publisher's version. For additional information about this publication click this link. http://hdl.handle.net/2066/179690 Please be advised that this information was generated on 2021-09-28 and may be subject to change. WINDOW ON THE NETHERLANDS MEDIATING POLICY COMPETITION THROUGH CAMPUS DEVELOPMENT IN DUTCH LIMBURG HENK-JAN KOOIJ Department of Human Geography, Institute for Management Research, Radboud University, PO Box 9108, 6500 HK Nijmegen, the Netherlands. E-mail: [email protected] Received: June 2015; accepted November 2016 ABSTRACT Over the past decades, governments have switched from a managerial to an entrepreneurial style of governance in the strengthening of certain places at the expense of others. This coevolved with an increase in inter-urban and inter-regional competition for resources, also called ‘policy competition’. The issue for regional governments is how they balance their wish to strengthen their economic structure, without creating conflicts of unfair competition in the designation of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. This paper addresses this balancing act in the Dutch Province of Limburg, where a multinational threatened to leave the region. The case is analysed with the help of actor-network-theory and follows the translations through which an innovative policy tool was constructed that allowed the Province to invest in real estate. Through the innovative ‘campus’ concept, the Province could comfort the vested interests of the multinational, while balancing out the interests of other economic cores in the region. Key words: policy competition, campus development, innovation campus, Dutch Limburg, regional economic policy, actor-network-theory INTRODUCTION prosperity within their region, but face chal- lenges to satisfy both the needs of local busi- How can regional governments strengthen nesses and of the EU rules on competition. their competitiveness without creating unfair Next to the formal EU rules of competition, competition? – One of the key questions for more informal and politically sensitive issues both national and regional governments is arise when specific companies benefit from how they can foster economic development in state measures to promote the competitiveness their jurisdiction, without violating the EU of regions (Bontje & Lawton 2013). rules for State Aid (Colomb & Santinha 2012). Theoretically, the debate has focused on This is even more pressing within areas facing the policy competition between governments economic decline, where any form of employ- in attracting resources from higher-tier gov- ment is carefully tended. While multinationals ernments within the context of the hollowing can shift employment to other regions, terri- out of the welfare state and, at the same tory bound governments are left with social time, a more entrepreneurial governance problems if no new employers appear. Against style (see Begg 1999; Malecki 2004; Jonas this relatively footloose situation of multina- et al. 2010; While et al. 2013; Addie 2015). tionals, territory bound governments develop The governance style of regional govern- strategies to maintain employment and thus ments has evolved from managerial to Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie – 2017, DOI:10.1111/tesg.12238, Vol. 00, No. 00, pp. 00–00. VC 2017 Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG 2 HENK-JAN KOOIJ entrepreneurial, focusing on fostering eco- public services such as Statistics Netherlands nomic growth within their territories (Harvey (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek), the Tax 1989). This new style co-evolved with an Administration (Belastingdienst) and Maas- increase in inter-urban and inter-regional tricht University (UM), its economic structure competition in the light of globalisation has been dominated by the chemical industry (Malecki 2004; Jonas et al. 2010). Cities in multinational the Dutch State Mines (DSM) growth regions such as Munich, Cambridge (Dohmen 2007; Elzerman & Bontje 2013; and Stockholm, struggle to shape a politics Jeannet & Schreuder 2015). that channels investments from state resour- This history of Limburg has fuelled the ces, at the expense of other less privileged need for economic development strategies regions (see While et al. 2013). Although through ‘cluster development’, which were encouraged by EU policies such as the Lis- launched through the ‘acceleration agenda’ bon Agenda of the 2000s, the implementa- of 2003, aimed at the strengthening of the tion of such an entrepreneurial style is ‘power clusters’ of ‘chemistry’, ‘health care & hardly straightforward, as conflicts arise from cure’, ‘agro-food/nutrition’ and ‘new energy’ ‘backing winners’ at the cost of other areas (Jacobs & Kooij 2013. These clusters mir- that equally deserve support (Begg 1999). In rored the economic cores of the province light of the recent modes of liberal thinking (i.e. DSM in Geleen, UM in Maastricht, on government spending, such an entrepre- Greenport in Venlo and Solland Solar in neurial stance is under pressure and inevita- Heerlen/Aachen on AVANTIS) and thus bal- bly leads to the support of some at the anced the interests of the economic cores. expense of others (While et al. 2013). The province’s policy was aimed at shaping While the debate has so far focused upon the right preconditions for these clusters more structural components of growth facili- through general provincial policies, for tation in terms of collective provision of example, mobility, labor market and educa- infrastructure, land and services (de Vor 2011; tion (Taskforce Versnellingsagenda 2005). Jonas et al. 2010; While et al. 2013; Addie However, in 2008, the Province developed 2015), the tactics of lower-tier governments in new policies for the development of specific policy competition remain underexplored. areas within these clusters, aimed at ‘campus This paper addresses this policy competition development’ (Jacobs & Kooij 2013), in which and the issues of regional governments and it prioritised the developments around DSM’s their balancing acts between unfair competi- Chemelot Campus in Geleen and around tion in general and binding multinationals to UM’s Health Science Campus in Maastricht, their region. Two important dimensions that above developments in Venlo and Heerlen. In shape these balancing acts are the economic contrast to the Province’s cluster policy context within the region, that is, what other between 2005 and 2008, two specific sites ben- firms or developments can claim resources efited from the province’s new policy. This from the region, and the dovetailing with paper focuses on this tension and analyses the broader policy discourses (Begg 1999; While policy development in the Province on a et al. 2013). Consequently, the research ques- micro-level to understand the issues involved tion is as follows: how can regional govern- with the balancing between unfair competi- ments strengthen their competitiveness tion and strengthening the competitiveness of through the facilitation of ‘winners’ without the region. It does so by focusing on the creating unfair competition? ‘translation’ and ‘net-working’ effects of the This research question is answered with the campus concept within the region of Lim- help of a case study on the Dutch Province of burg, with specific attention to the policy Limburg, a province in the south of the Neth- sphere of the Dutch Province of Limburg. erlands (see Figure 1). This region has faced serious economic and demographic decline Actor-network-theory as a way to understand since the end of the mining industry in 1973 the micro-politics and tactics in Limburg – (Elzerman & Bontje 2013). While some of the The mainstream literature on policy competi- pain has been remedied through bringing in tion is dedicated to comparative case studies VC 2017 Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG POLICY COMPETITION IN DUTCH LIMBURG 3 Wageningen Renkum Nijmegen Oss Schaijk Cuijk Den Bosch Boxmeer Tilburg Helmond Deurne Eindhoven HTC Greenport Venlo Eersel Dutch Province of Limburg Roermond Geleen Chemelot campus Kerkrade Heerlen Maastricht AVANTIS Health campus Aachen Legend Active campus development Past or dormant campus development Figure 1. Campuses and clusters in Dutch Limburg. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com] on a general level to equate collective provi- and issues of policy competition, but excludes sion competition in one region with another. detailed insights in the tactics and micro- This approach highlights the general patterns politics of policy competition. Therefore, this VC 2017 Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG 4 HENK-JAN KOOIJ paper uses the perspective of actor-network- In what follows, this paper analyses the theory (ANT), drawing upon the work of Cal- translation of the campus across the region lon (1986), Law (1992, 2008) and Latour using the four moments of translation, from (1986, 2005). This approach focuses on the a private initiative of DSM in 2003, towards relations between actors to understand the the public embrace of the campus in 2014 by entities that we encounter in our world, such the Province of Limburg as an important pol- as organisations, machines, knowledge, docu- icy tool. ments etc. In ANT, both things and ideas are conceived of as actors, hence, actor-network- CAMPUS DEVELOPMENT IN LIMBURG theory (Murdoch 2006; Hendrikx 2014). Central is the emergence and disintegration The issue: the withdrawal of DSM – In 2003, of relations between entities