School of Philosophy

Janet M. Levin School of Philosophy University of Southern California Los Angeles, CA 90089-0451 (213) 740-5170 e-mail: [email protected]

Areas of special interest

Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Psychology, Theory of Knowledge, Theory of Action, History of Empiricism

Education

M.I.T (PhD, Philosophy, 1980) University of Chicago (B.A., Philosophy, 1972)

Employment

Professor, USC, 2016-present Associate Professor, USC, 1987-2016 Assistant Professor, USC, 1980-87. Instructor, USC, 1979-80. Instructor, University of Pennsylvania, 1977-79.

Courses frequently taught

Philosophy of Mind, Theory of Knowledge, Theory of Action

Publications

Articles, book chapters, and longer critical reviews

‘Thinking About ‘Phenomenal States’ and Phenomenal Intentionality’ (to appear in a Festschrift for Brian Loar, A. Sullivan, ed.)

‘Materialism’ (forthcoming). Gennaro, R. (ed.). Routledge Handbook of Consciousness.

‘Representational Exhaustion’, (forthcoming). Pautz, A. and Stoljar, D. (eds.), Themes from Block.

‘Molyneux’s Question and the Amodality of Spatial Experience’ (2017, on-line version). Inquiry.

Critical discussion of Jeff Speaks: The Phenomenal and the Representational (2017). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. (DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12413)

‘Consciousness’ (2016). McLaughlin, B. (ed.). Macmillan Interdisciplinary Handbooks, Philosophy of Mind. Macmillan Press.

‘Reclaiming the Armchair’ (2015). Daly, C. (ed.) Palgrave Handbook on Philosophical Methods. Palgrave-Macmillan.

1 ‘Libet, Free Will, and Conscious Awareness’ (2015). Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3.1.

‘Armchair Methodology and Epistemological Naturalism’ (2013). Synthese, Volume 190, Issue 18, pp. 4117-4136

‘Do Conceivability Arguments Against Physicalism Beg the Question?’ (2012) Philosophical Topics Vol. 40, No. 2

“Tye’s Ptolemaic Revolution”, Critical Notice of M. Tye’s Consciousness Revisited (2012). Analytic Philosophy Vol. 53, Issue 1, March, pp: 98-117.

“Imaginability, Possibility, and Imaginative Resistance” (2011). Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 41, No. 3, September.

“Reconstruing Modal Intuitions” (2011). The Croatian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XI, No 31.

‘Levy on Neuroscience, Psychology, and Moral Intuitions’ (2011). in (on-line) AJOB Neuroscience, April.

“Experimental Philosophy”. (2009). Critical notice of anthology edited by J. Knobe and S. Nichols. Analysis Reviews, October.

“Taking Type-B Materialism Seriously” (2008). Mind and Language, Vol. 23, No. 4. September.

“Assertion, Practical Reason, and Pragmatic Theories of Knowledge” (2008). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

“Molyneux’s Question and the Individuation of Perceptual Concepts” (2008). Philosophical Studies (Vol. 139, No. 1/May 2008; online publication).

“Molyneux Meets Euthyphro: Does Cross-Modal Transfer Require Rational Transition?” (2008). The Croatian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 24.

“Nagel vs. Nagel on the Nature of Phenomenal Concepts”, (2007). RATIO XX 3.

“Can Modal Intuitions be Evidence for Essentialist Claims?”, (2007). Inquiry, Vol. 50, No. 3.

"What is a Phenomenal Concept?"(2007), in Alter, T., and Walter, S., Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge, OUP.

“Can Mental Images Provide Evidence for What is Possible?”, (2006). Anthropology and Philosophy, Vol. 7 (1-2).

“The Evidential Status of Philosophical Intuition” (2004). Philosophical Studies 121 Dec. 193-224.

“Is Conceptual Analysis Needed for the Reduction of Qualitative States?” (2002). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 64, No. 3..

“The Myth of Jones and the Return of Subjectivity” (2001). Mind and Language Vol. 16, no.2, April.

“Dispositional Theories of Color and the Claims of Common Sense” (2000). Philosophical Studies 100.

2 “Consciousness Disputed” (1997). (review article focusing on three books on consciousness), British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48,; pp. 91-107.

“Folk Psychology and the Simulationist Challenge” (1995). Acta Analytica 14.

"Analytic Functionalism and the Reduction of Phenomenal States" (1991). Philosophical Studies.

"Must Reasons be Rational?" (1988) Philosophy of Science.

"Physicalism and the Subjectivity of Secondary Qualities" (1987). Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

"Skepticism, Objectivity, and the Invulnerability of Knowledge" (1987) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

"Could Love be Like a Heatwave?: (1986). Physicalism and the Subjective Character of Experience", Philosophical Studies 49, March. Reprinted in Lycan, W.G. Mind and Cognition, Blackwell, 1990. Reprinted in The International Research Library of Philosophy, Ashgate, 1997. Reprinted in Heil, J. Philosophy of Mind.

"Functionalism and the Argument from Conceivability", (1985). Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Special Issue 11.

Encyclopedia entries:

"Functionalism", entry in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2004 (revised, 2009, 2013).

“Qualia”, entry in Routledge On-Line Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2009.

“Qualia”, entry in MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Sciences, 1999.

On-line publications:

Comments on E. Schwitzgebel’s ‘If Materialism is True, the United States is Probably Conscious’. (February, 2013). CO5 on-line conference, 2013.

Comments on Carruthers and Shier, ‘Dissolving the Hard Problem of Consciousness’ (February, 2012). CO4 on-line conference, 2012.

Book Reviews:

Polger, T. and Shapiro, L. The Multiple Realization Book. NDPR, December 2016.

Chudnoff, E. Intuition. Analysis Reviews (2015) doi: 10.1093/analys/anv067.

Weisberg, J. Consciousness. Teaching Philosophy (2015).

3 Gozzano, S. and Hill, C.S. New Perspectives on Type Identity. NDPR, September 2012.

Stueber, S. Rediscovering Empathy. NDPR, July 2007.

Nelkin, N. Consciousness and the Origins of Thought, Philosophical Review, October, 1998.

Clark, A. Sensory Qualities, Mind, July 1995.

Hacker, P.M.S. Appearance and Reality, Philosophical Review, Oct. 1990.

Heil, J. Perception and Cognition, Philosophical Review XCVI, July, 1987.

Woolhouse, R.S. Locke, Teaching Philosophy, 1985.

Wilson, E. The Mental as Physical; Philosophical Review XCI, April, 1982.

Work in progress:

‘The Phenomenal Concept Strategy and the Explanatory Gap’ (under review).

‘Color Experience as Partially Representational’ (under review).

The Armchair Near the Window, a manuscript on the role of “armchair” methods in philosophical inquiry, in progress.

Recent talks and presentations

‘Intuitions, Thought Experiments, and Philosophical Knowledge: An Unprincipled Approach’ Barcelona, SP, October 26.

‘Norms of Assertion in the Age of Twitter’. Oslo, Norway: Assertion: Foundational Issues. Sept. 2017.

Round table panelist, Grounding Sensible Qualities. Berkeley, May 26-27, 2017.

‘Color Experience as Partially Representational’. CaSE Workshop, NYU AbuDhabi. May 12-3, 2017.

‘Critic’s Commentary on Jeff Speaks’s The Phenomenal and the Representational, in Author Meets Critic session, APA, Central Division, March, 2017.

‘The scope (and limits) of the phenomenal concept strategy’ LOGOS (Barcelona) May 25, 2016.

‘Some Questions About Molyneux’s Question’. Perception Workshop, UCSD, February, 2016.

‘Libet, Free Will, and Conscious Awareness’. U. Michigan, Flint, October, 2014.

‘Is There a Hard Problem of Consciousness?’, keynote address at Philosophy Day, CSULB, May 2, 2014.

4 ‘The Phenomenal Concept Strategy and the Explanatory Gap’, Conference on Concepts and Consciousness, U. Mississippi, May 27-30, 2014.

‘Strong Representationalism, the Inverted Spectrum Problem, and the Puzzle of True Blue’ Colloquium, Claremont McKenna College, March 8, 2013).

‘Phenomenal Concepts, Cognitive Science, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness’. (Conference on concepts; Cognitive Science Program. Occidental College, March 2013).

‘Strong Representationalism and the Inverted Spectrum Problem’ (conference on color, Auburn University, March 2012).

Comments on S. Nishimura, ‘A Defense of Singular Intentionalism’ (APA Central Division, February, 2012).

‘Can the Phenomenal Concepts Strategy Stay the Course?’, conference on Materialism and Phenomenal Concepts, Tubingen, Germany, July, 2010.

“The Consolations of Experimental Philosophy’, UCI, March, 2010.

Recent departmental service

PPQ Editorial Committee, Chair (2008-17) Recruitment Committee (2008-17) Graduate Admissions Committee (2006-10, 2013, 2017) Graduate Exam Committees (2006-8) Undergraduate Studies Committee (2007-8)

Recent university service

Graduate Fellowship Awards Committee (2013-16) Undergraduate Awards Committee (2006-9) Co-chair, Arts and Humanities Panel, UCOC (2007-13)

Professional organizations and service

American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, Program Committee (2009-12) American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division Executive Committee (2005-8) Society for Philosophy and Psychology Hume Society Occasional referee, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Dialogos, MIND, Minds and Machines, NOUS, Philosophical Imprints, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophy and Psychology, Southern Journal of Philosophy, Synthese, Oxford University Press.

Outside Review Committee for Philosophy Department, Scripps College (2015)