Cite Alamo Renta Car and Southeastern Fidelity Insurance Company, Petitioners V. Loomis

Motion below; also, if they want a copy of the videotape and you do not want to produce them.

Cite Alamo Rent - A Car and Southeastern Fidelity Insurance Company, Petitioners v. Loomis

432 So2d 746, l983, 4th DCA:

Cites Dodson v. Persell, 390 So2d 704, (Fla 1980) which says: at 705:

We resolve conflict and hold l. surveillance movies and photographs are discoverable IF the materials will be used as evidence, either substantively or for impeachment if NOT used they are discoverable only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.

If party seeking discovery must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to observe te movie or photo before used as evidence

Work product involves thoughts and mental impressions of attorney in preparation for trial.

argue that docs and psychometricians are essentially under surveillance because you want to make sure they don=t give tests wrong, lead the patient to the answer, interfere with the patient getting the answer etc and it is not discoverable till after it is decided it would be used (ie after you depose the def. Doctor)

REMEMBER: have your videographer document the total time the DOCTOR not the psychometrician, is with the patient. Get the material on ASCII so it can be emailed and you can do a word search AND have the dvd have the time running the entire time so, if you find a place you want to go to, rather than in a vcr tape, you can go right to it.

which says that surveillance is work product because the attorney may choose where or what to tape, when to turn it off, if to call a court reporter or do it himself IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR HERNANDO COUNTY, FLORIDA

LUCY STASIO, CASE NO. H-27-CA-2002001001 Division: DM

Plaintiff,

STEPHEN MCMANAWAY and GAIL MCMANAWAY,

Defendants.

MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF=S ATTENDANCE AT COMPULSORY EXAMINATION

Comes now the Plaintiff, by and through her undersigned attorney, and files this Response To Motion To Compel Plaintiff=s Attendance at Compulsory Examination and would state as follows: 1. At no time has the Plaintiff refused to undergo a psychological examination by the Defense Expert, Dr. Susan Filskov, PhD. (Referenced to in

Defense motion as FilsCov) However, the plaintiff does object to the defense requiring the her to undergo evaluations by potentially two psychologists (Dr.

Filskov and Dr. Behner as both are both capable licensed and qualified to perform the same examination and there is no need for two such evaluations nor does the defense have the right to two such examinations) No reason for two examinations are set forth in any pleading and this burdensome request should be denied.

2. The issue surrounds the unreasonable, costly, and unnecessary requirements as set forth by the defense. Defense is demanding, in part:

A. That the Plaintiff refrain from taping any testing portion of the

exam, B. That the Plaintiff provide a copy of the transcript within l4 days of the

examination,

C. Although it is not specifically plead, it appears as though the defense

also objects to the tape recording of the entire examination by the

plaintiff=s counsel, including the testing portion of the exam, and

D. The affidavit from Dr. Filskov seeks to require the Plaintiff to pay Dr.

Filkskov $275.00 because she is being videotaped and require the

videographer to arrive 30 minutes earlier than the scheduled exam.

3. The Plaintiff will respond as follows:

A. Dr. Filskov alleges in her affidavit attached to the pleadings on number 5, that taping during the exam can affect validity of the testing and results of the testing and evaluation.

The Plaintiff includes affidavits from two different neuropsychologists who will agree to conduct such an examination in the presence of a videographer.

Therefore, there is no prejudice by permitting the defense=s examination to be videotaped even if Dr. Filskov refuses to permit the videotaping.

Dr. Filskov also demands extra money for permitting a videographer and there is no caselaw cited to support this demand. Furthermore, there is no proof whatsoever that this length of time is necessary to set up the equipment or requires the doctor =s presence in any way so as to document this extra charge.

If she claims the presence of a videographer or tape recording device is disturbing to her office, we will agree to have the examination conducted at the office of a court reporter. B. Item 15 in defendant=s motion claims that the APA code of ethics prohibits disclosure of test data. Actually, the APA requires the release of the raw data as discussed below.

First, the APA is not state or federal regulatory body, but simply a voluntary organization to which a psychologist may or may not choose to join. It has no regulatory or persuasive authority over this court or any other.

Additionally, nowhere in the code does it prohibit a doctor from releasing test data upon court order.

Furthermore, in fact, the APA code of ethics has been revised in 2003 to become HIPAA compliant and requires release of ALL raw data which, by definition, includes disclosure of test data. Test data includes test questions, many of which are written.

Federal HIPAA law supercedes state law and even the Florida

Administrative Code (now obsolete pursuant to HIPAA) does not preclude the doctor from releasing the raw data to the plaintiff. In fact, the Florida

Administrative Code, 64B19-19.005 (3)(2) See exhibit 1. It specifically states that the raw data must be released "when the release of the material is otherwise required by law." Fla. Admin. Code 64B19-19.005 (2002).

Pursuant to an attached Bulletin 98-001, Insurance Commissioner Bill

Nelson confirmed that, in fact, HIPAA supercedes conflicting state law. See exhibit 2. All Insurance Companies Authorized to Write Life and Health Insurance in Fl. And All Health Maintenance Organizations: Non-complying Health Insurance

Statues, Bulletin 98-001, Treasurer, available at

Http://www/fldfs.com/companies/Bulletins/98-001.htm (Jan. 7, 1998) Therefore, if the Florida Administrative Code is to be argued as to somehow preclude release of the raw data, since both the APA Code of Ethics requires it=s release, and new federal guidelines (HIPAA), the federal guidelines would take precedence over any Florida Code anyway, the argument tendered by the defendants has no merit.

A review of the APA Code of Ethics, as cited incorrectly by defense counsel, states as follows:

Rule 9.04 of the American Psychological Association Ethics Code 2002 states in relevant part:

(a) The term test data refers to raw and scaled scores, client/patient responses to test questions or stimuli, and psychologists' notes and recordings concerning client/patient statements and behavior during an examination. Those portions of test materials that include client/patient responses are included in the definition of test data. Pursuant to a client/patient release, psychologists provide test data to the client/patient or other persons identified in the release. Psychologists may refrain from releasing test data to protect a client/patient or others from substantial harm or misuse or misrepresentation of the data or the test, recognizing that in many instances release of confidential information under these circumstances is regulated by law. (See also Standard 9.11, Maintaining Test Security.) (emphasis supplied)

Therefore, the New APA code requires the release of raw data. A review of the

APA Fact Sheet for Neuropsychologists, reveals that the APA specifically states

(page 3)

"Under HIPAA regulations, patients generally now have access to their records, including neuropsychological reports, tests responses and raw data. This is regardless of the referral party (e.g. IME, Worker=s Compensation) or reason for referral." See exhibit 3. Am. Psychological Ass=n, Ethical Principles of

Psychologists and Code of Conduct, Assessment: Release of Test Data, 9.04

(2002). The defense is taking the position that it is correct, and in fact

SUGGESTED that the defense expert be permitted to document responses and plaintiff=s behavior during an exam but refuse to permit the plaintiff herself in this case the same opportunity via a videographer.

C. Medicine is an inexact science. Specifically, psychology and psychiatry are perhaps the most imprecise fields of scientific medicine.

Conclusions drawn from psychologists are not based on objective radiographic evidence but in fact, predominately in the field of psychology, are based upon comparisons and profiling.

For example, the MMPI2 is one of the commonly administered psychological inventories in the world. It consists of 567 true/false questions and conclusions are not based upon the patient=s actual answers, but rather on how those answers compare with other individuals who answered those same questions and on whom diagnosis may or may not have been made. In other words, the patient is compared to a group of subjects who also took the test and estimations are drawn based on how he or she compares to that sample.

The same is true with a relative quantity of the psychological batteries which cannot diagnosis with specificity or exactness any conditions, but really tell us simply how an individual compares to other individuals who might have taken the same test.

The administration and interpretation of psychological testing are rife with potential abuse. As indicated by Exhibit 4 an attached article, published in the

Workers= Injury Litigation Group, there are many ways in which a psychologist can control the ultimate conclusion by manipulating the data. Dorothy C. Sims,

Cross Examining the Psychiatric Expert, 3 Workers First Watch, 13, (2003). The only way to determine whether or not this manipulation is present, is to account for the controls dealing with the administration and interpretation of the test data.

Put differently, placing a witness at a scene of the examination.

As set forth in the attached article, there are many other situations in which manipulation of the data can occur. For instance, a psychologist may claim an individual does not have brain damage because she answered memory questions indicating no impairment, however the psychologist may have stopped the examination, given the patient the answer and then recommenced the examination. The only way to catch this type behavior is to have a witness and to also to be able to verify the tests themselves.

D. Furthermore, the defense argument that these tests cannot be disseminated because it could individuals how to "beat the test" must consider the fact that these are already available for purchase and, in fact, as indicated in

Plaintiff=s Exhibit 5, Are Psychologist Hiding Evidence? by Paul Lees-Haley, he makes it clear that anyone can go to the Library of Congress and review the tests.

Paul R Lees-Haley & John C. Courtney, Are Psychologicst Hiding Evidence? A

Need for Reform, Claims Magazine (2002). Moreover, numerous books are for sale to the general public including the MMPI, MMPI-II and MMPI-A for use in court by Dr. James Butcher which contains the entire test within the book and is available on Amazon.com. Therefore, this material is already available, and it is important this court determine whether or not.

In the case of Krouse v. Enterprise Leasing Co., NO. GCG-96-64 (Fla. 10th

Cir. Ct. 1996), Dr. Filskov was retained by the defense to examine an 11- year- old child for brain injury. See exhibit 6. During the examination, the child began to score poorly on one of the tests for brain injury. Dr. Filskov, after telling the child which answers she got wrong, to retest her. That is to say, after the child knew which answers she got wrong, Dr .Filskov started the test over, and, amazingly enough, the child scored well. Krouse v. Enterprise Leasing Co., NO. GCG-96-64

(Fla. 10th Cir. Ct. 1996)

This is type of "nonstandard" test administration must be documented for discovery and cross examination purposes and any complaint that the presence of a tape recorder makes test administration "nonstandard" pales in comparison to the actual test administration technique utilized by Dr. Filskov as set forth below:

A. Yes. Q. Okay. Does the book that gives you the protocol for administering the test permit you to start the test all over again if the individual answers some of the questions incorrectly? A. I don't -- well, again, one has to have a cooperative subject. And at the point where the child wasn't cooperative, I redirected her. Q. Okay. The question that was B A. So does the test say that you can -- I don't know that it would suggest that the test should be given to a child who's deliberately making a false response. Q. If you had -- go ahead. A. But at the point where I said to her, you know, "Let's do this over again," she was -- for instance, she'd point to -- at the two-year-old level, I'd say, "What's doll?" and she'd point to a comb or something and just laugh and say "I can give you the wrong answer if I want to" kind of thing. And I said "Well, that's true, but let's do this seriously" type of thing.

Q. She told you that she can give you the wrong answer? A. If she wanted to, yes. Q. Did you document that? A. I do believe we did in the report, yes.

Q. And when you started the test all over again, did you ask the same questions? A. Well, it was only like three or four items at the two-year-old level. Q. So the answer to the question is yes? A. Did we do it over again, yes. Q. So you asked the same questions that she had already been asked and been told were incorrect?

A. Yes. I said, "Point to doll" -- yes, I do those again, yes, at the two-year-old level. Q. Okay. So she was advised that those answers were incorrect, correct? A. Yes, she was. And we knew that we were kidding around. Q. Is that called "cuing" when you explain that the answer is incorrect and ask them to respond again? A. On this particular situation I wouldn't call it cuing because there was a deliberate false response and she was just having some fun.

This kind of behavior, and, at its best, nonstandard test administration wherein the doctor gives a test, the patient does poorly on the test consistent with brain damage, the doctor then re-administers the test after giving the plaintiff the answer, supports the very basis of the need to protect the integrity of the exam. Furthermore, since anyone off the street can review copyrighted material by requesting it from the Library of Congress, precluding to preclude a plaintiff=s lawyer from reviewing same is beyond absurd. See exhibit 5, citing circumstances in which the material Dr. Filskov claims needs protection is already available.

E. The unique nature of neuropsychological testing is such that the examiner can control the results of the exam (i.e. someone is or is not brain damaged, someone is or is not depressed, etc) by the very nature in which the examination is given.

For example, someone may subtly suggest an answer as the question is given and the examinee will then score out as quite unimpaired.

A more exhaustive list of the types of influence that a psychologist can have over the results is as follows: (and further discussed in the Dorothy C. Sims,

Cross Examining the Psychiatric Expert, 3 Workers First Watch, 13, (2003))

i. Telling patient to erase answers. Some doctors erase a patient=s

answer or tell them to erase same. ii. Incorrect scoring. Some doctors will score tests and testify that the patient scores out as not brain injured in concentration tests. However, the doctor input the wrong birth date, thus comparing the plaintiff to much older and more feeble individuals. When the correct birthday is input, the results indicate impaired cognition.

iii. False scoring. Some doctors simply add wrong.

iv. Using the wrong tests. Some doctors may testify that certain malingering scales reflect lack of motivation. Be careful. Often these tests, in fact, reveal concentration problems.

v. Playing with cut off scores. Some doctors may testify that someone is flunked a "malingering test." The test booklet in the doctor=s office reveals, in fact, the patient may have passed.

vi. Giving too many tests. Some tests suggest several trials of a test should be administered. Some doctors administer only one, or, if the test results are hurtful to the side retaining them, they keep administering the same test until the plaintiff does poorly and only report the poor scores, or, until they do better and report only the good scores.

vii. Giving clues. Some doctors will provide significant clues and then opine a good score means no brain damage.

viii: Test Interference: some doctors themselves may interfere with testing procedures and then claim poor scores reflect lack of effort. Example: talking on cell phone, using an attractive "psychometrician" in a form fitting, low cut dress to administer testing. F. Dr. Filskov=s argument regarding the effect of third parties observing the testing is illogical based upon the following:

i. Dr. Filskov cites the National Academy of Neuropsychology and the Code of Ethics. Nothing in this code precludes a doctor from releasing the material or permitting recording of an exam pursuant to court order. Furthermore, a review of the organization, a completely voluntary non-governmental regulatory body, reveals that a survey of members of the National Association of

Neuropsychology clearly indicated that 70% had no objection to third party observes. Bradley g. Sewick, John Blase, & Tracey Besecker, Third-Party

Observers in Neuropsychological Testing: A 1999 Survey of NAN Members, presented at the 1991 Annual Meeting of the National Academy of

Neuropsychology in San Antonio (Nov. 1999). See exhibit 7.

ii. Often, neuropsychologist use psychometricians and they, themselves become a third party observer. Dr. Filskov also claims that (page 4, paragraph l0, "Neuropsychological examinations required utilization of testing materials and scoring manuals that are available only to qualified professionals in accordance with the APA Ethical Principles of Psychologist and Code of

Conduct"

However, this is a farce when one considers that many psychologists use the services of a "psychometrician" who actually administers much of the testing.

Florida has no legal requirements as to formal training or education regarding the psychometrician. Therefore, the very individual who as access to the tests and the answers need not have even a high school degree.

iii. Failing to permit the plaintiff to record the examination of a mentally or cognitively impaired individual allows the defense witness total freedom to claim statements were or were not made. The presence of a recoding device is even MORE important in a case in which an impaired individual is being examined. Failure to permit this documentation gives the defense expert unfettered ability to claim the plaintiff said or did anything during the exam.

iv. In page 5 of Dr. Filskov=s affidavit, she states that " Permitting unrestricted video or audio or transcription recording of the neuropsychological evaluations results in a product that can be disseminated without regard for the need to maintain test security." The undersigned has no objection to the destruction of the raw data and tape recording at the conclusion of the case and will agree not to disseminate it to anyone outside the case. However, even that agreement is unnecessary because:

a. Many books containing the tests themselves are available by simply purchasing them from Amazon.com See exhibit 5.

b. Furthermore, the IQ test which Dr. Filskov often administered can be viewed by parents if a child is administered such a test in a school environment, and, in fact, in the attachment to Defense Motion, a printout from the Harcourt Web Site (test publisher of the WAIS III IQ Test) Harcourt, the publisher of the test, specifically permits parents of children who are given the test to view the test questions. (See page 3 of attachment)

In fact, the test publisher admits that Pursuant to Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) parents have the right to "inspect and review the education scores of their children" (20 U.S.C sec l232G(a)(l)(A) and even the publisher admits the parents can review the IQ tests/results/raw data.

c. In this case, Dr. Filskov/defense argues the plaintiff is not even entitled to look at the test results, much less make copies. Where, had the plaintiff been a student in an educational setting, she would surely have been able to review the material pursuant to the test publisher=s own statement attached by the defendant.

Furthermore, no code of ethics or law anywhere requires a psychologist

(Florida does not license nor regulate Dr. Filskov= s claimed area of specialty, that being neuropsychology) to violate a court order requiring the production of the material.

d. The lack of logic is further clarified when one considers all the test questions themselves are given to the plaintiff, yet, somehow, the plaintiff=s attorney should not be provided the data which supports the basis of the defense expert=s opinion.

e. To claim, somehow, that in a forensic environment the plaintiff is entitled to any less rights is illogical if the only reason for the requests is to protect the test publisher=s rights. The claim that the test questions constitute a

"trade secret" as indicated in the print out from Harcourt web sites is contrary to logic. The test questions are not a "trade secret" How can the questions that are given to the plaintiff in the case be a "trade secret" if they are not secret? That is the equivalent of telling the plaintiff the secret recipe for Kentucky Fried Chicken then claiming it becomes a secret once her lawyer wants to understand it.

G. The Florida Evidence Code entitled "Disclosure of Facts or Data

Underlying Expert Opinion, sec 90.705(2) states, in relevant part:

Prior to the witness giving the opinion, a party whom the opinion or inference is offered may conduct a voir dire examination of the witness directed to the underlying facts or data for the witness=s opinion. If the party establishes prima facia evidence that the expert does not have sufficient basis for the opinion, the opinions and inferences of the expert are inadmissible unless the party offering the testimony establishes the underlying facts or data.

In order for the plaintiff to determine whether the underlying facts or data are sufficient for the witness to give their opinion, the attorney must have the data, including what answers were given to the doctor by the plaintiff, whether the testes in questions were actually given and whether the hand written material completed by the plaintiff was actually completed.

This was aptly reasoned by the Fifth District Court of Appeals , in stating, in Lunceford v. Florida Const. R. Co. Inc, 728 So.2d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 5th DCA l999)"...it is the privacy right of the petitioner that is involved, not the privacy interest of the examinee and if the petitioner wants to ensure that the completed examination is accurately preserved, the petitioner should generally be entitled to do so." In Brompton v. Poy-Wing, 704 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 4th DCA l998) the

Fourth District Court of Appeal, in considering a plaintiff=s right to have his/her counsel or other representative present during a compulsory examination, noted that "Florida Rule of Civil Procedure l.360(a)(3) gives the trial court discretion to establish rules for the protection of the examinee and to maintain the integrity of the particular examination process during a court ordered independent medial exam (IME)" The court, however, added that the general rule is that:

absent any valid reason to prohibit the presence of a patient=s counsel or other representative, their presence should e allowed. The burden of proof rests with the party opposing third party attendance to show why the court should deny the examinee= s right to have counsel, a physician or other representative present. Id at 1128

In Bartell v. McCarrick, 498 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 4th DCA l986), the Fourth District, citing Jakubowski v. Lengen, 86 A.D. 2d 398, 450 N.Y.S. 6l2, 114 (N.Y.App. Div l982) provided the following reasoning for permitting a plaintiff=s counsel to be present during a compulsory examination. A physician selected by the defense to examine plaintiff is not necessarily a disinterested, impartial medical expert, indifferent to the conflicting interests of the parties. The possible adversary status of the examining doctor for the defense is, under ordinary circumstances, a compelling reason to permit plaintiff=s counsel to be present to guarantee, for example, that the doctor does not interrogate the plaintiff on liability questions in order to seek damaging admissions. Bartell v. McCarrick, 498 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 4th DCA l986)(emphasis supplied).

The right to have a third party present during a compulsory examination pursuant to Fla. R. Civ.P. 1.360 indicates the right to have a videographer and/or a court reporter present. This was upheld by the Florida Supreme Court case U.S.

Security Ins. Co. v. Cimino, 754 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 2000) where it was held that:

"...... we are further convinced that any chilling effect on doctors is far outweighed by the positive effects of this decision. The Third District Trepal v.

State of Florida, 754 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 2000) correctly noted "the potential for fraud at the confluence of the medical, legal and insurance industries is virtually unlimited." U.S. Security Ins. Co. v. Silva, 693 So. 2d 593, 596 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).

However, by allowing the examination to be observed by a third party or videotaped, the potential for harm to either party is reduced, not increased. As the Second District noted when discussing a rule 1.360 examination in Wilkins v.

Palumbo, 617 So. 2d at 852:

"there is nothing inherently good or bad about the credibility function of an IME. If there is no court reporter or other third party present at the examination, however, a disagreement can arise between the plaintiff and the doctor concerning the events at the IME. Plaintiffs' attorneys are understandably uncomfortable with a swearing contest at trial between an unsophisticated plaintiff and a highly trained professional with years of courtroom experience. They have searched for ways to level the playing field on the credibility issues arising from such examinations."

The same considerations are applicable to a medical examination required by the insured to continue PIP benefits. The concerns of physicians for conducting examinations without the distraction of third persons cannot outweigh the insured's rights as the Fourth

District noted in Bartell. Bartell, 498 So. 2d at 1380.

As the court said in Gibson v. Gibson, 456 So. 2d 1320, 1321 (Fla. 4th DCA

1984), a case in which we held that the presence of a court reporter should have been allowed at a psychiatric examination: "It is important to note also, that it is the privacy of the petitioner that is involved, not that of the examiner, and if the petitioner wants to be certain that this compelled, although admittedly reasonable, intrusion into her privacy be accurately preserved, then she should be so entitled." Bartell, 498 So. 2d at 1379. Cimino's rights must prevail over the concerns of the examining physician. Cimino, 754 So. 2d at 701, 702.

In fact, this is specifically the case in a neuropsychological examination.

In Freeman v. Latherow, 722 So.2d 885, (2d DCA 1998), the court found a videographer could be present at the neuropsychological examination. The very argument tendered by Dr. Filskov and the defense in this case, that the examination could be nonstandard, were rejected in the Latherow court as well.

H. Obviously, in order for Plaintiff to determine whether the underlying facts or data are sufficient for the witness to give the opinion, counsel for Plaintiff must have the underlying facts or data. Without the facts, Plaintiff is unable to challenge the ultimate opinion or conclusion that the neuropsychologist is drawing from the test data. To claim that we must be limited to our experts reviewing the raw data defeats the very nature and spirit of discovery rules.

Furthermore, it assumes

i. Our expert actually owns the tests selected by the defense expert. There are hundreds of psychological/neuropsychological tests an expert can purchase and to require the Plaintiff=s expert to purchase all tests selected by the defense, is unnecessarily burdensome.

ii. This precludes our ability for the plaintiff to confirm that, in fact, the answers and/or handwriting on the responses are actually hers.

I. Lastly, defense seeks to require the Plaintiff to produce a copy of the transcript of the CME. There has been no caselaw cited to support this demand and, based on the claim of work product and right of privacy, the undersigned strenuously objects to it=s production. Courts are denying such motions in other areas. See exhibit 8. In Hudmon v. Regal Insurance Co. No: 00-CA 001491 ( Fla.

19th Cir. Ct. April 12 , 2002) ((order granting motion for reharing on the production of the CME videotape of a doctor), wherein Judge Cynthia Angelos denied a similar motion on the part of the Defense on 4/2/02. The tapes constitute work product (Fla.R.Civ.P. l.280) and to require production of such a tape under these circumstances would be similar to requiring the defense to produce a copy of any surveillance material prior to the Plaintiff=s deposition.

Since defense may maintain a claim of work product until the decision is made to use such tape in trial, the undersigned asserts the same privilege.

This very issue has been ruled on in another case (Robinson v. Quarles &

Fiberglass Services) involving Dr. Filskov and the court, in that case the court specifically denied the requests (see exhibit 9) wherein Dr. Filskov also, without permission of Plaintiff=s counsel, tape recorded the Plaintiff. Wherefore, the undersigned requests the Defendant=s Motion be DENIED in whole.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by mail this 16th day of August, 2004 to: Teresa Jones, 1900 Ringling

Boulevard, Sarasota, Florida 34236.

Dorothy Clay Sims P. O. Box 3188 Ocala, Florida 34478-3188 (352)629 0480 (352)629 0421 Fl. Bar #340014