Towards Reciprocity in a Global Context

2004, November 6th, International Seminar on Political Science: Reconsidering Rawls and Sen, at Ritsumeikan University (for presentation)

The Possibility of Public-Provision Unit in Global Context --- Towards “Social Contract” based on Reciprocity ---

Reiko Gotoh1 Graduate School of Core Ethics and Frontier Sciences Ritsumeikan University

1. Basic Concerns “Einer fur Alle, Alle fur Einen” (Alfred Manes, A principle of insurance,) “If you can afford to provide, then provide resources, and if you are in needy, then receive resources” (A principle of mutual provision )

This paper investigates the possibility of a public-provision unit and a decision- making unit that corresponds to it, by examining the perspectives of John Rawls and Amartya Sen.

Traditionally, the principle of insurance has been justified that individuals’ behaviors of self-interest maximization under uncertainty must automatically result in public-interest maximization. Yet As John Roemer (1996) clearly analyzed, insurance system itself, as long as it is a system which intends to respect individuals’ private interest on planning their own lives, has no guarantee to realize public interest itself. For example, in planning his own life one may try to maximize his total expected utility under uncertainty. In this case, one shall rationally choose such a strategy which distributes the least resource to the predictable worst situation and the most resource to the predictable best situation. For example, if one has a risk to loose his hearing, he makes the following plan: to consume most, e.g. to buy an expensive trumpet, while he has a best hearing and to consume lest once he entirely looses his hearing. Of course, we can assume another person who may try to maximize his predictable minimum benefit in the worst situation. In this case, one shall rationally choose the reverse distributional life plan.

1 Corresponding address: E-mail: [email protected], Tel: +81-75-465-8375, Fax: +81-75-465-8364, 56-1 Toji-in Kitamachi, Kita-ku Kyoto, 603-8577 JAPAN

1 What is important in this situation is the following two points. First, in terms of consumer sovereignty, whichever strategy one may choose in the insurance system, it should be socially respected. Second, if every individual chooses such a strategy of maximizing his own expected utility, an insurance system cannot realize such a kind of public interest to secure a certain well-being freedom for all individuals, since it requires that the more resources should be distributed to the persons in worse situations.

Indeed, if there are plural groups which have different observable probabilities of risk, separate different premiums (a higher premium for higher group, a lower premium for lower group) may be achieved as one of equilibrium of a free competitive insurance market. And, not only in terms of efficiency, but also in terms of cost-befit equity (i.e. providing according to his benefit, or receiving according to his cost), such a system will be recommended.

In contrast, if we have a kind of public interest to secure a certain well-being freedom for all individuals, including one who is excluded by or who cannot live well in the given fixed groups (community, association, or state), what kind of features does such a system is considered to have? Moreover, what kind of logic is assumed consider behind such a system?

2. Definition Public-provision unit is defined as a distribution system which implements resource transfer as a whole to secure a certain well-being freedom for all individuals, including one who is excluded by or who cannot live well in the given fixed groups (community, association, or state).

Public-provision unit is obviously distinguished from a competitive market or a private contract, since it goes beyond the logic of cost-benefit equity based on individuals’ self-interest maximization. Then, is it considered a kind of community or association? No, it is also distinguished from them in the following three points.

1. As for the conception of membership, it should receive every newcomer without any qualification. Cf. A community already has a fixed conception of membership based on a “communal identity”. An association has a conception of membership based on a “sharing a common benefit”. 2. As for the conception of distributive justice, it should adopt such a precept

2 as “providing according to his ability, being provided according to his needs as an individual” (not as a member of community or association). 3. As for a conception of well-being, it should respect plural lists (including weights of items) of well-being that can reflect actual or potential diversities in place and time, and should coordinate them in certain, though not complete, fair way.

3. Main Problem By the way, who will or can accept such conceptions of public-provision unit? Who will or can participate in the decision-making unit which is responsible for deciding or revising the basic conceptions (or rules) of a public-provision unit? Does a person accept such conceptions if he himself has no need for public provision beyond what he can obtain in the market, private insurance, or through a communal provision in given groups? Does he keep in it, or does he voluntarily exit from it?

Moreover, it is noticed that a public-provision unit generally does not coincide with a decision-making unit. (The reason why) Actually, an individual may come into a public-provision unit, by birth or immigration, only after decision-making is completed. More fundamentally, as Sen points out, “the decisions to be taken by any focal group can influence the size or composition of the group itself”2. Thus, a decision-making unit cannot include all of individuals who will belong to a public-provision unit, while it might include some individuals who may never belong to a public-provision unit itself.

Then, how should we consider the problem of responsibility for implementing a public provision or the problem of agreement in setting a public provision?

4. Comparing Rawls and Sen 1). On responsibility Rawls depends on the concept of “society”, which is closed, but which needs not be restricted to a political “nation state” as traditionally conceived3.

2 This is a problem of “inclusionary incoherence” pointed out by Sen. (Sen, 2002). 3 Rawls, 1999, p.25f.

3 “Society” is nothing but a unit that certain political ideas, which are formed historically or ideally, such as liberty and right or decent hierarchy, are expected to be shared. Furthermore, when he says “a society is closed”, he tries to symbolize a unit in which members will remain there and take responsibilities for a public provision, basing on a kind of “reciprocity” (not “mutual benefit” nor “gift”, I will mention later). It is distinguished from a fully open unit like an association from which members will voluntarily exit with a motive of a rational choice based on his self- interest. Drawing on Sen, while an individual can belong to diversely diverse sub-units simultaneously and each sub-unit permits free exits and entries, he is expected to take responsibility for the sub-units he actually belongs to. Moreover, he will take responsibility for other sub-units through financial transfers between sub-units, or for protecting human rights beyond the boundaries of sub-units. Furthermore, he will take responsibility for the financial and political coordination among the sub-units in order to guarantee freedom of each culture.

2). On agreement Rawls predicts that a party in the stage of “the law of peoples (societies)” may confront a tension between two kinds of responsibility and might not fully avoid prejudice derived from the principles of the society he actually belongs to. Even under “a veil of ignorance” that can nullify group (society)-oriented interests, there might remain moral conflicts among different sorts of principles, laws, or “political ideas”. This is in contrast with, on the one hand, the stage of settling the principles of justice in a society, where such a preference that prefers precepts of local groups to principles of a society if they are in conflict, are excluded in advance. That is, the superiority of the principles of justice to local precepts of groups is assumed to be fully accepted by the parties in the stage of setting the principles of justice in a society.

This is in contrast to, on the other hand, Sen’s theory, where any constraint on the set of individual preferences is not assumed a priori, where incomplete consistency is supposed to be not unfeasible4.

4 “In scrutinizing these insights together, there may well be some common understanding that emerges forcefully, but there is no need to presume that all the differences arising from distinct perspectives can be settled similarly”(Sen, 2002, p.468)

4 A key is in a kind of epistemic condition, i.e., “open impartiality”, which makes it possible to be free from any kind of local prejudices while taking diverse local information into consideration. “ Open impartiality” makes it possible to understand particular meanings of position-situated evaluations in each context, and, at the same time, to reasonably recognize a certain universal, human meaning of each position-situated evaluation. Another key is such individuals who actually belong to diversely diverse groups (such as class, gender, or professional groups), since they have an opportunity to examine each position-situated evaluation through the eye’s of other position-situated evaluations and reflect one another5.

5. Summary and Discussion In the case of Rawls, the possibility of agreement and responsibility depends on the possibility of sharing certain political ideas including the conception of a society as a cooperative body. Comparing Rawls, Sen seems to pursue a more actually and more flexible unit in a global context, keeping the conceptual meanings Rawls tries to grasp through the conception of “society” or “social contract”. Let me summarize the main ideas of them.

First, what is important is two kinds of openness, as both Rawls and Sen suggest, though they are different in their focal points. One is the openness in the sequence of time, say, the decision should be open to criticisms, and a new comer can also participate in that decision through examining and revising it himself at the next point in time. Another is the openness in the practical reason of an agent, that is, an agent who participates in a decision-making process will form a judgment that takes not only actual members of a public-provision unit but also potential members of it or non- members who have a possibility to be affected into consideration under appropriate epistemic and informational conditions.

Second, both Rawls and Sen regard “incomplete ordering”, which leaves several social states non-comparable6, as a distinguished feature of rules (“rules of a practice”) 7. Rawls’s stage-sequential framework both in terms of the level of law --principles of justice, constitution, and legislations-- and in terms of the scope of law -- a law of

5 Sen, 1999a, p.28. 6 Note that “non-comparable” may not mean “indifferent”. 7 Refer to Rawls, 1971, p.201, refer also to Gotoh, 2002a, p.276 and Gotoh, 2002b. This argument seems to be shared with the deliberative democracy, see Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, p.35.

5 peoples, the first principles of justice of a people, the precepts of an association-- represents not an actual time-sequence but an order of priority of rules that constraints the decision-making process reasonably though incompletely. Whereas Sen insists that “systematic guidance to reasoned decisions can come from incomplete orderings that reflect unresolved conflicts”8

Third, we can get a perspective that individuals who belong to diversely diverse groups actually and imaginary grasp a possibility to make a consistency on their relationship at least partially, depending on their trial to integrate their multi-layered identity internally after reflecting diverse interests and political ideas derived from position-situated evaluations. Basing on these insightful arguments of Rawls and Sen, lastly, for further discussion, I want to reexamine the conception of reciprocity in a global context.

6．Reciprocity, not gift, nor mutual benefit Lastly, I would like to consider the logic behind the public-provision unit.

“[T]hey are ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so.”(Rawls, 1993, p.49)

Reciprocity requires a kind of symmetry between individuals or their actions. It is similar to the conception of mutual benefit in the sense that it satisfies a kind of bilateral relationship not unilateral one. It is similar to the conception of gift in that it does not need mutual advantage. However, it does not coincide with either of them.

I want to show the principle of public-provision unit also satisfies the logic of reciprocity, while a principle of public-provision unit is described as follows.

“If you can afford to provide, then provide resources, and if you are in needy, then be provided”

To do so, let us re-examine the conception of reciprocity in order.

1) Institutions and laws that realize human rights guarantee a formal symmetry

8 Sen, 2002, p.468.

6 between all individuals. More precisely, “political ideas” that underlie institutions and laws, including ones which have not been materialized as institutions or laws yet, guarantee symmetry in a formal sense among every individual in a global context. cf, “equality under a law”

Meanwhile, the range of symmetry depends on the range of application of laws or the participants of institutions, or the range of population who take responsibility for them, or the range of population who make consensus on the based on “political ideas” they are sharing.

2) If we focus not on the amount of providing but on the fact that one provides or not, we can find symmetry between individuals who actually provided. Similarly, if we focus not on the amount of providing but on the fact that one is provided or not, we can find symmetry between individuals who were actually provided. cf. “equality between providers”, “equality between recipients”

3) As Rawls(1971) pointed out in justifying “the difference principle”, we can also find symmetry between contingent matters and individual activities. For example, there is symmetry between the fact of being able to provide and the activity of providing resources. Similarly, there is symmetry between the fact of being not able to provide and the activity of being provided resources. cf. “equality between ability and activity”

4) Furthermore, if we focus not on the probability of risk but on the fact that anyone cannot fully avert risk to become not able to provide, then we can find symmetry between an individual who can and do provide and an individual who is in needy and is provided. I want call this “risk as a viewpoint”, which is distinguished from economic concern for calculation. cf. “equality between non-zero risk holders”

Generally, we can say “ought implies can” (not be able implies free from obligation), we cannot say “can implies ought”. “Can provide” does not immediately imply “ought to provide”. Yet if an individual can expect “equality under law” and furthermore “equality between providers” (others who have ability like him do provide like him), or “equality between ability and activity”, or “equality between non-zero risk holders”, he may abide by the principle and take a responsibility to provide.

7 7. Concluding Remarks Instead of summarizing of this paper, I would like to remark the implication of this paper.

As Rawls says, “social contract” does not coincide with private (rational) contract.

Following Rousseau’s opening thought in The Social Contract, I shall assume that his phrase “men as they are” refers to how (persons’ moral and psychological) nature works within a framework of political and social institutions; and that his phrase “laws as they might be” refers to laws as they should, or ought, to be. I shall also assume that, if we grow up under a framework of reasonable and just political and social institutions, we shall affirm those institutions when we in our turn come of age, and they will endure over time”(Rawls, 1999, p.7).

Similarly, as Sen says, “social choice” does not coincide with individual (rational) choice.

Arrow’s (1951) formulation is more permissive; it allows social considerations to influence the choices people make. Individual preferences in this interpretation reflects “value” in general, rather than being based only on what Arrow calls “tastes”(p.23). (Sen, 1995)

This paper is one of trials to reconsider a conception of “social contract” and “social choice”, which does not necessarily take root on individuals’ rational behavior based on self-interests maximization. A conception of public-provision unit which is proposed in this paper has a possibility to go beyond the boundary of “nation state” or given fixed groups in its essential idea. What remains to be inquired is to give a substantive body to this conception in our perspective of “realistic utopia” (Rawls, 1999). That is, to search conditions which make if possible to construct a public-provision unit.

References

8 Gotoh, R. (2001): “The Capability Theory and Welfare Reform,” Pacific Economic Review, 6:2, 211-222. Gotoh, R (2002a): The Economic Philosophy on Justice: Rawls and Sen, ToyoKeizaiShinpo-sha, in Japanese. Gotoh, R. (2002b): “A Perspective on the Theory of Justice a la Rawls and Sen,” mimeo. Gotoh, R. (2003): “Understanding Sen’s Idea of a Coherent Goal-Rights System in the Light of Political Liberalism,” paper presented International Symposium in, Publicness Towards The 21st Century—Realizing Sen in Theory and Practice, at Ritsumeikan University, 2 June, 2003. Gotoh, R. (2004): “Well-Being Freedom and The Possibility of Public-Provision Unit in Global Context,” Ethics and Economics, vol.2, 2004. Gotoh, R. and N. Yoshihara (2003) “A Class of fair Distribution Rules a la Rawls and Sen,” Economic Theory, vol. 22, 1, 63-88. Gutmann, A. and D. Thompson, (1996): Democracy and disagreement, Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Manes, A.(1930) Versicherungswesen, Funfte auflage, B. G. Teubner. Mill, J, S. (1859): Utilitarianism, in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. University of Toronto Press, pp.203-259, 1962. Rawls, J. (1955): “Two Concepts of Rule,” recorded on Collected Papers (ed. by Freeman, S., 1999, Cambridge, Harvard University Press). Rawls, J. (1971): A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Rawls, J. (1993): Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press. Rawls, J. (1995): “Reply to Habermas,” The Journal of Philosophy, 92:3. Rawls, J. (1996): Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press (reprinted paperback). Rawls, J. (1999a): The Law of Peoples, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Rawls, J. (1999b): Collected Papers, ed. by Freeman, S., Cambridge, Harvard University Press. Sen, K. A.(1970a): Collective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco: Holden-Day. Sen, K. A.(1970b):”The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol.78, pp.152-157. Sen, A. K. (1977): “Rational fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6, 317-344. Sen, A. K. (1982): Choice, Welfare and Measurement, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. Sen, A. K. (1983): “Liberty and Social Choice,” The Journal of Philosophy80.1, p.5-15.

9 Sen, A. K. (1992): “Minimal Liberty”, Economica, Vol.59, pp.139-159. Sen, A. K. (1993): “Positional Objectivity,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 22, pp. 126-145. Sen, A. K.(1995) : “Rationality and Social Choice,” American Economic Review, 85, 1- 24. Sen, A. K. (1999a): Reason Before Identity, The Romanes Lecture for 1998, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Sen A. K. (1999b) Development As Freedom, New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Sen, A. K. (2000): “Consequential Evaluation and Practical Reason,” The Journal of Philosophy, XCVII, 9, 477-503. Sen, A. K. (2001): “Justice, Democracy And Social Choice,” Text of Public Lecture at the Center for Interdisciplinary Research(ZIF), University of Bielefeld, Germany, on 22 June. Sen, A. K.(2002): “Open and Closed Impartiality,” The Journal of Philosophy, XCIX, 9, 445-469. Suzumura, K. and Gotoh, R (2001/2002) Amartya Sen: Economics and Ethics, Jikkyo- Shuppan-sha, in Japanese.

10 2004 年 11 月 6 日、政治科学国際セミナー：ロールズとセンを再考する（立命館大学にて）（報告要旨）グローバルな文脈における公共的相互提供ユニットの可能性後藤玲子立命館大学大学院先端総合学術研究科

本稿の位置づけに関する特別注：①公共的な相互提供という 1 つの観念をもとに、それを具現化する集合体および論理を構想しようという本稿の試みは、経済学でモデル・ビルディングと呼ばれる手法です。事実の再構成をベースとする歴史的・実証的手法とは異なるものです。②後述するように、本稿が構想する公共的相互提供システムは、特定のメンバーシップをもつコミュニティあるいはサークルを単位とするものではなく、本質的にボーダーレスである緩やかな集合体を単位とするものです。はたしてそのような集合体において個々人は互いに対する責任性を保持することができるのだろうか。あるいは共通のルールに関する合意形成が可能なのだろうか。これらの問題を考察することが本稿の主題となります。③本稿で理解している「相互性」の論理とは、私的利益最大化に基づく合理的計算とは別物です。はたして、そのような論理を説得的に提示することができるか、が本稿の後半部分の主題です。本稿の理解はかなり過激ではありますが、同様の解釈が選好研究にないわけではないです（本報告では詳細を省く）④以上の作業を通じて、私人間で交わされる契約とは異質な「社会契約」の観念をあぶりだすことが本稿の隠れた目的です（ほぼ通念化しているロールズ批判に応答したい）。⑤ただし、例えば福祉の問題を考える際に、いきなり私的利益最大化の論理を全否定してかかる必要もないわけで、例えば地域のお年寄りや子どもたちを守りたい、あるいは貧しい人の生活を改善したいという気持ちの中には、私的利益最大化論理の拡張として説明したほうがよいものもあります。それらを丁寧に拾いつつ、本稿のテーマである「相互性」の論理との接続、あるいはだぶりを考えるというのが、今学期の後藤玲子の「公共論」の主題です。

1．問題関心「一人は万人のために、万人は一人のために」（アルフレッド・メイネス、保険原理）「（誰であれ）余裕があるときは提供し、困窮しているときは受給しよう」（（公共的）相互提供原理）

メイネスの言葉にあるように、しばしば保険は助け合いの仕組みであることが強調される。だが、個々人の自己利益最大化と選択の自由を尊重しようとする限り、自分自身のために備えることがただちに他者のためになる保証はない（Roemer, 1996）。より広範囲の人々の間で資源を提供し合い受給し合う仕組みを実行するためには、はたして、どのような集合

11 体を構想したらよいのだろうか。はたしてそれはどんな論理で支えられるのだろうか。

２．定義「公共的提供」ユニットの定義：あらゆる個人（既存のコミュニティや組織ではうまく生きることのできない人々も含めて）に対して、一定の福祉的自由を保障する目的で、広範囲の資源移転を実行する分配システム。それは費用便益の均等を実現するとは限らないし、また規範的に要求することもない点において、市場機構や私的契約とは区別される。さらに、以下の 3 つの特徴において、コミュニティや目的集団とも区別される。

①メンバーシップに関する特徴：何の資格要件をおくこともなく、あらゆる参入者を受け入れる。参照：「共同体アイデンティティ」の保持、あるいは「共通利益の共有」を資格要件とするコミュニティや企業との違い。 ②分配理論に関する特徴：「能力に応じて提供し、（メンバーの一員としての必要ではなく）個人としての必要に応じて提供される」 ③福祉メニュー（必要の指標でもある）に関する特徴：地理的あるいは時間的位置の相違に応じた複数の福祉メニューが（サブ・ユニットごとに）構想されるとともに、公共的提供ユニット全体においては、それらが、完全ではないにしても、整合化される。

3．問題 1）上記の特徴をもった公共的提供ユニットに、はたして誰が参加しようとするか。公共的提供に、はたして誰が責任をもとうとするか。 2）公共的提供ユニットを動かす具体的な分配ルール、福祉メニューを、はたして誰が決定するのか。彼らの間で合意が形成される保証はどこにあるのか。

4．ロールズとセンの比較 1）責任性を支える基礎概念ロールズ：生れ落ちることによって参入し、死をもって退出するような「社会」概念。セン：出入り自由であるものの、異なり方すらも異なった複数の集団の集まり。

2）合意可能性を支える基礎概念ロールズ：政治的観念の共有（ただし歴史事実的共有とは限らない。理念的共有可能性で十分）。注記：「ローカルな集団準則」に対する「社会の正義原理」の優位性への合意が仮定されている一方で、諸「社会の正義原理」に対する「万人の法」の優位性は仮定されておらず→後者においてモラル・コンフリクトの問題が真正面から扱われる。セン：「開かれた不偏性」という実践的理性の役割。だが、合意可能性に関する議論は未完。

12 5．（小括）ロールズとセンの比較から得られる知見責任性と合意可能性を支える条件は以下の３つにまとめられる。１）開かれていること（openness）：①ルールはたえざる改訂にさらされること。ルールを改訂するためのルールが明示化され、改訂プロセスへの参加が保証されている。②ルールの制定に参加する個々人の実践理性が時間的や空間のボーダーを越えた開放性をもつこと。２）ルールの「不完備性」とシークエンス（段階性）：一度に、あらゆる選択肢・社会状態を完全に順序付けることを、ルールに求めない。ロールズ：より抽象的な次元での取り決めルールからより具体的な条件配慮的ルールへのシークエンス。３）センをヒントにして：現実に複数の集団に同時に所属する人々の存在、さらにはその人たちの内面的統合のプロセスに合意の基盤を見出すことはできないか。

6．相互性の論理――贈与とも相互便益とも異なる本節では、公共的提供原理を支える（正当化する）論理を探求する。本稿はそれを「相互性の論理」に求める。ただし、ここでいう｢相互性｣の論理は、交渉によって両者の便益が高まるわけではないという点において「相互便益」概念からは区別される。また、何らかの意味での双方向性あるいは対称性が存在するという意味で「贈与」概念とも区別される。本節の目的は、「（誰であれ）余裕があるときは提供し、困窮しているときは受給する」という公共的提供原理が相互性の論理をみたすことを明らかにすることにある。 1）人権観念を制度化する法制度の存在は、それ自体、個人間の対称性を保証する。ただし、その対称性は、そのような法制度に責任をもつことのできる人々、あるいは、そのような観念を共有することのできる人々に限らない。 2）提供量（受給量）の相違ではなく、提供した（受給した）という事実の共通性に注目するとき、資源を提供した（受給した）人々の間に対称性をみることができる。 3）ロールズが格差原理の説明として述べたように、偶然的事象と個人の行為との間に対称性をみることができる。例えば提供する余裕があるという事象と実際に提供するという行為との間に、あるいは提供する余裕がないという事象と実際に受給するという行為との間に。 4）「観点としてのリスク」、すなわち、リスクがゼロとはいえないという互いの共通性に着目することにより（たとえ個々人の事故率が客観的に観察可能になったとしても、その個人間相違に着目するのではなく）、すべての個人間に対称性をみることができる。

一般的に、「義務をもつことは可能であることを意味する」（換言すれば、できないとしたら義務をもたなくてよいことを意味する）と言われる。その一方で「可能であることは義務

13 をもつことを意味する」とは言われない。例えば、「資源を提供する能力をもつことは資源を提供する義務をもつこと」を意味するとはいえない。だが、本節で論じた相互性の論理はこの命題が人々によって受容されることを支えるのではないか。もしひとが「法のもとの平等」、「提供者の間の平等」あるいは「提供する能力をもつことと提供することとの対称性」あるいは「リスクがまったくゼロとはいえないひととひとの対称性」の中のいずれかを期待することができるとしたら、提供する能力を持つ個人は公共的提供の原理に従い、提供する義務を受容することができるのではないだろうか。

7．結びに代えて本稿には、「社会契約」ならびに「社会的選択」の概念的意味を再検討するという意義がある。ロールズが指摘しているように、ルソーのいう「社会契約」とは「あるがままの人間があるがままの環境で契約を交わすこと」を意味するわけではない。それはむしろ「ある政治的社会的条件のもとにあるとしたら、ひとはどんな道徳的心理学的性質はもつだろうか」、また、｢ひとがそのような性質をもつとしたらどんな法を受容しようとするだろうか｣（このような発想の仕方をロールズは「現実的ユートピア」（1999）と呼んだ）を考察するための概念的装置に他ならない。同様に、センが指摘しているように、アローのいう「社会的選択」は、人々の選択を与件として社会的取り決めをなすに留まらない。それは、人々の選択それ自体に影響を与える社会事象を考慮できる枠組みになっている。すなわち、単なる嗜好を越えた価値評価の形成プロセスを織り込むことのできるものだ。本稿で扱った「公共的提供のユニット」の構想は、論理的には、「国民国家」や所与の固定された集団の壁を越える性質を備えている。はたしてどのような政治的社会的条件のもとであれば、ひとは実際にこのユニットに参加し責任をもつことができるだろうか、また、このようなユニットを動かすルールに関して合意を形成することができるだろうか。「公共的提供のユニット」を支える具体的制度的条件の探求へと向かうことが、今後の課題として残される。

（参考文献省略：英語版参照のこと）