What Are We Making

What Are We Making? The Constructivist Approach to International Relations Theory

Samuel S. Stanton, Jr.

A paper presented at the 2002 Arkansas Political Science Association Annual Meeting February 22-23, 2002, Jonesboro, AR Abstract

This paper looks at the constructivist approach to the study of international relations. The constructivist approach is defined in terms of the philosophical underpinnings of the approach and the scientific/social scientific premises that highlight this social theory of international relations. The approach is critiqued based upon the postmodern approach to understanding and knowing. Also important to the critique of the approach is the understanding of scientific/social scientific criticisms of the constructivist approach. Social constructivism is analyzed for its offerings in the study of anarchy, regimes, world polity, and as systemic level theory of international relations. Among the interesting findings is the problematic nature of this approach to understanding anarchy, the difficulty of defining constructivism as positivist social science, and the optimistic outlook for the future of international relations studies offered by the constructivist approach. Introduction

It is often asked why any theory of international relations should be taken seriously. On the surface this appears to be a valid question. Theory is academically based and not part of the real world. Practitioners of foreign policy must live in the "real" world and actually take care of the business of government.

However, we need look no further than the Clinton administration in the US to see that theory can be highly influential on practitioners of foreign policy. One strand of liberal international relations theory is called "democratic peace theory".1 This strand of liberalism holds that democracy will rarely engage in conflictual behavior with one another. The Clinton administration's policy of "engagement" was designed to spread democracy, this in hopes that future conflicts might be avoided because democracies do not engage in conflict with each other.

More recently the Bush administration has made a decision on the type of arms to sell to Taiwan. Most of the systems were purposely defensive in nature. One version of realist theory is offense-defense realism.2 Defensive realism holds that when the strength of states is defensive in nature it will mitigate against interstate conflict because security is maximized. Conversely when offensive strength is the norm, it is more likely that states will engage in conflict with one another in an attempt to maximize their own security.

Both liberalism and realism in most of their varieties assume that the main unit of analysis in international relations should be the state. The difference between them is

1 A good review of democratic peace theory will be found in works by Michael Doyle, Zeev Maoz, Bruce Russett and David Singer. Christopher Layne and Joanne Gowa offer a good criticism of the democratic peace theory. 2 Scholars such as Stephen Van Evera, George Quester and Robert Jervis provide a good source of information about offense-defense realism. over the concern for power (absolute gains) versus the concern for economic prosperity

(relative gains) (Walt 1998, 38). In Neorealism and Neoliberalism, The Contemporary

Debate (Baldwin, Ed. 1993) it is shown as evident that the only true difference between the two main strands of liberal and realist theory is the question of when absolute gains mean more than relative gains.

For the student of international relations theory and for the practitioner looking for a way to provide the best foreign policy this becomes quite troubling. Theories are supposed to provide viable options that are competitive in their ambition to explain a phenomenon or to provide a means of predicting future behavior and outcomes. This is a general theoretical problem, but as Hans Morgenthau has informed us, "The key to a theory of international politics will not be found in the specific subject matter of international politics but in the requirements and problems of a general political theory,"

(1959, 16).

Stephen Van Evera says that theory is composed of causal law or causal hypothesis connected with an explanation of the causal law or hypothesis (1997, 9). The implication of this definition for social science is that theory should allow us to make predictions about future behavior of the actors involved based on an understood explanation of how phenomena relate to each other.

With these factors in mind, I turn to social constructivism to find a theory of international relations that is not particular to the specific subject matter of international politics, but rather to the question of general theory. Derived from a multitude of sources that include the "British School" of international politics, postmodern philosophy, and positivist social science, constructivist theory offers a means of moving beyond the stagnation of the popular neoliberal and neorealist theories of international relations.

Constructivist theory is addressed in this work for both its social scientific and philosophical offerings. The first two sections of this work look at the philosophy and social science of constructivist international relations theory and the philosophical and social scientific critiques of this theory. The third section looks at what constructivism offers to the study of international relations. After all, the root of constructivism is construct, so what is being constructed? I conclude this effort by looking at the value of constructivist theory as a systemic level offering to understand international relations.

Specifically, what is required for a theory to be systemic and does constructivism qualify?

Constructivism, Philosophy

To explain the basics of constructivist theory I turn to Alexander Wendt and his

Social Theory of International Politics (1999), which offers one of the most comprehensive looks at constructivist theory. Constructivist political theory holds that the structures of interaction are determined by shared ideas. Identities and interests are constructed by shared ideas. Wendt was not the first to explain human interaction this way. Lebow (2001) explains that Thucydides can actually be considered the father of constructivism, as his work explains how language and convention establish identities and enable power to be translated into influence (Lebow 2001, 547).

Viewed in this manner, constructivism is both idealistic and structural, which makes constructivist theory a richer and more vibrant account of the structure of international relations than offered by Neorealism—which ignores idealism in favor of naked structure—or by Marxism or World Systems Theory, which ignore structure in favor of ideas. It also makes constructivism a richer theory than liberalism or neoliberalism.

What is meant by the social construction of identity, or that identities are constructed by shared ideas? The theory is that norms and ideals of state behavior are embedded in the system. The system is primarily composed of states (as in neorealism) but also includes other non-state actors (as in liberalism). These embedded ideals guide and direct the interaction of states. International relations are not readily visible to human senses, but according to constructivism these relations result from a distribution of ideas. Implicit in this delineation is the assumption that states have "human" traits.

Indeed, scholars and state leaders often speak of the national "interests", "needs", etc.

(Wendt 1999, 10).

While Walt identifies the unit of analysis for constructivist theory as the individual (Walt 1998, 38), Wendt (1999) identifies the main unit of analysis for constructivist theory in international relations as the state. But, what comprises a state?

Individuals who are informed by the system comprise the state and inform the state of the state's responsibility and duty to the individuals. There is really not a conflict between

Walt and Wendt on this matter, Walt correctly points out that individuals are the main element of constructivist analysis and Wendt uses the states as "individuals" in the international system.

Constructivist theory of this type makes three moves that delineate it as different from Waltzian structural theory (neorealism). One, the structure of the international system is a social phenomenon rather than a material phenomenon (Wendt 1999, 20).

"The character of international life is determined by the beliefs and expectations that states have about each other, and these are constructed largely by social rather than material structures," (Ibid.) Material power and capabilities matter, but only insofaras states have delineated the meaning of power and capability. Two, state identities are constructed by the international system by ways that a pseudo-economic approach can explain (Wendt 1999, 21). States are identified as states because other states identify them as such, not merely because of existence. What states view as the quality of "state" is determined by the interactions between these actors over the existence of the system.

Three, anarchy has no logic apart from the process of interaction (Wendt 1999, 21).

Interaction is structured by the embedded norms of the system. Wendt states that this does not undermine systemic theory (Wendt 1999, 21). Whether or not it does or does not undermine systemic theory shall be discussed in the conclusions of this work. Before turning to the offerings of constructivism, I first examine its philosophical and social science aspects and offer a critique of these fundamentals of the theory.

What then are the philosophical roots for this theory? The philosophical basis for the theory is best understood from the perspective of critical or postmodern theory.

Because identity and norms are so important to constructivism we must ask whose identity and whose norms? It is also important to understand constructivism is a means of knowing or understanding phenomenon, which is the goal of existential and postmodern philosophical theory.

Postmodern philosophy informs constructivism along two lines. First, it is impossible to "know" anything or have a universal definition outside of those involved in the discourse. Second, how actors will behave is determined by the system in which the actor is located.

According to Lyotard, "Languages are not employed haphazardly,…each must formulate its own rules and petition the addressee to accept them," (1984, 42). How we discuss something must be agreed upon and understood before the discussion begins. If we look at international relations as a discussion, what are the rules and from where do they come would be the equivalent concern. Constructivism informs us that rules are embedded in the system as the norms and principles by which actors are identified. The discourse among the actors is done according to norms, which are designed by discourse among the actors. The actors are, in the case of international relations, states. By common communication, derived by norms of understanding, states can project the understanding of "stateness" onto the system of states.

These same embedded norms allow states to understand what is acceptable behavior and transmit this behavior into the system. Michel Foucault, in Discipline and

Punish (1977), states that "A body is docile that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved," (1977, 136). Looking at the constructivist proposition that the norms and principles that are embedded in the system inform and develop the identity of the actors and then the actors can in turn inform and redefine the system, it is easy to see the influence of the Foucauldian conception of docility.

One purpose of understanding international relations theory is to go beyond the description of the subject manner and explain how the system and the units of the system might be transformed. Foucault (1977) shows how discipline and punishment in the world changed over time as the people informed the governments of what types of punishment and discipline were acceptable. The role of the people was determined by the society in which they lived. The people in turn redefined acceptable practices in the society.

The same can be applied to states in the international system. The system provides meaning to being a state. The states then redefine acceptable practices in the system. In this manner the system and the states may be transformed. For example, when the Athenians could no longer justify their foreign policy—war and the forceful surrender of territory from Spartan liege states—with the accepted language of their time, they redefined the system and introduced new language, thus in the Melian Dialogue we find the argument that strength makes right—definitely out of place for a society so dedicated to democratic norms of behavior3.

Philosophically postmodern ideas would not be possible without the work of existentialists such as Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Existentialism created the basis for understanding that no truths are universal. All things are seen through the essence that is the individual actor. Existentialism created the individual lens that is made systemic in critical theory and makes it possible to argue in favor of social construction theories.

If international relations is a socially constructed phenomenon, then we must understand how people are able to understand others in relation to themselves, so that some norms or principles of understanding might appear to exist. “If I am dealing with a stranger who has yet to utter a word, I may well believe that he is an inhabitant of another world in which my own thoughts and actions are unworthy of a place. But let him utter a

3 The Melian Dialogue can be found in Thucydides account of the Peloponnesian War, it is also discussed in W. Robert Connor, Thucydides (1984): Princeton University Press. work, or even make a gesture of impatience, and already he ceases to transcend me,”

(Merleau-Ponty 1962, 361).

The argument is that understanding each other is a matter of not being transcended by the other. When we communicate we cease to be transcended and instead begin to construct the idea of each other. While this radical individualism may seem to be at odds with constructivism and critical postmodern theory, it is actually the foundation that makes constructivism and postmodernism possible. Social construction does not occur in a vacuum, it occurs between individual actors, who if they are transcended by the other cannot begin to construct a theory of how the system in which they exist functions or defines their own existence.

Constructivism, Social Science

The second foundation for a theory of international relations is discovered in the understanding that a theory about actors in a system is a social scientific theory.

International relations as a field of study in political science must be held to some scientific standard if it is to be considered as “science”. Hume, in Treatise of Human

Nature (E. Mossner, Ed. 1969), argues that the name political science reflects a commitment to explain political phenomena according to laws, methods, and principles similar to those at work in nature. Hume discusses an “association of ideas,” with three basic rules: resemblance; contiguity in time and place; and, cause and effect (1969, 58).

This relates to the scientific method of understanding, which is to be echoed in the study of social phenomena if we wish to call the study scientific. Neufeld (1995) sets the stage for understanding constructivism as positivistic social science by giving positivism three basic aspects. One, positive knowledge is true in that it corresponds to facts. Second, positive knowledge is objective. Knowledge should be generated without reference to normatively oriented ideas. Third, the methodological approach that is used would be as well suited for use in the natural world as the social world (1995, 24-25).

Alexander Wendt (1999) attempts to explain constructivism as a positivistic social scientific theory. This would mean that constructivism is not epistemological—a descriptive or relational theory—but, it is ontological—a causal theory. This seems problematic at first glance because Walt (1998) says that one of the main problems of constructivist theory is that it is better at describing what is and what was than in predicting what might be or should be (1998, 38).

One further point should understood before plunging into the argument about the positivist nature of constructivism—the difference between causation and constitution.

Materialism, the basis for neorealism, relies on causal logic. This is to say that X causes

Y. Idealism, the basis for constructivism, relies on constitutive effect. That is to say that

X presupposes Y, Y is not contingent upon X, but X does constitute Y or part of Y.

Wendt offers a good example: the joining of hydrogen and oxygen atoms causes Water; but water is constituted by the molecular structure H2O. The molecular structure does not cause water, but without this structure something cannot be water (Wendt, 25). This is similar to explanation of constitutive rules found in Ruggie (1998, 22), the rules might delineate how to play the game, but they also delineate the structure of the game. Armed with these insights into constructivism I turn to the questions of whether constructivism is scientifically positivist and whether or not anarchy is ideational rather than structural.

Whether or not constructivism is a scientific positivist theory is the crux of the argument about constructivism as a form of cognitive international relations theory.

Positivism4 refers to the idea that we can scientifically “know” something. A positivist theory of international relations would at minimum accept the idea that nature of “states” can be scientifically approximated. The maximum level of positivism in international relations theory would say that the nature of “the system of states” could be scientifically approximated. On the surface it seems that there is a logical flaw in arguing that a theory of “knowing” in the constructivist sense—where identity is constructed by the actors based on embedded norms—could be a scientifically positivist theory of international relations.

What should be recognizable is that while water is constituted by fundamental elements of matter, it is not caused by these elements. It is possible for a phenomenon to be constructed by positivistically understood parts, without being caused by these parts.

This is the argument of those who favor constructivist theory as a positivistic social scientific theory of international relations. Science positively defines “what is” and the search for “what is” is the result of an idea that a relationship exists between some elements of the system. In nature the elements of the system—oxygen, hydrogen, argon, etc.—make or constitute the identity of understood flora and fauna. In the social system the elements—people, states, ideology, etc.—constitute the identity of understood beings

—which are the states, people, ideologies, etc. The most common objection to this is that

4 I use positivism to refer to what Wendt (1999) terms scientific realism or realism to avoid any confusion between this term and realist theory of international relations. this seems tautological X causes Y which causes X. But this is premised on the misguided belief that all positive science is aimed at causal (ontological) theory at its core. Wendt’s (1999) argument is that while the goal of constructivism is positivistic— explaining some behavior in the system—at its core it is an understanding of the constitutive elements of the system.

Critiques, Philosophy and Science

The same areas that provide the philosophical and social science basis for constructivism also offer a strong critique. Along this line of reasoning two critiques of scientific positivism exist. The critiques are based on the need for science to be empirically verifiable and the nature of critical discourse that is so much a part of postmodernism. First I look at the scientific critique, then at the postmodernist critique.

Science is based on observable fact. We cannot know what is unobservable. As

David Hume has informed us, what we know is really the illumination of “sensa”5 in our minds. Sensa are the mental images we receive from sensory contact and this alone constitutes what is knowable. Since we cannot possess sensory perception of “state” or

“system of states”, these things cannot scientifically or knowingly exist. The second is the more radical critique of postmodernism. This critique says that it is impossible to

“know” anything; there are no universally applicable truths.

To some postmodernists constructivism would be epistemological rather than ontological (or positivist). Constructivism is the construction of discourse between masters of the linguistic game that is being used at that moment to express the

5 Sensa refers to sensory perceived information. What we see at this moment is active sensa. What we remember when not actually seeing something is memory, or decaying sensa. significance of the symbols that signify a possible definition of what has at one time been termed “state” or “system of states”. Through discourse, the linguistic game, we can gain an understanding of the construction of the norms that predicate the understood meaning of the understood action of the entity that we symbolize with the word state. In any case, there is a strong case that can be made that constructivism is an empirical before ontological theory. This would mean that the theory is more concerned with how we can understand a relation rather than how the relation might come into being.

The question of the positivism of a theory of international relations comes to rest on the question of whether a constructivist theory of international relations rests on a descriptive theory of reference, a relational theory of reference, or a causal theory of reference. If constructivism is a descriptive or relational theory then it is epistemological.

Wendt’s argument is that constructivism is a constitutive theory, which is an ontological theory and thus positivistic. A constitutive theory is necessary to understand the elements that will be causal of phenomenon in a system; this is how constructivism can be viewed as ontological.

Descriptive theory relates to the Hume argument about “sensa”. What we can describe is what we can understand and thus give meaning. The relational theory is rooted in linguistic structuration and is the basis for postmodern epistemology. What we observe in reality has nothing to do with meaning and truth, which are the product of sociological relations that are found in the discourse between actors. However, the problem with this theory is that it fails to account for the resistance of nature to certain representations reached through discourse (Wendt, 56). In causal theory a term is given meaning and that meaning is then taught to others through time (Wendt, 57). The meaning of the term becomes embedded in the process of understanding that actors possess. In the positivist view beliefs and the meanings that actors apply to terms is both a function of nature and discourse. This is how constructivism—a highly cognitive theory—is able to claim positivist status. The structure of the system of states has been given a meaning that is understood by its function and how its actors engage in discourse about its meaning. In the process of understanding this meaning, the beliefs about how the system operates and what constitutes being an actor in the system become embedded in the very nature of the actors and the system.

I repeat myself here briefly on the issue of tautology. The only logical critique of this bit of theorizing is that it is slightly tautological. If the structure has been given meaning, how can it give meaning to new actors? The system cannot both give constitutive meaning to the actors and receive its meaning from the actors. Unless of course, you are willing to accept the sociological premise that social kinds both give and receive meaning from their parts. This is because social kinds have both internal and external structure (Wendt 1999, 71). This returns us to the constitutive nature of the constructivist theory of international relations.

Many constructivists would disagree with the claim of tautology because social structure is created and maintained by individual performances that in turn impact structure. Subjectivity has a dialectic nature, not synthesis dialectic as understood in the

Hegelian sense, which is that subjectivity is internal and external. Remember that in its philosophical roots constructivism has a touch of existentialism which holds all things subject to the being that is observing and constructing the observable relationship at any given time. This same concept is applied by constructivism to the international actor.

To explain the nature of states in the simplest fashion we can turn to the internal structure. States are given meaning by the structures of governance that constitute “being a state”. States are also given meaning by the embedded understanding of what constitutes a “state”, i.e., by the external structure of the system that says “this is a state” or “this is not a state” (Wendt 1999, 85-87). The same question of whether this is logically tautological raises questions about the validity of Wendt’s argument. However, it is readily apparent that a constructivist theory of international relations is not epistemologically driven, but an ontologically specified epistemological search for structural meanings. More simply put, constructivist theory passes the tests of positivist scientific inquiry into relations between entities—albeit they are social kinds and not natural kinds.

The arguments for and against constructivism as positivistic social science are compelling. However one may lean on this argument, the idea of constitutive structure applied to social phenomena is an appealing idea. I find the constructivist argument to be stronger than the critique and believe that it should be accepted as a positivist theory of social science that finds its roots in postmodern critique and in constituted identity. This of course leads us to the next question, what exactly does constructivism have to say or predict in areas of concern for international relations theory? This is addressed in three parts: anarchy, regimes, and the idea of world polity. Anarchy

Neorealism and Neoliberalism both hold anarchy as the lack of higher authority in the world. States, according to Keohane and Mearsheimer alike, exist in a self-help world where gains (relative: Keohane, Grieco; or absolute: Waltz, Mearsheimer) matter.

Thus anarchy is a materialistic phenomenon that will drive states to compete for scarce resources, such as economic strength and security. Waltz (1979) defines anarchy as a system in which there is no legitimate use of force outside of the actors (which he defines as states) (1979, 104). Some liberals, such as Milner (1993) have attempted to overcome the neorealist/neoliberal conception of anarchy by redefining its meaning. This project seems almost constructive in approach, but does not extend itself to the conclusions about anarchy made by constructivists such as Wendt. Constructivists argue that anarchy is a deeply embedded structure that is basically only as important as the actors decide it is at a given point in time.

According to Wendt (1992) the interaction and cognitive processes of actors defines anarchy (Wendt 1992, 397-98). The argument rests on the key idea that actors acquire their identity by participating in the system and the system acquires institutionalization from the interests of actors. These interests exist above and beyond the individual members of the system and thus anarchy is only a nominal structure of the system and is redefined by the actors as their interests merge and change over time.

Wendt’s argument relies on the conceptualization of anarchy as an empty concept outside of the meaning, which the actors in the international system give to the word. In this case it is also possible to think of anarchy as an institution of or deep structure of the system.

The three structures that Wendt argues are possible for anarchy are friend, rival, and enemy. That is to say that anarchy can mean that states can cooperate and be friends (ala

Immanuel Kant and neoliberalism), they can be rivals for resources (ala John Locke and neorealism), or they can be enemies fighting in a continual struggle for primacy (ala

Thomas Hobbes).

Wendt’s reasoning on how this is possible: anarchic structures construct their elements, but these structures vary at the macro level and can have multiple logics

(Wendt 1999, 249). Which basically means that anarchy as a structure of the system does determine the nature of the actors. But, the actors can apply different logic at different temporal reference points and thus recreate the structure of anarchy. Wendt (1992, 1999) bases his desertion of the fundamental belief that anarchy is fundamentally about the

Hobbsean “war of all against all,” on the argument of Hedley Bull (1977). Some forms of interstate cooperation are possible based on shared ideals—making possible a Grotian or Lockean view of anarchy as a system of rivalries, not enmities. Constructivism goes further, though, to argue that a cooperative anarchy is possible because states define what anarchy means at the given moment of the interaction between the states. Conflict or cooperation are neither one a good indicator of materialism or idealism. It all hinges on how the concepts of cooperation or conflict are constituted (Wendt 1999, 253-255).

Anarchy is, according to Wendt, “An empty vessel, without intrinsic meaning.

What gives anarchy its meaning are the kinds of people who live there and the structure of their relationships,” (Wendt 1999, 309). Wendt does give a caveat to this proposition.

Because the constitution of anarchy and of the system is temporally specific, once one stage of anarchy is left, the system can never return to that stage again. Anarchy is probably first constituted as enmity and then progresses to rivalry and finally cooperation.

I have two primary problems with constructivist arguments about anarchy. First, the argument that the structure of anarchy defines the actors who then reconstitute or redefine anarchy which will in turn reconstitute the meaning of being an actor in the system is tautological. Wendt (1992, 1999) is repeatedly given to making circular arguments that do not have logical consistency. That anarchy can be reconstituted I do not doubt. In fact, at any time any symbol can be reified and the reification given new significance for interpretation. Beyond this idea, even the interpretation of the significance of the signification of the symbol can be reinterpreted as the discourse between actors grows and changes to incorporate new actors or fewer actors.6 However, just because actors can discursively redefine what something means at any point in time, does not mean that this meaning can in turn define the actors. From a realist point of view the system does define the actors, but the actors cannot redefine the system (Waltz

1979, Mearsheimer 1994). Whether one critiques constructivism from a realist or postmodernist viewpoint, the logic of anarchy defining actors and actors defining anarchy is flawed.

The second problem is that Wendt (1992, 1999) makes the constitution of anarchy linear. Once changed in form from enmity to rival it cannot return to enmity and from rival to cooperation it cannot return to rival or enmity. Natural science holds natural phenomenon act cyclically, which would indicate nonlinearity. Why should social kinds of phenomenon behave differently? This is particularly problematic because of the

6 For an insightful expansion on this idea see Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1997). contention that constructivism is positivistic social science. Realism would tell you that just because there is cooperation today does not mean that there will not be enmity tomorrow or at least rivalry. The US and Japan were allies in the early 1900s, rivals in the 1920s and 1930s, enemies in the 1940s, cooperative in the 1950s and 1960s and materialistic rivals in the last three (3) decades of the century.

Regimes

Regimes are “social institutions that consist of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programs that govern the interactions of actors in a specific issue area,” (Young 1997, 6). Principles are beliefs about causation and how a social process works. Norms are standards of behavior that are ideational. For the constructivist the principles and norms are embedded in the system and define the actors that are part of the system. Rules are specific guidelines, usually found in the form of a covenant or treaty, of behavior that conform to the norms. Decision-making procedures are the dispute resolution mechanisms of a regime. Should one or more actors violate the rules, a decision is made about the proper procedure for the other actors that are part of the regime to take in regard to the incident(s) in question.

There are generally three theories about regime formation and purposes. One is the power-based theory of regimes that is associated with realist theory of international relations. Second is interest-based theory that is associated with liberal theories of international relations. Third is the cognitive/constructivist approach to the study of regimes and regime formation. Neoliberals stress the self-interest of states as the motive for cooperation among states and for the creation and compliance with international regimes. Realist emphasize power considerations and how the relative position of actors will cause cooperation, and thus regimes, to be less likely to exist and harder to maintain.

Cognitivists show that the meaning of power and perception of actors' interests rely upon the development of the actors' social knowledge (Hasenclever, et al. 1997, 211).

For the neoliberal, international politics is not a zero sum game. States, which are the primary but not only actors, do not always desire to have all of the resource that is in contest. States have common interests in using and overseeing the use of resources and may choose to cooperate. Regimes exist for the purpose of lowering the probability of states cheating instead of truly cooperating in the use or oversight of a resource.

To the neoliberal, regimes are important because they provide information to states. The information that regimes provide is useful in facilitating cooperation

(Hasenclever, et al. 1997, 32-34). In this instance the goal of the actors is bound by cooperation, regimes are created as instruments to achieve the cooperative goal of the states regarding a certain resource (1997, 37).

Realism offers three theories about regimes and cooperation; hegemonic stability, power-oriented research, and modern realist theory. In fact, only hegemonic stability is truly realist. The other two theories are neorealist in scope.

Hegemonic stability holds that regimes are created by powerful states to ensure cooperation that is beneficial to the hegemon. Whenever the power of the hegemon begins to be equalized by other states, regimes will begin to fail and cooperation will be most difficult (Hasenclever et al. 1997, 90). Regimes and cooperation are treated as a public good in hegemonic theory. Neorealism concentrates on two areas of concern in addressing regimes and cooperation. One is power-based theory. The other is concern over relative gains.

Even power-based theory is concerned with the pay-off. Krasner (1993) points out that international interaction is about who gets what and not how they get what (1997,

105). In addition, power matters because it determines who can play, what the rules of the game will be, and it can change the pay-off (Krasner 1991, in 1997, 106).

To power-based theorists, regimes are important for policy coordination and stability. An example often cited is the global communications regime (Hasenclever et al

1997, 107). While this doesn't detract from neoliberal arguments, particularly the contractualist arguments, it does add to them an important element. Power-based theory allows the examination of zero-sum games.

John Mearsheimer (1994) points out that neoliberal theories of cooperation and regime are most problematic because they ignore the question of relative gains. Joseph

Grieco (1988, 1990, 1993) makes a strong argument that neorealism does not reject neoliberal institutionalism, but qualifies the theory. Mearsheimer argues that you cannot separate security and economics, and this is the crux of Grieco's arguments about modern realist theory and regimes.

Anarchy, defined as the lack of governance over states, makes cooperation difficult, not impossible. Why, because not absolute gains but relative gains matter more in an anarchic world. States desire to gain relative to other states, this hampers cooperation (Hasenclever et al 1997, 116-118). It is even the case, according to Grieco

(1988), that states will forgo absolute gain if it is expected that another state would reap greater benefit and increase in relative capabilities from the transaction (cited in 1997, 120). States will cooperate only if the terms ensure a balance or equitable distribution of gains that maintains the pre-cooperation balance of capabilities.

The third area is cognitivist/constructivist. I examine cognitivist theories of regime formation as constructivist due to the underlying principle of constitutive structure. Wendt (1999), whose work is an exemplary example of constructivism borrows heavily from Ruggie (1998) in explaining the way in which structures are constitutive of their parts and the system constituted in turn by the parts.

Cognitivist theory comes in two parts. Weak cognitivism holds that liberal and realist theories are not totally wrong, that they need to be fleshed out by the addition of theories of learning. Strong cognitivism holds that only the explanation of the origin and dynamic of societal actors' self-understanding can explain cooperation and the role of regimes in international interaction (Hasenclever et al. 1997, 137).

There are three basic assumptions to weak cognitivism. One, knowledge shapes the behavior of decision-makers and the expectations of the actors about the actions of others. Two, leaders require information to lower the level of uncertainty in decision- making. Three, a minimum collective understanding of ideas is necessary for choosing the rules of the game (Hasenclever et al 1997, 140-142).

Ideas, or knowledge, carry weight because interests are shaped by ideas.

Ikenberry (1993) points out that the post WWII world economy was greatly shaped by the idea of Keynsianism. Jackson (1993) explains how common ideas about the capabilities of the US and USSR to destroy each other and survive nuclear holocaust aided in the implementation of security regimes in the 1970s and 1980s. Ideas can be important not just for low politic areas, but also for economics and security. The addition of such thought into liberal or realist theory does prove stimulating and theoretically rewarding. More importantly, what this shows is that cooperation can be learned and regimes can be the dependent variable resulting from interaction and cooperation of states (Nye 1987, Haas 1993, in 1997, 145). It is less clear that cooperation serves as a causal factor in weak cognitivism, because it is problematic at best to measure cooperation and regimes as independent variables.

Strong cognitivism rejects the arguments of both liberalism and realism.

Basically, strong cognitivism says that there are fundamental rules that actors learn because they are embedded in the "what and who" of the actors identity. These rules lead to actors specifying interests and gaining new knowledge, which in turn leads to cooperation with those actors who share the same fundamental attributes and embedded ideas and knowledge by virtue of existence—and this leads to regime. The regime in turn affords an opportunity for new knowledge to be disseminated and internalized by actors who will then have new interests and demands for cooperation (Hasenclever et al 1997,

According to strong cognitivism the problem with the logical positivism of realism and liberalism is that social interaction is not the same as the biological interactions, which gave rise to the patterns of relationship testing found in positivistic social science. An example is that norms are often treated as causal variables by positivist science. According to Ruggie (1986) norms can inspire, guide or justify action, but they do not cause action (Hasenclever et al 1997, 163). Strong cognitivists other problem with positivistic science is that regimes are a practice and not a set of regulations (Hasenclever et al 1997, 163). Hasenclever, et al likens this to game playing. The rules of the game do not just control the game; they allow the game to be played in the first place.

This last point is problematic. It appears to be a reifying of regulation. Is regulation the same as practice? The practice or action of the game is controlled by regulation; does regulation equal the playing of the game? For a theory that is overly concerned with knowledge, ideas and logic, it is almost illogical in this particular point.

Another problem with strong cognitivism is its claim about the process when knowledge causes divergent interests and interpretations of reality. Hasenclever et al, show that the in strong cognitivist position divergent interpretations lead to divergent rules that will be conflictual. This conflict leads to discourse and discourse to common interpretation and thus converging expectations (Hasenclever et al 1997, 178).

Why will discourse lead to common interpretation? Why will conflict lead to discourse and if the interpretation of reality in the beginning leads to different ideas, why will different ideas cause a convergent expectation? This argument assumes that the mechanism of cooperation is already embedded in society. It is more likely that cooperation is created because of embedded ideals, not that it just exists.

It is interesting to note that only strong cognitivism seems unlikely to converge with any other theory of regime to form a synthesis. Liberalism and realism converge in neoliberal institutionalism and in relative gains concerns. Weak cognitivism compliments either liberal or realist theory. But strong cognitivism, where learning and knowledge lead to regime and regime teaches actors is the least likely to converge with other theory despite its argument about divergent interpretation of reality leading to convergent expectations.

World Polity

What would be needed to fundamentally transform the world system? Individual states and groups of states have attempted to alter the system, as it is currently understood. However, attempts of this type may lead to wars (Nazi Germany’s attempt to change the map), but rarely lead to transformation. Constructivism is an argument that says it is possible to transform the system. So, this question must be addressed.

The last great systemic transformation was the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), which outlined the idea of the sovereign state we currently understand. This treaty gave us the idea of state sovereignty—that is that a state is free from external controls and intrusions in its internal affairs (Krasner 1999, 4). If Krasner (1999) is correct, then the idea of legal sovereignty of the state might exist, but does the ability of a government to act without reproach within its own borders really exist? If Westphalian sovereignty is currently under assail, then how is this possible transformation being made possible?

Constructivism has an answer to this question. The construction of a world political culture or world polity is how the system can be fundamentally transformed given the nature of Westphalian states. Boli and Thomas (1999) argue that “To an ever increasing degree, all sorts of actors learn to define themselves and their interests from the global culture and organizational structures in which they are embedded. Conversely, these global structures are maintained and transformed by the actors they constitute,”

(Boli and Thomas 1999, 4). Constructivism as a systemic theory takes the state as the primary unit of analysis.

It does need to understand the current system that exists. Constructivism in offering a means of transforming the system then turns to the idea of a world political culture that is created by memberships of people around the world in international nongovernmental organizations.

Thomas Princen and Matthias Finger (1994), along with their contributors, have a larger picture explanation of the role of NGOs in the international environmental debate.

In Environmental NGOs in World Politics, NGOs are presented as a force for tying local concern to the global problem of environmental protocols and particularly for conservation efforts.

It is inevitable that as the number of international organizations increased, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) would increase in number also. But, as pointed out by Princen and Finger (1994) this linkage is only partially valid as an explanatory factor of the growth of NGOs. Between 1909 and 1988 the increase in IOs was only about 280, while the increase in NGOs was over 4,300 (Princen and Finger: 1). The increase in the number of NGOs coincides with the rising number of interest groups, groups form as political systems mature, and as individuals become more concerned with influencing issues of importance to themselves and issues that they perceive as greatly affecting their world.

Boli and Thomas (1999) examine the growth in NGOs as a way of changing world culture. It is a weak cognitivist approach to studying culture, because it conditions rational choice but is not terribly beset by the question of identity. The authors offer five cultural themes that can be seen in the NGO population. The first is an element of universalism (Boli and Thomas 1999: 35-36). Human nature, agency and the purposes of NGOs are viewed as being universal. If the NGOs have universal traits then it is possible that an element of universality underlies actual social forms. A world body politic would have to be universal to develop, if not universal the world body politic would not exist. This argument underscores the constructivist belief in embedded norms and principles.

Second is that NGOs are individualistic. Society is formed of individuals. At the

IGO level, the society is individual states. At the NGO level it is individual people from around the world. Combining the first two elements constructs "the world polity as a social unit," (Boli and Thomas 1999: 37).

The third element is that the activity of people who are involved in NGOs is rationalistic and voluntary. The authority of NGOs is not formalized; the reasons for people joining the NGOs actually create the authority of the NGO. So, a world culture must exist at some level for NGOs to successfully proliferate and penetrate many different states.

The fourth characteristic is that NGOs have a purposive nature. NGOs have a developmental agenda that includes not just security or economic growth. NGOs are greatly interested in individual self-fulfillment and justice (Boli and Thomas 1999: 38), as witnessed by the growth of organizations like Amnesty International. However, this process cannot be over rationalized, rationalization can cause severe problems for individual spiritual growth (1999: 39). The final characteristic is world citizenship. When the four previous elements are in place, world citizenship is the outcome. This citizenship is egalitarian and based on the access of individuals to the ideas which can shape their culture and identity.

Ruggie (1998) approaches the creation of world polity from a different perspective. It is a philosophical and psychological construction based on history, argumentation, legitimation, and identity formation. This is a strong cognitivist perspective.

The construction of world polity in this vein begins with the idea that identity is a social construction. Identity is constructed through language, validation and brute fact.

We identify with the state of our citizenship because we were born there. States come into existence through the formation of common identity.

Because rationality cannot explain all things, we must look for answers in other areas. Institutions might not be the most rational choice for solving a problem. This is a common problem, so we create identity to deal with problems.

The problem becomes one of fixing the identity. Identity is a historical and often linguistic construct. The post-modernist school of philosophy (both political and social) has argued that the problem is one of changing human thought through control of symbols that represent languages.

Ruggie rejects the post-modernist argument. Ideas are the meaning which people have attributed to phenomena. Ideas are socially constructed. If enough people accept the idea, then it becomes a part of the culture of the society. This same logic applies to the world polity. Whether one finds the construction of world culture (world polity) more appealing in the form given by Boli and Thomas (1999) or Ruggie (1998) does not really matter. What is important to understand is that in both cases a means of transforming the system is created based on the development of a world political identity shaped by individual level interaction that then informs the “state” of what ought to be and what will be acceptable to the people that the state represents in the international system. This is the truly fascinating aspect of constructivist theory in international relations.

Constructivism makes arguments about anarchy and regimes and systemic transformation. Do these arguments make this a systemic theory of international relations? And, if constructivism is a systemic theory, should it be given equal consideration to that given realist and liberal theories? These are the questions of the final section of this work.

Constructivism as Systemic Theory

“A theory, though related to the world about which explanations are wanted, always remains distinct from that world. ‘Reality’ will be congruent neither with a theory nor with a model that may represent it,” (Waltz 1979, 6-7). These lines are from the introduction to Waltz’ Theory of International Politics. Waltz’ offering is the seminal work of neorealist theory in international relations. If neorealism is the benchmark against which other theories are to be assessed, then a competitive systemic theory should at least meet the requirements of theory that Waltz uses to bedrock his neorealist theory.

“A theory is a picture, mentally formed, of a bounded realm or domain of activity.

A theory is a depiction of the organization of a domain and of the connections among its parts,” (Waltz 1979, 8). In the case of international relations scholarship the realm is the world. The parts are either states, groups of states, or individual people depending upon the type of theory. For constructivism the parts are individual actors, but the actors exist at two levels. At one level there are the individuals who generate the norms of world polity. At the other level are the states through which the system is transformed. But does meeting the requirements of theory make constructivist theory of international relations systemic?

“In international politics the appropriate concerns…of systems theory are twofold: first, to trace the expected careers of different international systems, for example, by indicating the likely durability and peacefulness; second, to show how the structure of the system affects the interacting units and how they in turn affect the structure,” (Waltz 1979, 40). There is little question that constructivist theory explains how the structure of the system affects the units and is in turn affected by the units.

Indeed most of constructivism focuses on how the embedded norms of the structure define the parts that then redefine the structure.

However, if there is a weakness to constructivism it is in the first purpose of systemic theory. Does constructivism inform us about the different systems and explain the likelihood of future actions? According to Walt (1998) the primary weakness of constructivism is that it is non-predictive. If the theory cannot predict how a system will grow and develop is it still a systemic theory? Realism did not predict the end of the

Cold War; interdependence liberalism fails to predict conflict in an increasingly economically interdependent world. Are these theories any less systemic? Constructivism seeks to explain systems and the interaction between systems and their parts. Actually constructivism can explain some aspects of the system quite well.

Why did the world unite against the genocidal behavior of Nazi Germany in WWII and universally condemn such behavior in the Balkans and in Africa during the 1990s?

Constructivists would answer that this occurred because of the norms and principles that are embedded in the system and define the states and the proper behavior of states. If we can understand the transformation of norms and principles embedded in the system caused by individual behavior, then we can actually predict the behavior of the systemic level actors—i.e., states.

Constructivism as a systemic theory offers the best hope for understanding the transformation of the system. It also offers the best hope for transformation when people realize that their collective identity can be based on norms and principles that they can instill in the structure of the system. It is a theory that should be given the same degree of attention that is given to the various forms of realism and liberalism, and it is likely to better explain the nature of international relations in the coming years than the more narrowly focused liberal and realist theories of international relations. SOURCES

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