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POL 319 US-India-China Military Dr. Lairson

The Complexity of US-India-China Relations: A Strategic Interaction System?

 Ideological

China Will Never Seek Regional Hegemony

China’s New Model for US-China Relations

China attacks US for Cold War against China: block China’s Rise

 Diplomatic Negotiations While in Conflict

Vietnam and China: Defense Hotline

China and Japan begins negotiations on the ECS

 Repositioning Based on Creating Potential Positions of Strength

US Lifts Arms Embargo on Vietnam for weapons for maritime security

 Complex Layers of Strategic Interaction: India – Vietnam - China

India provides training and weapons to Vietnam; China and Sri Lanka?

India’s $100 million defense credit to Vietnam

India-Vietnam joint call for freedom of navigation in SCS

US-India joint call for freedom of navigation in the SCS

 US Leaks Military Planning to respond to Chinese actions in East and South China Seas

 Military Capabilities and Developments as Indicators of Intentions and Strategy

China to Build Second Aircraft carrier

China will have four carriers and accompanying CBG’s at some point Aircraft Carriers won’t matter in future wars

SEA nations expand amphibious capabilities

Military buildup across East and Southeast Asia

Strategic Political Maneuvering

China get APEC to endorse new trade negotiations

US-China agree on Greenhouse gas limitations

US and China reach PTA on high tech products

May 5, 2013 file photo, Chinese troop hold a banner which reads, "You've crossed the border, please go back," in Ladakh, India

China says it will never seek regional hegemony Jun. 28, 2014 10:28 AM EDT  Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, third from right, meets with Indian Vice President Hamid Ansari at the at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China Saturday, June 28, 2014 BEIJING (AP) — Chinese President Xi Jinping said Saturday his country will never seek hegemony no matter how strong it becomes, even as his neighbors worry about Beijing's actions in several territorial disputes. Xi made the comments as he hosted leaders of India and Myanmar to commemorate 60 years since their countries agreed to principles of peaceful coexistence. At the same time, China is quarreling with several neighboring countries, including India, over territory and is challenging U.S. power in the region. In November, China declared an air defense identification zone over much of the East China Sea, where it is disputing several islands with Japan. Tensions also flared up with Vietnam after China deployed oil rigs in waters claimed by both countries, and with the Philippines, where Beijing has asserted its sovereignty in the South China Sea close to Philippine shore. However, Xi, Myanmar President Thein Sein and Indian Vice President Hamid Ansari pledged to work to preserve regional peace. Xi also called for "a new architecture of Asia-Pacific security." He has said previously that such a security arrangement would include Russia and Iran and exclude the United States. While the U.S. is not a claimant itself, it says it has a national interest in sustaining open navigation and trade through the strategic waters in the South and East China seas. China, Vietnam say they'll negotiate sea disputes By CHRISTOPHER BODEEN Aug. 27, 2014 9:07 AM EDT  In this photo released by China's Xinhua news agency, Vietnamese special envoy Le Hong Anh, left,... Read more BEIJING (AP) — China and Vietnam said Wednesday they're committed to negotiating maritime disputes to avoid a recurrence of tensions that spiked when China deployed an oil rig in waters claimed by Hanoi. The statement followed talks between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Vietnamese special envoy Le Hong Anh to resolve a crisis in relations dating from the rig's deployment in May. China's move triggered fury in Hanoi, but Beijing rejected Vietnamese complaints and pulled the rig out on its own terms in July. The friendship between China and Vietnam was created and nourished by older generations of leaders, state broadcaster CCTV quoted Xi as saying. "While clashes are inevitable between neighbors, what's crucial is how they are handled and what kind of attitude is taken," he said. China's official Xinhua News Agency said the sides would work toward a mutually acceptable and durable solution. They also agreed to research joint development in the disputed area of the South China Sea, not take actions to complicate or broaden the dispute, and to "maintain the stability of the overall China-Vietnam relationship and of the South China Sea," Xinhua said. China attacked Vietnam in 1979 to punish it for invading Cambodia and the two have since fought over island groups in the South China Sea. They settled their land border more than a decade ago, but remain at odds over their maritime claims. This summer's feuding was the worst in years, leading vessels from both nations to spar close to the rig and setting off deadly anti-Chinese riots across Vietnam. Anti-Chinese sentiment is widespread in Vietnam, and is often tapped into by the country's dissident movement, which criticizes the government for its allegedly subservient relationship to its Communist brethren next door. The tensions led to speculation that Hanoi might swing relations in favor of its old adversary the United States, as have other Southeast Asian nations locked in territorial disputes with China. However, the government was seen as split between those favoring a strategic shift to Washington and a faction believing that China, its ideological ally, giant neighbor and vital economic partner, can be accommodated. The Diplomat The US Lifts Arms Embargo: The Ball Is in Vietnam’s Court The United States partially lifted the embargo. The next move will be Vietnam’s.

By Carl Thayer October 06, 2014 On October 2, Secretary of State John Kerry finally met officially with his Vietnamese counterpart Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh in Washington. In May, Secretary Kerry invited Minh to visit but the invitation was not taken up immediately. Vietnamese officials privately told The Diplomat at the time that Binh’s visit was “too sensitive” because of the oil rig crisis with China. Under the terms of the Comprehensive Partnership agreed in July 2013, a ministerial-level mechanism was created to oversee all aspects of the bilateral relationship. The meeting between Secretary Kerry and Foreign Minister Minh was held to review developments over the past year under the Comprehensive Partnership Agreement. In remarks prior to their meeting Secretary Kerry noted that significant progress had been made on a number of issues including the civilian 123 nuclear program, the Proliferation Security Agreement, and economic and other issues. Foreign Minister Minh noted, “I come to the United States today to meet and to work with U.S. colleagues to review the bilateral relations between the two countries.” It therefore came as a surprise when Jen Psaki, spokesperson for the Department of State, announced at the daily press briefing: The Secretary informed Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Minh that the State Department has taken steps to allow for the future transfer of maritime security-related defense articles to Vietnam. This policy supports Vietnam’s efforts to improve its maritime domain awareness and maritime security capabilities. Under questioning from the media Psaki noted “our security relationship (with Vietnam) remains under constant review. Clearly there’s more work that needs to be done in areas like human rights… and this is, of course, a partial lifting.” When asked a series of questions about whether the lifting of the arms embargo was prompted by China’s action in the South China Sea, and specifically China’s placement of an oilrig in disputed waters, Paski replied: Well, in part, in order to fully integrate Vietnam into maritime security initiatives that we have partnerships on throughout the region. But there are also components of steps in progress on reforms that they made in the country that prompted the action. State Department officials held a separate briefing for the media to clarify this issue. They spoke on a background basis. These officials were at pains to downplay the China factor in the unexpected U.S. decision to approve the sale of lethal weapons to Vietnam for maritime defense. For example, one official stated: In very broad terms, it’s partly in response to the realization that there is a lack of maritime capacity in the region and it is useful to fill that gap. And certainly, the need for that has become more apparent over the last year or two. But it is not in response to a specific action or crisis at the moment. This is not an anti- China move. This is not something were we would feel we had to alert China to. This is really a move on the continuum of things we’ve been talking about to help countries build maritime capacity. The same State Department official also noted that immediate sales were not expected and “Vietnam does not have any equipment on order at this moment.” The United States first imposed an arms embargo on North Vietnam in response to the Gulf of Tonkin incidents in August 1964. This took the form of invoking the Trading with the Enemy Act that was extended to the whole of Vietnam after it was formally reunified. In 1984 the United States included Vietnam on the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) list of countries that were denied licenses to acquire defense articles and defense services. The ITAR list included countries that were already under a U.S. arms embargo or where it was deemed that armed exports “would not otherwise be in furtherance of world peace and security and the foreign policy of the United States.” ITAR restrictions remained in place even after the U.S. ended its trade embargo against Vietnam in 1994. In April 2007, the Department of State amended ITAR to permit “on a case-by-case basis licenses, other approvals, exports or imports of non-lethal defense articles and defense services destined for or originating in Vietnam.” The Bush Administration included Vietnam in the Foreign Military Financing program for the first time. It requested $500,000 for the 2009 Fiscal Year budget. This change in U.S. policy led Vietnam to inquire about the sale of spare parts for its Vietnam-era captured U.S. Huey helicopters and M113 Armored Personnel Carriers at the first Vietnam-United States Security Dialogue on Political, Security and Defense Issues held in Hanoi in October 2008. In December 2009, Vice Admiral Jeffrey Wieringa, the head of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, revealed in an interview that although U.S.-Vietnam defense relations were in their infancy eventual arms sales were “certainly possible” when the relationship matured. Admiral Wieringa suggested that Vietnam might be interested in maritime patrol aircraft or a coastal radar system. Admiral Wieringa’s remarks were made on the eve of the visit to Washington by Vietnam’s Minister of National Defense, General Phung Quang Thanh. When Thanh met with Secretary Robert Gates at the Pentagon he requested that the U.S. lift its arms embargo. The Obama Administration set human rights conditions on arms sales. In July 2010, on the fifteenth anniversary of diplomatic relations, U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Michael Michalak was asked on a nationally televised program in Vietnam why the U.S. arms embargo was still in effect. Ambassador Michalak replied: That is one of the areas where human rights questions do have an effect. We would very much like to expand our military to military relationship to include the sale of arms, but until we are more comfortable with the human rights situation in Vietnam, that’s just not going to be possible. According to annual State Department reports for the years 2007 to 2010, the U.S. licensed the export of $98.5 million of defense articles and $3.7 million of defense services to Vietnam. In response to Vietnam’s submission of letters of request under the Foreign Military Sales program, the State Department approved Foreign Military Financing for Vietnam’s acquisition of helicopter spare parts and ship radios. In August 2011, Senator Jim Webb revealed that the U.S. Department of Defense and Vietnam’s Ministry of National Defense had held “careful but positive” discussions on lifting the restrictions on the sale of military technology to Vietnam. No further details were made available. Over the next three years Vietnam conducted a concerted lobbying campaign at the highest level to get the United States to end its arms embargo. In June 2012, for example, when Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta visited Hanoi, both Defense Minister Thanh and Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung pressed for the lifting of the embargo. In July 2014, President Truong Tan Sang lobbied former President Bill Clinton for an end to the arms embargo during the latter’s visit to Hanoi. The partial lifting of the ban to permit the sale of lethal maritime security and surveillance capabilities on a case by case basis raises the question of what Vietnam will ask for. In January 2012, prior to the lifting of the partial ban, Vietnam provided a “wish list” of military weapons it would like to acquire to visiting Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberman while they were in Hanoi. No details were made public. Shortly after the visit by the two senators, there were media references to Vietnam’s interest in acquiring demining technology. More significantly, it was reported that Vietnam was interested in developing an anti-submarine warfare capability and had shown interest in procuring the Lockheed Martin P-3 Orion with advanced sonar detection equipment. Vietnam wanted the P-3 to protect its Exclusive Economic Zone in the South China Sea and to detect Chinese submarines operating in its waters. In June 2012, Vietnam’s Defense Minister addressed a joint press conference with Secretary Panetta in Hanoi. Thanh provided the first general indication of what Vietnam would like to acquire. He stated: Once the lethal weapons restrictions are lifted, Vietnam has the demand to buy some [items] from the United States, firstly to repair, to overhaul, the weapons that are left from the war. After that depends on the financial capacity and demands of our military. We will choose to buy… certain kinds of weapons for the process of modernization of our military. Present U.S. policy prohibits the licensing or sale of a variety of weapons, “non-lethal crowd control defense articles and defense services, and night vision devises to end users with a role in ground security.” The changed U.S. policy is aimed at bolstering Vietnam’s Coast Guard by providing patrol boats, coastal radar and maritime surveillance aircraft. It has yet to be determined what defensive armaments will be permitted for these platforms. Two conclusions can be drawn from the partial lifting of the U.S. arms embargo. First, the United States policy to counter Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea has moved beyond diplomatic rhetoric and support for international law to a strategy that now embraces arming littoral states to defend themselves in their maritime domain. This shift in U.S. policy is designed to beef up the maritime defense capabilities of littoral states to deter – if not respond to – Chinese assertiveness without directly dragging the United States into a naval confrontation with China. In the case of Vietnam, U.S. officials have made clear that their priority is to enhance the capabilities of the Vietnam Coast Guard to defend itself. This is because China has chosen to employ its Coast Guard, other civilian maritime enforcement agencies, and fishing fleet to advance its sovereignty claims. Second, the change in U.S. policy also has the effect of undercutting party conservatives in Vietnam who oppose stepping up defense and security cooperation with the United States. In the past party conservatives challenged other party members who wanted to step up integration with the United States by asking, “What has the United States done for Vietnam?” Party conservatives advanced a three point agenda of demanding more U.S. funds to clean up Agent Orange hot spots, more U.S. assistance in identifying the remains of Vietnamese soldiers missing-in-action in the Vietnam War, and an end to the arms embargo. The United States has taken steps to address the first two issues. The partial lifting of the arms embargo addresses the third concern. The ball is now back in Vietnam’s court. Party conservatives must now decide whether or not they should accept the U.S. offer to provide defensive weapons for maritime security. Party conservatives could argue that the partial lifting of arms sales does not go far enough and that the linkage between progress on human rights and the removal of further restrictions is unacceptable. In this case party conservatives are likely to press for a complete end to all U.S. restrictions on arms sale. Conservative opposition could have the effect of limiting Vietnam’s acquisitions of U.S. arms. On the other hand, if party conservatives accept the partial lifting of the arms embargo they could test the U.S. by requesting the most advanced weapon systems on any patrol boats and aircraft that they order. The Diplomat United States Lifts Vietnam Arms Embargo (With a Catch) 40 years after the Vietnam War, the U.S. will sell defense equipment to Vietnam for maritime security.

By Ankit Panda October 03, 2014

As expected, the United States announced that it would lift its long-standing policy of not selling lethal arms to Vietnam. The decision comes with a caveat in that it will only apply to equipment that will help Vietnam improve its maritime security. The move represents a move toward completely normalizing the U.S.-Vietnam relations. “The State Department has taken steps to allow for the future transfer of maritime security-related defense articles to Vietnam,” noted U.S. Department of State spokeswoman Jen Psaki. In addition to only covering items that will help Vietnam improve its maritime security, the deal will also require that requests for equipment from Vietnam be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Speaking in New York last week, Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Pham Binh Minh said that as long as the embargo was in place, the relationship between the two countries would remain “abnormal.” Minh later spoke in Washington D.C., where he noted that “no two countries have worked harder” to fix their relationship than Vietnam and the United States. The decision to lift the embargo comes nearly 40 years after the end of the Vietnam War. Support for lifting the embargo in the United States is broad and bipartisan. U.S. Senator John McCain (R- Ariz) told Reuters that “Easing the lethal arms ban on Vietnam for the purpose of maritime security will strengthen our defense cooperation in ways that benefit both countries.” Human rights groups remain concerned that lifting the arms embargo without applying explicit conditions on human rights is ill-advised for the United States. John Sifton, Asia advocate at Human Rights Watch, told Reuters that Vietnam hasn’t “earned” the right for the embargo to lifted. McCain additionally notes that for the embargo on non- maritime security-related equipment to be lifted, Vietnam will have to take “additional steps … to respect and defend the human rights of the Vietnamese people.” For Vietnam, the U.S. decision will be largely welcomed as a positive step in helping it modernize its naval capabilities. Vietnam has embarked on a multi-billion dollar modernization effort aimed at bolstering its ability to monitor and protect its sovereign waters from foreign incursion. In particular, Hanoi remains concerned about growing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. Earlier this year, China moved an oil rig along with around 80 vessels into waters that Vietnam claims as part of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Vietnam primarily relies on Russia for most of its defense needs. Its naval hardware mostly consists of legacy Soviet-era systems. Most recently, Vietnam is developing a submarine warfare capability by investing in improved Russian Kilo-class subs that will help it implement an anti-access/area denial strategy against possible Chinese encroachments. One of the first items that will likely be on Vietnam’s wish-list is Lockheed’s P3 Orion maritime surveillance aircraft. Vietnam’s aerial maritime surveillance capabilities remain rather modest with a small fleet of helicopters and short takeoff and landing (STOL) utility aircraft. In 2012, Vietnam Aerospace Association announced that it would cooperate with Sweden’s Unmanned Group to jointly develop unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that will likely be used for maritime surveillance. For the United States, lifting the embargo in the interest of helping Vietnam maintain its maritime security is in line its strategic “Pivot to Asia.” In addition to recommitting U.S. assets to the Asia-Pacific, the initiative intends to empower states interested in preserving the regional status quo. Vietnam’s national interest, to this end, is convergent with the United States’ interest in the region. The Diplomat What to Expect If the US Lifts Its Vietnam Arms Embargo What are the expected short-term effects of the U.S. lifting its arms embargo on Vietnam?

By Ankit Panda September 29, 2014

Last week, I had the pleasure of participating in a panel discussion at the Asia Society with Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh, who was in New York City to attend the United Nations General Assembly. During the Q&A portion of the event, Min called for the United States to lift its embargo on lethal arms sales to Vietnam, describing the embargo as “abnormal.” He went on to imply that relations between Vietnam and the United States will be normal once the ban is lifted: “Nearly 20 years ago, we normalized relations with the United States and in 2013 we set up a comprehensive partnership with the United States. So the relation[ship] is normal and the ban on the lethal weapons to Vietnam is abnormal. So we lift the ban, meaning that the relation is normal, even though we have normalized the relation[ship] 20 years ago.” Minh is heading to Washington D.C. in early October for discussions with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry while U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel is scheduled for a trip to Vietnam later this year. Minh’s remarks came less than 24 hours after a Reuters exclusive report cited comments by senior U.S. officials suggesting that the embargo would be on the agenda during Minh’s visit to the United States. According to that report, the Lockheed P-3 Orion surveillance aircraft may be one of the first items on Vietnam’s wish-list. The P-3 would be a major capability boost for the Vietnamese navy as it seeks to increase its maritime patrol and reconnaissance capabilities. The P-3 is also adept in anti-surface ship and anti-submarine warfare. The P-3 has an estimated unit cost of $36 million. Within the United States, there is broad support in both the executive and the legislative for bringing the U.S. and Vietnam closer amid increasing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. Lifting the embargo represents one of the surest ways for the United States to reap important diplomatic dividends from Vietnam in the region as it seeks to bolster its pivot to Asia. One other such critical area for increasing cooperation is Vietnam’s potential accession to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which remains a work-in-progress. When asked if the lifting of the U.S. lethal arms embargo would upset China, Minh seemed at ease, remarking, ”If we do not buy weapons from the United States, we still buy [weapons] from other countries. So, why should China be bothered by that?” At no point did he deny Vietnam’s ongoing multi-billion dollar military modernization effort, which is aimed primarily at countering Chinese advances in the South China Sea. Earlier this year, in May, China placed an oil rig in waters claimed by Vietnam as part of its exclusive economic zone under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). That incident exposed the growing differences between Vietnam and China, two countries that once enjoyed close relations owing to inter-communist party solidarity (indeed, following the oil rig incident, Vietnam’s defense minister described it as a petty disagreement between “brothers”). While Minh addressed the issue of the U.S. arms embargo in the context of Vietnam’s relationship with China, he was careful to emphasize that his country sees international law and multilateralism as the way forward in the South China Sea. ”Never before have we seen a greater risk for miscalculation and incidents that might escalate into military conflicts, as in the past few months,” he said. However, during his opening remarks, he noted that “Vietnam seeks to resolve the disputes in the South China Sea by available peaceful means, based on the rule of international law.” For Vietnam, while the United States can be an appealing partner for defense procurement, there are other compelling partners, including Russia and India. During a visit to Hanoi earlier in September, Indian President Pranab Mukherjee signed a memorandum of understanding that included the extension of a $100 million credit line to facilitate Vietnamese defense procurement. More critically, Vietnam sourced six improved Kilo-class submarines from Russia to add to its fleet of Soviet-era naval hardware. Vietnam is also interested in purchasing the jointly developed Russo-Indian BrahMos supersonic cruise missile in a deal that is likely only awaiting a nod of approval from Moscow. Additionally, earlier this year, Japan indicated its eagerness to expand defense cooperation with Vietnam. While cooperation between these two countries is still growing, it could easily lead to Vietnam sourcing Japanese defense equipment amid the latter relaxing its ban on weapons exports. To echo Deputy Prime Minister Minh’s remarks in New York last week, Vietnam indeed has other partners to source its defense hardware. With the exception of Japan, the United States remains considerably better positioned to actually help Vietnam, which relies primarily on Soviet-era equipment, modernize its military. Critically, Minh clarified that his comments on the embargo and on Vietnam-U.S. relations should be taken at face value and do not indicate a burgeoning alliance of any sort. To this end, Minh reiterated Vietnam’s “three nos” defense policy: say no to military alliances, say no to foreign bases on Vietnamese soil, and say no to relying on any external country for assistance in combat. Nothing in Minh’s remarks indicated that Vietnam’s military modernization program or desire to see the U.S. arms embargo lifted would lead to it fundamentally altering the underlying principles that guide its foreign policy. Despite its “three nos” policy, should the embargo be lifted, Vietnam will come closer to aligning itself with a concert of Asia-Pacific democracies including the United States, India and Japan that remain concerned about Chinese irredentism and assertiveness in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, it seems Hanoi remains adamant about maintaining its strategic autonomy — it just wants to do so with the most modern configuration of military hardware it can afford. If and when the U.S. decides to lift the arms embargo, the consequences will likely not be far-reaching in the region. It will usher a new era of deeper bilateral relations between Washington and an old foe, but will not critically alter the maritime security dilemma or balance of power that are shaping current security dynamics in the South China Sea. Hanoi won’t immediately be emboldened vis-a-vis Beijing, nor will it change its behavior to suit U.S. expectations (on human rights, for example). For the United States, boosting Vietnam’s ability to patrol and monitor its own waters will help maintain the regional status quo in line with the objectives of its pivot to Asia. The U.S. decision to lift the embargo on lethal arms sales to Vietnam is likely impending and first and foremost speaks to a growing confluence of interests between the two countries. Deputy Prime Minister Minh’s emphasis on normalization was thus well-placed — there’s only so far the U.S. and Vietnam can go with the arms embargo still in place.

The Diplomat China-Vietnam Defense Hotline Agreed: What Next? Beijing and Hanoi are looking to reset bilateral relations following a turbulent year.

By Carl Thayer October 20, 2014

When the China-Vietnam oil rig crisis broke out in May, regional analysts opined that bilateral relations had been set back several decades as a result of the worst crisis since the 1979 border war. This assessment was premature. There are now signs that Beijing and Hanoi are moving to reset their relations and pick up where they were prior to the oil rig crisis. The oil rig crisis witnessed physical confrontations by Chinese and Vietnamese civilian law enforcement vessels, an upsurge in anti-China sentiment in Vietnam including violent anti-China riots, the evacuation of Chinese workers from Vietnam, a drop in Chinese tourism to Vietnam, and Vietnamese threats to take international legal action against China. There were even calls by Vietnam’s political elite “to exit China’s orbit.” Initially China played diplomatic hardball and rebuffed all Vietnamese efforts to send special envoys and to open up bilateral channels of communications between government ministries and agencies most directly affected. Vietnamese leaders held two main concerns. First, they could not appear to be buckling under pressure from Beijing, especially given the intensity of domestic anti-China sentiment. Second, Vietnamese leaders wanted to contain the fallout from the oil rig crisis and prevent it from damaging the broader bilateral relationship. Chinese leaders also had a re-think. On June 18, State Councilor Yang Jiechi traveled to Hanoi to attend the annual meeting of the Joint Steering Committee that oversees the China-Vietnam comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership. Media and academic commentary focused almost exclusively on Yang’s remarks on territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The significance of Yang’s visit was that he came at all. It signaled that China wanted to prevent South China Sea disputes from rupturing the broader bilateral relationship. Yang’s visit resulted in confidential behind-the-scenes discussions by external relations specialists from the Chinese and Vietnamese communist parties. In July, China withdrew its oil rig HD 981 from disputed waters. In late August, China received Le Hong Anh, special envoy of the Secretary General of the Vietnam Communist Party, thus ending Beijing’s diplomatic stonewalling of Vietnamese efforts to open a dialogue. China-Vietnam relations took a major step forward with the unexpected three-day visit to Beijing by a 13- member high-level Vietnamese military delegation led by its minister of national defense, General Phung Quang Thanh. General Thanh was invited by his Chinese counterpart, General Chang Wanquan. The delegation arrived on October 16 and departed two days later. China laid out the red carpet for General Thanh. On the morning of October 17 Thanh inspected a People’s Liberation Army honor guard at the Ministry of Defense. Immediately after the two sides held formal discussions. General Thanh was received later in the day by Vice President Li Yuanchao. On the following morning, General Thanh met with Lt. Gen. Fan Changlong, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and member of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo. No joint statement was issued. Chinese and Vietnamese media reporting of General Thanh’s three bilateral meetings varied in their coverage. The Chinese media provided only sparse accounts, while the Vietnamese media provided greater details on the substance of the exchanges. What is clear from media accounts is that the atmospherics of these bilateral meetings were cordial and positive. Both sides used past diplomatic formulations in an effort to overcome relations strained by the oil rig crisis. For example, General Chang stressed China has always valued friendly and cooperative relations with Vietnam and that General Thanh’s visit would contribute to the comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership in general and defense relations in particular. General Thanh opened his remarks by congratulating the Chinese people for their accomplishments over the past 65 years. Thanh expressed his appreciation for the positive development of China-Vietnam relations in recent years. He reaffirmed Vietnam’s basic policy of highly valuing good neighborly relations and comprehensive cooperation with China. General Thanh also noted that overall relations between China and Vietnam were developing well and that disputes over maritime sovereignty were the only stumbling block in bilateral relations. Pleasantries aside, General Thanh tabled five proposals to rebuild confidence and trust and to provide both sides with reassurance that force would not be used. According to Quan Doi Nhan Dan, the organ of the Vietnam People’s Army, General Thanh proposed that both militaries should remain calm, patient, show restraint and strictly control activities at sea to avoid misunderstandings, prevent conflict, and not use force or the threat of force to settle maritime disputes. General Thanh proposed that the military should act in a humane manner towards fishermen and not confiscate equipment used to earn their livelihood. In addition, the military should assist fishermen in distress and create conditions for them to go about their business, thus contributing to the common interests of both sides. General Thanh reiterated Vietnam’s long-standing policy on the peaceful settlement of South China Sea territorial disputes on the basis of international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the full implementation of the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Thanh urged China to reach a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Genera Thanh requested China to lift its travel advisory so that economic exchanges and tourism could be restored to normal. Finally, General Thanh invited General Chang to visit Vietnam. Both defense ministers agreed that military-to-military cooperation formed an important part of China- Vietnam relations. Under the terms of a defense cooperation agreement reached in 2003 the two sides exchanged visits, held a strategic dialogue at deputy minister level, conducted personnel training, held discussions on party and political work in the military, coordinated the work of border guard units, and conducted joint patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin. Both ministers agreed that the 2003 protocol had led to positive outcomes and both sides should continue to step up these activities in the future. At the conclusion of their meeting, both defense ministers witnessed the signing of a technical memorandum of understanding on the establishment of direct communication lines between their respective ministries. No further details were released. According to Xinhua, the two ministers “reached consensus on developing bilateral military relations… pledging to properly handle their maritime disputes.” The two ministers further “decided to gradually resume and promote the healthy and stable development of bilateral military ties.” Xinhua also quoted from “a statement” that read, “both sides’ armed forces should enhance solidarity and provide a strong guarantee for the governing status of the communist parties of the two countries and the cause of socialist construction.” Finally, the two ministers agreed “to abide by the consensus reached by both leaders and play a positive role in dealing with maritime disputes and safeguarding a peaceful and stable situation.” General Thanh’s meeting with Vice President Li was equally cordial. Li opened the conversation by noting that General Thanh’s visit “would contribute to boosting bilateral relations, strengthen understanding, trust and mutually beneficial cooperation between the two parties, states, and militaries. Li also emphasized that China attached great importance to cooperation and friendship with Vietnam and stressed the importance of traditional friendly cooperation by senior leaders. Xinhua reported that Vice President Li called on both sides “to intensify strategic communication, enhance political trust, manage maritime disputes, promote joint development, and strengthen tangible cooperation so as to forge ahead bilateral relations.” General Thanh passed on the greetings of Vietnam’s party and state leaders. Thanh informed Vice President Li that the purpose of his visit was to promote the understanding reached by their leaders previously and to promote healthy, long-term and stable relations between the two parties, states and armed forces. Xinhua paraphrased General Thanh as stating, “Vietnam and China have maintained close contacts and enjoyed broad common interests… the Vietnamese military is willing to contribute to the development of bilateral military and state relations as well as the peace and stability of the region.” General Thanh met with General Fan Changlong on the morning of his departure. According to Chinese media accounts General Fan told his visitor, “a neighboring country cannot be moved away. It is in the common interest of China and Vietnam to live in amity, handle disputes properly and promote common development.” Fan also noted that the armed forces of both countries had significant responsibility to safeguard and sustain bilateral ties and should contribute “positive energy” towards this end. “We should make our troops well-behaved,” he said, “and not make remarks harming the feelings of both people or do things undermining the overall bilateral relations.” Vietnamese media reported that General Thanh affirmed that Vietnam attached special importance to good neighborliness and comprehensive cooperation with China and both sides should fully implement the common understanding reached by their leaders. General Thanh reiterated in detail Vietnam’s long- standing policy to resolve maritime disputes by peaceful means, under international law, and to reach a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. On October 16, in a positive upturn in China-Vietnam relations, Premier Li Keqiang met with Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung on the sidelines of the Asia-Europe Summit Meeting in Milan. News reports quoted Premier Li as saying China and Vietnam should “properly address and control maritime differences… Thanks to the efforts from both sides, China-Vietnam relations have ridden out the recent rough patch and gradually recovered.” Prime Minister Dung was quoted as being in agreement and endorsed stepping up “cooperation in infrastructure, finance and maritime exploration,” three areas that had been agreed to during Li’s visit to Hanoi in October 2013. China and Vietnam have begun to repair bilateral relations by utilizing trusted party-to-party and military- to-military links, bypassing their respective foreign ministries. These developments need to be treated with a degree of caution. All professions of mutual respect, traditional good neighborly relations, and perceptions of high-level leaders have been said before. It is important to note the size and composition of the two defense delegations. Military commanders on both sides of the border and at sea have met their respective counterparts. More importantly, these commanders have all witnessed the verbal understandings reached by their respective ministers. Military commanders on both sides can be expected to carry out their duties accordingly. From Vietnam’s point of view, the visit by its Defense Minister was important to demonstrate unity to China by bringing such a large delegation to Beijing. Chinese and Vietnamese military commanders are now committed to stepping up existing defense cooperation activities in a number of areas. Analysts will have to “watch this space” to determine if words are followed by deeds. When will Defense Minister Chang take up the invitation to visit Hanoi? It would be a sign of progress if General Chang attended the seventieth anniversary celebrations marking the founding of the Vietnam People’s Army on December 22. The most important outcome of the talks between the two defense ministers was agreement on a protocol establishing direct communication links between their respective ministries. This is a positive indication that both sides realize how quickly an incident could spiral out of control and lead to deadly force. Another indication of the state of China-Vietnam relations will come at the APEC Summit hosted by China later this month and the East Asia Summit hosted by Myanmar in November. Will Chinese and Vietnamese leaders meet on the sidelines and agree to make progress on settling their differences? China’s recent extension of the runway on Woody Island in the Paracels and the visit to land reclamation sites in the Spratly archipelago by China’s navy commander clearly demonstrate that territorial and sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea remain the main irritant in bilateral relations.

The Diplomat India’s Strategic Vietnam Defense Relations India is seeking to counter Chinese ambitions by training and supplying Vietnam’s military. By P K Ghosh November 11, 2014

India’s courtship of Vietnam is now overt. For instance, during the recent visit of the Vietnamese Prime Minster Nguyen Tan Dung, New Delhi not only laid out the red carpet for the visiting Vietnamese leader and the accompanying business delegation of 50 members, it took the decisive step of overtly acknowledging its assistance in modernizing Vietnam’s armed forces, much to the chagrin of China. Vietnam has its own difficult history with China. It is not surprising, then, that this emerging country is often seen as a linchpin in India’s counter-encirclement and “Look East” policies. As a consequence, New Delhi is actively courting Vietnam with defense-related offers and infrastructure deals. Providing impetus to these bilateral relations have been a flurry of senior-level official visits to and from Hanoi. The Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong visited India in November 2013, during which eight MoUs were signed, and Vietnam offered India seven oil blocks for exploration. India already had three Vietnamese blocks, in which the state-run ONGC Videsh (OVL) had invested about $360 million. President Pranab Mukherjee then visited Hanoi in September this year, just ahead of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to India, sending a strong message of unity with the Vietnamese. During this visit seven pacts were inked along with a $100 million in credit for defense deals. This could be seen as a tit for tat with the Chinese president’s subsequent visit to Sri Lanka and Maldives; a region that the Chinese have been trying to influence. The Chinese reacted sharply to Mukerjee’s visit by sending a military incursion into Chumar sector on September 15 – the day the deals were signed. The bilateral bonhomie was again on display during Dung’s recent visit to India. For the first time India openly acknowledged modernizing Vietnam’s armed forces and enhancing its maritime capacity. In addition, India was one of the few countries to continue expanding its energy exploration in South China Sea waters that are claimed by China. On that occasion Prime Minister Narendra Modi said: “Our defence cooperation with Vietnam is among our most important ones. India remains committed to the modernization of Vietnam’s defence and security forces. This will include expansion of our training programme, which is already very substantial, joint-exercises and cooperation in defence equipment. We will quickly operationalise the $100 million line of credit that will enable Vietnam [to] acquire new naval vessels from India.” Given the need to keen an eye on Chinese movements in this volatile region, India is keen to have basing rights in Vietnamese ports such as Na Trang for its naval warships. This would not only help give India a presence in the region, it would also serve as a quid pro quo for the increasingly frequent Chinese forays into the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR). While the forward base in Na Trang has not yet been made available, Indian naval warships are extended special privileges when berthing at any Vietnamese port. When the Indian warship Airavat was challenged by the People’s Liberation Army Navy in September 2012 while on passage from Vietnam, it reinforced the need for India to enhance maritime cooperation and interoperability with the Vietnamese. That opportunity for developing interoperability has presented itself again, with the Vietnamese having taken delivery of the first of six Russian-made 636 Kilo-class submarines on order. In the very near future Vietnam will have a fleet of submarines requiring skilled submariners to man these sophisticated platforms. The Indian Navy has stepped in and begun training a large number of Vietnamese sailors in submarine operations and underwater warfare. The ongoing “comprehensive underwater combat operations” training for these Vietnamese sailors is in progress at the Indian Navy’s INS Satavahana (Submarine School) in Visakhapatnam. The Indian Navy’s experience since the mid 1980s in operating Russian Kilo-class submarines will undoubtedly help in this effort. In the past, India had supplied spare parts for the Russian-origin Petya-class warships and OSA-II class missile boats of the Vietnamese Navy, while from continuing to train its military personnel in information technology and English language skills. This development is likely to perturb Beijing, and it will also be closely watched by Pakistan. It may prove to be the impetus that prompts China to consider giving Pakistan a nuclear submarine, which would raise the security stakes for India considerably. Apart from submarine training, India also plans to train Vietnamese Air Force Sukhoi pilots, while Vietnam has also been negotiating to acquire the supersonic anti-ship cruise missile BrahMos, which is built jointly in India with Russia. This ongoing strategic game of chess underscores the importance of India and Vietnam to each other. While China continues to make inroads into Sri Lanka and other Indian neighbors, India is returning the favor with growing support for Vietnamese capacity building. Dr. P K Ghosh is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation. He is the former co-chair of the CSCAP International Study Group on Maritime security and has been closely following the South China Sea dispute. The Diplomat: India, Vietnam and $100 Million in Defense Credit Stronger ties will give Hanoi a boost and strengthen New Delhi’s hand. By Amruta Karambelkar September 28, 2014

A visit earlier this month by its President Pranab Mukherjee saw India sign several memorandums of understanding with Vietnam. Among them, the extension of a line of credit worth $100 million on defense procurement is particularly significant. This deal gives defense relations between India and Vietnam another shot in the arm, and has important implications for both countries. India: Asserting Itself As India enters the third decade of its Look East Policy, its engagement with its eastern neighbors has both widened and deepened. India has comprehensive bilateral partnerships in the region, as well as multilateral relationships through ASEAN. New Delhi’s defense diplomacy in the region has made strides in the last two decades, such that India is now considered an important and welcome security partner in Southeast Asia. India’s regional cooperation in defense has generally entailed high-level visits, participation in multilateral exercises, port calls, assistance in maintaining military hardware, and cooperation in training. Defense ties with Vietnam are already robust, with India helping Vietnamese forces, especially the navy, build capacity. Bilateral cooperation is comprehensive, facilitated by the fact that both India and Vietnam largely rely on Russian military hardware. For example, India is able to repair Vietnam’s MiG aircraft. Since 2011, India has been providing the Vietnam People’s Navy with submarine training. The Indian Navy has also assisted in technical training and vessel construction, and India may start training Vietnamese air force pilots on the Sukhoi 30-MKI fighter and sell Hanoi the BrahMos cruise missile. The extension of credit to Vietnam furthers this defense engagement. India is emerging as a credible partner, with frequent requests that it play a more active role in regional security. Through defense cooperation, India can entrench itself in the regional security architecture and assert itself in the east. Vietnam: A Military Modernization Boost The extension of $100 million in credit for defense purchases will also prove significant for Vietnam, which has been trying to modernize its military since the early 1990s. During the 70s and 80s, Vietnam developed capabilities that put it ahead of its regional neighbors. Progress was derailed, however, in 1987 with the withdrawal of Soviet assistance. The Soviet Union had been Vietnam’s primary security partner, and the cooperation allowed flexible modes of payment. But the reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev scaled back Soviet military assistance, marking the beginning of an era of stagnation for Vietnam’s military, even as other Southeast Asian militaries began to rapidly modernize. The crisis became so severe that Vietnam had difficulty making the most basic defense expenditures. In response, Hanoi began expanding its search for defense partners, seeking cooperation from non- traditional partners, while continuing its engagement with traditional allies like India. At one point, Vietnam had the fifth largest army in the world. Even today, its military is numerically the largest in Southeast Asia, but now others like Singapore’s are technically superior. Vietnam’s military has traditionally been a land force trained primarily for guerrilla warfare. Its air force and navy are best suited for a self-defense role, with limited territorial reach. Current capabilities are not considered sufficient to put up a robust defense, or even display an effective deterrent. Vietnam is thus trying to rapidly modernize its forces. In recent years, it has focused on adding to its naval hardware by acquiring Kilo-class submarines, patrol boats, Gepard-class frigates, fast attack craft, air- defense systems, and other equipment. While the details are not yet clear, it is likely that Vietnam is planning to purchase air and naval defense hardware. In the past, Vietnam has lacked the financial wherewithal to make purchases such as these, or has had to barter and offer partial payment. India’s extension of credit will certainly help loosen Vietnam’s financial constraints. Amruta Karambelkar is M.Phil scholar at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. The Diplomat: India and Vietnam Call for Freedom of Navigation in South China Sea The two countries also signed seven bilateral agreements during Indian President Pranab Mukherjee’s trip to Vietnam.

By Ankit Panda September 18, 2014

Ahead of Xi Jinping’s scheduled three-day visit to India, Indian President Pranab Mukherjee traveled to Vietnam for a state visit. At the conclusion of his trip to Vietnam, Mukherjee and his counterpart, Truong Tan Sang, issued a joint communique in which they jointly called for countries to stand for freedom of navigation in the disputed South China Sea. The communique is ostensibly aimed at China, which was engaged in a major stand-off earlier this year with Vietnam after it placed an oil rig within waters Vietnam claims as its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). More specifically, the communique calls for South China Sea countries to codify and implement the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and work towards adopting a “Code of Conduct.” The idea of a code of conduct in the South China Sea has met considerable resistance from China, which instead prefers to handle disputes in the region on a bilateral basis. Apart from China, major disagreements exist within ASEAN regarding the need for a code of conduct. Such disagreements led to the disintegration of the 2012 ASEAN summit in which regional leaders were unable to agree to a joint statement. As per India and Vietnam’s joint communique: The leaders reiterated their desire and determination to work together to maintain peace, stability, growth and prosperity in Asia. They agreed that freedom of navigation in the East Sea/South China Sea should not be impeded and called the parties concerned to exercise restraint, avoid threat or use of force and resolve disputes through peaceful means in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the UNCLOS-1982. They also welcomed the collective commitment of the concerned parties to abide by and implement the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and to work towards the adoption of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea on the basis of consensus. They called for cooperation in ensuring security of sea-lanes, maritime security, combating piracy and conducting search and rescue operations. Mukherjee’s trip to Vietnam resulted in other agreements as well. Overall, India and Vietnam signed seven agreements over the course of the visit. As The Hindu reports, one of these agreements will see greater cooperation between the two countries in the oil sector. Vietnam has granted India oil exploration rights within its EEZ in the past and will likely continue to do so. Additionally, India will extend a credit line to Vietnam per an agreement signed during Mukherjee’s visit. The two countries also signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on agricultural cooperation, and a MOU on “operating and jointly promoting direct air services between Vietnam Airlines (Vietnam) and Jet Airways (India).”

The Diplomat: China's Not Happy About the US-India Statement on the South China Sea According to a Chinese statement, the U.S. and India should play no role in resolving South China Sea disputes.

By Ankit Panda October 10, 2014 On Wednesday, China condemned the recent United States-India joint statement which called for countries to respect the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea according to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei told a media brief that China’s “position is that the dispute in the South China Sea should be resolved by countries directly concerned through negotiations and consultations. Any third party should not be involved in this.” Hong made the remark in response to a question about the U.S.-India joint statement. The U.S.-India joint statement was released on September 30; the Chinese foreign ministry’s late reaction is due to the week- long National Day holiday that begins on October 1. Following Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s trip to the United States, which ended last week, the two sides released a joint statement as is customary. The statement made a series of declarations on U.S.-India cooperation in the areas of defense and security in the Asia-Pacific and elsewhere. The statement marked the first time that the United States and India jointly made a declaration on the South China Sea, specifically in calling for all countries in the region to respect a certain set of principles. Both the United States and India have a similar policy toward the South China Sea, and given increased tensions over the past year between China and South China Sea littoral states, the two leaders saw fit to emphasize their common stance. As both India and the United States remain outside the immediate South China Sea region, China sees their interference as unwarranted and illegitimate. India, for its part, may be making a declaration on the South China Sea into a regular feature of any bilateral joint statements it issues. In a recent trip to Vietnam, Indian President Pranab Mukherjee concluded a joint statement with his Vietnamese counterpart which contained remarkably similar language. On the surface, the common language between the Vietnamese and U.S. joint declarations suggest that the clause may have been something proposed by the Indian side. Specifically, the India-U.S. joint statement noted that Obama and Modi “expressed concern about rising tensions over maritime territorial disputes, and affirmed the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea.”

The Diplomat: US Pacific Command Plans Responses for Unilateral Chinese Coercion In order to boost its credibility, the US is gearing up to respond in kind to unilateral Chinese provocations in Asia.

By Ankit Panda April 29, 2014 The United States has a vested interest in maintaining the strategic status quo in the Asia-Pacific given that its position as a power in the region could be undermined should China succeed in changing the regional security landscape. As anxiety has grown about China’s intentions following an increase in tensions over the Senkaku/Dioayu dispute between it and Japan, and a host of territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the U.S. military has set up several symbolic responses to possible Chinese moves. A report in the Wall Street Journal highlights the U.S. military’s broad contingency planning for responding to Chinese provocations in the East and South China Sea where territorial disputes abound with several important U.S. allies. According to the report, the plans comprise everything from a symbolic show force by flying B-2 bombers to more provocative aircraft carrier exercises in the waters around China. The WSJ‘s sources noted that the U.S. response to the Russian annexation of Crimea has unnerved important allies in the region and that this new action plan for the Asia-Pacific strives to make U.S. intentions known to China, which may continue to attempt to coercively change the status quo. The issue driving U.S. planning seems to be credibility — ensuring that the United States’ presence in the Asia-Pacific remains a credible deterrent for China as it strives to pursue its claims to territorial disputes. “They’re concerned. But it’s not only about Crimea. It’s a crescendo that’s been building,” one official told the WSJ. The strategic and tactical planning for responding to provocations in the region — be they from China or from North Korea — was conducted by the Hawaii-based U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), the combatant command responsible for the Asia-Pacific. The planning was accelerated by China’s moves late last year, including setting up an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) along its East China Sea coastline. ”Combatant Commands plan…for everything from exercises and humanitarian assistance, disaster relief operations all the way up to full-scale combat operations,” said Capt. Chris Sims, the PACOM spokesman. “In the plans that they create, options are provided to senior military and civilian leadership.” Overall, expect to see the U.S. military respond to any unilateral Chinese provocations in the East and South China Seas. While Washington won’t engage in an escalatory game of tit-for-tat, it will ensure the the U.S. presence and posture in the Asia-Pacific is pegged to the relative assertiveness of Beijing’s behavior. Under the new PACOM plans, any attempts at unilateral coercion by China will be met by the United States bearing down in the region. U.S. officials believe that this strategy avoids the risk of a skirmish or a “shooting war” between the U.S. and China. This belief is based on intelligence estimates that the People’s Liberation Army remains divided about how China’s military should respond to assertive moves by the United States. Still, one official noted that the U.S. would be prudent to avoid cornering China, or setting up a state of affairs that left Beijing with few viable options apart from escalation. ”Never push your enemy into a corner because you might get a reaction you don’t want,” notes one official who spoke to the WSJ. That this report emerged as President Obama returns from Asia should be no coincidence. The president’s trip to Asia was intended as a grand tour for the purpose of reassuring the United States’ allies and friends who have grown skeptical of U.S. credibility after witnessing the U.S. response to Ukraine and Syria in recent years. PACOM’s new plans are one way to make the “pivot to Asia” more credible and will likely draw the support of most U.S. allies in the region. Is US Pacific “Dominance” Up For Grabs? Admiral Locklear rightly raised alarm bells over America’s traditional regional dominance. Are policymakers listening?

By Harry Kazianis January 22, 2014

Recent comments by U.S. Navy Admiral Samuel Locklear III set the internet afire (well, at least for strategic studies followers) in suggesting that the United States was losing dominance in the Pacific Ocean. While no news to those of us who follow events closely in this part of the world, such remarks are a stark reminder of the challenges Washington and its allies face in Pacific and larger Indo-Pacific, especially in the years to come. The comments themselves, not the first from senior naval officers over the last several years concerning the rise of China’s military capabilities, were blunt and to the point. “Our historic dominance that most of us in this room have enjoyed is diminishing, no question,” explained Locklear, head of U.S. Pacific Command, last Wednesday at a conference in Virginia. Locklear may have been reflecting on the last few weeks — essentially blowing off some steam — but also presenting a warning to those who would listen. Beijing has dominated the news cycle with some impressive defense and geostrategic achievements. From launching an ADIZ in the East China Sea and recent military exercises in the South China Sea and promises of permanent patrols to reports that China is working on more carriers and testing hypersonic weapons, it would seem Beijing is set to exert increasing dominance in a ring expanding from its coastline all the way to the now infamous first island chain. Some could even bravely make the statement that in some areas of the Pacific, thanks to large advances in ballistic and cruise missile technology, allied forces in times of conflict would be foolish to enter such areas given near-certain losses. These areas include most of the islands China and its neighbors are contesting. A no man’s land from Shanghai to Guam thanks to China’s growing military might? It’s looking more and more likely every day. While such comments certainly are a headline grabber, there is a larger point that seems to get lost. When pulled together — increasingly aggressive Chinese actions in the East and South China Seas in combination with growing military capabilities in equipment and training — a decade from now China could very well be in a position to truly challenge U.S. military dominance in a number of domains across large sections of Pacific. With possible purchases from Russia of the SU-35 and deployment of domestic 5th generation fighters like the J-20, the skies above the Pacific could certainly be up for grabs — with maybe another ADIZ in South China Sea to match Beijing’s enhanced capabilities. On the high seas, at least near and around the first island chain (and increasingly pushing out to the second), thanks to Chinese missiles and possible fully developed anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM), allied forces may not be able to operate in such waters at all during a conflict. Chinese anti-satellite weapons will make space a domain that could be up for grabs, striking at the heart of America’s military might: combined operations thanks to C4ISR powered by satellites. And as for cyberspace — while an exact picture is hard to ascertain — we already know Beijing has scored big in stealing information on the designs of a number of America’s most prized weapon systems. Considering the trend lines, Locklear was wise to sound the alarm bells, and U.S. politicians and those who have influence over policymakers would be wise to listen to his comments. While today’s strategic environment in the Pacific is clearly worrisome if China’s economy continues its dramatic rise (and that is NOT guaranteed), and its political system continues to hold on to the reins of power, things in the Pacific in a decade or so should be very interesting. Keep sounding the alarm, Locklear — let’s hope those who can effect change are listening. Can U.S. Navy Shift to Pacific? Shifting limited U.S. naval assets into the Pacific makes sense. But that doesn’t mean it will be easy.

By James R. Holmes January 11, 2012 You can expect some backsplash when you stir the pot. That was the case with my last The Diplomat feature article, on the future of the U.S. Navy’s venerable “two-ocean navy” construct. In a nutshell, I maintained that the U.S. Navy may continue to shrink as the costs of ships, aircraft, and weaponry soar, budgets stagnate, and national priorities shift. In effect, if not by conscious strategic design, Washington may be dismantling the second navy it has maintained since the Second World War. If so, policymakers and commanders must think ahead about how to deploy scarce resources more efficiently. Severely reducing the Atlantic Fleet to assure a surplus of naval might in the Pacific appears prudent if the navy indeed remains in decline. This take on the situation occasioned a fair amount of pushback, mostly from sailors and officers on sea duty aboard navy warships and aircraft. One of the few downsides to serving as professor at the Naval War College is that faculty spend very little time on the “deckplates” conversing with the executors of U.S. maritime strategy. Hearing from seafarers doing business in great waters is always a pleasure, even when we part company on important matters. The objections took several forms. First, some interlocutors inferred that I advocate a smaller navy. Far from it. Given my druthers, Americans would make the conscious political choice to preserve and extend their mastery of the seas. U.S. sea power has served the nation and the world well for seven decades. The U.S. Navy is smaller in raw numerical terms than it has been since President Woodrow Wilson vowed to construct a “navy second to none” nearly a century ago. Expanding the current 285 ship fleet to the 346 ships espoused by the 2010 Quadrennial Defence Review, or even the 313 ships the navy establishment deems minimally acceptable, would reverse the downward drift in U.S. naval power. Such an expansion, furthermore, should take place in balanced fashion—not just by adding less expensive platforms like the new Littoral Combat Ships now entering the fleet. Such vessels are adequate for lesser missions, but are unable to take much punishment in a serious fight. They can boost the fleet’s numerical strength on paper but dilute its overall combat capacity. But strategists must accept and work within unpleasant realities rather than wishing them away. The process of drafting strategy and matching it with sufficient means is very orderly—in theory. Senior political leaders draft a strategy in concert with military commanders and Congress, and lawmakers levy resources to procure the means necessary to execute it. Political and fiscal realities being what they are, however, the process is seldom that neat. Rear Adm. J. C. Wylie, America’s foremost sea-power thinker since World War II, describes strategy straightforwardly as a “plan of action” that harnesses means— forces, in the military context—to fulfil national purposes. Wylie observes that congressmen making budgetary decisions are making fundamental strategic decisions, whether they know it or not. If they set a dollar figure too low to fund the necessary means, the armed services may find themselves short on the manpower and hardware they need to reach the goals entrusted to them. The hard reality is that the U.S. Navy appears set to shrink further. Whether the United States will continue funding a complete navy for both the Atlantic and Pacific theatres is doubtful. It behoves naval leaders, public officials, and the electorate to whom they are accountable to think ahead toward a day when the U.S. Navy may remain second to none but can no longer do everything, everywhere, at all times. Second, some of my correspondents objected to denuding the Atlantic coast of high-end naval forces. They commonly invoked the German naval menace during the world wars. In 1942-1943, for instance, U-boats rampaged within sight of the U.S. east coast and in the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico. The Soviet Navy comprised a two-ocean challenge from the late 1960s through the 1980s. It provided the impetus for maintaining a two-ocean U.S. Navy until the Soviet downfall in 1991. U.S. naval strategists were startled at the massive Soviet “Okean” naval manoeuvres during the 1970s, when hundreds of Eastern Bloc men-of- war took to the seas simultaneously. A Soviet squadron dispatched to the Eastern Mediterranean outnumbered the U.S. Sixth Fleet during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. And so forth. But who plays the part of the German High Seas Fleet or Reichsmarine today? Where’s the counterpart to the Soviet Navy? Nowhere. No “peer competitor,” or major adversary, looms over the Atlantic horizon, demanding that a major portion of the U.S. battle fleet remain in east coast seaports. Europe is friendly. Russia has made noises about staging a naval comeback, but its progress remains fitful at best. There are no serious naval powers in Africa or Latin America. The chief banes to navigation in Atlantic sea-lanes are nuisances like piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, drug-running in the Caribbean and Gulf, and—potentially—maritime terrorism. It doesn’t take an Aegis destroyer or a big-deck aircraft carrier to combat such scourges. So why not station low-end assets like Littoral Combat Ships and guided-missile frigates on the East Coast, where they can discharge constabulary functions, while shifting the main battle force to the Pacific? Augmented by a Marine expeditionary contingent centred on amphibious carriers and transports for humanitarian and disaster response, a police-like force could anchor the U.S. naval presence in “permissive” Atlantic waters. Let’s not allow strategic inertia or worst-case thinking to govern fleet dispositions. Such a redeployment would conform to current strategic guidance. The 2007 U.S. Maritime Strategy calls on the U.S. sea services—the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—to stage “credible combat power” in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean for the foreseeable future, remaining the dominant maritime force in East, Southeast, and South Asia. Yet some 40 percent of the navy remains in the Atlantic, where it risks becoming a wasting asset. It’s high time to reallocate forces in to support the Maritime Strategy, and to back up President Barack Obama’s pledge to keep the U.S. military number one in this critical region. China’s People’s Liberation Army would be the yardstick for a new “one-power standard.” Once concentrated in the Pacific—arrayed not only along the West Coast, Hawaii, and Guam but at forward bases in Japan and, preferably, in central positions like Australia—preponderant U.S. forces would dissuade China from mischief-making, much as Theodore Roosevelt’s “Great White Fleet” did vis-à-vis Imperial Japan a century ago. In the unlikely event a serious threat coalesced in the Atlantic, the fleet could “swing” into eastern waters through the Panama Canal. And third, some of the critics intimated that I disregard intervening factors working against a wholesale shift of forces from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific. Not so. Politics is a messy business. I harbor no illusions that this process will unfold strictly according to strategic logic. Myriad factors shape—and misshape—big, complex decisions like realigning the U.S. sea services. For one thing, it’s excruciatingly hard for large institutions to relinquish longstanding commitments. In a way, naval proponents had it easy a century ago: the navy was building up to a one-power standard rather than shedding loads. Today, by contrast, scaling back commitments engages strong passions like fear and honor. Wouldn’t withdrawing from the Atlantic signal a return to isolationism, collapsing the edifice of U.S. leadership? And then there’s domestic politics. If the Base Realignment and Closure, or BRAC, process showed nothing else, it’s that closing military bases or shifting major assets around represents an uphill struggle. The thought of losing defense-related revenues renders lawmakers apoplectic. Legal challenges are commonplace. The Virginia congressional delegation, for instance, pitched a fit last year over proposed plans to transfer one carrier strike group—a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and its entourage of escorts and support vessels—from Hampton Roads to Mayport, Florida. Imagine the uproar that would greet plans to move all such groups to Pacific or Indian Ocean seaports! A decision of such moment will be neither swift nor easy nor politically painless. Strategy, it bears repeating, isn’t devised in some abstract realm where thinkers boasting forty-pound heads size up the strategic surroundings, set goals, and apportion funding and resources to attain those goals. But approximating such a process should be the objective. In the final analysis, the American people elect their leaders to lead. One hopes they will choose officeholders wisely at the ballot box, with a view not only to advancing parochial state and local interests, but also to upholding America’s strategic standing. James Holmes is an associate professor of strategy at the Naval War College. He discussed the two-ocean strategy on National Public Radio last Friday. The views voiced here are his alone A New Model for China-US Relations? Both countries should do more to alleviate suspicion and defuse tensions. By Wei Zongyou November 10, 2014

U.S. President Barack Obama is visiting China for the first time since 2009, and following the APEC Summit will hold his fourth meeting with China’s President Xi Jinping. The two leaders are expected to meet in an informal setting, as they did at Sunnylands in California last year, when Xi Jinping first met Obama as president and put forward the concept of “New Type of Major Powers Relations” to guide the growing complex relations between the two countries. Unfortunately, there has been little evidence of positive progress since last year’s summit; instead, the bilateral relationship has been marked by growing tensions and even setbacks. Whether it be the China seas, the ADIZ, or U.S. surveillance conducted in China’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), tensions between China and U.S. are running high. On maritime disputes, their positions and perceptions are almost diametrically opposed. In the economic sphere, China and the U.S. are engaging in a kind of unspoken competition, with Washington’s Trans-Pacific Partnership pitted against Beijing’s Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. The U.S. worries about an increasingly assertive China, while China suspects the U.S. of pursuing a policy of encirclement and containment. Clearly, the China-U.S. relationship is not a new model of relations and interactions between a rising power and the established power. Rather, it shows all the classic manifestations of the rising power/established power historical dynamic. That begs a question: Is a new model possible? While there is every reason to be pessimistic about the future of the relationship, I’m still cautiously optimistic. There are several reasons why. First, in contrast to historical patterns, in the postwar era, no country can expect to rise to great power status through conquest. On the ashes of the World War II, the United States took the lead in building a world order based on international law and institutions, and abolished the use of war as a legitimate national foreign policy instrument except in rare situations of self-defense or collective defense with UN Security Council authorization. A new pattern has emerged: States rise peacefully by means of trade, as Japan, Germany, India and China have done. Second, while China is not entirely satisfied with the existing international order, which it play no part in creating, it is not bent on overthrowing it or displacing it with its own alternative. Since 1978, when China first opened its door to the outside world after 30 years of isolation, it has tried hard to become part of the order, as witnessed by its entry into WTO, and quite possibly the TPP in the future. And unlike the Soviet Union, which established its own economic bloc, ideological camp, and satellite states, and which was bent on putting an end to the capitalist world, China is determined to rise peacefully, and has explicitly sought to build a new type of great power relations as a way of avoiding a repeat of history. Third, despite the different views concerning disputes in the China seas and maritime and air surveillance in the EEZ, China and the U.S. hold more than 90 institutionalized bilateral interactions annually, an unusually high number even by the standards of U.S. and its close allies. While this engagement alone cannot guarantee that there will be no spats or friction between China and U.S., it does provide channels to express worries, concerns or dissatisfaction to the other side and get feedback directly, which in turn helps defuse tensions and prevent miscalculations, misjudgments and escalation. That said, China and the U.S. still have much to do to build a new pattern of rising and established powers relations. Both countries should do more to reduce mutual suspicions and defuse regional tensions. Here are some steps they could take. First, China and the U.S. should engage in a serious dialogue about the future trajectory of the East Asian order. The region is in the midst of a power flux, and the existing order established during the Cold War and based on ideological antipathy and military confrontation now lags far behind the new reality. East Asia is today the arena for China-U.S. competition for influence and the source of much of the mistrust. The 1972 Nixon visit to China and the ensuing normalization of relations between China and U.S. was the first serious attempt by U.S. to adjust the order. That “grand bargain” helped usher in a golden era in East Asia. Today, with simmering tensions in the region and growing suspicion and mistrust between China and U.S., the two countries should adopt a strategic vision and aim to strike a second “grand bargain” on the future of the East Asian order. This bargain should encompass a future vision for the East Asian order, consider the adjustments and compromises that need to be made, and how they can be made, and specify what role China, the U.S. and other stakeholders should play in the reconstruction of the order. Second, China and U.S. should hold direct dialogues on the rights and boundaries of air and maritime surveillance in EEZs. One of the major irritants in China-U.S. relations is the surveillance that takes place in China’s EZZ, which for the past decade has caused serious standoffs and confrontations between the two militaries and placed bilateral relations under great strain. It has also aroused Chinese suspicions that the U.S. is seeking to contain China. While it is not realistic to hope U.S. will abandon its “right” to surveillance in international commons, an informal understanding concerning the frequency, scope, and pre-surveillance notification could be feasible, and would remove one of the most volatile irritants in the relationship. Third, China should engage with its neighbors to develop a code of conduct for the maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas. While China and the other claimants are unlikely to forgo their claims to the rocks and reefs, they can all agree to deal with the issue peacefully. As a rising power and the major claimant, China has an important responsibility to defuse regional tensions and work with other parties to find an acceptable solution for the co-development of the maritime resources and a peaceful resolution of the disputes. Building on that, China, the U.S., and other countries in East Asia could then try to establish an inclusive security arrangement that guarantees peace and stability in the region. WEI Zongyou is professor of International Relations at Center for American Studies, Fudan University, China. Previously, he worked as Vice Dean at Institute of International and Diplomatic Affairs, Shanghai International Studies University. The views expressed here are all his own. China's Building Second Aircraft Carrier A provincial party leader confirms China has begun construction on its second aircraft carrier.

By Zachary Keck January 20, 2014 China has begun building its second aircraft carrier and will eventually build four of them, a provincial Party leader said, according to local media. Hong Kong-based Ta Kung Pao newspaper quoted Wang Min, the Party chief of Northeast China’s Liaoning province as saying that construction of China’s second carrier had begun in the port city of Dalian in Liaoning province. Wang said that the carrier would be completed in six years’ time, and that China ultimately intended to build four aircraft carriers. If true, this would be China’s first indigenously built aircraft carrier. China’s first carrier, the Liaoning, is a Ukraine carrier that was refitted at a shipyard in Dalian. The PLA Navy (PLAN) commissioned the Liaoning in late 2012, and it recently underwent test trials in the South China Sea. Ta Kung Pao later took down the report, although not before it was picked up by numerous international media outlets and, on Sunday, the official Global Times ran an article on Wang’s comments. The Global Times said that China’s Defense Ministry had not responded to inquiries about the Hong Kong news reports. However, the fact that the Global Times carried the story lent credibility to the Ta Kung Pao report. It has long been assumed that China was interested in building additional aircraft carriers. In August a picture posted to Chinese military forums appeared to show a carrier under construction in southern China. However, some foreign analysts later speculated that the picture was actually of an amphibious assault ship capable of carrying hovercraft and helicopters. When asked about the photos in August, Yang Yujun, a defense ministry spokesperson, would only say that the Liaoning would not be China’s only aircraft carrier. In late November, South China Morning Post, citing a military source, reported that China planned to build up to four medium size carriers by 2020. Then, in December of last year, Australia’s The Age cited Chinese website qianzhan.com in reporting that China planned to build a nuclear-powered 110,000 ton super carrier by 2020 and two smaller carriers by 2015. That report seemed overly ambitious. Chinese military analysts told the Global Times that the second carrier was likely to be similar to the Liaoning in terms of tonnage, and would also feature a ski-jump take-off ramp. Wang was also quoted as saying that the shipyard in Dalian was building two 052D missile destroyers. Notably, during its recent training exercises in the South China Sea, the Liaoning was escorted by two Type 051C or Luzhou class destroyers, as well as two missile frigates. China’s Oversized Aircraft Carrier Ambitions Reports suggest China will have an indigenous carrier battle group within three years. Don’t bet on it.

By Harry Kazianis June 20, 2014

According to a June 5 report in the Strait Times (and a timely tweet by @RobertCObrien) the People’s Republic of China will allegedly add some major firepower to its armed forces. While we have seen many of these reports over the last several years, one thing should seem quite obvious by now — take it with a grain of salt, Flashpoints readers. According to the report, China is “preparing to deploy three new carrier battle groups (CBG) in the world’s oceans, with the first expected just three years from now.” The Singapore-based newspaper seems to have sourced the information from the latest GI Zhou newsletter. The newsletter is published in Australia and “specializes in forensic analysis of China’s defense-related publications and news sources.” The People’s Liberation Army Navy, or PLAN, already maintains one refurbished aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, which was commissioned in November 2012 after a multi-year modernization effort. The Liaoning at present has very little military utility, as China has not fully devised a truly capable CBG to defend the vessel. Most experts consider the ship a training vessel to master the complex processes that guide modern carrier aviation and operations. The report lays out some very ambitious plans for China’s supposed new carriers. In what one would have to assume would be a new class of ships for the PLAN, the new vessels “will have an overall length of 320m and a planned displacement of 85,000 tons. The Liaoning has an overall length of 300m and a displacement of 67,000 tons.” The piece also details two side deck lifts to help “transfer aircraft from hangar to flight deck.” Also interesting is the supposed development of “an electromagnetic catapult with a length of 120m to 150m on the angled flight deck, as well as a bow ski jump as on the Liaoning, which helps aircraft with quicker take- offs.” Even more noteworthy is the rumored aircraft and assets the new carriers will utilize as part of its air wing. The Times suggests that “the carriers will be able to carry a maximum of 50 J-15B sized fighter jets, although in practice, this will be limited to 46 J-15Bs and six Ka-31 or Z-8 airborne early warning helicopters.” In the future, the new carriers could even pack a stealth punch: “The new aircraft carriers will have between 25 and 27 J-20 stealth fighters, which are expected to replace the J-15B as China’s new carrier-borne strike fighter.” The challenge with such reports is that they are tough to verify and even harder to make accurate predictions against. When you consider how difficult it was for China to fully develop and put to sea one carrier that was partially completed (yes, it was completely refurbished from top to bottom) it seems quite the challenge to develop a whole new class of carriers so quickly. Could the report be more a wish list than a stated fact? Thinking through the logic it would seem so. While it is very possible Beijing is planning to deploy a total of four carriers — the Liaoning plus three new carriers — the undertaking would be immense. When you also factor in the additional challenge of building, deploying, and testing the necessary vessels and training the needed sailors for three additional new Chinese CBGs, such a goal seems more aspirational than actual fact. Remember, one does not just put a carrier by itself to sea. You must defend such a prized capital ship, keep it fueled (if it is not nuclear) and acquire the skills needed to make it the deadly fighting machine a modern carrier should aspire to be. And, as others have noted, that can take a lot of time and effort. While I remain skeptical about the speed in which China could deploy such expensive and complicated weapons of war, Beijing has demonstrated the capability to surprise western military analysts in the past. China’s efforts to develop anti-access/area-denial technologies, cyber weapons, hypersonic platforms, and various other weapons have clearly demonstrated amazing prowess at pushing beyond standard conventional thinking. My own take: China will have four carriers and accompanying CBG’s at some point, just don’t look for Beijing’s latest flat top on the high seas in three years’ time. Why to Ignore China’s Aircraft Carriers A lot of Chinese hardware could challenge US primacy in the Pacific. Carriers are not among them.

By Harry Kazianis January 28, 2014

As someone who has made a career of tracking China’s latest defense technologies , let me clue you on a little secret: Beijing’s new carrier, supposedly being built in Dalian, is no military threat for the foreseeable future. In fact, don’t even waste your time reading about whatever rumor comes next. There is a lot of Chinese hardware that could challenge U.S. primacy in the Pacific — but carriers are not one of them. Before I get into why, a little background is in order. China has been researching, thinking about, and studying carrier technology for decades but is just now building its own flattops. PLAN Admiral Liu Huaqing, who most scholars consider the founder of China’s aircraft carrier research program, believed that Beijing’s maritime doctrine should evolve through a two stage effort with carriers being a big part of such a plan. Step one would be “a ‘green-water active defense’ that would enable the PLAN to protect China’s territorial waters and enforce its sovereignty claims in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea.” While scholars can argue the point, in many respects, China seems close to achieving such a goal. The second part would be to “develop a blue-water navy capable of projecting power into the western Pacific.” As noted back in 2004 in the US Naval War College Review (USNWCR), “aircraft carriers were needed to protect China’s sovereignty and maritime resources, especially with regard to Taiwan and the South China Sea; guard China’s sea lanes of communications as the country industrialized and increasingly became a major trading power; enable China to keep up with regional powers such as India and Japan; and give the PLAN a decisive edge in future naval warfare.” Here the plot thickens, moving from talk to action. Beijing began purchasing old carriers to learn their secrets. In a seldom discussed episode, China in 1985 purchased the Australian carrier HMS Melbourne for scrap — or so it was thought at the time. As noted in the above piece from USNWCR, “the flight deck of the Melbourne was kept intact and used for pilot training in carrier takeoffs and landings (though a static flight deck would, of course, have been of limited utility, since it could not replicate the pitch and roll of an aircraft carrier at sea).” Years later China would purchase three ex-Soviet carriers in an effort to increase its knowledge, with the refurbished incomplete Varyag carrier being reborn as the PLAN carrier Liaoning and finally commissioned into the PLAN on September 25, 2012. So now that you have an idea of the timeline when it comes to China’s aircraft carrier history, some readers might be wondering why I argue you should stop clicking on the latest and greatest China aircraft carrier article? Simply stated: such a plan — sinking billions of dollars into carriers and all the goodies to make them a viable weapon — is not worth it for Beijing, and chances are over the long haul China will realize it. As recent media coverage has shown here in the U.S., carriers are big investments. Modern CVs are something one does not just throw in the water and expect military dominance. China took 27 years from the purchase of the Melbourne to launching a refurbished carrier that is not even ready for combat operations. Many pieces are needed to make a carrier a true weapon of modern war. Years are needed to develop aircraft to perform on the decks of such a carrier in times of combat — not an easy task. Chinese naval aviators will need to perform in the wildest of conditions with carriers operating in the toughest of seas and against potentially some of the world’s best navies who have decades of experience. Also, a carrier battle group must be assembled to supply and defend the most costly of capital ships — again, certainly not an easy or cheap task. China’s first carrier is nowhere near the capabilities of America’s CBG’s, and I would assume would take decades to reach such anything close to that level of competency — let alone another additional three as some reports are suggesting. Such an effort, if reporting is accurate (note: some reports have already been taken down), would be a massive undertaking which would take decades to achieve any sort of strategic edge. Also, one must consider China’s own A2/AD strategy, which seems bent on relegating carriers into the dustbin of history — something that is achieving real results much faster than China’s own carrier investments. Beijing is pouring resources into ever more sophisticated cruise and ballistic weapon systems to push carriers and other advanced surface combatants away from its coastline. Nations like Iran and even non-state actors have noticed and are emulating such a strategy. Many have made the argument that such weapons, which in various forms have been around for decades, are slowly making carriers obsolete. Heck, they don’t call ‘em “carrier-killers” for nothing. So why would China invest in a weapon system that it is effectively trying to push into the history books and which has limited military utility for the foreseeable future? Raw military might not be the reason behind China’s carrier push — in fact, it’s not. Beijing has other motivations beyond just pure power projection. Nothing says “great power” like an aircraft carrier and the fleet of vessels that accompany it — just like battleships did many decades ago. And not all nations of the world are arming themselves to the teeth with A2/AD missiles and systems — at least not yet. There is a certain prestige in being in the carrier club. And as long as China has the economic resources to plow into a project that does more to increase Chinese prestige than military prowess, there is some small utility in such a move — at least for now. Yet, economics and a changing strategic environment could press China to change its tune. For at least a decade, Beijing has poured tremendous resources into its armed forces and increasingly more and more into its Navy. Thanks to a combination of a booming economy and a weakened Russia, China’s good fortunes on land have created the conditions to invest in stronger forces at sea. There is no guarantee both of those conditions are forever static. If money needs to be diverted to propping up a slowing economy or balancing against a threat from the north, it may be hard to justify billions in aircraft carrier development that will take many years to prove fruitful in combat —if ever. “China will never build an aircraft carrier,” a senior Chinese official told a group of foreign visitors in the early 1970’s. “Aircraft carriers are tools of imperialism, and they’re like sitting ducks waiting to be shot.” For modern day China, carriers could end up being a source of pride and a shining example of its rise, just don’t expect much else. Why China’s Carrier Program Makes (Some) Sense China’s interest in aircraft carriers is a strategic calculation based in the psychology of modern warfare.

By J. Michael Cole January 27, 2014

The reactions to what appeared to be the confirmation last week that China has embarked on a program to build its own aircraft carrier were as varied as they were expected, ranging from alarmism to the usual dismissal of the large platforms as little more than hugely expensive boats for enemy target practice. While carriers do indeed have severe vulnerabilities, they are not without their uses, though those are a function of the role(s) they are expected to play. The first role is more psychological than utilitarian. There is no doubt that China’s domestic program is directly related to the country’s desire to be regarded as a major power, of which aircraft carriers, warts notwithstanding, serve as an undeniable symbol. Although the acquisition of the ex-Varyag, its eventual refurbishment, and its rechristening as the Liaoning following its entry into service, provided a major boost to China’s self-image, the platform nevertheless served as reminder of China’s reliance on external assistance. For that reason alone, a domestic carrier will help China cross a very important psychological barrier and signal to the world that it is now a major and, perhaps more importantly, self-sufficient power. Additionally, the program cannot be dissociated from the need for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) services to justify growing budgets (a carrier project, while already requiring extraordinary amounts of funding, will in turn generate further budgetary requirements as carrier battle groups must be built to accompany them, while carrier-capable aircraft must also be created). Evidently, the ambitions of military services alone would not in and of themselves be sufficient to rationalize the allocation of such budgets without the acquiescence of the political leadership and the conditions that can help justify their development. China’s regional — and perhaps global — ambitions, which seem to be expanding under Xi Jinping’s leadership (though the carrier program would likely have been approved under the Hu Jintao administration), make it easier to sell the need for various power- projection platforms such as aircraft carriers. The key term here is power projection. In an age where a number of countries, big and small, have acquired or can easily acquire the means to sink aircraft carriers, the decision to build and deploy expensive and ultimately vulnerable platforms may appear counterintuitive. After all, critics would argue that from a purely combat perspective, it would be much more sensible to build dozens, if not hundreds, of smaller vessels equipped with torpedoes and cruise missiles for the same price, what with the advantages of dispersal, radar evasion, and so on. What those critics fail to realize is that aircraft carriers may no longer be regarded as primarily war-fighting instruments, but rather are to be used as tools of psychological warfare in the context of regional power projection. And here, size does matter. In such a context, the utility of an aircraft carrier stems not so much from its ability to serve as a semi-permanent range extension for combat aircraft and bombers — which certainly cannot be discounted — but instead as the bully’s perfect weapon, one that ensures that belligerents actually never come to blows. The reason is simple: during the phases of a dispute that precede actual combat, competitors must constantly assess the costs and benefits of crossing the line by launching offensive operations. Whoever strikes first must do so with the understanding that such actions will prompt a reaction, which can range from (optimally) capitulation to (worst scenario) retaliation in kind. Normally, retaliation will be commensurate with, or represent a slight escalation over, the nature of the initial attack. What we have here, therefore, is a gradient of severity. As we saw, every decision to use force will prompt a reaction, which inherently imposes psychological brakes on the advisability of launching combat operations. Aware of this, rational military and political decision-makers will calibrate their response to a situation by presumably choosing to shoot down or sink the platform which is of least value to the opponent first. Under this logic, the decision to down an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) can be arrived at with much greater ease than that of shooting at a manned aircraft, as killing a human being is already one step up the ladder of belligerence. Sinking a small attack boat with a few men and women on board is equally less problematic than sending an entire destroyer to the bottom of the ocean, and so on. Beyond the human cost is the symbolic value of the target involved: The higher the symbolic value of the platform, the more friction there is against the decision to attack it, as the cost of doing so increases. And in terms of symbolic value — not to mention other important variables such as lives involved and dollar value — nothing beats an aircraft carrier. Consider, therefore, a small country in Southeast Asia that faces a territorial dispute with China. Imagine that our hypothetical country, while much weaker than China, has the capabilities to sink an aircraft carrier, but does not itself have a carrier in its fleet. Following weeks of saber rattling and failed talks, the PLA Navy decides to dispatch vessels to the area, and the other side sends its own ships. As tensions rise, China sends its aircraft carrier, which adds a whole new dimension to the conflict by making it possible to use combat aircraft and bombers against a variety of targets within the area. In a combat situation, sinking the aircraft carrier would be the most rational choice, as doing so would deny China a major offensive capability. However, in a conflict situation that has not yet reached the combat phase, the aircraft carrier casts a long shadow. Even if country X can, as we saw, sink the carrier, the psychological barriers against doing so are extraordinarily powerful, as an attack against it would represent a tremendous escalation that would in turn force the PLA to respond commensurately — in this case, all-out war and, presumably, attacks against a variety of high-value targets. Rather than face such a devastating outcome, the smaller belligerent would refrain from targeting the aircraft carrier and likely seek to negotiate its way out of the impasse, or capitulate altogether in the face of unfavorable odds. Should it choose to launch military operations against the PLA while refraining from targeting the carrier (in other words, lesser escalation), it would face a war scenario in which the Chinese military retains the capability to launch air operations from its carrier. Aircraft carriers lose some of their utility when a military opponent is of similar strength or is stronger, as the cost of retaliation for China becomes much greater. Consequently, China’s carriers are probably not intended to serve a role against powerful countries like the U.S., Japan, or India. Instead, current and future Chinese carriers will likely be deployed in scenarios involving smaller countries that do not have the ability to sink them (e.g., the Philippines), or that do have such capabilities (e.g., Taiwan) but are extremely reluctant to escalate conflict in a manner that would prompt a devastating PLA retaliation. Sending thousands of lives to the bottom of the ocean, and along with them billions of dollars and a nation’s pride, would be the surest way to invite such a response from China. The symbolic and psychological value of an aircraft carrier, and the cost of targeting it, is ultimately its best protection, and the reason why in certain scenarios, carriers will continue to play an important role. Security Southeast Asia Image Credit: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Robert Clowney Southeast Asia's Emerging Amphibious Forces ASEAN navies are rapidly acquiring amphibious capabilities. Their intentions, however, remain unclear. By Koh Swee Lean Collin October 17, 2014

As a natural consequence of the maritime geography and complex array of security challenges within, naval modernization programs in Southeast Asia have always been characterized by the quest for a balanced set of capabilities. They not only reflect unique national requirements but also differing economic circumstances, which dictate the need for prioritization. In this equation, amphibious forces – often regarded as the less “glamorous” branch of navies – have long taken a backseat to other high-end assets such as missile-armed surface ships and submarines. Over the last decade, this has begun to change. Six of the nine member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam – now possess varying-sized, specialized amphibious ground forces equivalent to the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) or Russian Naval Infantry. This is no coincidence given that, because these formations are distinct from the army ground forces, maintaining them can be expensive. Moreover, the ships designed to give these forces mobility – large amphibious landing vessels – are also costly even though they feature comparatively less complex combat systems than those installed on warfighting assets. Regional Interest Tampered by Funding Constraints In the early 1990s, Indonesia bought 12 former East German Frosch class landing ships at bargain prices. This prompted Malaysia to purchase the KD Sri Inderapura, an 8,450-ton ex-U.S. Navy Newport class landing platform dock (LPD), which is a large amphibious landing ship designed with a well-dock for smaller craft and fighting vehicles, as well as deck facilities for two or more medium-sized helicopters. As Indonesia and Malaysia acquired these amphibious vessels, Singapore replaced her vintage landing ships with four 8,500-ton locally-built Endurance class LPDs in the late 1990s. Since Southeast Asian amphibious fleets mainly comprise WWII or Soviet-era vessels of dubious operational status, these were significant acquisitions. Still, shortfalls in amphibious capabilities left many ASEAN countries woefully unequipped to engage in disaster relief operations following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. It was only in the immediate years after that Indonesia and Thailand in particular went about procuring new LPDs. For its part, Indonesia purchased five 11,400-ton Makassar class LPDs (one of which was specially outfitted as a hospital ship) based on a South Korean design. Thailand introduced HTMS Ang Thong, a modified variant of the Singapore- designed Endurance class, which had performed well in the tsunami relief operations off Indonesia’s Banda Aceh. Still, regional interest in new amphibious capabilities quickly stalled as lack of funding forced ASEAN navies to prioritize more immediate maritime security concerns. For example, despite the need to replace KD Sri Inderapura following a 2009 fire, budgetary reasons forced Malaysia to defer the Multi-Role Support Ship (MRSS) program from the Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006-2010) to the Tenth Malaysia Plan (2011-2015). Instead, Malaysia acquired sea control (corvettes and offshore patrol vessels) and sea denial platforms (submarines) in order to combat rising piracy in the Malacca Strait and, more recently, South China Sea tensions. ‘Amphibious Forces Creep’ in Southeast Asia: Only for HADR? However, over the past couple of years there are signs of a renewed regional commitment to modernizing amphibious forces. In July of this year, Myanmar reportedly began negotiations with Indonesian shipbuilder PT PAL for the purchase of an unknown number of LPDs based on the Makassar class. If this deal does go through, it will mark a major milestone for the Myanmar amphibious forces, which currently consist of only a modest fleet of small landing craft and a Naval Infantry battalion. The Philippines also finally made progress on its long-discussed Strategic Support Vessel (SSV) program when it inked a contract with PT PAL for a pair of modified Makassar class LPDs. Prior to that, the locally built 570-ton landing craft utility BRP Tagbanua – which was commissioned in 2011 – had been the only notable addition to the Philippines’ mostly WWII-vintage fleet of landing ships. Most commentators may attribute this “amphibious forces creep” to recent natural disasters like the Super Typhoon Haiyan that ravaged the region and, especially, the Philippine islands of Leyte. This conjecture may be reinforced by plans mooted in June this year by Singapore to purchase what some called a mini- aircraft carrier, dubbed the Joint Multi-Mission Ship. The vessel is envisaged to be larger than the Endurance class and with greater helicopter capacity. The announcement seemed closely linked to island state’s offer to host a Regional Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) Coordination Center a couple of months before as a remedy to the lackluster coordination and questionable response capacity observed amongst ASEAN governments in the aftermath of Haiyan. While this “creep” could be seen as a collective effort to enhance HADR capacity in Southeast Asia, there are other factors that should not be overlooked. This “creep” is actually more far-reaching than the mere acquisitions of new sealift assets. It involves, at least for some countries, the modernization and mechanization of existing amphibious ground forces, as well as doctrinal shifts – certainly steps that go beyond HADR needs. For example, even though the MRSS could potentially be deferred again, following last year’s clashes with Sulu militants in Lahad Datu, eastern Sabah, Malaysian Defense Minister Datuk Seri Hishammuddin told local press in October 2013 that efforts are underway to improve amphibious defenses. During a working visit to Hawaii in January of this year, he also sought American help in developing a dedicated amphibious ground force based on the USMC model. The just-concluded Malaysia- U.S. Amphibious Exercise (MALUS AMPHEX) conducted in Lahad Datu possibly heralded the first step in this regard. Similarly, Indonesia is revitalizing its sealift capabilities, having just launched its latest indigenous landing ship, the KRI Teluk Bintuni, and plans to acquire at least another six of these vessels. The Indonesian Marine Corps (Korps Marinir or KORMAR) is also in the process of modernization and deeper mechanization. In July 2013, Jakarta reportedly sought to establish a tenth KORMAR battalion as part of the Navy force expansion and restructuring program. A second batch of Russian-built BMP-3F Series-2 infantry combat vehicles – a variant optimized for amphibious assault – was delivered in late January 2014, bringing the total to 54 in KORMAR service. There have also been reports that Jakarta completed work on a draft contract to purchase BTR-4 amphibious troop carriers from Ukraine. Likely Extra-Regional Influences? Looking beyond the HADR motivation, the “amphibious creep” in Southeast Asia may be partially influenced by the ambitious amphibious forces programs of extra-regional powers. For instance, Australia is currently inducting its new pair of 26,000-ton Canberra class landing helicopter docks based on the Spanish Juan Carlos I class, and has plans for an Amphibious Ready Group by 2016. South Korea similarly outlined plans in 2013 for an amphibious landing ship larger than the existing 19,000-ton Dokdo, possibly based on the Juan Carlos I class as well. In addition, Seoul launched the first of its new indigenously-built 4,500-ton LST-II landing ships in September 2013, and plans to acquire three additional ones by 2018. Japan is establishing dedicated amphibious forces to suit the needs of a dynamic defense posture, ostensibly aimed at security concerns in the remote southern isles including the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. This includes creating a USMC-like formation by FY2015 that will be equipped with amphibious fighting vehicles and MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor transports, as well as a large amphibious landing ship – most likely bigger and more capable than the 14,000-ton Osumi class LPDs – slated for a decision timeline by March 2019. The Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force has already begun acquiring relevant specialized know- how in amphibious assault operations through joint training and exchanges with the USMC. Most notably perhaps, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been bolstering its amphibious forces in recent years. The PLA Marine Corps is modernizing with new infantry equipment and amphibious fighting vehicles, supported by a burgeoning fleet of larger, more capable sealift assets. In August of last year, Beijing reportedly began constructing the first Type-081 landing helicopter dock possibly inspired by the French Mistral class. Perhaps more ominously, the PLA has recently demonstrated its amphibious might in the South China Sea. Specifically, 17,600-ton Type-071 Yuzhao class LPDs were frequently sighted together with PLA Marine Corps detachments, ship borne helicopters and landing assault craft in the disputed waters. China and the South China Sea Factor? China’s growing amphibious forces seen in the context of persistent tensions over the South China Sea disputes could be a significant driving factor behind the “creep” observed in Southeast Asia. This is especially the case for the Philippines and Vietnam, and to a lesser extent Indonesia and Malaysia. Just late last month, Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief-of-Staff General Gregorio Pio Catapang announced the reorientation of the Philippine Marine Corps in line with the overall transition from an internal security to an external defense force, with its focus on the South China Sea. The SSVs, when they are delivered in 2016-17, would support their deployments to those far-flung outposts in the disputed Spratly Archipelago. Vietnam’s primary opponent in the South China Sea disputes is almost certainly China, but Hanoi’s strategy has traditionally been predicated on sea denial in reflection of the vast naval force asymmetry between it and Beijing. However, there is an evident shift in such thinking towards building some limited forms of offensive sea control capacity, especially for the purpose of undertaking counter-offensive operations in the event of a hostile takeover of Vietnamese-occupied Spratly features. Still, the priority remains with warfighting assets, and thus only small inroads have been made into amphibious sealift. Instead of large landing ships such as LPDs, Vietnam is steadily inducting locally built roll-on/roll-off vessels with small payloads optimized for Spratly missions. Nonetheless, the Vietnam Naval Infantry is in a serious if modest process of modernization, and has been seen sporting new camouflaged uniforms, personal protective gear, and Israeli-made weapons even though it is still operating Soviet-era amphibious fighting vehicles. Malaysia has a way smaller extent of claims in the Spratlys than Vietnam. Thus it wasn’t completely surprising when, to avoid damaging relations with China – its biggest trading partner – it remained somewhat ambiguous about two reported instances of PLA Navy ships, including amphibious forces, “showing the Chinese flag” at the disputed James Shoal. Still, Kuala Lumpur could not have been oblivious to the potential Chinese military challenge to its Spratlys claims. While the plan to establish an amphibious force modeled on the USMC may be attributed to the Lahad Datu experience, one cannot dismiss the possibility that such measures are also motivated by concerns over the South China Sea. Seen in this light, MALUS AMPHEX is akin to killing two birds with one stone – to prepare Malaysia for future contingencies in both eastern Sabah and the Spratlys. Jakarta’s “amphibious forces creep” can be seen as part of contingency measures against potential crises in the South China Sea. In March of this year, the chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces, General Moeldoko, announced plans to strengthen defenses around the Natuna Islands in the southern end of the South China Sea, where Chinese fishing vessels were known to frequently intrude. He called for the need to “carefully watch the South China Sea,” and said that every event in the South China Sea could be dangerous for the country. Moeldoko also warned that “if something happens there, it could also spread to Indonesia.” Even though Indonesia has repeatedly said it is not a claimant in the South China Sea dispute, tensions in the area have not gone unnoticed Jakarta. Besides the South China Sea issue, Indonesia’s buildup appears directed at potentially resurgent maritime disputes with Malaysia. Malaysia allegedly violated Indonesian territory by installing a light beacon off the coast of Tanjung Datu along the West Kalimantan-Sarawak border in May 2014. Shortly after this incident, KORMAR was involved in an Indonesian joint air-land-sea operation codenamed Garda Wibawa 14, ostensibly aimed at enhancing its response to future Malaysian transgressions in the disputed Ambalat hydrocarbon block, located in the Celebes Sea. The Need for More Caution, More Cooperation Amphibious landing ships epitomize the classic difficulty in distinguishing between armaments used for offense and defense. By their very nature, such assets are dual functional. They can be deployed for peaceful purposes such as HADR, or for aggressive reasons like annexing maritime territories. As the region grapples with the foreseeable rise in incidences of natural calamities, acquiring such platforms benefits collective security. In this sense, amphibious landing ships have become indispensable to ASEAN. However, it is precisely because of their dual-functional nature that one ought to exercise caution over the potential geopolitical ramifications of such acquisitions, especially when combined with the use of marine or naval infantry maneuver forces. This is particularly the case in ongoing regional territorial dispute, where the offensive utility of amphibious forces becomes relevant and could potentially inflame tensions. To ameliorate this problem, regional amphibious forces ought to be encouraged to participate in future multinational exercises, not just for building regional resilience against natural calamities but also to build confidence and trust. Koh Swee Lean Collin is associate research fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies based in Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

NYT Frosty Meeting Could Be the Start of a Thaw Between China and Japan By JANE PERLEZ NOV. 10, 2014 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan, left, and China's president, Xi Jinping, shook hands during a meeting in Beijing on Monday. BEIJING — The meeting between President Xi Jinping of China and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan lasted only 25 minutes, less than half the time usually given to formal encounters between the leaders of two nations. The names of the tiny islands in the East China Sea that are at the core of their frosty relationship did not pass their lips. The two leaders tried a new beginning Monday at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, but the atmosphere could hardly have been cooler. Their countries’ flags, often the backdrop for such diplomatic meetings, were conspicuously absent, lest they convey an impression of amity. And the body language? At the outset of the meeting, before they were seated, Mr. Abe spoke to Mr. Xi. The cameras caught the Chinese leader listening but not answering, turning instead for the photographers to snap an awkward, less than enthusiastic handshake. “Obviously Mr. Xi did not want to create a warm or courteous atmosphere,” said Kazuhiko Togo, director of the Institute for World Affairs at Kyoto Sangyo University. “It was a very delicate balancing act for Xi.” If the Chinese leader smiled too much, he would antagonize the nationalistic audience at home, which has been led for more than two years to believe that Mr. Abe is not worth meeting, Mr. Togo said. If he glared, he would sour world opinion. The long-awaited encounter came three days after the two countries agreed to a formal document in which they recognized their differing positions on the East China Sea, including on the waters around the islands known as the Diaoyu in China and the Senkaku in Japan. The two sides said that “following the spirit of squaring history” — an oblique reference to Japan’s brutal occupation of parts of China during World War II — they would seek to overcome the problems in the relationship. The meeting Monday was not intended to deliver any substantive progress on territorial and historical issues that have brought the two richest countries in Asia close to conflict and inflamed nationalist sentiments, officials from both sides said. But Mr. Abe, who appears to have done most of the talking during the limited time given, asked for the early implementation of a hotline that could help defuse possible clashes between Chinese and Japanese vessels in waters around the islands, said Kuni Sato, the press secretary for the Japanese Foreign Ministry. In general, Ms. Sato said, Mr. Abe told Mr. Xi that China and Japan should explore a relationship that was based on strong economic cooperation, better relations in the East China Sea and stability in East Asia. Mr. Abe talked about the need to curb Ebola, and about cooperation on dealing with North Korea. He also squeezed in, as an example of cultural exchange, a mention of his attendance last month at a Chinese ballet company’s performance in Tokyo, according to Ms. Sato. Mr. Xi had refused to consider a face-to-face meeting since becoming president in March 2013, but Mr. Abe, who was elected at the end of 2012, publicly requested the encounter in the past few months. Japanese diplomats were dispatched to Beijing to arrange the meeting and to complete the accord released Friday, which was intended as a basis for better relations. The Chinese, as hosts of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum that opened Monday, realized they could not snub Mr. Abe during the summit meeting, and agreed to the encounter, Chinese officials said. President Obama arrived in Beijing for the forum Monday morning. That Mr. Xi and Mr. Abe met gives a “kickoff” to what could be an exceedingly long process of discussions over the future of the uninhabited islands, and the disagreements over Japanese repentance for atrocities in China during the war, said Yang Xiyu, a senior fellow at the China Institute of International Studies and a former Chinese diplomat. “The gaps between the two sides are too big to handle, let alone narrow,” in such a meeting between the two leaders, Mr. Yang said. Since taking control of the islands from the United States in 1972, Japan has consistently refused to concede that there is any dispute over sovereignty. China says the islands were taken from it by Japan at the end of the 19th century. On the question of what China sees as Japan’s lack of repentance for its occupation of China, Mr. Togo of Kyoto Sangyo University said it would be impossible for Mr. Abe to announce publicly that he would not visit the Yasukuni Shrine, a site in central Tokyo that honors the nation’s war dead, including convicted war criminals. Such a pledge would antagonize his conservative political base. “Abe cannot say he will not go, but it doesn’t mean he will go,” Mr. Togo said. Some Japanese analysts said they believed Mr. Abe’s visit to the shrine in December of last year was sufficient to satisfy his domestic constituency, allowing the prime minister to focus on developing a modicum of a working relationship with China. Even though the four-point document agreed to by both countries appeared to be evenly balanced to give each side “face,” the Chinese government got the upper hand, said Ren Xiao of Fudan University in Shanghai. Japan contends that there is no dispute over the islands, and that it maintains total control of them. But the four-point accord’s declaration that there were different positions over the islands “fulfilled China’s requirement,” he said. That was a sufficient concession that there was a conflict over the islands, he said.

NYT China Turns Up the Rhetoric Against the West By EDWARD WONGNOV. 11, 2014 BEIJING — Even as his government was making red-carpet plans to host President Obama this week, the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, praised a young blogger whose writing is best known here for its anti- American vitriol. In one widely circulated essay published by state news outlets titled “Nine Knockout Blows in America’s Cold War Against China,” the blogger, Zhou Xiaoping, argued that American culture was “eroding the moral foundation and self-confidence of the Chinese people.” He compared unfavorable American news coverage of China to Hitler’s treatment of the Jews. In another essay, he said the West had “slaughtered and robbed” China and other civilizations since the 17th century, and was now “brainwashing” it. Mr. Xi, speaking at a forum last month aimed at tightening political control of the arts, said the blogger exhibited “positive energy.” His embrace of Mr. Zhou, who has been hailed by propaganda officials but widely mocked by scholars here, is just the latest sign of rising anti-Western sentiment, bordering on xenophobia, that has emanated from the highest levels of the Communist Party and sent a chill through Chinese civil society and academia. Using ideological language reminiscent of the Cold War, Chinese officials have voiced conspiracy theories with relish, accusing foreigners, foreign companies and nongovernmental organizations of plotting to weaken or overthrow the party. Chinese institutions with ties to Western entities, no matter how benign, have also come under attack. Meanwhile, state-run newspapers have taken to blaming “hostile foreign forces” for any major disturbance, whether it is ethnic violence in western China or student-led pro- democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong. The vilification of foreigners as enemies of China has been a staple of propaganda by the Communist Party since before its rise to power, and analysts say the leadership tends to ramp up such rhetoric when it feels under pressure at home. “Historically, during every period with many deep conflicts within the country, there has been a surge of anti-foreign sentiments from the party,” said Zhang Lifan, a historian, pointing to Mao Zedong’s disastrous Cultural Revolution as an example. At the moment, he said, “the political establishment needs the public to turn their rage toward foreign countries” because anger over the widening gap between rich and poor in China has reached “crisis levels.” But unlike earlier campaigns targeting the West, the current wave of nationalism comes as China is ascendant. Mr. Xi presides over a country that is on the verge of overtaking the United States as the world’s largest economy and that enjoys influence around the world, especially in Asia, where it has sought to expand its territorial footprint. In speeches, Mr. Xi has openly called on other nations to push back against the United States on specific issues. In July, for example, he told Brazil’s National Congress that developing nations must “challenge U.S. hegemony on the Internet.” Two months earlier, Mr. Xi suggested at a conference in Shanghai that the United States should cede power in Asia, saying, “It is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia.” The surge in anti-Americanism extends beyond speeches. Over the summer, for example, the Chinese government began a security review of foreign NGOs operating in China, as well as Chinese NGOs that receive foreign support, scrutinizing their finances and freezing bank accounts. A strident, 100-minute anti- American propaganda film made by the People’s Liberation Army last year laid out the case that American NGOs were out to undermine the party. (It used the martial theme music from the HBO series “Game of Thrones.”) In Guangdong, the southern province adjacent to Hong Kong that has long been more open to foreign influence and investment, officials have considered shutting down Chinese NGOs that depend primarily on foreign funds, the state-run newspaper Global Times reported last week. Wang Jiangsong, a professor of labor relations at the China Institute of Industrial Relations, was quoted in the newspaper saying that the authorities had secretly tracked transfers of overseas money to the Chinese organizations, and were worried that “some NGOs would be manipulated by overseas forces and conduct activities that may endanger national security and undermine social stability.” The campaign has reached into academia as well. An employee of an American organization that promotes dialogue among scholars said some Chinese professors who work on international relations are no longer writing or saying anything in public that casts the United States in a positive light, for fear of being accused of being a spy. The employee, who spoke on condition of anonymity so as not to antagonize Chinese partners, added that one prominent Chinese university has barred visiting American scholars from giving lectures if their research did not conform to the party line. An we lost the propaganda war. It should be obvious by now that we a country in decline and we lack a political party that with life us... In a speech in June, Zhang Yiwei, a senior party official at the influential Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said “accepting foreign forces’ point-to-point penetration” was one of the research institute’s main ideological problems, according to People’s Daily, the official party newspaper. Mr. Zhang added that his office would not tolerate any scholar who was not in line with party thought. Casting blame on the “black hand” of foreign forces has become increasingly common in the state news media as well. The People’s Daily has published 42 articles this year blaming China’s domestic problems on “Western,” “foreign” or “overseas” forces, nearly triple the number of similar pieces from the first 10 months of last year, according to a count by the Christian Science Monitor. The pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong have been a favorite target. Last Friday, Ta Kung Pao, a Hong Kong newspaper close to the party, ran a front-page story under a headline that said the newspaper had found “ironclad evidence” that the United States had been secretly plotting the local Occupy movement since 2006. The government has also targeted major Western companies with high-profile investigations and imposed record fines for what officials call monopolistic practices. Some foreign businesspeople and officials say the investigations are a form of protectionism. At the same time, the Chinese government has maintained restrictions on foreign investment, ownership and market access in many industries. As a result, American executives have tempered their optimism about doing business here, said John Frisbie, president of the U.S.-China Business Council, a trade group in Washington. “It should be more than a $350 billion market in China for U.S. companies,” he said. “Many sectors are still closed. There has generally been a lack of movement forward on further openings.” Some have questioned the sincerity — or pointed out the hypocrisy — of the party’s tirades against the West, noting that many party officials have children or other family members living and even applying for citizenship overseas. Mr. Xi’s daughter, Xi Mingze, attended Harvard University under a pseudonym. “How can Chinese officials really be anti-American?” asked Zhan Jiang, a media studies professor at Beijing Foreign Studies University. “Anti-foreign sentiments will always be present in China because of China’s unique history,” he said. “However, the public’s opinion of the West will not change because of what the party says.”

NYT Obama’s Focus in China Is on Leader, Not Public By MARK LANDLERNOV. 10, 2014

President Obama joined peers in Chinese garb on Monday, starting a visit focusing on his ties to President Xi Jinping. Credit Sergei Ilnitsky/European Pressphoto Agency BEIJING — President Obama is in China for less than three days this week, but he is seeing a great deal of President Xi Jinping. On Tuesday, they will go for a quiet walk in Mr. Xi’s walled compound and have dinner. The next day, they will take part in a formal welcoming ceremony at the Great Hall of the People and toast each other at a state banquet. Mr. Obama will spend far less quality time with the broader Chinese population. There are no town-hall- style meetings, televised interviews or major speeches on his schedule. Much of that was due to time constraints: squeezing an economic summit meeting and a state visit into three days, before the president leaves on Wednesday to travel to Myanmar and Australia, is no easy task. But the itinerary also reflects the White House’s decision to nurture the one-on-one relationship between Mr. Obama and Mr. Xi in favor of reaching out to the Chinese public. The White House has learned that those efforts are often stymied by the Chinese government. When Mr. Obama took part in a town-hall meeting on his first visit here as president in 2009, his hosts tried to limit the audience and control the questions. They refused to stream the session on the Internet or mention it on the evening news broadcasts. Photo

From left, Hassanal Bolkiah, the sultan of Brunei; President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia; President Xi Jinping of China and his wife, Peng Liyuan; and President Obama at a ceremonial reception on Monday that was part of a summit meeting in Beijing. Credit Pool photo by Mikhail Klimentyev These restrictions were amplified by the American news media and cast a shadow over Mr. Obama’s trip, reinforcing a narrative that the president was vulnerable to Chinese manipulation. White House officials said they got a big audience and deemed the event worthwhile, but the endless haggling with the Chinese left them fed up. The White House has also changed its approach to the Chinese news media. In 2009, Mr. Obama gave an interview to Southern Weekly, a newspaper based in Guangdong Province that is known for pushing the limits of China’s censorship rules. The government clumsily censored the transcript, leaving in Mr. Obama’s lighthearted observations about basketball. This time, the White House is granting a written interview with Mr. Obama to China’s official news agency, Xinhua. That interview, combined with the president’s encounters with Mr. Xi, ensures that his visit will be widely covered here, officials said. White House officials note that when Michelle Obama visited China last March with her daughters, Malia and Sasha, they did plenty of public diplomacy — playing table tennis, dabbling in calligraphy, practicing tai chi and trudging up the Great Wall. Moreover, they said, Mr. Obama did his part for people-to-people relations, announcing a reciprocal agreement with China to extend tourist and business visas to 10 years from one year, and student visas to five years from one. The deal, he said, will create jobs, make it easier for businesspeople to invest and encourage thousands of exchange students. The amount of time Mr. Obama is willing to lavish on Mr. Xi attests to the power of a single Chinese citizen. Mr. Xi’s status as the nation’s paramount leader has only been enhanced since the two men spent nearly eight hours in discussions in June 2013, strolling amid the cactuses of the Sunnylands estate in Rancho Mirage, Calif. By contrast, the White House played down a brief encounter between Mr. Obama and President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia at the opening ceremony of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum on Monday. The two leaders did not have time to say more than hello, an official said. The White House is well aware that Mr. Obama’s encounters with Mr. Xi run the risk of looking stage- managed, which is one reason American officials are pushing the Chinese authorities to permit questions when the two men are to deliver public statements on Tuesday. So far, the answer has been no, and history suggests that will be hard to reverse. Hu Jintao, the former president, did not take questions when he appeared with Mr. Obama in 2009. White House officials insist they have not lost hope: They say they will keep lobbying the Chinese until just before the leaders take the stage. The comments on the Chinese message boards are telling. Things about dissing Chinese by using a car different and larger than everyone else... “If you go back to when Chinese leaders have agreed to joint press availabilities, you’ll have a very hard time finding one where they have been willing to take questions,” said Kenneth G. Lieberthal, a former adviser on China in the Clinton administration. “We want it; they don’t. They are the host, and that’s where we end up.” In Beijing, Mr. Obama appeared determined not to antagonize his host. Asked about Hong Kong’s pro- democracy protests, Mr. Obama appealed for restraint, saying that while the United States did not necessarily agree with China about the issues behind the standoff, it did not want to see the tensions erupt into violence. “Obviously, the situation between China and Hong Kong is historically complicated and is in the process of transition,” he said in carefully calibrated remarks. “Our primary message has been to make sure violence is avoided,” the president said, adding: “We don’t expect China to follow an American model in every instance. But we’re going to continue to have concerns about human rights.” The president also put in a pitch for his ambitious trade deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, when meeting with the leaders of other countries involved in those negotiations. “Today is an opportunity, at the political level, for us to break some remaining logjams,” he said. But that trade deal does not include China, and in a subsequent speech to business executives, Mr. Obama twice repeated, “the United States welcomes the rise of a prosperous, peaceful and stable China.” Certainly, China’s prosperous side was on vivid display. Mr. Xi welcomed leaders from the 20 other members of APEC with a dazzling display of fireworks and technology, including an illuminated red carpet that rolled out in front of their motorcades. And in a goofy bit of APEC tradition, Mr. Xi outfitted them in native garb: Chinese-style shirts with Mandarin collars. Mr. Obama tried to end the tradition when the conference was held in Hawaii in 2011. But on Monday he dutifully turned up in a purple silk shirt that looked more “Star Trek” than Shanghai Tang.

China wins support for Asia-Pacific trade proposal By JOE McDONALD and YOUKYUNG LEE 3 hours ago 11/11/14 HUAIROU, China (AP) — Leaders of Asia-Pacific economies agreed Tuesday to begin work toward possible adoption of a Chinese-backed free-trade pact, giving Beijing a victory in its push for a bigger role in managing global commerce. Related Stories 1. China uses APEC to boost regional role Associated Press 2. China's Xi says Asia-Pacific trade area will boost regional ties Reuters 3. APEC set to launch study on China-backed free trade area Reuters 4. China's Xi says economy shifting to lower growth Associated Press 5. Obama Backs Xi’s Road Map to Create Asia-Pacific Free Trade Area Bloomberg In a joint statement after a two-day Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, the leaders including U.S. President Barack Obama and Russia's Vladimir Putin agreed to take a first step by launching a two-year study of the initiative. "This is a historic step in the direction of an Asia-Pacific free trade area," said Chinese President Xi Jinping at a news conference. China is promoting the proposed Free-Trade Area of the Asia Pacific despite U.S. pressure to wrap up other trade negotiations. Analysts see it as a response to a U.S.-led initiative, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which includes 12 countries but excludes China. The APEC leaders also promised to work more closely to combat official corruption. That is a special concern for Beijing, which is stepping up efforts to pursue officials who flee abroad with stolen public money. Beijing has launched a series of trade and finance initiatives in pursuit of a bigger role in U.S.-dominated economic and security organizations to reflect Beijing's status as the world's second-biggest economy. APEC was the first major international gathering in China since Xi took power and gave Beijing a platform to lobby for a bigger leadership role. On the eve of the summit, Beijing announced a free-trade agreement with South Korea. Also Monday, regulators approved a plan to open Chinese stock markets wider to foreign investors by linking exchanges in Hong Kong and Shanghai. That followed the weekend announcement of a $40 billion Chinese-financed fund to improve trade links between Asian economies. Earlier this year, Beijing launched a regional development bank with 20 other governments. In May, Xi called for a new Asian structure for security cooperation based on a group that includes Russia and Iran but excludes the United States. China says its motives are benign, but its growing economic weight as the top trading partner for most of its neighbors from South Korea to Australia could erode U.S. influence. Tuesday's meeting took place under elaborate security at a government conference center in wooded hills north of the Chinese capital.

View gallery U.S. President Barack Obama, left, Chinese President Xi Jinping, right, and Russian President Vladim … In an effort to appear more open, organizers took the unusual step of allowing access from the press center to websites such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube that usually are blocked by China's extensive Internet filters. The Asia-Pacific trade pact was first proposed by an APEC business panel but China took the lead in promoting it. It marks the first time Beijing has played a leading role in a multinational trade agreement. "(The U.S.-led) TPP is being used to push aside China and to weaken China's economic core status," said Wu Xinbo, director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai. Promoting its own initiative "will give China a bigger right to speak in the Asia-Pacific — to have a new status." Obama said Monday the United States "welcomes the rise" of a prosperous, peaceful and stable China. Still, American officials chafe at Beijing's insistence on promoting the Free-Trade Area of the Asia Pacific. U.S. trade officials say the two proposals are not competitors. But they want Beijing to wrap up a U.S.- Chinese investment treaty and a separate agreement to lower barriers to trade in information technology. Washington and some other governments argued the Chinese proposal would be a distraction at APEC but Beijing made it the centerpiece of the meeting.

View gallery From left to right, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping, U.S. President B … Few details of the U.S.-led proposal have been released but promoters say it would reduce or eliminate tariffs on most goods among the member countries. That might hurt China by encouraging member countries to trade more with each other. Leaders of the nations involved in TPP talks, including the United States, Mexico, Japan and Australia, met Monday and issued a statement saying they were making progress. The talks have been delayed repeatedly by disputes over the sweeping nature of its market-opening proposals. "We have instructed our ministers and negotiators to make concluding this agreement a top priority," the statement said. The initiative promoted by Beijing is less ambitious and is aimed at reducing conflict among overlapping trade agreements between pairs of Asia-Pacific economies. It is a logical response to being excluded from the TPP, said Li Wei, an economist at the Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business in Beijing.

View gallery Russian President Vladimir Putin, center, looks back at U.S. President Barack Obama, left, as they a … "If the U.S. doesn't want China to join the TPP, then China can form its own trade groups," said Li. Li also pointed to limits on access to U.S. markets for some Chinese technology companies such as Huawei Technologies Ltd., a maker of network switching gear, on security grounds. "The world, with the U.S. leading, is retreating from free trade. It is moving into protectionism," said Li. "If the U.S. is saying, I should be careful about who I have free trade with, then China should take a more liberalizing role."

NYT U.S. and China Agree to Cut Tariffs, but Vie for Trade Blocs By MARK LANDLERNOV. 11, 2014 Photo President Obama and President Xi Jinping before a private dinner on Tuesday. Credit Pablo Martinez Monsivais/Associated Press BEIJING — China and the United States vividly displayed on Tuesday why they are both rivals and partners atop the global economy, announcing an agreement to reduce tariffs for technology products even as they promoted competing free-trade blocs for the Asian region. The maneuvering came during a conference of Pacific Rim economies in Beijing that has showcased China’s growing dominance in Asia. It has also shown the determination of the United States, riding a resurgent economy, to reclaim its historic role as a Pacific power. On Tuesday evening, President Xi Jinping of China invited President Obama to dinner at his official residence, telling his guest that he hoped that they had laid the foundation for a collaborative relationship — or, as he more metaphorically put it, “A pool begins with many drops of water.” Greeting Mr. Obama at the gate of the walled leadership compound next to the Forbidden City, Mr. Xi squired him across a brightly lit stone bridge and into the residence. Mr. Obama told the Chinese president that he wanted to take the relationship “to a new level.” “When the U.S. and China are able to work together effectively,” he added, “the whole world benefits.” But as the world witnessed this week, it is more complicated than that. Mr. Xi won approval Tuesday from the 21 countries of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum to study the creation of a China-led free- trade zone that would be an alternative to Mr. Obama’s Trans-Pacific Partnership, a 12-nation trading bloc that excludes China. Mr. Obama, meanwhile, met with members of that group here on Monday and claimed progress in negotiating the partnership, which is a centerpiece of his strategic shift to Asia. Negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership are much further along than those for the nascent Chinese plan, known as the Free Trade Area of Asia Pacific, and some analysts said the Pacific Rim nations’ approval of a two-year study was mainly a gesture to the Chinese hosts to give them something to announce at the meeting. For all the jockeying, the biggest headline on Tuesday was a breakthrough in negotiations with China to eliminate tariffs on an array of information technology products, including video game consoles, computer software, medical equipment and semiconductors. The understanding, American officials said, opens the door to expanding a World Trade Organization treaty on these products, assuming that other countries can be persuaded to accept the same terms. With China on board, officials predicted that a broader deal would be reached swiftly. “We’re going to take what’s been achieved here in Beijing back to Geneva to work with our W.T.O. partners,” said Michael B. Froman, the United States trade representative. “While we don’t take anything for granted, we’re hopeful that we’ll be able to work quickly” to conclude an expansion of the treaty, known as the Information Technology Agreement. The breakthrough is most likely to be among the most tangible outcomes of Mr. Obama’s visit to China, though American officials were confident that he and Mr. Xi would also make progress in developing a common position on the reduction of carbon emissions. Mr. Obama’s dinner with Mr. Xi was the first of a series of meetings they will hold before Mr. Obama flies to Myanmar on Wednesday evening. In the morning, Mr. Xi is to formally welcome the president at a ceremony in the Great Hall of the People; the two leaders are later set to toast each other at a state banquet. Administration officials said Mr. Obama would press Mr. Xi to resume a United States-China working group on cybersecurity issues, which abruptly stopped its discussions after the United States charged several Chinese military officers with hacking. “We did see a chill in the cyberdialogue,” said Benjamin J. Rhodes, the deputy national security adviser. “The fact that we pursued those cases demonstrates that we’re not going to stand idly by.” But he added, “We do believe it’s better if there’s a mechanism for dialogue.” Speaking Tuesday, Mr. Obama credited APEC with originating the work on reducing technology tariffs and said, referring to the coming World Trade Organization talks in Geneva, “It is fitting that we are here with our APEC colleagues to share the news that the United States and China have reached an understanding that we hope will contribute to a rapid conclusion of the broader negotiations in Geneva.” Talks with China over expanding the 1997 treaty on information technology broke down last year over the scope of the products covered by the agreement. But after intensive negotiations leading up to Mr. Obama’s visit, Mr. Froman said, the Americans and Chinese agreed Monday evening to eliminate more than 200 categories of tariffs. While the United States still exports many high-technology goods, China is the world’s dominant exporter of electronics and has much to gain from an elimination of tariffs. Taiwan, South Korea and Japan increasingly find themselves supplying China’s huge electronics industry, deepening their dependence on decisions made in Beijing. The administration estimated that expanding the Information Technology Agreement, or I.T.A., would generate up to 60,000 new jobs by eliminating tariffs on goods that generate $1 trillion in sales a year. About $100 billion of those products are made in the United States. “With so many new products created since the I.T.A. was concluded two decades ago, expanding the agreement’s coverage is imperative,” said Myron Brilliant, head of international affairs of the United States Chamber of Commerce. “With trade in tech goods surpassing $4 trillion annually, the commercial significance of these negotiations is obvious.” The administration faces a longer path on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, including whether Mr. Obama will obtain fast-track trade authority from Congress. That could make it easier for the United States to extract concessions from the countries in the partnership, since they would have more confidence that the treaty would be ratified by Congress. While Mr. Froman acknowledged that sticking points remained, he said, “It’s become clearer and clearer what the landing zones are.” He said Mr. Obama would seek fast-track authority but the best way for the president to win congressional passage of the Trans-Pacific Partnership would be to negotiate the best possible deal.

NYT

Xi Jinping’s Rapid Rise in China Presents Challenges to the U.S. By CHRIS BUCKLEY NOV. 11, 2014 President Obama with President Xi Jinping of China in Beijing on Tuesday during a conference of Pacific Rim economies. Credit Mandel Ngan/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images HONG KONG — President Obama will sit down Wednesday with the kind of Chinese leader no American president has ever encountered: a strongman with bold ambitions at home and abroad who sees China as a great power peer of the United States. President Xi Jinping has amassed power faster than any Chinese leader in decades, and his officials have cast his talks with Mr. Obama and other regional leaders this week in Beijing as another affirmation of the ascendance of China and of Mr. Xi. For over 20 years, the Chinese Communist Party elite largely made decisions by consensus, seeking to avoid a repeat of the turbulence under Mao and Deng Xiaoping. But less than two years after assuming power, Mr. Xi has emerged as more than the “first among equals” in the ruling Politburo Standing Committee, shaking the longstanding assumption that China would be steered by steady, if often ponderous, collective leadership. The implications of his rise for the United States, and for Mr. Obama, are two-sided. When the two leaders meet, Mr. Obama may have a surer sense that his counterpart has the power to make good on his promises. On Wednesday, they unveiled a deal on curbing greenhouse gases, including a landmark agreement by China to reach a peak in carbon dioxide emissions by about 2030. On Tuesday, China also said it would eliminate tariffs on many information technology products. But so much now depends on Mr. Xi’s political calculations, and he has shown himself to be wary of the West and disinclined to make concessions under pressure. “Xi portrays himself in some ways not unlike Putin,” said Dali Yang, a political science professor at the University of Chicago. “He’s basically saying that ‘I am here to defend the party, to defend the national interests in terms of national territorial sovereignty.’ ” Signs of Mr. Xi’s ascendancy are everywhere, from the collections of his speeches selling in bookstores to the intense, often adulatory, news coverage of his busy routine. In lighter moments, the state-run news media have taken to calling him “Xi Dada”: roughly, Big Papa Xi. Mr. Xi, 61, has shaken up party ranks with an extended campaign against official corruption and pursued a crackdown on dissent that has dismayed liberal intellectuals. Rather than distribute portfolios among his colleagues, he has hoarded control of the party’s most important policy committees, known as “leading small groups,” and established several new ones under his command: on national security, military overhauls, economic restructuring and control of the Internet. “Xi has been more vigorous than anyone probably had imagined he would be,” Professor Yang said. “We did anticipate some strong moves on his part, but not the scale, the breadth and the scope of his initiatives.” Mr. Xi has overseen a muscular foreign policy, pressing China’s claims to disputed seas and islands, deepening rifts with Japan and neighbors in Southeast Asia. Those tensions have been tempered, for now, by an agreement with Japan on Friday acknowledging their differences and a trade agreement with South Korea announced Monday. He has said he wants to build a new “great power” relationship with Washington to avoid confrontation that could tip into armed conflict, but also to win greater recognition for China’s demands and interests. In June last year, he sought to build trust with Mr. Obama during two days of talks at the Sunnylands retreat in California. At the same time, Mr. Xi’s administration has resurrected and amplified traditional party themes that China’s woes have been exacerbated, even instigated, by “hostile forces” controlled by Western governments. Chinese officials accuse the United States of seeking to topple Communist Party rule, most recently by supporting pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong, a charge the United States government denies. “There is this contradiction between this Cold War ideological thinking about hostile foreign forces and U.S. subversion, but at the same time saying that they want to have this new type of great power relationship,” said Susan L. Shirk, a professor at the University of California, San Diego, who was a deputy assistant secretary of state in the Clinton administration. “It’s the domestic insecurity of the Chinese Communist Party.” Gnawing fear and anxiety, Professor Shirk and other China experts say, are the flip side of China’s new strength and assertiveness, and may go a long way toward explaining what can appear to be dissonant positions. The sources of China’s insecurities are many: public discontent over smog, graft and land seizures; a bureaucracy and military rotted by corruption; tumult in Hong Kong; ethnic strife in Tibet and Xinjiang; and the uncertain effects of slowing economic growth. “The tasks our party faces in reform, development and stability are more onerous than ever,” Mr. Xi said in late October, “and the conflicts, dangers and challenges are more numerous than ever.” That calculus applies to domestic policies as well. Mr. Xi has already overseen the most intense and extended crackdown on political dissent in China in years, as well as a sweeping campaign against corruption whose targets have included retired senior security and military officials once thought of as immune to scrutiny. He has also vowed to overhaul the economy and give businesses more room to grow, and party leaders at a meeting last month endorsed proposals to give citizens fairer treatment at the hands of the police and in court. Several China scholars said Mr. Xi was likely to defy early expectations that he might shift to a more moderate course after consolidating power. Such a shift could be seen as a sign of dangerous weakness, they said. “If over the next year or two, there is a significant slowdown in the Chinese economy, the air quality fails to improve in major cities such as Beijing, or the violence spreads from Xinjiang to other parts of the country, then Xi may well take a serious hit to his political authority,” Elizabeth C. Economy, director for Asian studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, said in emailed answers to questions. “The motivation behind his tough approach may well include fear that it will all come crashing down otherwise.” Echoing previous party leaders, Mr. Xi has said that China needs a stable and peaceful international neighborhood so that it can focus on its domestic needs, and analysts said that focus could encourage his government to contain tensions with Japan and neighbors in Southeast Asia. “It looks to me like there has been a recalibration, a kind of learning from the reaction of your neighbors” by China, Professor Shirk said. But Ms. Economy said she was skeptical that the calm would last. “There is certainly a foreign policy debate underway within China over whether China’s assertiveness in the region has been harmful to China’s broader foreign policy objectives,” she said. “But I don’t think that it has been resolved in a way that suggests this moderation is permanent.”

Class Notes

Lifting the Shroud on China's Defense Spending: Trends, Drivers, and Implications Liff and Erickson

Describe the overall trends in Chinese defense spending

 China's surging defense spending over the past decade contrasts starkly with that of the United States and many of its security allies and partners, for whom fiscal pressures— especially in the past four years—have kept purse strings relatively tight. It is this relative speed of China's defense spending that further exacerbates concerns about its rapid growth.  China's civilian leaders clearly see military modernization as a priority that is secondary to overall economic development. Over the past two decades, China's defense budget increases have been roughly consistent with GDP growth and actually have been outpaced by the even more rapid increase of overall government expenditures. Keeping the Communist Party in power, ensuring national survival, and defending vital national interests are even more important to Chinese decision-makers than economic development per se, but at present it appears that they judge that these core imperatives are achieved adequately at current levels of defense spending. A good indication of Beijing's priorities is evident in the fact that since 2010 official spending on public security has surpassed the official defense budget.  Over the past decade, China's official defense budget has ranged between 1.3% and 1.5% of GDP, and even high-end foreign estimates of China's total defense spending correspond to only 2%–3% of GDP. Thus, it seems abundantly clear that for a variety of reasons, not the least of which are lessons drawn from the Soviet Union's experience with over-prioritization of the military and strategic over-extension, China's leaders will limit defense spending increases to a rate roughly proportional to its economic growth.  BUT, China’s official defense budget is projected to increase 12.2% in 2014 to roughly 808 billion yuan ($132 Billion), while the country’s economic growth is expected to hold steady at 7.5%, according to the annual budget report released Tuesday in Beijing. This year’s projected growth in the People’s Liberation Army budget is higher than last year’s defense spending increase of 10.7%, and marks the third year in a row that official military spending is projected to outpace GDP growth.  China wants to compensate for past austerity and neglect, and to modernize China's military so that it achieves capabilities commensurate with contemporary standards.  Beijing has ramped up military spending to accelerate the PLA's modernization and personnel development in order to secure China's homeland and assert control over contested territorial and maritime claims. In addition, the PLA is undertaking "new historic missions" to safeguard its overseas interests and to improve its international image as a "responsible great power."  With regard to possible combat scenarios, the available evidence suggests that China's defense spending is focused on developing formidable military capabilities to ensure stability on its land and maritime boundaries and to resolve its numerous territorial and maritime disputes in its favor. Aside from borderland disputes with India and Bhutan, all China's outstanding island and maritime claims lie in the "near seas" (the Yellow, East, and South China seas).  The PLA is developing weapons systems and ways to deploy and employ them that are designed to coerce the disputant, as well as any third-party, should it attempt to intervene in these sensitive disputes. China's goals in this regard are to convince its neighbors that it is in their interests to settle the disputes on terms favorable to Beijing and, toward that end, to deter third-party intervention.  a growing (but uncertain) percentage of the PLA's budget is being allocated toward developing power-projection platforms, such as aircraft carriers, and deploying destroyers and frigates on antipiracy and naval diplomacy missions, as well as toward increasing the ability to safeguard Chinese nationals and interests overseas.  While investments in military modernization over the past decade mean that China is increasingly fielding formidable military capabilities in its immediate periphery, this is a far cry from developing a global force similar to that of the U.S. military, which is capable of high-intensity modern warfare anywhere in the world. Such missions will remain out of China's reach for many years. That said, capabilities in the cyber and, to some extent, space domains are important exceptions to these geographical limitations on China's power- projection capabilities.  When it comes to the specific matter of China's defense budget transparency, there are basically two related but analytically distinct issues. First, there is the issue of how accurately the officially announced defense budget figure captures China's total spending on its military. Second, there is the issue of how much information the Chinese government reveals about how these funds are spent—i.e., how the budget is allocated within the PLA.  This contrasts sharply with the practices of some other major emerging countries. India, for example, publishes detailed spending breakdowns for its ministry of defense, defense pensions, army, navy, air force, and defense ordnance factories. While India is still sometimes criticized for its own level of defense budget transparency, China would be perceived very differently if it elected to at least offer similar spending details.  Despite Beijing crying foul over Japan’s recently-announced plans to raise its own defense budget over a five-year period—a direct response to China’s own increased defense spending and destabilizing behavior in the East China Sea—Tokyo’s actual planned increases to defense spending for 2014 and 2013 are a mere 2.2% and 0.8%–a minor reversal after ten straight years of annual decreases.  The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) increasingly has the resources, capabilities, and confidence to attempt to assert China’s interests on its contested periphery, particularly in the Near Seas (Yellow, East, and South China Seas). This development has the potential to seriously challenge the interests of the U.S., its allies, and other partners in the region, as well as access to and security of a vital portion of the global commons—waters and airspace that all nations rely on for prosperity, yet which none own.  Yet beyond China’s immediate periphery the actual impact of PLA spending growth overall may be far less impressive than the headline numbers suggest. The PLA would need far greater resources and capabilities to pursue high-intensity combat capabilities much further away from China’s borders and the territory it claims.  One crucial observation often absent from the commentary about China’s military development is the simple reality that its defense planners face a complicated strategic calculus, owing largely to geography. Land borders with more than a dozen countries (including multiple nuclear powers), a string of island nations interposed between its eastern seaboard and the western Pacific and Indian Oceans, and ongoing island and/or maritime disputes with all of its maritime neighbors, coupled with decades of economic and military inferiority, have largely compelled China to maintain relatively limited, consistently- defined strategic objectives for most of the period since 1978.  Since witnessing Operation Desert Storm in 1991, and directly experiencing the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crises and the 1999 Belgrade Embassy bombing, Beijing has funded and built its military for the reasons it says it has: to compensate for past neglect—which meant that well into the 1990s the PLA consisted largely of obsolete 1950s-era Soviet military equipment and a bloated land army—that severely limited the PLA’s ability to cope conventionally with even a moderately-capable adversary or project even minimal naval or air power beyond its land borders, even to assert its long-standing territorial and maritime claims a few miles offshore; and to take what its leaders see as China’s rightful place as a great power with “a seat at the table” and commensurate regional suasion and global influence.  Despite its relative military inferiority throughout much of this period, by largely, if decreasingly, focusing on potential conflicts in the Near Seas, the PLA has rapidly exploited its geographical proximity and the vulnerabilities in potential adversaries’ military technologies, achieving asymmetric capabilities that are disproportionately efficient in asserting its interests, even though its overall defense spending remains significantly less than that of the U.S. In the words of leading China scholar and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Thomas Christensen, writing in 2001, this core focus has enabled the PLA to “pose problems without catching up.”

Between ‘China Threat Theory’ and ‘Chindia’: Chinese Responses to India’s Military Modernization Lora Saalmany

Military relations and capabilities represent two distinctive aspects of international relations:

1) Shifting capabilities and strategic concepts provide indicators of national thinking and convey usually opaque messages about national intentions 2) Military capabilities represent the physical capacity to harm others states and societies, and the threat of use and actual use are acts of deterrence and compellence.

 Arms sales represent a commercial enterprise for the defense firms of nations, allowing them to achieve economies of scale.  Arms sales are also forms of influence and methods of binding nations together in webs of strategic interdependence.  And arms sales provide tangible capabilities that can affect the outcome of conflicts and also can come back to haunt the seller. To what extent has India’s military modernization affected Chinese calculations?

Not only has the volume of notice of India’s modernization increased, but far fewer dismissive statements appear. China must now recognize the effects of India’s military capabilities on its security.

Connected to: 1998 nuclear tests ending of US arms embargo to India US-India agreement on civil nuclear cooperation 2010 Obama visit to India Associated US lifting of high technology restrictions on sales to India space agencies India plans to expand aircraft carrier fleet to three (3)

2006 Hu Jintao refers to India as a great power

Chinese perceptions of India’s army:

China has and will retain a significant advantage

China’s perceptions of India’s navy

China has much greater respect for the Indian navy and fear its potential to surpass China’s navy

Much of the modernization of the India navy will depend on the development of manufacturing in India

India is in a position to disrupt oil flowing through the India Ocean from the Middle East and Africa to China. The distance to China means even a weaker India navy could create major problems for China. Indian aircraft carriers are especially important for the projection of military force into the Indian Ocean.

China’s “string of pearls” plan to obtain the ability to dock in Sri Lanka is effort to counteract India’s advantages.

China’s perception of India’s air force

India has a significant and growing capability, based on procurement from sophisticated sources and training relationship with the US.

India has highly skilled pilots. China’s perception of India’s Space force

Global positioning and navigation systems, remote-sensing satellites, com- munication satellites, and C4ISR can be used in everything from missile guidance and reconnaissance to command and control of nuclear forces. Launch technology used to propel satellites into space is readily applicable to missiles and hit-to-kill intercepts. If India were to decide to engage in an anti-satellite test (ASAT), its system of choice could very well be to imitate its neighbor and use a ballistic missile.

Growing respect but believes China is ahead

China’s perception of India’s nuclear force

Greatest interest is the US role in expanding India’s nuclear capabilities

India’s Military Modernization and the Changing US-China Power Balance

How do we evaluate India’s military capabilities?

 There is almost a deliberate tendency to dismiss, neglect, or ignore India’s ongoing military modernization, in stark contrast to the international focus on China’s evolving military capacity. This oversight of India’s military development is a mistake.

 Compared with Japan—the world’s sixth largest defense spender—India will procure three times the number of fighter aircraft, more than double the number of tanks, four times the number of artillery pieces, and nearly the same number of warships within the next two decades. It is high time that policy makers and analysts took heed of the upcoming impact of India’s military modernization on the military balance of power in Asia.  The military power relationship between China and the US is rapidly shifting in China’s favor  The result has been an arms buildup by several Asian nations seeking to balance China’s rising power: Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Australia, Japan  the United States needs a “strong Japan.” However, the United States also needs a strong India. Japan and India, together, are obvious candidates to fill the evolving power vacuum in Asia as a result of China’s rise. Therefore, it is in the interests of the United States to pursue strong and proactive engagement with both countries.

 India has a long historical connection to Southeast Asia and India continues to develop its military connections with countries in Southeast Asia.

 India is increasing its naval power projection capacity. Since 1990, India has increased its number of “big surface combatant” ships from 14 to 21, with plans to further increase this number to 27 by 2013, thus enabling it to project power throughout the Indian Ocean and into Southeast Asia. There are also plans for India to acquire three aircraft carriers and four or five nuclear submarines within the next two decades.

 it is clear that India will be an influential security partner for the United States in shaping the US-China power balance throughout Asia, but especially in Southeast Asia. The United States, Japan, and also Australia, should coordinate and cooperate with India in addressing the security concerns of Southeast Asian countries.

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