Another Route to Broadening the Scope of Social Psychology: Ecologically Valid Research

Samuel D. Gosling The University of Texas at Austin Department of Psychology 1 University Station A8000 Austin, TX 78712-0187 (512) 471-1628 [email protected] http://homepage.psy.utexas.edu/homepage/faculty/Gosling/index.htm

Abstract: An imbalance is identified in social psychology between controlled experimental studies (which are common) and real-world, ecologically valid studies (which are rare). The preponderance of experimental studies (which provide mere existence proofs and lack realism) helps fuel social psychology’s fault-finding focus. Laboratory experiments and ecological studies should be pursued jointly to examine social life in the real world.

Krueger and Funder highlight an imbalance in social psychology, persuasively arguing that researchers devote far more attention to how people get things wrong (e.g., bias) than to how people get things right (e.g., accuracy). Here I highlight another imbalance in social psychology, mentioned only briefly in Krueger and Funder’s article—that between the highly controlled experimental studies that characterize much of social psychological research, and real-world, ecologically valid non-experimental studies that are rather rare. I argue that this methodological imbalance contributes to the broader substantive imbalance lamented by Krueger and Funder.

Thanks in part to the influence of social cognition, modern social psychology has become closely associated with one particular method—carefully controlled laboratory experiments. Although most, if not all, social psychological research is inspired by real-world events, it has become standard practice to control reality out of the picture. As has been argued elsewhere (e.g., (Funder,1999; Kenny, 1994; Rozin, 2001) this over-reliance on laboratory experiments can limit the real-world relevance of the research. Here I argue that two specific features of experiments also fuel the field’s fault-finding fixation.

First, experimental research is concerned with existence proofs. That is, laboratory experiments how only what can happen under some circumstances but, without some ideas about the everyday context of the phenomenon, the experiments say very little about what will happen in the real world. Laboratory experiments tell us what is possible, not what is likely. To map out where the limits of possibility lie, experiments tend to focus on the points at which processes (e.g., decision making) break down. Consider the research programs on majority and minority influence. Essentially, these programs tell us merely that there exist circumstances under which the majority can influence the minority (e.g., Asch, 1956) and there exist circumstances under which the minority can influence the majority (e.g., Moscovici, 1980). However, the pinpoint focus of experimental studies on either the majority or the minority allows researchers to study these intrinsically related processes independently, bypassing the incontrovertible fact that in the real world, every time a minority exists so too does a majority. And by overlooking the real- world contexts in which these social processes typically occur, the limit-testing experimental paradigm draws attention to the boundaries, where things break down, and neglects the question of how often these boundaries are approached by the circumstances of everyday life. If the conditions promoting majority or minority influence occur very rarely then the negative influence of the majority or the minority could be practically inconsequential. Experiments show us where the boundaries of possibility lie, but social psychologists now need to adopt the higher goal of sketching out the real-world topography within those generous boundaries.

Second, the artificial experimental stimuli in experiments do not permit tests of accuracy. In their reasonable attempts to exert control, experimental social psychologists typically rely on artificial stimuli (e.g., vignettes) so that the variable of interest can be manipulated while keeping all other variables constant. Although useful from the standpoint of identifying causal processes, the stimuli are not real so they cannot serve as criteria against which accuracy can be evaluated; thus, in a vignette about Bob, “there is nothing accurate you can say about Bob, because Bob never existed” (Funder, 1999; p.15). In our own research on the perception of individuals' personalities based on their bedrooms (Gosling et al., 2002) we could have provided observers with artificial bedrooms, changing just one element at a time (e.g., making the clock fast or slow) to examine the effects of that one element on the observers’ perceptions. However, because these bedrooms would not belong to real individuals we would not have been able to test the accuracy of the observers’ perceptions (e.g., Were there really differences between people with fast vs. slow clocks in their bedrooms?). To test accuracy (but not to test bias), real targets are needed. Thus, a preponderance of experimental research tends to limit research foci to negative (e.g., bias) rather than positive (e.g., accuracy) findings.

Two points should be acknowledged: Some ecologically valid research is being done in social psychology and experiments can, in principle, also be used to examine positive processes. However, social psychologists appear to have a preference for control over realism and, as Krueger and Funder have noted, social psychologists also seem to have a penchant for the negative.

Even if laboratory experiments predispose social psychology to focus on negative rather than positive findings, I do not advocate simply replacing experiments with real-world ecological studies. An over-reliance on either method paints an incomplete picture. The two methods need to be used in concert to identify which causes have an impact and how they operate in the real world. Ultimately social psychologists need to study social beings in the contexts of their social worlds. Krueger and Funder propose analytical and theoretical routes to achieving a more balanced social psychology. To these, I propose adding a methodological route, in the guise of a greater emphasis on ecological validity. In essence, I suggest that bringing at least some of the current research out of the cubicle and back into the street can further broaden the scope of social psychology.

Asch, S. E. (1956). Studies of independent and conformity: A minority of one against a unanimous majority. Psychological Monographs, 70, (whole No. 416).

Funder, D. C. (1999). Personality judgment: A realistic approach to person perception. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Gosling, S. D., Ko, S. J., Mannarelli, T., & Morris, M. E. (2002). A Room with a Cue: Judgments of Personality Based on Offices and Bedrooms. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 379-398.

Kenny, D. A. (1994). Interpersonal perception: A social relations analysis. New York: Guilford Press.

Moscovici, S. (1980). Toward a theory of conversion behavior. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 13, pp. 2209-2239). New York: Academic Press.

Rozin, P. (2001). Social psychology and science: Some lessons from Solomon Asch. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5, 2-14.