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European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Security and Defence
JOINT MEETING
With the NATO Parliamentary Assembly In association with the Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces
SEMINAR REPORT
1. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence held a two-day joint meeting on 21-22 November 2007, organised in association with the Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF). Some 40 national and Euro-parliamentarians gathered in Brussels to discuss the future of EU-NATO co-operation, particularly in Afghanistan and Kosovo, as well as various issues of common interest, such as the US proposal for a missile defence system in Europe.
2. Contributions from independent experts, as well as NATO and EU officials, made it clear that the EU still has a long way to go before it can provide an efficient and coherent framework for EU member states to implement a genuine European Security and Defence Policy. Meanwhile, NATO and the EU are engaged in an increasing number of joint policy areas. Yet, co-operation between the two organisations remains problematic at a political level with negative implications for the operational level. Relations between NATO’s ISAF and the EU police mission in Afghanistan, for instance, are already difficult, and one can expect similar problems in Kosovo, should the EU take over the leadership of the international presence there. Parliamentarians insisted that inter-institutional rivalry should not be allowed to undermine the international community’s efforts in these two critical regions. While prospects for a “grand bargain” between NATO and the EU are very limited, experts and officials argued that encouraging practical solutions and multiplying contacts might progressively lead to the necessary mindset change.
I. US PLANS FOR A MISSILE DEFENCE SHIELD IN EUROPE
3. Ambassador Victoria Nuland of the US Mission to NATO provided an overview of the US proposal for a missile defence shield in Europe and of the current state of negotiations with NATO allies and with Russia on its implementation. She emphasised the serious threat emanating from Iran, asserting that in 2015 Iranian missiles would be able to hit the US territory and claimed that this perception of the nuclear and missile threat posed by Iran is also shared by allied members. The US has already developed a missile defence architecture, which covers US territory. The existing proposal for a Europe-based missile defence system would protect US territory as well as part of Europe against long-range missiles from Iran. A complementary system would be required in order to protect allied members not covered by this system from short- and medium-range missiles. 014 JOINT 08 E
4. Ms Nuland assured delegates that the US proposal does not pose any threat to the Russian deterrent. She underscored the purely defensive nature of the system’s technology and the common missile threat the US and all other European countries (including Russia) share. The US government has made it clear that it intends to strengthen co-operation with Russia on missile defence. Talks on the US proposal have been ongoing both at a bilateral level and in the framework of the NATO-Russia Council, and proposals made by both sides are currently under review. Ms Nuland presented a detailed phased plan aiming to fully integrate existing and planned elements of the US, European and Russian missile defence systems in order to achieve a co-operative architecture by 2010-2012.
5. Stephen Pullinger, Director of ISIS Europe, presented the findings of a study prepared for the European Parliament entitled “Missile Defence and European Security” (November 2007), which analyses how missile defence fits into Europe’s security concerns and strategy. He pointed out that while the US are determined to proceed with plans for a missile defence system in Europe, there is a clear difference in threat perception among NATO allies as well as doubts on the effectiveness of the existing missile defence technology. European countries are also more concerned with the negative impact the deployment of the system could have on their relations with Russia, as well as with the risk of triggering an arms race in space.
6. Mr Pullinger argued, however, that there are certain circumstances in which the four instruments traditionally used to address missile proliferation – arms control, diplomatic pressure, deterrence and pre-emptive action – might fail collectively. In such a scenario, if a missile is eventually launched, the only system that could protect a country is a missile defence system. According to Mr Pullinger, there is therefore no logical reason to rule out a missile defence system in Europe if such a system could save many lives. Through their participation in NATO's Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme, European governments have already accepted the principle of missile defence as being an important part of Europe's military capabilities to protect troops in theatre. The core issue is how to achieve a proper balance between risk (that a missile is fired) and cost (economic cost of investing in an imperfect system, as well as political cost).
7. Mr Pullinger concluded his presentation by putting forward a series of recommendations for a coherent EU position on the issue:
- adopt a clear threat assessment; - re-appraise whether the four tools above are applied effectively; - ensure that the development of missile defence does not lead to less cautious decision-making; prevention should remain the main priority; - consider whether modest deployments of missile defences - of proven technical proficiency - configured to meet threats from a limited number of ballistic missiles can serve as a useful hedge against the unpredictability of ‘rogue’ dictators, and as insurance against accidental or inadvertent launches; - if an upper-layer missile defence is considered desirable, prefer an integrated European approach expanding on NATO’s ALTBMD over bilateral deals between the US and individual European states; - whenever possible, seek multilateral solutions (including Moscow in particular); - ensure that a European missile defence system would safeguard the current strategic balance; - ensure that every country or region in Europe is covered by the missile defence system; - reach an agreed view on the issue of the weaponisation of space; - assess the potential benefit of a missile defence system for European industry; - allow for a genuine public debate to take place before any decision is taken on this issue. 8. The discussion clarified some of the issues addressed by the two speakers. On US determination to implement missile defence, Ms Nuland insisted that the current US Administration 014 JOINT 08 E
enjoys a full bipartisan support on this issue. On Russia’s intentions, Mr Pullinger argued that, in general terms, Moscow is not opposed to the idea of deploying a missile defence system, though it considers the establishment of NATO military bases in the former countries of the Warsaw Pact as a humiliation. On the likelihood of a conventional missile threat from Iran, Mr Pullinger argued that such a scenario would be very unlikely given the tremendous costs Iran would have to pay for such a decision. In this sense, a missile defence system should be designed as an insurance policy against any future Iranian attempt to threaten allied members, especially with nuclear weapons. Ms Nuland added that the threat of a short- or medium-range missile with a chemical or biological warhead is already real; yet under current circumstances, the only option available to NATO allies would be a first strike. Such a situation is unacceptable. On the possibility of converting the missile defence system into an offensive system, she insisted that the missile defence system is exclusively defensive, and represents a complementary option to that of a pre-emptive strike. Mr Pullinger affirmed that a decision to transform a defensive system into an offensive one would clearly alter the existing strategic balance; no US President would be willing to take such a risky decision.
9. Parliamentarians also put forward a number of serious concerns. They insisted on the need to guarantee the indivisibility of security among allies. In this regard, Ms Nuland emphasised that the US favoured a common NATO solution precisely because of the need for a complementary defence system against short- and medium-range missiles. Members disagreed on the preferred framework for developing a European missile defence system. While some members favoured the NATO framework, arguing that it is best suited for a project that lies at the very core of NATO’s collective defence commitments, others wondered about the potential implications of such a system for the EU and the role that the EU could or should play in this regard. Parliamentarians also raised concerns regarding the command and control arrangements for the system, wondering who would be associated to the decision-making process: the US only, individual European states, NATO, or even Russia?
II. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS
10. David Law, Senior Fellow at DCAF, emphasised that the point of departure for security sector reform (SSR) is the notion that security and development are interdependent. He maintained that an effective SSR strategy requires a comprehensive approach that takes into account all the main actors in the security sector and their functions. It also requires an adequate balance to be found between external and internal drivers of SSR.
11. Mr Law stated that in post-conflict settings SSR grows out of peacekeeping operations and tends to be dominated by the countries that participated in these operations. This means that the international presence has a strong military component and a weak civilian one, and that defence capacity-building programmes might be given priority over reconstruction in other areas. International donor involvement in post-conflict states can be far-reaching, including the need to assume some governmental functions.
12. Contrasting NATO and the EU’s involvement in SSR activities, Mr Law argued that NATO’s role in SSR has been driven by the process of defence reform in countries aspiring to become members of the Alliance. The EU, for its part, tends to concentrate on areas such as rule of law and police reform. Both actors have engaged together in SSR activities in several countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, and Afghanistan.
13. While the EU has a greater capacity, NATO has the capability to move forward defence reform. Although the Alliance has no SSR doctrine as such, it has developed SSR policies through its Partnership for Peace programme (PfP) and its involvement in certain countries (such as Ukraine), where defence reform proved impossible without solving the problem of security structures. The
* Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name. 014 JOINT 08 E
EU for its part will have to address issues of coherence, as problems might arise due to its complex decision-making process. Mr Law further pointed out that both the EU and NATO suffer from the lack of sub-sector specialists. He suggested that both organisations address these important issues in order to increase their role in SSR. In particular, he stressed the need to develop “rules of engagement” for SSR. He also urged the two organisations to increase co-operation with other international bodies, such as the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD, etc.
14. Adrian Kendry, Senior Defence Economist in the Political Affairs and Security Policy Division at NATO, reviewed NATO’s growing involvement in SSR. The Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB), adopted at NATO’s Istanbul Summit in 2004, is one of the main instruments for promoting SSR in partner countries. In line with NATO's special focus on the Caucasus and Central Asia, the PAP-DIB has had particular relevance for partners in these two regions. The PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) also has an important SSR component. It requires partners wishing to participate in the programme to submit information on a wide range of subjects related to their defence sector. On the basis of this information, NATO develops individual assessments and recommends measures to enhance SSR. Since 2002, the Alliance has also developed the Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs) in order to support domestic reform efforts in partner countries. Finally, another tool is the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES).
15. In conclusion, Mr Kendry pointed out that NATO has reinforced its emphasis on democratic control of the armed forces and endorsed the need for a comprehensive approach to SSR. He also stressed that good governance is an important pre-requisite for successful SSR.
III. NATO AND THE EU: STRUCTURES AND CAPABILITIES
16. Paul Cornish, Head of the International Security Programme at Chatham House in London, presented the updated findings of his report for the European Parliament entitled “EU and NATO: Co-operation or Competition” (October 2006). He argued that, while there have been some practical achievements in NATO-EU co-operation, the realisation of a mature and efficient security relationship has been hostage to the illusion that the two organisations could achieve a grand bargain. Rather, the focus should be put on practical progress in meeting actual security risks and challenges, with the hope that in time the practice of learning by doing lubricate the highly politicised transatlantic security debate. In this sense, a “bottom-up approach” would be most likely to ensure fruitful EU-NATO co-operation.
17. Dr Cornish briefly reviewed five areas where both NATO and the EU are involved and assessed prospects for co-operation in each of them:
(1) Geopolitical Burden-Sharing. Dr Cornish argued that while both organisations aspire to act in a wide variety of scenarios, prospects for a clear division of labour are slim as the trend in the relationship is towards functional competition rather than co-operation. A division of labour whereby NATO would focus on a strict interpretation of article 5 and the EU would develop a comprehensive role would be regrettable.
(2) “ Berlin Plus” and Beyond. The EU has acquired greater operational experience with two operations conducted under the “Berlin Plus” agreement, Operations Concordia and Althea, and other missions conducted independently from NATO. However, while co-operation at the military level is good, major differences persist at the political level. Dr Cornish warned that neither “Berlin Plus” nor the proposed “Berlin Plus in reverse” would be good options if they are used as a temporary fix while both organisations acquire the full range of civilian and military capabilities. 014 JOINT 08 E
(3) Rapid Reaction Force Planning. While the efforts of NATO and the EU are very similar in this area, though at different levels of capability, prospects for co-operation are uncertain, given the increasing number of caveats and “red cards” that various countries have presented. According to Dr Cornish, one possible area of co-operation could be mutual force substitution.
(4) Resource and Capability Planning and Development. Dr Cornish stressed that neither organisation is meeting standards in this area and, therefore, not much should be expected. He insisted that the focus should be on risk- sharing rather than burden-sharing. He reminded the audience that many countries experience difficulties in dealing with emergencies and that defence budgets in most EU member states are stretched. He nevertheless admitted that some progress has been made, particularly in the field of defence technology and research.
(5) Response to Terrorism. The EU-NATO relationship is least developed in this area. Dr Cornish argued that the EU’s policy framework is fragmented and lacks in coherence, since there is no link between the EU’s internal and external counter-terrorism policies. The EU also needs a more effective policy on information sharing.
18. Yves Boyer, Chairman of the Société Française d’Etudes Militaires in Paris, introduced the study he prepared jointly with Mr Lindley-French for the European Parliament, entitled “Euro-Interoperability: The Effective Military Interoperability of European Armed Forces” (November 2007). He noted that the issue of allied interoperability is far more complex today than during the Cold War. The problem is not simply about technical forms of interoperability; it is about the development of joint capabilities and common tools, which could form the basis of a European Security and Defence Policy. In this sense, interoperability is a comprehensive concept that embraces different dimensions – civil and military –, which need to be closely co-ordinated.
19. Dr Boyer underlined the importance of the ongoing development of a single European identity in defence matters, a novelty that is adding an important new dimension to the current strategic environment. No single European country today can realistically develop the military “enablers” necessary for current expeditionary and peacekeeping operations, hence the need for an integrated EU approach and for improved co-operation with the US. Dr Boyer argued that the current military gap between the US and the EU, particularly with regard to deployment and expeditionary capabilities, should not necessarily be viewed as a cause for concern. Although most military actions currently take the form of crisis management operations, no one knows what type of war will be fought in the future. It would, therefore, be unwise to neglect capabilities for high-intensity conflicts, even though they seem inadequate under current circumstances. Finally, Dr Boyer suggested the idea of promoting a wider European culture of military strategy especially through the establishment of a European military institute.
20. Julian Lindley-French, Professor of Military Operational Science, Netherlands Defence Academy, completed Dr Boyer’s presentation of the study on European interoperability. Mr Lindley- French argued that current figures regarding defence spending in Europe highlight the existence not only of a US-EU gap but also of an emerging and worrying Euro-Euro gap, with the UK, France and Germany bearing an increasing share of the burden. If this trend is not reversed, by 2015 France and the UK will represent 60% of the entire European defence expenditure. Moreover, there is also another emerging gap between operations on the ground and decision-makers in Brussels. Overall, these problems are evidence that allies are retreating not only from combinedness, but also from jointness.
21. NATO also suffers from low levels of solidarity among allies. In this sense, the ISAF mission in Afghanistan is not a very encouraging example of 60 years of allied co-operation. Current missions require new assets and partners, as well as new planning and training systems. Given existing 014 JOINT 08 E
gaps, Mr Lindley-French warned that the larger countries might be tempted to step out of the existing integrated frameworks and favour ad hoc coalitions. This is already happening. In this context, Mr Lindley-French urged member states to enhance allied interoperability more than ever. In particular, he reminded the audience that interoperability starts with the basics and requires first of all a mindset change.
22. Commenting on the presentations, Luís Faro Ramos, Portuguese Deputy Permanent Representative to the Political and Security Council of the EU, noted that in 2003 European countries agreed on three important principles: the defence of allied territory as a NATO task; avoiding duplication; and developing an EU Strategy based on the Berlin Plus Agreement and co-operation with NATO. According to Mr Ramos, the Berlin Plus Agreement has worked well in facilitating NATO-EU co-operation, as exemplified by the Althea mission. However, he stressed the need for a longer-term agreement between the two institutions that could go beyond the Berlin Plus framework and encompass cases such as Kosovo and Afghanistan.
23. In his comments, Christophe Cornu, Deputy Head of the NATO and Multilateral Affairs Section at NATO, agreed that unnecessary duplication should be avoided. He also underlined the fact that the Berlin Plus Agreement was the result of three years of negotiations. Despite the important functions it performed, there are still significant problems with NATO-EU co-operation. Consequently, the two institutions need to look for new methods and co-ordination mechanisms.
24. Pierre Seailles, Desk Officer for Civil-Military Relation & EU-NATO Co-operation at the European Commission, pointed out that the EU Commission is more an observer than an actor on defence issues and NATO-EU co-operation, given the prominent role played by the European Council. Nevertheless, he argued that there have been important achievements with regard to NATO-EU co-operation. The EU preferred a gradual approach and invited allied members to focus on practical questions rather than pursuing big plans for NATO-EU co-operation.
25. In the discussion, Dr Cornish reaffirmed that there has not been significant progress towards an effective ESDP. While ESDP had initially been driven by a French-British initiative, there are today indications of a growing disagreement between France and the UK on defence issues and ESDP. Nevertheless, Mr Lindley-French argued that there is room for a genuine European defence. For instance, in certain theatres, such as Lebanon, the EU is better suited than NATO or the US to intervene.
26. Delegates enquired about the actual relevance of several issues that are often mentioned as major obstacles to the development of a genuine European defence: political issues relating to the status of Cyprus; insufficient levels of European defence spending or the inadequate use of funds; and the lack of standardised equipment. On the second point, Mr Lindley-French argued that European countries need to increase their efforts in defence spending and integration. Current spending levels and capabilities do not allow Europe to lead an independent global strategy; rather poorly trained and equipped European troops are called upon to fight wars shaped by US planning, strategy and methods. On the last point, Dr Cornish noted that standardisation of equipment has been a problem since the first years of the Alliance given the high costs it entails. For this reason, member states have abandoned any significant standardisation plan.
27. Members enquired further about whether the recent change in attitude of the French leadership towards NATO could lead to a breakthrough in the co-operation between NATO and the EU. Dr Boyer replied that France has linked its eventual participation in NATO military structures to the condition of significant developments on the ESDP front. In particular, France considers the establishment of a joint EU headquarters as an absolute prerequisite for its return in NATO. Mr Lindley-French was also encouraged by an emerging French pragmatism in defence issues.
28. Responding to questions on the prospect of NATO adopting a new Strategic Concept, which could improve relations with the EU, Dr Cornish pointed out that the formulation of a new Strategic Concept in 2008 would be highly unlikely because of the lack of consensus among allied members. Mr Lindley-French disagreed and predicted that two different documents would probably be drafted 014 JOINT 08 E
in 2008: some kind of “Atlantic Charter” which would celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Atlantic Alliance; and a “light” Strategic Concept, more flexible than its predecessors and similar to the strategic documents of the EU.
29. Finally, when asked about ways to address the difficulties faced by the NATO engagement in Afghanistan, Mr Lindley-French highlighted for a more active information campaign in order to end the “strategic vacation” of European populations. In addition, Mr Lindley-French challenged the assumption that the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are an efficient use of allied resources in Afghanistan. In his view, rather than the use of static forces, what is needed is a mobile force in the South ready to reinforce other NATO contingents when and where necessary. Dr Cornish for his part argued in favour of an effective “substitution system” to ensure the continuity of rotations, when the mandate of a specific national contingent comes to an end.
IV. NATO AND EU CO-OPERATION IN OPERATIONS: KOSOVO AND AFGHANISTAN
30. While acknowledging the major progress made in Afghanistan, Daoud Yaqub, former Deputy Spokesperson & Foreign Policy Aide to President Hamid Karzai, focused his presentation on a number of critical challenges that have received insufficient attention from the international community. One of the main problems relates to the lack of co-ordination, the prevalence of ad hoc solutions and inefficiency. Afghanistan receives assistance from a host of different actors whose priorities and requirements are sometimes incompatible with available resources. Additionally, while concentrating on one aspect of a problem, other aspects are often missed. A second major issue is the ongoing insurgency on the Pakistani-Afghan border. Putting an end to this situation would require robust action on both sides of the border. Thirdly, international assistance has sometimes taken the form of improperly chosen and inappropriately placed consultants, which has undermined the efficiency and credibility of the international effort. Fourthly, the international community lacks a common definition of success and quarrels on the future of Afghanistan have a disastrous impact on the trust and confidence placed by the Afghan population in the international assistance effort. Finally, the current strategy adopted by the international community focusing on the PRTs has had negative side effects in terms of the relationship between local leaders and central authorities. Mr Yaqub warned against undermining the legitimacy of local leaders and pleaded in favour of re-establishing links between micro-societies at a local level and central authorities in Kabul.
31. Ending on a positive note, Mr Yaqub assured delegates that success in Afghanistan is still possible. He called on the international community to reinvigorate its efforts to build Afghan capacity - particularly in terms of law and order - and address the challenges he mentioned. Instead of an exit strategy, what is required is a hand-over strategy that emphasises local ownership. Priority should also be given to the co-ordination of all stakeholders at the level of PRTs as well as at national and international levels. The Afghan government must also do its part by negating the conditions that sustain corrupt officials thereby restoring public trust in the Afghan administration.
32. Ambassador James Pardew, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Operations at NATO, gave his assessment of EU-NATO co-operation in Kosovo and Afghanistan. He noted that NATO is becoming increasingly operational. At the same time, both the EU and NATO have to adapt to new security challenges and it is therefore important for these two key players to work together. According to Mr Pardew, operational co-operation between NATO and EU has steadily improved and the EU-NATO relationship, despite some degree of competition, is maturing. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina provide success stories of this co-operation. However, he admitted that today’s challenges are more complex. While affirming that NATO will remain in Kosovo, Mr Pardew argued that the EU should assume a greater role in the region, leading the international civil presence in such areas as police reform, customs, border control, etc. 014 JOINT 08 E
33. Mr Pardew further noted that success in Afghanistan would require wider efforts on the part of the international community and would not be achieved by military means only, however important these may be. He suggested that a major priority should be capacity building, and that a larger EU police force (EUPOL) in Afghanistan would be welcome. He further asserted that co-operation between the EU and NATO on the ground is good, but relations at the top remain very limited.
34. Mr Faro Ramos noted that in Kosovo, the EU and NATO have not been able to overcome all political and technical obstacles. Solving the problem at the political level would require continuous dialogue. In Mr Ramos’ opinion, agreements between ISAF and EUPOL in Afghanistan have been easier to reach.
35. Mr Seailles declared that in both Kosovo and Afghanistan, the EU Commission co-operates with all international actors, including NATO. He emphasised the fact that the EU is not a military contributor, but noted that it endeavours to achieve concrete, visible results, which should, in turn, improve its relations with NATO.
36. In the discussion, Mr Ramos and Mr Pardew clarified the current state of relations between respective NATO and EU missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan. In Kosovo, the existing agreement between UNMIK and NATO’s KFOR was used as a basis for negotiating four technical agreements, which would regulate relations between KFOR and the future EU mission. Unfortunately, these agreements could not yet be adopted due to political obstacles. Nevertheless, Mr Pardew was confident that the UNMIK-KFOR agreement would provide sufficient guidance for the future. In Afghanistan, several technical agreements between NATO and the EU have also been prepared, but not yet adopted. The situation there is slightly more complex, as relations between NATO and the UN mission have not been formalised. Rather, the UN has negotiated bilateral agreements regulating its relations with the different national contingents in the regions where they are deployed. Although cumbersome, such a framework functions and could be used to regulate NATO-EU relations in Afghanistan as well.
37. Parliamentarians regretted that the already drafted technical agreements between NATO’s ISAF and the EUPOL mission in Afghanistan, as well as between NATO’s KFOR and the EU (in view of the future ESDP rule of law and police mission) have not been signed due to political problems. Such a situation could endanger the success of these missions. Mr Ramos explained that these political problems arise from the EU’s principled wish to involve all 27 member states in the negotiations, while NATO insists that a decision can be taken in the framework of “Berlin Plus”, and Turkey vetoes the participation of Cyprus in negotiations.
38. Experts repeated their bleak assessment of the international community’s actions in Afghanistan and called for radical changes. Mr Lindley-French stressed the need to incorporate existing training missions into ISAF. Furthermore, he suggested that a greater effort is necessary to publicise the achievements of the international community’s involvement in Afghanistan. For instance, “model PRTs” could be chosen to demonstrate to the Afghan public the contribution of PRTs to improving governance in Afghanistan. Short of a radical reassessment of NATO’s engagement, the Alliance would not be able to sustain the ISAF mission beyond 2009/2010. Mr Yaqub reaffirmed that success in Afghanistan also requires a firm commitment on the part of Pakistan, which has been insufficient so far. Recognising the complex nature of the government in Afghanistan, Mr Yaqub explained that while most Afghanis would nowadays not look favourably at the restoration of monarchy, a system reminiscent of the monarchy - the rule of a strong personality capable of dealing with micro-societies – might be the best option for his country.