Balancing Competing Claims In Flexible Labor Markets: The Impact Of Professions And Networks

Balancing competing claims in flexible labor markets: The impact of professions and networks

Birgit Apitzsch, University of Duisburg-Essen

Full paper prepared for the 28th International Labour Process Conference “Work Matters”, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, March 15-17, 2010

- Please do not circulate without the permission of the author. -

Abstract This paper relates the organization of work and employment to project worker’s social integration. Based on a comparison of two flexible labor markets, architecture and media production in Germany, it is argued that the modes of control of the labor process and recruitment practices are closely related to each other, and that both are shaped by historically evolved labor market institutions. The resulting control mechanisms, professional and informal control, are functionally equivalent in recruitment processes. However, they differ markedly in their ramifications for the work-life balance.

Contact: Birgit Apitzsch University of Duisburg-Essen Institute of Sociology Lotharstr. 65 47057 Duisburg [email protected]

1 Introduction Today we witness changes in the sphere of work that seem to increase flexibility demands and uncertainty of employment perspectives for a growing part of the working population. Project and network forms of work organization as well as atypical forms of employment gain momentum and mark a significant deviation from what has long been considered the standard employment relationship. More or less explicitly, much of the contemporary reasoning on deregulation and flexibilization of work and employment tends to put more emphasis on agen- cy of labor market actors, and, more specifically, on instrumental action in response to increasing market uncertainties. Empirically, current studies of flexible forms of work concentrate on the so-called creative industries as forerunners of these developments. They empha- size the entrepreneurial and artistic strategies of dealing with market demands by utilizing networks, and they stress the uniqueness of these labor market segments. Taking this reasoning as a vantage point, this paper will describe two alternative mechanisms that relate the labor process and the labor market to each other. As is shown by recent research on creative industries (see, for example, Blair, 2001, 2003, Eikhof, 2004, Eikhof, Haunschild, 2007, Haunschild, 2003, 2004, Jones, 1996, Kop- petsch, 2006, 2007), in-depth case studies allow for a closer examination of the interrelation- ship between the labor process and the labor market. However, as was emphasized by a review of this strand of literature by Smith and McKinlay (2009), comparing different segments of the creative industries helps to generalize findings of case studies. I would like to add and specify that in order to situate findings on creative industries in labor market research more generally, a comparative study of flexible work and employment is particularly helpful. It en- ables us to understand labor market processes and the social integration of workers, and the limits and institutional structuring of individual entrepreneurial strategies. The theoretical framework that will be employed for a comparative empirical analysis of the labor market, the labor process, and the social integration of workers in two industries builds on central concepts of the labor process theory and combines them with sociological concepts of social control, qualification and labor market segmentation. I investigated German architecture and media industry1 as two sectors in which work is organized in projects and where freelance work and temporary employment prevail, but which differ in their degree of professionalization. This comparison involves tracing back how professional and non-professional project labor markets evolve, how the coordination of work shapes labor demand and

1 73 qualitative, semi-structured interviews with project workers and labor market experts from both fields allowed reconstructing the functioning of the labor process, labor market structures and their impact on the life course of project workers, and, finally, on how they reconcile flexibility demands with personal life. 2 recruitment practices, and, finally, how the resulting employment practices shape work-live boundaries. On this basis, I suggest professionalism and informal control as two principles that structure both the labor process and the labor market. Professional and informal forms of control of the labor process and the labor market can be considered functionally equivalent for recruitment, but they are fundamentally different with regard to their effect on the social integration of project workers. Offering a ‘holistic’ approach to studying flexible and potentially precarious forms of work and employment (Kalleberg, 2009) by relating the labor process, the labor market and workers’ social integration to each other, this paper aims to contribute to three strands of literature: First, by comparing two relatively old project industries, it helps to situate research findings from the field of creative industries by taking historically developed labor market institutions and their impact on the organization of work into account. Second, it aims to broad- en our knowledge on labor market segmentation in explaining recruitment practices by relating them to the modes of coordinating work. Third, it shows under what conditions the organization of work and employment limits individuals’ strategies to balance competing claims of work and personal life. This paper is organized as follows: First (section 1) I will review existing theory and literature that discuss forms of control, labor market structures, and how both interact. I will suggest paying closer attention to skill requirements that may result from personal forms of control, thereby proposing an explanation of why networks are of varying importance in different labor market segments. In the second part, I will first give an overview over labor market institutions of the two fields. Then I will investigate how they shape the labor process and recruitment, and, finally, how they affect the work-life-balance of project workers (section 3). Lastly, I will summarize and discuss the findings.

1. Specifying the relation between labor market institutions, the labor process and recruitment practices Much of the contemporary reasoning on changes in organization and labor markets agrees in that the current trend towards market-driven, flexible forms of work and employment result in a subjectivation of control over the labor process (Bröckling, 2005, Eikhof, 2004, Ezzy, 1997, Haunschild, Eikhof, 2009, Heckscher, 1994, Lewis, 2007, Menz, 2008, Moldaschl, 2003a, b, Moldaschl, Sauer, 2000, Pongratz, Voß, 2003, Voß, 1998, Voß, 2001a, b). It is assumed that workers are increasingly held self-responsible for the coordination of work and their careers and for work-life-reconciliation. A more flexible and market-driven organization of production results in workers’ strategies of self-adjustment to changing market demands, in self con-

3 trol, self-marketing and the economization of life (Kratzer, Sauer, 2003, Sauer, 2002, Voß, 1998). As attention turned to the so-called creative industries, the delicate, individually cali- brated balance between artistic or professional identities and self-economization (Haunschild, Eikhof, 2009, Koppetsch, 2006) and the blurred boundaries between work and life received more attention (Eikhof, Warhurst, Haunschild, 2007). In addition, studies on creative industries, such as film, television, theatre, new media, and advertisement, agree on the premise that networks are important, but they do not fully explain why (for a critical review see Blair, 2009). They share, however, the underlying assumption that workers can and do use networks first of all instrumentally and strategically to build up their careers (Eikhof, Haunschild, 2007, Faulkner, Anderson, 1987, Haunschild, Eikhof, 2009, Jones, 1996, 2002; see for a more theoretical elaboration of the argument Blair, 2009). In the following, I will review existing literature that addresses these phenomena, and the problem of linking the labor market and the labor process, in particular.

1.1 Recruitment practices and labor market structure Although there is a huge body of literature on the role of networks in labor markets, starting with Granovetter’s (1995) seminal study of recruitment and job search processes of high- -skilled workers, we know little on the conditions under which networks become important. While this strand of research focuses on the information capacity of networks and reveals the outcomes of informal recruitment for workers (particularly wages and status in the new position) and employers (knowledge on availability and qualification of the applicant), it does not take labor market institutions into account. In contrast, labor market segmentation theory does address the questions of how institutions, the organization of work and firm’s personnel strategies interact and together constitute labor market segments with an “inner structure” and varying degrees of attachment between employers and employees (Doeringer, Piore, 1971, Kerr, 1954, Sengenberger, 1987: 53ff). To put it briefly, unstructured labor markets are closest to neo-classical conceptions of the market. There are neither any specific skill demands, nor are there institutions effectively de-com- modifying labor. In contrast, firm-internal labor markets restrict interfirm mobility as they of- fer employment security in return for investments in firm-specific training. Institutions such as employment protection, seniority rules regulating wages and careers, and codetermination provide both employers and employees with security and incentives for long-term commitments (Sengenberger, 1987: 150ff). Lastly, in professional or craft labor markets, professional institutions coordinate and standardize training across companies and secure supply of occupational skills, they protect occupational titles, and together with job design according to oc-

4 cupational titles, allow for easy recruitment and for interfirm mobility of workers (Sengen- berger 1987: 126ff, Stinchcombe 1959). Accordingly, professionalism has been suggested as a third logic (in addition to hierarchy and the market) that structures the organization of work and of labor markets (Freidson, 2001). However, this school of thought does not consider networks important for labor market structure. There is only little research that brings together the insights of labor market segmentation theory and of network theory, and thus systematically relates labor market institutions, the organization of work and informal structures to each other to explain recruitment practices. Christopherson and Storper (1989), Faulkner and Anderson (1987), and Jones (1996) describe US-american film labor markets as divided into a core and a periphery and thereby employ concepts of labor market segmentation theory while acknowledging the role of networks in these labor markets (for a critique see Blair 2001). However, they do not satisfyingly account for the institutional impact on labor market structure. The study of Tony Manwaring (1984) reveals how firm-internal labor markets are informally tied to community networks and use them to recruit workers who are more committed and better integrated into the work teams. On the basis of his comparative research of the British and German film industry, Arne Baumann (2002a, b) argued that informal recruitment practices compensate for a lack of transparency of skill supply in labor markets without standardized training and occupational titles. Thereby he explicitly relates skill demand and training institutions to recruitment practices: In the absence of training institutions which provide for standardized occupational skills, and occupational titles which are linked to standardized training on the one hand, and without internal labor markets which both provide training and evaluate (firm-specific) skills and efforts on the other hand, employers seek alternatives to evaluate occupational skills of workers. Consequently, networks are particularly important in labor market segments without formal training institutions and with a smaller share of standard forms of employment. While the view that labor market institutions and skill supply structure employment strategies has a lot to commend it (Stinchcombe, 1965, Streeck, 1996), as described above, labor market segmentation theory plausibly accounts for the influence of the organization of work on skill demand (Doeringer, Piore, 1971, Sengenberger, 1987): Idiosyncratic, complex and expensive assets do require more experiential, firm-specific knowledge. High training investments by the firm and the worker are additionally encouraged by institutions thatcsecure long-term commitments and by the advantages of internal flexibility. I do not aim to reject one of these claims, but rather suggest paying more attention to the question of whether both can be integrated. Thus, to better understand the interaction between labor market institutions

5 and firm’s skill demand, I will in the following section elaborate on different modes of orga- nizing work, and project work in particular.

1.2 Forms of control Current discourse on the flexibilization of work in the sociology of work and the labor process debate centers on market orientation, self-responsibility of organizational units and the subjectivation of control by workers. In the following, I would like to add to this discourse by sit- uating self-control among alternative forms of control of the labor process and specifying their institutional preconditions. In addition, in order to better understand how different forms of control of the labor process affect worker’s ability to reconcile work and non-work-related commitments, I will relate the concept of control of the labor process to arguments from social control theory. Self-control over the conversion of labor power into useful labor is only one of several theoretically plausible forms of coordinating work in the absence of standardized routines or bureaucratic structures. As is suggested by Mintzberg (1979), there are five alternative modes of coordinating work: standardized routines and processes (bureaucracy), standardized quali- fications, standardized results, direct control and mutual adjustment. The three forms of standardization reduce the need for informal communication These forms of coordination, however, rest on specific requirements: bureaucratic governance presupposes stable market demand and that the work process is planable, whereas professional or craft control requires labor market institutions that provide for standardized training and institutionalized professional control (Stinchcombe, 1959). The preconditions of self-control and, respectively, of controlling work by results are, however, only rarely com- mented upon by the proponents of the subjectivation-thesis (see for a critique of the German version of this argument, the “Arbeitskraftunternehmer”- or entreployee-thesis, Gottschall, 1999). As has been argued elsewhere (Sengenberger 1987: 119ff), products or services have to be defined in advance for output-control to be viable. I would add that flexible adjustment to market demands presupposes transparent information and a considerable degree of autonomy. Finally, also the use of direct control and mutual adjustment, which could, according to Edwards (1984), be classified as personal forms of control, require certain conditions to be fulfilled. They can be employed only as long as work groups are not too large (Mintzberg, 1979). So, how do these forms of coordination relate to skill requirements, or, more broadly, to labor market structure and mobility? First of all and most obviously, if work is coordinated by standardized procedures and formal rules, it takes effort and long-term commitment to train

6 workers these rules, but also tacit knowledge of routines. If work is coordinated by professional rules, training is more independent from firms, and skills are relevant and transferable across companies. It can be argued that the ability of self-coordination may require professional socialization or extended training (Gottschall, 1999). The relationship between the labor market and the labor process, or, more specifically, the impact of labor market structures and mobility on power relations in the firm, was also studied by central theorists of the labor process debate (see Edwards 1973, Littler 1982) and is recently receiving more attention (see Smith 2006). As described in the section above, labor market theorists and the sociology of professions have established hierarchy, markets, and professionalism as alternative mechanisms governing the labor market and the organization of work. However, informal recruitment was scarcely tied to the forms of control of the labor process. The research on the film industry undertaken by Blair (2001, 2003) and Marrs (2007) illuminated the connection between both levels: As good relationships to the supervisor are necessary to secure future employment opportunities, subordinates will perform particularly well in order to not endanger these ties. In addition, as Sydow and Windeler (1999) have argued, repeated collaboration helps to build up routines that facilitate the coordination of work. However, as the institutional context of these work organizations and networks does not vary, it is hard to explain the predominance of informal modes of coordination in the labor process and the labor market, and to account for the impact of labor market institutions on the organization of work and employment. The skill requirements that result from personal control or mutual adjustment are also undertheorized. Following Mintzberg (1979), it can be argued that the less there are formal rules, the more important becomes personal interaction and the greater the interdependence between colleagues. I would add that interactivitiy and interdependency require spatial prox- imity, and are prone to increase the observability of all involved (R.L. Coser, 1961). As a con- sequence, control does not only cover the aspects of immediate relevance for the production process, content and results of work, but can extend. How does the extension of observability and social control affect skills demand? In order to clarify this relation, I would suggest to draw on the concept of extra-functional skills which has been introduced by Ralf Dahrendorf (1956) and developed further by Claus Offe (1970). Extra-functional skills can be defined as requirements which do not immediately result from the technical production process, which are more diffuse and relate more to the broader social and organizational context of the task (ibid: 554ff). They contribute more sub- tly to the efficiency of production and involve the adaptability to working conditions, taking

7 responsibility for and being knowledgeable of the adjacent parts of the production. Further- more, they are acquired by experience rather than by formal training (ibid: 557). Offe (1970: 93ff) suggests to further differentiate between several subcategories of extra-functional skills. For instance, in work settings characterized by a high degree of interdependency, the contribution of a single worker, especially if in a lower hierarchical position, is hard to separate from the achievement of co-workers. Other examples are normative expectations regarding political views, adaptability, religion, age, and gender (Offe, 1970: 94f). As observability increases (as in interactive work settings), all these extra-functional aspects are easier to evaluate and become intrinsically tied to the evaluation of occupational skills and of work outputs. This mechanism is in line with the argument that the organization of work shapes skill demand: not only do idiosyncratic procedures in the organization of production necessitate experiential learning of routines and other forms of tacit knowledge – all of what is usually called firm-specific skills. Linking forms of work coordination to social control also helps to explain when extra-functional skills are more important. Recent discourse on flexible forms of work and employment also pays closer attention to work-life balance of workers (Eikhof, Warhurst, Haunschild, 2007). In line with the assumption that market-driven restructuring of work triggers a subjectivation of control and thus activates workers capacity for self-control and self-economization, it is argued that while for- merly sharp delineations between “work” and “life” blur in several dimensions such as time and space, workers are held more self-responsible to calibrate different spheres by themselves. By doing so, they orientate primarily on market demands and try to enhance their mar- ketability (Haunschild, Eikhof, 2009, Voß, 1998). Above I tried to situate flexible, market-driven forms of coordinating work among alternative modes of control. These forms of control of the labor process can be expected to differ also in how they affect workers’ discretion, be it by codified professional or bureaucratic norms, be it by deadlines and detailed specifications of results, or through the “surveillance” by superiors or colleagues. In the following analysis, I will pay particular attention to the question of how different forms of coordination in the labor process and the labor market affect the reconciliation of competing demands from work and leisure.

2. Institution in project labor markets: The cases of architecture and media production in Germany German architecture and media industry share the project character of the organization of work, and the prominence of atypical forms of employment, such as freelance work and

8 fixed-term contracts. Both, however, differ in their degree of professionalization. Below, I will describe the work, employment and training structures in both fields.

2.1 Employment-related regulation of risks In both architecture and media production, there is a high share of atypical forms of employment, such as self-employment and fixed-term-contracts. Also, employers consist predomi- nantly of small firms. In 2007, 97,326 architects were registered at the federal chambers of architects, half of them as self-employed and almost half of them as working employed or as civil servants. With respect to the number of employees, most German architecture firms are very small: the vast majority of more than 90% of the architecture and engineering firms employ less than 9 people (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2006). This dominance of small offices and the high share of self-employed correspond with the ideal of the independent professional (“Freier Beruf”, see also Littek/Heisig/Lane 2005: 77). Due to the restructuring of the media sector in the 1980ies and 1990ies in Germany, the share of self employed and temporary workers increased significantly. After the break-up of the public broadcasting monopoly in Germany and the approval of private broadcasters in the 1980s, the production of television content underwent dramatic changes through processes such as decentralization, outsourcing, and subcontracting. This marked the change from the vertically integrated broadcaster to the publisher-broadcaster model and witnessed the erosion of internal labor markets in media production (Baumann, 2002a, b, Baumann, Voelzkow, 2004, Tunstall, 1993). Independent production firms were used by the public broadcasters (mainly the Second German Public Broadcasting Corporation/ZDF) only to a limited extent. The new private broadcasters first bought content from the US market and then increasingly organized the production of their content in networks, making use of already existing production firms and thereby increasing demand for these services. With rising competition, public broadcasters also opted more and more for contract production in networks (Elbing, Voelzkow, 2006, Windeler, 2004). Thus, after the emergence of private broadcasters, labor demand in the private production market rose throughout the 1990s, right up to the economic crisis of 2000/2001. The media sector included 101,442 workers in the audio-visual media sector in 1997 in total (DIW 1998: 21ff in Baumann 2002b), including 42.400 workers in film, video and television production (DIW 1999: 8 in Baumann 2002b). German broadcasters employed 29,650 persons in 2002 in the television section (Henninger, Mayer-Ahuja, 2005: 24) However, the share of self-employed and atypical workers, which are in large parts hired temporarily by independent production firms for the duration of the production of one television or film project, can be expected to be much higher. For instance, more than half of

9 the 25,000 photographers and camera operators working in 2000 were self-employed (Hen- ninger/Mayer-Ahuja 2005: 27). The organization of work and the structure of firms and employment in both fields affect the uncertainty of employment and income that project workers face. While architecture firms refrain from fixed-term contracts due to the problems of defining the work load and project duration in advance, employment protection is nevertheless restricted for employees of small firms. This implies a considerably higher risk of unemployment for the employees of these small architecture firms. However, all members of the federal chambers of architects gain access to a specific pension insurance scheme. In comparison, media workers with fixed- term contracts do know how long they will be involved in a given project. But because they hardly can engage in searching for or working for new projects before their current project is completed, they repeatedly face the risks and uncertainties of employment and. Also, the employment status can vary according to the hierarchical position within the project: Those who occupy leading positions in the teams, such as director and director of photography, work as self-employed and can, if their work is classified as artistic and independent, gain access to the health and pension insurance by the artists social insurance (Künstlersozialkasse). In contrast, project workers in assisting positions are employed for the duration of the project, are subject to social insurance contribution and can become entitled for unemployment benefits, if they work for at least 360 days within two years prior to unemployment. Income between two projects therefore depends on the income paid during a project and on the regularity of employment. In addition, employment status is sometimes prescribed by production firms which thereby threaten the entitlements. Collective interest representation for media workers is rather fragmented. Regulations in the field of architecture are oriented towards the ideal of the self-employed, autonomously working „Free Architect“, and architectural chambers concentrate on the control of professional practice and the regulation of access to the field of architectural services (Apitzsch, 2010, forthcoming).

2.2 Training Architecture and media differ markedly in the way training is organized. Architecture, or more generally, the construction industry, provides an example of a traditional project industry. In Germany, the construction industry, which consists mainly of occupations such as construction engineers, architects, and construction workers/craftsmen, is characterized by a high degree of professionalization, i.e. standardized training tracks, protected occupational titles, restricted access to certain fields of services, and legally defined rules regarding work proce-

10 dures and results. Only university graduates who successfully completed an architecture course of study at university or university of applied sciences (Fachhochschule) and two years of supervised professional practice are allowed to become member of the chamber of architects. They are thereby permitted to use the title “architect” and to gain access to the field of architectural services. In particular, “they are entitled to draw up plans for approval of building projects and submit them to the building permission authorities” (see the description of the Federal Chamber of German Architects, http://www.bak.de, accessed on 02/06/2008). Their professional practice abides by specific regulations of federal state building laws. Ad- herence to these regulations is supervised by the chambers. This implies codified and en- forced professional norms and professional control for the architectural practice. The standardization and regulation of training and labor market access for architects is characteristic for the continental model of professions, regulating professional practice by controlling the access of individuals to a specific market for professional services (see Littek, Heisig, Lane, 2005: 77). It can be traced back to the efforts of the Prussian administration to secure the quality of civil servants planning and supervising the construction of public build- ings (Baubeamte) as well as to the struggle of private architects in the late 19th and early 20th century to establish and legitimize a market monopoly for architectural service for private, bourgeois clients (Bolenz, 1991, 1994). In contrast, labor market entry in the television and film industry is only marginally regulated. Entry paths into employment by independent production firms are extremely heterogeneous, with an emphasis on experience rather than credentials. Training is conducted rather informally and on-the-job, under the supervision of the respective higher positions during sub- sequent projects. However, during the 1990s, several universities and vocational schools established degree programs for occupations such as director of photography (DoP), focus puller, director, or scriptwriter, thus challenging the established model of informal training and gradual advancement through assistant positions. Because of the many different and competing training and entry opportunities, the qualification structure of this field is still highly heterogeneous.

2.3 Summary To sum up the similarities and differences between these two project labor markets2, the standard employment relationship is of minor relevance in both industries. “Atypical” forms of employment such as freelance, temporary work, and self-employment are widespread. Since the workforce in both industries largely consists of self-employed, and employment and in-

2 For a more detailed comparison, see Apitzsch (2009, 2010, 2010, forthcoming) 11 come depend on the project duration and access to future projects, regulations of employment and work conditions which are oriented towards the standard employment relationship (Bosch, 2004) and interest representation at the firm level do not cover those atypical forms of employment. Employees’ interest representation in both fields is rather weak and fragmented, professional organizations rather concentrate on the regulation of professional practice and partly on self-employed. In contrast to architecture with its institutionally codified self-regulation and the highly restricted access on the basis of formal training and licensing, in the television and film industry there are competing career paths and training tracks.

3. Relating the labor process to the labor market and worker’s social integration: Informal and professional control

3.1 Control in projects Work in architecture and media production is organized in projects, i.e. architects and media workers collaborate for accomplishing a complex, often innovative task in a limited period of time. The end product is usually unique and market demand is highly volatile and uncertain (Faulkner, Anderson, 1987). In both fields, project work often implies that work loads are hard to predict in advance and working times, as one means of flexibilization, can vary considerably. Due to their coordinating role, architects have more control over the work process, but are also more self-responsible for structuring the work process and meeting deadlines. The project duration depends on the size of the project, the complexity of the design, and approval procedures and can stretch from few months to years. Within this time span, workload varies so that usually more than one project is carried out at the same time. As architects try to be available for their clients and due the non-routine character of project work, workloads are hard to predict and working times often stretch from 50 to 80 hours per week. In film projects, each day’s work load is defined in advance, according to the script, the budget and the overall project schedule. However, it is also specified day-by-day, depending on delays caused by whether, mistakes, or other difficulties. Therefore, the precise working time remains uncertain. In addition, the project duration has been reduced and work intensified over last years. During a project, the working hours are usually very long, ranging from 10 to more than 15 hours a day, thus often exceeding the limit which is set by the labor protection laws. Conse- quently, projects in the television and film industry are usually so intense that it is impossible for one person to work in two projects at the same time. Architecture and film projects differ with regard to the intensity of involvement, and the forms of control employed. Projects for architects can consist of all or some tasks defined in

12 the Regulation of Fees for Architects and Engineers, such as design, shop drawings, preparing bid sets and construction documents, and construction management. These project phases and, therefore, architect’s tasks, differ in the degree of complexity, innovativeness, interactivity, and involvement of negotiations with the client or construction workers. For instance, concep- tual design and architectural competitions require more creativity and innovativeness than compiling bid sets or drawing plans according to defined specifications, and they involve less interaction with craftsmen and other project partners than developing construction documents and site supervision. Projects in the planning stage usually include collaboration with struc- tural and mechanical electrical plumbing (MEP) engineers, and involve (in later stages) com- missioning construction firms and administering and supervising the construction process. Traditionally, the architect coordinates the planning and construction process on behalf of the client, thereby mediating between planning and construction, the various construction firms and public authorities (Syben, 1997: 13ff). The standardized training which qualifies architects for this broad range of tasks and conveys norms of professional practice significantly shapes the coordination of work and personnel practices: Depending on the size of a project, an architect does not necessarily have to collaborate with other architects in order to complete a project. In addition, standardized training allows for firm-internal flexibility: As smaller architecture firms are less likely to be spe- cialized in a certain task (see also Raabe, 2004), they tend to assign a broad range of tasks to their employees who are at least basically qualified to exercise them. Finally, professional control reduces the need for face-to-face coordination: Because of the standardized tasks and codified professional norms, collaborating in projects in the construction industry does not require permanent personal communication or mutual adjustment. Except for meetings that allow project members to coordinate their activities and to plan next steps, they are working rather autonomously. As they do not have to continually interact with other projects members they can concurrently work in different projects. Film projects consist of different departments, such as camera, set, costumes, which are hierarchically differentiated into different ranks of assistants and supervisors. The duration of the filming, which is the most labor-intensive project phase, varies from a few days (for com- mercials) to 6 to 8 weeks for a movie or several months for a television series. All the members of the different departments work together at the same time and the same place which is chosen according to the script and usually distant from the project members’ homes. While architects’ activities center on a certain construction site, they nevertheless do not have to be permanently present in order for the planning and construction processes to advance. In con-

13 trast, the coordination of the work of the film crew cannot rely on codified professional norms. Training and entry paths of media workers into the industry are extremely heterogeneous, as training-on-the-job and different forms of formal, but not standardized training co- exist (for a detailed analysis of project workers’ careers see Apitzsch, 2010, 2010, forthcoming). Personal control by direct supervisors and mutual adjustment by informal communication between team members are the dominant control devices. Accordingly, the work of project members is highly interactive and interdependent. Due to the differences with regard to the existence of codified professional norms, architects typically enjoy more autonomy at work, than media workers.

3.2 Recruitment practices In temporary organizations such as film projects, the questions of how to coordinate work and how to recruit qualified and motivated workers become more pressing (Marsden, 2004). Since the interviewees were not labor market entrants, most of them were experienced in making decisions regarding the hiring and promotion of assistants, such as interns, camera loaders or focus pullers in media, or associates, student assistants or interns in architecture. Due to the hierarchical differentiation of positions in film projects, the responsibility for hiring is shared: In most cases, a production firm (which is commissioned by a broadcaster or operates on the basis of funding by federal state agencies) employs a director of production, who hires the director. The other heads of department then recommend members of their department. The recruitment criteria and practices of architects and media workers shed light on the functioning of the labor markets in question. With respect to recruitment channels, informal recommendations or direct contacts to colleagues, former fellow students or former co-workers play a significant role in both architecture and media production. However, in architecture, formal recruitment strategies like formal applications are used as frequently as informal contacts for hiring student assistants, employees, and freelancers. In comparison, camera crew members in the field of scenic production of fictional contents, such as films and soap operas, rely almost exclusively on recommendations and direct contacts for filling assistant positions. These contacts involve former assistants, colleagues, and equipment rental agencies, which trained assistants in handling cameras. This confirms the findings of other studies that have revealed the crucial role of informal networks in recruitment processes in the US-American (Faulkner, Anderson, 1987, Jones, 1996), the British (Baumann, 2002a, Blair, 2001), and the German film industry (Bau- mann, 2002a, Marrs, 2007, Sydow, Windeler, 1999). The use of informal networks in recruitment processes has been explained by the capacity of informal contacts to reduce uncertainty

14 about occupational qualification in the absence of standardized training and credentials (Bau- mann, 2002a). In the following, I will take a closer look at modes of control and resulting skill demands. Basic professional skills were mentioned as recruitment criteria by all self-employed architects. If specified, these skill requirements corresponded to the nature of the assigned task. Also extra-functional skills and personal traits played a role in hiring decisions. For instance, the interviewed self-employed architects expected freelancers or employees to be communica- tive, and be able to guide craftsmen and handle clients if the position to be filled involved these contacts. However, these criteria were of minor importance as there are clearly defined tasks which correspond to project phases as defined in the Regulation of Fees for Architects and Engineers. Professional norms are codified and their adherence is controlled by the chambers as publicly entitled professional organizations. Therefore, they can function as more or less transparent standards for evaluating architectural practice. The interviewed members of camera crews were more pronounced about criteria such as liking each other, “personality”, being friends and having fun with each other at work. They attached as much or even more importance to these extra-functional (Dahrendorf, 1956, Offe, 1970: 91ff), diffuse and particularistic (Parsons, 1951: 64ff) criteria, than to professional qual- ifications. These preferences are explained with the duration and intensity of collaboration: "A working day during the shooting lasts 10 hours, as specified in the contract, often it takes longer. [...] And if you spend that much time at work, personal contact is very important. If good friends get on each other's nerves, it does not matter." (DoP) "Of course I have my favorites, persons I like to work with. They have to be able to work under pressure, be reliable, and it should be in harmony. The team should be harmonic, it has to be a good match, only then it is fun, for everyone. A director of production has to motivate the staff." (DoP and director of production) These statements reflect the nature of the production process in the media industry, which is highly interdependent and interactive and involves long working hours. If mutual adjustment (Mintzberg, 1979: 3, 435) and collaborative skills (Jones, 2002: 215) of team members are key to the production process and if performance pressure is high, the particularistic and extra-functional criteria described above can be assumed to play a particularly important role. Individual achievement is hard to evaluate. In this respect, project work seems to resemble the work situation of former longshoreman as described by Finlay (1982: 52), where "a considerable proportion of what is usually described as 'skill' or 'compe- tence' derives from the autonomous coordination of activities between gang members." There- fore it can be assumed, that interdependency and interactivity in project teams complicates the evaluation of the qualification and achievement of single project members.

15 In addition, routines in informal coordination or mutual adjustment, the perceived similarity of work attitudes, and particularistic and diffuse criteria, such as sympathy or liking each other, "being on the same wavelength," humor and having fun with each other, develop and/or are evaluated in the course of collaboration. They can be communicated only by informal recommendations and direct contact. The creation of cohesive and "harmonic teams" might be even consciously brought forward to compensate for difficult working conditions, to increase motivation and the capacity for mutual adjustment (see quotation above: "The team should be harmonic, it has to be a good match, only then it [work] is fun, for everyone. A director of production has to motivate the staff"). Thus, it can be argued that informal networks are relied upon in recruitment practices for film projects because they reduce, at least to some extent, the uncertainty in terms of the following aspects: The professional and extra-functional qualification as well as the motivation and commitment of project members, the cohesion of the team, and the coordination of project work in the absence of bureaucratic structures and professional control. Therefore, networks can be considered as functional equivalents of professional institutions. However, as informal recruitment rests by definition on personal contact, observability increases and evaluations are more likely to cover attitudes, life style, and other diffuse and particularistic criteria. Thus, networks always transfer information on extra-functional criteria. As has been shown so far, the professionalization of a given labor market segment as well as the regulation of employment accounts for the use of informal modes of labor market closure, such as networks. Professional control and regulation of labor market access decreas- es the need for personal forms of control and for informal communication in the labor process. As a result, the evaluation of workers will more likely concentrate on functional specific, universal criteria, the work results are easier to attribute to individual achievement, and the uncertainty about their qualification is reduced by certificates that reliably signal broad and standardized occupational skills and that supersede informal networks for recruitment. In contrast, lacking codified professional norms, a restriction of labor market access on the basis of standardized professional qualification and institutionalized professional control, personal forms of control gain momentum and recruitment becomes more particularistic. As the evaluation of both professional skills and extra-functional criteria are both communicated by informal, personal communication, both become inextricably tied to each other, thus further con- tributing to the dominance of informal networks. How this affects workers opportunities to reconcile work and non-work-related commitments will be discussed in the following section.

16 3.3 Balancing competing claims The establishment, maintenance, expansion and intensification of work-related contacts seems inevitable for securing employment and improving career prospects in the film industry. Only at first sight, getting in contact with future employers and assistants is an unavoidable by- product of project work. Rather, it requires efforts such as regularly visiting award ceremonies and local industry-related events, going out and hanging out together after work despite 10 to 15 hour-work days. These activities enable the intensification, maintenance and extension of networks and improve employment possibilities. The following interview statements illustrate the importance of informal leisure activities with colleagues on employment prospects: “There are always premiere parties, the Berlinale, you have to show your face. Und maybe, somehow, something results from that, hopefully. And as I said, this only helps if the others like what you are doing. It does not have to be good or bad. You just have to have the impression that it was better than something else. There are many colleagues who have no work. That’s how it is. The amount of productions diminished, and it is distributed unjustly. There are people – I could make 4 movies in September and I know at least 4 colleagues who don’t work in September. And they are not worse than me.” (DoP) “There are many who go for a drink at night, who socialize a lot, but do not work as good as me. But they have their contacts, they are buddies, adventurers, and get more jobs than I do” (focus puller) “And if they are people I like having a beer with at night, then I made the right decision.“ (DoP) Despite such irregular activities outside of work, vertical relations can be stabilized mainly at work, because the flexibility and intensity of project inclusion does not allow for regular activities and meetings, even between projects. Therefore, not working together regularly threatens the very basis of employment and income prospects. The necessity to intensify and stabilize employment-relevant social relations places several constraints on the use of alternative strategies for securing employment, career, and income. One such strategy is the often-proposed option of "diversification" (Menger, 1999, O'Mahony, Bechky, 2006), i.e. working in different parts of the film and television industry, in different positions or occupations and departments. Another is to form weak ties (Gra- novetter, 2002) or intensify contacts to other supervisors. Finally, investing in training to open up alternative employment opportunities could be regarded as a rational strategy in these flexible labor markets (Voß, 2001a, b). However, these strategies are in conflict with the dominant structure of such labor markets, because strong vertical relations tend to erode and therefore to lose their protective function if they are not stabilized on the basis of regular interaction. In addition to the corrosive effect that interruptions to repeated cooperation have on the stability and employment-enhancing function of social relations, securing employment by re-

17 lying on networks is a risky strategy for two more reasons. First, access to those networks rests on diffuse and particularistic criteria, which are by definition hardly transparent or calcu- lable. Second, networks cannot be instrumentalized too openly and too extensively without threatening their emotional basis — the use of social capital always has to be obscured (Bour- dieu, 2001). Thus the support for gaining access to projects by recruitment or by the recommendations of former supervisors is neither guaranteed nor transparent. Informal networks and, more specifically, repeated cooperation between supervisors and their assistants are used as a strategy to reduce uncertainty. For those recruiting, the repeated collaboration with familiar personnel reduces the uncertainty regarding both professional and extra-functional skills. For the recruited, it increases their chances of gaining access to projects and improves their ability to make plans. These strong vertical relations result from a selection process from project to project, where not only the work but also personal traits, the similarity of work attitudes, humor, life styles, and other extra-functional criteria are used, which are mainly particularistic and diffuse in nature. As is explained above (and in more detail in Apitzsch 2009), the particularism of recruitment is mainly due to the lack of universalistic criteria for evaluating work and qualification, and the time spent together in close interaction, both at work and after, in places distant from the respective home and non- work-related contacts. In addition, to work with people on a friendship-like basis, sharing the sense of humor, and "being on the same wavelength" not only eases the coordination of work, which is mainly based on informal interaction and personal control; it also compensates for stressful working conditions such as extremely long working hours and time pressure. Eventu- ally, directors finish up working with only a few DoP on a regular basis, who themselves tend to recruit from a small pool of camera assistants. However, the resulting demands for commitment, life-style adjustments and flexibility deviate markedly from the „limited and negotiated involvement“ that characterized fordist production in Germany (Streeck, 1996). Their acceptance varies with age and depending on the family situation of media workers (see, for a more detailed analysis, Apitzsch, 2010, forthcoming). These requirements for flexibility and life-style adjustments, in addition to the dependency on networks and the insecurity regarding future employment led most interviewees to consider alternatives to employment in film projects. Despite the lack of quantitative data, on the basis of the expert interviews and narratives of media workers it can be assumed that labor market exit before retirement is a widespread phenomenon in the film and television industry.

18 Camera crew members usually have demanding working times, and the length of a working day depends on the former work day’s results and thus is usually specified only from one day to another. In addition, in the television and film industry, the hiring usually starts late for the assisting staff, allowing for only few weeks or even days of advance planning. The lack of predictability of working time, the intensity of project involvement make it particularly difficult for project workers to reconcile work and private life: family life, hobbies, further training, to be friends or in relationship with persons outside the film industry were hard to maintain: “Everything that could distract you, be it friends, family, children, is counterproductive. […] The female DoP’s that I know, who are successful, they think 150 percent in film, they live film, they do everything for film. None of them has a family. To be successful as a female DoP you must not have a family.” (Focus puller) As a result of the homophily (Ibarra, 1992, Lazarsfeld, Merton, 1954, Marsden, Gor- man, 2001, McPherson, Smith-Lovin, Cook, 2001) in recruitment and the difficulties of maintaining non-work-related commitments and contacts, media workers’ networks tend to become more homogeneous over time with regard to life style, attitudes, and occupation of contacts. As a result, the project labor market in the film and television industry resembles Lewis Coser’s “greedy institutions”, “organizations and groups which, in contradistinction to the prevailing principle, make total claims on their members and which attempt to encompass within their circle the whole personality […], seek exclusive and undivided loyalty and they attempt to reduce the claims of competing roles and status positions on those they wish to encompass within their boundaries.” (L.Coser, 1974). These greedy institutions differ from Goffman’s total institutions in drawing on the voluntary commitment of their members, they “aim at maximizing assent to their styles of life by appearing highly desirable to the partici- pants” (ibid.: 6). In addition, they intensify their members’ loyalty by means of isolating them from competing relationships (ibid: 7f.). Interestingly and in contrast to the examples provid- ed by Coser (1974), such as the servant who resides in the house of his master in 18th century Britain, commitment is not rewarded by long-term security. An important difference to the labor market in the television and film industry is that in architecture there is an alternative to highly interactive work settings and to relying on informal relations for career prospects and future employment because job advertisements play a significant role for recruitment, too. In addition, for the self-employed architects, there is an opportunity to become a licensed energy auditor or consultant for Mechanical Electrical Plumbing upon completion of further training. The services of consultants and auditors are commissioned on the basis of public listings for each region and therefore access to this field

19 of activity does not require networks. As a result, architects are less dependent on informal networks to secure employment and income, than media workers. Furthermore, while parental leaves often ended careers of project workers in the film and television industry due to the loss of employment-relevant contacts, for architects they frequently marked the transition to self-employment. Due to the lack of part-time jobs in architecture, self-employment was experienced as being much easier to reconcile with family life. By reducing the amount and/ or size of projects, self-employed architects could reduce and adapt their working time and therefore did not have to interrupt their career for a long period. In contrast, employment in an architecture firm was viewed as an impediment for autonomously structuring the working time by deciding on the number and size of projects to work in. Therefore, due to the existence of positions which are relatively autonomous with regard to work and to defining working time, non-work-related commitments do not interfere with securing income and employment architects as they do for media workers.

Conclusion This paper aimed to shed light on the ramifications of flexibilization of work and employment on the functioning of labor markets and the social integration of workers. It showed that personal forms of control, which are used in the absence of professional institutions, increase the particularism of recruitment. Extra-functional, diffuse and particularistic criteria become more important under the following conditions: (1) Working time is not effectively regulated, so that colleagues spend much time with each other. Thus, in labor market segments where employees interest representation is weak, as in architecture and media, are likely to increase particularism of recruitment. (2) Work is coordinated by personal forms of control and is therefore highly interactive – as in industries where standardization of skills or processes is not viable, due to a lack of institutionalized professional control or lack of the continuity of demand and routines of production. The first two factors increase “observability” and make social control extend to extra-functional aspects. (3) There are no institutionalized universalistic and functionally specific criteria to evaluate qualification and achievement outside work, and training is not standardized, as in media, where training and entry paths into the industry are highly heterogeneous. If professional qualification can be evaluated and communicated only personally, i.e. via networks, these evaluations are likely to be linked to subjective as- sessments of diffuse and particularistic criteria such as sympathy, humour, lifestyle or “being on the same wavelength”. (4) Team members are involved in recruitment decisions, as can be expected for project and team forms of work organization.

20 Following Baumann (2002), the evidence presented, and other studies that revealed the importance of networks in the film industry, it can be stated that networks can replace intraor- ganizational communication channels and credentials in recruitment decisions. Therefore, at first sight, informal networks are functionally equivalents for credentials and standardized professional training in recruitment processes. However, I argue that networks are more likely to be used under the conditions described above, and, additionally, add themselves to the particularism of recruitment. Moreover, the way networks integrate individuals into labor markets and how they enable them to reconcile work and life is fundamentally different from organizations or professions. Due to restriction of access to the labor market based on formal professional qualification and the greater autonomy at work, architects were less dependent on networks to get a job, and better able to work in different projects at the same time. In addition, their broad skills allowed them to specialize in different tasks as well as to complete projects autonomously. Accordingly, their professional skills allowed for adjustment to changing market demands, as well as to changing preferences for working conditions independent from informal support. In contrast, establishing and maintaining informal networks is the only possibili- ty to secure employment and income in the film and television industry. As a result, criteria for career success and income security were not transparent, but rather diffuse and particularistic. Also, informal support can not be mobilized too openly without threatening the relationship. Finally, as informal networks are stabilized by regular interaction, or, more precisely, by regular collaboration in projects, it is not possible to adjust to changing market demands by switching between fields of specialization or by investing into further training without endan- gering the ties that are basis for securing income and employment. Thus, networks rather than formal institutions seem to limit individual mobility and leeway for strategic action in flexible labor markets. Finally, analyzing how architects and media workers coped with the blurring boundaries between the sphere of work and non-work-related commitments, I showed that informal networks develop “greedy” tendencies in maximizing observability and extending social control to extra-functional aspects. The demands on life-style adjustment, availability and network maintenance also tended to isolate workers from ties to friends and partners outside the media industry. Unlike architects, who could change their employment status in order to increase their autonomy to reconcile work and family or other non-work related commitments and who did not have to rely on informal support, media workers were unable to change to more autonomous work settings in which they could better integrate both spheres.

21 To sum up, professionalism allows for a qualitative limitation of the claims on project workers where the regulations of the standard employment relationship do not apply. Further- more, professional control increases autonomy in the labor process and in the labor market, and serves as the basis for formal evaluation of work and formal recruitment. In contrast, the absence of professional institutions increases the dependency on informal networks for securing employment. Non-professional project labor markets become all-encompassing and thus restrict the autonomy of workers to balance career and personal life. Thus, the results presented in this paper help to explain when networks are more important than other means of recruitment. They also help to better understand the conditions under which workers can adjust to volatile labor markets – namely institutionalized professional control – and the limits of individual instrumental action, of self-control, self-marketing and of economization of life. The findings contradict the widespread assumption that informal, network-based forms of control of labor markets increase individual leeway by showing the limits of the instrumentalization of informal support and by showing how networks limit individual mobility. Finally, they highlight the interrelation between labor market institutions, recruitment and organization of work, and workers social integration.

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