Evaluation of China S Resonse to East Turkistan Terrorist Forces
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
Virginia Review of Asian Studies 153
EVALUATION OF CHINA’S RESONSE TO EAST TURKISTAN TERRORIST FORCES
Wang Yinghui Nanyang Technological University
Abstract: East Turkistan terrorist forces in Xinjiang (ETTF) are currently posing a great threat to China’s security and development. The Chinese government has been combating ETTF vigorously and has achieved some effect. This paper examines Chinese government’s hard response as well as social and economic measures to the threat posed by ETTF. In addition, the essay also evaluates the successful experiences as well as lessons China has learned from the war on terror. Finally, the paper also discusses the aspects on which China should make improvement.
According to Chinese government, the stability of China is threatened by three evil forces, namely, terrorism, ethnic separatism and religious extremism. The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China is no doubt the most afflicted area by the three evil forces, and the Chinese government has made consistent efforts to crack down the terrorist and insurgent activities, and have achieved some effect. However, the breakout of the 5 July 2009 Riot in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang Autonomous Region, fully exposed problems in China’s counterterrorist measures.
This paper examines the Chinese government’s response against East Turkistan Terrorist Forces over the past decades from the aspect of capability building, mechanism building, legislation effort, intelligence, international cooperation, and social and economical measures, etc. Meanwhile, it also examines the major strength and deficiencies in China’s response. Finally, the essay also discussed the ways that China should follow to boost its counterterrorist ability to a new level. The paper points out that hard measures only are not sufficient in dealing with terrorism aroused by ETTF, and social and economic measures, or “soft measures” should also be resorted to in coping with this complicated issue in a comprehensive way.
Overview of East Turkistan Terrorist Forces and its Threat
The term “Turkistan”, meaning “the region of the Turks” was originally a historic term used in the Middle Ages, referring to west-central Asia extending east from the Caspian Sea to the border of China and south from the Aral Sea into Afghanistan. In the late 18th century it became very vague in historical record. However, in the early 19th century, the term was revived due to colonial expansion by major powers like Russian, who used the term “East Turkistan” or “Chinese Turkistan” to refer to the areas around Tarim Basin in
153 Virginia Review of Asian Studies 154
China’s Xinjiang east of “Turkistan”.1 During the first half of the 20th century, a tiny number of separatists and religious extremists in Xinjiang politicized the term “East Turkistan”, and advocated about the “independence of East Turkistan”. Due to the massive instability and continuous insurgencies in China, there appeared the short-lived and self-claimed East Turkistan Republic and Second East Turkistan Republic occupied by warlords.2 From the early 1930s to the mid-1940s, with the support of some forces from abroad, the "East Turkistan" separatist forces raised slogans like “killing the Han and annihilating the Hui” and “opposing and expelling the Han”, causing many riots and even slaughtering innocent people.3 Since the founding of PRC, Xinjiang was established as the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region under the control of the Chinese Central Government, and the “East Turkistan” separatist forces waned to some degree, but still persisted.
After the Cold War, influenced by the turbulence of international and ethnic situation, the “East Turkistan” forces both inside and outside China turned to terrorist violence as the chief means of their separatist activities. According to statistics from Ministry of Public Security, in the past 10 years until 2005, the "East Turkistan Islamic Forces” in Xinjianag had created over 270 terrorist incidents inside and outside Chinese territory, resulting in the deaths of more than 160 people of all ethnic groups and injuries to more than 440 people. The major crimes they committed included explosions, assassinations, attacks on police stations, poison and arson.4 Since 2008, the “East Turkistan” forces have started a new round of sabotage activities, and created a number of bloody incidents of terror and violence aimed at the Beijing Olympics. In particular, the seriously violent incident of July 5, 2009 in Xinjiang caused 197 death, 1803 casualties, demolition of 380 stores and destruction of 169 cars.5 It seriously jeopardized the normal order and social stability of the region.
It takes time for China to perceive and respond properly to the threat caused by East Turkistan forces. In December 2003, China’s Ministry of Public Security, for the first time, issued a list of identified “Eastern Turkistan” terrorist organizations, including the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the Eastern Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO), the World Uygur Youth Congress (WUYC) and the Eastern Turkistan Information Center(ETIC).6 ETIM, the spearhead of the forces, is undoubtedly the vanguard of this fight against China. To sustain its fight against China, the ETIM had tried to obtain support of other transnational terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Union(IJU). ETLO was
1 "Origin of the "East Turkistan" Issue," State Council of the People's Republic of China (May 1, 2003). http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20030526/4.htm. 2 “East Turkistan”, Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_Turkestan. 3 “East Turkistan’ Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity,” People’s Daily ( January 21, 2001). 4 “Counterterrorist Bureau: East Turkistan Forces is the Major Terrorist Threat,” Beijing Youth Daily (September 12, 2005). 5 “Press Conference of Xinjiang Legal Experts on July 5 Riot,” ifeng.com, (October 12, 2009). http: //news.ifeng.com/mainland/special/wulumuqisaoluan/zuixbaodao/200910/1012_7229_1384851.shtml 6 “China issues 'terrorist' list”, BBC News, Monday, 15 December, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia- pacific/3319575.stm 154 Virginia Review of Asian Studies 155 also a terrorist group with its headquarters in Istanbul, and had committed assassination and sabotage activities. WUYC merged with another radical group, the Eastern Turkistan National Congress (ETNC) and formed World Uighur Congress (WUC) in Munich, Germany in April 2004.7 Now, WUC appears to be the most prominent organization among Uighur exile communities around the world, whose newly elected Chairman, Rebiya Kadeer was believed to have instigated the July 5 Riot.8 ETIC serves as the mouthpiece for WUC, and also collect fund, search for recruit and disseminate sabotage information. According to Chinese counterterrorist expert Li Wei, for the same separatist purpose, these groups are increasing collaboration in recent year.9
The Chinese government seems to be ambiguous when referring to “terrorism” in China. China interchangeably used the term “East Turkistan Forces”, “East Turkistan Terrorist Forces”, “East Turkistan Separatist Forces” or “East Turkistan Islamic Forces” to refer to the Islamic radical force in Xinjiang. However, some separatist subgroups or sentiment are not violent. While on the other hand, some violent activities or terror are increasingly performed not necessarily by the organization members, but by some self- radicalized cells and individual in Xinjiang. Therefore, the term ETTF in this essay refers to the organized terrorist forces, such as ETIM, as well as the self-radicalized groups inside and outside Xinjiang seeking terrorist means for the separation end.
Before 2001, China addressed the separatist forces mainly through hard measures, or military and paramilitary means. Starting from the 1980s and 1990s, China launched a series of “Strike Hard” campaigns to crack down on the riots. It was after the September 11 terrorist attack when the world began to reflect seriously on the root cause of terrorism that China began to address the problem in a comprehensive way. With the accumulation of experience in dealing with ETTF, and under the influence from the international community on countering terrorism, China began to resort more to other instruments. So far, China has greatly improved its anti-terror intelligence, legislation, anti-terror finance, international cooperation, and has taken social and economical approach to fight terrorism in an all-round way.
Building up a Professional Anti-terror Fighting Force
China’s anti-terror fighting forces is the key to understanding the effectiveness of China’s anti-insurgency and anti-terrorism campaigns.10 Now the fighting forces are mainly composed of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF), and the People’s Police. Chinese officials claim that this system of “joint defense” is playing an “irreplaceable special role” in the campaigns of “smashing and
7 Rohan Gunaratna, Arabinda Acharya, and Wang Pengxin, Ethnic Identity and National Conflict in China, (Palgrave Macmillan, May 2010), p. 81. 8 “Family asks Rebiya Kadeer not to organize violence, undermine harmony,” China-Embassy.org, (July 3, 2009), http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t576801.htm 9 “East Turkistan Forces Strengthen Collusion and Share Labor”, China Daily, (June 30, 2010) , http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqgj/jryw/2010-06-30/content_518034.html 10 Rohan Gunaratna, Arabinda Acharya, and Wang Pengxin, Ethnic Identity and National Conflict in China, p. 142. 155 Virginia Review of Asian Studies 156 resisting internal and external separatists’ attempts at sabotage and infiltration,” and in “maintaining the stability and safety of the borders of the motherland.”11
The PLA had been the traditional force that the government relied on to counter insurgencies and riots in Xinjiang in the 1990s. After the Baren uprising in April 1990, the central and local government officials were pressured to build a more professional counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism force to fight against ETTF. Therefore, the PLA troops in Xinjiang have improved their capabilities both in terms of equipments and personnel. Now the PLA has a presence of an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 troops in Xinjiang mainly responsible for border defense, economic development, and internal security.12 In each Regional Military Command, there are Special Forces that take the mission of coping with terrorist activities and emergencies. However, in general, China depended more on PAPF and People’s Police in fighting terrorist activities, while the role of PLA in China’s counter-terrorism is limited to deterrent and supportive functions.
The People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) is the central professional force increasingly capable of handling political unrest and terrorist attacks within China. In China’s National Defense in 2008 report, the PAPF is defined as “the state’s mainstay and shock force in handling public emergencies” and “an important counter-terrorism force of the state.”13 After the September 11 terrorist attack, China began to strengthen the special counter-terror forces in PAPF, building tactical counter-terrorism units, immediate action units, and special police units. Among them, the most prominent one is Snow Wolf Commando Unit (SWCU), a 300-strong unit taking the mission of counter- terrorism, riot control, and other special tasks, such as hijacking and bomb disposal.14 Early in 2010, Meng Jianzhu, the Commissar of PAPA emphasized to build the PAPF into a “fist force” in counterterrorism and internal security safeguarding.15
The People’s Police, under the charge of Ministry of Public Security (MPS), is the backbone among the anti-terror forces. Xinjiang Local police have always been in the vanguard in the war against terrorist activities and insurgencies in the region. Since the 1980s, the Police, together with the PLA and PAPF, had launched “strike hard” waves targeting against separatist activities and insurgencies in Xinjiang. The campaign carried on to the 1990s and after 2000s, and the police arrested large numbers of insurgents and separatist propagandists, and clamped down scores of “illegal religious organizations”. After the July 5 Riot, the Ministry of Public Security arrested a large number of terrorists
11 “Role of Xinjiang Production Construction Corps Important: White Paper,” Xinhua News (Beijing, 2003). 12 Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century (London: Routledge, 2006), 80. 13 China’s National Defense in 2008 (Beijing: The State Council Information Office of PRC, January 20, 2009). http://www.china.org.cn/government/central_government/2009–01/20/content_17155577.htm. 14 Li Zhihui and Li Shu, “China’s Anti-terrorism Force in Action Ahead of Olympics,” Xinhua Net ( June 19, 2009). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008–06/19/content_8400608.htm. 15 “Building PAPF counter-terror Forces into a “Fist Force’,” China.com (January 8, 2010), http://military.china.com/zh_cn/news/03/11078238/20100108/15768550.html 156 Virginia Review of Asian Studies 157 who participated in the riot. In March 2010, it was reported that 97 cases and 198 people were arrested and tried.16
The waves of “strike hard” measures have been effective and had also played the deterrence role. However, China has long been criticized of excessive and indiscriminate use of force in response to terrorist threat. There were also comments that the use of force may intensify ethnic tension and grievance and may provide more recruit for ETTF.
Command and Control System
China has built up the counterterrorist system both on the state and local level. Shortly after the September 2001 terrorist attack, China established its National Anti-Terrorism Coordination Group (NATCG) and a Secretariat led by President Hu Jintao. The system is an up-down horizontal command and control level, from State Council to Provincial Government down to Municipal Government structure. The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) also simultaneously set up an Anti-Terror Bureau (ATB) responsible for the research, planning, guidance, coordination, and undertaking of the national anti-terror agenda. The NATCG’s office was headquartered in the Anti-Terror Bureau of the MPS. With Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Xinjiang, and Tibet at the forefront, all the provinces followed suit by organizing their own anti-terrorist coordination groups and offices. On the municipality level, counterterrorism agencies are also set up. Actually counterterrorism has become an important part of emergency responding mechanism in local government. Meanwhile, Quick Response System (QRS) has been set up for China’s relevant authorities to take speedy and determined measures to work for a quick resolution in the event of emergency. To some degree, the QRS overlaps with anti-terror system. In many local governments, the “Counterterrorist Office”, “Quick-response Office” and “Safeguarding Security Office” is the same organ.17
According to a Chinese counterterrorism expert, Wang Baofu, after decade of construction, the counter-terrorist system is basically complete now, and China is stepping into an era of counterterrorism with perfecting law and regulations.18 This command and control system proved effective in the 2008 Olympic Games. However, China was widely criticized for the slow response and incapability in command and control when dealing with July 5 Riot. This requires China to strengthen its emergency response and to enhance coordination between different counterterrorist sectors.
Legislation Effort
Before the 1990s, the term “terrorism” or “terrorist” could not be found in any Chinese law documents. It was not until 1994 that “terrorist crime” began to be stated clearly in Rules for Implementation of the State Security Law of the People's Republic of China. In
16 “97 Cases and 198 People Have been Trialed for the July 5 Riot,” China News.com. (March 7, 2010) 17 “China’s Anti-Terrorism Structure” Xinhua News Agency Outlook Weekely (July 29, 2010), http://big5.news365.com.cn:82/gate/big5/www.news365.com.cn/wxpd/wz/jsbl/201007/t20100719_277 2954.htm） 18 Ibid. 157 Virginia Review of Asian Studies 158
Chapter I, Article 8, it regulates that “Organizing, plotting or committing terrorist acts endangering the State security” fall to “other sabotage acts endangering the State security”.19 After the September 11 terrorist attack, to conform to the world situation of counterterrorism, and to prevent various terrorist activities from happening, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the Supreme People’s Court and the Public Security Ministry jointly issued the “Notice on Harshly Striking Terrorist Criminal Activities”.20 In December 2001, China passed the Amendment III to PRC Criminal Law, which made a modification to the criminal law, adding 7 new accusations related to terrorist crimes, and intensified the penalty of these crimes. These accusations include providing funding for terrorist organizations, stealing guns, ammunitions, and spreading poisonous or radioactive substance, money laundry, etc.21 In particular, China also set up special laws concerning terrorist financing. In October 2006, China published the Anti-Money Laundering Law, providing the legal system for the prevention of terrorist financing.22
However, until today, China still lacks a special Anti-Terror Law, which will serve as the comprehensive legal framework to preventing and countering terrorism. This has been mentioned by quite a few experts.23 Good news is that the effort is underway. Relevant personnel said that the framework of China’s Counterterrorist Law has been completed in 2005, but still need more effort in defining basic concepts, designing special counter-terror measures and linkage with other legislations.24
Intelligence Network Building
An effective intelligence mechanism is essential to carry out effective security and defense strategies. China has established a counter-terror intelligence network, which is in full function now. There are three national intelligence organizations: Ministry of State Security (MSS), Ministry of Public Security (MPS), and PLA, in charge of domestic, foreign and military intelligence respectively. As to the intelligence coordinating mechanism, National Anti-Terrorism Coordination Group is the top body. China’s intelligence agencies also set up an Early Warning and Prevention System (EWPS).
During the 2008 Olympic Games, the intelligence system was comprehensively exercised and tested, and proved to be successful and effective. Even before the launching of the Games, Beijing had obtained the information that the ETIM were
19 Adopted at the19th Executive Meeting of the State Council on May 10, 1994，promulgated by Decree No.157 of the State Council of the People. http://www.eduzhai.net/yingyu/615/763/yingyu_246317.html 20 Han Shubin, “Work Report of Supreme Procuratorate”, (Mar 11, 2002), http://www.spp.gov.cn/site2006/2006-02-22/00018-293.html) 21 See the Website of PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/jkxw/t208622.htm 22 “China adopts anti-money laundering law,” China Daily (October 31, 2006). http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006–10/31/content_721316.htm. 23 “China’s Anti-Terror System Emerged; Legislation yet to be Strengthened to Deter Terrorists,” 1n0.net. (September 14, 2009), http://www.1n0.net/Article/sztg/77404.html 24 “China Took the initiative in Counterterrorism, Preventing Large Casuaties,” CNWEST.COM (Aug 5, 2009). http://mil.cnwest.com/content/2009-08/05/content_2287794.htm 158 Virginia Review of Asian Studies 159 planning to “sabotage and destruct” the Games.25 This helped the relevant agencies in cracking down their plan.
However, the two most serious violent terrorist attacks in China, the March 4 2008 Tibet Riot and July 5 2004 Riot in Xinjiang, exposed the loopholes in the counterterrorist intelligence work. China’s intelligence must improve its integration of resources and coordination between different intelligence organs. China should learn from US to establish a position like director of national Intelligence to take charge of the overall intelligence coordination, and integrate intelligence information from Ministry of Public Security, Department of General Staff of PLA, and the People’s Police. China also need to put more professionalism in its intelligence work, and enhance intelligence sharing with other countries, so as to improve the effectiveness and efficiency in anti- terror intelligence level.
International Cooperation
Since 2001, China has strengthened counterterrorist coordination with related countries and organizations through regional frameworks or bilateral channels on many aspects, such as joint counter-terror exercise, joint counter-terror training, intelligence sharing and cooperation in anti-terror financing.
China has always stated clearly that counter-terrorism should be held within the framework of UN. So far, among all the 12 UN international conventions on Countering terrorism, China has joined 11 of them.26 The most prominent regional counter-terrorist framework is Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In June 2001, the five member countries signed The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism. 27 Since 2002, China has launched six joint exercises and training with other SCO member countries. The “Peace Mission 2010”, the seventh joint exercise, will be held in the coming fall in Kazakhstan. China also held joint training and exercises with Pakistan, Thiland, and India under the name of counterterrorism. In particular, China held 3 counterterrorism joint trainings with Pakistan, from whom China learned valuable real combat experiences in counterterrorism. According to Vice Chief of Staff Ma Xiaotian, the PLA lacks real combat experience, and is willing to continue to hold joint exercises with other countries.28 In addition, China also sent Armed Police Force contingents to Israel to learn counter-terror tactics from Israeli military.
China has also been seeking international cooperation in curbing terrorist financing and money-laundering. China was accepted in February 2005, as a observer in Financial
25 Yang Hui, “Strengthening Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Cooperation and Promoting Peace in the Asia- Pacific,” (presented at the Asian-Pacific Intelligence Chief ’s Conference, Singapore, February 18, 2009). 26 Zhang Jie, “China's Anti - terror Policy: Principles, Content and Measures,” Contemporary Asia- Pacific Studies. (No.11, 2005) 27 The document is from SCO’s website. See http://www.sectsco.org/EN/2001.asp 28 “PLA Vice Chief of Staff: China is Willing to Strengthen Counterterrorism Cooperation with Foreign Armies,” (July 7, 2010), http://mil.eastday.com/m/20100710/u1a5320810.htm 159 Virginia Review of Asian Studies 160
Action Task Force (FATF), the inter-governmental agency spearheading the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. In October 2004, China, together with Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Belarus, established the Euro-Asian Group on combating Money-laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG), which became one of the key components of international anti-terrorist financing cooperation.29
China and U.S. also started counter-terrorist cooperation after the 9-11 attack. In the wake of the attack, China voted for UN 1368 and 1373 Resolution to combat terrorism. In 2002, US President Bush claimed that China and U.S. were “allies” in combating terrorism.30 Prominent cooperation have been mainly conducted with the FBI, including anti-terror financing cooperation assistance of anti-terror expertise and technology for Beijing’s 2008 Olympic Games. However, there still exist frictions and misunderstandings between the two countries concerning counter-terror issue. Washington kept supporting the Uighar exile groups operating in US and Europe. In 2007, Bush met Rebiya Kadeer, the leader of World Uighur Congress (WUC), which was strongly objected by China. Beside, until now, US did not identify the three groups, WUC, ETLO and WUC as terrorist groups, which have been recognized by China as early as 2003. And in US, there were criticism that Beijing’s intention was to exploit counter-terrorist campaign to justify its harsh control of Uighur people.31
Social and Economic Response
The large number of Han people migrating to Xinjiang has always been the cause of grievance among Uyghur people.32 The Uyghur people are concerned about the widening gap of social and economic development between the two ethnic groups. They are also worried that large influx of Han people will cause more unemployment of Uyghur people, and consume more scarce resources like water. Most importantly, they believe that Han people pose a threat to their ethnic religious identify.
Perhaps it is the most difficult thing to mitigate the ethnic tension, and win the “heart and mind” of the Uyghur people. To address this issue, the central and local government need humane instead of hard measures. On the one hand, the ethnic relationship between Han and Uyghur must be improved. The government could use the media to spread propaganda about harmony between the two groups, and could conduct educational work as well as psychological assistance on the grassroots level. In terms of achieving multiethnic harmony, China should learn from other countries that cope well with these problems well, like Singapore. On the other hand, the government should enhance efforts that can genuinely help Xinjiang to develop the economy and improve the living standard of Uyghur people.
29 The EAG official Web site. http://www.eurasiangroup.org/.. 30 Shirley Kan, “US-China Counter_Terrorism Cooperation: Issues for US Policy,” CRS Report for Congress. (December 7, 2004). http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21995.pdf 31 Ibid. 32 According to China’s census, in 1949, there were 75.9% Uyghur people and 6.7% Han people in Xinjiang, while in 2000, the figure changed to 45.2% and 40.6% respectively. 160 Virginia Review of Asian Studies 161
The July 5 riot has exposed that the government is insufficient in developing Xinjiang socially and economically. It urged the central as well as the local government to take stride in developing Xinjiang’s economy. After the riot, China and the local government took a series of measures to boost the local economy and promote the welfare of the Uyghur people. In May, China launched a package of favorable policies to help the region, which was described as “leapfrog development”. It was noted by Chinese President Hu Jintao as “a major and urgent task of strategic significance” to achieve the lasting stability in the region.33 The blueprint is that Xinjiang will build six new airports covering 1.66 million square km by 2015. And the railroad will extend from 3,599 km to more than 12,000 km by 2020 with an investment of 310 billion RMB yuan.34 Some underdeveloped areas, especially the south of Xinjiang, will be the priority of assistance. There were also slogans to build Kashgar City into a Shenzhen in China’s West.35
Conclusion and Suggestions
According to Chinese counterterrorist expert Li Wei, there are two major reasons that lead to the China’s modest achievement in counterterrorism and the relative stabilized situation in Xinjiang. The first is the effective control of guns, and the second is the powerful grassroots regime.36 From the above discussion, we could also conclude China has been successful in cracking down the terrorist criminals and in law enforcement, which brought the terrorists to justice and played a deterrence role for terrorists. However, the hard response is a double-edged sword. China has been criticized by foreign media being too “tough” in hard response, referring to the “torture” and “death penalty” of terrorist criminals. Moreover, there are also criticism that some strict and compulsory measures infringed upon people’s personal freedom and right. For example, the 10-month long ban of mobile phone SMS and internet use after the July 5 riot caused much inconvenience to people in Xinjiang.
There has been increasing awareness among Chinese officials and experts that the war on terrorism does not only rely on tough military measures, but also on social and economic measures to tackle the “root cause” of terrorism, such as poverty, marginalization and ethnic tension. Now the central government is on the right track to “strike hard” on the criminals committing terrorism on the one hand, and to enhance the social, cultural and economic development of Xinjiang on the other hand. Counterterrorism is a complicated issue and need a holistic approach from military, law, social, economic and psychological aspects to achieve real effect. China should continue to make effort in perfecting the counterterrorist system, completing legislation framework, strengthening international cooperation, etc. Meanwhile, China should figure out more ways to address the “root cause” of ETTF terrorist activities. In the final
33 “China builds new Silk Roads to revive fortunes of Xinjiang,” People’s Daily Online, (July 2, 2010). http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90778/90862/7050355.html 34 Ibid. 35 Shenzhen is a city in Guangdong, south of China. It is China’s first, and arguably one of the most successful special economic zones. 36 “China’s Anti-Terrorism Structure,” Xinhua News Agency Outlook Weekly. 161 Virginia Review of Asian Studies 162 analysis, a harmonious ethnic relationship between Uyghur and Han people will be the final solution to counter terrorism successfully.
162