Chen Mao’S 1717 Memorial To The Kangxi Emperor:

Chen Mao’s 1717 Memorial to the Kangxi Emperor:

Perspectives on the Prohibition of Catholicism

in the Early-Qing Period

David P. Willard

Initial project submitted in fulfillment of junior thesis requirement Princeton University

Revised and extended version submitted while working as a Saint Louis University Museum of Art

1 research intern, Summer 2006

2 Introduction

The ailing Kangxi Emperor was nearing the end of his days. As he awakened each morning in late 1721, the proud Manchu ruler complained of weakness in his bones and horrible intestinal pains, as he struggled with the delicate portions of food set before him.

His deteriorating memory made it difficult for him to manage the myriad affairs of state – a striking contrast to the deft political and diplomatic skills he once possessed.

In March of 1718, the Kangxi Emperor had announced that he was considering a proposal to proscribe Christianity. Three years later, on January 18, 1721, that intention became a reality, and the Emperor officially prohibited further propagation of

Christianity in the Qing state.1 The Kangxi Emperor decreed:

The content of [Catholic doctrine] is identical with the heterodox teachings of the Buddhist and Daoists. All these wild sayings are generally the same. Hereafter, to avoid further problems, the westerners will be prohibited from practicing their teachings in [our land].2

The Kangxi Emperor’s 1721 proscription of Christianity marked a turning point in the development of Catholicism in China. Following the proscription, Catholic missionaries throughout the Qing state were officially banished to Canton in 1724, and then subsequently deported to the Portuguese enclave at Macao in 1732.3 During this period, Qing authorities closed churches and converted many Catholic missions into temples and granaries. While several small underground Catholic movements continued to exist in Qing territories, their activities were severely limited and frequently faced

1 Rosso, Antonio Sisto, O.F.M., Apostolic Legations to China of the Eighteenth Century. South Pasadena: Perkins, 1948, p. 364. While the Kangxi Emperor’s 1721 decree formally proscribed Christianity in China, this policy was not effectively implemented until 1724 by his son and successor, Yin-ti, also known as the Yongzheng Emperor. 2 Leung, Beatrice. Sino-Vatican Relations: Problems in Conflicting Authority, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 29. 3 Standaert, Nicolas. Handbook of Christianity in China, Vol. I: 635-1800. Leiden: Brill, 2001, p. 521.

3 severe persecution from local and provincial authorities. It was not until the early 19th century, with the influx of European traders under the cover of “gunboat diplomacy,” that

Catholic missionaries re-emerged as vehicles of Christian propagation and conversion in

China.4

The 1721 proscription was the culmination of an extended period of increasing mutual apprehension between the papal authorities in Rome and the imperial court in

Beijing. While the Kangxi Emperor had initially demonstrated a conciliatory attitude towards Catholic missionaries in Qing territories, he gradually became quite distrustful of them, particularly in light of his personal encounters with the arrogant apostolic delegations that visited his court and the Vatican’s corresponding attempts to dictate unilaterally the course of missionary policy in the Qing state.5

Most scholarly literature on the Chinese Rites Controversy portrays the 1721 proscription as an event primarily (if not exclusively) instigated by (i) internal inner court politics in Beijing; (ii) the acrid relationship between the Kangxi Emperor and the visiting papal delegates; and (iii) the conflicting Beijing-Vatican claims of moral authority in formulating missionary policy. However, there is an additional, albeit previously unexamined series of events that directly impacted the development and implementation of the 1721 proscription. While issues of moral authority and cultural tensions between the Qing imperial court and Rome were contributing factors that influenced the Kangxi Emperor’s 1721 decree, it is equally apparent that geopolitical and economic factors of the Qing state were critical elements of consideration by the imperial court and the Kangxi Emperor. In particular, prior to the 1721 proscription, the Kangxi 4 Ibid, 521-522. 5 The controversy over missionary policy in China was rooted primarily in the compatibility of ancestor worship and Confucian doctrine with Catholic teachings. This controversy persisted throughout the late- Ming and early-Qing period and is commonly referred to as the “Chinese Rites Controversy.”

4 Emperor had become increasingly concerned with the rising geopolitical strength of the

Europeans in the southern peripheral Qing provinces. Before the Kangxi Emperor’s reign, the southern coastal region had developed into a critical center of trade and commerce; however, domestic economic stagnation and protracted regional warfare threatened the vital southern regions. Accordingly, to ensure the geopolitical and economic stability of the region, the Kangxi Emperor ordered his provincial officials to monitor closely all activities of Catholic missionaries and foreign merchants and to report directly to his imperial court in Beijing any unusual events or threats.

In more fully examining the geopolitical and economic aspects of the Rites

Controversy and the 1721 proscription, one particular provincial official, Chen Mao, 陈昴,

(1651-1719), is found to have played an important role in bringing to the imperial court’s attention the geopolitical threats of Catholic missions. Chen Mao served as a prominent brigade-general of Guangdong province during the latter part of the Kangxi Emperor’s reign. Most significantly, he was familiar with all maritime activities along the southern coastal regions and had regular direct contact with Western traders and missionaries.

In January 1717, Chen Mao prepared a memorial to the Emperor imperial court that detailed his concerns over the rising power of the Catholic missionaries and Western traders.6 The most significant (and, to date, largely overlooked) aspect of his memorial was his urgent request for an all-out prohibition of Catholic missionaries in the Qing provinces. Chen Mao addressed the problem of Catholic missions not in the context of theological or ideological conflicts, but rather in the larger context of the missionaries’ threatening geopolitical power and relationship with European merchants. In addition, he

6 Wang, Zhongmin 王重民, “Chen Mao Zhuan” 陈昴传, Tushujikan 图书季刊 xin 新, 7, 1-2 (January 1946); repr. In: Lenglu wensou 冷录文薮, Shanghai Guji, 1992, p. 212.

5 expressed specific concerns that these foreign merchants and missionaries were conspiring to exert control over the entire region of the Qing’s southern provinces.

What makes Chen Mao’s memorial particularly significant is the role it played in subsequent imperial deliberations regarding Catholic missions. Chen Mao’s memorial was not approved initially by the Kangxi Emperor; however, Chen’s basic arguments against the missionaries later were adopted by Yang Lin, Governor-General of

Guangdong and Guangxi, who re-submitted Chen Mao’s memorial to the imperial court in March 1718. The Kangxi Emperor then agreed to what was characterized as Yang

Lin’s proposal to proscribe Christianity, a proposal that, in reality, was the original formulation of Chen Mao. An imperial decree of proscription was formally declared in

1721 and implemented in 1724. While Chen Mao’s original memorial was not the sole factor that led the Kangxi Emperor’s decision to proscribe Christianity, Chen Mao’s initial analysis and thorough description of the conditions and missionary activities in the southern regions had an influence on the imperial deliberations and the Kangxi

Emperor’s ultimate policy decision.

This paper examines the significance of Chen Mao and his memorial in the context of the development and proscription of Christianity in the early Qing dynasty.

First, I begin with a brief examination of the development of the Catholic missions in the late-Ming and early-Qing period. In this section, I focus on the promulgation of

Catholicism in the late-Ming and early-Qing eras, the development of the Chinese Rites

Controversy, and the corresponding tensions between Rome and Beijing. Second, I provide a critical summary of the scholarship regarding the factors and motives that led to the 1721 proscription. Third, I introduce Chen Mao and a complete English translation of

6 his 1717 memorial, as well as a textual analysis of the memorial. There are three specific aspects of his memorial upon which I focus: (i) the geopolitical and economic context of the memorial, (ii) the fundamental reasons for Chen Mao’s advocating proscription of

Catholic missionaries, and (iii) the means and rationale by which his arguments factored into the deliberations of the imperial court. Finally, I explain how Chen Mao’s memorial relates to the larger context of the Chinese Rites Controversy and ongoing scholarly debates regarding the early eighteenth-century development of Catholicism in the Qing state.

Historical Context and Development of Catholicism in Late-Ming Early-Qing

In the early 17th century, the Ming state experienced a steady increase in the number of Catholic missionaries. In furtherance of Rome’s edict to expand the domains of Christianity, Catholic missionaries sought to propagate Christian teachings throughout all provinces in the Ming empire.7 This required the collective effort of various Catholic religious orders and congregations, the most influential (and ubiquitous) of which was the

Society of Jesus – the Jesuits. Inspired by the teachings and experiences of the Jesuit priest Matteo Ricci (1552-1610), the Jesuits set out to formulate a missionary doctrine that attempted to reconcile Catholic teachings with existing Confucian doctrine, Chinese rituals, and Chinese notions of the supernatural.8 This “accommodation” strategy, at least initially, proved effective, as it enabled Catholic missionaries to ingratiate themselves

7 In 1622, Pope Gregory XV founded the Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide (The Holy Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith). The aim of this organization was to remedy the shortage of mission priests by providing the basic framework for the development of “indigenous clergy and hierarchy” in Catholic missions around the world. – Standaert, Handbook of Christianity in China. p. 289. 8 Ricci, Matteo, S.J., The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven (T’ien-chu Shih-ji). Translated by Douglas Lancashire and Peter Hu Kuo-chen, S.J. St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1985, pp. 5-9.

7 into the social establishments of Ming communities and to convert individuals from various strata of Ming society to Catholicism.9 The Jesuits in the early years of their missions concentrated their initiatives within urban centers and pursued a “top-down” missionary policy, with the goal of first converting elite upper gentry and literati. 10

However, they gradually began to conduct mass conversions of Ming commoners and expanded into more remote areas in the Chinese countryside. The increasing influence of

Catholic missions soon evolved into an intricate set of relationships, or guanxi 关系, and networks among Jesuit missionaries, sympathizing Ming (and later, Qing) literati and officials, and indigenous catechists and clergymen.11

With these Catholic individuals and institutions becoming firmly embedded in

Chinese society, the number of Chinese converts and the geographic scope of Catholic missions grew substantially in the late-Ming and into the early-Qing period. From 1611-

1620, several permanent Jesuit residences and missions were founded in eastern Jiangnan near Shanghai and Hangzhou. From 1621-1630, Jesuits and their converts achieved considerable territorial expansion of Catholic strongholds in Zhejiang, Jiangxi and Fujian provinces. The years 1631-1640 marked a dramatic increase in the number of missions in

Fujian province, with an influx of Dominican and Franciscan missionaries.12

The fall of the Ming dynasty and subsequent military conflicts between the Qing and “rebel” Chinese armies slowed the growth of Catholic missions. Nevertheless, the development of missions soon resumed with new expansions into Shaanxi and Shanxi provinces. By the beginning of the 18th century, the most highly concentrated

9 Mungello, David E. The Great Encounter of China and the West: 1500-1800. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999, p. 26. 10 Standaert, Handbook of Christianity in China,, pp. 386-387. 11 Wang, Xiaochao Christianity and Imperial Culture: Chinese Christian Apologetics in the Seventeenth Century and their Latin Patristic Equivalent. Leiden: Brill, 1998, pp. 218-224. 12 Standaert, Handbook of Christianity in China,, pp. 534-562.

8 macroregions of Catholic missions were the eastern coastal provinces of Zhejiang and

Fujian, and the capital region of Beijing.13 Numerous first-hand reports from missionaries indicated that by 1701, there were approximately 200,000 baptized Christians and over one hundred and thirty missionaries living in the Qing provinces.14

Catholic missionaries not only exerted religious authority, but also substantial political influence in towns and cities, as well as within the imperial court. In fact, imperial officials and the Kangxi Emperor welcomed missionaries into the highest levels of state bureaucracy because of the perceived benefits of learning the Europeans’ scientific knowledge.15 In addition, Catholic missionaries relished the possibility of converting the emperor, the so-called Son of Heaven and the ruler of two hundred million

Chinese. Johann Adam Schall von Bell, S.J., for example, served as an influential court astronomer for the young Shunzhi Emperor in the 1640s and 1650s.16 Ferdinand Verbiest,

S.J., educated the young Kangxi Emperor in Western mathematics, music, and calendar techniques.17 Thus, the missionaries’ presence and interactions with the imperial court were seen as mutually beneficial to the missionaries and the Qing court.

Notwithstanding these positive initiatives and relationships, there were periods during the late-Ming and early-Qing eras when missionaries suffered periods of persecution, and even expulsion. The primary opposition came from literati and Buddhist clergy, who frequently petitioned provincial and state officials to restrict missionary

13 Ibid, 560. 14 Ibid, 383. 15 Wang, pp. 167-169. 16 Malek, Roman. Western Learning and Christianity in China: The Contribution and Impact of Johann Adam Schall von Bell, S.J. (1592-1666). Monumenta Serica XXX, Vol. 1, Sankt Augustin: Germany: Institut Monumenta Serica, 1998, pp. 32-36. 17 Lin, Jinshui, “The Influence of Ferdinand Verbiest on the Policy of the Kangxi Emperor towards Christianity,” In: Witek, John W., ed. Ferdinand Verbiest: (1623-1688) Jesuit Missionary, Scientist, Engineer and Diplomat. Sankt Augustin: Institut Monumenta Serica; Leuven: Ferdinand Verbiest Foundation, 1994; Monumenta Serica Monograph Series, 30, 1994, pp. 56-72.

9 activities and the propagation of Catholicism. While this opposition to Catholic missionaries did not develop into widespread anti-Christian movements, animosity towards the missionaries persisted as various individuals and publications openly denounced the missionaries’ beliefs and activities.18

In 1607, twenty-seven literati in Jiangxi submitted a lengthy petition to provincial officials, accusing the missionaries of spreading heretic teachings and “destroying statues of deities.”19 In 1616, Shen Que, the Minister of the Nanjing Ministry of Rites, submitted memorials against missionaries in Beijing and Nanjing, accusing them of “[causing] great damage to Confucianism.”20 Thereafter, an imperial edict of February 3, 1617 authorized

Ming authorities to arrest several Jesuit priests in Nanjing, who were subsequently expelled to Macao.21 Opposition in the 1630s and 1640s was presented in anti-Christian texts, Yuandao pixie shuo (1636), Poxieji (1640), Pixie ji (1643), which were published by Buddhist literati in Fujian and Zhejiang provinces.22 In 1664, the prominent literatus

Yang Guangxian attacked the Jesuit faction in the imperial court for subverting “Chinese ideology” through propagation of specious astronomical theories and anti-Confucian teachings.23 Thereafter, several missionaries were sentenced to confinement in Canton, churches were closed in the provinces, and Christianity was forbidden in parts of some provinces.24

18 Mungello, David E. The Forgotten Christians of Hangzhou. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994, pp. 123-139. 19 Standaert, Handbook of Christianity in China, p.509. 20 Kelly, Edward Thomas. The Anti-Christian Persecution of 1616-1617 in Nanking. Ann Harbor, Michigan: University Microfilms; Columbia University Ph.D. Dissertation, 1971, p. 277. 21 Ibid, 278-282. This event is typically referred to as the 1616-1617 Nanjing Incident. Jesuit priests in Beijing were allowed to remain. 22 Standaert, Handbook of Christianity in China. p. 511. 23 Malek, pp. 314-317. 24 Ibid, 335-336.

10 One of the primary issues that contributed to the tenuous position of Catholic missionaries in the provinces was the controversy over Chinese rites. While the Jesuit

“accommodation” policy allowed for Chinese Christians to continue with “civil” practices of ancestor worship and veneration of Confucius, Dominican and Franciscan missionaries took a much more dogmatic approach and prohibited Chinese rites from being included in any form of Catholic ceremony and liturgical practices.25 These disparate views on missionary policy directly affected the development of Catholic communities. Under the Dominican approach, natives who wanted to convert to

Catholicism were required to abandon all forms of Confucian ritual; conversely, under the Jesuit approach, Confucian ritual and Catholic beliefs were not deemed to be mutually exclusive, but rather were allowed to exist harmoniously as part of Catholic doctrine.26

In the 1680s and 1690s, the various Catholic orders dispatched procurators to

Rome to advocate their respective theological and missionary policies to the Pope.27 It soon became clear that the Kangxi Emperor, irrespective of Vatican policy, endorsed the

Jesuits’ “accommodation” policy.28 He saw the benefits of learning Western science from the Jesuits and admired the work of Matteo Ricci.29 In addition, the Kangxi Emperor saw diplomatic advantages from closer relations with the Jesuits, as several Jesuits had assisted in negotiations between the Qing state and Russia in the wake of costly military conflicts along the Qing’s northern borders.30 These positive developments led to a period

25 Standaert, Handbook of Christianity in China, pp. 323-325 26 Ibid, 310-313. 27 Ibid, 356-357. 28Fu, Lo-shu. A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations (1644-1820). Tucson, Published for the Association for Asian Studies by the University of Arizona Press, Vol. 1-2, 1966 p. 105. 29 Ibid, 105-106. 30 Spence, Jonathan. “The Kangxi Reign,” The Cambridge History of China, edited by Denis Twitchett and John Fairbank; Cambridge (Eng.); New York: Cambridge University Press, Vol. 9, The Ch’ing Empire

11 of “tacit toleration” of Catholic missions in Qing provinces during the 1680s and 1690s. 31

The Kangxi Emperor sought diplomatic relations with Western countries and sent several representatives of the Qing state to Rome. In 1692, the Kangxi Emperor issued an “Edict of Toleration,” which officially recognized all Catholic missions (not just the Jesuits) as legitimate institutions and authorized the missionaries to preach more widely32:

The Westerners admired our sacred culture when they sailed to [our land] from ten thousand li away…They have offered many services to this nation. The Westerners who live in the provinces have not committed crimes or behaved badly. They do not commit the heresy of luring people to their church, or causing trouble…We should order that the Catholic churches in all the provinces be preserved as usual.33

Nevertheless, relations between the Kangxi Emperor and Rome soon worsened.

The Vatican, seeking to reaffirm its Counter-Reformationist stance, sought to align its foreign missionary policy with the more rigid and dogmatic approach of the Dominican order of missionaries. As a result, and beginning in 1700, a series of apostolic delegations from Rome set out for Beijing to reinstate the new missionary policy and to abolish observance of any Chinese rites as part of Catholic practices in the Qing provinces. One of the most significant delegations was the Tournon delegation. In 1705, Pope Clement

XI sent Charles-Thomas Maillard de Tournon (1668-1710) as an apostolic delegate to

Beijing.34 Tournon’s first audience with the Emperor was successful, as the Emperor agreed to “Tournon’s wish to install relations between the Pope and the Court of

Beijing.”35 However, at his second audience, Tournon conveyed the Pope’s demand for

(i) the prohibition of Chinese rites, (ii) the nullification of Jesuit “accommodation” policy, and (iii) the reinstatement of the Dominican approach. The Kangxi Emperor

Dynasty to 1800; 2003, p. 152. 31 Standaert, Handbook of Christianity in China, pp. 515-516. 32 Ibid, 516. 33 Fu Loshu, p. 105. 34 Standaert, Handbook of Christianity in China, pp. 358-359. 35 Ibid, 359.

12 immediately and unequivocally rejected this proposal. The Emperor soon became openly hostile towards Tournon, whom the Emperor believed showed no respect for Chinese customs and culture.36 In December, 1706, the Emperor decreed that all missionaries who wanted to stay in the provinces of the Qing state would need a state-approved certificate, or piao 票, that confirmed their identity and purpose of engaging in missionary practices.

Moreover, this piao was to be granted only to those missionaries who agreed “with the

[Jesuit] method of Matteo Ricci.”37

Bitter disagreements between Beijing and Rome immediately ensued, and many missionaries left the provinces, thereby stifling the growth of additional Christian communities.38 In 1716, Rome reaffirmed Tournon’s decree with Apostolic Constitution

Ex illa die.39 This papal decree was perceived by the Emperor as a direct threat to his authority.40 On September 18, 1719, Carlo Ambrogio Mezzabarba, a papal delegate, appeared before the imperial court in an effort to ease tensions between the Vatican and the Kangxi Emperor, while at the same time attempting to encourage the Emperor to accept the Pope’s decree of 1716. Despite Mezzabarba’s efforts, the Emperor flatly rejected his proposal, as well as the 1716 Ex illa die.41 Just two years later, in 1721, the

Kangxi Emperor formally proscribed Christianity in China.

36 Ibid, 359. 37 Mungello, David E. The Chinese Rites Controversy: Its History and Meaning. Nettetal, Germany: Steyler, Monumenta Serica, Monograph Series, XXXIII, 1994, p. 31. 38 Standaert, Handbook of Christianity in China, pp. 517-518. 39 St. Sure, Donald F. S.J., trans. 100 Roman Documents Concerning the Chinese Rites Controversy (1645- 1941). (Chinese). Zhongguo li yi zhi zheng 中国礼仪之争: xi wen wen xian yi bai pian 西文文献一百篇, 1645-1941, Su’er 苏而, Nuo’er 诺而 bian 编; Shen Baoyi 沈保义, Gu Weimin 顾洧民, Zhu Jing 朱静 yi 译; Shanghai: Shanghai guji chuban she 上海古机出版社, Ed. I, 2001, p. 9. 40 Ibid, 9-10. 41 Vermilion Decree to Legate Mezzabarba, January 31, 1721, Submitted to the Provincial Government of Beijing on January 31, 1721. Primary document of full text found in Rosso, Antonio Sisto, O.F.M., Apostolic Legations to China of the Eighteenth Century. South Pasadena: Perkins, 1948, p. 388.

13 The magnitude of the proscriptive decree cannot be overstated. For over half a century, the Kangxi Emperor had been in contact with the Western missionaries. During this period, the Emperor developed close relationships with Jesuits in the imperial court, learned techniques in Western science, used the missionaries for diplomatic assistance, and sought to forge stable relations with Western representatives. In addition, Catholic missionaries, despite periodic resistance and persecution, had developed important religious and social institutions under the Manchu rulers. Nevertheless, the growing hostility between Rome and Beijing and the bitter disagreements over Chinese rites and missionary policy in the Qing state were simply too divisive, culminating in the failed apostolic delegations and the 1721 proscription.

Current Scholarship Regarding Catholicism in the Early-Qing Period

Analyses and interpretations of the development of Catholicism in the early-Qing period and the eighteenth-century proscription have been undergoing revision in recent years. Access to archives and research centers in China, Taiwan, Europe and the United

States have enabled researchers to study significant primary documents related to the dynamics of the Chinese Rites Controversy. These materials span a broad range of sources: memoirs of Jesuit priests, decrees of the Kangxi Emperor, publications by

Chinese literati, among others. The circumstances surrounding the Kangxi Emperor’s

1721 proscription of Christianity and subsequent expulsion of Catholic missionaries have been the subjects of particular scrutiny. The resulting literature has provided a more nuanced look at the various factors that played a role in the imperial decision-making process surrounding the 1721 proscription.

14 In assessing this literature, there are several themes that emerge. First, the proscription is often characterized as the result of theological intransigence and antagonism between the Qing imperial authorities and the papal delegations. Secondly, some scholars contend that the proscription was an unfortunate culmination of disagreements between two conflicting political authorities; in short, Rome and Beijing were simply unable to reach mutually compatible policies that would guide and direct the course of Catholic missionary policy in the Qing state. Thirdly, a common argument is that fundamental cultural differences between the Chinese and Europeans unavoidably produced religious, linguistic, and philosophical differences; thus, the Qing state’s rejection of Catholicism was inevitable. Fourthly, and perhaps most significantly, many scholars view the proscription as almost exclusively instigated by events in Europe. In particular, the Reformation in Europe caused Rome to pursue a more assertive and

Counter-Reformationist approach to its missionary activities, including in the Qing provinces, which, in turn, provoked the Kangxi Emperor to pursue a similarly hard-line policy against Catholic missionaries.

In assessing the 1721 proscription, Beatrice Leung argues that “the ultimate motive for banning Catholicism rested on the fact that Kangxi could not accept that his authority over the Chinese rites should be undermined by the Catholic authorities, whose papal legates repeatedly ignored his suggestions and refused to give him the chance to have his final word on the decision.”42 Leung’s analysis suggests that the central factor for proscription was the single-minded arrogance of the European delegations and the manner in which the attitudes (real or perceived) of these delegations affected the Kangxi

Emperor’s perception of the Catholic missionaries. Implicit in Leung’s argument is the

42 Leung, p. 29.

15 notion that the Europeans’ behavior in the imperial court provoked ethnocentrism and that this attitude particularly aggravated the ailing Emperor. The Europeans, in discarding the Jesuits’ “accommodation” policy and excluding indigenous rituals from Catholic practices, insisted on a religion that, at its ideological core, was perceived as subversive to existing Confucian doctrine and the ultimate authority of the Qing state.

Other analyses of the motives for proscription emphasize cultural differences between Europe and Qing society and the impact of the external European Reformation movement. The French Sinologist, Jacques Gernet, views the proscription as rooted primarily in the Sino-European differences in language and philosophy. He argues that the Qing rejection of Catholicism in 1721 can be attributed to the fact that Catholicism was unable to be assimilated into Qing culture because of “irreconcilable differences in the ways [the Qing] and Europeans thought, [which were] produced by linguistic differences in the Chinese and Indo-European languages.”43 According to Gernet, the

Chinese were unable to grasp the transcendental nature of Catholic teachings simply because they did not have proper words with which to comprehend Catholic concepts of spirituality. The Dutch Sinologist Erik Zurcher argues that Catholic missionaries were rejected from the Qing state because of the “overly centralized manner in which the

Jesuits were directed by a Counter-Reformation church and because of the incompatibility in China of the Jesuit dual roles of scholar and priest.”44

While the failed delegations, religious developments in Europe, and manifest

“cultural differences” between the Europeans and Qing were, in varying degrees, contributing factors to the 1721 proscription, these assessments each over-simplify a

43 Mungello, David E. The Great Encounter of China and the West: 1500-1800. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999, p. 45. 44 Ibid, 46.

16 much more complex process. Much of scholarship on the Rites Controversy and the 1721 proscription focuses on the narrow stream of information regarding interactions and communications that occurred among individuals in the Qing imperial court and the various papal delegations. These analyses overlook several critical questions. For example, what was the Qing perspective outside of the imperial court? Were there domestic security reasons for the Kangxi Emperor’s decision to proscribe Christianity?

More specifically, to what extent did the Kangxi Emperor rely on the word of his provincial officials – those directly involved with the Catholic missions in the provinces - to reach his decision to prohibit mission activities? Were provincial officials more acutely aware of a possible geopolitical threat that Catholic missionaries posed?

The Role of Chen Mao in the 1721 Proscription

There is one individual, Chen Mao 陈昴, whose role in the 1721 proscription was relevant to these questions. Chen Mao was a prominent brigade-general in Guangdong province. Skilled in military and maritime affairs, Chen Mao served as one of the prime overseers of commercial and naval activities in the Guangdong region during the latter part of the Kangxi Emperor’s reign. Chen Mao was familiar with Catholic missionary activities in the region and interacted directly with Jesuit priests as they arrived in the ports of Canton and Macao. He emerged as a significant figure in the imperial deliberations regarding the status of Catholic missionaries in the Qing’s southern provinces. In January of 1717 (four years before the proscription was actually issued),

Chen submitted a memorial to the Kangxi Emperor and the imperial court in Beijing. In

17 the memorial, Chen harshly criticized the westerners in Guangdong and advocated a complete proscription of Catholic missionaries in Qing provinces.

Several new aspects of the events leading up to the 1721 proscription are revealed in Chen Mao’s memorial. First, the memorial shows that Chen, a provincial military official, perceived Catholic missionaries in Guangdong province as a direct threat to the geopolitical and economic stability of China. For Chen, the debate over Catholic missionaries was not a question of Jesuit policy versus Dominican policy, or papal claims of “universality” versus Qing imperial court authority. Instead, it was a question of

Catholic missionaries challenging the regional and economic status quo and autonomy of

Guangdong. Secondly, while Chen’s recommendation was not adopted initially, further deliberations on his memorial in the imperial court revealed that his memorial was a factor and consideration in the process leading up to the formal proscription declaration in 1721 by the Kangxi Emperor. Finally, the disposition of Chen Mao’s memorial demonstrates that the controversy over Chinese rites and the eventual expulsion of

Catholic missionaries cannot be viewed exclusively as the culmination of an ideological or theological contest between Rome and Beijing.

Translation and Textual Analysis of Chen Mao’s Memorial to the Kangxi Emperor:

To date, there are no reported English translations of Chen Mao’s 1717 memorial to the Kangxi Emperor and the imperial court in Beijing. It has been translated previously into Latin and French. I have completed the following English translation of the full text of Chen's memorial45:

45 I obtained the Chinese version of Chen Mao’s memorial from Duhalde’s Lettres edifiantes et curieuses, ecrites des missions strangers memoires de la chine. Memoires de la Chine. (Chinese). Yesu hui shi Zhongguo shu jian ji 耶稣会士中国书简集: Zhongguo hui yi lu 中国回忆录/ Duhede bian 杜赫德编;

18 As part of my usual responsibilities, I inspected all the islands. In six months time, I traveled along the western coastal territories, and in the second month observed Nangao Island off the eastern seashore. In a year’s time, I had inspected the island’s regional jurisdiction. There was not a bay or strait that I did not personally inspect. I discovered that Your Majesty’s wisdom and prestige have made the regions of the most remote domains of the empire enjoy tranquility and peace. But once I arrived at Macao in the jurisdiction of Xiangshan County, I was shocked to find in the harbor over ten European warships that were only navigating for the purpose of engaging in trade in Guangzhou. I immediately considered this to be an extremely worrisome matter, and considered writing a memorial to Your Majesty to report the situation of these naturally mischievous, inferior and malicious people. Recently, Your Majesty issued a decree on the 18th day of the twelfth month saying: “The coastal territories are to be watched closely, with special attention given to the intentions of foreigners. To achieve this requires a strict prohibition of our ships from traveling to the Southern Sea. This precautionary measure will restrict trade relations with foreigners and will prevent a disaster from occurring.” When the Esteemed Emperor handles these matters, Your Majesty should not only consult the high-ranking officials of the cabinet, but also listen attentively to the opinions of lower-level officials. If it were not for Your Majesty’s wisdom surpassing that of Yao and Shun, how could we enjoy such peace and prosperity in this day and age? If one did not personally carry out an inspection, who would dare approach the Emperor to discuss the matters of foreign countries? I have been personally involved in commercial affairs, and I once went on overseas travels to Japan, Xianluo, Jiaozhi, Dongjing, Batavia, Manila, etc. I know the customs and habits of these races and the various strategies of their governments, and therefore I courageously venture to make suggestions to Your Majesty. To our east, the most important country is Japan; another kingdom, Liuqiu, is worth increasing our attention over. These countries’ rivers all flow towards the east. Further south we control the island of Formosa’s province of Fujian, and on that border there are no other countries. In the west lies the kingdoms of Xianluo, Jiaozhi and Dongjing, and they lie adjacent to our frontier city of Qin-zhoufu. In the South there are many kingdoms of savage races, for example Roufo, Malecca, Yaqi, and others. Although these countries’ domains are small, each has its own legal system. However, they have never dared to seek control over other countries’ territories. For this reason, the imperial decree that I previously cited is only related to the harbors of Batavia and Manila that were occupied by Europeans. At first Europeans there only engaged in trade relations, after which they used this business to control all surrounding regions. In my opinion, among the overseas savage nations, Japan’s military force and national power are second to none. During the Ming dynasty there were huge disturbances, and certain evildoers of ours did unrestrained violence; however, we and the people of Japan engaged in peaceful trade relations throughout. The kingdom of Liuqiu learned the rule of law from our nation, and has accordingly maintained control

Zheng Dedi 郑德弟, Lu Yimin, Shen Jian yi; Zhengzhou Shi: Da xiang chuban she 大象出版社, Xifang zaoqi Hanxue jing dian yi cong 西方早期汉学经典译丛 Ed. 1, Vol. II, 2001, pp. 184-187.

19 for as long as one hundred years. The island of Formosa has already pledged its allegiance to us. Xianluo, Dongjing, and other kingdoms every year pay tribute to us; they do not have any malicious intentions. Therefore, we may consider the Europeans to be most vicious and the most difficult to handle. “Red hair” is the general designation of these savage races, among which are the English and the Dutch. Although these kingdoms of Europe and India are not wholly identical, nevertheless their peoples are of the same rudeness. Among which the Dutch are especially so; they are simply like tigers and wolves. They make their ships very fearsome. No matter whether they are businessmen or barbarians, they are all like this, and there is no one that can compete with them. As soon as they arrive at a certain place, they first assess through what means they can control the region. Their warships could survive the most severe storms. On each ship there are more than one hundred cannons. Nothing could survive their attacks. They gave us a lesson in the harbor of Macao last year. Only a single warship of this type produced tremendous panic. Now over ten ships have arrived in Guangzhou. How could this not cause worry among people? These people and the Europeans who arrived previously in Macao are of the same race, and they come from the same nation, speak the same language, and have the same customs. In addition, they have close relations with each other. If we don’t stop the evil before it gets worse, it will be difficult to handle in the future. Therefore, I hope Your Majesty commands the major officials in each province to implement preemptive measures. For example, the Europeans can only be allowed to enter the harbor once the captains of warships are forced to get rid of their cannons and disarm. Until the Europeans get rid of their barbarian behavior, their activities should be limited to certain ports when they conduct business in Macao, and they should not be allowed to arrive in great masses at once, but rather arrive in certain intervals. This is the way to guarantee the security of our dynasty. Another matter concerns the problem of Christianity. This religion spread from Europe to the Philippines. Previously, during the Ming Dynasty, the people of the Philippines engaged in trade relations with Japan. Europeans used religion to change the minds of Japanese people, and successfully won over many people by unfair means, after which the Europeans almost completely controlled Japan. Only after facing strong resistance did the Europeans return to the West. Nowadays they are still keeping an eye on Japan, hoping to subdue them. Seeing that these matters are as such, I strongly believe that these Europeans have no justification for constructing churches in our country’s provinces. These people squander money, and certain days they will gather great numbers of people to hold ceremonies. They study our laws, decrees and customs, they survey and draw up maps of our mountains and rivers, and at the same time they strain every nerve to win over the populace. Although I am not clear on their intentions (this is not a matter I am able to comprehend fully), nevertheless I do know that Christianity spread to the Philippines due to the Europeans, after which the Philippines was conquered by Europe; I know that the nature of Europeans is barbaric, and they used the banner of religion to control Japan, and I also know that after they seized the Philippines, in Guangzhou and other places they constructed many churches, and have won over the minds of countless persons. Besides, these Europeans belong to the same race as those who come from the warships that I mentioned before. Nevertheless, I have complete faith in the wisdom and resolve of the well-respected departments of the

20 empire, and I firmly believe that they will not allow this type of bad grass to grow wild. The danger is tremendous; tiny, narrow streams can converge and become much larger rivers. If we do not in this ripe time pinch off the branches, after awhile we will be forced to use an axe to chop them down. We have a responsibility to maintain our fortifications to counter attacks, and we should thus increase our defense fortifications along the coast. I earnestly request Your Majesty to examine my memorial. I ask to be notified of Your Majesty’s decision and that also all the provinces are notified of the decision of the Imperial Court.46

In order to understand fully the various arguments in Chen’s memorial, it is important to first review Chen’s background. From the memorial, it is apparent that Chen is well acquainted with the geography of the southern Qing provinces. In fact, throughout his life Chen was closely involved with the maritime and military activities in the southern coastal regions and became quite knowledgeable of all aspects of the geography of those regions. Chen was born in 1651 to a poor family in the coastal province of Fujian

福建. His father, Jian-qian 健前, died when Chen was a young boy. In 1660, Chen’s family was ordered by the Qing government to be removed inland during the period of the prohibition of coastal trade, which was ordered to prevent collaboration with Ming resistance in Taiwan. Chen enrolled in a school but soon left his studies and traveled abroad, “fei shu xue mai” 废书学买 , where he observed many aspects of trade among foreign nations.47 During this time, Chen also became acquainted with military affairs, and in 1686 he served as a staff assistant and topography specialist in the Qing army during the conquest of Taiwan. After this assignment, Chen Mao was sent on further expeditions to pursue remnant factions of Taiwan’s Zheng family. He eventually was elevated to the rank of brigade-general of Guangdong province in 1706.48

46 The full Chinese text of Chen Mao’s memorial is located in the Appendix Section. 47 Wang Zhongmin, p. 212. 48 Ibid, 212-215. Other sources that offer summaries of the life of Chen Mao include: Aomen Ji lue 澳门记略, (1751), ch. I, p. 38b, Tong an xian zhi 同安现志, (1929) ch. 30, p. 5a, Xiangshan xianzhi 香山现志 (1827 ed.) ch. 4, p. 92a, Quan zhou fu zhi 泉州府志, (1870 ed.) ch. 56, p. 37b. The brief biography of Chen

21 Given this personal background, particularly his extensive military and travel experience, it is not surprising that Chen in the memorial seeks initially to establish his credentials in order to underscore the credibility of his later charges against the

Europeans. Chen stresses the fact that he devoted extensive periods of time to examining the economic and geopolitical situation in southern China. “As part of my usual responsibilities, I inspected all the islands. In six months time, I traveled along the western coastal territories, and on the second month observed Nangao Island off the eastern seashore. In a year’s time, I had inspected the island’s regional jurisdiction.” His military and travel experiences to neighboring regions enabled him to witness first-hand the policies of various governments and regional commercial interactions. Perhaps most importantly, however, is the fact that Chen “personally” undertook the responsibility of examining and overseeing maritime and economic activities; this is a point that Chen stresses repeatedly. Notwithstanding his subordinate position to other military leaders and provincial officials in Guangdong, Chen seeks to affirm his reliability as an informed and active observer of the on-the-ground realities unfolding in the ports and harbors of the southern provinces. “There was not a bay or strait that I did not personally inspect.”

There are instances in Chen’s presentation that might lead one to view Chen as an opportunist, an official seeking merely to obtain favor and thus a higher military rank from the imperial court. For example, Chen affirms the greatness of the Kangxi Emperor and the Emperor’s ability to bring unprecedented prosperity to the various regions in the

Qing state. “If it were not for Your Majesty’s wisdom surpassing that of Yao and Shun, how could we enjoy such peace and prosperity in this day and age?” Chen also

Mao produced by Wang Zhongmin covers Chen’s life and his role as brigade-general in Guangdong.

22 compliments the Kangxi Emperor’s 1716 decree, which called for extensive maritime reforms, improvement in southern naval defenses, and a crackdown on the “evil misconduct” of pirates and foreign merchants.49 In his 1948 book Apostolic Delegations to China, Sinologist Antonio Rosso asserts that Chen was an opportunist in submitting his memorial. Rosso states: “Chen Mao…took the opportunity of decline of the missionaries’ prestige and favor to accuse them of conspiracy with foreign merchants against the safety of China.”50 Thus, in Rosso’s assessment, Chen’s motive for issuing the memorial was primarily – if not solely - instigated by his realization that the Kangxi

Emperor had grown increasingly distrustful of the missionaries in Beijing. Rosso contends that Chen was more concerned with advancing his own military career than with assessing the threat of Catholic missionaries and Western militaries.51

In my assessment, Rosso oversimplifies the context of Chen’s memorial. While there are phrases in the memorial that can be taken out of context and viewed as

“opportunistic,” Chen was not predominately motivated by personal advancement. The sixty-three year old Chen had already achieved a relatively high rank in the Qing military. Moreover, in the memorial Chen does not request higher military rank, nor does he even allude to this possibility. More importantly, a fundamental aspect of Chen’s memorial is his intent to change existing Qing policy towards Catholic missionaries. It is thus important to recognize that Chen’s flattering references should in no way negate or lessen the critical substance and concerns expressed by Chen, particularly his specific accusations against the merchants and missionaries.

49 Fu Lo-shu, p.122. 50 Rosso, pp. 193-194. 51 Ibid, 194.

23 Another central theme of the memorial is Chen’s warning that the Qing state was threatened by the growing presence of Europeans in the ports along the southern ports.

“At first Europeans there only engaged in trade relations, after which they used this business to control all surrounding regions.” Here, it is important to recognize that Chen first seeks to diminish the perceived threat from any neighboring country, particularly

Japan. It is clear that Chen’s traveling experiences enabled him to understand the dynamics of the Qing government’s interactions and relationships with other countries and kingdoms. Chen demonstrates that while these countries possessed substantive military capabilities that could, if employed, threaten the Qing borders, the benign military posture of these governments and their constructive diplomatic and economic relations with the Qing state showed that they had no intention of attacking. “(O)ther kingdoms every year pay tribute to us; they do not have any malicious intentions.”

Chen stresses that the Europeans posed the gravest threat, both militarily and economically, to the stability of the Qing state. “Therefore, we may consider the

Europeans to be most vicious and the most difficult to handle.” The military and technological superiority of the European warships not only generated fear among the coastal populace and provincial officials, it also demonstrated to Chen that the Qing state would be unable to withstand a foreign invasion by European powers. In addition, Chen realized that the Europeans’ increasing commercial influence in the ports could lead to

European territorial control over the coastal regions. “They are simply like tigers and wolves. They make their ships very fearsome. No matter if they are businessmen or barbarians, they are all like this, and there is no one that can compete with them. As soon as they arrive at a certain place, they first assess through what means they can control the

24 region.” Chen’s concern over the Europeans’ commercial influence stemmed from his understanding that coastal trade was of critical importance to the Guangdong provincial officials and the Qing government.

In fact, during the Kangxi reign, the Qing state was undergoing rapid economic change.52 Thus, one of the most significant challenges that confronted the new Qing government was maintaining stability in the peripheral regions and provinces of the empire in the wake of this economic tumult. The protracted War of the Three Feudatories

(1673-1681) brought economic strife to southern provinces and provoked additional mutinous coalitions in opposition to the new Qing authorities.53 In addition, piracy plagued the coastal regions, as “merchants of contraband” disrupted commercial activity in the ports and in the neighboring seas.54 Moreover, the new Qing government suffered humiliating naval defeats at the hands of Ming loyalists and pirates who controlled significant portions of the South China Sea.55

Contemporaneously, a severe global economic depression significantly disrupted the flow of silver into the Qing state, which, in turn, stifled economic growth in the main trading ports in Canton and Macao.56 To reinstate control over the trading ports, the

Kangxi Emperor established an extensive intelligence network to gather information on foreign traders and assigned coastal military positions to his most trusted military commanders. 57 In addition, he instituted large-scale reforms to consolidate power within the Beijing bureaucracy and to solidify control over the key coastal provinces in the

52Kishimoto-Nakayama, Mio. “The Kangxi Depression and Early Qing Local Markets,” Modern China (Beverly Hills, CA) 10, no. 2 (April 1984), pp. 45-47. 53 Spence, p.122. 54 Fu Lo-shu, p. 122-123. 55 Ibid, pp. 122-123. 56 Kishimoto-Nakayama, p. 48. 57 Dai, Yingcong, “To Nourish a Strong Military: Kangxi’s Preferential Treatment of His Military Officials,” War & Society (Canberra) 18, no.2, October 2000, p. 71.

25 southern regions,58 which provided the empire with a steady flow of commerce and revenue.59 Thus, Chen warns in his memorial that officials in Beijing must institute more rigid maritime reforms to tighten control over foreign traders and to prevent them from causing economic instability in an already fragile coastal market. “Until the Europeans get rid of their barbarian behavior, their activities should be limited to certain ports when they conduct business in Macao, and they should not be allowed to arrive in great masses at once, but rather arrive in certain intervals.”

Chen’s memorial also reveals his opinions towards the character of the

Europeans, whom Chen bluntly classifies as “red-haired barbarians,” or hong mao 红毛.

Chen was intensely hostile towards Europeans and despised European customs, habits and behavior. “Although these respective European kingdoms are not wholly identical, nevertheless their peoples are of the same rudeness.” One can speculate on the source of

Chen’s racist attitudes. Given his position as one of the prime overseers of the commercial and maritime affairs in Guangdong, it is reasonable to assume that his direct interaction and conversations with foreign merchants resulted in bitter disagreements with foreign merchants over the limited trading access given to them in the Qing ports.

Perhaps the mere sight of the European warships, commanded by light-skinned, raucous foreign men, angered the proud brigade-general. In any event, Chen’s purpose in addressing the problem of the “red-haired barbarians” is to convey the sense that all

Europeans, no matter their religious, national or commercial affiliations, were colluding to undermine the security and coastal trading system in Guangdong.

58 Calanca, Paola. “From a Forbidden Ocean to an Ocean Under Close Watch: The Ming and Early Qing Governments and the Maritime Problem,” Ming Qing Yanjiu (Napoli, Roma), 1998, pp. 27-32. 59 Gao, Xiang; Huang Shiqi; Yu, Sheng; Liston, Mike, trans., “On the Trends of Modernization in the Early Qing Period,” Social Sciences in China (Beijing) 22, no. 4, (Winter 2001), p. 108.

26 These aspects of Chen’s memorial are preliminary to his final and most forceful argument: his call for the prohibition of Catholic missions. “The danger [of Catholicism] is tremendous; tiny, narrow streams can converge and become much larger rivers. If we do not in this ripe time pinch off the branches, after a while we will be forced to use an axe to chop them down.” In assessing Chen’s accusations against the missionaries, it is important to note that Chen viewed the threat of Catholic missions in economic and geopolitical contexts, not as a religious or theological dispute. Chen seeks to convey to the bureaucrats and imperial court officials in Beijing that the problem of Catholicism in the Qing provinces was not a question of conflicting missionary policy towards Chinese rites, but rather a larger challenge and threat to the Qing state’s commercial and territorial hegemony. Chen draws upon the historical context of the development and propagation of Catholicism in other regions of the world and explains how religion had been used by the Europeans to exert territorial control over portions of Japan and the Philippines. “I do know that Christianity spread to the Philippines due to the Europeans, after which the

Philippines were conquered by Europe; I know that the nature of Europeans is barbaric, and they used the banner of religion to control Japan, and I also know that they indeed seized the Philippines.” In addition, Chen links the “threat” of churches to a military threat by noting that missionaries and foreign militaries shared similar customs and ethnicity. “In Guangzhou and other places [the Europeans] have constructed many churches, and have won over the minds of countless persons. Besides, these Europeans belong to the same race (minzu 民族 ) as those who come from the warships that I mentioned before.”

27 To Chen, Catholic churches were institutions that occupied land and received direct funding from “barbaric” foreign merchants and distant European rulers; Catholic churches posed a fundamental threat to the national security of the Qing state. “We have a responsibility to maintain our fortifications to counter attacks, and we should thus increase our defense fortifications along the coast.” When Chen submitted the memorial in 1717, the presence of Catholic missionaries in Guangdong province had become increasingly noticeable. The 1692 Edict of Toleration allowed Catholic missionaries to preach more widely, which resulted in an influx of priests into Guangdong province.

While Guangdong’s port towns previously had been stop-over destinations for Catholic missionaries who wanted to travel more deeply into inner territories, the increased number of churches and priests in Guangdong led to the establishment of many permanent Catholic missions along the southern coast.60 In fact, in the first decade of the eighteenth-century, Guangdong had more Catholic churches than any other province in the Qing state, with twenty-seven churches in total within Guangdong, and eight alone in

Guangzhou.61

In addition, Chen points to the fact that Catholic missionaries in Guangdong had expanded the geographic scope of their missions, setting up numerous churches and holding many church services in various municipalities. Chen further asserts that this geographic expansion and permanent establishment of Catholic communities enabled missionaries to become increasingly familiar with the legal and economic institutions of jurisdictions, as well as the regional geography. “These people squander money, and on certain days they will gather great numbers of people to hold ceremonies. They study our

60 Standaert, Handbook of Christianity in China, pp. 560-563. 61 Ibid, 563.

28 laws, decrees and customs; they survey and draw up maps of our mountains and rivers, and at the same time they strain every nerve to win over the populace.” Chen not only perceived these various geopolitical developments and the growing influence of Catholic institutions as direct threats to Guangdong, he also believed that these developments were an impetus for an even greater Catholic propagation and further establishment of Catholic churches in other provinces. Chen thus felt that it was imperative for the Qing state and

Kangxi Emperor to enact preemptive measures, in particular, a prohibition of all Catholic missionaries in the Qing provinces to prevent the increasing territorial and commercial control of the Catholic missions and foreign merchants. “Therefore, I hope Your Majesty commands the major officials in each province to implement preemptive measures…

This is the way to guarantee the security of our dynasty (guojia 国家).”

Deliberations in the Imperial Court Regarding Chen Mao’s Memorial

Chen’s memorial arrived in Beijing in the early spring of 1717. The ailing Kangxi

Emperor, preoccupied with his squabbling sons and his deteriorating health, referred

Chen’s memorial to the imperial court’s State Council of Nine, a committee entrusted with the responsibility of carrying out preliminary deliberations of provincial documents and memorials. Chen’s accusations against the Catholic missionaries and recommendations for maritime reform were initially well-received by the imperial court.62

62 Rosso, p. 194.

29 On April 16, 1717, the State Council of Nine convened to discuss Chen’s memorial and subsequently issued a preliminary verdict advocating Chen’s recommendations for prohibition of Catholicism. Jesuit missionaries learned of the

Council’s verdict and immediately pleaded with Yin-t’ang, the ninth son of the Kangxi

Emperor, to intervene and persuade the Council to revoke the initial determination. On

May 11, the Council reconvened to discuss Chen’s memorial and the related pleas of the

Jesuit missionaries; however, despite the intervention of Yin-t’ang and the Jesuits, the

Council issued a supplemental and similarly harsh verdict calling for prohibition.63

Discussions of Chen’s memorial in the Council continued nevertheless. Soon thereafter a third verdict was announced. It was much less drastic than the two prior decisions. This final decision, issued by the Council on May 19, eliminated the prohibition clause, citing as precedent the decrees of 1669 (semi-toleration of

Catholicism in the provinces) and 1706 (allowing missionaries who held a piao certificate to continue to preach).64 Two days later, the Kangxi Emperor received this final deliberation from the Council and ratified it. It was passed to the Beijing gazette for expedited publication and distribution.65 On May 24, the Catholic priests Fr. Jose Suares,

S.J., Fr. Dominique Parrenin, S.J., and Fr. Joao Mourao, S.J., attended an imperial audience with the Kangxi Emperor.66 They claimed that, despite its modified provisions, the final verdict essentially “banned” Catholicism. The Kangxi Emperor explained that

Catholicism was not banned, and that Catholic missionaries with the piao would be allowed to continue regular practices in the provincial missions.67

63 Ibid, 194-195. 64 Fu Lo-shu, pp. 123-124. 65 Rosso, p. 314. 66 Ibid, 321. 67 Ibid, 323.

30 While the imperial court’s final response to Chen’s memorial suggests that his impact on the decision-making in Beijing was not significant, ensuing events revealed that Chen’s accusations against the missionaries became important to the considerations that resulted in the 1721 proscription and the subsequent deportation of missionaries in

1724. On March 9, 1718, Yang Lin, Governor General of Guangdong and Guangxi provinces, resubmitted Chen’s memorial nearly in its entirety.68 Yang, who admits his direct use of Chen’s exact arguments, accused foreign merchants and missionaries of conspiring against the Qing state and called for the prohibition of Catholicism.69 The

State Council of Nine convened to reconsider this updated version of Chen’s original memorial. The Council adopted Chen’s original recommendation that the Kangxi

Emperor issue an imperial decree to proscribe all Catholic missionaries in Qing provinces. The Kangxi Emperor ratified the Council’s recommendation and decreed that a prohibition was necessary.70 In January 1721, eleven months before his death, the

Kangxi Emperor issued the formal decree proscribing Catholic missionaries in the Qing state. Following the Kangxi Emperor’s death, his son and successor, the Yongzheng

Emperor, implemented this policy in October 1724, leading to a massive deportation of

Catholic missionaries to Canton and cessation of all official Catholic missionary practices in Qing provinces.71

Conclusion

68 Fu Lo-shu, p. 125. 69 Wang Zhongmin, p. 213. 70 Rosso, p. 375. 71 Standaert, Handbook of Christianity in China, p. 519.

31 Chen Mao and his memorial shed new light on the dynamics surrounding the

1721 proscription of Catholicism and the evolution of the Chinese Rites controversy in the early-Qing period. Recent scholarship has focused on the tensions between

Catholicism and the Qing state within the context of the ideological, religious, and linguistic differences that were manifested in the Qing imperial court’s tenuous interactions with papal delegations and Catholic missionaries. Moreover, while the discourse on the Chinese Rites Controversy has attempted in recent years to expand upon the myriad (albeit inadequate) “Euro-centric” interpretations of the development of early-

Qing Catholicism, a common shortcoming of this literature has been its narrow focus on how Qing imperial officials in Beijing interpreted the religious and moral implications of the various missionary policies, the actions of the papal delegations, and the corresponding decrees issued directly from Rome. These various issues are important to an overall understanding of the perspectives of Beijing officials and the manner in which they addressed the policies and philosophies of the meddling Europeans. However, if an assessment stops here, a further element of the prohibition of Catholicism in the early-

Qing era is erroneously overlooked.

Chen’s memorial is particularly significant because it reveals a new dimension in the interpretation of this period. In short, Chen Mao and his memorial are central to the importance of provincial and security considerations in the context of the 1721 proscription of Catholicism. Moreover, Chen Mao is a unique figure because he emerged from relative obscurity in the Qing military ranks to influence directly the imperial decision-making in Beijing and the policies of the Qing government. In contrast to the traditional focus on theological events and tensions in Beijing and Rome, an examination

32 of Chen Mao’s background, military position, and his memorial’s various arguments provides valuable insights into the much broader set of circumstances that led to the 1721 proscription. Chen’s perspective on the presence of Catholic missionaries in Guangdong and their assimilation into Qing society was the culmination of his first-hand experiences and observations in Guangdong and the neighboring regions. And, most importantly, while Chen’s urgent advocacy for the prohibition of Catholicism initially did not receive final approval from the imperial court, his memorial was an important factor in the deliberations leading up to the ultimate prohibition decision by the imperial court and the

Kangxi Emperor.

Chen Mao died in 1719. A state funeral was conferred upon him in honor of his military services to the Qing state.72 Thus, Chen did not witness the fruits of his own work.

72 Wang Zhongmin, p. 215.

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“ Vermilion Decree to Legate Mezzabarba,” January 31, 1721, Submitted to the Provincial Government of Beijing on January 31, 1721. Primary document of full text found in Rosso, Antonio Sisto, O.F.M., Apostolic Legations to China of the Eighteenth Century. South Pasadena: Perkins, 1948, p. 388.

Wang, Xiaochao. Christianity and Imperial Culture: Chinese Christian Apologetics in the Seventeenth Century and Their Latin Patristic Equivalent. Leiden, Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 1998.

Wang, Zhongmin 王重民, “Chen Mao Zhuan” 陈昴传, Tushujikan 图书季刊 xin 新, 7, 1-2 (January 1946); reproduced. In: Lenglu wensou 冷录文薮, Shanghai Guji, 1992.

Wu, Silas H. L. Communication and Imperial Culture in China: Evolution of the Palace Memorial System 1693-1735. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970.

37 Acknowledgements

I gratefully acknowledge the research assistance from the following individuals: Professor Willard Peterson, David Mungello, Nicolas Standaert, Joanne Chiang, Zhang Yue, Martin Kern, Martin Heijdra, and the respective Staffs of Princeton University’s Gest Library and Firestone Library. In addition, I would also like to thank the University of San Francisco Ricci Institute for their helpful assistance in obtaining documents related to the Chinese Rites Controversy.