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U.S. ARMY

Comps Notes SAMS Seminar 7

Compiled by Chuck 11/18/2008

This is a conglomeration of all of Seminar 7. The books sections have information provided by last years class too. Some books were not read by Seminar 7

1 THIS PAGE WAS INTENTIONAL LEFT BLANK.

(Well other than this box, which I guess the page is not actually blank, but it is in between the cover and the table of context)

2 Contents Section 1: Question Responders...... 11 Oral Comprehensive Examination Questions for 08-02...... 11 1.) Miriam R. Lowi in Understanding Civil War vol 1. Africa concludes, “Natural resource wealth played an important, but indirect, role in the onset, form, and persistence of violence, in ways that are peculiar to oil.” Citing evidence from both Lowi and Roberts, assess Lowi’s conclusion. The assessment must analyze the relationship between the oil industry and the onset of the violence and either its form or its persistence...... 11 2.) Is American Grand Strategy likely to change with a new presidential administration? Why or why not? How or how not? Your answer should define Grand Strategy, reference the American tradition of Grand Strategy, and note changes (or continuity) in that tradition over time...... 12 3.) A major theme in this course has been Hans Delbruck’s thesis that wars are divided between War of Annihilation and Wars of Exhaustion. Please select one of the wars we have studied in the Evolution of Warfare Course and describe the factors that made it either a War of Annihilation or a War of Exhaustion...... 15 4.) Assess the role of logistics in the planning and conduct of past, current and future military operations...... 17 5.) Can a mistake in the initial strategy or initial strategic assumptions of a war be overcome by operational means? Agree or disagree but provide information to support your argument from the Evolution of Warfare Course...... 18 6.) Of the sociological, economic, etc. trends that are discussed in the USJFCOM Joint Operating Environment, what one or two do you think will be most relevant to future U.S. military operations? Relevant in what way?...... 18 7.) Describe, compare, and contrast the different views about generational warfare. 3. What is Hybrid War? Is it the wave of the future or is it nothing new? Do Hybrid Wars require any great adjustment on the part of the US Military or US Government? How does Hybrid War relate to Full Spectrum Operations?...... 18 Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars...... 18 8.) What are 'complex adaptive systems?' Provide an example, and discuss the relevance of this to the domain of military commander and planner...... 19 Key concepts:...... 20 Relevance:...... 20 Example of CAS:...... 20 9.) Using theory, historical campaign, and personal experience, compare and contrast the concepts, methods, and merits of analytical and intuitional decision-making...... 21 Definition:...... 21 Examples:...... 21 Theory: Analytical: MDMP/JOPP, Design Process...... 21 Merits:...... 21

3 Method:...... 22 10.) What insights on the challenges of executing operational art became apparent during the Barbarossa practicum? How did logistical constraints impact the conduct of successive operations? On the basis of the practicum, what are the differences between Blitzkrieg and Deep Operations?...... 22 Concepts:...... 22 FM 3-0:...... 23 Key Insights from exercise:...... 24 11.) Relying on Hayden White, discuss the function and utility of narrative in design as well as its relationship to discourse. A good answer should focus on defining what narrative and discourse are, what comprises them, how you 'do' them, how they function, and how they inform strategic understanding and design...... 25 Definitions:...... 25 Relationships:...... 25 12.) Describe how logistics influences the planning and conduct of military operations by evaluating the relationship between operational maneuver and sustainment...... 26 JP 4.0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations...... 26 FM 3.0 Operations...... 28 13.) A number of authors have discussed the importance of control and its relationship to governance and political violence. Discuss the causal paths from control to collaboration. In your discussion define both control and collaboration and include an assessment of factors that determine the cost of extending control...... 28 14.) What is the proper balance among the elements of national power? How might the traditional conceptualization be expanded to incorporate the realities of the current operating environment?...... 29 15.) How has the nature of strategic/operational command changed from Alexander to present day? Support your argument with evidence from The Evolution of Warfare Course...... 29 16.) Why do some insurgencies succeed while others fail?...... 29 17.) In Revolution in Military Affairs, what comes first, the weapons or the methods of waging war? Describe several viewpoints from the readings, including Unrestricted Warfare, then state and support your own viewpoint...... 30 18.) What is the American Way of War? How does Irregular Warfare fit with it? What are the roles of conventional forces, SOF, non-military forces/organizations and technology in the American Way of War and IW?...... 31 19.) Two central concepts you explored through your reading and discussion of Treatise on Efficacy were propensity and potential. How are they important towards gaining a relevant systemic/ qualitative understanding that includes red and how do they inform possible action. Illustrate with an example...... 32 20.) What considerations must be taken into account in regards to conflict termination of a proxy war? What happened in Afghanistan post-1989? What was the ripple effect of conflict termination in Afghanistan?...... 33 21.) How do you think that the “rules of the Game” for proxy warfare have changed from the Cold War? Is the US engaged in a proxy war now? With whom? How?...... 34 22.) Discuss the nature of the tensions between art and science in design. How do we resolve or manage these tensions in the requirement to codify the 'art' of design?...... 35

4 23.) How did the proxy struggles of the Cold War between the United States and the USSR shape the COE? What are the implications for this kind of indirect interventionism in the FOE?...... 36 24.) What makes good and poor strategists and explain why?...... 37 25.) Using Joint Pub 3.0 and 5.0 as source for understanding the comprehensive systems perspective, assess the utility of system analysis, causal analysis, and network analysis. Be precise in defining terms and be certain to illustrate the concepts with evidence from material presented in the program...... 37 26.) You have encountered numerous commanders who succeeded or failed in the conduct of war. Pick one and explain the reasons for success or failure...... 38 27.) Will Irregular Warfare degrade conventional warfighting capability? Or can it enhance it? What challenges and/or opportunities does IW present to conventional military forces?...... 44 28.) How did Friction and change disrupt strategic and operational planning during the execution of a campaign? Provide examples...... 49 29.) In your opinion, does the Department of Defense or United States Army need to restructure to include permanent advisory units or a return of the Military Assistance and Advisory Group(s)? Why or why not? What are some of the considerations, advantages, and disadvantages of these proposals?...... 52 30.) Given a scenario, describe how you would develop your plan to plan...... 53 31.) What should be the roles of indigenous and external forces in COIN? What are the implications of these roles in light of the recent agreement for US forces to withdraw from Iraq by 2011?...... 55 32. Synthesize your understanding of the enemy. How is he different from us? How should we apply this understanding to conducting operations in Iraq, Afghan, or Africa?...... 56 33.) What points do Mao and Che make that remain pertinent today? Is their work of any value to the modern insurgent? To modern counterinsurgency planners?...... 58 34.) What is the difference between “Classic” and Islamic Fundamentalist Insurgencies? How does it affect the US approach in terms of DIME?...... 60 35.) What is the importance of ideology, cause, or narrative to the insurgent? How can the counterinsurgent use Insurgent Ideology to mitigate their operations or defeat them?...... 62 Section 2: Books Short Notes...... 65 Alexander, John B., The Changing Nature of Warfare, the Factors Mediating Future Conflict, and Implications for SOF...... 71 Applbaum, Kalman, Russell W. Belk, John Clammer, Roy Dilley, James H. McDonald, Daniel Miller, Benjamin Orlove. The Sweetness of Salvation: Consumer Marketing and the Liberal- Bourgeois Theory of Needs [and Comments and Reply]...... 71 Axelrod, Robert and Michael D. Cohen, Harnessing Complexity: Organizational Implications of a Scientific Frontier...... 71 Baldwin, David A., "Power and International Relations"...... 72 Handbook of International Relations, Ch. 9, pp. 177-188 [11 pages]...... 72 Beeson, Mark “Civil Military Relations in Indonesia and the Philippines - Will the Thai Coup Prove Contagious?”...... 72

5 Benson, Kevin and Christopher Trash, "Declaring Victory: Planning Exit Strategies for Peace Operations"...... 72 Birtle, Andrew J.. U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860- 1941...... 73 Bledsoe, Elizabeth E., MAJ, U.S. Army, “The Use of Culture in Operational Planning”...... 73 Bouandel, Youcef, "Algeria's Presidential Election of April 2004: a backward step in the democratization process or a forward step toward stability"...... 74 Boykin, Willam G. “Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Legislation: Why Was it Passed and Have the Voids Been Filed?”...... 74 Boykin, Willam G. “The Origins of the United States Special Operations Command”...... 74 Brett, Gary,. The Nervous Liberals: Propaganda Anxieties from World War I to the Cold War74 Bush, George W., National Security Strategy of the United States, March 2006...... 75 Byers, Michael, War Law,...... 75 Challans, Timothy. Awakening Warrior: Revolution in the Ethics of Warfare...... 76 Clausewitz, Carl von, On War...... 76 Cook, Martin, The Moral Warrior...... 77 Cooper, Matthew, The German Army...... 77 Cordesmann, Anthony, " Iraq, Grand Strategy, and the Lessons of Military History"...... 78 Lee Lecture in Military History, Ohio State Univ, October 2004...... 78 Coughlin for Beginners...... 78 Craig, Gordon A., "Delbrück: The Military Historian," Makers of Modern Strategy...... 79 Cubbage, T.L., "German Misapprehensions Regarding Overlord: Understanding Failure in the Estimative Process"...... 79 de Atkine, Norvelle, "Why Arabs Lose Wars"...... 80 Dewey, John, How We Think...... 80 Dörner, Dietrich, the Logic of Failure...... 80 Dower, John W., Embracing Defeat...... 81 Drea, Edward J., In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army...... 81 Easterbrook, Greg, "The End of War?"...... 82 The New Republic, vol 232, no 20, May 30 2005, pp 18-22. (EBSCO) [4 pages]...... 82 Easton, David, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems,"...... 82 Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941...... 82 Fallows, James. Breaking the News, How the Media Undermine American Democracy...... 83 Feezell and Hancock, How Should I Live?...... 84 Finley, Milton, The Most Monstrous of Wars: the Napoleonic Guerilla War...... 84

6 Four Principles of Interpersonal Communication...... 84 Fridovich, David P. and Krawchuk, Fred T. “The Special Operations Forces Indirect Approach.”...... 85 Fugate, Bryan I., Operation Barbarossa...... 85 Gaddis, John, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience...... 86 Glister, Herman L., The Air War in Southeast Asia: Case Studies of Selected Campaigns...... 86 Gordon, Michael R. and Bernard E. Trainor, COBRA II...... 87 Graham, John L. and Kjell Gronhaug. Ned Hall Didn’t Have to Get a Haircut: Or, Why We Haven’t Learned Much about International Marketing in the Last Twenty-Five Years...... 87 Gray, Colin S. “Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters.”...... 88 Gray, Colin S. Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?...... 88 Griffin, Em and E.J. Park, Media Ecology of Marshall McLuhan...... 89 Griffin, Em. A First Look at Communication Theory...... 89 Griswold, Sarah. The Two-Step Flow of Communication Theory...... 90 Guevara, Ernesto "Che", Guerrilla Warfare...... 90 Hammes, Thomas X., “Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges”...... 90 Handel, Michael, "Introduction: Strategic and Operational Deception in Historical Perspective,"...... 91 Hasler, Jeffrey. “Defining War: New doctrinal definitions of irregular, conventional, and unconventional warfare.”...... 92 Special Warfare 20:2 (March-April 2007), pp. 18-25. (BlackBoard)...... 92 Hatch, Mary Jo, Organization Theory...... 92 Herspring, The Pentagon and the Presidency...... 92 Herzog, Chaim. The Arab – Israeli Wars...... 93 Hewes, James E., From Root To McNamara: Army Organization and Administration...... 93 Hoffman, Frank. “Complex Irregular Warfare: The Next Revolution in Military Affairs”...... 94 Hollis, Martin and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations...... 94 Hourani, Albert, A History of the Arab Peoples, Harvard University Press, 1991,...... 95 Howard, Michael, British Intelligence in the Second World War...... 95 Ignatieff, Michael., The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror...... 96 Ikenberry, G. John, "Grand Strategy as Liberal Order Building,"...... 96 Ikenberry, G. John. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars...... 96 Indonesia Country Primer...... 97 Indonesia Culture...... 98

7 Irregular Warfare in the 21st Century: Attaining and Retaining Positional Advantage,...... 98 Jager, Sheila Miyoshi, “On the Uses of Cultural Knowledge”...... 98 James, D. Clayton, The Years of MacArthur, V. III,...... 98 Joint Forces Command, The Joint Operational Environment - Into the Future,...... 99 Jomini, Antoine Henri, the Art of War,...... 99 Karsh, Efraim, Empires of Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, Harvard University Press, 1998...... 100 Katzenstein, Peter, "Conclusion: National Security in a Changing World,"...... 100 Katzenstein, Peter, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security,"...... 100 Klein, Gary, Sources of Power;...... 100 Krause, Michael G., Square Pegs for Round Holes: Current Approaches to Future Warfare and the Need to Adapt,...... 101 Krepinevich, Andrew F., The Army in Vietnam,...... 102 Landman, Todd, Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction...... 102 Langgruth, J., Our Vietnam: The War 1954-1975,...... 103 Lantis, Jeffrey, "Strategic Culture and National Security Policy,"...... 104 Lardner, Richard. “Commando forces under new leadership more interested in ‘indirect’ warfare.”...... 104 Layne, Christopher, The Peace of Illusions,...... 104 Levy, Jack S., "War and Peace,"...... 105 Lewis, Bernard, The Crisis in Islam,...... 105 Lewis, Michael, Moneyball;...... 106 Maclean, Norman, Young Men and Fire,...... 106 Mann, Col Edward C., et. al., Thinking Effects: Effects Based Methodology for Joint Operations ...... 106 Mansfield, Edward D. and Jack Snyder, "Prone to Violence"...... 107 Mansoor, COL Peter R., USA, and MAJ Mark S. Ulrich, “Linking Doctrine to Action: A New COIN Center-of-Gravity Analysis,”...... 107 Mansoor, Peter R., The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945...... 108 Manual, Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations, Supplement 2...... 108 Manual, Commander's Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations...... 108 Manual, Commander's Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations, Supplement 1...... 109 Manual, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, December 2006...... 109 Manual, FM 90-8 Counterguerrilla Warfare, August 1986,...... 109

8 Manual, Joint Publication 1, "Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,"...... 110 Executive Summary, Chapter 1. [38 pages]...... 110 Manual, Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations (17 September 2006),...... 110 Manual, Joint Publication 3-07.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID),...... 111 Manual, Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (26 December 2006)...... 111 Manual, Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. FM 3-05.301. August 2007. Phase II, Target Audience Analysis...... 112 Manual, Standard Operating Procedures & Tactics, Techniques & Procedures for the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (JFCOM 14 July 2004),...... 113 Manual, U.S. Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC), Version 1.0, 2007,...... 113 Manual, United States Government Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Termination (July 2007),...... 114 Manual, United States Special Operations Command, History: 15th Anniversary...... 114 Manual, USA/USMC COIN Handbook Draft...... 114 Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare,...... 115 Maraniss, David, They Marched into Sunlight,...... 115 Mattis, James, and Frank Hoffman, "Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars”,...... 116 Mazzetti, Mark, “Gates promises help for Indonesian military”...... 116 McDougall, Walter A., Promised Land, Crusader State...... 117 McFarland, Maxie, Colonel U.S. Army, Retired, “Military Cultural Education,”...... 117 McRaven, William H. SPEC OPS Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice...... 118 Mead, Walter Russell, Special Providence,...... 118 Mearsheimer, John, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics...... 119 Mintzberg, Henry, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning...... 119 Mohammad Haniff Bin Hassan, “Explaining Islam’s Special Position and the Politic of Islam in Malaysia”...... 120 Muller, Klaus-Jurgen, "A German Perspective on Allied Deception Operations in the Second World War,"...... 120 Naveh, Shimon, In Pursuit of Military Excellence...... 121 Naylor, Sean D. “Support grows for standing up an unconventional warfare command.”...... 121 Naylor, Sean D. “The Spec Ops Stretch.”...... 122 Nye, Joseph, "Soft Power and American Foreign Policy",...... 122 Ottaway, Marina, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism...... 122 Pape, Robert A., Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War...... 123

9 Parsa, Misagh, States, Ideologies, & Social Revolutions...... 124 Patai, Raphael, The Arab Mind, Hatherleigh, 1976, 1983, 2002. Prefaces,...... 125 Pearlman, Michael D., Unconditional Surrender, Demobilization, and the Atomic Bomb...... 126 Perry, Mark, Four Stars...... 126 Peters, Ralph, “Also Known as Indonesia, Notes on the Javanese Empire”...... 126 Pirsig, Robert, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance...... 127 Posen, Barry and Andrew Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy"...... 127 Posen, Barry, "The Best Defense"...... 127 Princeton Project on National Security, introduction and executive summary...... 127 Race, Jeffrey, War Comes to Long An,...... 128 RAND study “America’s Role In Nation-Building From Germany to Iraq”:...... 128 Reynolds, Paul Davidson, a Primer on Theory Construction;...... 129 Roberts, Hugh, The Battlefield Algeria 1988-2002...... 129 Russett, Bruce, "Bushwhacking the Democratic Peace,"...... 131 Salmon, Wesley C., Causality and Explanation...... 131 Schmidt, Brian, "On the History and Historiography of International Relations"...... 132 Schneider, James J. and Lawrence L. Izzo, "Clausewitz's Elusive Centers of Gravity,"...... 132 Schroeder, Paul W., "Napoleon's Foreign Policy: A Criminal Enterprise",...... 132 Slaughter, Anne-Marie, "The Real New World Order,"...... 132 Slipchenko, Vladimir, “A Russian Analysis of Warfare Leading to the Sixth Generation”,...... 133 Snyder, Jack, "One World, Rival Theories",...... 133 Spector, Ronald H., After Tet,...... 133 Stoler, Mark A., Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II...... 133 The Art and Science of Cause and Effect," in Judea Pearl, Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference...... 134 Tone, John Lawrence, The Fatal Knot: The Guerilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain,...... 134 Tucker, David and Lamb, Christopher J. “Restructuring Special Operations Forces for Emerging Threats.”...... 135 Tufte, Edward R., The Visual Display of Quantitative Information, 2nd ed...... 135 Tufte, Edward R., Visual and Statistical Thinking: Displays of Evidence for Making Decisions ...... 136 Tzabag, Shmuel, "Termination of the Yom Kippur War between Israel and Syria: Positions, Decisions and Constraints at Israel's Ministerial Level,"...... 136 United States Special Operations Command, USSOCOM Fact Sheet 2007...... 136

10 Wendt, Alexander, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics"...... 137 Wofe, Robert,“American Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan”,...... 137 Zimmerman, COL Douglas K., "Understanding the Standing Joint Force Headquarters,"...... 137 Index...... 141

Section 1: Question Responders Questions 1-4 - Chuck & Sim Questions 5-8 - Mark & Brian Questions 9-12 - Tom & DB Questions 13-16 - Nik & John Questions 17-20 - Phil & Hummer Questions 21-25 - Lex & Bryant Questions 26-30 - Jeremy & Jason Questions 31-35 - Dirk & Brandy

Oral Comprehensive Examination Questions for 08-02

1.) Miriam R. Lowi in Understanding Civil War vol 1. Africa concludes, “Natural resource wealth played an important, but indirect, role in the onset, form, and persistence of violence, in ways that are peculiar to oil.” Citing evidence from both Lowi and Roberts, assess Lowi’s conclusion. The assessment must analyze the relationship between the oil industry and the onset of the violence and either its form or its persistence.

Lowi’s article is about the Algerian civil war (1992-2002) in which she examines how various factors (such as oil) affected how the civil war was fought and its persistence. The proximate cause of the war was the Algerian military’s annulment of legislative elections in which the FIS (a legal political party) won 47% of the popular vote. (pg 221) Lowi posits that Algeria’s oil wealth was neither “lootable” nor “easily appropriable” and thus had an important but indirect role in the form and persistence of the conflict. (pg 221)

For the insurgents, what started out as a conflict over elections evolved into a conflict over “the appropriation and utilization of a hydrocarbon rent” (pg 222) Control of the oil became the ultimate prize, so while it serves as an incentive for gaining control of the state, it can’t be used to finance the

11 rebellion without also controlling the pumping, transportation and sale of the oil. The rebellion eventually turned to the parallel or contraband economy as a method of financing their operations. “As the violence became increasingly articulated within the micro-economy, the interest in capturing the state gave way to looting it and, eventually, to holding the state at bay so as to focus squarely on gaining and maintaining access to resources.” (pg 233) For the counter-insurgent, there was also an economic incentive to continue the fighting. The state used its importance as an oil producer to win support from Western countries and institutions by casting the insurgency in terms of Islamism and terrorism. Even though the insurgency had very little if anything to do with Islamic fundamentalism, the government was successful in gaining support and financial credits from Western countries. (pg 237) This explains the persistence of the insurgency, in that both sides had economic stakes in seeing it continue vice concluding it.

For the counter-insurgent, the state was very rich, but very dependent on oil for its income and thus determined to protect the associated infrastructure at all costs. As the oilfields are located in the remote south, this was relatively easy. Remarkably, the insurgents rarely targeted oil pipelines in what appears to be an acknowledgement that damaging the oil infrastructure would also hurt them should they somehow win control of the state.(pg 238) Thus the importance of oil also affected the form of the insurgency and where the fighting took place. Most of the fighting took place in urban areas and the rich agricultural area south of Algiers, while very little occurred in the sparsely populated south.

It is too long to quote here, but the summary (ultimate) paragraph on page 241 offers a good summation of Lowi’s argument.

2.) Is American Grand Strategy likely to change with a new presidential administration? Why or why not? How or how not? Your answer should define Grand Strategy, reference the American tradition of Grand Strategy, and note changes (or continuity) in that tradition over time.

Definition: Grand Strategy – -According to Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, in their article ‘Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy’ in International Security (journal) Grand Strategy is: The collection of political means and ends with which a state attempts to achieve security. -According to Colin Gray in War, Peace and International Relations, “The term ‘strategy’ frequently is employed in such a way that it is not clear whether the author means military strategy or Grand Strategy. The latter embraces all the instruments of statecraft, including the military.” (pg 1) A summary definition is also offered “The purposeful employment of all the instruments of power available to a security community.” (pg 283)

American traditions of strategy – -According to Walter Russell Mead in Special Providence, there are four traditions of American foreign policy: Jeffersonian, Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, and Jacksonian.

12 Hamiltonian - strong alliance between big government and big business are key to domestic stability and to effective action abroad. Nation needs to be integrated into the global economy on favorable terms Wilsonians - the US has a moral obligation and important national interest in spreading American democratic and social values throughout the world, creating a peaceful international community that accepts the rule of law Jeffersonian -US foreign policy should be less concerned about spreading democracy abroad than about safeguarding it at home; skeptical of Hamiltonian and Wilsonian policies that involve the US with unsavory allies abroad or increase the risks of war Jacksonians - the most important goal of the US Govt in both foreign and domestic policy should be the physical security and economic well-being of the American people. US should not seek out foreign quarrels, but in case of war, victory is the only way.

-According to Walter McDougall in Promised Land, Crusader State, there is America the Good and America the Bad (pg 2), followed by the observation that American strategy confusion and discord are the norm because we have so many values. (pg 4). Essentially, US strategy traditions divide up into Old Testament and New Testament halves. The traditions for each are:

Old Testament (1776-1890)  Liberty at Home (Exceptionalism) Americans are exceptional because it is who we are (a tautology) and the only way we could ever be.

 Unilateralism abroad (Isolationism) natural corollary of Exceptionalism (Liberty at Home) then Unilateralism was to be AT LIBERTY to make foreign policy independent of European issues

 American System of States (Monroe Doctrine) Declared the Americas off-limits to new colonization

 Expansion (Manifest Destiny) Expansion was a logical corollary of earlier doctrines

 To remain free - the US must pursue unilateral foreign policy

 To have unilateralism - US must promote an American System of States

 Not enough to remain aloof from Europe - US must preempt European bids for land in N. America

New Testament (1890-Pres) Progressive Imperialism (short period of time of US colonialization) Wilsonianism (Liberal Internationalism)  A crusade to make the world safe for democracy Despised 'balance of power' politics and secret diplomacy

Containment

13 Global Meliorism - simply the socio-economic and politico-cultural expression of an American mission to make the world a better place.

Depending on your point of view you can argue that American Grand Strategy will change: -from unilateral to more multilateral in approach -from Hamiltonian/Wilsonian to more Jacksonian (populist)

Or take the position that it won’t change much: -will remain Meliorist as a guiding theme -will remain Wilsonian in principle but approach problems differently

Or you can argue that there is no such thing as American Grand Strategy. As described by Colin Gray, he argues that the US doesn’t practice ‘Grand Strategy’ (pg 273) “But overall, America did not have a Grand Strategy for the prudent orchestration of the instruments of national power.” Based upon this observation, the above question becomes rather moot.

Or you can argue that American Grand Strategy will fall somewhere on the menu of choices presented by Posen and Ross.

14 3.) A major theme in this course has been Hans Delbruck’s thesis that wars are divided between War of Annihilation and Wars of Exhaustion. Please select one of the wars we have studied in the Evolution of Warfare Course and describe the factors that made it either a War of Annihilation or a War of Exhaustion.

The Second Punic War between Rome and Carthage was a war of exhaustion. In examining this war I will start with a short synopsis of Hans Delbruck’s definitions of War of Annihilation and Exhaustion. This will be followed by an analysis of the strategic/political setting for the Second Punic War, along with a short analysis of the tactics utilized by Hannibal and Fabius as the principle generals involved in the conflict.

Hans Delbruck defines war as having two forms or poles. The first form is a War of Annihilation, characterized by the Decisive Battle. Its goal is the destruction of the enemy’s forces, after which the victor can impose whatever terms he desires upon the loser. “…the aim of war to be the annihilation of the enemy’s forces and that, consequently, the battle that accomplishes this is the end of all strategy.” (Craig, Gordon. Makers of Modern Military Strategy, pg 341) The second form of war is a Strategy of Exhaustion, which combines both battle and maneuver. In this form of war, “battle is merely one of several equally effective means of attaining the political ends of the war and is essentially no more important than the occupation of territory…” (Craig, pg 342) Maneuver would be another means to consider towards achieving the political goal. The goal of a War of Exhaustion is not necessarily to defeat the enemy, but wear him down until you can either defeat him (through decisive battle) or achieve a favorable political outcome. The real difference between the two strategies is the intent of the commander, as even in a strategy of exhaustion, a commander could conceivably always choose decisive battle over maneuver, however, those choices would, by definition, show that the commander was instead pursuing a strategy of annihilation.

The factor of the tactics employed by Hannibal and Fabius which made the Second Punic War a war of exhaustion is the contrast in styles. Hannibal continually sought a decisive battle in order to militarily defeat Rome’s armies and then seek to impose his terms on Rome’s political leadership. To this end, his army was built for winning decisive battles against other armies. It is notable that his army did not include the engineers and siege engines required for laying siege to Rome. Initially, his tactics succeeded, as the Roman leadership also thought in terms of decisive battle. However, their defeats at Trebia, Trisamene, and most notably Cannae put an end to that strategic approach. This is contrasted with the tactics of Fabius, who did not seek decisive battle but instead utilized maneuver to shadow Hannibal’s army, but never decisively engage him. This put Hannibal in a bit of a quandary, as he was required to keep moving in order to feed his large army, but also exposed his army to harassing attacks from the Romans. “He (Fabius) transferred his command to the consuls, who continued, for the remainder of the year to follow his methods of harassing and skirmishing without venturing on a general engagement. They were so successful that Hannibal, finding himself in difficulties over the question of supplies, is said to have contemplated the idea of returning to Cisapline Gaul.” (Barker, G.P., Hannibal,

15 pg 125) The Fabian strategy was one of attrition. To Fabius it did not matter if Hannibal’s army was defeated through battle, hunger, or skirmishes, what mattered was that Hannibal would eventually be defeated and that Rome survived. To this end, it is notable that despite their stunning defeats, the Romans refused to accept the results as ‘decisive’. They refused Hannibal’s offers for terms and continued to fight. This led the Romans to the conclusion that the strategy of annihilation wasn’t going to win, (at least not against the tactical genius of Hannibal) so that they would need a different strategy in order to win. However, to employ the strategy of exhaustion, the Romans would need to seek an answer in the strategic context.

The factors of the political and strategic context that support a War of Exhaustion developing in the Second Punic War are Rome’s superior manpower vis-à-vis Hannibal’s army in Italy and the political structure of the Roman Confederation. Each of these factors played an important role. In regards to the issue of manpower, the Romans had access to vastly greater numbers of potential troops than Hannibal had in his army. “…impassively they increased still further their army and fleet. Eighteen legions were placed in the field. A hundred new ships were built.” (Barker, pg 173) It is significant to note that Hannibal also did not have access to a reliable means of re-supply either for food, equipment or additional men. He did get some reinforcements, but not nearly enough to match what the Romans were producing. The fact that the Roman navy controlled the Mediterranean Sea meant that the army that Hannibal entered Italy with, after crossing the Alps (effectively a one-way journey) was going to be the army that he would have to fight with for the duration of the campaign. This meant that a strategy of exhaustion would clearly favor the Romans. Of course, Hannibal could always hope that he would pick up extra troops from any cities that he could peel away from Roman influence. However, that plan didn’t work either, as illustrated by the next point, which is the strength of the Roman Confederation. The Roman Confederation was the construction of a confederation of Italian cities under the leadership of Rome. All of these cities had fought with Rome at one point or another, and it was Hannibal’s hope that he could appeal to them to throw off Rome’s leadership and accept Carthage’s instead. This would have seemed a sound plan, except that the bonds of confederation were stronger than Hannibal anticipated. One of the reasons for this was citizenship. When a city joined the confederation, its people gained citizenship in the Roman Confederation, which meant they enjoyed certain rights and protections as Roman citizens. In short, the peoples of those cities identified themselves with Rome (and each other) more than they did with Carthage. This is contrasted with Carthage’s method of building alliances which was more through compulsion than invitation. This contrast also shows up later in the Second Punic War, as Scipio is able to peel away erstwhile Carthaginian allies in Spain and Numidia.

In conclusion, the Second Punic War might have started as a War of Annihilation, but it was mostly fought as a war of exhaustion. From the tactical choices of Fabius to the strategic and political context which generated the choices of Rome’s political leadership, the Second Punic War can be characterized by aspects from the strategy of exhaustion as defined by Han Delbruck. In the end, neither side had the means to purse a full fledge War of Annihilation so a war of exhaustion naturally evolved.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Baker, G. P. Hannibal. New York: Cooper Square Press, 1999; 1999.

16 Paret, Peter, Gordon Alexander Craig, and Felix Gilbert. Makers of Modern Strategy : From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986.

4.) Assess the role of logistics in the planning and conduct of past, current and future military operations.

Logistics plays a vital role in the conduct of military operations and can be examined from different perspectives in strategy and operational art.

In terms of strategy, while Hans Delbruck discusses the ‘intent’ of a commander to conduct a War of Annihilation vice one of exhaustion, often times it will be an issue of logistics which determines what kind of war the commander can truly undertake.

So to begin with, sufficient logistics becomes a pre-requisite before pursuing a strategy of destruction. As Dr. Jake Kipp points out in his introduction to Aleksandr Svechin’s Strategy, “Destruction required the ability to conduct large-scale, immediate, decisive, lighting operations. In place of mobilizing the civilian economy for war, a strategy of destruction required an in-place war industry which would in peacetime provide all the weapons and material necessary to conduct decisive operations.” (Svechin, Aleksandr. Strategy, pg 45)

In some cases, the strategic assessment of the environment leads a commander to conclude that a strategy of destruction isn’t really a viable option as he lacks the resources to pursue it. In Civil War Command and Strategy, Archer Jones lays out an argument that General Grant recognized the strategic quandary that the North faced and developed a suitable strategy to counter it. “Grant and Sherman found the remedy for this strategic impasse in abandoning the persisting strategy or territorial conquest and adopting raiding as the means of carrying out the same basic logistic strategy.” (Jones, Archer. Civil War Command and Strategy, pg 183) (Logistic strategy in this case is used as a euphemism for a strategy of attrition.) Grant recognized that logistics would be the key to eventually subduing the South, and thus adopted a strategy that specifically attacked the South’s logistic capability, from the raids of Sherman to the blockade strategy by the Federal navy.

In terms of Operational Art, Svechin saw it as composed of two primary parts: tactics and logistics. “Tactics and administration are the material of operation art and the success of the development of an operation depends on both the successful solution of individual tactical problems by the forces and the provision of all the material they will need to conduct an operation without interruption until the ultimate goal is achieved.” (Svechin, pg 69)

17 5.) Can a mistake in the initial strategy or initial strategic assumptions of a war be overcome by operational means? Agree or disagree but provide information to support your argument from the Evolution of Warfare Course.

6.) Of the sociological, economic, etc. trends that are discussed in the USJFCOM Joint Operating Environment, what one or two do you think will be most relevant to future U.S. military operations? Relevant in what way?

7.) Describe, compare, and contrast the different views about generational warfare. 3. What is Hybrid War? Is it the wave of the future or is it nothing new? Do Hybrid Wars require any great adjustment on the part of the US Military or US Government? How does Hybrid War relate to Full Spectrum Operations?

Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars James N. Mattis and Frank Hoffman. USN Institute proceedings, Annapolis, Nov. 2005. Written to inform changes in MAGTFs.

What is Hybrid War? Relevance is more important than dominance. Technology doesn’t win wars, humans do. War is an armed struggle between human adversaries. Combat in contested zones of urban and other complex terrain. Combat against irregular challengers using terrorism, insurgency, unrestricted warfare, guerilla war or coercion by narco-criminals increasing in scale and sophistication. They magnify small tactical effects through media and information warfare to weaken US resolve. Hybrid Wars are fought by adversaries who combine novel approaches (a merger of different modes and means of war) by selecting a combination of tactics and techniques from the four types of threats outlined in the QDR: Traditional, Irregular, Catastrophic, Disruptive.

Some other examples of characteristics of Hybrid Wars include:

Failed states, loss of control/accountability of CBRNE assets or missiles, ethnic strife, religious strive, paramilitary forces, radical terrorists, displaced civilians, rogue states, novel use of conventional weapons, attacks against infrastructure and civilians, financial and technical targets, Computer network attacks and DDOS.

Fight the Three Block War (GEN Krulak) where fight on one block where conducting humanitarian assistance on another and stability/peacekeeping ops on a third. Mattis and Hoffman add a Fourth Block – psychological and information warfare. All operators are sensors and transmitters.

18 Is Hybrid War the wave of the future or nothing new? Mattis and Hoffman state “This is our most likely opponent in the future.” I argue that this is nothing new. Few large wars have not been Hybrids. Both WWII saw traditional, Irregular (clandestine troops operating within and behind enemy lines), Catastrophic (Nuclear and Chemical warfare), and Disruptive (disrupting supply lines and communication lines). Certainly the Vietnam War had all four with the Viet Mihn, VC, conventional and unconventional forces, Tet Offensive, strong use of IO/Psyops, guerilla and terrorist tactics…. A new-er development is the threat of non-state actors and distributed organizations being the adversary vice nation-states.

Do Hybrid Wars require any great adjustment on the part of the US Military or US Government? All wars require adjustment. Carl von Clausewitz wrote that "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking."1 It is imperative to establish the nature of the war and the adversary to reshape the military forces to compete in this environment. The US had to build forces from scratch during the WWs and changed forces and tactics during Vietnam. The larger the war, the more growing pains the military will face, but it almost always has to change to meet the needs of the exigency. Desert Storm is a notable exception.

How does Hybrid War relate to Full Spectrum Operations? A military uses full spectrum operations (FSO) are in all wars, including Hybrid Wars. A force balances its use of Offense, Defense and Stability based on the operating environment, the nature of the adversary and the phase of operation.

8.) What are 'complex adaptive systems?' Provide an example, and discuss the relevance of this to the domain of military commander and planner.

Source Lessons: R316 (Complex Adaptive Systems) 27 May 2008

Key readings: Yaneer Bar Yam : Making Things Work and Alex Ryan: What is a Systems Approach and Art of Design Student Text 1.0 pages 7-11.

Definition: (1) Complex Adaptive System: (Ryan) Complex systems that can learn and evolve to maximize their own survivability and advantage within their environment. (Holland) dynamic network of many agents (which may represent cells, species, individuals, firms, nations) acting in parallel, constantly acting and reacting to what the other agents are doing. The control of a CAS tends to be highly dispersed and decentralized (3) Art of Design 1.0 & DB - Complicated systems (usually mechanical) are defined by the presence of a large number of interactive components or parts, but are ultimately knowable and their behavior is predictable; they demonstrate linearity and causality. Complex systems (most often biological or involving living things) are systems in which the interactions

1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War. Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Peret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976): 88.

19 of elements and components have so many possible interrelationships and feedback loops that their behavior is never completely predictable. Complex systems are marked by a phenomenon called emergence, the ‘power to generate behavior that could not be anticipated from a knowledge of the parts of the system alone’ and self organization, which means ‘order arises spontaneously, there is no external controller or planner engineering the appearance of the emergent features or properties.’

Key concepts: 1. Complexity: something with many parts in intricate arrangement; (Ryan) In complex systems, complexity “is something of an illusion”—It is something that emerges when several agents follow simple rules. If a system displays emergent behavior or is unpredictable it is complex vs. complicated (Brown.)

2. Adaptation: ability to change behavior, either positively or negatively based upon interaction with the environment. The process which results in emergent properties (Brown.)

3. Self-organization: process of attraction and repulsion in which the internal organization of a system, normally an open system, increases in complexity without being guided or managed by an outside source. Order that arises spontaneously in a system without an external controller, planner or engineer and results in emergent properties or behaviors (Design 1.0 pg 8.)

4. Emergence: (Goldstein) "the arising of novel and coherent structures, patterns and properties during the process of self-organization in complex systems. “) The generation of behavior or properties this could not be anticipated from knowledge of the parts of the system alone (Design 1.0 pg 8.)

Relevance: 1. Understanding the levels of adaptation (action, learning system, learning to learn, defining success, and co-adaptation) can help determine what direction an organization is currently operating at

2. ODP (as defined by SAMS) helps the adaptive process through systemic understanding.

3. Understanding CAS as a planner enables the planner to attempt to anticipate how individual agents affect the overall system. It allows planners to “test” changes to the environment or realize that there will be emergent properties or behavior and to establish collection means or methods of learning to identify these properties.

4. For military commanders, CAS implies that the effects of actions can have unintended consequences and that there are no truly simple solutions that can be applied in any situation.

Example of CAS: Global Markets: the immeasurable number of human actors and assemblages (companies, interests, nations, etc…) in a global market make it a complex adaptive system. There is no way to predict how the market will react to any given input and the market can and will develop or display emergent behaviors based on events, input or stimulus. The price of oil is an example. Rumors, speculation, fear,

20 messaging, etc… all interacted to drive the price of oil sharply up and then sharply down. No one could have predicted this accurately (see this article for an example involving crude oil, the futures market, an airline, refineries and the weather) http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/business/18air.html

Insurgent Cells, US Army organizations – easy enough to describe

9.) Using theory, historical campaign, and personal experience, compare and contrast the concepts, methods, and merits of analytical and intuitional decision-making. Source Lessons: R304/305 (Decision Making and the Logic of Failure) 29 APR /1 MAY 2008

Key readings: Klein: Sources of Power, Dorner: Logic of Failure, Galdwell: Blink

Definition: (1) Analytical Decision-Making: Is a structured, systematic, rational, and methodical approach to making decisions that often uses decision making tools, takes time and attempts to achieve an optimal solution. Examples of this in the military are the MDMP and JOPP processes.

(2) Intuitional Decision-Making (p. 17): Is an intuitive approach that draws upon experience to recognize key patterns that indicate the dynamics of the situation and facilitate quick decisions. Experience allows decision maker to see situation as an example of a prototype so they know the typical COA right a way and do not have to compare options. Effective when decision maker is very experienced, has little time to act, and chooses the first workable, not necessarily optimal, option. COAs evaluated quickly by imagining how they will turn out. This is titled the Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model by Klein and found that 81% of those he tested used this model to make decisions.

Considerations: Time, Experience, Risk involved

Examples:

Theory: Analytical: MDMP/JOPP, Design Process Intuitional: Decision Point tactics

Historical: Analytical: Operation Barbarossa, Operation Desert Shield Desert Storm

Intuitional: Vincennes shoot down, OIF-1 Insurgency begins

Personal: First impressions, gut feelings, anticipations…

Merits: Intuitional decision making allows a person to recognize similar situations and apply readymade solutions to a problem. It works in time sensitive environments, but assumes a greater risk in not considering potential effects. Intuitional decision making also allows people to rely on wisdom and past experience. Intuition can also help to account for the human element (emergent properties or behaviors) in a system or in a situation that analysis could not predict.

21 Repeated intuitional decisions can result in Dorner’s Logic of Failure by overusing standard solutions or by incorrectly applying experience to a distinct situation. Intuition can also just be wrong; a decision maker can read a situation wrong or misinterpret the situation and make a wrong / bad decision.

Analytical decision making allows for consideration of multiple factors and elements influencing the environment. Analytical decision making usually relies on ‘proven’ systems and analysis to make decisions; but this can lead to trouble when dealing with unique, distinct or complex situations or decisions. Analytical decision making can involve more people / staff and bring more ‘experts’ together because there is usually a system or gather inputs and organize the information (think big staff, MDMP.)

Method: Consider the situation and problem. Complicated problem & adequate time – best to go analytical. Complex problem and adequate time – best to use a mix of both. Limited or no time to do the analytical process– gotta go with intuition.

10.) What insights on the challenges of executing operational art became apparent during the Barbarossa practicum? How did logistical constraints impact the conduct of successive operations? On the basis of the practicum, what are the differences between Blitzkrieg and Deep Operations? Source Lessons: E207 (Barbarossa 1941) 25 MAR 08,R311 (Barbarossa Practicum) 9-12 MAY 08, and R306 (Military Theory) 2 MAY 08

Key readings: Matthew Cooper: The German Army, Bryan Fugate: Operation Barbarossa, Fuhrer Directive 21, Jacob W. Kipp: General-Major A.A. Svechin and Modern War

Definition: (1) Operational Art: JP 3-0. The application of creative imagination by commanders and staff -- supported by their skill, knowledge and experience – to design strategies and campaigns and organize and employ military forces.

In applying operational art, the JFC draws on judgment, perception, experience, education, intelligence, boldness, and character to visualize the conditions necessary for success before committing forces.

Class discussion of Operational Art (various definitions from DB’s notes): Translating Strategy into tactics, linking tactics (or a series of tactical events) to support or achieve Strategy. The arrangement of tactical events in time and space, in relation to each other and the enemy, to achieve Strategy or the Strategic Aims. The design of ‘campaigns’ (if a campaign is a series of tactical events) into a campaign plan (i.e. a series of campaigns) designed to achieve the Strategy. Linking tactical events to win a war vs. winning a battle.

Concepts: (1) Blitzkrieg: (E207) offensive operational-level military doctrine which involves an initial bombardment followed by the employment of motorized mobile forces attacking with speed and surprise to prevent an enemy from implementing a coherent defense.

Wiki Definition: The generally accepted definition of blitzkrieg operations include the use of maneuver rather than attrition to defeat an opponent, and describe operations using combined arms,

22 concentration of mobile assets at a focal point, armor closely supported by mobile infantry, artillery, and close air support assets. These tactics required sheer speed, specialized support vehicles, new methods of communication, new tactics, and an effective decentralized command structure. Broadly speaking, blitzkrieg operations required the development of mechanized infantry, self-propelled artillery and engineering assets that could maintain the rate of advance of fast tanks. German forces avoided direct combat in favor of interrupting an enemy's communications, decision-making, logistics and morale. In combat, blitzkrieg left little choice for the slower defending forces but to clump into defensive pockets that were encircled and then reduced by slower-moving German infantry reserves

DB comment: I would argue that Blitzkreig never got past the tactical level of war. It was a new form of warfare, but it wasn’t operations in my opinion (at least against the Russians.) You could perhaps argue that is was operational against the Poles and French because of the depth of the battle space the effects you could achieve (with respect to Germany’s Strategic ends) in Poland and France vs. Russia.

Details: Hitler’s Strategic goal was to ‘defeat’ Russia. The ‘operational’ goal of Operation Barbarossa was the rapid conquest of the European part of the Soviet Union, west of a line connecting the cities of Arkhangelsk and Astrakhan, often referred to as the A-A line. Germany would accomplish this by utilizing Blitzkrieg to overwhelm the Russians and bring about their ‘defeat’ through either/or 1) defeat of their armed forces 2) destruction of their armed forces 3) capture of their territory 4) their surrender 5) etc....

(2) Deep Operations: (R306) Combined arms warfare utilizing coordinated fires in support of maneuver. Maneuver elements are organizing into tactical and operational groupings (operational shock and strike maneuver.

Interestingly enough, ‘deep operations’ as a term isn’t in JP 1-0, 3-0 or 5-0 (at least per my electronic search.) It’s not in 3-0 either, but operations in depth is discussed:

FM 3-0:

6-85. Depth is the extension of operations in time, space, and resources. Operations in depth can disrupt the enemy’s decision cycle. These operations contribute to protecting the force by destroying enemy capabilities before the enemy can use them. Commanders balance their forces’ tempo to produce simultaneous results throughout their operational area. To achieve simultaneity, commanders establish a higher tempo to target enemy capabilities located at the limit of a force’s operational reach.

6-86. Simultaneity and depth are inherent in full spectrum operations. Army forces execute simultaneous operations across vast areas. They force the enemy to react to numerous friendly actions—potential and actual— throughout the operational area. Army forces use combined arms, advanced information systems, and joint capabilities to increase the depth of their operations. The complementary effects produced by executing simultaneous operations in depth overwhelm enemy forces, forcing them to respond piecemeal or not at all.

6-87. Commanders extend the depth of operations through joint integration. When determining an operation’s depth, commanders consider their own capabilities, as well as joint capabilities and limitations. They use these capabilities to ensure actions executed at operational depth receive robust and uninterrupted support. Commanders sequence and synchronize operations in time and space to achieve simultaneous effects throughout the operational area.

Details of the campaign: During Barbarossa, Soviet forces maintained thin forward echelons of forces building sustainable battlefield depth supported by mobilization of resources through key LOCs and logistics assets. The Germans soon bogged down / slowed down due to: weather, losses, dealing with

23 encircled soviets, changing objectives and a logistical system (horse based) unable to keep pace with its mechanized forces. The Russians were able to trade space and front line units for time and institute a massive mobilization plan. As the Germans exhausted themselves and reached the limits of their advance the Russians employed the forces generated through their mobilization were able to counterattack and we all know the rest.

Difference between Blitzkrieg and Deep Operations?

1. If you use the R306 definition (Tom’s) then there isn’t a difference; they are both combined arms warfare which utilize fires (aerial or surface delivered) to strike the enemy in tactical depth to support maneuver to achieve tactical victory.

2. If you use the FM 3-0 definition of Operations in Depth then there is a distinct difference assuming you believe Blitzkrieg is just tactics. Operations in Depth strike the enemy through the depth and breadth of the entire battle space to attack enemy capabilities (para 6-85) in order to support friendly operations over time throughout the breadth and depth of the battle space. This concept links tactical events in space and time to achieve either Strategic or Campaign aims or goals. Either way, it’s operations and not just tactics. (Think over the shoulder CAS or Fires vs. an air campaign far in front of the FLOT that is destroying or shaping enemy capabilities that wouldn’t be employed until well into the future.)

Key Insights from exercise: 1. Difficulty of command and control across vast areas of space and time

2. Synchronization and integration of forces is more difficult as conditions change (destruction of forces, receipt and integration of reinforcements, prioritization of forces)

3. Maintaining focus of strategic and operational objectives is difficult when executing the tactical fight

4. Challenges of sustainment not planned for during the course of military operations.

5. Soviets developed a sustainable defense for War of Attrition that benefitted from German shortcomings in planning

6. Soviet understanding of environment provided advantage over attacking German forces constrained by weak assumptions

1. Soviets were able to create large scale maneuvers to meet German small-medium size tactical successes

2. German Blitzkrieg utilized air assets for tactical strike capabilities and not deep attack

24 11.) Relying on Hayden White, discuss the function and utility of narrative in design as well as its relationship to discourse. A good answer should focus on defining what narrative and discourse are, what comprises them, how you 'do' them, how they function, and how they inform strategic understanding and design. Source Lessons: R312 (Narrative and Meaning) 19 May 2008

Key readings: Hayden White: The Content of the Form and Hayden White: Tropics of Discourse

Definitions: (1) Narrative: Ron Heifetz: “Song beneath the words.” Hayden White: The underlying structural story of an environment/system without regard to culture. A postmodern/poststructuralist thought pattern that is able to describe the underlying story from a person’s point of view.

(2) Discourse: attempt to ascribe meaning (moving back and forth). It is used in creating narrative to determine meaning of the world/system before us. Hayden White (p.11) “a movement through all of the structures of relating self to other which remain implicit as different ways of knowing in the fully matured consciousness.”

TRADOC PAM 525-5-500, CACD (28 January 2008), 39, defined discourse as “The process of reasoning through a candid exchange of opposing ideas without fear of retribution that results in a synthesis and a shared visualization of operational problems.”

Hayden White (p.4) “3 levels of discourse: (1) Description: mimesis (2) Narrative: diegesis (3) Effect on each other-diataxis”

(3) Understanding: Hayden White: “a process of rendering the unfamiliar”

SAMS Art of Design: A comprehension of the environment based on system analysis with a holistic emphasis on how the entire system functions and is affected by the introduction of external stimulus. A systemic understanding also incorporates the perspectives of both the observer and that which is observed and the tension between their differing understanding and how it affects the system.

(4) Meta-questioning: linkage of meaning to questions (qualitative why questions; logic of what we are seeing by making data logical

Relationships: 1. Bottom Line: System logic is described by narrative built upon the discourse with an understanding of why/how the system functions in terms of efficacy, propensity, potential, actuality, and tensions identified in the meta-story

2. According to design, discourse is essential because it enables frank discussion that includes and incorporates dissenting ideas or related thoughts. It is done without regard to rank/position and relative experience. It assumes that everyone has something to contribute the sharing of understanding.

25 3. Narratives are often the written products of design because placing words into pictures is often not enough to gain a systemic understanding. In design, the narrative describes the logic of a system.

4. In design, the narrative is created from and informs systemic understanding. Systemic understanding is gained in two ways: (1) understanding the logic of the data encountered ; why aspects of the system function and (2) discourse between members of a group/sponsor in establishing the logic of why an action is taking place or may /may not take place 12.) Describe how logistics influences the planning and conduct of military operations by evaluating the relationship between operational maneuver and sustainment. Base answer: Logistics determines what combat power the US can bring to bear on a problem, and the timeline for their deployment, maneuver and sustainment.

Operational maneuver may be constrained by the existence and capabilities of the nodes and modes of deployment, availability and capability of lines of communication (air, ground and sea), and terrain.

4-20. The sustainment warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. The endurance of Army forces is primarily a function of their sustainment. Sustainment determines the depth and duration of Army operations. It is essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative. (FM 3-0 Operations – Feb 2008)

Sustainment is the provision of the logistics, personnel services, and health service support necessary to maintain operations until mission accomplishment. Internment, resettlement, and detainee operations fall under the sustainment warfighting function and include elements of all three major subfunctions. FM 4-0 describes the sustainment warfighting function.

Additional doctrine to support this answer:

 Logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations that deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services (JP 1-02).

JP 4.0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

 Logistics is the foundation of combat power

26  Definition. Logistics is the process of planning and executing the projection, movement and sustainment, reconstitution, and redeployment of operating forces in the execution of national security policy.

 The science of logistics concerns the integration of strategic, operational, and tactical sustainment efforts within the theater, while scheduling the mobilization and deployment of units, personnel, equipment, and supplies in support of the employment concept of a geographic combatant commander. The relative combat power that military forces can bring to bear against an enemy is constrained by a nation’s capability to plan for, gain access to, and deliver forces and materiel to the required points of application across the range of military operations.

 Logistic planners must focus on seamless deployment, distribution, and sustainment in order to properly enable the employment concept of the mission or task.

 The combatant commander’s strategic logistic concept will focus on the ability to generate and move forces and materiel into the theater base and on to desired operational locations where operational logistic concepts are employed. Tactical planning is done primarily by the Service components.

 Planners must identify and assess critical or key issues unique to a specific operation plan they must support. These issues include the increased demand associated with an expanding force; critical supply items; flow or process constraints; control of all means of transportation (including those provided by allies and host nations); critical infrastructure protection and the resourcing of supplies and services from civilian, coalition, and allied sources.

 Combatant commanders must ensure that their campaign plans fully integrate operational and logistic capabilities. The influence of the combatant commander is essential in bridging any operations-logistic gap.

 The logistic system includes projection, movement, sustainment, reconstitution, and redeployment of forces. Key areas to address during planning include lines of communications, the theater transportation network, specialized units, allied and coalition support, support and movement of displaced civilians, and host-nation support. Considerations in developing a logistic system include logistics sourcing, distribution, geography, weather, transportation, logistic capability, asset visibility, logistic enhancements, logistic resources within the theater, availability of existing logistic facilities and options for purchase, lease, or construction of other facilities, logistic infrastructure protection, echelon of support, contracted support, assignment of responsibility and availability of host-nation support.

 Principles of Logistics: Responsiveness, Simplicity, Economy, Attainability, Survivability, Flexibility, Sustainability

27 FM 3.0 Operations

 3-40. Army forces attack using ground and air maneuver to achieve objectives that conclude the campaign or move it to a subsequent phase. In expeditionary campaigns and major operations, operational maneuver includes deploying land forces to positions that facilitate joint force offensive action.

 4-1. Combat power is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit/formation can apply at a given time. Army forces generate combat power by converting potential into effective action.

 4-2. Leadership and information are applied through, and multiply the effects of, the other six elements of combat power. These six—movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, command and control, and protection—are collectively described as the warfighting functions.

13.) A number of authors have discussed the importance of control and its relationship to governance and political violence. Discuss the causal paths from control to collaboration. In your discussion define both control and collaboration and include an assessment of factors that determine the cost of extending control.

Kalyvas’ 7 Causal paths from control to collaboration (starts page 124)Z:

1. Coercion and survival maximization (threats combined with the option to switch sides) – the imposition of control allows the effective use of violence, thus deterring defection; opponents are identified and flee, are neutralized, or switch sides. The rest of the population complies, while some people may switch to side with the ruler. 2. Shielding (protect them from rival’s threats) – shield the population from competing sovereignty claims 3. “Mechanical ascription” (you join the home team) – long lasting control spawns informational monopolies that socialize populations accordingly 4. Credibility of Rule (join the winning team)– short term credibility of immediate sanctions, as well as long-term – expectations about the outcome of war 5. Provision of benefits – hearts and minds, win allegiance by providing benefits that generate loyalty 6. Monitoring – was control is established, monitor / register the population 7. Self-reinforcing by-products – area’s reputation generates action, e.g. area is perceived as an insurgent stronghold, actions are taken, this causes backlash that may in fact make that area a stronghold

Collaboration = any form of support that does not aid the enemy control – the extent to which actors are able to establish exclusive rule over a region (111)

28 The cost of control (factors) (Herbst, 23) How far power is being broadcast (the closer to the base of support the cheaper it is) Degree of consolidation required / desired (security apparatus only or infrastructure)

14.) What is the proper balance among the elements of national power? How might the traditional conceptualization be expanded to incorporate the realities of the current operating environment?

15.) How has the nature of strategic/operational command changed from Alexander to present day? Support your argument with evidence from The Evolution of Warfare Course.

16.) Why do some insurgencies succeed while others fail?

Successful insurgencies: Vietminh / Vietcong vs. French and USA; Eritreans in Ethopia Unsuccessful insurgencies: (far more examples of failure than success): Calabria, Italy; Greek Communist Insurgency

According to: Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, Strategic Studies Institute in Insurgency In Iraq And Afghanistan: Change And Continuity

Those which did succeed invariably exhibited one characteristic: they were able to prevent the counterinsurgents, whether the regime or outside occupiers, from driving the conflict to the point of decision in the military realm while the counterinsurgents still had an overwhelming military superiority. In other words, the insurgents were either able to make the political and psychological theater of operations decisive (since it was much easier for them to attain parity with the counterinsurgents in this sphere), or to postpone decisive military struggles until they remedied their military disadvantage through guerrilla, political, and psychological operations. At a somewhat finer level of resolution, successful insurgencies had four characteristics in common:

Effective strategy Insurgent strategies have two interlinked dimensions: they must avoid a decisive engagement until the adverse power balance is adjusted, and they must take direct steps to adjust the power balance by weakening the counterinsurgents and strengthening the insurgents themselves. Often insurgents have been able to build strategies in which they seize and hold the initiative due to their inherently greater flexibility and absence of ethical or legal constraints.

Effective ideology There are many variants of effective insurgent ideologies, but are unifying and mobilizing. In the 20th century, the combination of Marxism and nationalism was particularly powerful. The nationalistic angle made the ideology broad and unifying; the Marxist angle focused anger and resentment on the regime and provided a rationale for why the insurgents could expect ultimate success even when the odds against them appeared long.

29 Effective leadership Leading an insurgency is extremely difficult. Insurgent leaders must convince people to undertake extraordinary danger and hardship for extended periods of time with a very small chance of a positive outcome. Those who succeed tend to be those who can unify diverse groups and organizations and mobilize segments of the polity not previously engaged in politics. Psychologically, effective insurgent leaders tend to be so dedicated to their cause that they will persevere even though the odds are greatly stacked against them. In a similar vein, they tend to believe so strongly in their cause that they become utterly ruthless, and are willing to take whatever steps are necessary to weaken the counterinsurgents. Insurgent leadership, in other words, is not a business for the faint of heart, but for the utterly committed.

A method of obtaining resources In the broadest terms, insurgents need five types of resources: 1) manpower; 2) funding; 3) equipment/supplies; 4) sanctuary; and, 5) intelligence. These can be provided, seized, or created. Provided resources can come from outside sponsors, domestic supporters, or from the ineptitude of the counterinsurgents (e.g., the government may provide sanctuary by being unaware of the presence of the insurgents). Funding, equipment, and supplies are the resources most often seized, but in some insurgencies, particularly those in Africa, manpower is seized through violence as insurgents undertake forcible recruitment. Just as in nature an organism seeks to obtain food with the minimum energy expenditure, most insurgencies would prefer to be provided resources, but will seize or create them if none are provided or, in some cases, if provided resources come with too many strings attached. 17.) In Revolution in Military Affairs, what comes first, the weapons or the methods of waging war? Describe several viewpoints from the readings, including Unrestricted Warfare, then state and support your own viewpoint.

Source Lessons: T503

Key readings: Unrestrictive Warfare –Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangshi PLA -

The Dynamics of Military Revolution - Knox and Murray

Definition:

Unrestrictive Warfare - Using all means including armed force or non-armed force, military and non- military, and lethal and non-lethal to compel the enemy to accept one’s interest.

Revolution in Military Affairs – 1990’s term- Soviets originally called it “Military Technical Revolution” by this they refer to Precision Strike- In reference to RMA think of technical advancement

Military Revolutions – 1955 term -Those events which recast society and the state as well as military organizations - They alter the capacity of the state to create and project military power. Punctuated Equilibrium. Examples – 17th Century development of nation states, the French Revolution – Levee en Masse, Industrial Revolution – Mass Armies,

30 Key concepts: In Unrestrictive Warfare the authors states that the weapons revolution is a prelude to a Revolution in Military Affairs. What is different is that the Revolution in Military Affairs will no longer be driven by one or two individual weapons but rather by a hundreds of different kinds of weapons that will make up a weapons system. The book then goes on to make a distinction between traditional warfare and future warfare. In traditional warfare the rule is to “fight the fight that fit’s one’s weapons” . Here weapons come first then tactics. In future warfare one “builds the weapons to fit the fight” – develop the tactics and the weapons follow. The key to achieving this is to ensure the weapons developed have link and match with other weapons to produce a synergistic effect. This is incredibly expensive though and so “new-concept weapons” emerge to fill the bill. These new-concept weapons are weapons that transcend the domain of traditional weapons but still have the goal to kill and destroy. There is also a NEW CONCEPT OF WEAPONS. This is a view that sees all means which transcend the military realm as weapons as long as they can affect combat operations. A new concept of weapons drives new-concept weapons.

Murray and Knox SAY 1)RMA are rarely driven by technology. Technology or weapons merely function as a catalyst. 2) RMA emerge from evolutionary problem solving directed at specific operational and tactical issues, 3.) RMA’s require coherent framework of doctrine built on service culture.

My Viewpoint:

There is a collaborative relationship between weapons and methods that leads to a RMA. Dramatic changes in weapons capabilities or maneuverability provide a foundation for changing methods to exploit or counter the influence. When there are not dramatic changes in weapons capability or maneuverability, agents whose relative combat power is inferior or equal to the relative peer seek altering methods to gain situational advantage. When either of these elements achieves relative dominance and then is copied by their peers it creates a Revolution in Military Affairs

18.) What is the American Way of War? How does Irregular Warfare fit with it? What are the roles of conventional forces, SOF, non-military forces/organizations and technology in the American Way of War and IW?

Claim -The American Way of War --- We actually have a way of battle not a way of War.

Defined by Russell Wiegley- The American Way of War

Decisive military operations to secure victory through a strategy of attrition or annihilation , preferably the latter.

Secure victory through the rapid employment of overwhelming firepower

31 War is an alternative to bargaining War is really more of a way of battle than a way of strategy

Provides the foundation for the Powell doctrine of fighting wars only for vital national interest, with clear political objectives and popular support.– It emphasizes the use of overwhelming force

Defined by Max Boot in Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power

America’s involvement in small wars outnumbers its involvement in large operations

Small Wars are not fought to achieve decisive victory but to punish, protect, pacify, or profit

Both shy away from the concept of turning military triumphs into strategic success

Cebrowski- The American Way of War – Cebrowski and Barnett

Emphasize the use of speed, maneuver, flexibility, and surprise in execution

Also emphasize the use of precision firepower, special forces, and PSYOPS to achieve victory

Cebrowski pushes for the super-empowerment of the war fighter to employ discrete amounts of military firepower to address the emergence of super-empowered individuals.

Square Pegs, Round Holes

The American Way of War forces competitors to face us through irregular warfare because of our nuclear weapons and conventional military dominance

Roles: Conventional Forces: Deter peer competitors; Full Spectrum Operations

SOF – Conduct IW; Conduct FID

Interagency- Support and assume military efforts.

19.) Two central concepts you explored through your reading and discussion of Treatise on Efficacy were propensity and potential. How are they important towards gaining a relevant systemic/ qualitative understanding that includes red and how do they inform possible action. Illustrate with an example.

32 Two central concepts you explored through your reading and discussion of A Treatise on Efficacy by Francois Jullien were propensity and potential. How are they important towards gaining a relevant systemic/qualitative understanding and how do they inform possible action? Illustrate with an example.

Propensity and potential, is defined by Jullien as two parts of the Chinese concept of strategy. The propensity is the configuration of the system or the normal manner the system acts. Potential is the ability to make things happen. He uses Sun-zi’s example of the mountain stream. The mountain stream’s physical slope and deep cut into the Earth is its configuration. Its potential is the stream’s ability to move rocks. (Jullien, page 17) I will describe propensity and potential with regard to Afghanistan as my example.

The concepts of propensity and potential can be important to understanding Afghanistan because it may highlight problems we face in Enduring Freedom and can be used to guide what actions we can take on. The propensity of Afghanistan is eternal conflict. From the time of Alexander the Great through today, the landscape has been the stage of conflict. This understanding of the propensity is important to see, holistically, what Afghanistan is and not what we want it to be. Our views of governance and rule of law are incongruent with Afghanistan. This leads to why potential is vital to grasp. The history of rulers over Afghanistan does not allow for the potential for our Western concepts of law and governance. This understanding of Julienne’s two theories should illuminate how we can act in this system.

Acting against these propensities and potentials should alert us to the tensions we will face, specifically with the tribal affiliations and economic standing of those in power. Additionally, the lack of potential for Afghanistan to accept our Western view of the rule of law must govern how and what goals we hold for the local, regional, and national levels of enforcement of law and security. The understanding of what is possible and what will be difficult to undertake should allow us to better determine what our goals should be.

20.) What considerations must be taken into account in regards to conflict termination of a proxy war? What happened in Afghanistan post-1989? What was the ripple effect of conflict termination in Afghanistan?

I am going to define a proxy war as a war between two nations, where one nation employs a third entity to fight the other. The United States conducted a proxy war against the Former Soviet Union via the Mujahedeen. Two considerations that must be taken into account with regard to conflict termination of a proxy war are what will the relationship between the facilitating nation and the proxy be after the conflict and secondly, what will be the lasting impact of the actions as perceived by the proxies.

Afghanistan, post-1989, became a vacuum of power and money. The United States withdrew all economic aid from Afghanistan. The Mujahedeen that had previously been well armed and financially

33 supported by the United States were abandoned by the United States. Key leaders that had previously been revered for their access to vast quantities of money and arms were challenged by rivals and in due time the Taliban rose to power. The Taliban’s control of the nation allowed a safe haven for terrorist training and terrorist leaders such as Osama bin Laden to flourish.

The ripple effect of the conflict termination in Afghanistan is continuing to affect our efforts in Afghanistan. The relationship of the U.S. with the Mujahedeen was severed when support and funding was terminated. The Taliban’s rise to power and 9-11 attacks were ripples derived from the conflict termination of the proxy war of the 1980s. The final ripple is the perception that the United States will once again walk away from the Afghani people. The proxies’ perception of U.S. interests and history of severing ties with the Mujahedeen, are having an effect in our current efforts. This is echoed by the Taliban’s messaging that supporting the Americans is futile as they will eventually leave.

21.) How do you think that the “rules of the Game” for proxy warfare have changed from the Cold War? Is the US engaged in a proxy war now? With whom? How?

Definition of “Proxy War”: A war instigated by a major power but does not directly participate (source: freeonlinedictionary.com)

Cold War Proxy Wars (Benchmark): The U.S. and Soviet Union leveraged smaller conflicts in an attempt to gain political leverage and strategic territorial advantage without engaging directly. This allowed both sides plausible deniability if the venture failed and was relatively risk free. The advantages to Cold War proxy warfare is that despite the appearance of asymmetry, there appeared to be some semblance of order that prevented the conflicts from growing out of the sponsor’s control. The major powers were clearly identified and both understood the limits of proxy warfare. The primary examples of classic Cold War proxy warfare are the Vietnam War and the Soviet Afghan War.

Post-Cold War Proxy Warfare (Changes): Post-cold war proxy warfare can be characterized by asymmetry. There is no longer a balancing power to “regulate” warfare and its makes defining the enemy more difficult. In many instances, countries of interest lost the support of their strategic sponsors resulting in internal violence and instability; Afghanistan.

Engaged now? Who? How? Yes. The GWOT can be considered a proxy war in that the President is attempting to enlist the help of the world, as proxies, to combat global terrorism. The statement below from the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism reflects the asymmetrical nature of the current threat and the need for proxies to assist in achieving national goals.

“The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were acts of war against the United States of America, its allies, friends, and against the very idea of civilized society. No cause justifies terrorism. The world must respond and fight

34 this evil that is intent on threatening and destroying our basic freedoms and our way of life. Freedom and fear are at war. The enemy is not one person. It is not a single political regime. Certainly it is not a religion. The enemy is terrorism.”

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003

22.) Discuss the nature of the tensions between art and science in design. How do we resolve or manage these tensions in the requirement to codify the 'art' of design?

(I’m skimming the surface of this highly complex, adaptive, post-modern looking, interpretive subject; here are the highlights of some of the larger cross-cutting issues that have surfaced throughout the year. Fill in the blanks with your experiences and opinions)

References: Haywood monograph, SEM 7 Notes (Chuck Glossary), ODP Student Text (Primary), JP 3.0 (p.IV-3)

To achieve a common understanding and to highlight a key tension, key problematic terms must be defined:

Term Definition (from Art of Design Student Text) Design to conceive of and construct a strategy build upon a logical framework Problemitize To problematize (verb transitive) is to take the difference between two states or ideas, to identify the obstacles to transforming from one state to the other, and state the requirements as a problem. Problematization places the commander in the cognitive position to cope with the emergence. (Editor) Art of Design A theory and practice of iterative learning and action that develops and uses critical thinking skills to understand and manage complex problems across the security environment. Systemic Systemic Understanding: A comprehension of the environment based on Understanding system analysis with a holistic emphasis on how the entire system functions and is affected by the introduction of external stimulus. A systemic understanding also incorporates the perspectives of both the observer and that which is observed and the tension between their differing understanding and how it affects the system.

- Hard Systems Approach: Use of precise and, when possible, quantitative techniques intended to produce one or more views and a dynamic model of the system of interest.

35 - Soft Systems Approach: Use of loosely structured methods to investigate problem situation in Human Activity Systems from multiple perspectives in order to identify interventions that are feasible and desirable from all perspectives.

Tensions A strained relationship between individuals, groups, nations, or elements of the system. Considering tensions in the system enables designers to identify and exploit existing tensions between elements of the system, or avoid actions that create tensions that are detrimental to overall aims of the campaign design. Additionally, designers should look for tensions within friendly forces plans, policies and strategy that may be acting against the overall strategic aims. Designers should consider both negative and positive tensions. “Definitions for Proposed New Concepts,” School of Advanced Military Studies, Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design (CACD) Operational Design Process (ODP), Executive Briefing AY 2007-2008. (April- May 2008)

The design process includes aspects of several disciplines (Systems Theory, Post Modern Philosophy, Eastern Philosophy) from both science and liberal arts. The science is characterized by the data and the process, whereas the art is in the imaginative application of the process. The tensions in design are centered less on the timeless conflict between art and science and more on merging aspects of differing disciplines: Terms that are taken out of their context lose meaning. The word “Problemitize” in its three forms (in the ODP Student text) is a good example.

Resolving the tensions will require a common understanding of what Operational Design is (process and definitions that are understandable), how it fits into doctrine and what are the expected outcomes of the design process.

23.) How did the proxy struggles of the Cold War between the United States and the USSR shape the COE? What are the implications for this kind of indirect interventionism in the FOE?

The proxy wars between the U.S. and the Soviet Union shaped the COE in a negative way. (need examples of good and bad) Limited engagement and short term strategies (either by design or by consequence) inherently created conditions that promoted instability (Afghanistan). (Broad statement) Both countries provided political, military and financial support to target countries and would leave or greatly reduce support after goals were met or the effort was no longer viable. This pattern created well armed failed states.

The implications for Cold War interventionism in the FOE are the increase of non-lethal interventions to prevent failed states from becoming rogue nations that support terrorism. The

36 U.S. will be involved in asymmetrical warfare in a preemptive nature that will require leveraging all the elements of national power.

24.) What makes good and poor strategists and explain why? Strategy: Strategy is the art of combining preparations for war and the grouping of operations for achieving the goal set by the war for the armed forces (Svechin, 69); or A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 3-0)

Good Strategist: Are strong leaders. They must correctly evaluate the nature of war, which depends on the different economic, social, geographic, administrative and technical factors (Svechin, 69). Strategists must understand the operational and the political situation. Strategic guidance is often vague, which requires the strategists to be creative and to be comfortable operating in an ambiguous environment. Also, a good strategist must be an expert in their field and have an understanding of all related fields.

Poor Strategist: Opposite of above plus… strategists that confuse analysis for synthesis and strategic planning for strategy formation (Mintzberg, p.321). Analysis supports/elaborates synthesis.

25.) Using Joint Pub 3.0 and 5.0 as source for understanding the comprehensive systems perspective, assess the utility of system analysis, causal analysis, and network analysis. Be precise in defining terms and be certain to illustrate the concepts with evidence from material presented in the program. 21.

Terms Definition System A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements; that group of elements forming a unified whole. (JP 3.0 glossary)

Comprehensive A comprehensive systems approach strives to provide an understanding of Systems interrelated systems relevant to a specific joint operation without regards to Approach geographic boundaries. (p II-21) System Analysis Analysis of a functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements; that group of elements forming a unified whole. (JP 3.0) Causal Analysis Causal analysis is used to diagnose problems, project future impacts, and

37 evaluate the effectiveness of past actions (Salmon in plain English) Network Analysis Used to understand the connections between various nodes and identify emerging trends within the network. (Bar-Yam, 45.)

Terms Utility Comprehensive Enables the commanders to make decision with a full understanding of the Systems nuances of and interlocking elements of a complex system and not make Approach decisions on an ad hoc basis. (Dorner, p.5) System Analysis Same as above Causal Analysis “Decision making necessarily involves evaluations, and value judgments cannot be properly rendered without considering consequences.” (Salmon, p.4) Network Analysis Helps understand how systems/nodes are connected, why they need to be connected to perform (independence vice inter-dependence) and identify emergent trends witin the system. (Bar-Yam , p.49)

26.) You have encountered numerous commanders who succeeded or failed in the conduct of war. Pick one and explain the reasons for success or failure.

This question is likely from Dr. Epstein and is very similar to the one he provided in the Midterm. It is possible to answer this question in several ways. One manner is identify how the commander recognized both science (Jomini) and art (Clausewitz) of the conflict or individual battles in which he was involved. Another technique is to emphasize how they recognized how social revolutions or Revolution in Military Affairs changed the capabilities of a military force and made changes based on the revolution in organization, doctrine, command and control that led to their success. Another manner is to identify how the commander recognized the type of war required to win which they implemented. This is in line with Delbrucks principles of War of Attrition or War of Annihilation. A final possibility is to simple state the commander’s genius and how he excelled in some area or characteristics.

In the midterm, I used Scipio Africanus and described how he understood complexity and the situation to exploit it to his advantage. I just described how he understood the various political situations and complexities, which he exploited such as after one defeat he prevented several key leaders of Rome from fleeing or surrendering understanding the Hannibal was incapable of taking the city. He also understood and exploited the tribal situations in Spain and North Africa to his advantage. Lastly, in the Battle of Zama, he phased his forces to surprise Hannibal with his cavalry as wells as positioning his forces on ground that favored him. Amazingly, this answer worked well at least with Dr. Epstein.

38 Here are some commanders to consider for this answer along with things to consider for why they succeeded.

1. Hannibal (Great Tactician) – Failed Overall. Although Hannibal understood the science of war (excellent tactician) and crushed multiple Roman Armies with huge victories such as those at the Battles of Lake Trasimene and Cannae, he failed to defeat the Romans. Hannibal believed that by winning decisive victories or by following a strategy of annihilation that the Romans would submit. Hannibal failed to understand that Rome as Republic was capable of recreating an Army although of a much poorer quality from its populace. Also as long as its allies remained faithful Hannibal was trapped on the Italian peninsula unable to achieve victory. Rome eventually as it commanders gained experienced and realized their advantage adopted a Fabian strategy (attrition without fighting decisive battles) only fighting when necessary. In the end as Roman Generals and forces such as those led by Scipio gained experienced and began to hem in Hannibal as well as take the fight to Spain and to Carthage. Hannibal called back to defend Carthage found himself forced to fight on ground and in a situation favorable to Scipio. This resulted in his lose at the Battle of Zama and ultimately the defeat of Carthage. Carthage lacked the ability to regenerate its forces like the Rome. Further, its allies had largely abandoned them in favor of Rome. Hannibal failed to develop a successful strategy in Italy and in the defense of Carthage. Play this in reverse to why Scipio was a success.

2. Frederick the Great (Great Tactical, Operational, and Strategic Commander)– Success. Excellent tactician and operational commander. Frederick understood his situation disadvantages, and advantages. He established the modern Prussian state against superior forces of French, Russians, and Austrian. Frederick was a master of the politics of the day using treaties and alliances to gain advantages. He recognized that the states (monarchs) depended on their Armies. Armies of the time were expensive relatively, small and professional. To defeat an Army meant the defeat of the enemy state or monarch. Frederick used this to his advantage by building an extremely proficient, disciplined, and capable army. He created the best army in Europe. He also used a variety of tactics including surprise and the oblique order to mass his forces at one point against an enemy that often resulted in victory. He also used lines of operations to outmaneuver his enemy tactically and operationally. of the time he realized the linkage between politics and military The greatest examples of his abilities occurred during the Third Silesian War or the Seven Year’s War (1756-1763 Wars with Austria, Russia and France. Frederick successfully defended his territory against the three other states.

Understanding how nation states functioned he linked his military efforts to his policies or politics. States at the time relied on their armies in order to maintain their power so by defeating an enemy’s army, Frederick achieved his political goals of uniting Prusssia.

In 1757-9 Frederick and Ferdinand achieve some remarkable victories, usually against much greater numbers and with fewer casualties on their own side. Frederick defeats a French and Austrian army at Rossbach in November 1757 and an Austrian army at Leuthen a month later. He holds his own against a

39 much larger Russian force in a heavily contested encounter at Zorndorf in August 1758. Meanwhile Ferdinand defeats vast French armies at Krefeld in June 1758 and at Minden in August 1759.

Some of the best examples of his tactical genius was at the battle of Rossbach in Nov 1757 when he crushed a Allied French Army. The French Army attempted to fake a retreat and then maneuver onto the Prussian flank. Frederick upon detecting this used his Armies superior training to fake a retreat and reposition them to attack into the flank of the repositioning Allies before they could deploy. This trap worked catching the Allies by surprise. The total losses amongst the Prussian army comprised under 550 men as compared with about 10,000 casualties including 5,000 prisoners on the part of the Allies. Frederick was heard to say "I won the battle of Rossbach with most of my infantry having their muskets shouldered.". The second example occurred a month later as Frederick manuevered his victorious Army to now face the Austrian Army. Demonstrating his ability to understand not only tactics, but operational art in order to prevent his opponents from first linking up by defeating them independently and maneuvering his Army to advantageous positions. Basically as the Austrian Army maneuvered to retake Silesia, Frederick closed on the much larger Army and deceived them into believing he was deploying to their front. In reality he maneuvered the mass of his Army to the Austrian left flank and crushed the Austrian. He feinted an attack on the Austrian right flank and then used the terrain to move his army to their left flank.

Frederick earned his noble nickname through the many accomplishments during his reign. Through clever military maneuvering, Frederick was able to double the population of Prussia to six million people, through lands taken during the War of the Austrian Succession. Now Prussia was not only the largest of the German states, it was a formidable power in Europe.

Prussia’s new political standing alarmed its neighbors and Maria Theresa of Austria joined with France and Russia to try and divide Prussia. This struggle, known as The Seven Years War, raged from 1756 until 1763. http://german-history.suite101.com/article.cfm/frederick_the_great

Frederick’s concept of statecraft in turn convinced him that Prussia must fight only short, decisive wars —partly to conserve scarce resources, partly to convince the losers to make and keep the peace, and partly to deter potential challengers. This required development of a forward-loaded military, able to spring to war from a standstill with strong initial results.

Frederick frequently led his military forces personally and had six horses shot from under him during battle. Frederick is often admired as one of the greatest tactical geniuses of all time, especially for his usage of the oblique order of battle. Even more important were his operational successes, especially preventing the unification of numerically superior opposing armies and being at the right place at the right time to keep enemy armies out of Prussian core territory. In a letter to his mother Maria Theresa, the Austrian co-ruler Emperor Joseph II wrote,

3. Napolean (Tactically and Operational Excellent, but Strategically a Failure)

40 Born in Corsica and trained as an artillery officer in mainland France, he rose to prominence during the French Revolution and led successful campaigns against the First and Second Coalitions arrayed against France. In 1799, Napoleon staged a coup d'état and installed himself as First Consul; five years later he crowned himself Emperor of the French. In the first decade of the nineteenth century, he turned the armies of France against every major European power and dominated continental Europe through a series of military victories - epitomised in battles such as Austerlitz and Friedland. He maintained France's sphere of influence by the formation of extensive alliances and the appointment of friends and family members to rule other European countries as French client states.

The French invasion of Russia in 1812 marked a turning point in Napoleon's fortunes. His Grande Armée was wrecked in the campaign and never fully recovered. In 1813, the Sixth Coalition defeated his forces at Leipzig, invaded France and exiled him to the island of Elba. Less than a year later, he returned and was finally defeated at the Battle of Waterloo in June 1815. Napoleon spent the last six years of his life under British supervision on the island of Saint Helena, where he died in 1821. The autopsy concluded he died of stomach cancer though Sten Forshufvud and other scientists in the 1960s conjectured that he had been poisoned with arsenic.

Napoleon developed few military innovations, drew his tactics from different sources and scored major victories with a modernised French army. His campaigns are studied at military academies the world over and he is widely regarded as one of history's greatest commanders. While considered a tyrant by his opponents, he is remembered for the establishment of the Napoleonic code, which laid the administrative foundations for much of Western Europe. Wikipeida (Oh! Yeah!!)

1. Napoleons greatest skill was his ability to understand the situation and take advantage of it. This was evident in his understanding of the French Revolution and military revolutions that could come out of it. Napoleon effectively developed tactics, organization and doctrine to greatest advantage. Examples include:

1. Utilization of independent Corps with mission command type orders that moved along separate lines of operation and came or massed on the battlefield.

2. Orde Mixte- using combination of line and column within same formation depending on the experience of the troops and tactical situation. Columns require less training so suitable for citizen soldiers. Also utilized skirmishers.

3. Use of skirmishes and forages enabled by the connection of the people to the state as a result of the French Revolution. Forages broke French Army free from supply depots.

4. Understood that he could rapidly rebuild his Army with citizen soldiers through the levee en masse.

He ultimately failed because of the following:

1. Napoleon failed to develop a Grand Strategy let alone an effective one. As long as his opponents continued to operate under the old construct of states and militaries were linked, he could achieve victory. But as soon as they modernized and linked their people with the state, Napoleon’s tactical

41 victories were no longer sufficient to defeat an enemy state. This is best seen in his invasion of Russia in 1812.

2. Napoleon’s enemies gained experience and learned his tactics. He failed to recognize this and adjust his own. This became evident as his opponents modified their tactics to counter his and use similar adaptations such as corps

3. His policies toward conquered nations only served to alienate the people and ruling class. This resulted in many nations forming alliances against Napoleon or conducted insurgencies such as Spain, Calabria, and the conquered portions of Russia. His continental system designed to cut trade off to Britain also alienated many European nations that relied on Britain for trade and caused more collateral damage.

His inability to link politics and Grand Strategy to his tactical and operational victories led to his ultimate failure.

Austerlitz: The French victory at Austerlitz effectively brought the Third Coalition to an end. On December 26, 1805, Austria and France signed the Treaty of Pressburg, which took Austria out of the war, reinforced the earlier treaties of Campo Formio and Lunéville, made Austria cede land to Napoleon's German allies, and imposed an indemnity of 40 million francs on the defeated Habsburgs. Russian troops were allowed to head back to home soil. Victory at Austerlitz also permitted the creation of the Confederation of the Rhine, a collection of German states intended as a buffer zone between France and the rest of Europe. In 1806, the Holy Roman Empire ceased to exist when Holy Roman Emperor Francis II kept Francis I of Austria as his only official title. These achievements, however, did not establish a lasting peace on the continent. Prussian worries about growing French influence in Central Europe sparked the War of the Fourth Coalition in 1806. Napoleon deceived the Coalition Army which was larger by about 10,000 into thinking he desired a treaty and that his right flank was weak. The Coalition fell for his trap and attacked his right. Napoleon then attacked their weakened center as the mass of their force was oriented on his right. This resulted in his victory. The allies suffered 37% casualties (27,000) and lost 180 guns. The Holy Roman Empire was destroyed and the Third Coalition was destroyed and France saved.

Battle of Jena-Austerlitz: The twin battles of Jena and Auerstedt (older name: Auerstädt) were fought on October 14, 1806 on the plateau west of the river Saale in today's Germany, between the forces of Napoleon I of France and Frederick William III of Prussia. The decisive defeat suffered by the Prussian army a mere nineteen days after its mobilization resulted in Prussia's elimination from the fourth anti- French coalition until the liberation war of 1813. The battles began when elements of Napoleon's main force encountered Hohenlohe's troops near Jena. Initially only 48,000 strong, the Emperor took advantage of his carefully-planned and flexible dispositions to rapidly build up a crushing superiority. Further north at Auerstedt, both Davout and Bernadotte received orders to come to Napoleon's aid.

42 Davout attempted to comply via Ekartsberg; Bernadotte, via Dornburg. Davout's route south, however, was blocked by the Prussian main force of 55,000 men, including the Prussian King, the Duke of Brunswick and Field Marshals von Möllendorf and von Kalckreuth. A savage battle ensued. Although outnumbered two to one, Davout's superbly trained and disciplined III Corps endured repeated attacks before eventually taking the offensive and putting the Prussians to flight.

Friedland: The Battle of Friedland (June 14, 1807) saw Napoleon Bonaparte's French army decisively defeat Count von Bennigsen''s Russian army about twenty-seven miles (43 km) southeast of Königsberg, effectively ending the War of the Fourth Coalition against Napoleon. After nearly twenty-three hours of fighting, the French took control of the battlefield and the Russian army retreated chaotically over the Łyna River, where many soldiers drowned while trying to escape. Napoleon used his eye for the terrain and mobile forces to drive the Russian from the field. Also effectively used artillery to mass fires. French casualties hovered around 8,000 while the Russians suffered nearly 20,000 in dead and wounded. This battle knocked Russia out of the Fourth Coalitions attempt to destroy Napoleon’s France ending this conflict as Prussia was alraeday taken out.

4. Ulysses S. Grant: (Tactically, Operationally, Strategically Excellent)

Grant first reached national prominence by taking Forts Henry and Donelson in 1862 in the first Union victories of the war. The following year, his celebrated campaign ending in the surrender of Vicksburg secured Union control of the Mississippi and—with the simultaneous Union victory at Gettysburg— turned the tide of the war in the North's favor. Named commanding general of the Federal armies in 1864, he implemented a coordinated strategy of simultaneous attacks aimed at destroying the South's ability to carry on the war. In 1865, after conducting a costly War of Attrition in the East, he accepted the surrender of his Confederate opponent Robert E. Lee at Appomattox Court House. Grant has been described by J.F.C. Fuller as "the greatest general of his age and one of the greatest strategists of any age." His Vicksburg Campaign in particular has been scrutinized by military specialists around the world..

Tactical Victories:

1. Capture of Fort Henry and Donelson in 1862 first Union victories. Captured 12,000 rebels and secured the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers for the Union.

2. Shiloh, 1862. Despite vicious Confederate attack, Grant stabilized his line and on the second day with reinforcements counterattacked and won.

3. Vicksburg, July 4, 1863. Grant in six week siege captured Vicksburg securing the Mississippi.

4. Orchestrated the victory at Chattanoga, 1863.

In March 1864, Grant was promoted to overall general in chief of all the armies of the United States. In this position he orchestrated the Unions strategy to defeat the South. This included his Overland Campaign designed to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia (Gen. Lee) and capture Richmond. Grant

43 also issued orders to Gen Sherman to capture Atlanta and conduct his March to the Sea. Gen. Sheridan received orders to destroy the Shenandoah Valley and Gen Early’s army there. The Overland Campaign included the Battles of the Wilderness, Spotslvania, Cold Harbor, Petersburg and ended at Appomattox.

Although some these operations proved costly, Grant understood that to win it required fighting a War of Attrition. Gen Lee and the South did not have the resources to continue to resist if pressure was maintained and they were not allowed to break contact to rebuild. He forced Lee to fight or lose Richmond. Grant constantly applied pressure and pursued Lee not allowing him to break contact. At the same time he instructed Sherman to destroy the South support and morale in his March to the Sea while Sheridan struck at the Shenandoah destroying that source of logistics. Grant realized the only way to defeat the South was a War of Attrition that broke the peoples will to continue to resist by destroying or threatening their very existence with total war. He broke from the strategy of War of Annihilation that previous commanders followed including Lee. His ability to command and move armies further demonstrate that he understood modern warfare as it had developed in his time.

Other popular commanders include: Alexander the Great, General Robert E. Lee, General Norman Schwarzkopf, Helmuth Von Moltke, General Petraeus (Heck Ya!!!), and

27.) Will Irregular Warfare degrade conventional warfighting capability? Or can it enhance it? What challenges and/or opportunities does IW present to conventional military forces? This question is from Twenty First Century Warfare, T504 Irregular Warfare I instructed by LTC A. Johnson.

There is the potential that IW could degrade conventional warfighting capability or enhance it. It is all up to the individual on how they want to answer this question. I plan to answer that IW although has the potential to degrade based on my experience it has enhanced the capabilities of the US Army. Whether it degrades or enhances is more a question of the leadership of the particular force involved in the conflict. It is also important to note that IW and conventional warfare are not mutually exclusive. IW or conventional warfare often contain elements of the other or is conducted simultaneously. A balanced force capable of meeting the demands of both is more desirable for a nations military.

Challenges: Very Complex, Long Duration

1. Strategy Development – must be holistic as it is not just a military conflict. Colin Gray claims that this is one of the US weakness. He claims we are good at fighting, but unable to develop persistent strategies to deal with IW. US focuses on the Military solution and not a political solution.

2. Identification of combatants is very difficult.

3. Cultural considerations. IW normally takes place in areas of the world of different cultures.

44 4. Style of warfare usually extremely different then that defined in conventional warfare. Forces involved in IW usually fighting in small units over large areas require a strong C2 backbone, extensive intelligence, mobility, and precision fires. They also must deal with complicated ROE and missions or tasks not normally associated with their conventional mission such as artillerymen patrolling as infantry.

5. Degradation of skill sets. Forces lose some of their conventional skills as a result of not performing their normal mission, operating from secure FOBs, or never maneuvering as part of larger formations.

6. Usually long in nature and require political will to last the duration.

Advantages:

1. Military becomes more flexible, agile and adaptable to meet the challenges of IW. IW caused or allowed numerous changes to be executed across the military (transformation, modularity, and FCS)

2. IW requires interagency approach so not just the big “M”. Although the military uses does the majority of the lifting. Share the effort and likely end with political solution.

3. Combat is still combat and warfare is still warfare. The complexity of IW only serves to hone the skills of the forces involved. They still execute the principles of war and must have the warrior skills required to fight a conventional, but are adding to them to meet the IW mission. Conventional skills are only amplified in IW. They still shoot, move, and communicate. (Still execute calls for fire, convoys, and missions involving other units or agencies)

4. Door is open to a wide range of solutions to solve the problem, not just warfare. Asymmetric operations should be possible and not limited to conventional warfare unless nation limits itself based on its values or something else. (Financial, Cyber, Information warfare)

5. Less destructive or require less force then conventional wars. (Militarily Cheaper)

6. IW hones intelligence, logistics, and communications capabilities. IW further identifies requirements, shortcomings, and gaps that need to be improved.

Again I think, how this question is answered is up to each individual and his opinion on whether IW degrades or enhances conventional warfighting.

The following is a question from last year that was similar and following that is some of the definitions and material from our classes.

45 Is the US Army in danger of over optimizing itself for COIN at the expense of traditional war fighting capabilities? Support your answer.

Yes, if the future organization, systems, doctrine, and equipment necessary for traditional warfrighting are scarificed in favor of COIN oriented alternatives. The Army must find the balance between the two capabilities.

Although LIC / COIN may very well be the most likely scenario the Army will find itself in, it is probably far from being the scenario with the most serious repercussions.

Dorner- “Logic of Failure” “It is unwise, however, to abandon an established course of action too soon. Persistence often pays off, and taking the middle path between clinging stubbornly to a doomed plan and giving up a fundamentally good one at the first sign of difficulty is not easy. Finding a path, though, will give us greater chances for success.”

On a larger scale, the US Army has (momentarily) abandoned many of its traditional warfighting capabilities, primarily out of necessity to address the task at hand. Dorner might conclude that the Army is falling into ‘repair service’ behavior, addressing only the problem in front of it at the time. This can lead to the wrong problems being solved (for example, concerning Iraq, developing safer equipment to ensure better survivability in the environment rather than developing systems and training that address why the environment is hostile to begin with).

We should guard against a complete shift away from conventional operations. After years of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the Gaza Strip and West Bank territories, IDF ground forces were tactically unprepared and untrained to fight against a determined Hezbollah force that conducted what was, in many ways, a conventional, fixed-position defense.

Definitions and concepts of IW:

Colin Gray “War is war and strategy is strategy - The kinds of warfare are of no relevance whatever to the authority of the general theory of strategy. In short, irregular warfare, waged by a range of irregular enemies, is governed by exactly the same lore as is regular warfare, viewed strategically”

46 Gray, Colin S. Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006. pp 1-55 http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB650.pdf

On April 17, 2006, the deputy secretary of defense approved a working definition of irregular warfare as a basis for planning and doctrine analysis: A form of warfare that has as its objective the credibility and/or the legitimacy of the relevant political authority with the goal of undermining or supporting that authority. Irregular warfare favors indirect approaches, though It may employ the full range of military and other capabilities to seek asymmetric advantages, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence and will.

FM 3-0 (doctrinal review and approval group, or Drag version), Full Spectrum Operations, describes IW as merely one operational theme within the spectrum of conflict.

Moreover, the Joint Operating Concept lists the constituent activities of IW as follows:

1. Insurgency.

2. Counterinsurgency (COIN).

3. Unconventional Warfare (UW).

4. Terrorism.

5. Counterterrorism (CT).

6. Foreign Internal Defense (FID).

7. Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations.

8. Strategic Communications.

9. Psychological Operations (PSYOP).

10. Civil-Military Operations (CMO).

11. Information Operations (IO).

12. Intelligence and Counterintelligence Activities.

13. Transnational Criminal Activities, including narco-trafficking, illicitarms dealing and illegal financial transactions that support or sustain IW.

47 14. Law-enforcement activities focused on countering irregularadversaries.3

Conventional Warfare: The IW JOC appropriately and necessarily identifies the following working definition for conventional or traditional warfare: A form of warfare between states that employs direct military confrontation to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s warmaking capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary’s government or policies. The focus of conventional military operations is normally an adversary’s armed forces with the objective of influencing the adversary’s government. It generally assumes that the people indigenous to the operational area are non-belligerents and will accept whatever political outcome the belligerent governments impose, arbitrate or negotiate. A fundamental military objective in conventional military operations is to minimize civilian interference in those operations. (working definition.)4

Hasler, Jeffrey. "Defining War: New doctrinal definitions of irregular, conventional, and unconventional warfare." Special Warfare 20:2 (March-April 2007); https://courses.leavenworth.army.mil/@@e52d40b7945c4e24eac5349b6cf6afaf/courses/1/AMSP_200 8-002/content/_388020_1/Defining%20War_SpecWar_MAR07.pdf

IW is not a lesser-included form of traditional warfare. Rather, IW encompasses a spectrum of warfare where the nature and characteristics are significantly different from traditional war. It includes, but is not limited to, activities such as insurgency, counterinsurgency (COIN), terrorism, and counterterrorism. Traditional warfare and IW are not mutually exclusive; both forms of warfare may be present in a given conflict.

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3, 1 August 2007.

48 https://courses.leavenworth.army.mil/@@e52d40b7945c4e24eac5349b6cf6afaf/courses/1/AMSP_200 8-002/content/_388021_1/AFDD2-3.pdf

Samual P. Huntington “The United States is a big country, and we should fight wars in a big war. One of our great advantages is our mass; we should not hesitate to use it … Bigness, not brains, is our advantage, and we should exploit it. If we have to intervene, we should intervene with overwhelming force.”

28.) How did Friction and change disrupt strategic and operational planning during the execution of a campaign? Provide examples.

Friction:

“Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper. … The tremendous Friction, which cannot, as in mechanics, be reduced to a few points, is everywhere in contact with chance, and brings about effects that cannot be measured … One, for example is weather. … Action in war is like movement in a resistant element. Just as the simplest and most natural of movements, walking, cannot easily be performed in water, so in war it is difficult for normal efforts to achieve even moderate results. … Friction, as we choose to call it, is the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult.” Clausewitz

The unforeseen and often unknown events that cause resistance, impede, delay, or prevent the execution of an operation as planned or according to schedule.

Barbarossa: The most glaring examples of Friction disrupting strategic and operational planning during the execution of a campaign can be identified in Operation Barborosa. Operation Barbarossa started on June 22 1941 and was Nazi Germanys attempt to defeat Russia in a single campaign at the beginning of World War II.

B C German – German – Very Russian – Strategy of Russian – There was Arguably the Germans aro Strategy of effective in the initial Exhaustion. Dominated clear linkage between attempted to adapt too b n annihilation. No stages but hampered byby Stalin but Zukov a operational and much and were unable arv real strategic interference. central character. strategic aims. The to do so successfully o e synchronization Confusion over Utilized distance and Russian terrain and due to the scale of the ssn above operational aims – manpower. Strong infrastructure favored problem and the a ti Army/Army destruction of military leadership – Great the defense. inconsistency of their o group level. vs. terrain seizure Patriotic War. solution. The Russians n Failed to (Moscow). Lack of Movement of industry used the scale to their alappreciate the operational end state. east of the Urals. advantage – it formed

49 scale of the Objectives kept shifting. an essential part of their operation. strategy. They were Dominated by able to adapt much Hitler more successfully.

Friction:

1. Friction occurred almost immediately in strategic and operational planning due to the civil-military relations between Hitler and the Army as they disputed strategy, timing, and the objectives. The German Army wanted to take Moscow first in a decisive campaign to knock Russia out of the war. Hitler desired to seize the resources in the Ukraine and the Baltics as well as to destroy the Russian Army. Both groups failed to develop termination criteria or a concept of how to defeat Russia other then through decisive victory. They also did not understand the true logistics requirements and the enemies capabilities or strategy in there planning.

2. Weather prevented the operation from starting on time and as a result was about a month behind schedule, which had a drastic effect as winter approached toward the end of the campaign and the Germans were un prepared.

3. Panzer or armored units outpaced their infantry and logistical support causing delays as they had to wait for these units to close the gaps. Giving time for Russians to move forces and prepare defenses.

4. The size, space, and geography was immense and understated in their planning especially for logistics and timelines. Soviets able to trade space for time. Soviet partisans also played havoc in the German rear areas stressing German logistics as well as causing forces and resources to be used against them. Many logistics elements still used horses to resupply, plus as the logistic tail grew more resources were required just to support it.

5. The Germans realized, that they underestimated the Soviet strength and capabilities to mobilize. A debate broke out between Hitler and Generals over whether to pursue a strategy of taking Moscow (Generals) or doing economic damage by seizing Kharkov, Donets, natural resources and link up with the Fins (Hitler). A constant swapping of objectives as the Generals and Hitler squabbled over strategy resulted in the diffusion of the strategy as key assets or units such as Panzer Armies (2nd Panzer Army moved south to attack Kiev and then back north for the push to Moscow) were moved around which prevented any strategy being resourced or followed fully.

6. Russia determined Japan did not pose a threat, which freed forces for use against the Germans.

7. Russia’s ability to move forces and resupply with rail greatly assisted them as well as their ability to move their industry out of the reach of the Germans.

50 The German planning and campaign were flawed and plagued with numerous Friction points and challenges because of their failure to understand the complexity and immensity of the task. They failed to identify the Russian Centers of Gravity and the Russian strategy to conduct a War of Attrition against the Germans who were attempting to win decisive battles of encirclement. This resulted in Friction hindering the German plans or causing them to divert their efforts while it bought the Russians more time.

Midway The Japanese encountered numerous Friction points in their attempt to take Midway from 4-7 June 1942.

Friction:

1. Japanese encountered Friction in some of the forces that they planned on using in the battle were damaged during the Battle of Coral Sea and were thus not available or not operating with experienced crews and pilots.

2. Strategic planning differences between Japanese Navy and Army as well as between the Japanese Combined Fleet under Yamamoto and the Navy’s Imperial High Commande caused delays and multiple adaptations to the plan.

3. Japanese believed the Carrier Yorktown was sunk at the Battle of Coral Sea and did not figure it into the force ratio. They also overestimated the importance of Midway to the Americans and that by seizing the island they could draw the remaining two US carriers into a fight to be destroyed.

4. Japanese carrier operations and design greatly hindered their operations to maintain sufficient CAP, launch and recover aircraft, effectively rearm, and conduct damage control when hit. Their design and doctrine also hindered their ability to effectively.

5. Yamamto operated his fleet in dispersed separate groups that were not mutually supporting and difficult to manage due to listening silence. This tactic was used to insure surprise and show a minimal force in an attempt to lure the US fleet out and into a fight. The knock out blow would be delivered by his battleships after his five fleet carriers softened up Midway and the US fleet.

6. Forces diverted to attack Aleutian islands which served to further reduce forces for the main effort and complicate the operation.

7. Japanese reconnaissance aircraft were not properly allocated and not on time. US fleet was not located promptly.

8. Recommendation from raid on Midway for a second strike resulted in rearming planes for land attack as the American Fleet or air attack had not yet begun. As this was occurring the Crusier Tone reported

51 identifying part of the American fleet. Friction developed as the decision was needed on whether to launch against the fleet as is, or prepare to land aircraft returning from attacks on Midway, or as doctrine stated wait and attempt to prepare for a complete strike force could be formed that was properly armed and escorted by fighters. He choose the doctrinal approach. Either way the US forces strike was already on its way and the Japanese caught with their carriers crowded with planes, bombs, and fuel.

9. Misunderstanding of his strength and damage to the US forces caused Yamato to retreat in defeat despite still having numerical superiority in surface ships.

Operation Anaconda: US attack into Shai Khowt valley in order to destroy al Qaide (AQ) and Taliban (TB) safehaven between Zormat and the Pakistan border. The valley served as a safe haven for AQ and TB in very defensible terrain used since the Soviets with escape routes into Pakistan. Sympathetic locals from the village of Zormat provided logistic support.

Friction:

1. Chain of command issues. Their were multiple chains of command between the SF and conventional forces that resulted in confusion in planning.

2. Stove piped intelligence resulted in not everyone having the same information. Intel also failed to properly assess and identify the threat that caused serious issues on the objective as US forces faced heavy indirect and machine gun fire.

3. Relied heavily on indigenous forces that a failed to accomplish their mission and reach their objective. Southern group failed to block exfil routes.

4. Fratricide on SF group leading indigenous force in north. Prevented them from reaching blocking positions and cost US lives.

5. Air Force was not brought into the planning or properly coordinated that resulted in failures within the air support.

6. Long distances to the battle resulted in the establishment of FARPS and long flight times. It also stressed the communications do to the distances and prevented higher levels of command from understanding the situation in the battle.

7. SF team going into Takir Gar lost one man out the back of CH-47 when it was engaged which changed mission and priority.

8. Two CH-47 where shot down that forced changes in the mission.

9. Numerous AQ/TB successfully escaped to Pakistan or blended in with local population.

52 29.) In your opinion, does the Department of Defense or United States Army need to restructure to include permanent advisory units or a return of the Military Assistance and Advisory Group(s)? Why or why not? What are some of the considerations, advantages, and disadvantages of these proposals?

Class T506, LTC Andrew Johnson

Haywood, John, C. Challenges associated with Long Term US Presence Advising Foreign Nations

This answer can also be answered in a vairty of ways and depends on the opinion of the individual answering it. My answer is that the DOD or Army does not need to restructure to create permanent advisory units or a return of the Military Assistance and Advisory Groups. It is better to maintain a balance of forces that can be organized to meet the mission. Anything that is to specific or specialized has problems adapting or can be targeted through an asymmetric approach or likely to have a single point of failure. The US is capable of forming ADHOC organization to execute this mission to train another states Army, but to do nation building requires other agencies and therefore if a permanent structure should be created independently or as part of an organization like the department of state. Secondly the US Army has the Special Forces whose mission it is to train indigenous people or other state’s armies. The conventional forces should augment or support the SF community in executing this mission if the size or scope is to large for the SF community. The SF could provide the HQ and oversight to conventional forces executing the mission. Something to consider is does the problem require a security solution or something more.

Advantages:

1. Permanent structure that would not have to be created each time needed.

2. Experts in training or developing other states. (a core competency)

3. Develop doctrine, training, facilities, and equipment to execute the mission.

4. Reduction of demand on combat forces. Requirement to deploy reduced and training requirements reduced.

Disadvantages:

1. Cost and expensive to build new force with specific narrow mission.

2. Special Forces already designated as the force to do this mission. Why duplicate the effort when all that may be needed is adjustment to doctrine or operations?

53 3. Adhoc organization allows each to be specifically tailored to meet the situation or requirement.

4. Permanent military structure tends to focus on military solutions and often does not perform nation building very well or identify the whole solution. It must include the whole DIME and interagency.

5. Permanent advisor group would take away from the size and resources of the forces needed to defend the nation. Secondly regular forces would still likely be required to provide security and logistic support degrading their capabilities to execute their missions.

30.) Given a scenario, describe how you would develop your plan to plan.

There was no class instruction that I could locate on how to plan to plan. So this is my best shot. If you have anything better please pass it on to the rest of the class.

Planning to plan is the development of a framework in order to accomplish and execute the planning process.

A good place to start is with the instructions found in the MDMP process under Receipt of Mission.

1. Alert the staff.

2. Gather tools.

3. Update staff estimates.

4. Perform an initial assessment.

5. Issue the initial guidance.

6. Issue the initial warning order

Several key considerations for planning to plan:

1. Time available to execute planning. Develop initial timeline. (one-thirds/two-thirds rule)

2. Where is the planning going to be conducted? Planning cell or group? SPU-7?

3. Do you understand what is being asked for or the problem? Do you have a warning order or commander’s guidance?

4. Is the planning be conducted parallel or collaborative (simultaneously) with a higher headquarters?

5. Based on the above information what type of planning are you going to do? Is it MDMP, MCPP, JOPP, or is it design? Do you need to modify the planning process such as abbreviated MDMP in order to meet timelines or constraints?

54 6. What is the planning horizon (short range(commitment planning), mid-range(contingency), or long-range (orientation planning)?

7. Forward or reverse planning? Begin at start point and work forward or begin at end and plan way back to starting point.

8. Identify any initial gaps or planning pitfalls.

31.) What should be the roles of indigenous and external forces in COIN? What are the implications of these roles in light of the recent agreement for US forces to withdraw from Iraq by 2011?

REF: T512A, COIN I

- Readings:

-- Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, Chaps 4-7.

-- Kitson Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping.” Chaps 3-7 (SAMS issue)

T512B COIN II

-- Seth Jones, Counerinsurgency in Afghanistan, RAND study

Also reference TCC classes on indirect approach and insurgency.

- Galula’s Laws of COIN (page 74-80)

1. Support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgents as it is for the insurgents

2. Support is gained through an active minority (p. 75-77)

3. Support of the population is conditional on the security situation

Also consider the three key variables to a successful counterinsurgency posed by Jones’ RAND study:

55 1. Capability of indigenous security forces, especially police 2. Local governance 3. External support for insurgents, including sanctuary.

These “laws” and variables suggest some answers to the above question. First of all, there will be a set of distinct grievances against the government that have led to the insurgency. Only the indigenous people will fully understand those grievances and their history. As such, popular support will be largely defined by how indigenous forces play their part in dealing with these grievances as well as the insurgency.

Likewise, the presence of external forces, although essential, will likely be part of the problem that the government will have to deal with. For instance, American presence in Iraq is the source of much of the grievances and has motivated many to fight on the side of the insurgency. On the other hand, though, the American presence was the only thing keeping the country of Iraq from falling into civil war. It is a Catch-22.

Given all of this, the role of indigenous forces will be to seek the support of the population by organizing the favorable minority (to use Galula’s discussion) to mobilize the population against the insurgent.

As for developing a favorable security situation, again, the indigenous forces must play a key role.

Given all of this—the role of external forces is to assist indigenous forces in their task. At first, external forces may be the primary forces that establish security, while indigenous forces build capacity, legitimacy, and influence. As time goes on, indigenous forces will have to establish primacy while external forces fade into the background and reduce their influence.

External forces will also have to help the indigenous government face up to its role in the grievances that got the insurgency started in the first place. As we’ve seen in Iraq, US forces do just as much work shaping the government and how the armed forces do their job as they do actually fighting the counterinsurgency.

- Popular perceptions of the external forces are critical to understand. External forces must actively try to understand how the populace views them and what their influence is. For instance, US patrols through Iraqi towns was reassuring to some—it meant that the security situation was favorable. In Afghanistan, this has the opposite effect. Thus, external forces must carefully analyze their effect on the situation so that what they do betters the situation.

32. Synthesize your understanding of the enemy. How is he different from us? How should we apply this understanding to conducting operations in Iraq, Afghan, or Africa? Enemy as individual

56 - Complex set of internal motivations and factors that make a person decide whether or not to engage in combat - Some individuals are motivated by ideology—in the case of religion, as part of a supernatural conflict. These, you probably can’t reason with. - Some individuals are motivated by material concerns--motivations which are catalyzed by religious rhetoric, xenophobic beliefs, or other cultural influences. Many of these individuals view their participation in combat as a rational choice—therefore, there is a potential to reason with them. With these individuals, the idea is to figure out the root of their decision-making behind taking up arms and either remove the concern, offer a better alternative, offer a “least worst” alternative, or reason with the person away from that concern. - Some individuals are coerced into fighting. These individuals may or may not share ideals with those who coerce them to fight. They cannot be easily lumped into a category for “fixing,” because their true motivations are unknown. Some will gladly turn away from fighting and even against those that coerced them. Others will exhibit a kind of “Stockholm Syndrome” mentality and refuse to cooperate. - In all cases, the enemy (as an individual) has certain needs (Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, for example) that they seek to satisfy. In general, the more abstract the need, the more difficult it is to displace, replace, or rationalize.

Enemy as organization

- Comprised of an amalgam of these individuals, the enemy as an organization is both a single entity with a single voice, but also a divisible entity with many differing factions within. - An analysis of the type of organization is critical o Some organize with a cellular structure. This type of structure can be effective at quick, adaptive operations but has trouble massing effects. Likewise, they are often under no burden to communicate the truth about situations. In that case, as long as their actions damage their enemy, then it doesn’t matter what their message is. o Some organizations may be loosely organized, but they follow the direction from a more centralized leader or leadership. In these cases, the organization’s leaders become the central feature that organizes action—their removal may solve the problem, or it may create a power vacuum into which someone else will emerge - Viewed systemically…the organization can be looked at this way: o Actions taken by the organization (i.e. plant and explode IEDs) (systemic outputs) o Motivation for fighting (ideology, $$$, etc;) (systemic input) o Actors within the organization who play certain roles (the IED planters, the security team, the financier, etc;) o The relationships between those actors.

Enemy as ideology

- Links between actors that can be attacked - May not be something that can be reasoned with, but can be dealt with

57 - As with AQ, the ideology can be simple and direct with a definable end state (The Caliphate) which is easy to organize people behind. - Ideology cannot be countered only with physical action…that only serves to solidify one’s resolve. Instead, ideology must be countered with ideology expressed physically, cognitively, and even spiritually.

Enemy as self

- The enemy can be as much our creation, as an actual entity. Our own faults, misconceptions, prejudices, and biases can operate to create enemies where none may have existed.

- We often see others through American-colored lenses and conclude that they are somehow lesser—as a result, we inadvertently create in our minds the concept of others as enemies.

- In doing so, we make them less than human, in many ways, and fall prey to the danger of underestimating them.

- In addition, in an organizational setting, we can let organizational norms and processes impede sound decision-making and hard choices leading to easy “technical solutions” employed to solve complex problems.

References: RCD R314 “Thinking about our cognitive boundaries by reflecting on difference: Rival as Rationale”

- The course focused on understanding Arabs as an identity. We read The Arab Mind, “Forgiveness and Reconciliation: The Religious Dimension,” and “Fighting Identities: Why we are Losing our Wars.”

- Bottom line of this course was to identify that getting a clear definition about who an Arab is is extremely difficult. As planners, we will need to understand that our “enemy” will see the following very differently than us:

-- war and peace, success and failure, time, space, distance, history, power, government, family, gender, freedom, as well as victory versus defeat.

We apply this understanding to our operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Africa by consciously trying to understand the culture in which we operate as it sees itself. Defining those terms above as the “enemy” defines them will help us know the enemy better, as well as the environment in which we operate.

58 33.) What points do Mao and Che make that remain pertinent today? Is their work of any value to the modern insurgent? To modern counterinsurgency planners?

REF: T511 Insurgency (10 Sep 08)

Readings: Walter Laqueur, The Voices of Terror

Mao and Che both discuss ways that the insurgent goes about getting the population on their side as they try to fight the existing government. Mao argues for the 3 stage approach:

- First, establish a political base amongst the peoples

- Second, begin guerilla warfare and mobilization of the populace

- Third, once strong enough, begin “Insurgent” strategic counteroffensive to force the enemies strategic retreat.

Mao’s writings are pertinent today as they help shed light on various tactics used within and throughout these stages. For example, Gen Petraeus’ COIN guidelines to soldiers in Iraq are not unlike Mao’s direction to his forces as they began to widen their political base. Both sets of rules were designed to establish control of the populace in a way that honored their culture and their dignity. Likewise, Mao’s 3 stages can help us perceive the beginnings of an insurgent threat before it turns overtly violent.

Che took a different view. He argued that the revolutionary process should begin first with violence against the government. In doing so, the government will overreact to maintain power and will lose legitimacy. This will lead to the popular support for the insurgent (people are encouraged by the capability of the insurgency—as opposed to the urban terrorist strategy in which the populace is enraged by the government’s overreaction.) This was called the FOCO strategy. It is dependent on 3 key premises:

- Enemy will struggle to maintain power; time is on the side of the insurgent as their force grows and causes more problems for the counterinsurgent

- (Latin America specific) peasants are, by nature of their treatment by the upper class, primed for fighting in the liberation effort.

- This is a continental struggle—the insurgency will cross international boundaries as government forces fight harder to remove it.

59 Che is applicable today in that there are still insurgent forces that try to utilize the FOCO strategy (in spite of the fact that it has been tried >200 times and has yet to work). Our efforts to fight this kind of insurgency can capitalize on the FOCO strategy’s failure rate in our strategic communications. We can also, as external forces, help moderate the indigenous government’s response to insurgent attacks. In doing so, we can help the government act in ways that solidify its legitimacy in the eyes of the populace.

Modern insurgents can look to both Mao and Che to gain an understanding of ways to influence the population. Mao, in particular, charts the course for slow development of a political base of support before moving forward. As an insurgent, this understanding is key to being patient in establishing the conditions for the second stage of the insurgency.

Modern insurgents can look to Che to understand that a military only focus will not inherently gain the support of the population. Given it’s failure rate, the FOCO strategy cannot be pursued without a concerted effort placed on gaining popular support (either active or passive).

COIN planners can use both Mao and Che to get an understanding of the type of insurgency they face and the steps insurgents may take. For example, COIN planners may reference Che as they begin planning for their responses to insurgent attacks. Since many of these attacks are designed to de-legitimize the government, COIN planners must plan the governmental response in a way that bolsters governmental legitimacy and de-legitimizes the insurgent. Thus, Mao and Che can be very helpful in informing the kind of strategic communications needed to gain popular support.

34.) What is the difference between “Classic” and Islamic Fundamentalist Insurgencies? How does it affect the US approach in terms of DIME? “Classic” insurgencies:

I could not actually find a definition of “classic” insurgencies, per se. Perhaps the best articulation of the various types of insurgencies, apart from Islamic Fundamentalist Insurgencies, comes from Bard O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism. He lists the following types of insurgencies:

- Anarchist: Believe that all authority patterns are unnecessary and illegitimate - Egalitarian: Initially seek to impose a new system based on the ultimate value of distributional equality and centrally controlled structures designed to mobilize the people and radically transform the social structure w/in an existing political community. - Traditionalist: Seek to establish a system based on primordial and sacred values rooted in ancestral ties and religion. 2 features: o Emphasis on values and norms that legitimatize small, centralized ruling elite o Rest of the population passive participation in politics

60 - -- Sub-type is known as reactionary-traditionalist o This fits in with the Islamic Fundamentalist strain—groups who seek to reestablish an ancient political system that they idealize as the golden age – the Caliphate - Apocalyptic-Utopian: Envisage a world order as the result of an apocalypse precipitated by their acts of terrorism (read: Aum Shinrikyo) - Pluralist: Aim to establish a system that emphasizes freedom, liberty and compromise - Secessionist: Seek to completely withdraw from the political system they are currently in. - Reformist: Attempt to use violence to achieve some measure of change in the political system…not to overthrow it - Preservationist: Attempt to use violence against nonruling groups and authorities that are trying to effect change. - Commercialist: Typically led by warlords, they use violence to seize and control political power by the acquisition of material resources

NOTE: O’Neill identifies 5 problems to identifying types of insurgent movements: changing goals, conflicting goals, misleading rhetoric, ambiguous goals, and confusion of ultimate and intermediate goals.

Islamic Fundamentalist:

Establish Caliphate

Loosely organized in a networked organization

Based on Koranic ideal – one source generates ideological harmony

Cultural norms which reject the presence of foreigners, or justify the use of force against another (Pashtunwali) can be crafted into Islamic narrative

IO is key—terror is an end in and of itself (Ref: S.K. Malik, Quranic Concept of War)

Key point here is that this group falls in O’Neill’s characterization as a reactionary- traditionalist. The important thing, though, is that most of those who lead the Islamic Fundamentalist movements do not suffer from changing goals, conflicting goals (to a point), misleading rhetoric, ambiguous goals, or confusion between ultimate and intermediate goals. Because everything can be linked to the Koran (in its most extreme writings) an Islamic Fundamentalist insurgency does not need to be extremely well organized (in a hierarchical sense). The ideology of all insurgents acts as an organizing principle and permits highly decentralized operations. Other “classic” insurgencies do not necessarily benefit from such a clear principle for organizing action.

61 Because of the differing nature of various types of insurgencies…a careful mix of DIME must be applied. Once identified, the type of insurgency may suggest the type of actions along D, I, M, and E that must be taken to combat it. With an Islamic Fundamentalist Insurgency, however, this may not be so easy. First of all, at its most extreme, Islamic Fundamentalists see everything the US does as anathema to their God. For those people, there can be no appropriate mix of DIME that will change their beliefs. For others, there might still be an appropriate approach (information-heavy) that will hold sway and change their approach— mostly, this will do less with diplomacy, military action, economic initiatives, or even “information operations.” It will have to be some kind of cultural reconciliation between belief systems, if that is at all possible.

35.) What is the importance of ideology, cause, or narrative to the insurgent? How can the counterinsurgent use Insurgent Ideology to mitigate their operations or defeat them?

1-14 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 15 December 2006

Ideology and Narrative

1-75. Ideas are a motivating factor in insurgent activities. Insurgencies can gather recruits and amass popular support through ideological appeal (including religious or other cultural identifiers). Promising potential recruits often include individuals receptive to the message that the West is dominating their religion through puppet governments and local surrogates. The insurgent group channels anti-Western anger and provides members with identity, purpose, and community, in addition to physical, economic, and psychological security. The movement’s ideology explains its followers’ difficulties and provides a means to remedy those ills. The most powerful ideologies tap latent, emotional concerns of the populace. Examples of these concerns include religiously based objectives, a desire for justice, ethnic aspirations, and a goal of liberation from foreign occupation. Ideology provides a prism, including a vocabulary and analytical categories, through which followers perceive their situation.

1-76. The central mechanism through which ideologies are expressed and absorbed is the narrative. A narrative is an organizational scheme expressed in story form. Narratives are central to representing identity, particularly the collective identity of religious sects, ethnic groupings, and tribal elements. Stories about a community’s history provide models of how actions and consequences are linked. Stories are often the basis for strategies and actions, as well as for interpreting others’ intentions. Insurgent organizations like Al Qaeda use narratives very effectively in developing legitimating ideologies. In the Al Qaeda narrative, for example, Osama bin Laden depicts himself as a man purified in the mountains of Afghanistan who is

62 gathering and inspiring followers and punishing infidels. In the collective imagination of Bin Laden and his followers, they are agents of Islamic history who will reverse the decline of the umma [Muslim community] and bring about its inevitable triumph over Western imperialism. For them, Islam can be renewed both politically and theologically only through jihad [holy war] as they define it.

1-77. Though most insurgencies have been limited to nation-states, there have been numerous transnational insurgencies. Likewise, external powers have tried to tap into or create general upheaval by coordinating national insurgencies to give them a transnational character. Al Qaeda’s ongoing activities also attempt to leverage religious identity to create and support a transnational array of insurgencies. Operational-level commanders address elements of the transnational movement within their joint operations areas. Other government agencies and higher level officials deal with the national-strategic response to such threats.

1-78. As noted earlier, insurgent groups often employ religious concepts to portray their movement favorably and mobilize followers in pursuit of their political goals. For example, the Provisional Irish Republican Army frequently used Roman Catholic iconography in its publications and proclamations, although many of its members were not devout Catholics. In other cases, a religious ideology may be the source of an insurgent group’s political goals. This is the case in Al Qaeda’s apparent quest to “reestablish the Caliphate.” For many Moslems, the Caliphate produces a positive image of the golden age of Islamic civilization. This image mobilizes support for Al Qaeda among some of the most traditional Muslims while concealing the details of the movement’s goal. In fact, Al Qaeda’s leaders envision the “restored Caliphate” as a totalitarian state similar to the pre-2002 Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

1-79. Religious extremist insurgents, like many secular radicals and some Marxists, frequently hold an all-encompassing worldview; they are ideologically rigid and uncompromising, seeking to control their members’ private thought, expression, and behavior. Seeking power and believing themselves to be ideologically pure, violent religious extremists often brand those they consider insufficiently orthodox as enemies. For example, extreme, violent groups like Al Qaeda routinely attack Islamic sects that profess beliefs inconsistent with their religious dogma. Belief in an extremist ideology fortifies the will of believers. It confirms the idea, common among hard- core transnational terrorists, that using unlimited means is appropriate to achieve their often unlimited goals. Some ideologies, such as the one underlying the culture of martyrdom, maintain that using such means will be rewarded.

1-80. Cultural knowledge is essential to waging a successful counterinsurgency. American ideas of what is “normal” or “rational” are not universal. To the contrary, members of other societies often have different notions of rationality, appropriate behavior, level of religious devotion, and

63 norms concerning gender. Thus, what may appear abnormal or strange to an external observer may appear as self-evidently normal to a group member. For this reason, counterinsurgents— especially commanders, planners, and small-unit leaders—should strive to avoid imposing their ideals of normalcy on a foreign cultural problem.

1-81. Many religious extremists believe that the conversion, subjugation, or destruction of their ideological opponents is inevitable. Violent extremists and terrorists are often willing to use whatever means necessary, even violence against their own followers, to meet their political goals. Nevertheless, they often pursue their ends in highly pragmatic ways based on realistic assumptions. Not all Islamic insurgents or terrorists are fighting for a global revolution. Some are pursing regional goals, such as a establishing a Sunni Arab-dominated Iraq or replacing Israel with an Arab Palestinian state. And militant groups with nationalist as well as religious agendas seek cease fires and participate in elections when such actions support their interests.

1-82. In that light, commanders must consider the presence of religious extremism in the insurgents’ ideology when evaluating possible friendly and enemy courses of action. Enemy courses of action that may appear immoral or irrational to Westerners may be acceptable to extremists. Moreover, violent extremists resist changing their worldview; for them, coexistence or compromise is often unacceptable, especially when the movement is purist (like Al Qaeda), in an early stage, or small. However, some extremists are willing to overlook their worldview to achieve short-term goals. Terrorist groups, regardless of their ideology, have cooperated with seemingly incompatible groups. For example, the Palestinian group Black September used German terrorists to perform reconnaissance of the Olympic Village before its 1972 attack on Israeli athletes. Currently, the Taliban is engaged in the drug trade in South Asia. Al Qaeda cooperates with a variety of diverse groups to improve its global access as well.

1-83. The rigid worldview of such extremist groups means that friendly actions intended to create good will among the populace are unlikely to affect them. Similarly, if a group’s ideology is so strong that it dominates all other issues, dialog and negotiation will probably prove unproductive. The challenge for counterinsurgents in such cases is to identify the various insurgent groups and determine their motivations. Commanders can then determine the best course of action for each group. This includes identifying the groups with goals flexible enough to allow productive negotiations and determining how to eliminate the extremists without alienating the populace.

64 Section 2: Books Short Notes

Section 2: Books Short Notes...... 65 Alexander, John B., The Changing Nature of Warfare, the Factors Mediating Future Conflict, and Implications for SOF...... 71 Applbaum, Kalman, Russell W. Belk, John Clammer, Roy Dilley, James H. McDonald, Daniel Miller, Benjamin Orlove. The Sweetness of Salvation: Consumer Marketing and the Liberal- Bourgeois Theory of Needs [and Comments and Reply]...... 71 Axelrod, Robert and Michael D. Cohen, Harnessing Complexity: Organizational Implications of a Scientific Frontier...... 71 Baldwin, David A., "Power and International Relations"...... 72 Handbook of International Relations, Ch. 9, pp. 177-188 [11 pages]...... 72 Beeson, Mark “Civil Military Relations in Indonesia and the Philippines - Will the Thai Coup Prove Contagious?”...... 72 Benson, Kevin and Christopher Trash, "Declaring Victory: Planning Exit Strategies for Peace Operations"...... 72 Birtle, Andrew J.. U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860- 1941...... 73 Bledsoe, Elizabeth E., MAJ, U.S. Army, “The Use of Culture in Operational Planning”...... 73 Bouandel, Youcef, "Algeria's Presidential Election of April 2004: a backward step in the democratization process or a forward step toward stability"...... 74 Boykin, Willam G. “Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Legislation: Why Was it Passed and Have the Voids Been Filed?”...... 74 Boykin, Willam G. “The Origins of the United States Special Operations Command”...... 74 Brett, Gary,. The Nervous Liberals: Propaganda Anxieties from World War I to the Cold War74 Bush, George W., National Security Strategy of the United States, March 2006...... 75 Byers, Michael, War Law,...... 75 Challans, Timothy. Awakening Warrior: Revolution in the Ethics of Warfare...... 76 Clausewitz, Carl von, On War...... 76 Cook, Martin, The Moral Warrior...... 77 Cooper, Matthew, The German Army...... 77 Cordesmann, Anthony, " Iraq, Grand Strategy, and the Lessons of Military History"...... 78 Lee Lecture in Military History, Ohio State Univ, October 2004...... 78 Coughlin for Beginners...... 78 Craig, Gordon A., "Delbrück: The Military Historian," Makers of Modern Strategy...... 79

65 Cubbage, T.L., "German Misapprehensions Regarding Overlord: Understanding Failure in the Estimative Process"...... 79 de Atkine, Norvelle, "Why Arabs Lose Wars"...... 80 Dewey, John, How We Think...... 80 Dörner, Dietrich, the Logic of Failure...... 80 Dower, John W., Embracing Defeat...... 81 Drea, Edward J., In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army...... 81 Easterbrook, Greg, "The End of War?"...... 82 The New Republic, vol 232, no 20, May 30 2005, pp 18-22. (EBSCO) [4 pages]...... 82 Easton, David, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems,"...... 82 Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941...... 82 Fallows, James. Breaking the News, How the Media Undermine American Democracy...... 83 Feezell and Hancock, How Should I Live?...... 84 Finley, Milton, The Most Monstrous of Wars: the Napoleonic Guerilla War...... 84 Four Principles of Interpersonal Communication...... 84 Fridovich, David P. and Krawchuk, Fred T. “The Special Operations Forces Indirect Approach.”...... 85 Fugate, Bryan I., Operation Barbarossa...... 85 Gaddis, John, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience...... 86 Glister, Herman L., The Air War in Southeast Asia: Case Studies of Selected Campaigns...... 86 Gordon, Michael R. and Bernard E. Trainor, COBRA II...... 87 Graham, John L. and Kjell Gronhaug. Ned Hall Didn’t Have to Get a Haircut: Or, Why We Haven’t Learned Much about International Marketing in the Last Twenty-Five Years...... 87 Gray, Colin S. “Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters.”...... 88 Gray, Colin S. Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?...... 88 Griffin, Em and E.J. Park, Media Ecology of Marshall McLuhan...... 89 Griffin, Em. A First Look at Communication Theory...... 89 Griswold, Sarah. The Two-Step Flow of Communication Theory...... 90 Guevara, Ernesto "Che", Guerrilla Warfare...... 90 Hammes, Thomas X., “Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges”...... 90 Handel, Michael, "Introduction: Strategic and Operational Deception in Historical Perspective,"...... 91 Hasler, Jeffrey. “Defining War: New doctrinal definitions of irregular, conventional, and unconventional warfare.”...... 92 Special Warfare 20:2 (March-April 2007), pp. 18-25. (BlackBoard)...... 92

66 Hatch, Mary Jo, Organization Theory...... 92 Herspring, The Pentagon and the Presidency...... 92 Herzog, Chaim. The Arab – Israeli Wars...... 93 Hewes, James E., From Root To McNamara: Army Organization and Administration...... 93 Hoffman, Frank. “Complex Irregular Warfare: The Next Revolution in Military Affairs”...... 94 Hollis, Martin and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations...... 94 Hourani, Albert, A History of the Arab Peoples, Harvard University Press, 1991,...... 95 Howard, Michael, British Intelligence in the Second World War...... 95 Ignatieff, Michael., The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror...... 96 Ikenberry, G. John, "Grand Strategy as Liberal Order Building,"...... 96 Ikenberry, G. John. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars...... 96 Indonesia Country Primer...... 97 Indonesia Culture...... 98 Irregular Warfare in the 21st Century: Attaining and Retaining Positional Advantage,...... 98 Jager, Sheila Miyoshi, “On the Uses of Cultural Knowledge”...... 98 James, D. Clayton, The Years of MacArthur, V. III,...... 98 Joint Forces Command, The Joint Operational Environment - Into the Future,...... 99 Jomini, Antoine Henri, the Art of War,...... 99 Karsh, Efraim, Empires of Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, Harvard University Press, 1998...... 100 Katzenstein, Peter, "Conclusion: National Security in a Changing World,"...... 100 Katzenstein, Peter, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security,"...... 100 Klein, Gary, Sources of Power;...... 100 Krause, Michael G., Square Pegs for Round Holes: Current Approaches to Future Warfare and the Need to Adapt,...... 101 Krepinevich, Andrew F., The Army in Vietnam,...... 102 Landman, Todd, Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction...... 102 Langgruth, J., Our Vietnam: The War 1954-1975,...... 103 Lantis, Jeffrey, "Strategic Culture and National Security Policy,"...... 104 Lardner, Richard. “Commando forces under new leadership more interested in ‘indirect’ warfare.”...... 104 Layne, Christopher, The Peace of Illusions,...... 104 Levy, Jack S., "War and Peace,"...... 105 Lewis, Bernard, The Crisis in Islam,...... 105 Lewis, Michael, Moneyball;...... 106

67 Maclean, Norman, Young Men and Fire,...... 106 Mann, Col Edward C., et. al., Thinking Effects: Effects Based Methodology for Joint Operations ...... 106 Mansfield, Edward D. and Jack Snyder, "Prone to Violence"...... 107 Mansoor, COL Peter R., USA, and MAJ Mark S. Ulrich, “Linking Doctrine to Action: A New COIN Center-of-Gravity Analysis,”...... 107 Mansoor, Peter R., The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945...... 108 Manual, Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations, Supplement 2...... 108 Manual, Commander's Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations...... 108 Manual, Commander's Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations, Supplement 1...... 109 Manual, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, December 2006...... 109 Manual, FM 90-8 Counterguerrilla Warfare, August 1986,...... 109 Manual, Joint Publication 1, "Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,"...... 110 Executive Summary, Chapter 1. [38 pages]...... 110 Manual, Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations (17 September 2006),...... 110 Manual, Joint Publication 3-07.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID),...... 111 Manual, Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (26 December 2006)...... 111 Manual, Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. FM 3-05.301. August 2007. Phase II, Target Audience Analysis...... 112 Manual, Standard Operating Procedures & Tactics, Techniques & Procedures for the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (JFCOM 14 July 2004),...... 113 Manual, U.S. Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC), Version 1.0, 2007,...... 113 Manual, United States Government Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Termination (July 2007),...... 114 Manual, United States Special Operations Command, History: 15th Anniversary...... 114 Manual, USA/USMC COIN Handbook Draft...... 114 Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare,...... 115 Maraniss, David, They Marched into Sunlight,...... 115 Mattis, James, and Frank Hoffman, "Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars”,...... 116 Mazzetti, Mark, “Gates promises help for Indonesian military”...... 116 McDougall, Walter A., Promised Land, Crusader State...... 117 McFarland, Maxie, Colonel U.S. Army, Retired, “Military Cultural Education,”...... 117

68 McRaven, William H. SPEC OPS Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice...... 118 Mead, Walter Russell, Special Providence,...... 118 Mearsheimer, John, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics...... 119 Mintzberg, Henry, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning...... 119 Mohammad Haniff Bin Hassan, “Explaining Islam’s Special Position and the Politic of Islam in Malaysia”...... 120 Muller, Klaus-Jurgen, "A German Perspective on Allied Deception Operations in the Second World War,"...... 120 Naveh, Shimon, In Pursuit of Military Excellence...... 121 Naylor, Sean D. “Support grows for standing up an unconventional warfare command.”...... 121 Naylor, Sean D. “The Spec Ops Stretch.”...... 122 Nye, Joseph, "Soft Power and American Foreign Policy",...... 122 Ottaway, Marina, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism...... 122 Pape, Robert A., Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War...... 123 Parsa, Misagh, States, Ideologies, & Social Revolutions...... 124 Patai, Raphael, The Arab Mind, Hatherleigh, 1976, 1983, 2002. Prefaces,...... 125 Pearlman, Michael D., Unconditional Surrender, Demobilization, and the Atomic Bomb...... 126 Perry, Mark, Four Stars...... 126 Peters, Ralph, “Also Known as Indonesia, Notes on the Javanese Empire”...... 126 Pirsig, Robert, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance...... 127 Posen, Barry and Andrew Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy"...... 127 Posen, Barry, "The Best Defense"...... 127 Princeton Project on National Security, introduction and executive summary...... 127 Race, Jeffrey, War Comes to Long An,...... 128 RAND study “America’s Role In Nation-Building From Germany to Iraq”:...... 128 Reynolds, Paul Davidson, a Primer on Theory Construction;...... 129 Roberts, Hugh, The Battlefield Algeria 1988-2002...... 129 Russett, Bruce, "Bushwhacking the Democratic Peace,"...... 131 Salmon, Wesley C., Causality and Explanation...... 131 Schmidt, Brian, "On the History and Historiography of International Relations"...... 132 Schneider, James J. and Lawrence L. Izzo, "Clausewitz's Elusive Centers of Gravity,"...... 132 Schroeder, Paul W., "Napoleon's Foreign Policy: A Criminal Enterprise",...... 132 Slaughter, Anne-Marie, "The Real New World Order,"...... 132 Slipchenko, Vladimir, “A Russian Analysis of Warfare Leading to the Sixth Generation”,...... 133 Snyder, Jack, "One World, Rival Theories",...... 133

69 Spector, Ronald H., After Tet,...... 133 Stoler, Mark A., Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II...... 133 The Art and Science of Cause and Effect," in Judea Pearl, Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference...... 134 Tone, John Lawrence, The Fatal Knot: The Guerilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain,...... 134 Tucker, David and Lamb, Christopher J. “Restructuring Special Operations Forces for Emerging Threats.”...... 135 Tufte, Edward R., The Visual Display of Quantitative Information, 2nd ed...... 135 Tufte, Edward R., Visual and Statistical Thinking: Displays of Evidence for Making Decisions ...... 136 Tzabag, Shmuel, "Termination of the Yom Kippur War between Israel and Syria: Positions, Decisions and Constraints at Israel's Ministerial Level,"...... 136 United States Special Operations Command, USSOCOM Fact Sheet 2007...... 136 Wendt, Alexander, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics"...... 137 Wofe, Robert,“American Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan”,...... 137 Zimmerman, COL Douglas K., "Understanding the Standing Joint Force Headquarters,"...... 137

70 Alexander, John B., The Changing Nature of Warfare, the Factors Mediating Future Conflict, and Implications for SOF

Hurlburt Field: Joint Special Operations University, 2006 (student issue)

 Violence, while it will remain prominent, will be optional in future conflicts  War has changed because war no longer involves violence…  “war is not about killing, rather about imposition of will.”  ME: Then it isn’t a war. War requires violence

Applbaum, Kalman, Russell W. Belk, John Clammer, Roy Dilley, James H. McDonald, Daniel Miller, Benjamin Orlove. The Sweetness of Salvation: Consumer Marketing and the Liberal-Bourgeois Theory of Needs [and Comments and Reply] Current Anthropology, Vol. 39, No. 3. (Jun., 1998), pp. 323-349.

(Found on: http://www.jstor.org/view/00113204/dm991526/99p00857/0)

 Western social science based on idea that people ultimately seek to maximize pleasure and minimize pain.  Man a slave to his own needs.  St Augustine and Adam smith

Axelrod, Robert and Michael D. Cohen, Harnessing Complexity: Organizational Implications of a Scientific Frontier (NY: Basic Books, 2000),

Chapter 1, 1-31.

Chapter 3, 62-116.

 An agent has the ability to interact with its environment, including other agents.

71  Strategy, the way an agent response to its surroundings as it persues its goals.  A system is complex “when there are strong interactionis among its elements, so that current events heavily influence the probabilities of any kinds of later events”  When agents seek to adapt, it is a complex adaptive system.  Harnessing complexity. Changing the structure of a system to increase some measure of performance.  Complexity = emergent properties  increased interaction = increased complexity  great variety though underlying patterns are simple  external (designer or policy maker) and internal (agent) strategies

Baldwin, David A., "Power and International Relations"

Handbook of International Relations, Ch. 9, pp. 177-188 [11 pages]

 2 main schools: o power as elements of power vs . Dimensions of power. Scope, domain, weight, cost, . means: symbolic, economic, military, diplomatic (DIME). o power as relative relationship of nations.

Beeson, Mark “Civil Military Relations in Indonesia and the Philippines - Will the Thai Coup Prove Contagious?”

Armed Forces Armed Forces & Society, Volume 34 Number 3, April 2008 474-490; read pages 474-482 and 485-487 (12 pages) at (available through CARL) http://afs.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/34/3/474

Benson, Kevin and Christopher Trash, "Declaring Victory: Planning Exit Strategies for Peace Operations" Parameters (Vol. XXVI, No. 3, Autumn, 1996),

p. 69-80.

 Planning Haiti…  levels of conflict--strategic, operational, and tactical--tend to be compressed during peace operations.

72  field- and company-grade officers should be prepared to function "two levels higher" during such operations, thinking and operating at the operational and strategic levels  No doctrine for exit strategy ME: BECAUSE ITS STRATEGIC

Birtle, Andrew J.. U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941

Read CH 4 & 5 (CGSC Book Issue)

 We were set on making phillipines democratic  Our lack of strategic endurance gave us little leverage in the Phillipines  Tried to apply the Indian model to Phillipines o Spread out to protect populace o Bases and aggressive attacks o Using indigenous people (segmented population meant we were facilitating civil war between factions)  GEN Aurhtur MacAurthur takes over. o Lenient treatment of guerillas and amnesty o Focus on education o Provide services  The quality of local commander was biggest determinant in success or failure  MacAurthur switches to “Chastisement,” o punish population for insurgency o Banish military age males from towns o Torture for interrogations o War of annihilation (put the province to the torch) and concentrate civilians  Positive incentives alone could not overcome a strong rebellion  Doctrine couldn’t be captured o Couldn’t encode illegal behavior o People wouldn’t admit to their tactics for fear of prosecution  Occupation of Peking: US zone was the best run o Closed opium dens and gambling o Innoculations, education, and infrastructure building  Marines in Cuba intervention o Doctrine: counterinsurgency, pacification, and military government. o Army didn’t want to do it. Marine corps became tool of choice.

Bledsoe, Elizabeth E., MAJ, U.S. Army, “The Use of Culture in Operational Planning”

73 MMAS, Master?s Thesis Jun 2005, US Army Command and General Staff College, ?Chapter 3: Methodology,? (only pages 13-18; total 7 pages) http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/showfile.exe? CISOROOT=/p4013coll2&CISOPTR=328&filename=329.pdf

 Schools of anthropology

Bouandel, Youcef, "Algeria's Presidential Election of April 2004: a backward step in the democratization process or a forward step toward stability" Third World Quarterly, vol 25, no. 8, (2004), p. 1525-1540..[

 Army is the true power in Algeria.

Boykin, Willam G. “Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Legislation: Why Was it Passed and Have the Voids Been Filed?” Individual Study Project, U.S. Army War College,

1991. pp. 45-59, 15pp. (Blackboard)

Boykin, Willam G. “The Origins of the United States Special Operations Command” , n.p., n.d., 18 effective pages. (Blackboard)

Brett, Gary,. The Nervous Liberals: Propaganda Anxieties from World War I to the Cold War

(Columbia Studies in Contemporary American History.) New York: Columbia University Press. 1999. (Attached) (38 pages)

 WWI: Anti-war speech = subversion. Govt propaganda  Post WWI: o Propaganda hurts democracy

74 o Lipmann: . People need help of media . “scientific persuasion” to make democracy “more stable” o Dewey . Democracy needs education, not communications  Pre WWII: o Nazi example bad o Chafee: Govt must never influence people

Bush, George W., National Security Strategy of the United States, March 2006

 1. champion aspirations for human dignity  2. strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends  3. work with others to defuse regional conflicts  4. prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction  5. ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade;  6. expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy;  7. develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power;  8. transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century o 1. assure our allies and friends; o 2. dissuade future military competition; o 3. deter threats against U.S. interests, allies, and friends; and o 4. decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails.”

Byers, Michael, War Law, Grove Press 2005.

 UN charter: use of force is not permitted outside borders. Security council authorization (Chapter VII) and self-defense (Article 51) are only exceptions.  Bush doctrine of preemption of WMD + terrorists?  Unwritten exceptions of last few decades: o intervene to restore democracy (Panama, Grenada)- o Humanitarian grounds (Kosovo).  Jus in bello (Geneva convention of 1949). Combatant/non-combatant and dual use and collateral damage assessments. Combatants-unnecessary suffering, POWs. War crimes.  Brits proposed justification for unilateral action: o 1. only available as a last resort,

75 o 2 addressed an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe which the territorial government was unable or unwilling to prevent, o 3 involved force tha was both proportionate and in accordance with international law, and o 4 was exercised by a group of states rather than an individual state

Challans, Timothy. Awakening Warrior: Revolution in the Ethics of Warfare.

New York: State University of New York Press. 2007. read pp 1-186

 Levels o Unreflective live: sleep of reason o Pseudo-reflective life: battle sleep o Semi-reflective life: instrumental means o Quasi-refelctive life: Inadequate ends o Fully-reflective life: autonomy for automatons  The ends never justifies the means  All acts in a war are immoral if the war is immoral and vice versa  Army morality is bad because it is taught by immoral chaplains

Clausewitz, Carl von, On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Book One, "On the Nature of War," pp. 75-123.

Book Six, pp. 357-392, 453-519. pp. 523-573.

 War: 1. an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.  “In war the result is never final”  Paradoxical Trinity  Many ways to success without outright defeat of enemy  Friction  Fog of War  Natural dominance of the defense o Popular support

76 o Friction favors defender o Easier to hold ground  People in Arms can keep nation alive after defeat of Army  COG Definitions: o Attack Discussion:” that area where the greatest concentration of enemy troops can be found; the larger the force with which the blow is struck, the surer its effect will be.” “Always found where the mass is concentrated most densely.” o Hub of all power (Book 8)  Defense as a necessary evil in attack.  Attacker should try to “expedite decision”  Destruction of enemy surest way to achieve victory in war  Culminating point  Attacks not seeking decision (limited objectives)  Greatest disadvantage of attack: “one is eventually left in a most awkward defensive position.”

Cook, Martin, The Moral Warrior SUNY Press, 2004.

 Begins with the analogy of US in GWOT to peloponesian wars and wanting hegemony with no way to maintain it. No political structures.  Jus ad bellum, reason to go to war vs jus in bello, law during war  1648, to end 30 years war, Peace of Westphalia. Took religion out of international affairs.  WWII ended this idea that officer not required to evaluate the morality of his state Nazis?  US Army wants to fight and win wars, not do Kosovo and bosnia. Longer view, this is not the traditional role of Army.  smart bombs lower the threshold for use of force by making it easy

Cooper, Matthew, The German Army (Scarborough, Chelsea, MI: 1978), pp.139-153, 243-346.

 Hitler was reason for failure of Barbarosa: Agreed with army on destruction of russions in wst, but o 1 disagreed on double envelopment and o 2 said marsh was not an obstacle. o 3 Disagreed on centrality of Moscow. o 4. Began changing guidance and preventing withdrawal of forces after culmination  Truppenfuhrung beat out over armored idea:  Paralysis by taking Moscow would have been better than annihilation of Russian Army  France gave Hitler so much power he could overrule the generals.  Operational plan became divorced from the strategic goals (ME: Disagree)  Cooper says Russian “Strategic doctrine” was “crude”

77  Me: IGNORES THE FACT THAT THE GERMANS WERE OUTNUMBERED 136 DIV TO 154 AND FACED A 36 MILLION MAN MOBILIZATION

Cordesmann, Anthony, " Iraq, Grand Strategy, and the Lessons of Military History"

Lee Lecture in Military History, Ohio State Univ, October 2004

 US sucks at strategy. o From 1812 to WWI, we had no Grand Strategy but go west. o Failure of Grand Strategy after WWI led to WWII. o No Grand Strategy led to 2 Koreas, Vietnam, Post gulf war Shia massacre and Iraq mess, and lebannon marine bombing.  Failure of “Hope over experience”

Coughlin for Beginners

28 Jan 2008 - Breinholt - Coughlin for Beginners.doc (44 Kb)

 We are being led astray by those who claim that Westerners should rely solely on Muslims to tell us what Islam is  Professor Edward Said attacked the notion that Westerners could ever understand what people in the "Orient" thought and how they behaved.  Can only understand Quran in Arabic, but 95% of Muslims don’t read Quranic Arabic

Coughlin--Thesis__Final__8_AUG_07 w Appendices.doc (1.432 Mb)

Read: pp 5-46, 228-232, and 238-248

 Jihad is an obligation of all Muslims, and Bin Laden appeals to this obligation. (infer: can’t marginalize Bin Laden to stop Jihad).  The Current Approach requires enforcement of the “Islam does not stand for this” standard when characterizing jihadi activities.”  Saudi’s = Wahhabism = Hanbali school  Islamic law is the basis of all law in the middle east  Last of Qutb’s milestones is Jihad. The only question is, when?

78 Craig, Gordon A., "Delbrück: The Military Historian," Makers of Modern Strategy edited by Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986,

pp. 326-353.

 Delbruck history of war: o Marathon perfected the Phalanx. o Romans made it flexible. o When rome fell, roman tactics declined, and the cavalry became dominant. o Crecy and Agincourt are outliers of dismounted. o Swiss revived articulated infantry squares. o Led to French revolution and massed formations of infantry  Subordination of war to politics = attrition warfare as a strategy (successor to Clausewitzian annihilation)

Cubbage, T.L., "German Misapprehensions Regarding Overlord: Understanding Failure in the Estimative Process" Michael I. Handel, ed., Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War

(London: Frank Cass, 1987),

pp. 114-174 [60 pages] [SAMS Issue].

 German errors prior to overlord: o 1. human factor o 2 bias factor o 3. expectation factor o 4 options factor o 5 plausible interpretation factor o 6. distraction factor o 7 intel collection factor o 8 deception factor o 9 time factor o 10 organization factor  LONE VOICES—HERETICS

79 de Atkine, Norvelle, "Why Arabs Lose Wars" Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 4., No.1,

pp 16-27.

 Information as power,  combined arms operations (lack of trust, sectarian behavior, balance of power),  Jihad: Just war in Islam. St. Augustine and City of God: Western just war.

Dewey, John, How We Think Dover Books

 Reflective thought: Active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends.  Interpretation of facts = judging: 3 features: a controversy of opposite claims, a process of elaborating the claims, a final decision  “Science is the most perfect type of knowledge because it uses causal definitions”  “Language tends to arrest personal reflection and inquiry”

Dörner, Dietrich, the Logic of Failure New York: Henry Holt, 1996, pp. 1-110, 126-152. pp. 153-199.

 Failings: o 1 acting without prior analysis, o 2. failed to anticipate side effects or long term repric. o 3. assumed the absence of immediate neg effects meant none coming, o 4. let overinvovlement in ‘projects’ blind them to emerging needs. o 5. were prone to cynical reactions  Examples: Chernobyl, Space Shuttle, Iran airliner  : complexity: many interdependent variables, Intransparence- can’t see all of the variables. “reality model”

80  Reality model right or wrong, complete or incomplete, usually incomplete and wrong  Define clear goal, model (requires observation), plan.  Planning = long chains of imagined actions.  Planning fallacies, o 1 ignoring Friction, o 2 methodism  Reasons for failure: o 1. Slow human thinking (fast at routine activities DRIVES US TO METHODISM or Ballistic behavior, causes shortcuts, o 2. “preserving a positive view of one’s competence” SAVING FACE ( o 3. Slow human memory storage system (good for classification, bad for building models), o 4. “We don’t think about problems we don’t have.”  Solving the problems we know how to solve instead of the real problem

Dower, John W., Embracing Defeat NY: Norton, 1999,

pp. 33-48, 87-120, 339-345

 Culture kept society together through hardship  Stealing did happen, but murder was unheard of. When it happened, it worked as an IO message to make people work harder to suffer and survive  US victory actually saved people from fighting to the death. They were grateful to lose.

Drea, Edward J., In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army

(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), pp. 60-74. [PDF: Drea (part 1), Drea (part 2)]

 Japanese focused on infantry using spirit in lieu of technology.  American infantry focused on technological solutions.  America, infantry-artillery team—arty open holes.  Culture and tactics: Japanese think US are cowards, but they don’t was lives  Japanese had no education in Operational art, only 10 per year.

81 Easterbrook, Greg, "The End of War?"

The New Republic, vol 232, no 20, May 30 2005, pp 18-22. (EBSCO) [4 pages]

 no society with war as its organizing principle can endure any longer. So far, this theory has been right on the money  Reasons for no war: o UN peacekeeping, o spread of democracy, o nuclear deterrence-example setting, o spread of “enlightenment,” o economic affluence.

Easton, David, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," WORLD POLITICS, vol. 9, no. 3 (April 1957),

p. 383-400.

 A framework for analyzing a political system in a country

Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997),

Chapter 10, 353-390, Chapter 11, 391-401, and Chapter 14, 487-517.

 Japan should have focused on building more merchant vessels considering their dependence on imports o Japan clogged shipyards with military orders before war, making it impossible to replace commercial ships! o Japanese requisitioning of ships for conversion to military vessels hurt their shipping fleet.  super-battleships: quality over quanitiy: Yamato and Musashi overtaken by technology. o Superbattleships waited for big battle that never came. o Musashi sunk by torpedoes at Leyte o Yamato sunk by air cause sent without cover to Okinawa on suicide mission.

82  Reasons Axis didn’t do well: o 1. delusions about own military superiority, o 2. assumed short conflict, o 3. did not mobilize industry, technology, or science o Lack of Operational Logic “The problems of “bullets, beans, and black oil’ could not hold the attention of either staff or line officers fixated on the dramatic strategies and tactics of the great encounter at sea.”  Need for Pearl Harbor o Not necessary: . 1. could have taken SE Asia without knocking out US. . 2. US fleet was battleship based and vulnerable, . 3. Would have taken 2 years to build up ANYWAY. o Counter argument (why ignore American anger problem) . 1. Had to attack Netherlands east indies and Phillipines to secure oil shipping lanes, . 2. would have caused war with US anyway.  Lost initiative and gave allies time. Switched to “defensive barrier” strategy  Falacies o 1. Opening moves of WWII were THOUGHT to be limited, but created unlimited war. CREATED A STRATEGIC SHOCK. o 2. Thought that they could control pace. o 3. Did not think through phase II. o 4. lack of ability to change doctrine (no decisive battle and cost of attrition), o 5. submarine effectiveness???Maybe, o 6. Institutional problems (interservice mistrust and duplication, c2 of Navy), o 7. tactics don’t match operational/strategic needs, o 8. Clinging to mythical tactics . Culture: secrecy, surprise attack, and night or dawn fighting . Metaphysical causes for success or failure discourages questioning . Quality over Quantity  most serious strategic failing of the Japanese navy was to mistake tactics for strategy and strategy for the conduct of war.”

Fallows, James. Breaking the News, How the Media Undermine American Democracy New York: Pantheon Books, 1996.

(Chapter 6: News and Democracy. Attached) (36 pages)

 WWI first real govt propaganda.  Lippman, o world so complex, rule by expert elite.

83 o Lippman: Journalism should be educated class and lead public opinion.  Dewey, o those in charge need to explain things to public + people’s responsibility to be smart on stuff. o Dewey: society can’t function well if people feel estranged from public life.

Feezell and Hancock, How Should I Live? Paragon House, 1991.

 Steps: o 1. Divine Command Theory-Morality comes from God, o 2 Ethics without God = moral relativism o 3 Psychological Egoism, hunter: everyone seeks his own self interest-descriptive. Ethical egoism: self interest should be everyone’s top concern-prescriptive. o 4 Utilitarianism: very demanding ethical doctrine. Calls the ethical altruist a “moral doormat” acting only for others o 5: Kant: doing the right thing is acting according to absolute moral laws and doing one’s duty, rather than weighing consequences. Absolute rul;es should be universal “what if everyone did it?” o 6 Aristotle and Aquinas: virtue is primary in our moral lives (defines our moral character). Truth is not descriptive, it is normative. Truth is a value.

Finley, Milton, The Most Monstrous of Wars: the Napoleonic Guerilla War Southern Italy 1806-1811, (University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, 1994),

pp. 3-147.

 There were no social structures to underpin insurgency  Insurgents were just bandits  No affluence or cosmopolitanism in Calabria  Occupied towns where insurgency flourished and drove out residents.  POPULACE WAS MORE AFRAID OF FRENCH THAN GUERRILLAS!!!

Four Principles of Interpersonal Communication http://www.pstcc.edu/facstaff/dking/interpr.htm (2 pages)

How all Human Communication Fails, Except by Accident. Communications Maxims: http://www.cs.tut.fi/~jkorpela/wiio.html (6 pages)

84  If a message can be interpreted in several ways, it will be interpreted in a manner that maximizes the damage  The more we communicate, the faster misunderstandings propagate.

Fridovich, David P. and Krawchuk, Fred T. “The Special Operations Forces Indirect Approach.”

Joint Forces Quarterly (1st Quarter 2007): 24-27. 4pp.

Available at: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i44/9.pdf

 Success of IA in Pacific

Fugate, Bryan I., Operation Barbarossa (Presidio Press, Presidio CA: 1984),

pp. 13-59, 81-82.

 Russians initially wanted to Mobilize  1937 purge stopped Russian military innovation.  After 1939 Japan war in Mongolia, a surge of production of Armor, Mech inf, and SP artillery  Planned to invade Germany, but in 1941, had to start planning defense.  Wanted to defend on border, but wargame convinced them of folly of plan. Zhukov wins and develops defense in depth  Defense in Depth o Sacrifice frontline forces o Germans would foment anger in populace with their anti-Russian zeal o Newer tanks and arty held back and hid. o 63 russian divs to 154 german. o Evacuate industry west. Mobilize strategic reserve outside Moscow  They were trying to apply a model meant for France or Poland to the vastness of Russia.

85 Gaddis, John, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2004, Chapters 2, 3 (pp 7-67). [60 pages] (CARL)

 US culture and intitutions linked both to mostly free land and mostly free security  “Safety comes from enlarging, rather than from contracting, its sphere of responsibilities.” We don’t withrdraw from threats. We attack them. We expand to gain security  John Quincy Adams, the most influential American Strategist of the nineteenth century. Prinicples: o Preemption, o unilateralism, o hegemony  9/11 and pearl harbor were similar surprises  Difference in wars. o FDR demanded and got a mobilized country. pearl harbor where return to normality would mean enemy won o Bush demanded and only partially got a police action while calling for vigilance and people to continue their normal lives. Departure from normality meant enemy won  FDR best strategist of 20th century: FDR went from West hemisphere power to global power while scrapping preemption AND unilateralism. Virtually no cost to expand. o Made Japan fire first shot o Fought as an Alliance  No pre-emption in Cold War because of FDR principle: There should always be something worse than American domination. Makes coercion of partners unnecessary. o Make soviets build the wall o Unilateral intrests in a multilateral framework. (Make countries WANT to be led by US)

Glister, Herman L., The Air War in Southeast Asia: Case Studies of Selected Campaigns (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, October 1993),

Chapter 5, 75-115.

 Linebacker II succeeded because politicians got out of targeting.  Focused on tactics and data of bombing, rather than Operational Logic of bombing  Campaign lessons: o 1. Expanded Target List (“A more expansive target list, however, would have provided the operational commander with more flexibility to overcome periods of target area congestion and poor weather.”), o 2. Strikes against enemy defense (decrease length of total campaign) o 3. All weather bombing capability

86 o 4. Strike Phasing, o 5. Strike Patterns, o 6. Single Manager for Air

Gordon, Michael R. and Bernard E. Trainor, COBRA II (Pantheon, NY, 2006),

p. 3-163, 260-268, 278-326, 345-361, 433-436, 446-507.

 Rumsfeld wanted NCW and saw Pentagon Bureaucracy as an impediment  Used Iraq to prove NCW  State would not participate in 99 wargame on Iraq because of politics  “Settling a plan to secure Iraq after the regime was ousted was an issue to be dealt with later.”  Military wanted lots of people to do Iraq  Rumsfeld, MacGregor, and Gingrich advocated the light package  Running start was compromise but Rumsfeld knew he would never send the follow on forces  Shinseki comments were based on powell doctrine, not post war Iraq.: Gordon implies otherwise ME: NO ONE SAID WE NEED PH IV effort  State didn’t want to own post war planning. Rumsfeld shut them out.  Focus change to Saddam Fedayeen REFRAMING  5 grievous errors.: o 1. failed to understand ethnic groups and tribes, o 2. wrong tools for fight, o 3. failed to adapt, o 4. stifled discourse, o 5. forgot nation-building lessons of Balkans.

Graham, John L. and Kjell Gronhaug. Ned Hall Didn’t Have to Get a Haircut: Or, Why We Haven’t Learned Much about International Marketing in the Last Twenty-Five Years The Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 60, No. 2. (Mar. – Apr., 1989),

pp. 152-187. (Found On: http://www.jstor.org/view/00221546/di962518/96p0036q/0)

 We are not good at marketing to international audiences because of our insular education

87 Gray, Colin S. “Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters.”

Strategic Studies Quarterly (Winter 2007): 35-57. http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2007/Winter/gray.pdf

Gray, Colin S. Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?

Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006. pp 1-55 http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB650.pdf

 RMA is dead  The United States has shown a persisting strategy deficit,  American public, strategic, and military culture is not friendly to the waging of irregular warfar  War and warfare are different: o Warfare is the conduct of war, generally by military means o Nature of war never changes  “Essence of Strategy?” o strategy is about the use made of force and the threat of force for the goals of policy. o strategy is all about the relationship between means and ends. o there has to be a constant dialogue between policymaker and soldier. o politics must rule  countering the irregular warfare of insurgency and terrorism? o 1. Protect the People. o 2. Intelligence Is King. o 3. Ideology Matters. o 4. The Irregular Enemy Is Not Usually the Target. o 5. Unity of Effort. o 6. Culture Is Crucial. o 7. No Sanctuaries and No External Support. o 8. Time Is a Weapon. o 9. Undercut the Irregular Enemy Politically.  American way of war: o Apolitical o Astrategic o Ahistorical o Problem-Solving, optimistic o Culturally challenged o Technology dependent

88 o Focused on firepower o Large-scale o Aggressive, offensive o Profoundly regular o Impatient o Logistically excellent o Highly sensitive to casualties  Counter-IW and American way of war are opposite

Griffin, Em and E.J. Park, Media Ecology of Marshall McLuhan 1991, McGraw-Hill, Inc.

http://www.afirstlook.com/docs/mediaecology.swf (26 pages)

 the medium is the message. o Example: Evangelistic hymns on a piano in a brothel  Content keeps our attention away from the actual force of the medium.  What makes content especially distracting, if not dangerous, is that we often fail to recognize that content can never be separate from the medium itself  Any understanding of social and cultural change is impossible without a knowledge of the way media work as environments.”  4 questions about new medium: o What does it enhance or intensify?, o What does it render obsolete or displace?, o What does it retrieve that was previously obsolesced?, o What does it produce or become when pressed to an extreme?

Griffin, Em. A First Look at Communication Theory. 1991, McGraw-Hill, Inc.

Available at http://www.afirstlook.com/archive/talkabout.cfm?source=archther “Talk About Communication” Chapter 2. (An Historical Perspective) (8 pages)

Griffin, Em. A First Look at Communication Theory. 1991, McGraw-Hill, Inc. Available at www.afirstlook.com; select “Theory Archive” at the top of the page; select “General Semantics”by Alfred Korzybski (7 pages)

89  PRINCIPLE 1: THE MAP IS NOT THE TERRITORY  PRINCIPLE 2: THE MAP DEPICTS ONLY PART OF THE TERRITORY  PRINCIPLE 3: MAPS OF MAPS CONDENSE THE TERRITORY

Griswold, Sarah. The Two-Step Flow of Communication Theory.

http://www.ciadvertising.org/studies/student/99_spring/theory /griswold/twostep.html (5 pages)

 ideas often flow from radio and print to the opinion leaders and from them to the less active sections of the population  People tend to be much more affected in their decision making process by face to face encounters with influential peers than by the mass media  ME: Rendon: The Mavens

Guevara, Ernesto "Che", Guerrilla Warfare

1961. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998, Chap 1, "General Principles of Guerrilla Warfare." (12 pp) Available online at http://www.bellum.nu/literature/guevara003.html

 Minimum for an insurgency o 1 People must see clearly the futility of maintaining the fight for social goals within the framework of civil debate. o 2 When the forces of oppression come to maintain themselves in power against established law, peace is considered already broken  Need support of the people  Get weapons from enemy  3 phases of insurgency o Political activity . At the outset, the essential task of the guerrilla fighter is to keep himself from being destroyed o Guerilla war o War of Movement  Terrorism indiscriminant and self-defeating except against hated officials  IEDs  Try to turn enemy soldiers with kindness  Suburbs the worst place to fight guerilla war

90 Hammes, Thomas X., “Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges”

Military Review, May-June 2007, pp 14-24 http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink? vinst=PROD&fmt=6&startpage=-1&ver=1&vname=PQD&RQT=309&did=1288673391&exp=10-13- 2012&scaling=FULL&vtype=PQD&rqt=309&TS=1192475686&clientId=5094

 Shift from stratcom to support combat ops to combat ops to support stratcom  Fifth gen is WMD terror warfare

Handel, Michael, "Introduction: Strategic and Operational Deception in Historical Perspective,"

Michael I. Mandel, ed., Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War (London: Frank Cass, 1987),

pp. 1-91 [90 pages] [SAMS Issue].

 Deception has no meaning on its own, only relative to achieving surprise.  “Haversack Ruse”: “The documents fitted conveniently into the preexisting concepts of the deceived, who were psychologically predisposed to accept them.”  Avoiding deception: o 1. avoid overreliance on one source, o 2. never rely on non-material evidence, o 3. never rely on second hand from agents, o 4. check and double check falsified intel, o 5 heed lower-level intel analysists, o 6. know enemy’s LIMITATIONS as well as capabilities  Dieppe deception failed, but it was good because it convinced Germans they could detect deception--more vulnerable  Reason for US failure: o 1. US didn’t know Japanese mind, o 2. Friction with brits, o 3. lack of dedicated resources, o 4. weakness of signal deception. o 5 Double-cross system barely used in Pacific. o 6. Planners not integrated into operational planning (done at JCS), o 7. Japanese Strat intel so weak it missed deception info

91  Great Russian deception prior to Barbarossa: ME: Really? When does deception just become OPSEC?  1973 is great deception. ME: Really? Surprise != deception  Sicily deception failed because story (simultaneous invasions) was unbelievable

Hasler, Jeffrey. “Defining War: New doctrinal definitions of irregular, conventional, and unconventional warfare.”

Special Warfare 20:2 (March-April 2007), pp. 18-25. (BlackBoard)

 irregular warfare A form of warfare that has as its objective the credibility and/or the legitimacy of the relevant political authority with the goal of undermining or supporting that authority.  Irregular warfare favors indirect approache  FM 3-0: IW is an operational theme within FSO  conventional or traditional warfare: A form of warfare between states that employs direct military confrontation to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s warmaking capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary’s government or policies

Hatch, Mary Jo, Organization Theory (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1997),

Chapter 4, pages 101-123.

 Three theories of how an organization interacts with environment: o Resource dependence theory (environment drives), o population ecology theory (external social factors—people coming and going from organization) drive, o institutional theory (social legitimacy of organization to environment drives)  SWOT analysis – Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and threats  The more complex the environment, the less the realistic theory applies (need more chefs)  Organizations have external and internal “Stakeholders” who have conflicting goals. Organization can deal with conflicting goals by o dividing to address each, o or sequential attention. o Third way is “satisficing” or compromising to meat SOME demands of all.  Goals are the nexus of strategy, implementation, and stakeholders in EVERY theory discussed

92 Herspring, The Pentagon and the Presidency

Chs. 1, 3-6 (pp. 1-22; 52-183)

 Military no longer apolitical.  MILITARY IS A “BUREAUCRATIC INTEREST GROUP  Truman was pro army. Herspring calls him weak and indecisive o Navy doesn’t want to merge. Congressional testimony an opportunity for naval mutiny. o MacAurthur revolt over bomb  Eisenhower made JCS. o JCS continental defense v. o Eisenhower cold war

Herzog, Chaim. The Arab – Israeli Wars

Read pp 145-323

 1958 arab upheaval King Feisal of Iraq and PM Gen Said assassinated. Gen Kassem takes over and Soviets get toe hold.  Nasser destabilizes Jordan and Lebannon.  US lands marines in Lebannon, British army goes to Amman to prop up King Hussein.  “United Arab Republic” of Ba’ath Syria and Egypt.  Nasser kills Jordan PM Majali. Tried to get King too. Syrian intel chief masterminded.  Revolt in 1961 in Syria threw off Egypt.  1967: o 250k from all Arab countries poised to attack Israel o Israeli airforce preemptive strike destroys Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq air force.  Yom Kippur. o Assumed arab reliance on air power and mass o Egypt relies on SAMS and AT missiles and no mobilization o Limited goals: return to 67 borders. THEY WON!

Hewes, James E., From Root To McNamara: Army Organization and Administration

(Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1983), pp. ix-21, 50-56. [Online]

 Pre 1903: Bureau level control of Army

93  1903: Chief of staff and general staff. 4 div army, NG and res under Army control  1916: Nat def act. Roles of Army components. Composition of army units  1920: return to pre 1903. General staff permanent  Until late 30s. 9 skeleton divisions. Peacetime constabulary force

Hoffman, Frank. “Complex Irregular Warfare: The Next Revolution in Military Affairs”

Orbis (Summer, 2006), pp. 395-411. http://www.fpri.org/orbis/5003/hoffman.complexirregularwarfare.pdf

Hollis, Martin and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991). Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 9 [CARL LIBRARY - 112 pages]

 Idealism response to WWI. “wars could no longer be won” WWII creates realism cause they CAN be won.  Falsification is what counts (disregarding observations). It is ‘pseudo-science’ to advance theories with no fear of refutation (Marx and Freud).

 Filled in from  Explanation (Science)  Understanding carlsnaes (interperative-current events, hermeneutic)  Holism  structural (realism,  social-institutional neo-realism, approach (social defensive and constructivism, offensive realism, discursive neo-classical-external approaches- factors on realism language). greater than relativism, neo-liberal institutionalism)  Individualism  agency based  interpretative actor (organizational perspective (look at processes-hollis and individual leaders)0 smith, cognitive and psychological approches, bureaucractic politics approach, liberal approach)

94  Realism applied Positivism to IR (humans are guided by immutable laws). Science give cause and effect (Hume) in 18th cent

Hourani, Albert, A History of the Arab Peoples, Harvard University Press, 1991,

Chapters 1-3.

 Begins with Islam.  Seat of power o 1. Arabia, o 2. Damascus under Umayyad caliphs, o 3 Baghdad under Abbasids.  At forty, on the night of power or destiny, an angle told him to recite some words.  The move to Medina is the beginning of the Muslim era, the hijra. It has come to mean leaving pagan or wicked communities for Islamic ones.  Established the Muslim person pattern: o man searching, o bemused by power falling on him, o eager to communicate, o gain authority through followers, o arbitrator making peace, and o manipulator of political forces  Still, the first 4 caliphs are known as the Rashidun or ‘rightly guided’. After this time, Caliph was virtually hereditary.  Shi’ite : Other division was mahdi (he who is guided) movement 680, about second coming. o Husayn, son of Ali goes to Kufa looking for supporters. o Killed at Karbala. MARTYRDOM. o Partisans of ‘Ali (the shi’at Ali or Shi’i) o Fatima, ‘Ali’s first wife. o 740, Khursan, now influenced by Iran, launched a Shi’I revolt against Ummyads. o Abu Muslim went west from Kufa, got an army, came back under a black flag and chased the caliph to Egypt where he was killed. o New Caliphate in Baghdad. ’Abbasisds (other branch of prophet’s family, NOT Ali). o Ja’far al –Sadiq, 6th imam, taught passive resistance until mahdi comes.  Shia v. Sunni o Shi’I: most worthy decendent should be caliph, acceptance of teachings of rationalist theologians a basis for official service, vs. o Sunnis (from Sunna) who say Quran and Sunna is enough.  Iraq was center of Judaism

Howard, Michael, British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume Five: Strategic Deception

95 (Cambridge University Press, 1990),

pp. 83-93. LINK: Michael Howard

 This deception is why Allies only faced 2 divs in Sicily. Really?

Ignatieff, Michael., The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror.

Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2004

 Tensions: o 1 slow judicial process vs. executive prerogative, how big a threat is terror? o Checks and balances (pragmatic democracy) vs. dignity (moral democracy) o What necessity demands vs. what dignity requires o Rights of minority vs. safety of majority o Insurgency (political) vs. terrorism (nihilism) o Oversight vs. the ticking timebomb example  do rights apply to enemy and friendly?  3 p8 Some actions are wrong, even if they work (title of book).  Extremes: Cynics and perfectionists  emergency, extra-legal powers of executive go back to roman times. Questions: o are they necessary and o will they erode respect for law permenantly.  in terror, the reaction is often out of proportion to the risk.  Terrorism has never succeeded in breaking up a liberal democracy.  “If terrorism is a form of politics, it needs to be fought with the force of argument and not just with the force of arms,”  Answer to maintain lesser evil is “adversarial review”

Ikenberry, G. John, " Grand Strategy as Liberal Order Building," draft conference paper, 29 May 2007 [20 pages].

 Need to build a new international order based on international institutions. Need cooperate with rather than balance against rest of world.

96 Ikenberry, G. John. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars.

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 1-79; 163-273.

 Order change due to realignment: o 1. has changed as state power changed, o 2. Use of international orgs varies but has increased over time (to “lock in” new orders), o 3. institutional logic drove cold war stability. P17: Current problem of order formation is huge asymmetry between weak and strong states. Inability of weak states to control their countries makes it hard for them to comit.  3 most important orders: o 1. balance of power, o 2. hegemony, o 3. Constitutionalism  3 choices after victory: o 1. Dominate weaker states, o 2. Go home, o 3. Gain mutually acceptable order.  2 post war orders- o the cold war-military, and o the west + japan, instituions.  P166: Lord Ismay on NATO: created to “keep the Russians out, the Germans down, and the Americans in.”  Emergence of containment o US wants Tri polar order, o Brits want Bipolar order. o US gets Laissez-faire trade with colonies o Brits get NATO

Indonesia Country Primer produced by USPACOM 20 April 2007; READ pages download from right column: http://www1.apan- info.net/vic/SoutheastAsia/Indonesia/tabid/1963/Default.aspx (pages 1, 5-10, 12-17, 23-24, 36-43, 68- 69, 109-114, 116-118, 121-126; total 40 pages)

 Military has dominated govt til recently  Aggressive multiculturalism. No Islamic law

97  Doctrines: o National resilience (ketahanan nasional), which emphasizes the need for Indonesia to build its economic, social and political strength through self-sufficiency and national resourcefulness; o Total people's defense and security (hankamrata), the civilian population and infrastructure are vital components of the national defense strategy; and o The archipelagic doctrine (wawasan nusantara), which stresses the vital importance of maintaining the integrity and unity of Indonesia's island and maritime territory. o The doctrine called Paradigma Baru - New Paradigm, developed in 1998, stresses the military's support of democracy and civilian rule  Spearheaded ASEAN

Indonesia Culture

(total 26 pages) at http://www.everyculture.com/Ge-It/Indonesia.html

Irregular Warfare in the 21st Century: Attaining and Retaining Positional Advantage,

McCormick Tribune Foundation, May 2-3 2007, pp. 4-32, 37-40 (32 effective pages) http://www.mccormicktribune.org/publications/irregularwarfare.pdf

Jager, Sheila Miyoshi, “On the Uses of Cultural Knowledge”

November 2007, SSI (total 24 pages) at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/Display.Cfm?pubID=817

 GWOT has failed because ME doesn’t know what freedom is that we are offering  Cultural understanding can help with terrororism

James, D. Clayton, The Years of MacArthur, V. III, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985,

pp .3-17, 35-50, 109-174, 183-192, 221-235, 248-254.

98  MacAurthur ruled for 6.5 years. Seen as a god  People blamed militarists for everything  Devestation of WWII created a “Political, economic, and spiritual vacuum”  MacAurthur had 3 proclamations. Scrapped them to empower Japanese govt.  Tension: FEC (the allies), JCS, and US public wants to punish, vs. US needs a strong Japan  Slowly introduce reforms and purge govt  Made emperor go on radio and say he wasn’t divine and listen to MacAurthur.  FEC commission, tried to block progress. MacAurthur marginalized  MacAurthur wrote constitution to keep progress going.  Land Reform to empower poor and encourage local govt: Only 12 acres per person  “Reverse Course”: Stopped reforms to block communism.

Joint Forces Command, The Joint Operational Environment - Into the Future, Coordinating Draft, January 2005. Read pp. 3-47. [44 pages]

 Lack of a clear enemy means capability-focus instead of threat-focus  challenges to the US Defense community: o 1 Traditional Challenges o 2 Irregular Challenges o 3 Catastrophic Challenges o 4 Disruptive Challenges  Impact of Globalization: “affects local decisions and policies may have marked unintended consequences on a global scale,”

Jomini, Antoine Henri, the Art of War,

Chapter Two, "Military Policy."

Chapter III, "Strategy."

 Governments can only hinder military  Fundamental principle of war: o 1.STRATEGIC MASS mass on decisive points and LOCs without compromising own, o 2. maneuver to engage fractions of enemy, o 3. “on the battlefield” TACTICAL MASS. o 4. synchronization.  DP  Lines of Operation

99  Folly of the entrenched defense  Natural superiority of the attack  Sees Russia failure as not having good allies and needing more supply bases

Karsh, Efraim, Empires of Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, Harvard University Press, 1998.

6,9,11-17

 Turkish rule and disaster in WWI  Turks support Jews but crack down over nationalism  Brits take over Palestine  “Arab Revolt” with Lawrence WASN’t. just him and Sharif Hussein because Saud wouldn’t participate  No body wanted a United Caliphate. France wanted Syria, Britain wanted out of Iraq, Hussein wanted Jordan  Sykes Picot divides up middle east, screws the Jews.  Brits support Jews: Balfour establishes Israel

Katzenstein, Peter, "Conclusion: National Security in a Changing World," Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 498- 528. [30 pages]

 Realism and Liberalism both failed to predict post-Cold War  Strategic decisions in IR more based on internal politics and cultural narrative than realism or liberalism  Arab cultural aversion to chemical weapons driving them toward nuclear proliferation.

Katzenstein, Peter, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security," Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 1- 26. [25 pages]

Klein, Gary, Sources of Power; Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998,

100 pp. 1-119. 1. pp. 121-175, 197-213, 233-293.

 We don’t think analytically. “naturalistic decision making”  sources of power that are needed in natural settings are usually not analytical at all— o deductive logical reasoning (not in natural setting) o intuition, o mental simulation, o metaphor, and o storytelling.  “two option hypothesis.” Is wrong” “fireground commanders NEVER make a decision.”  EXPERTS: 1 COA, NOVICES: multiple COAs.  Truth is, we pick the first good option.  Pitfalls of mental simulation: o 1 de minimus explanations: minimize inconsistencies between reality and simulation. o 2 overconfidence in model: Discard contradictory evidence. o 3. difficult when puzzle get too complicated  Vincennes shootdown. Failure to falsify hypothesis  Experience is the most important factor in making a good decision maker  Stage models for problem solving require well defined goals  People break up problems into smaller parts to solve them.  Novices follow rules (i.e. doctrine)  Japanese expected US to react to Pearl Harbor the way Russians reated to Port Arthur  Using analogy for reasoning is as likely to hurt as help.  Rational Thinking is using only one source of power. Only good to root out inconsistent beliefs  sources of errors: o 1. lack of experience, o 2. lack of information, o 3. mental simulation, the de minimus error (discounting evidence).  Expertise impossible when DYNAMIC SYSTEM!!! o 1. domain is dynamic o 2. have to predict humans, o 3. less chance for feedback, o 4 not enough repetition, o 5. fewer trials

Krause, Michael G., Square Pegs for Round Holes: Current Approaches to Future Warfare and the Need to Adapt, Duntroon: Australian Army Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2007 (BlackBoard)

101  Nuclear deterent + US conventional supremacy = complex irregualar warfare  ‘complex irregular warfare’, a type of war that deliberately uses an asymmetrical approach in an attempt to dislocate Western strength  Australia should support US hegemony as a good thing.  high-end air and maritime forces should best be seen in the same light as nuclear forces: their role is to deter conventional combat.  In forcing an adversary to conduct complex irregular warfare, they perform a great service by prescribing the environment in which an adversary must operate

Krepinevich, Andrew F., The Army in Vietnam, (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore: 1986):

pp. 38-55, 112-118, 131-193. (1st Group) pp. 194-233, 237-275. (2nd Group).

 Counter insurgency doctrine very kenetic. Oct 61: DSCOPS recommends beef up of UW capability. Kennedy pushes whole army to get smart on COIN. 1961. Army resisted.  Special warfare center was a sideshow.  Infantry still focused on killing. Armor never took coin seriously. CGSC focused on the combat part  Air Mobile was a kenetic concept  Marines combined action platoons and oil spot theory. Army couldn’t restructure to do it.  Army chased enemy in country side, but they were in densely populated costal region.  Focus on attrition and body counts  Go it alone, without ARVN.  No good advisor effort o 12 mo advisors o ARVN trained in HIC, too.  We focused on stopping NVA log, but truth was they needed very little every day  RF-PF (ruff puffs, locally recruited men for village security). Very effective 20-30% of VC/NVA deaths. IGNORED by authorities

Landman, Todd, Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2003)

Chapter 1 and 2, pp. 2-37.

Chapter 3 & 4, pp. 40-93.

102 Chapter 5, pp. 96-122.

 Only 3 laws, o Iron Law of Oligarchy—all organizations develop hierarchies over time, o diverges law –state based = 2 parties, pop based = many parties, o Democratic peace  Trade off: level of abstraction (quantity) vs. scope of countries (quality)  Value bias: attaching one’s values to analysis of data  Key obstacles to democratization: Putnam o late development and o state-centered growth.  MEASURES OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE: ( o policy processes, pronouncements, and implementation) o cabinet stability, o budget promptness, o stateiscal and informational services, o reform legislation, o legislative innovation, o daycare centers, o familiy clinics, o industrial policy instruments, o agricultural spending cap, o local health unit spending, o HUD, & o bureaucratic responsiveness.  Political violence and the conditions for revolution o Gurr: 1968: variable is magnitude of civil strife o Hibbs, 2 factors: collective protest, internal war o paige: agrarian sector and political violence o siegelman and simpson inequality and violence, affluence education, and social mobility. o Muller and Seligson: land inequality and income inequality o Parsa: state strength and economic intervention o Womack: “country people, however defined, will resist change.”

Langgruth, J., Our Vietnam: The War 1954-1975, ((Simon & Schuster, NY: 2000),

pp. 30-36, 49-64, 72-107.

103  Vietnam and struggle for independence from China  Ho Chi Min’s early life.  Bao Dai as ceremonial emperor of Vietnam doesn’t work  Chinese help NV kick French ass  Eisenhower refused to get involved in French loss of Vietnam. What’s the strategic objective?  Bao Dai rules south but stays in Cannes. Catholic Diem takes over as PM.  2 year separation turns into war when Diem gov’t prevent promised vote.  Land reforms allow NV to form viet cong.  Coup fails and wife of Diem Brother Nhu becomes real power.

Lantis, Jeffrey, " Strategic Culture and National Security Policy," International Studies Review, Vol. 4 Issue 3, (Fall 2002), pp 87-113 [27 pages]

 “Strategic culture ‘provides the milieu within which strategy is debated.’”  Elites create the historical narrative, so elites are most important in political culture

Lardner, Richard. “Commando forces under new leadership more interested in ‘indirect’ warfare.”

Associated Press (n.d.). 3pp.

Available at: http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2007/06/29/military/11_25_036_27_07.txt

 Changing focus of SOF from DA to IA

Layne, Christopher, The Peace of Illusions, pp. 1-38.

Chapter 3, pp. 51-70.

Chapter 6, pp. 118-133.

 Extra-regional hegemony is the goal of the US. o Not defensive realism (balance of power) o Not offensive realism or Mearshimer’s offshore balancer

104  Open door theory-America persues empire by economic and ideological expansion.  Where did cold war come from. o Traditional answer, necessary because of stalin. o Cold War really came from our irrational fear of Russia and Stalin o We wanted an open door and Europe but eastern Europe was going to go commie anyway  Cold war was bad: o Antagonized Russia o Germany didn’t unify. Could have (as communists!)  Open Door policy is primary driver of American foreign policy. o People say liberalism promotes peace. o Layne says it causes overexpansion, unnecessary military intervention, and occasionally involvement in otherwise avoidable wars.  Terrorism doesn’t pose an existential threat to US

Levy, Jack S., " War and Peace," Handbook of International Relations, Ch. 18, pp. 350-362 [12 pages].

 War: Large scale organized violence between politically defined groups.  3 concepts of war: 1. war as a constant, continuous state, 2. war as a variable, 3. particular wars.  Realist theories of war: international anarchy necessary for war. Variations in distribution of power cause war.  Liberal theories of war and peace (underdeveloped): interdependence promotes peace  Democractic peace (mid 1980s) only if both are democratic (democracies initiate WAR against autocracies A LOT)

Lewis, Bernard, The Crisis in Islam, University of Chicago Press, 1988.

 Theocracy is a new creation of Iran.  Components of new resurgence: o 1. Humilitaion, o 2 frustration, o 3 new sense of power (oil).  3 camps: Jihadists, moderates, Jihadists-in-waiting.  Jihad OK against infidels, apostates, rebels, bandits.  Crusades are a late development and departure in Christianity. Jihad is the FOUNDING of islam.  Jurists and Jihad, laws of war:  House of Truce, those countries that pay tribute to avoid invasion.  Whabbism 1774 Fueled a Saudi rebellion against ottomans.

105  1921, Saud takes whole Najd (Arabian peninsula). Cause for war over Hijaz: o 1. Hussein declares himself Caliph. o 2. Barring Whabbis from Hadj.  1933, Saud allows standard oil in (1929 depression). Saud exporting Wahabbism world wide, the madrasa.  Radical islam feeds on humiliation, privation, frustration, and resentment. Provides: 1. reason for problem, 2. solution, 3. can’t be suppressed  Radical complaint against modernization (there is not too little, but too much).  Competing traditions: Obedience to Ruler vs. duty to disobey and kill apostate ruler.  First suiciders: 1980-88 Iranian boys run through minefields, 1982 Lebannon and Israel  Response to 9-11 like holocaust: 1. Never happened, 2. exaggerated, 3. they deserved it anyway.  Russia, china, India will be less forgiving than US.  3 PHASES OF ISLAMIC WARFARE: o 1. offer your opponent opportunity to convert, o 2. defensive phase, consolidate your power and defeat near enemy, o 3. Offensive war: spread faith by sword.

Lewis, Michael, Moneyball; New York: Norton, 2003, pp. 3-96, 119-137, 162-187, and 217-262.

 Replacing wrong assumptions and intuition with scientific method for selecting players.  Exploiting inefficiency in the system.

Maclean, Norman, Young Men and Fire, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992, pp. 3-139.

Norman Maclean, Young Men and Fire; pp. 164-301.

 Scientific method applied to disaster to really understand solution

Mann, Col Edward C., et. al., Thinking Effects : Effects Based Methodology for Joint Operations (Maxwell AFB: AL: Air University Press, October 2002),

1-42., 55-88.

 the majority of doctrine was written to deal specifically with a major theater war (MTW) through the employment of the conquest paradigm.

106  EBO as a way to leverage NCW (written pre-Iraq)  Conquest Paradigm: War is the FAILURE of politics and diplomacy, rather than an extension of them. (Resentment of SCUD hunting)  Policy->Objective->Effect->Target->Action->Weapon  Types of effects: o 1 physical, o 2 functional, o 3 systemic (“those indirect effects aimed at affecting or disrupting the operation of a specific system or set of systems”), and o 4 psychological  Continual cycle of strategy development, operations, and assessment (figure of two circles, strategy and operations planning)  Strategy: relating means to ends  Anti-Mintzberg “In strategy development, planners and analysts build a comprehensive list of the range of possibilities and determine which combination of actions is most likely to create the desired effects and achieve policy goals.”  Challenges in implementing EBO: o 1. Kinetic habits, o 2. Focus on input rather than output of process

Mansfield, Edward D. and Jack Snyder, "Prone to Violence" The National Interest, Winter 2005 / 2006.

 Pushing countries too soon into competitive electoral politics not only risks stoking war, sectarianism and terrorism, but it also makes the future consolidation of democracy more difficult o poorer, o more ethnically divided, o ideologically more resistant to democracy, o with more entrenched authoritarian elites and o a much frailer base of governmental institutions and citizen skills  External can make institutions, but internal must make elections happen

Mansoor, COL Peter R., USA, and MAJ Mark S. Ulrich, “Linking Doctrine to Action: A New COIN Center-of-Gravity Analysis,”

Military Review. Combined Arms Center. Sep/Oct 2007. (p45-51). Available online at http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/SepOct07/mansoorengseptoct07.pdf

 COIN COG through IPB

107  COG = threat objectives???  “7 pillars of insurgency” = characteristics

Mansoor, Peter R., The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945

(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999), Read pp. 1-15, 160-180, 249-267; Scan pp. 49-83, 181- 248. [SAMS Issue]

 Wisdom: Allied Numbers won out over German tactics  Mansoor: US logistics and fires tactics were really good and won the war  SLA Marshall’s 25%: Mansoor: no one to shoot at  Me: Ignores Russian contribution to war.

Manual, Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations, Supplement 2 ONA (Joint Warfighting Center, 24 February 2006),

2 pages

 ONA =DIME Action.....on.....PMESII Systems.  ENAR: The principal product of the ONA is a pre-analyzed range or menu of options in the form of effect-node-action-resource linkages that reside in an automated database

Manual, Commander's Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations (Joint Warfighting Center, 24 February 2006),

Chapter 1 &2, 18 pages [Linked Above]

Chapter III, 23 pages.

 Effects only at Strategic and Operational level  OE = physical battlespace + PMESII  Objectives->Effects

108  MA = SoSA: “JIPB and SoSA should not be separate and distinct processes.”  Node-key node- link  COG = CC + CR + CV  MA adds SoSA and objectives, effects, MOEs, and COGs  COA Dev adds  Direct v. Indirect approach to COG

Manual, Commander's Handbook for an Effects -Based Approach to Joint Operations, Supplement 1 (Joint Warfighting Center, 24 February 2006),

18 pages.[Linked Above]

 Apologetics, Why ONA is not working in Iraq… o Not complex adaptive systems…“An effects-based approach is founded on “General Systems Theory,” not “Chaos Theory” or “Complex Adaptive Systems” methods addressed in the mathematical sciences.” o VS… o Complex adaptive system as defined by Axlerod… “Most systems will confound detailed understanding; their nodes and links often cannot be accurately mapped; much of their inner dynamics will remain opaque to comprehension.”

Manual, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, December 2006  Warfare remains a violent clash of interests between organized groups characterized by the use of force  From Gallula: Counterinsurgents seeking to preserve legitimacy must stick to the truth and make sure that words are backed up by deeds; insurgents, on the other hand, can make exorbitant promises and point out government shortcomings, many caused or aggravated by the insurgency  From Gallula Frequently, contradictions are based on real problems. However, insurgents may create artificial contradictions using propaganda and misinformation  PARADOXES OF COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS  20-25 insurgents / 1000 people ME: = 400k in Iraq

Manual, FM 90-8 Counterguerrilla Warfare, August 1986,

Chap 1, online in AKO at https://akocomm.us.army.mil/usapa/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_aa/pdf/fm90_8.pdf

109  Prerequisites o 1 Vulnerable population. o 2 Leadership available for direction. o 3. Lack of government control.  Other required conditions o 1 Popular support. o 2 Unity of effort. o 3 Will to resist. o 4 Leadership. o 5 Discipline o 6 Intelligence. o 7. Propaganda. o 8. Favorable environment. o 9. External support.  3 phases  Dau tran: target groups o Population o Insurgents o External actors

Manual, Joint Publication 1, "Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,"

Executive Summary, Chapter 1. [38 pages]

 Principles of War: objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, simplicity.  Other principles: restraint, perseverance, legitimacy

Manual, Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations (17 September 2006),

Review Chapter II and Chapter IV.

 Principles of War: objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, simplicity. Other principles: restraint, perseverance, legitimacy  PMESII  Operational Environment = Physical Environment + Information Environment  Military planning = joint strategic planning: o security cooperation planning, o force planning, and o joint operation planning

110  key links and nodes used to attack operational and strategic COG  A COG comprises the source of power that provides freedom of action, physical strength, and will to fight  1 COG per level of war  “The essence of operational art lies in being able to produce the right combination of effects in time, space, and purpose relative to a COG to neutralize, weaken, destroy, or otherwise exploit it”  Decisive Point

Manual, Joint Publication 3-07.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID),

Internal Defense And Development Strategy April 2004. Appendix B - online at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_07_1.pdf

 FID is not just military. Requires OGA  Principles o 1 Unity of Effort. o 2 Maximum Use of Intelligence o 3 Maximum Use of PSYOP and CA o Minimum Use of Violence. o 5 A Responsive  Alleviate underlying causes

Manual, Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Plannin g (26 December 2006) Chapter III, III-1 to 29.

Chapter IV, 38 pages.

 There is a delicate balance between the desire for quick victory and termination on truly favorable terms  Effects-desired and undesired effects  Tasks->Effects->Objectives  Indirect effects, often undesired effects  A system is “A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements”  Node, Key Node, link  PMESII  MOPs, MOEs

111  Questions of Operational Art: Ends, Ways, Means, Risk  3 types of campaigns: global, theater, subordinate.  Joint Elements of Operational Design o Termination o End State & Objectives o Effects o COG o DPs o Direct v. Indirect o LOOs o Op Reach o Simultaneity & Depth o Timing & Tempo o Forces & Functions o Leverage o Balance o Anticipation o Synergy o Culmination o Arranging Operations  The COG is always linked to the objective  “The essence of operational art lies in being able to produce the right combination of effects in time, space, and purpose relative to a COG to neutralize, weaken, defeat, or destroy it.”  COGs on PMESII as groups of nodes (key nodes)  COG = CC, CR, CV  Direct v. Indirect diagram (lilly pads to the COG)  Joint Phases (with diagram showing activities simultaneous through phases o Shape o Deter o Sieze the Initiative o Dominate o Stabilize o Enable Civil Authority o Shape  Branches and Sequels

Manual, Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. FM 3-05.301. August 2007. Phase II, Target Audience Analysis.

Pages 2-1 to 2-10

 4 target audiences NOT 2 step model o Organizations

112 o Demographic sets o Leaders o Key communicators  Behavior-Cause-Effect Analysis

Manual, Standard Operating Procedures & Tactics, Techniques & Procedures for the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (JFCOM 14 July 2004),

Chapter 5, 5-1 to 5-12

 ETO Process o 1 EWG makes effects, o 2. COA dev-ona WG approves Effects Node-Action-Resource (ENAR), o 3. and might be labeled “high-payoff nodes”. nodes have been identified and linked to DIME actions o 4. J3 generates ETO.

Manual, U.S. Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC), Version 1.0, 2007,

40 effective pages (SAMS issue)

 IRREGULAR WARFARE is defined as: “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations.  IW is people focused instead of military focused (Clausewitzian trinity diagram)  Ultimately, IW is a political struggle with violent and non-violent components.  IW activities o Insurgency o Counterinsurgency (COIN) o Unconventional warfare (UW) o Terrorism o Counterterrorism (CT) o Foreign internal defense (FID) o Stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction operations (SSTRO) o Strategic communications o Psychological operations (PSYOP) o Information operations (IO) o Civil-military operations (CMO) o Intelligence and counterintelligence activities

113 o Transnational criminal activities, including narco-trafficking, illicit arms dealing, and illegal financial transactions, that support or sustain IW o Law enforcement activities focused on countering irregular adversaries  Irregular (CT)  Catastrophic (Counter WMD, HD)  Traditional  Disruptive (shape)  The Long War  Indirect Approach using IW  Risk 2: OGAs don’t step up  Risk 7: Bad Stratcom: requires a big, joint, strategic capability

Manual, United States Government Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Termination (July 2007), p. 6-47.

 Conflict Transformation: The two-pronged approach o diminish the factors that cause violent conflict instability while o building the capacity of local institutions  Locally-led Nascent Peace: tipping point for conflict transformation  PRINCIPLES OF PLANNING o Unity of Effort: o Simplicity: o “Just Enough” Planning: o Adaptability: o Standardization of Products:  2-3 years a likely window for before international attention wanes  ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER o 1 Diplomacy o 2 Military o 3 Strategic Communications o 4 Intelligence o 5 Economic Relations o 6 Assistance Programs o 7 Law Enforcement o 8 Consular Policy

Manual, United States Special Operations Command, History: 15th Anniversary.

Tampa: USSOCOM, 2002. pp 3-18, 16pp. (Blackboard)

114 Manual, USA/USMC COIN Handbook Draft Chap 1

Draft: USA/USMC COIN Handbook Chapter 2

 ASCOPE o A – Area (Where; the relation of people to where they live) o S – Structure (Why are buildings, bridges, hospitals, shrines, etc important) o C – Capability (Who in the community is capable of providing for the people o At a minimum use “SWEAT-MS” (Sewer, Water, Electricity, Academic, Trash, Medical, and Security). o O – Organization (What are the different groups of people in the AO/AI) o P – People (How do the people communicate) o E – Event (When are things occurring  Characteristics. o Leadership o Ideology o Objectives o Environment and geography o External support o Phasing and timing o Organizational and operational patterns  Strategies o Basic – “Urban Terrorism” and “Foco” (Military-focused) strategies o Advanced – “Protracted Warfare” and “Subversive” strategies  3 phases

Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, translated by Samuel B. Griffith II, 1937; republished with new introduction by Samuel B. Griffith II, University of Illinois Press, 2000, Chap 1-7 (24 pp). Available online at http://www.bellum.nu/literature/mao001.html

 Parallel political and military effort. guerrilla operations alone cannot produce final victory.  3 phases of insurgency o Political activity o Guerilla war o War of Movement  Don’t steal from people  Quotes Clausewitz on weakness of Offensive

115 Maraniss, David, They Marched into Sunlight, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003,

pp. 3-138, 141-165.

 2/28 Black lions. Crappy commander gets them ambushed because of drive for body counts  Senior military tries to cover up: Don’t use “Ambush,” decorate unit  Madison police beat down protestors for accosting Dow Chemical reps at University  Policeman: I don’t care if they nuke that whole side of town!

Mattis, James, and Frank Hoffman, "Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars”,

Proceedings, NOV 2005, 131:11, pp 18019. http://lumen.cgsccarl.com/login? url=http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=928877101&Fmt=3&clientId=5094&RQT=309&VName=PQD

 need to maintain our traditional combat capabilities for major war to deter enemies from using the tactic.  Hybrid War: o We're adding a fourth block-which makes it the Four Block War. o The additional block deals with the psychological or information operations aspects. o This fourth block is the area where you may not be physically located but in which we are communicating or broadcasting our message.

Mazzetti, Mark, “Gates promises help for Indonesian military”

February 26, 2008, International Herald Tribune at http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/02/26/asia/26gates.php

New strain on Malaysia's ethnic ties (9 Jan 08 before election) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia- pacific/7178709.stm

A New Democratic Era in Malaysia (11 Mar 08 after election) http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/JC11Ae01.html

116 McDougall, Walter A., Promised Land, Crusader State

(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), pp. 1-100.

Walter A. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), pp. 101- 146. [SAMS Issue]

McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State, Ch. 7, 8 and Conclusion (pp. 147-222).

 Old Testament: o 1 liberty or exceptionalism, . War of 1812 to protect shipping, protect republican power, and protect idea of American sovereignty o 2. unilateralism or isolationism, . foreign entanglements warning o 3. the American system or Monroe doctrine, . No more European colonies in America: Russia and independence for Spanish colonies. British uphold o 4. expansionism or manifest destiny. . Opportunity = progress = liberty  New Testament: o 1 Progressive imperialism, . “White Man’s Burden” . Expand American System o 2. Wilsonianism or liberal internationalism, . We don’t do things for material interest . Make world safe for democracy o 3 containment, . Deperession breaks grip of Protestants on government . People want global police force after WWII . UN fails . Churchill suggests NATO . Doesn’t violate other traditions o 4. global meliorisim . Not just make world safe for democracy, make world democratic . Meant as excuse to challenge soviets in 3rd world. . After containment, becomes an end itself o Clinton: Only do global meliorism when interests NOT at stake (Wilson) o Religious millenarianism caused new testament to prepare the way for messaiah o Suggestion: Put away mellinarianism and husband our freedoms at home

117 McFarland, Maxie, Colonel U.S. Army, Retired, “Military Cultural Education,”

Military Review, March-April 2005, Pp. 62-69 (total 8 pages) at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/mcfarland.pdf

 Cultural literacy requires knowing cultural patterns and your own culture.  Norms: o . 1 Communication styles o 2 Attitudes toward conflict o 3 Approaches to competing tasks o 4 Decisionmaking styles o 5 Attitudes toward personal disclosure o 6 Approaches to knowing.

McRaven, William H. SPEC OPS Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice. Presidio: Presidio Press, 1996. pp 1-25, 25pp. (CARL SAMS multiple copy)

 Pro DA.  San The raid as proof of importance of DA over other missions.  Can achieve local mass

Mead, Walter Russell, Special Providence,

Chapters 1 and 2, pp. 3-55.

Chapter 3, pp. 56-98

Chapters Eight and Nine, pp. 264-334.

 Refutes idea that there was no American foreign policy before WWII  Intentional Myths of cold war o 1. Communism was one monolithic force, o 2. We had been babes in the woods before cold war and now had to do something radically different

118  new paradigm, new “myth” for 21st century. o First era, till 1823, figure out balance of trade w/England, o second, Til 1914, shift of power to US. o Third, Til end of WWII, o Fourth, Cold War.  4 schools: o Hamilton (health of econ), Imperialism for markets o Wilson (crusader), Extension of missionary tradition. Gives us soft power o Jeffersonian (protect democracy at home, we screw everything up), Isolationists o Jackson (cowboy diplomacy) Powell doctrine. Suspicious of meliorisim. Hates UN  ME: Traditions line up with DIME  Cold War: o Realists Jacksonians, Hamiltonians, and some Wilsonians o Idealists: Jeffersonians and Willsonians  Post Cold War o Hamiltonian (globalism) o Wilson (UN) o Jefferson and Jackson (anti-globalization)  Must do something we have never done before: develop a coherent strategy in peacetime. We need a Grand Strategy

Mearsheimer, John, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), Chapters 1, 2 (pp 1 - 54). (CARL reserve) [53 pages]

 Best garauntee of survival is to be a hegemon. OFFENSIVE REALISM  Why states pursue power: o 1. the international system is anarchic, o 2. great powers inherently possess some offensive capability, o 3. states can never be certain about other states intentions, o 4. survival is the primary goal of great powers, o 5. great powers are rational actors.  What is hegemony: o 1. a state that is so powerful that it dominates all other states in the system o 2. means domination of the system, which is usually interpreted to mean the entire world (can be regional OR global).  The “Tragedy” Great powers will always vie for hegemony as long as the system is anarchic

Mintzberg, Henry, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning (New York: The Free Press, 1994),

Chapter 1, pages 5-15 & 23-32; chapter 2, 35-39.

119 Henry Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning (New York: The Free Press, 1994), Chapter 5, pages 282-321.

 Planning = formalized process. 3 elements: decompose, articulate, rationalize  Strategy != plans o An intended strategy that makes it to realized is “deliberate”. An intended strategy that doesn’t is “unrealized” o “emergent strategies” come from adjustment to conditions. (unplanned actions) o hybrid. An “umbrella” strategy gives broad outlines that are deliberate but allows emergent adjustment.  Every failure to implement is, by definition a failure to formulate, since formulation should take into account the “dumbbells at the bottom”.  Strategy formulation by implementers = emergent strategy  “Strategy need not emanate from a center”  In emergent strategy, one tactic MAY TURN OUT to be a strategy.  Organizations conflate strategy and planning, and make strategic planners a class apart from executors.  Fallacy of formalization (that innovation can be institutionalized).  Strategy formation should establish the categories, then planning should operationalize them  Is intuition separate from rational thought? Planning assumes they are the same.  Example of how Polaroid was made. Just an idea that “got him thinking.”  Strategy is not easily “chunked.”  Grand fallacy: “Because analysis is not synthesis, strategic planning is not strategy formation” “Ultimately, the term “strategic planning” has proved to be an oxymoron.”

Mohammad Haniff Bin Hassan, “Explaining Islam’s Special Position and the Politic of Islam in Malaysia”

(18 pages) at http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb? index=0&did=1276901171&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName= PQD&TS=1204758036&clientId=5094

 Maylay = speak Malayan and Islamic

Muller, Klaus-Jurgen, "A German Perspective on Allied Deception Operations in the Second World War," in Michael I. Handel, ed., Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War (London: Frank Cass, 1987),

120 pp. 301-316 [15 pages] [SAMS Issue].

 Sicily invasion: intel so inundated by contradictory reports that deception was just another false report.  DECEPTION REQUIRES ENEMY TO HAVE HIGH DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE IN HIS INTEL  Post hoc,ergo propter hoc argument is a fallacy.

Naveh, Shimon, In Pursuit of Military Excellence pp. 1-23, 105-238[355.4N323i].

 Systems theory born out of skepticism about current “mechanistic approaches”  To be operational: o 1. Expresses strategic-tactical tension, o 2. Must address links in systems and link actions to strategic aims, o 3. Must synergize a number of forces separated by space and time, o 4. Disrupts opponents system, o 5. Must address randomness in interactions in system, o 5. Op plan must be non-linear in nature, o 6. Acts must “reflect deliberate interaction between the notions of manoeuvre and attrition. o 7. Op plan Autarkic (self-sufficient), o 8. Plan “related to a broad and universal theory  Uses “hub of all power” COG: o 1. ID points of strength and weakness, o 2. Creation of operational vulnerabilities, o 3. Explointing vulnerabilities with strikes.  Blitzkrieg was a self-perpetuating myth. Guderian perpetuated  Germans were doing tactics for tactics sake. One out over older guys’ Truppenfuhrung  Sum of all tactical excellence does not equal achieving strategic objectives  Russians understood operational art: achieve operational shock to disrupt enemy system  Soviet Deep Operations o Operational strike maneuver o Airborne, fix far elements and reduce from rear to front.  Me: IGNORES THE FACT THAT THE GERMANS WERE OUTNUMBERED 136 DIV TO 154 AND FACED A 36 MILLION MAN MOBILIZATION

Naylor, Sean D. “Support grows for standing up an unconventional warfare command.”

121 Armed Forces Journal (November 2007): 30-34, 37. 6pp.

Available at: http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/11/3049653

 Drive for a UW command inside SOC because of SF commitment to DA instead of UW

Naylor, Sean D. “The Spec Ops Stretch.”

Armed Forces Journal (November 2006): 30-35. 5pp.

Available at: http://armedforcesjournal.com/2006/10/2174369

 "SOF Truths": o • Quality is better than quantity. o • Special operations forces cannot be mass produced. o • Competent special operations forces cannot be created after emergencies occur. o • Humans are more important than hardware  Growing SOF is hurting it  Strategic importance of SOF is overblown. SMUs have negligible strategic impact

Nye, Joseph, "Soft Power and American Foreign Policy", Political Science Quarterly, vol 119, no 2, 2004, pp 255-270. [15 pages] (full text via EBSCO)

 “Soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.”  America is losing soft power because of its foreign policy  Moderates need a popular US  Traditions: o Alexander Hamilton’s realists (Hard power, no soft), o Jeffersonian populists (soft power, no hard), o Wilsonian idealists (2 camps, . transform through peace—democrat, . transform through war, neo-conservative).

Ottaway, Marina, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism

(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003),

122 Introduction, Chapter 1, scan 1-12, read 12-23 and 31-50.

Chapter 1, Egypt and Chapter 6 & 7, pp. 31-50, 137-194.

 Donor model of Democratization: o 1. liberalization o 2 transition proper, and o 3 consolidation  Semi-authoritarians stop at 1.  Egypt = institutionalized semi-authoritarianism 4 liberal qualities, but… o 5 sytem to protect govt from real competition, o 6 limits freedom of orgs to make them harmless, o 7. impossible to transfer power through elections, o 8 maintains stability  Nasser liberalization got through step 1  Dilemna: Bring together elites and masses of poor susceptible to radical islam who are excluded from power  Mubarak clamp down after Sadat assassination: 20 year state of emergency  politicians problems o 1. manipulate features of election process, o 2. win voter’s support, o 3. finance campagn activities o 4 (authoritarian only) prevent emergence of competition o 5. control flow of info to citizens o 6. maintain political stability  democ. Requires: o 1. pluralism with flexible demands, o 2. some group willing to switch parties

Pape, Robert A., Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996),

Chapter 1 and 2, pp. 1-54.

Chapter 6, 174-210.

 “Coercion” means efforts to change the behavior of a state by manipulating costs and benefits.”  Not punishment but denial is the kind of coercion that works. Give enemy no military option o Coercion by punishment (cost) vs.

123 o Coercion by Denial (prevent goals of enemy)  Exception is Nuclear coercion  Ground is only a denial tool (in Medieval times, it did punishment too (RISE OF LAW OF WAR).  Vietnam: o COULDN’T TARGET NORTH MILITARY WHEN IT WAS AN INSURGENCY o Why Rolling Thunder Failed: . North saw country as one. . Industry not highly valued . North industry not supporting insurgency (FALACY OF CAUSE OF INSURGENCY) o Linebacker 1: (destroy war material, prevent flow out of north of material, and personnel). Thwarted Easter offensive-stopped north’s momentum. o Linebacker II was a faster repeat after North backed out when South refused to sign. Reinforced impression that resuming offensive was futile o 3 lessons of Vietnam bombing . (1. not every enemy is susceptible to coercion . 2. air power is not good against insurgency or agrarian civilians, . 3.. pay attention to relation between US actions and ENEMY goals)

Parsa, Misagh, States, Ideologies, & Social Revolutions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000),

Chapter 1 and 2, pp. 3-54

Chapter 3, pp. 55-86

Chapter 5, pp. 130-161

 popular mobilization and collective action overthrew: Iran, Nicaragua, Phillipines. o Similarities ( . 1. similar experiences (had used repression to survive challenges, not weakened by external or war, ), . 2. similar structures (successful capatilim, authoritarian) . 3. Unlikely person came to power). 4 . . All had experienced earlier insurgencies that failed. o Differences . . 1. Iran, religious leader came to power and repressed dissent. . 2. Nicaragua, communists came to power but never controlled cities. . 3. Phillipines, communists overthrew govt but didn’t come to power.  Revolutions: “rapid, basic transformations of society’s state and class structures that are carried through class-based revolts from below.”  what causes revolution: o 1. Exlucisve Rule

124 o 2. State intervention (“state intervention in capital allocation and accumulation has profound consequences,” scale: o 3. coalition formation (Army defections the worst “dismantles” coercive tools) . o 4 Ideology  “In extreme cases, a hyperactive state may even become the single largest entrepreneur” When workers work for state, state is blamed for grievances  Churches and religious events used to grow and hide movement  “Clergy: actors with relative impunity”  Nicaragua: Church organizations were the main distributors of relief after earthquake  Tyrants require external support as they weaken, but support makes them weaker..  Iran: o Increase pop = food shortage = move to urban areas = less food. o “Political power was used effectively to promote the accumulation of wealth in the hands of a small number of people”  Irrationalities of economy in Totalitarian regimes.  Shah was trying to promote Persia over islam

Patai, Raphael, The Arab Mind, Hatherleigh, 1976, 1983, 2002. Prefaces,

Chapts. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16.

 Three circles, arab world, Middle East, and Islam.  Original arabs are the Bedouins. Eventually, occupied peoples became arabs  Dar al Islam (house of islam) and Dar al Harb (House of War).  Arabic and Islam defines an Arab  Arab exaggeration and repetition  Past is one big clump, no chronology, from Koran  “Whiten one’s face”= save face, increase reputation  5 pillars of islam o Prayer o Hadj o Alms o Ramadan o No god but Allah  Lying between Egypt and Jordan in 1967 war.  Shame-based, rather than guilt-based society  Rank: Bedouin, townsperson, farmer=aversion to dirtying hands  Insha allah = long range planning sinful.  Pattern of arab fighting: insults, fighting, bloodshed, neutral tribe forges peace, less bloddied tribe pays blood money, peace.  All resolution of conflict between arabs requires a mediator-culture  1258-1798 (fall of Baghdad to Napoleon in Egypt) = Arab stagnation. Mongol invasion, black death, more mongol invasion

125  West as a jinni the arabs can’t get to go back in the bottle. Started in Egypt with napoleon and spread.

Pearlman, Michael D., Unconditional Surrender, Demobilization, and the Atomic Bomb

(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 1996), 24 pages. [Online: http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Pearlman/pearlman.asp]

 Post VE tensions o Americans sick of war, want 1 mil man demob o Hardliners want unconditional surrender o Army knows invasion will be super bloody and take long time o ME: Russians are entering the war  Atomic bomb and keeping emperor as a compromise

Perry, Mark, Four Stars (Houghton Mifflin, Boston: 1989),

pp. 132-204.

 JCS with Wheeler, LeMay was setup to approve the war  JCS: Only options that made since: “Get in and win or stay out.”  NSC rejected both options. Taylor report: “Controlled escalation.”  Westmoreland was using a “big Unit” strategy  Abrams sent as deputy and then to take over  JCS wanted a big war, so they kept asking for more and more troops to force president to do full mobilization.

Peters, Ralph, “Also Known as Indonesia, Notes on the Javanese Empire”

(79 pages) at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/ceto/indonesia_report_march_31_2002.pdf

126  Indonesia as the Javanese Empire  Fundamentalism CAN’T take over here

Pirsig, Robert, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance

2005.

 Infinite number of hypotheses as a problem  Classical (structured hierarchical world, function, masculine) vs. Romantic (aesthetic world, immediate appearance, feminine)  Inductive-observation to conclusion. Deductive-start with a general idea and predict a specific observation  Quality exists in the lag between vision and recognition of an object. Every object is in the past and is not real. Real is now and you can’t perceive now. Quality exists there and is unperceivable.

Posen, Barry and Andrew Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy"

International Security, vol. 21, no. 3, (Winter 1996/1997), pp 5-53.

[48 pages] (full-text via EBSCO)

 Competing post Cold War Strategies o neo-isolationism (least ambitious, focus on power, very little intervention) o selective engagement (Engage with important states-prevent war) o cooperative security (Use international institutions to guarantee peace) o primacy (“this strategy holds that only a reponderance of U.S. power ensures peace”

Posen, Barry, "The Best Defense" (review of Tragedy of Great Power Politics), National Interest, Spring 2002, pp 119-126. (EBSCO) [7 pages]

 Problems with “stopping power of water” o Britain and the United States in WWII. o Japan undeterred by water  Mearsheimer disagrees with US assertiveness after WWII but Offensive realism predicts it!

127 Princeton Project on National Security, introduction and executive summary.

 Need to reform UN.  If we can’t, need Concert of democracies

Race, Jeffrey, War Comes to Long An, (University of California Press, Berkley: 1972),

p. 1-73, and 84-96.

 War with France had been good for peasants because it drove out landlords. DESTROYED PEASANT FATALISM  Peasants in Lang An hated Vietminh because they used schorched earth.  Peasants hated govt police because they were foreign and too heavy-handed  Diem brought back landlords.  Vietcong local shadow govt more powerful than legit local govt.  Land reform replaced landlords with govt. Made govt as hated as landlords.  Vietcong IO themes o Govt corruption o Land reform o Nationalism against Diem puppet regime.

RAND study “America’s Role In Nation-Building From Germany to Iraq”:

Read CH 7 on Kosovo (available in the “multiple copy” section next to the SAMS reserve

Read CH 9 in the RAND study “America’s Role In Nation-Building From Germany to Iraq”

 Lessons from Kosovo o 2. “A slow mobilization of civil elements in peace operations can be costly.” o 3. Uncertainty over final status hinders democracy, o 4. expatriates can work in admin when no one else is available, o 5. Large Scale assistance OK with good financial institutions in place.  Lessons from Iraq o 1. Requirement for democracy . a. prior democratic experience, . b. level of economic dev,

128 . c national homogeneity, . c level of effort (time, manpower, money), o 2. multilateral is better (complex but cheaper), o 3. multilateral more lasting results, o 4. unit of command, o 5. greater size of force equals less risk, o 6. neighboring states can give heavy influence, o 6. Accountability aids reconciliation but makes stability harder, o 7. 5 year min to nation build. 

Reynolds, Paul Davidson, a Primer on Theory Construction; Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1993, pp. 3-19.

 A desirable Theory has (i.e. the criteria by which it is judged o “1. Abstractness (independence of time and space); o 2. Intersubjectivity (agreement about meaning among relevant scientists) o 3. Empirical relevance (can be compared to empirical findings)”  Purpose of answering question: o 1. Categorize things “typology”: Must be useful. Determine criteria that are exhaustive and mutual exclusive (i.e. unambiguous) o 2. predict future events: Under condition X, changing variable Y causes change Z. Must be TRANSFERABLE to other situations to be useful. Builds on typology. Very definite predictions are “Laws” o 3. explain past events, understand what causes events: Answers why and requires predictable behavior first. Either a derivation from a scientific statement (or law) or a description of a causal mechanism (must fit all cases) o 4. Control events. Not a requirement for a theory (Jomini vs. Clausewitz)

Roberts, Hugh, The Battlefield Algeria 1988-2002 (New York: Verso, 2003),

Chapters 1, pp. 3-31.

Chapters 2 and 4, pp. 34-57 and 82-101.

Chapters 7, 9, 12 and 14, pp. 138-150, 160-179, 200-211, and 217-242.

 “Radical Islamism is wholly orhodox and this is one of its strengths.”  “Salafiyya: a return to a strict adherence to scripture and thus the purification of the faith of all blameworthy innovations.”

129 o 1931: came to Algeria from Egypt. Replaced Maraboutic Islam (cult of saints). o FLN absorbed and subverted Salafiyya. Created new fundamentalist movement. o Began with death of Arab nationalism in 1967 October war. o Rise: . 1. Arabisation had the effect of making poor people illiterate in French, sewed seeds of revolution. . 2. Socialization of farms created more unrest. Soviet alliance opened govt to “atheist” criticisms. . 3. Mobilizing students went awry. . 4 Reforms alientated the military  Shura: the obligation of govt to consult the people. Islamists use call to get govt.  Parties, the left, the arabists, the berberists, the feminists, and the Islamists. Islamists getting support from govt.  “The deliberate creation of disorder, fitna, is the very last thing a Muslim feels obliged to endure from his government.”  Syrian Ba’ath party’s dealing with Islamists is admired by Algerian govt. Ba’athims could be Algeria’s future  Other political traditions o 0 Qba’il, self-governing tribes, led by jema’a or heads of families p 43:: o 1. nobility: military ajwad or jawad, religious shurfa or sheriff, o 2. qa’id, agha, and bashagha (leaders appointed by central govt), o 3. tariqa (religious brotherhood, sheikh, mqaddemmin, and ikhwan), o 4. Jihad with amir mujahadin and khulafa, o 5. mahdi tradition (second coming).  Aban Ramdane’s downfall o used Jacobin Robespierre model and failed  FIS: Islamists-have no economic strategy  FLN: technocrats are powerless  Algerian identity crisis o arabo-islamism o Berberism o Islamism  The French definition3 & 7 are right. , o 1. state vs. islamists, o 2. no room for compromise o 3. Islamist win is bad, o 4. economic cause, o 5. no middle ground, o 6. only alternatively is to prop up regime, o 7. mut have a political solution:  Categories of participants (Conflict: readmitting FIS o 1. govt: eradicators and conciliators, o 2. rebellion: GIA-intransigent, AIS-FIS-reconcilable, o 3. legal islamists: MNI and HAMAS, o 4. other parties: Ben Bella: movement for democtracy and PRA, o 5 NGOs: FLN (not support govt), ONM and UGTA (support govt), o 6. Kabyles: FFS and RCD,

130 o 7 Marxists: defiance party opposed to Islamists, PT support Islamists  FIS Moderating to enter govt. COMPETING VIEWS: o 1. (ROBERTS) WEST CAN’T END THIS BECAUSE THEY SEE IT AS ISLAMIC TAKEOVER VS. o 2. (WEST) RADICAL ISLAM IS HIDING BEHIND MODERATE WORDS TO GET INTO POWER.  West should discourage posturing by parties for international audience and stay out of conflict

Russett, Bruce, "Bushwhacking the Democratic Peace," International Studies Perspectives 6:4 (November 2005), pp. 395-408 [14 pages].

 the vast majority of democracies’ use of force is against autocratic states, why: o 1. high likelihood of success, o 2. restrained executives exercising their one power, o 3. The only way to expand nations wealth in democracy, o 4. popularity of we-vs-them politics in democracies  worked in Germany and japan, why not Iraq: o 1. poor, o 2. no democratic history, o 3. resource curse, o 4. authoritarian tradition of islam  thirteen successes for a policy of democratization, and sixteen failures. When democratization was not an explicit goal it virtually never happened.

Salmon, Wesley C., Causality and Explanation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998),

Introduction, Chapter 1, 3-24.

Chapter 2 & 5, 25-49, 79-91

 teleological-Aristotle’s final cause,  Newton, Darwin: non-telological Efficient cause  Hume (science avoids secret powers and mysterious connections): Science hates assigning cause  Locke: Volition equals cause (willing arm to move) vs. Hume (what about nerves and muscles)  Cause requires: o 1. temporal connection, o 2. spatial connection, o 3. constant conjunction  Dowe: Theory of conserved quantities: a process is causal if it manifests a conserved quantity  Sufficient vs necessary conditions

131  Types of Philosophy on Causality o 1. Mechanistic determinism, o 2. teleological determinism (God), o 3. Mechanistic indeterminism, o 4. teleological indeterminism (free will).  Types of SCIENTIFIC understanding: o 1 our place in world and what kind of world it is, o 2. understanding the basic mechanisms of our world.

Schmidt, Brian, "On the History and Historiography of International Relations" Handbook of International Relations,

Ch. 1, pp. 4-17 [13 pages]

 Realism Roots to Thucydides, Machiavelli, hobbes, hume, Clausewitz, Morgenthau, organski, waltz, Gilpin.  Great debates: idealists v realists. Traditionalists vs. behaviorialists. Third debate: adding science to the field positivists.

Schneider, James J. and Lawrence L. Izzo, "Clausewitz's Elusive Centers of Gravity," Parameters, Fall 1987, student handout.

 FM 100-5, 1986 adds elements of op design, including COG  US confuses COG with decisive point (Jomini)  Germans confused this too.  COGis a physical location, preponderance of enemy force.  Schneider: Sees op art as attacking at DP to destroy COG  Schneider ignores HUB definition

Schroeder, Paul W., "Napoleon's Foreign Policy: A Criminal Enterprise", THE CONSORTIUM ON REVOLUTIONARY EUROPE, PROCEEDINGS, 1989 (Institute on Napoleon and the French Revolution, Florida State University, Tallahassee, 1990),

pp.104-111.

 To understand Napoleonic wars you must see them as a criminal interprise

132  The reason appeasement failed was because you couldn’t appease him. His demands were worse than the cost of war  Ended up being a poster child AGAINST liberty

Slaughter, Anne-Marie, "The Real New World Order," Foreign Affairs Sep/Oct97, Vol. 76 Issue 5, p183-197 [15 pages]

 A new trasngovernmental order is emerging that interconnects the bureaucracies of states. Spans huntington’s civilizations.

Slipchenko, Vladimir, “A Russian Analysis of Warfare Leading to the Sixth Generation”,

Field Artillery, OCT 1993, pp 38-41. http://sill- www.army.mil/famag/1993/OCT_1993/OCT_1993_FULL_EDITION.pdf

 6th gen warfare: airpower makes ground irrelevant  RMA  Threat to peace is backwards 3rd world countries that won’t adopt technology  Nuclear club will expand

Snyder, Jack, "One World, Rival Theories", Foreign Policy, November/December 2004, pp 53-61. (EBSCO) [8 pages]

 How Realism, Liberalism, and Idealism explain post 9-11 world.

Spector, Ronald H., After Tet, (The Free Pres: NY: 1993):

p. 279-294. (3rdth Group).

133  Senior state rep in VN: “Whether security is ten percent of the total problem or ninety percent, it is inescapably the first ten percent or the first ninety percent.”

Stoler, Mark A., Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II pp. 1-40. [CARL NetLibrary] pp. 64-102, 211-257. [SAMS Issue]

 tension: Should military be involved in strategy. Before WWI state and civs said no  Search for strategy before WWII, went back to Old Testament traditions  Hitler’s 1940 victories, which destroyed almost overnight the foundations of 135 years of American ‘‘free security’’ and forced Americans to rethink their most basic assumptions regarding appropriate foreign  and defense policies.  Navy wants pacific, Army wants France, Brits want North Africa  Army, if not France, lets do Pacific  Walter Lippman Life article, US will decline with 3 totalitarian industrial powers.  FDR: Let Russia do most of the fighting via lend lease  Sudden shift as Russians refuse to help Poles. See Soviets as postwar threat  Southeast Asia Command (seac), a theater so filled with British postwar political interests as to have its seac acronym derisively translated by Americans as ‘‘Save England’s Asian Colonies.”

The Art and Science of Cause and Effect," in Judea Pearl, Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 331-358. (SAMS Reprint Aspects of Campaign Planning.)

 Gallileo: How before why & descriptions in mathematics  Hume: cause and effect by observation = rooster & sun problem  Has created a reluctance to conjecture on cause and effect (Correlations only)

Tone, John Lawrence, The Fatal Knot: The Guerilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain, (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1994),

134 pp. 3-183.

 History of non-compliance with Madrid  Were with French until they tried to impose taxes  Strong family ties and social governance  History of autonomous govt.  Many disenfranchised men because of primogeniture  Enlightened society before French arrived  Terror and counter-terror to influence populace  French never controlled rural areas, focus in Pamplona  Reasons: o 1. French hated. o 2. French didn’t know how to occupy, o 3. attacks on church “French troops behaved as if they were charged with the de- Chrisitianization of the province.” (church supported guerillas, integrated into society) o 4. nationalism of Navarre rural people as Navarre and Spaniards (except Pamplona, French assaulted institutions, French tried to “reform” navarre), o 5. plunder of Navarre (taxes, French worse than guerillas). o 6. Montana couldn’t meet demands for taxes, Rebira could

Tucker, David and Lamb, Christopher J. “Restructuring Special Operations Forces for Emerging Threats.”

Strategic Forum (January 2006): 6pp.

Available at: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Strforum/SF219/SF_219.pdf

 Need two commands, IA and DA

Tufte, Edward R., The Visual Display of Quantitative Information, 2nd ed. (Cheshire, CT: Graphics Press, 2001),

Chapter 1 in parts, study the principles of graphical excellence, p. 51.

Chapter 2 &3 in part, study the conclusions on pages 77 and 87, study Chapter 4, 91-105.

 Graphical displays should:

135 o 1 Show the data, o 2 induce the viewer to think about the substance, o 3 avoid distortion, o 4 present many numbers in small space, o 5 make large data coherent, o 6 encourage comparison of data, o 7 r eveal data at several levels of detail, o 8serve a clear purpose, o 9 integrate statistical and verbal descriptions of data.  “The eye tends to pick out linear patterns even in random noise.”  “descriptive chronology is not causal explanation.”

Tufte, Edward R., Visual and Statistical Thinking: Displays of Evidence for Making Decisions (Cheshire, CT: Graphics Press, 1997),

p. 5-31.

 Good methods of displaying and analyzing data produce truthful, credible, and precise findings  John Snow used empirical evidence to discover how Cholera was transmitted, o tested the theory, o explained the outliers, (Considering alternative explanations and contrary cases ) and then o acted to fix the problem.  Space shuttle example, bad. Did not focus data representation on the problem (temperature) or include all data points

Tzabag, Shmuel, "Termination of the Yom Kippur War between Israel and Syria: Positions, Decisions and Constraints at Israel's Ministerial Level," Middle Eastern Studies (October 2001),

p. 182-205. (SAMS Reprint Aspects of Campaign Planning).[Linked Above]

 Forms of termination: o 1. Unilateral (surrender, withdrawal, declaration), o 2 cooperative (cease fire, truce, armistice, arrangement, or agreement), o 3. Enforced externally

136  Halted by Jordan and Iraq from taking Damascus, but Egypt attacked to help Syria and lost. Caused suing for peace  “The lack of decision in a war is not necessarily a defeat or an absence of victory.”  Israel lost Sinai because they focused on Syria in War of Attrition during peace talks.

United States Special Operations Command, USSOCOM Fact Sheet 2007. Tampa: USSOCOM, n.d., 17pp. (Blackboard)

United States Special Operations Command, USSOCOM Posture Statement 2007, Tampa: USSOCOM, n.d., 26pp. (Blackboard)

 IW and PSYOP to stop problems in world before they start

Wendt, Alexander, " Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics" International Organization 46:2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425 [35 pages].

 Self-help is only one possible way anarchy could exist. Other IR configurations could have existed  CONSTRUCTIVISM. Nash Mini-Max was not inevitable.

Wofe, Robert,“American Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan”, Chapter 1 pp. 3-51, published in: Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952, Carbondale and Edwardsville, Southern: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984.

 1939 State-brookings-CFR study to decide fate of Japan in context of desired post-war strategy  Stage 2, get buy in from OGAs  Stage 3: War and Navy Dept take it + guidance from president’s speeches.  Army school of Military Govt.  Assumed there were liberal elements in Japan being suppressed o Want strong Japan after war o Keep monarchy or moderates will not be able to take power.  Old japan hands: Don’t impose on Japanese culture, vs. hardliners: Punish japan  Office of War Info (OWI) as a key player, wanted IO on populace in schools

137  Public didn’t like keeping emperor.  Zaibatsu (monopolies) survived attempts to destroy them by waiting out reforms until soviet threat became dangerous.  McAurthur came and state weenies got pushed out. Made a social transformation without socialist revolution

Zimmerman, COL Douglas K., "Understanding the Standing Joint Force Headquarters," Military Review (July-August 2004), p. 28-32. Zimmerman, Understanding the SJFHQ (429.18 Kb)

 MCO2: First practical test of EBO which made it popular  SJFHQ, temporary!  ONA is not only Colaborative Info Environment, but also a process and product  EBO and EBP replaces JOPES HUH?!?  ONA to leverage DIME

138 Index

A F Afghanistan, 30, 34, 36, 38, 57, 58, 60, 65 Fabius, 15, 16 American Way of War, 4, 7, 32, 33, 48, 69 FID, 115, 117 anarchy, 141 FM 3-0, 23, 24, 27, 48, 95 Arab Fog of War, 79 Arabs, 96, 98, 103, 104, 129, 130, 134 Foreign Internal Defense, 49, 71, 115 art of design, 4, 36 Frederick the Great, 40 Art of Design, 19, 26, 36 Friction, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 79, 80, 84, 95 ASCOPE, 119 Full Spectrum Operations, 18, 19, 48 Austerlitz, 42, 43, 44 G B Grand Strategy, 12, 14, 43, 68, 70, 72, 81, 123, See Grand Barbarossa, 21, 22, 23, 24, 51, 69, 88, 95 Strategy Blitzkrieg, 22, 23, 24, 25, 125 Grant, 17, 44, 45

C H Caliphate, 60, 63, 65, 99, 103 Hamiltonian, 12, 13, 14, 123 causality, 135, 136, 138 Hannibal, 15, 16, 17, 40 Centers of Gravity, 80, 112, 136 Hybrid War, 3, 18, 19, 120 Che, 61, 62, 69, 93 Civil War, 11, 17 Civil-Military Operations, 49 I Clausewitz, 19, 40, 51, 68, 73, 79, 119, 133, 136 Information Operations, 49 COG, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 125, See Centers of Gravity Insurgency, 21, 30, 49, 57, 61, 62, 64, 99, 117 COIN, 47, 48, 49, 50, 57, 61, 62, 71, 106, 111, 117, 118 IO. See Information Operations complex adaptive systems, 19, 113 Iraq, 30, 48, 57, 58, 60, 61, 66, 68, 72, 81, 90, 96, 99, 103, Complex systems, 19 110, 113, 132, 133, 135, 141 complexity, 74, 75 Irregular Warfare, 32, 46, 69, 70, 71, 91, 97, 101, 117 Complicated systems, 20 Islam, 5, 12, 65, 81, 98, 99, 134 Counterinsurgency, 49, 57, 68, 71, 76, 113, 117 jihad Counterterrorism, 49, 117 Whabbism Crusader Whabbis, 81, 83, 98, 109, 124, 129, 134 Crusade, 121 Islamic, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 82, 98, 101, 124 culture, 76, 84, 85, 86, 91, 101, 104, 107 Israel, 96, 103, 109, 141 Israeli, 96, 103, 109, 141 D Deep Operations, 22, 23, 24, 125 J Jacksonian, 12, 14 E Joint Operating Environment, 18 Jomini, 40, 70, 103, 133, 136 effects, 110, 112, 115 Jus ad bellum, 80 Effects Node Action Resource, 112, 117 jus in bello, 80 Effects Node-Action-Resource, 117 elements of national power, 30, 38 emergence, 20, 36, 127 L End State, 115 Logic of Failure, 21, 22, 47, 69, 83

139 M S Manifest Destiny, 13 Second Punic War, 15, 16 Mao, 61, 62, 71, 119 self organization, 20 Middle East, 83, 103, 129, 141 Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction, 49 Midway, 53 Strategic Communications, 49, 118 Military Review, 94, 111, 122, 142 strategy, 75, 78, 81, 82, 85, 91, 100, 103, 110, 115, 124, Military Revolutions, 31 131, 138 Monroe Doctrine, 13 System, 13, 19, 26, 39, 121 moral, 80 Systemic Understanding, 37 Mujahedeen, 35 T N Taliban, 35, 54, 65, 66 Napolean, 42 Tensions, 37, 99 Napoleon, 42, 43, 44, 73, 130, 137, 139 Termination, 9, 10, 71, 73, 115, 118, 141 Terrorism, 36, 49, 62, 94, 100, 108, 117, 119 theory, 85, 93, 95, 96, 106, 108, 125, 133, 137, 140 O Trinity, 79 Objectives, 51, 112, 115, 119 Operation Anaconda, 54 U Operational Design, 37, 115 operational environment, 102, 114 Unconventional Warfare, 49 Unity of Effort, 91, 115, 118 P Unrestrictive Warfare, 31, 32 peace, 75, 80, 108, 109, 118, 127, 135 W PMESII, 112, 114, 115, 116 populist. See Jacksonian war, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 82, 85, 87, 89, 91, 93, 94, 95, 99, Problemitize, 36, 37 103, 104, 107, 108, 109, 110, 114, 118, 119, 120, 121, Progressive Imperialism, 13 123, 124, 127, 129, 131, 132, 138, 139, 141, 142 Psychological Operations, 49, 71, 116 War guerilla, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 82, 85, 87, 89, 91, 93, 94, 95, 99, 103, 104, 107, 108, 109, 110, 114, 118, 119, R 120, 121, 123, 124, 127, 129, 131, 132, 138, 139, Revolution in Military Affairs, 7, 31, 32, 70, 91, 97, 137 141, 142 RMA. See Revolution in Military Affairs War of Annihilation, 3, 15, 16, 17, 33, 40, 45, 51, 76, 80, 82 War of Attrition, 17, 24, 33, 40, 45, 53, 141 Wars of Exhaustion, 15 Wilsonian, 12, 13, 14, 126

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