Chapter 1. of the Main Difference Between Philosophic Systems

OUTLINES OF PYRRHONISM ( in part) from Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Book 1, translated by Rev. R.G. Bury (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933). Copyright 1933 by Harvard University Press. BOOK I

Chapter 1. Of the Main Difference Between Philosophic Systems The natural result of any investigation is that the investigators either discover the object of their search or deny that it is discoverable and confess it to be inapprehensible or persist in their search. So, too, with regard to the objects investigated by philosophy, this is probably why some have claimed to have discovered the truth, others have asserted that it cannot be apprehended, while others again go on inquiring. Those who believe they have discovered it are the "Dogmatists," specially so called is Aristotle, for example, and Epicurus and the Stoics and certain others; Cleitomachus and Carneades and other Academics treat it as inapprehensible; the Sceptics keep on searching. Hence it seems reasonable to hold that the main types of philosophy are three: the Dogmatic, the Academic, and the Sceptic. Of the other systems it will best become others to speak: our task at present is to describe in outline the Sceptic doctrine, first premising that of none of our future statements do we positively affirm that the fact 2 is exactly as we state it, but we simply record each fact, like a chronicler, as it appears to us at the moment

Chapter 4. What Scepticism Is Scepticism is an ability, or mental attitude, which opposes appearances to judgements in any way whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we are brought firstly to a state of mental suspense and next to a state of "unperturbedness" or quietude. Now we call it an "ability" not in any subtle sense, but simply in respect of its "being able." By "appearances" we now mean the objects of sense- perception, whence we contrast them with the objects of thought or "judgements." The phrase "in any way whatsoever" can be connected either with the word "ability," to make us take the word "ability," as we said, in its simple sense, or with the phrase "opposing appearances to judgements"; for inasmuch as we oppose these in a variety of ways appearances to appearances, or judgements to judgements, or allernando appearances to judgements, in order to ensure the inclusion of all these antitheses we employ the phrase "in any way whatsoever." Or, again, we join "in any way whatsoever" to "appearances and judgements" in order that we may not have to inquire how the appearances appear or how the thought-objects are judged, but may take these terms in the simple sense. The phrase "opposed judgements" we do not employ in the sense of negations and affirmations only but simply as equivalent to "conflicting judgements." "Equipollence" we use of equality in respect of probability and improbability, to indicate that no one of the conflicting judgements takes precedence of any other as being more probable. "Suspense" is a state of mental rest owing to which we neither deny nor affirm anything. "Quietude" is an untroubled and tranquil condition of soul. And how quietude enters the soul along with suspension of judgement we shall explain in our chapter (XII.) "Concerning the End." 3

Chapter 6. Of the Principles of Scepticism The originating cause of Scepticism is, we say, the hope of attaining quietude. Men of talent, who were perturbed by the contradictions in things and in doubt as to which of the alternatives they ought to accept, were led on to inquire what is true in things and what false, hoping by the settlement of the question to attain quietude. The main basic principle of the Sceptic system is that of opposing to every proposition an equal proposition; for we believe that as a consequence of this we end by ceasing to dogmatize.

Chapter 7. Does the Sceptic Dogmatize? When we say that the Sceptic refrains from dogmatizing we do not use the term "dogma," as some do, in the broader sense of "approval of a thing" (for the Sceptic gives assent to the feelings which are the necessary results of sense-impressions, and he would not, for example, say when feeling hot or cold "I believe that I am not hot or cold"); but we say that "he does not dogmatize" using "dogma" in the sense, which some give it, of "assent to one of the non-evident objects of scientific inquiry"; for the Pyrrhonean philosopher assents to nothing that is non-evident. Moreover, even in the act of enunciating the Sceptic formulae concerning things non-evident such as the formula "No more (one thing than another)," or the formula "I determine nothing," or any of the others which we shall presently mention, he does not dogmatize. For whereas the dogmatizer posits the things about which he is said to be dogmatizing as really existent, the Sceptic does not posit these formulae in any absolute sense; for he conceives that, just as the formula "All things are false" asserts the falsity of itself as well as of everything else, as does the formula "Nothing is true," so also the formula "No more" asserts that itself like all the rest, is "No more this than that," and thus cancels itself along with the rest. And of the other formulae we say the same. If then, while the dogmatizer posits the matter of his dogma as substantial truth, the Sceptic enunciates his formulae so that they are virtually canceled 4 by themselves, he should not be said to dogmatize in his enunciation of them. And, most important of all, in his enunciation of these formulae he states what appears to himself and announces his own impression in an undogmatic way, without making any positive assertion regarding the external realities.

Chapter 8. Has the Sceptic a Doctrinal Rule? We follow the same lines in replying to the question "Has the Sceptic a doctrinal rule?" For if one defines a "doctrinal rule" as "adherence to a number of dogmas which are dependent both on one another and on appearances," and defines "dogma" as "assent to a non-evident proposition," then we shall say that he has not a doctrinal rule. But if one defines "doctrinal rule" as "procedure which, in accordance with appearance, follows a certain line of reasoning, that reasoning indicating how it is possible to seem to live rightly (the word 'rightly' being taken, not as referring to virtue only, but in a wider sense) and tending to enable one to suspend judgement," then we say that he has a doctrinal rule. For we follow a line of reasoning which, in accordance with appearances, points us to a life conformable to the customs of our country and its laws and institutions, and to our own instinctive feelings.

Chapter 9. Does the Sceptic Deal with Physics? We make a similar reply also to the question "Should the Sceptic deal with physical problems?" For while, on the one hand, so far as regards making firm and positive assertions about any of the matters dogmatically treated in physical theory, we do not deal with physics; yet, on the other hand, in respect of our mode of opposing to every proposition an equal proposition and of our theory of quietude we do treat of physics. This, too, is the way in which we approach the logical and ethical branches of so- called"philosophy."

Chapter 10. Do the Sceptics Abolish Appearances? 5

Those who say that "the Sceptics abolish appearances," or phenomena, seem to me to be unacquainted with the statements of our School. For, as we said above, we do not overthrow the affective sense-impressions which induce our assent involuntarily; and these impressions are "the appearances." And when we question whether the underlying object is such as it appears, we grant the fact that it appears, and our doubt does not concern the appearance itself but the account given of the appearance, and that is a different thing from questioning the appearance itself. For example, honey appears to us to be sweet (and this we grant, for we perceive sweetness through the senses), but whether it is also sweet in its essence is for us a matter of doubt, since this is not an appearance but a judgement regarding the appearance. And even if we do actually argue against the appearances, we do not propound such arguments with the intention of abolishing appearances, but by way of pointing out the rashness of the Dogmatists; for if reason is such a trickster as to all but snatch away the appearances from under our very eyes, surely we should view it with suspicion in the case of things non-evident so as not to display rashness by following it.

Chapter 11. Of the Criterion of Scepticism That we adhere to appearances is plain from what we say about the Criterion of the Sceptic School. The word "Criterion" is used in two senses: in the one it means "the standard regulating belief in reality or unreality," (and this we shall discuss in our refutation); in the other it denotes the standard of action by conforming to which in the conduct of life we perform some actions and abstain from others; and it is of the latter that we are now speaking. The criterion, then, of the Sceptic School is, we say, the appearance, giving this name to what is virtually the sense-presentation. For since this lies in feeling and involuntary affection, it is not open to question. Consequently, no one, I suppose, disputes that the underlying object has this or that appearance; the point in dispute is whether the object is in reality such as it appears to be. 6

Adhering, then, to appearances we live in accordance with the normal rules of life, undogmatically, seeing that we cannot remain wholly inactive. And it would seem that this regulation of life is fourfold, and that one part of it lies in the guidance of Nature, another in the constraint of the passions, another in the tradition of laws and customs, another in the instruction of the arts. Nature's guidance is that by which we are naturally capable of sensation and thought; constraint of the passions is that whereby hunger drives us to food and thirst to drink; tradition of customs and laws, that whereby we regard piety in the conduct of life as good, but impiety as evil; instruction of the arts, that whereby we are not inactive in such arts as we adopt. But we make all these statements undogmatically.

Chapter 12. What Is the End of Scepticism? Our next subject will be the End of the Sceptic system. Now an "End" is "that for which all actions or reasonings are undertaken, while it exists for the sake of none"; or, otherwise, "the ultimate object of appetency." We assert still that the Sceptic's End is quietude in respect of matters of opinion and moderate feeling in respect of things unavoidable. For the Sceptic, having set out to philosophize with the object of passing judgement on the sense- impressions and ascertaining which of them are true and which false, so as to attain quietude thereby, found himself involved in contradictions of equal weight, and being unable to decide between them suspended judgement; and as he was thus in suspense there followed, as it happened, the state of quietude in respect of matters of opinion. For the man who opines that anything is by nature good or bad is forever being disquieted: when he is without the things which he deems good he believes himself to be tormented by things naturally bad and he pursues after the things which are, as he thinks, good; which when he has obtained he keeps falling into still more perturbations because of his irrational and immoderate elation, and in his dread of a change of fortune he uses every 7 endeavour to avoid losing the things which he deems good. On the other hand, the man who determines nothing as to what is naturally good or bad neither shuns nor pursues anything eagerly; and, in consequence, he is unperturbed.

The Sceptic, in fact, had the same experience which is said to have befallen the painter Apelles. Once, they say, when he was painting a horse and wished to represent in the painting the horse's foam, he was so unsuccessful that he gave up the attempt and flung at the picture the sponge on which he used to wipe the paints off his brush, and the mark of the sponge produced the effect of a horse's foam. So, too, the Sceptics were in hopes of gaining quietude by means of a decision regarding the disparity of the objects of sense and of thought, and being unable to effect this they suspended judgement; and they found that quietude, as if by chance, followed upon their suspense, even as a shadow follows its substance. We do not, however, suppose that the Sceptic is wholly untroubled; but we say that he is troubled by things unavoidable; for we grant that he is old at times and thirsty, and suffers various affections of that kind. But even in these cases, whereas ordinary people are afflicted by two circumstances, namely, by the affections themselves and in no less a degree, by the belief that these conditions are evil by nature, the Sceptic, by his rejection of the added belief in the natural badness of all these conditions, escapes here too with less discomfort. Hence we say that, while in regard to matters of opinion the Sceptic's End is quietude, in regard to things unavoidable it is "moderate affection." But some notable Sceptics have added the further definition "suspension of judgement in investigations."

Chapter 13. Of the General Modes Leading to Suspension of Judgment Now that we have been saying that tranquillity follows on suspension of judgement, it will be our next task to explain how 8 we arrive at this suspension. Speaking generally, one may say that it is the result of setting things in opposition. We oppose either appearances to appearances or objects of thought to objects of thought or alternando. For instance, we oppose appearances when we say "The same tower appears round from a distance, but square from close at hand"; and thoughts to thoughts, when in answer to him who argues the existence of Providence from the order of the heavenly bodies we oppose the fact that often the good fare ill and the bad fare well, and draw from this the inference that Providence does not exist. And thoughts we oppose to appearances, as when Anaxagoras countered the notion that snow is white with the argument, "Snow is frozen water, and water is black; therefore snow also is black." With a different idea we oppose things present sometimes to things present, as in the foregoing examples, and sometimes to things past or future, as, for instance, when someone propounds to us a theory which we are unable to refute, we say to him in reply, "Just as, before the birth of the founder of the School to which you belong, the theory it holds was not as yet apparent as a sound theory, although it was really in existence, so likewise it is possible that the opposite theory to that which you now propound is already really existent, though not yet apparent to us, so that we ought not as yet to yield assent to this theory which at the moment seems to be valid."

But in order that we may have a more exact understanding of these antitheses I will describe the Modes by which suspension of judgement is brought about, but without making any positive assertion regarding either their number or their validity; for it is possible that they may be unsound or there may be more of them than I shall enumerate.

Chapter 14. Concerning the Ten Modes The usual tradition amongst the older Sceptics is that the "modes" by which "suspension" is supposed to be brought about are ten in number; and they also give them the synonymous names of 9

"arguments" and "positions." They are these: the first, based on the variety in animals; the second, on the differences in human beings; the third, on the different structures of the organs of sense; the fourth, on the circumstantial conditions; the fifth, on positions and intervals and locations; the sixth, on intermixtures; the seventh, on the quantities and formations of the underlying objects; the eighth, on the fact of relativity; the ninth, on the frequency or rarity of occurrence; the tenth, on the disciplines and customs and laws, the legendary beliefs and the dogmatic convictions. This order, however, we adopt without prejudice.

Alternate text

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

OUTLINES OF PYRRHONISM

Book I

1. The main differences between philosophies

When people are looking for something, the likely outcome is either that they will find it; or that they will give up the search and admit it cannot be found; or that they will carry on looking for it. It is exactly the same with people looking for a philosophy. Some say they have found the truth; some assert that it cannot be attained; and some go on looking for it. The ones who think they have found it are called ‘dogmatists’ in the strict sense — examples being Aristotle, Epicurus, the stoics, and various others. The ones who 10 assert that it cannot be found are the school of Cleitomachus and Carneades, and other members of the Academy. [n.1] Those who are still looking for it are the sceptics. So it seems reasonable to say that the three main philosophies are the dogmatic, the Academic, and the sceptical. I leave it to others to expound the first two. My present enquiry is about the sceptical school, which I shall present in outline. But before I do so, I must warn you that I do not positively assert that anything I say is wholly as I say it is. I merely report empirically [n.2] how each thing appears to me at the moment.

2. Two ways of expounding scepticism

The sceptical philosophy can be expounded generally, or in detail. A general exposition covers the distinguishing features of scepticism — its definition, principles, reasonings, criterion, goal, modes of suspension of judgment, how we understand sceptical affirmations, and the distinction between scepticism and related philosophies. [n.3] A detailed exposition provides the antithesis to every thesis [n.4] of what is claimed to be genuine philosophy. The first part of my book consists in a general exposition, and I shall begin the overview with the names given to the sceptical school.

3. The names of the sceptical school

As well as being called the ‘sceptical’ school, it also has the following names:

* the ‘enquiring’ [n.5] school, because its followers do not merely think, [n.6] but actively enquire; * the ‘suspensive’ [n.7] school, because of the thinker’s state of mind after an enquiry; [n.8] 11

* the ‘wondering’ [n.9] school, whether because of their wondering and enquiring about everything (as some say), or because of their inability to accept or deny anything; * the ‘Pyrrhonian’ School, because Pyrrho seems to have embodied scepticism more conspicuously than anyone before him.

4. What scepticism is

Scepticism is the ability to find the opposites both of objects of experience and of objects of the [n.10] in any way whatever. Because the opposed things or reasonings have equal force, we are led first to suspension of judgment, and then to serenity. [n.11]

I do not mean ability in any technical sense, [n.12] but simply in the sense of ‘being able.’

By objects of experience I mean things given to our senses, which is why I contrast them with objects of thought.

The phrase in any way whatever can be taken as qualifying either ‘ability’, or ‘the opposites of both objects of experience and objects of thought.’ In the former case, it emphasises what I have already said — that ‘ability’ is to be taken in its everyday sense. In the latter case, I say in any way whatever in order to cover all kinds of opposition: between one object of experience and another; between one object of thought and another; and between objects of experience and objects of thought. Or it can be taken as qualifying ‘objects of experience and objects of thought,’ so that we do not worry about how it comes about that objects of experience are experienced, or how objects of thought are thought, but we simply take these terms at face value. 12

By opposed reasonings, I do not mean absolutely any assertion and its denial, but only conflicting reasonings.

By having equal force, I mean being equally probable and equally improbable, so that neither of two conflicting reasonings is more probable than the other.

Suspension of judgment is when the process of thinking comes to an end, without our denying or asserting anything.

Serenity is freedom from disturbance, and calmness. I shall explain how serenity accompanies suspension of judgment in the chapter on the goal of scepticism.

5. The sceptic

The definition of the Pyrrhonian philosopher follows from the definition of the sceptical school. He is the one who has the ability referred to.

6. The principles of scepticism

We say that the fundamental principle of scepticism which provides its rationale is the hope of attaining serenity. The greatest minds of humanity were disturbed by the capriciousness of nature, and they were at a loss what they should believe in. They were led to search for what is true and what is false in nature, so that they would attain serenity by coming to a solution. Scepticism, on the other hand, was constituted on the principle that for every reasoning there is an equal and opposite reasoning; for we believe that this is the way to stop dogmatising. [n.13]

7. Does the sceptic dogmatise? 13

We say that the sceptic does not dogmatise. But we do not mean this in the wider sense of ‘dogma’ [n.14] according to which some people say that it is a dogma to assent to anything whatever. After all, the sceptic submits to his feelings brought about by sense impressions. So if he were hot or cold, he would not say it seemed to him that he was not hot or was not cold. No, we mean that the sceptic does not dogmatise in the sense in which others say it is a dogma to assent to one of the imperceptible [n.15] objects of scientific research. A Pyrrhonian never assents to any imperceptible objects.

Nor does the sceptic dogmatise when uttering any of the sceptical slogans [n.16] about imperceptible objects, such as ‘Nothing is truer than anything else,’ or ‘I determine [n.17] nothing,’ or any of the other slogans I shall discuss later. The dogmatist asserts the objective validity of what he is said to be dogmatising about, whereas the sceptic does not claim universal and objective validity for his slogans. The sceptic is well aware that the slogan ‘Everything is false’ proclaims its own falsehood as much as that of any other proposition. Similarly, ‘Nothing is true,’ or ‘Nothing is truer than anything else’ declare that they too are no truer than anything else, and therefore cancel themselves out along with the rest. We say the same about all the other sceptical slogans.

However, given that the dogmatist asserts the objective validity of what he is dogmatising about, and the sceptic utters his slogans as having self-limiting force, then the sceptic would not be said to be dogmatising when uttering them. And, most importantly, in uttering these slogans, he says what appears to himself and he reports his own feelings undogmatically, since he is making no claims about external objects. [n.18]

8. Does scepticism have a distinctive system? 14

We give a similar answer to the question of whether scepticism has a distinctive system. If, on the one hand, you mean by system, adherence to a number of interconnected dogmas consistent with experience, and by dogma, acceptance of something imperceptible, then we have no distinctive system in this sense. On the other hand, we do have a distinctive system, if you mean by this, a philosophy of life which embraces a distinctive method of reasoning, and which accepts what is given in experience. This method of reasoning includes the ability to suspend judgment, and it suggests what seems to be the right way of life (where ‘right’ is taken in the widest sense, and not just restricted to morality). For we follow a certain method of reasoning which, on the basis of experience, suggests that we should live in accordance with traditional customs, the law, our philosophy of life, and our own feelings.

9. Does the sceptic do natural science?

Our answer to the question of whether the sceptic does natural science takes the same form. On the one hand we do not do natural science if that means declaring positive convictions about any of the issues treated dogmatically in natural science. On the other hand, we do touch on natural science in so far as we provide equal and opposite reasoning for any given piece of scientific reasoning, and thus achieve a state of serenity. We also have the same approach to the logical and ethical parts of what is claimed to be philosophy.

10. Do the sceptics deny the world of experience?

Those who say that the sceptics deny the world of experience [n.19] do not seem to have listened to what we have said. As I said at the beginning, we do not deny that we are involuntarily led to assent to the impressions of sense, which experience consist in. And when we enquire whether an object is as we experience it, we 15 accept that we experience it. We are not enquiring about the experience, but about what is said about the experience. This is very different from enquiring about the experience itself. For example, we experience honey as sweet. This we accept, since our senses are affected by sweetness. But we are enquiring whether it is also sweet at the rational level, [n.20] which is not a question of how we experience it, but of what is said about the experience. And if we do the opposite, and raise arguments against experience, we present them not as wanting to deny experience, but as pointing out the rashness of the dogmatists. For if reason is so deceptive that it can steal our world of experience almost from under our very eyes, we must be all the more suspicious of it in matters not given in experience, so as not to follow it rashly.

11. The criterion of scepticism

That we adhere to experience is obvious from what we say about the criterion of the sceptical approach. The word ‘criterion’ has two senses. In one sense, it is the criterion used for deciding whether to believe that something exists or not (which I shall refute later). In the other sense, it is the criterion for action, so that by following it in our lives, we either do something or refrain from doing it. It is the latter sense I want to discuss now.

Now we say that the criterion of the sceptical approach is experience, calling it that by virtue of its sensory imagery. For since this imagery depends on our being passively subjected to an involuntary feeling, it is unquestionable. This is why probably no- one doubts the experience of this or that object, but what is questionable is whether it really is as we experience it.

So, adhering to experience, we live undogmatically in the conduct of life, since we cannot be totally ineffectual. It seems that this conduct of life has four aspects: (1) guidance by nature; (2) submission to our feelings; (3) traditional laws and customs; and 16

(4) skills training. We should be guided by nature, since it is only thanks to nature that we are capable of experiencing and thinking. We should submit to our feelings, since it is only thanks to hunger and thirst that we are led to eat and drink. We should observe traditional laws and customs, since it is only thanks to them that we learn to see piety in life as good, and impiety as evil. And we should undergo skills training since it is only thanks to training that we are effectual in the skills we practice. [n.21]

All this I say undogmatically.

12. The goal of scepticism

Following this, I should discuss the goal of the sceptical approach. Now a goal is that for the sake of which anything is undertaken in the realm of action or thought, and is not itself for the sake of anything else — in other words, it is the ultimate objective aimed for. So far we have been saying that the goal of the sceptic is serenity in matters of opinion, and moderation of emotion in face of the inevitable.

In order to achieve serenity, the sceptic started philosophising about the fact that he evaluated his sensory images, and realised that some were true and some were false. He then fell into contradictions between equally good arguments on either side, and not being able to decide one way or the other, he suspended judgment. Finally, suspension of judgment led by fate to serenity in matters of opinion. Someone who believes that anything is objectively good or evil is perpetually disturbed. When he lacks the things he thinks good, he thinks he is being tormented by things which are objectively bad, and he strives after things which are good (as he thinks). But when he has obtained them, he falls into even greater disturbance because of his irrational and immoderate elation; and fearing a reversal of fortune, he does everything to avoid losing the things which seem good to him. But 17 the person who has come to no opinion as to which things are objectively good or evil puts no effort into avoiding or striving after them. This is because he is in a state of serenity.

In fact, the sceptic has had the same experience as is reported to have happened to Apelles the painter. [n.22] It is said that he was painting a horse, and was trying to represent the horse’s foam in the picture. But he was making such a mess of it that he gave up, took the sponge which he used for cleaning the paints off his brush, and threw it at the picture; and where it touched the picture, it made a perfect representation of the horse’s foam. So the sceptics hoped to achieve serenity by coming to a decision about the capriciousness of the objects of experience and of thought; but since they could not do this, they suspended judgment. By fate, serenity followed for those who suspended judgment, just as the shadow follows the body. [n.23]

We do not think that the sceptic is wholly undisturbed, since we say that he is disturbed by things which cannot be avoided. We admit that he is sometimes cold, or thirsty, or suffers in other such ways. But in such cases, ordinary people are distressed by two conditions: not only by the sufferings themselves, but no less by the belief that their condition is objectively evil. On the other hand, the sceptic suffers less even in these circumstances, since he eliminates the additional opinion that each of these sufferings is objectively evil. So this is why we say that the goal of the sceptic is serenity in matters of opinion, and moderation of emotion when faced with the inevitable. However, some distinguished sceptics have added to these suspension of judgment in enquiries.

13. The modes of suspension of judgment in general

Since we said that serenity follows suspension of judgment about everything, it would be appropriate for us to say next how suspension of judgment is brought about. Speaking generally, it is 18 brought about by putting things in opposition to each other. We either oppose objects of experience to objects of experience, or objects of thought to objects of thought, or a combination of the two. An example of objects of experience opposed to objects of experience is when we say that the same tower appears round from a distance and square from close to. An example of objects of thought opposed to objects of thought is when the existence of providence is inferred from the regularity of the heavens, and we oppose to this the fact that often the good are unfortunate, and the evil prosper; and on these grounds we conclude that there is no providence. And an example of objects of thought opposed to objects of experience is when Anaxagoras opposed to [the experience] that snow is white, [the argument] that snow is frozen water; water is black; therefore snow is black.

In a different sense of ‘oppose’, we sometimes oppose present things to present things (as in the above examples), and sometimes to past or future things. For example, when someone makes a dialectical move which we can find no answer to, we present him with the following argument: Before the birth of the founder of the school he belongs to, its distinctive theory lay hidden in nature, [n.24] even though its soundness had not yet been revealed. Similarly, it is possible that the opposite of the theory now put forward in debate lies hidden in nature, but has not yet been made evident to us. Consequently, we should not yet assent to a theory which seems sound at the moment.

In order to master these antitheses, we need to go into greater detail. I shall propose a number of modes through which suspension of judgment is achieved. However, I make no claims about their number or validity, since it is possible that they are unsound, and that there are others which I have not mentioned. . .

14. The ten modes 19

. . . .

The fourth mode [n.25]

This is called the mode of condition, since by ‘condition,’ we mean ‘disposition.’ [n.26] We say that it covers the following dispositions:

natural or unnatural; waking or sleeping; age; moving or at rest; liking or disliking; hungry or full; drunk or sober; predispositions; brave or cowardly; sad or happy.

Natural or unnatural.

Things come to us differently depending on whether we are in a natural or an unnatural state. For example, people suffering from inflammation of the brain or possessed by the gods think they hear demonic voices; but we do not. Similarly, they often say they can smell incense, or frankincense, or some such, or many other things, even though we cannot smell them. The same water poured on an inflamed part of the body seems hot to the sufferer; but lukewarm to us. The same coat seems reddish to someone with a blood-clot in their eye; but not to me. The same honey seems sweet to me; but bitter to someone with jaundice. 20

Suppose someone says that it is an irregular mixture of humours which distorts the perceptual images of objects when people are in an unnatural state. The reply is that people in good health also have a mixture of humours. So it could be that the people we describe as in an unnatural state perceive external objects as they really are, whereas the mixture of humours in healthy people makes them perceive them differently. It is entirely arbitrary to endow the humours of the sick with the power of distorting objects, but not those of the healthy. The healthy are in a state which is natural for the healthy, but unnatural for the sick; and the sick are in a state which is unnatural for the healthy, but natural for the sick. So we must believe the sick as far as concerns what is natural to them.

Waking or sleeping

We have different perceptual images when we are asleep from when we are awake — we do not have the same sort of images when we are awake as we do when we are asleep, and we do not have the same sort of images when we are asleep as we do when we are awake. Consequently, the question of whether they are real or not is not absolute, but relative — relative to whether we are asleep or awake. So it seems likely that in sleep we see things which are not absolutely non-existent, but which merely do not exist for us when we are awake. They are real for us in sleep in the same way as things are real for us when we are awake, even though we are not aware of them when we are asleep. . . .

19. The slogan ‘not one rather than another’

. . . . So even though the slogan ‘nothing rather than another’ looks like an assertoric [n.27] claim, we do not use it this way. We are using it loosely and elliptically — instead of a question, [n.28] or of saying, ‘I do not know which of these alternatives I ought to accept or reject.’ It is a question of expressing what appears to us, 21 and we are indifferent as to the form of words we use to express it. It must be stressed that when we utter the slogan ‘nothing rather than another,’ we are not asserting that it is true and certain of objective reality, but using it to talk about what appears to us to be the case.

20. Non-assertion

What we say about non-assertion is as follows. There are two senses of ‘assertion’: the ordinary and the special. In the ordinary sense, it means an utterance which expresses something, whether positive or negative — for example, ‘It is day,’ or ‘It is not day.’ In the special sense, it is restricted to positive assertions, so that denials are not called assertions. Non-assertion is abstention from assertion in the ordinary sense (i.e. covering both the positive and the negative). So non-assertion is a state of mind in which we say neither that something is, nor that it is not. From this it is obvious that, in the case of non-assertion as well, we do not take it as meaning that things are objectively such as to give rise to absolute non-assertion. Rather, we make it known that we, at the time of utterance, are in this mental state regarding the matters in question. And it is important to note that the things we neither affirm nor deny are dogmatic assertions about what is imperceptible. For we cannot resist the things which give rise to our sensations, and compel us into accepting them. . . . .

23. The slogan ‘I determine nothing’

The following is what we say about ‘I determine nothing.’ We think that to determine something is not merely to say something about it, but to refer to the thing itself as an imperceptible object, and to accept its existence. It will surely be realised that, since the sceptic does not determine anything in this way, he does not even determine the slogan ‘I determine nothing.’ For it is not a dogmatic assumption (that is, acceptance of something imperceptible), but a 22 verbal expression of our mental state. So when the sceptic says ‘I determine nothing,’ what he means is ‘I am now in a state of mind such that I neither affirm nor deny dogmatically any of the matters under discussion.’ And he says this describing what appears to himself on the subject at issue — not dogmatically, with a display of conviction, but reporting on his feelings. . . . .

27. The slogan ‘For every argument there is an equal and opposite one’

When we say that ‘For every argument there is an equal and opposite one,’ we mean every argument we have gone through. By argument, we don’t mean ‘argument’ in its everyday sense, but one that purports to establish something dogmatically (i.e. by reference to imperceptibles) in any way whatever, and not necessarily by means of premises and conclusions. By equal, we mean equally plausible or implausible; and opposite is to be taken in the everyday sense of ‘conflicting’. The qualification ‘as it seems to me’ is taken for granted. So, when I say ‘For every argument there is an equal and opposite one,’ I am in effect saying ‘For every argument I have considered, which purports to establish something dogmatically, it seems to me that there is another argument purporting to establish something dogmatically, which is opposite to it, and which is equally plausible or implausible.’ Consequently, uttering these words is not a piece of dogmatism, but the expression of a human feeling experienced by the subject.

Some formulate the slogan in the following way: ‘For every argument there is to be given an equal and opposite one.’ That is, they formulate it as an exhortation in the imperative mood: ‘For every argument which purports to establish something dogmatically, let us give an argument with a dogmatic conclusion, which is equally plausible or implausible, and which is in conflict with it.’ Their intention is to address the sceptic, even though they use the infinitive instead of the imperative (‘to be given’ instead of 23

‘let us give’). And the reason why they address the sceptic is in case he is tripped up by the dogmatist, and gives up his questioning of him too soon, thus missing out on the serenity which the sceptics experience, and which they believe depends on suspension of judgment about everything (as I said earlier).

28. Supplementary remarks on the slogans

I have gone through enough slogans for what is only an outline. Besides, it is possible to deduce the rest from the ones I have mentioned here.

In the case of all the sceptical slogans, it must be understood right from the start that we make absolutely no claims as to their truth. We even say that they can be self-defeating, since they refer to themselves as well as to other things. They are like laxatives, which not only expel fluids from the body, but also expel themselves together with the fluids.

We also say that we do not use the slogans to make authoritative statements about imperceptible objects referred to. We do not worry about technical distinctions; and we might even be accused of misusing language. But it is not appropriate for the sceptic to quibble about words.

Besides, it supports our case to say that even our own slogans do not have absolute meaning, but only relative to the matter in hand and to us sceptics. In addition, it must also be remembered that we do not utter them universally about all things, but only about the imperceptible objects of dogmatic research. We say how things appear to us, but we do not make any positive assertions about the nature of external objects. I think this is enough to overturn any fallacious arguments brought against any sceptical slogan. . . . .