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Constitutive Surveillance and Social Media’, in Hunsinger, J., Allen Constitutive Surveillance and Social Media by Ryan Tippet A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Otago New Zealand ABSTRACT Starting from the premise that surveillance is the ‘dominant organising practice’ of our time (Lyon et al 2012: 1), this thesis establishes a framework of ‘constitutive surveillance’ in relation to social media, taking Facebook as its key example. Constitutive surveillance is made up of four forms: economic, political, lateral, and oppositional surveillance. These four surveillance forms – and the actors who undertake them – intersect, compound, and confront one another in the co-production of social media spaces. The framework of constitutive surveillance is structured around a Foucauldian understanding of power, and the thesis shows how each surveillance form articulates strategies of power for organising, administering, and subjectifying populations. After outlining the four surveillance forms, each chapter unpacks the relationship of one form to social media, building throughout the thesis an extensive critical framework of constitutive surveillance. i ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Thanks first of all to my supervisor, Dr Brett Nicholls, for his insight, support, and guidance on this project, which was invaluable in helping me to identify and pursue some of the thesis’ most interesting questions and ideas. Thank you also to my many inspiring postgraduate colleagues in the Department of Media, Film and Communication, especially George, Paul, Chloe, Chris, Lewis, Edmund, Kevin, Thaera, Massi, David, and Alex. And to Peter – your bottomless reserve of cheer and goodwill will always be missed, and never forgotten. Thanks to other department faculty, past and present, for your generous feedback and support, especially Holly, Rosie, Anne, and Vijay. A special shout-out must be made to my self-anointed ‘best friend’, Amie, whose infectious good nature filled the postgraduate suite with (obnoxious) laughter and (off- colour) humour. Personal thanks to mum and dad, and to Simon and Sylvie, for your unquestioning support and understanding, and equally to friends who have sat through presentation rehearsals and proofed draft papers. Thanks most of all, of course, to Ellena, without whom I’m not sure where I’d be – but probably not finishing this thesis. Thank you for your love, support, understanding, patience, your gentle reminders, and your belief. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ................................................................................................................................ i Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................ iii Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... iv List of Figures .................................................................................................................... vi Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1 1 | Economic Surveillance ................................................................................................. 22 1.1 | Foucault, Deleuze, and Economic Surveillance ..................................................... 25 1.1.1 | Power, Governmentality, Neoliberalism ......................................................... 26 1.1.2 | Control and Assemblage ................................................................................. 40 1.1.3 | Critiques of Economic Surveillance ................................................................ 58 1.1.4 | Logics of Economic Surveillance .................................................................... 80 1.2 | Constitutive Economic Surveillance ..................................................................... 85 1.2.1 | Assemblage ..................................................................................................... 90 1.2.2 | Capitalisation ................................................................................................. 101 1.2.3 | Dividuation .................................................................................................... 117 1.2.4 | Modulation ................................................................................................... 123 1.2.5 | Simulation .................................................................................................... 134 1.3 | Economic Surveillance Expansion ...................................................................... 146 1.3.1 | Internet.org ................................................................................................... 149 1.3.2 | Economic Surveillance Logics of Internet.org .............................................. 157 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 171 2 | Political Surveillance .................................................................................................. 174 2.1 | Categories of Risk and Exclusion on Social Media .............................................. 176 2.1.1 | Security & Biopolitics .....................................................................................178 2.1.2 | Bare Life & Risk ............................................................................................ 194 2.1.3 | The Snowden Revelations ............................................................................ 214 2.1.4 | Logics of Political Surveillance ..................................................................... 228 iv 2.2 | Constitutive Political Surveillance ...................................................................... 233 2.2.1 | Biopolitical Suspicion ................................................................................... 235 2.2.2 | Exceptional Veridiction................................................................................ 249 2.2.3 | Hegemonic Insecurity .................................................................................. 264 2.2.4 | Public-Private Assemblage .......................................................................... 272 2.2.5 | Simulative Risk management ...................................................................... 276 2.3 | Political and Economic Surveillance .................................................................. 283 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 288 3 | Lateral Surveillance ................................................................................................... 292 3.1 | Locating the Panopticon in Modern Surveillance ............................................... 295 3.1.1 | The Panopticon ............................................................................................. 296 3.1.2 | Confession, Consumption, and Synopticism ................................................ 309 3.1.3 | Lateral Surveillance Theory .......................................................................... 322 3.2 | Constitutive Lateral Surveillance........................................................................ 334 3.2.1 | Watching on Facebook ................................................................................. 336 3.2.2 | Being Watched on Facebook ........................................................................ 347 3.3 | Political and Economic Uses of Lateral Surveillance ......................................... 362 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 365 4 | Oppositional Surveillance ......................................................................................... 369 4.1 | Everyday Resistance to Surveillance ................................................................... 374 4.1.1 | Power, Resistance, and the Everyday ........................................................... 376 4.1.2 | Theorising Oppositional Surveillance .......................................................... 389 4.2 | Constitutive Oppositional Surveillance .............................................................. 414 4.2.1 | User Opposition ............................................................................................ 414 4.2.2 | Platform Modulation.................................................................................... 431 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 437 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 441 References list ..................................................................................................................451 v LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: A cropped promotional example of a peer-to-peer payment made over Facebook Messenger......................................................................................................... 93 Figure 2: Facebook's authorization API allows third party services such as Duolingo to tap into its social map. Google offers the same option through its own platform. .......... 98 Figure 3: Facebook's profile page invites the user to add more information. ............. 106 Figure 4: A banner on Facebook reminds the user to update their profile information. .......................................................................................................................................
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