Propaganda 2.0. Weaponising Information in the Age of Social Media and the Traces of Russia’s Information Warfare in Lithuania’s Mediascape.

23 June 2017

by Pija Ona Indriunaite Student Number: 11312955 [email protected]

MA Thesis, Media Studies MA New Media and Digital Culture, Thesis Supervisor: mw. drs. L.C. (Lonneke) van der Velden The Second Reader: dhr. dr. M.D. (Marc) Tuters Word Count: 19 043 Table of Content

Abstract Introduction 1 Literature Review The Internet as a Tool for Democratisation? 6 Defining Information Warfare 8 Russia and Information-Psychological War 11 Lithuania and Russia 15

Methodology Digital Methods and the Choice of Social Platform 18 Choice of Facebook Pages 29 Time Frame 21 Tools 21 Data Collection 21 Data Analysis 22 Content Narrative/Type Analysis 22 Page Likes Network 24 Content Traffic Analysis 25

Findings Narratives and Types 27 Page Likes Network 30 Content Traffic and Shared Content 35

Findings Analysis 40 Propaganda 2.0 47 So What’s Next? 50

Conclusion 52 Bibliography 55 Appendices Appendix 1. 61 Appendix 2. 64 Appendix 3. 67 Appendix 4. 69 Abstract

This work is interested in the activities and organisation of a group of Facebook pages in Lithuania that are highly controversial due to their alleged involvement in Russian Information Warfare campaigns, as well as their tendency to spread hate speech. Through close analysis of the online community of interest, I intend to discuss the new strategies of Information Warfare as well as reasons behind the struggle to counter it. Most importantly, I am interested in the role of social media sites such as Facebook in enabling this contemporary phenomenon of warfare and propaganda practices. With a carefully selected sample of over 30 pages representing the network of interest, I conduct a close content analysis to determine the key narratives and discourses bonding the pages, as well as a more infrastructural analysis of the community, which includes familiarisation with the Page Likes Network and the shared content comparison. The findings reveal a specific set of narratives and themes recurring among the pages analysed, including highly anti- western, anti-Lithuanian independence themes, as well as racist and homophobic content, just to name a few. While being bound by similar narratives and rhetoric, the pages specialise in different sub-communities, varying from entertainment through informative to political. While initially there appear to be no direct links between the community of the pages analysed and Russian Information- Psychological Warfare strategies, findings suggest that the news sites that are part of the Kremlin’s information network are key sources of information for the network, and thus agenda setters. This work therefore argues that through new social practices enabled by social media communication, Information Warfare strategies move away from the conventional, direct, authoritarian ways of spreading propaganda and towards using organic communities as platforms and tools for energising influence over the public. I then argue that the textbook understanding of propaganda and warfare limits the way we situate such information offences, and restricts the ways to counter these problematic phenomena. Introduction

Many of those following the election campaigns prior to the 2016 US presidential election have at some point encountered or perhaps even been rather entertained by the multitude of bizarre conspiracy theories and fake news stories inundating their news feeds. Whether it be scandalous ‘confirmation’ that Hillary Clinton sold weapons to ISIS, shocking news about Pope Francis endorsing Trump’s candidacy, or everyone’s favourite outlandish theories surrounding Pizzagate — an underground paedophile circle run by Hillary Clinton herself (Ritchie) — many intellectuals across the globe were rather amused by the imagination needed to produce, popularise or believe in such modern tales of the 21st century. However, after the fiasco defeat of Hillary Clinton, the same stories now are seen in a different light and phrases such as ‘misinformation’ and ‘fake news’ have migrated from being buzzwords to representing new dangerous phenomena. Various social media platforms became the target of the general public and experts trying to rationalise the outcome of the election (Connolly et al.), for they afford the spread of misinformation and are indifferent to the social/political consequences they can cause. Facebook, being the main social media platform in dialogue with this debate while initially denying any responsibility for the popularisation of fake news and its influence over the election (Solon), recently acknowledged that social media has become a battleground and facilitates ways to manipulate public opinion, and consequently took action to deal with it (Menn). And while misinformation and fake news stories are in no way a new thing and have been used in various ways for centuries, the concerning difference seen today is a fundamental shift in western society — the realisation that it may have moved to an age of post-truth. Within the mindset of post-truth society any narrative is just as effective and influential as fact, which opens concerning ways to manipulate public opinion. Social media and the Internet in general, while upon its creation celebrated as democratic and emancipatory (Halpern and Gibbs; Kline), now is a tool for accelerating and normalising misinformation. Furthermore, there are no easy ways to counter or deal with the issue. While Western intellectuals are trying to figure out what is happening and how to understand this unexpected turn of events, on the other side of the world, the spread of disinformation as a dangerous act of warfare is not such a novel thing. As Dmytro Shymkiv, the deputy head of Ukraine’s presidential administration has mentioned in his interview with Quartz: ‘This post-truth era? We have been living in the post-truth era for the past three years’ (Timmons). With this comment the Ukrainian official refers to the highly controversial 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia and many cases of propaganda and Information War 1 happening between the two countries prior and after the events (Mejias and Vokuev; Ojala, Panatti and Kangas; Timmons).

Indeed Russian Information Warfare is a fascinating case for thinking about 21st century media, warfare strategies or geopolitics. Through the last few decades Russia has been perfecting its strategies and operations within the cyber realm: whether it be the widely discussed history of cyber attacks through hacking or DDoS (recently a highly covered topic due to the allegations of Russia’s involvement in hacks interfering with the US presidential election (Thielman)) or its ‘Information-Psychological War Operations’ (Lucas and Nimmo; Pomerantsev) that have been globally discussed since various disinformation and propaganda campaigns surrounding the 2014 Ukraine Conflict. In this work I am particularly interested in the ‘Information-Psychological’ aspect of Russia’s Information Warfare and how this type of warfare is employing various technical and social affordances of contemporary information and communication infrastructure and environment to spread and normalise misinformation and propaganda. They use this modern cyber infrastructure in the wake of years of experience in the field of propaganda gained through the Soviet Cold War (Fattibene; Blank). Furthermore, reports reveal that these information strategies have received very generous funding (Boffey and Rankin). The most important characteristics of such Information Warfare as it has been observed and covered so far are: the use of a high number of channels and mediums to spread their narratives and information (Paul and Matthews) (these channels can be huge media houses, local television stations, small Facebook groups, or even so-called paid trolls managing individual accounts); a huge quantity of content produced and spread (Paul and Matthews); disinformation and manipulation of truth (Aro; Mejias and Vokuev); lack of consistency (Lucas and Nimmo; Pomerantsev); and finally, receptiveness (Lucas and Nimmo; Paul and Matthews).

As I will argue in more detail in this work, Russian Information Warfare as an active but covert strategy initiated by the Kremlin is, by definition, not visibly apparent, which makes it difficult to track and research. This makes it difficult to label it as propaganda or sometimes even as an act of warfare, however constant cases of misinformation and other politically manipulative content points to the existence of a complex and concerning network of influence that cannot be ignored. But this proposition gets even more complicated, as while this type of Information Warfare could be defined as simple and repetitive, it is also highly adaptive to cultural context. It is based on quantity of content produced just as much as in the specificities of the audiences it 2 targets. Most importantly, it does not aim to inject specific narratives, but more likely aims to spread confusion and mistrust.

How is one supposed to research and evaluate such a growing phenomenon? As of today there exist few different ways societies are attempting to familiarize with and counter this type of warfare. There exist various small scale local investigations usually organised by journalists or private organisations that are covering and popularising the websites or pages that are considered to spread propaganda or be part of Russia’s information operations (examples of such actions include publications by the Finnish journalist Jessica Aro or by famous Lithuanian public figure Andrius Tapinas). These case studies, while virtuous in their attempt to draw the public’s attention to various controversial sites and to problematize the content produced within them, they do not go any deeper in understanding the overall problem. These investigations and publications do not attempt to conceptualise and understand the overall network and the context within which such Information Warfare can flourish. On the other side of the spectrum there exist more global and grand attempts to address the issue, the most significant being the establishment of the East StratCom team by the European Council. This established task force deals with responding to and addressing cases of misinformation in European Union, however such a centralised body attempting to overlook huge geographical area in many cases while popularising the existing problem, fails to understand the local context specific details around peculiarities. Furthermore, it does not suggest more essential ways to counter the whole phenomenon of misinformation influencing communities and spreading mistrust. Another honorable mention in ongoing attempts to counter Information Warfare is StopFake.org — started as a collaborative fact-checking project by students and lecturers at Kyiv Mohyla Journalism School to fight misinformation regarding the annexation of Crimea. It has now grown to be an international initiative which aims to ‘investigate how propaganda impacts on other countries and regions, from Syria and Turkey to the European Union and countries which once made up the Soviet Union’ (StopFake.org). While the initiative is growing to work within various contexts, it still is predominantly concentrating on and popular among a Ukrainian audience. There however has not been any consistent academic conceptualisation on how contemporary Information Warfare operates within the current media environment. In this work I aim to choose a particular case study, Lithuania, and to analyse the controversial pro-Kremlin associated communities within its mediascape. Through close familiarisation and contextualisation of the activities within the communities researched I will aim to understand the 3 role of social media and social environment it creates in enabling and energising these rather new complex warfare operations.

The case study of Lithuania is particularly interesting when it comes to Russia due to the well known fact that Lithuania, with many other former Soviet countries, is within its sphere of interest (Winnerstig) as well as the rather intense relationship between the two (mostly due to Lithuania being a very vocal critic of many Russian policies (Raik)). Due to my personal background as someone born and raised in Lithuania, it is a great opportunity for me to analyse and contextualise the traces of contemporary Information Warfare within Lithuania’s social media, and use this insight to evaluate more general debates on Information Warfare, propaganda and new media. As I will argue later, I identify Facebook as the dominant platform for these communities to organise (in the context of Lithuania) and therefore will base my research on understanding the communities of interest within this particular platform.

A more detailed understanding of how contemporary Information Warfare operates, what enables it and how to counter it is closely related to the ways we think, talk and see new communication technologies within our everyday life. It is the openness and emancipatory character of social media, as well as the polarising effect it has through the notions of echo chamber that eventually could be blamed for creating the dangerous environment of post-truth that is so easy to appropriate and exploit. Information Warfare in this case is rather the most straight forward example of this dangerous tendency and how it works. By zooming in on this phenomenon and analysing the ways it uses the social media environment for its own benefit, one is observing a phenomenon that is still difficult to describe and talk about within current new media vocabulary. Within this work, therefore, I intend to research and understand how the contemporary social media environment enables new ways to mobilize, socialize and communicate, and how these social affordances can be used to accommodate new warfare and propaganda strategies.

Research Question: How does social media enable contemporary Information Warfare in the context of Lithuania?

In the next chapters I will work to understand and situate the Lithuanian Facebook pages associated with pro-Kremlin propaganda within the conventional understanding of Information Warfare and propaganda and see how it is the environment created by new media technologies 4 that enable this concerning tendency we are currently witnessing. First, I will cover existing literature regarding Information Warfare and Russia’s strategic communication and situate it in opposition to the rather popular narrative which imagines new communication technology as a tool to counter propaganda and enable a democratic public sphere. Then I will present a detailed explanation of how I chose the groups to research as well as how I familiarised myself with its content and overall network. I will present my findings, emphasising three particular aspects: the narratives and themes that are the mostly recurrent throughout the content of the pages and what it suggests about the underlying discourses behind the community; the Page Likes Network — to identify sub communities within the network that are organised around specific cultural affinity patterns; and content traffic which represents a level of communication and connectivity among the pages that is not initially visible but that ties the pages into a singular discourse. When analysing the findings, I will emphasise not only the organisational/structural aspect of the community researched, but rather discourses that bind and make the network. I will then consider how these findings challenge the effectiveness and usefulness of certain conventional concepts and understandings such as propaganda; and finally, what these findings and conclusions emerging from them suggest about the ways to conceptualise the phenomenon and its dangers.

5 Literature review

The Internet as a Tool for Democratisation?

Since the very mid 20th century we have been witnessing the dominance of the ‘utopian information narrative’ (Kline 6) which claims that through the global computer-mediated communication system the new socio-economic order will be achieved, free from labour exploitation or class struggle (Barbrook) and most importantly enabling democratisation of communication and ‘enhancing civic participation and democratic decision-making’ (Halpern and Gobs 1160). The association of the Internet and computer development with freedom and democracy (Kelty) has its intellectual roots in the Cold War race for the research and development of the Net. In response to the horrors caused by fascism in Europe during World War II, US intellectuals and artists of the 1940s concluded that it is through single-channel mass media that propaganda is effective in creating an authoritarian persona which therefore enables authoritarian rule; the way to avoid this is therefore through multi-media democratic surround, which empowers the democratic individual to self-govern (Turner). With the developments of new communication technologies and the popular prophecies of Global Village by Marshal McLuhan, the ideas of democratic multi-media surround actually seemed to materialize: the Net becoming the ultimate vision of it. The ideas of the global information society through the conceptualisation and theorisation of Marshall McLuhan, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Daniel Bell, as well as revolutionary works by The New Communalists that were richly funded by the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) and United States Information Agency (USIA) (Turner) became the essential part of the US ideology and the proclaimed tool against the mass media propaganda horror associated with the fascist rule in Germany and the totalitarian Communism within Soviet Union (Barbrook, Turner). Through the development of the Net, society was assumed to have became foolproof against propaganda.

It is this popularisation of the belief in the promise of the democratisation of the public sphere through the use of new communication technologies that is of interest and concern in my work. Indeed there are many new ways the current development of the information and network age have been affecting contemporary societies. The increasing scale of new media activism and general participation of civilians does resonate with the ideas discussed by Habermas in terms of ‘the expansion of the public sphere in democratic regimes’ (Calvo 98). The introduction of new 6 media and communication technologies supplied tools that enable low-commitment-and-effort- based support and participation (Huang et al. 212) therefore higher numbers of participation and engagement with various political, social, economical issues. In theory these new technologies provide individual equal egalitarian opportunity to participate in democratic governing — it is open for everyone to express their opinions, thoughts and imagined realities. However, the openness and emancipatory character of new media has its own shortcomings and naive trust in technological determinism as well as the assumed and normalised idea of individual empowerment by media surroundings complicates the notion and creates a variety of issues. Scholars acknowledge that ‘an increase in opportunities for expression (in this case associated with social media) does not necessarily mean an increase in opportunities for political empowerment’ (Medias and Vokuev 3). This echos the work of Deleuze who observes that within societies of control, ‘repressive forces don’t stop people expressing themselves but rather force them to express themselves…’ (129).

With increasing use of various online mediums to engage with political debates and discourse, the tendencies of greater fragmentation of political communities emerged. Instead of the promise of one global public sphere where citizens are exposed to political diversity and share their common experiences, the current system allows users to filter the type of content they want to be exposed to resulting in intense selective exposure (Yonghwan 972). The contemporary issue of intensification of the so called ‘filter bubble’ or ‘echo-chamber’ (Howard) is likely to ‘widen political polarisation to extremes’ (Yonghwan 972) and result in a ‘centrifugal movement going outwards from the centre’ (Halpern and Gibbs). Various research identifies many other aspects that determine whether online communication has democratic or fragmentary implications. Research by Wojcieszak and Mutz claims that the purpose of the discussion/communication page or space can be one of the key characters, suggesting that ‘cross cutting political exchange is likely to take place where politics come up incidentally and is not the main purpose of online discussion spaces’ (Yonghwan 972). Other research proposes that there exists a ‘positive relationship between the size of the network in which individuals discuss civic matters and participatory behaviours’ (Halpern and Gibbs 1160-1161). Therefore the greater the size of a network, the higher the probability of interacting and encountering information and arguments of different political stance.

7 Even though experts now understand the number of ‘side effects’ caused by the emancipatory nature of new media communication, among the general public there still exists dominant narrative of the utopian techno-revolutionary information age which makes ordinary civilians blind towards the issues these side effects can cause. The increasing opportunities result in new media’s indifference to the quality of content, which leads to the particular new means to weaponise information — such as, for example, misinformation (Rojecki and Meraz). Within the reality of information sharing in new media, verifiability is less important than plausibility (Rojecki and Meraz 29). These essential characteristics of new media technologies have afforded the spread of misinformation and resulted in ‘production of truth changing rapidly’ (Bratich 237). The way narratives have become more influential than facts in the post-truth era has been of increasing concern in western societies after the success of Donald Trump’s presidential campaign (Connolly). With the increasing spread of fake news and disinformation, it becomes clear that ‘information no longer only reflects reality, but also creates new reality’ (Syuntyurenko 205). In this context there is a possibility for various powers to exploit the natural openness of democratic societies (Lucas and Nimmo) and use it for their own advantage. This becomes a new battlefield for power in the geopolitical scene and escalates the importance of information warfare to a new high.

Defining Information Warfare

To start it is essential to define the exact understanding of Information Warfare on which I will be basing this work as there exist many definitions and uses of it. Information Warfare in many cases can also be referred to as cyber warfare and the two have been used interchangeably or as synonymous with each other, and it is generally defined with no exact exclusive definition or specific characteristics. It can be variably defined from simply being ‘mediated dimensions of warfare’ (Ojala, Pantti and Kangas 3) to ‘the use of symbolic resources to penetrate the enemy’s secrecy and confidence’ (Chong 601) or ‘the use of computational technologies in cyberspace for malevolent and destructive purposes in order to impact, change and modify diplomatic and military interaction between entities’ (Maness and Valeriano 303). There are as many definitions as there are articles dealing with this specific information-technologies-related doctrine. Both terms (information warfare and cyber warfare) in a broad sense are concerned with the activities happening within cyberspace — ‘an object of contestation and as a vector for generating strategy effects and outcomes’ (Deibert, Rohozinski and Crete-Nishihata 4). Cyberspace has become 8 ‘recognised in United States strategic doctrine as being equally as important as land, air, sea, and space, and a dedicated strategic command for cyberspace has been established within the US military’ (Deibert, Rohozinski and Crete-Nishihata 3). While dealing with misinformation or propaganda has been on many nation states’ agenda for a long time, it is only when hi-tech was introduced that it emerged as a doctrine which focuses on information technologies and political actions they allow (Munro).

In colloquial terms it can be assumed that Information Warfare refers more to a standard propaganda war which dates back to the Cold War era, and cyber warfare is a term usually used to refer to technical operations such as hacking or distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS). The literature on the topics suggest that this generalisation is not accurate as there have been a number of articles defining Information Warfare in terms of information technologies (Munro) as well as articles talking about cyber warfare in terms of propaganda and information content (Aro; Chong). Within the existing literature on information or cyber warfare, many scholars emphasized the importance of acknowledging two essential dimensions of it: the cognitive domain of cyber, as well as technical (Blank; Deubert, Rohozinski and crete-Nishihata). This work is particularly interested in the cognitive/societal aspect of Information Warfare strategies as it occurs and takes form predominantly outside the military realm; as well as how specific technical and social affordances of new media technological environment are appropriated and used to reach political goals. By using the word ‘affordance’, I imply the ways social media as an environment is affording its users with new social and cultural ways to communicate and mobilize, and therefore enabling new practices and ways to govern. While I acknowledge the importance of technical analysis (information/cyber warfare such as hacking, DDoS’s etc.) I am interested in less straight-forward cyber offences and informational operations that cannot be tracked to a particular event or cyber insult. This preference is closely related to exact strategies and actions of my case study of choice: Russia, which I will review in more detail in the next section. First of all, the operations and actions I refer to as information or cyber warfare inside Russian parlance is known as ‘Information-Psychological War Operations’ (Lucas and Nimmo 7; Pomerantsev 46). As Blank describes it:

where Western definitions of cyberspace focus on technical aspects of information technology, ‘informatization’ takes on a much broader definition. ‘Informatization’ can be broadly defined as, applying modern information technologies into all fields 9 of both social and economic development, including intensive exploitation and a broad use of information resources’ (32)

When discussing Information Warfare from its ‘cognitive’ (Blank) or psychological aspect, this work attempts to track and understand various strategies and the more ambitious picture behind cases of disinformation, propaganda, fake news network and other information production practices (troll factories, for example). In a way, rather than treating cyberspace as a battlefield of Information Warfare in this work I am interested in how ‘the mental sphere, a people’s identity and its national and cultural identity [...] become battlegrounds’ (Blank 33; Pomerantsev). Therefore, it is not only infrastructural and organisational aspects afforded by social media that should be part of contemporary Information Warfare studies, but also discursive contextual features that build and energise the phenomenon, and which are commonly overlooked by new media scholars.

Propaganda and misinformation is not a new phenomenon and has been used for various reasons such as war (Jones and Kovacich) or even entertainment; for example, fake imagined news as entertaining journalist pieces in the 19th century (Uberti). But with the emergence of new media technologies and the new levels of communication they afford, the possibilities have evolved, creating a whole new case of Information Warfare; much more complex and still evolving. The exact relation and understanding of similarities and differences between the Information Warfare and the conventional understanding of propaganda is also not clear, with some suggesting that that the contemporary Information Warfare is somewhat broader and more ambitious than simple propaganda (Munro). In this image, propaganda is imagined through its 20th century context as a top-down ideological narrative injected into society with a help of media. If one assumes propaganda as it was practiced and understood during the 20th century it would fail to inform us on the contemporary situation. However, as I will argue later such simplistic and old-fashioned understanding of propaganda and the concluded distinction of it from contemporary practices complicates the general judgement of the existing situation.

The increasing importance of Information Warfare within the discourse of national security has challenged many normalised boundaries. It is warfare which follows the reasoning of soft power (Nye) rather than hard power. While hard military power would target the physical boundaries of the nation-state loop, soft power aims to command and exercise the nation’s influence through 10 more sophisticated means of shaping others’ preference (Nye). In this sense within the geopolitical sphere it is users that become the battlefield and the information technologies and new media become targets and weapons of Information Warfare operations simultaneously (Munro). Furthermore, within informational warfare, military and civilian realms have become blurred (Deibert, Rohozinski and Crete-Nishihata; Jones and Kovacich; Munro). It is nearly impossible to track a distinction whether material is strategically produced by military realms or is organic. Furthermore, organically produced opinions could be energised by the military realm or any other power whose interests it might serve. Within the realm of Information Warfare it is easy to misjudge whether the operation is offensive or defensive (Giles). Any promotion of an alternative, controversial narrative could be explained through the balance imperative which claims that ‘there must be two sides to every story’ (Giles 34). Following this logic, offensive information and propaganda operations could be defended as simply preserving objectivity of media. Eventually, the increasing emphasis on Information Warfare blurs the boundaries of war and peace itself, as many information operations are constantly happening among nations that are not at war. While certain scholars suggest to use more appropriate vocabulary and refer to operations in terms of tactics and not warfare as ‘it is a tool in the arsenal of diplomacy and international interaction’ (Maness and Valeriano 303), certain cases of informational operations between peaceful countries are aggressive enough to be compared to a military offense. In other words, Information Warfare, if aggressive enough, can be transformed from soft power (which it is suppose to be) into a ‘hard power in a velvet glove’ (Fattibene 134).

Russia and Information-Psychological War

While the case of Russia and its particular techniques of using Information Warfare for global politics has been acknowledged by various scholars throughout the last few decades, only recently the concerns over the country’s global cyber network of influence became more mainstream (courtesy of Russia’s alleged interference in the US presidential election (Thielman) and the increasing number of disinformation cases across Europe (EEAS)).

Russia is an interesting case as it has been building its Information Warfare and propaganda strategies on the experiences gained during the Soviet era and Cold War (Fattibene; Blank; Paul and Matthews). Moreover it has been in constant development, being ‘driven by contemporary information environment’ (Paul and Matthews 1); a very generous budget (in the article 11 published by the Guardian it is reported that ‘EU officials estimate that Russia spends $1bn (£801m) on state media outlets such as RT and Sputnik, and has an unknown budget for troll factories’ (Boffey and Rankin)); and the previously discussed openness of the western world (Fattibene). When discussed in relation to various other military operational concepts, Russia’s conduct has been described as ‘hybrid, ambiguous, asymmetric, non-linear, and more’ (Giles 4). In an online article Cory Doctorow claims that Russia has developed its own particular propaganda strategy. According to Doctorow while China relies on ‘suffocating arguments’ and the toxic alt-right in the US attempts to ‘weaponize hate’, Russia’s aim is to spread confusion and mistrust. The analysis and understanding of this model of Information-Psychological War Operations is essential to analyze and understand in more detail, not only due to its concerning success but the fact that ‘other neo authoritarian regimes are adopting similar approaches’ (Pomerantsev 48).

The attention towards Russia’s Information Warfare strategies has been slowly growing, but scholars are still not able to date when exactly the aggressive and organised operations became essential to Russia’s understanding of modern geopolitics. While some claim that the same strategies can be seen through their news reporting back in 1994, during the conflict with Chechnya (V’zquez Liñ ́n), or dates back to the coloured revolutions of 2003-2004 (Fattibene), the more popular events are considered to be 2008 Georgia and 2014 Ukraine conflicts. Paul and Matthew claim that ‘since its 2008 incursion into Georgia [...], there has been a remarkable evolution in Russia’s approach to propaganda’ (1) and the information warfare during the 2014 Crimean annexation has been described by a commander in US military as ‘the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen in the history of information warfare’ (Mejias and Vokuev 2). These events should have been a wake up call for the rest of the world on how advanced and serious the Information Warfare developments are in Russia. While now more and more have become aware of various disinformation sources infiltrated across the world, the specific infrastructure and network has been developed and perfected throughout the years.

Interestingly, Russia is somewhat open about how important Information Warfare is to general politics, with Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigy openly stating that the Kremlin sees media as a weapon (Aro). On the other hand, the exact practices, strategies and the global network of Information Warfare is basically impossible to trace or to prove in terms of the Kremlin’s direct involvement into various cases (Seddon; Deibert, Rohozinski and Crete-Nishihata; Chong; 12 Mejias and Vokuev) which is what makes it so difficult to directly target and deal with various cases and their consequences.

So far from the overall literature reviewed, four key features and characteristics associated with Russia’s Information Warfare emerge: high numbers of channels and messages (Paul and Matthews); constant use of disinformation and manipulation/narration of truth (EEAS; Aro; Mejias and Vokuev; Lucas and Nimmo; Rojecki and Meraz); it is somewhat repetitive (Lucas and Nimmo; Paul and Matthew; Seddon) and lacks commitment to consistency (Lucas and Nimmo; Pomerantsev). For the spread of its own narratives and disinformation, Russia uses a number of different mediums tailored for different audiences. Whether it is official state TV Channels and media houses such as RT or Sputnik, vaguely reliable blogs and ‘independent’ news sites (Aro; Rojecki and Meraz; Springe) or the so-called paid trolls, managing fake social media accounts to spread comments and memes (Seddon; Aro; Mejias and Vokuev). The variety of different information sources provide a variety of ‘tailor-made disinformation for different audiences’ (Aro 125). It is not just straightforward unreliable partisan websites and Facebook groups, but websites that are ‘a fascinating hybrid of revealing detailed military intelligence and totally bogus stories’ (Aro 126). Furthermore, it is not always clearly pro-Kremlin or strongly anti-western sentiment and narrative that a number of these channels provide, it is the subtle and intelligent content that in many cases appears professional and objective that is the most problematic (Aro; Lucas and Nimmo). While Russia does have one monolithic doctrine and is persistent with their narrative through its ‘monologue of power’ (V’ zquez Lin’ n 138), the goal of their information operations is not simply to promote their ideology, provide their truth and answers, but to confuse and and disorientate the audiences (Munro; Lucas and Nimmo; Pomerantsiv). The common mistake in responding to such strategic information operations is to apply ‘western notions of the nature and importance of truth, [as] this approach measures these campaigns by entirely wrong criteria, fundamentally misunderstands their objectives’ (Giles 3). The production of disinformation during these operations may not be consistent but is very persistent. As repetitive and simplistic as it might seem, it spreads confusion; ‘information warfare can be understood in Heideggerian terms as the attack or defence of one’s proximal orientation in the world’ (Munro 201). These strategies Russia has been using not only influence the politics abroad, but achieve ‘managed democracy’ (Pomerantsev 42) among its own society. The research by Szostek was interested whether the young and educated Russian population is aware of government managed narratives within the local mediascape and if so, how one deals 13 with information received from such sources. Szostek found that by introducing ‘fake pluralism’ of media sources ‘an audience may believe or accept a narrative even while disbelieving or rejecting media source via which the narrative is forcefully projected’ (3). In other words, while certain certain media sources can be easily identified as propagandist and not objective, this does not mean that the viewer will automatically reject the narratives promoted by these sources.

It has been noted many times how pro-Kremlin media houses and various globally produced narratives contradict themselves numerous times; Russia’s narrative being in support of both radical left or radical right: ‘European right-wing nationalists are seduced by Russia’s anti-EU message; Europe’s far left is enticed by the prospect of fighting U.S. hegemony; and U.S. religious conservatives are attracted to the Kremlin’s stance against homosexuality’ (Pomerantsiv 43). As Lucas and Nimmo state, ‘the unifying factor behind those it supports can be summed up in the word of anti: they are anti-NATO, anti-EU, anti-nuclear, anti-America and anti-each other’ (Lucas and Nimmo 8). Through various micro-messaging operations to spread whatever narrative fits anti-EU, anti-Western views in a case by case context, Russia does not seek to win factual arguments, but simply to make people question the normative power and distrust those behind it.

And as mentioned while some scholars or journalists suggests that Russia’s aim for quantity rather than quality (Seddon) results in repetitive and predictable information production, it does not necessarily mean it is easy to map the practices or respond to them effectively. While recently the European Council has set up the East StratCom team (Strategic Communication) to address Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns (EEAS; Boffey and Rankin), dealing with the issue appears to be more complicated than it seemed at first. The task force was created to find effective ways to communicate EU policies, strengthen ‘the overall media environment in the Eastern neighbourhood and in EU Member States’ (EEAS) and to work on the EU’s strategies of responding to and addressing disinformation by external actors, which mostly is based on the practices of ‘myth-busting by analysing trends, explaining narratives and addressing disinformation’ (EEAS). However such EU efforts do not show any direct results so far. First of all, simple fact-checking is not efficient enough because as mentioned before, the goal of such operations is not to win factual arguments but to confuse people and their trust in news. By the time a certain article or story is proven to be fake, the damage of mistrust and confusion is already made. Furthermore and most importantly, different nations are targeted depending on 14 their particular context; for example, while constantly portraying many post-Soviet countries as fascist and framing their ‘mistreatment’ of Russian ethnic minorities as human rights violations, Russia actively supports ultra-nationalism in France (Lucas Nimmo) and embraces other forms of radical right. Not only does the message differ, but also different countries are targeted in their own native languages (Giles), in their own popular local forums, which complicates the centralised response to such attacks.

Lithuania and Russia

Due to historical and geopolitical circumstances it can be claimed that ‘it is well known that Russia regards the area of the former-Soviet Union as its sphere of interest’ (Winnerstig 19). Particularly targeting Eastern European post-soviet countries and the three baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) Russia has named the region ‘near abroad’ and since the early 1990s has been using Kaaganov doctrine as well as the Compatriot Policy to sustain and manage its influence in the region (Maliukevicius). The basic idea of the Compatriots Policy is to ‘protect rights and legitimate interests of compatriots abroad’ (The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2) with the definition of compatriot being very broad, including everyone from those with Russian citizenship, nationality or simply being born within the Soviet Union (Winnerstig). Around the intention of defending and supporting compatriots, it becomes clear that there exists a ‘‘humanitarian dimension’ of Russian foreign policy in the region’ (Maliukevicius 118). The humanitarian narrative includes support and the advocation of human rights as well as

strongly counteracting manifestations of extremism, neo-nazism, any forms of racial discrimination, aggressive nationalism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia, as well as attempts to rewrite history using it to build confrontation and provoke revanchism in global politics and to revise to outcomes of World War Two’ (Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 13).

The understanding of the nuances behind the aforementioned intentions and narratives as being an official part of Russia’s foreign policy is essential when making sense of the contemporary Information Warfare.

15 Lithuania is a particularly interesting case due to its exceptionally complicated relationship with Russia. After half a century of being part of the Soviet Union, Lithuania, together with other Baltic countries (Latvia and Estonia), was at the heart of the movement that shook the Soviet Union and was the first country to declare its independence in 1990, March 11. Since then the Baltic countries have been constant critics of Russia’s policies, seen by both Brussels and Moscow ‘as ‘troublemakers’ or ‘agenda spoilers’ in the EU-Russia partnership’ (Raik 237). Lithuania has been known to be ‘the most noisy and radical among the three [...] even labelled a ‘new cold-warrior’’ (Raik 238). To some extent, opposing Russia and pushing for the western world to recognise Russia’s previous aggression as an act of colonialism (Annus) has become part of the national identity. Lithuania has been an active opposer of Russia’s military action in Georgia and Ukraine (Raik) and, since these events, became even more concerned about its own national safety; this resulting even in such extreme measures as compulsory military service (Lithuania to Reinstate the Compulsory Military Service). Following the incident in Ukraine 2014, Lithuania has been increasingly aware of Information Warfare happening within its territory and concerned with the ways Russia has exploited grassroots protest potential to justify its military actions (Lucas and Nimmo). While there have been attempts by local journalists to cover the complicated network of pro-Kremlin propaganda and misinformation (Černiauskas; Černiauskas and Pancerovas) these investigations were not detailed, substantial or gave any suggestions on how to deal with the issue. In many cases the reports were rather sensational coverage of interesting and promising investigations.

While these local investigation are aware of the issue, there have been no detailed attempts to dissect and understand the various local networks of groups associated with Russian Information Warfare. The journalist investigations, while covering local cases, do not pay attention or attempt to conceptualise what these cases suggest about the overall strategies and contemporary propaganda. Various other more centralised agents such as the previously mentioned EU initiative or western scholars on the other hand, have not attempted to zoom in and map various specific, local cases due to the plurality of these networks and language barriers that are due to the global spread of these practices. I am interested in what a close look at the case study of choice would teach us about the characteristics and practices of contemporary Information Warfare as it is enabled by the popularity of social media. With the previously explained interest in the social/discursive dimension of contemporary Information Warfare, I attempt to understand

16 the role of social media, its openness and emancipatory character, in creating the worrying phenomena and enabling multiple dangerous warfare practices.

17 Methodology

Digital Methods and the Choice of Social Platform

I base my research on the school of methodology practices by the Digital Methods Initiative, which suggests that there exists ‘an ontological difference between the natively digital and the digitized’ (Rogers, The End of Virtual 5). In this framework, the Internet and its research is no longer concerned with the distinction between virtual and real, as it is through the online analysis cultural social environments that breach beyond realm of cyber can be traced and analysed. First of all the Internet becomes a tool to get a greater cultural understanding of various existing social phenomena, because as Rieder explains it, ‘these activities revolve around elements that have cultural significance — liking the page of a political party is more than “clicking” — these data are not simply behavioral, but allow for deeper probing into culture’ (Rieder 347). In this research, however, social media is more than a reflection of reality or a tool to understand the socio-cultural problems, it becomes ‘a new engine’ (Martin and Valenti in Crossley 254) for social practices, mobilisation and discourses. Various practices and connections that can be seen and interpreted from social media are not merely an extension of old operations and social actions, which have been simply digitised. The structures and affordances of new media have resulted in new social practices and communities, which eventually orchestrates the new generation of communication, activism, you name it. Even though these practices are natively digital (Rogers Digital Methods 4) and can be researched explicitly online, their influence reaches far beyond the cyber realm. In my attempt to research contemporary Information Warfare, social media sites such as Facebook are not only a mirror of existing political climate or a tool to track propaganda, but are at the core of the new notion of propaganda and Information Warfare strategies themselves. Facebook was chosen as the most commonly used social media site in Lithuania (Delfi). By researching and understanding activities of specific Facebook communities and taking the bottom-up approach, I believe one can understand the way Information Warfare is organised and structured as well conceptualise new forms of strategic propaganda. This specific emphasis on medium and importance of it is at the core of my methodological approach toward understanding contemporary Information Warfare and propaganda 2.0.

18 While Facebook as social medium is the main interest of my research and analysis, it also serves as a news media repertoire in this way allowing the research to go beyond one medium and include analysis of various blogs and news sites shared within the Facebook groups and pages that will be analysed during the research. Therefore, through the analysis of content published by the specific Facebook pages of choice, the research will be able to get the wider sense of sources and platforms shared, channeled or communicated and the general media network of interest, breaching beyond Facebook.

Choice of Facebook Pages

The list was made of various previously identified controversial Facebook pages and shared any of these characteristics in content: anti-western, anti-EU, anti-NATO, anti-US, anti-Lithuanian, pro-Kremlin, pro-Putin attitudes; self-labeled alternative news and alternative-facts sites (Appendix 1). The list of the Facebook pages was assembled by researching existing journalist investigations and general private or public initiatives to cover the possible spread of misinformation and propaganda. Three main sources were selected to produce the so-called ‘seed’1 sample of pages that are considered to be problematic. Firstly, various publications by two famous Lithuanian journalists Šarūnas Černiauskas (investigative journalists who specialises in organised crime and corruption reporting) and Andrius Tapinas (journalist and TV host, initiator of the first crowdfunded online television channel Laisves TV (en. Freedom TV)) (Alfa.lt; 15min.lt; Cerniauskas). Second is the website unlike.lt, the local communal initiative to inform about websites that are considered to be propaganda or spread disinformation. The initiative works on the communal principle where people can suggest suspicious websites and administrators investigate these pages, constantly updating the list of pages they consider inappropriate and misinforming society. Unfortunately, these initiatives have not been active for over a year; the Facebook pages listed were used to create the ‘seed’ sample for my research. The third source is the website and blog updates by CEPA’s StratCom Program for Central and Eastern Europe. The program is ‘an innovative, on-the-ground effort to monitor, collate, analyze, rebut and expose Russian disinformation in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)’ (CEPA) and has weekly updates on identified cases of misinformation from individual countries (Lithuania included and covered by Dalia Bankauskaite). This source however was

1 seed sample in this case refers to the primary sample which will be used to find other pages suitable for the research sample. 19 rarely including any information about social media sites such as Facebook, and mostly covers disinformation within specific news sites and websites.

With this set of ‘seed’ pages, I further investigated the Facebook pages liked by these ‘seed’ pages, or Facebook recommendations for similar pages. I used this snowballing sampling method until it was exhausted and yielded no further new pages. I chose to exclude Russian and Polish speaking pages due to the language barrier, and therefore go rather in more depth for Lithuanian-language-oriented websites. I chose to keep three pro-Kremlin Russian Facebook pages (Baltnews.lt, RuBaltic.ru and Sputnik) as a point of reference for further analysis and was advised and assisted by native Russian speakers if content analysis was needed. While Sputnik is openly owned by Russian government-controlled agencies, the connections between Kremlin and RuBaltic.ru and Baltnews.lt have been obscured, and only through investigations have relationships and funding has been revealed (Jemberga and Springe; Springe). As the snowballing sampling method resulted in rather a huge sample with many neutral pages, such as governmental or international organisations, political parties, mainstream media pages etc. I narrowed the snowballed sample via the selective sampling technique (Bryman), excluding neutral pages and keeping pages that were found to be controversial by investigating reviews and comment sections of these pages. In this way, the final sample represents the highly controversial network of communities and pages that in multiple cases has been accused by the public of having links with pro-Kremlin propaganda.

Nine of the pages found through this snowballing method were no longer active during the time of the research or were very passive — no content being posted within the last few months. I chose to exclude or include such passive posts depending on whether they were active at any time during the time frame on which I based my research (which as I will argue later was set to be six months prior to the research).

During the time between the finalisation of the sample and the collection of data, three key largest Facebook pages that have been criticised for spreading misinformation and propaganda since 2014 (Alfa.lt) became inaccessible (deleted or blocked). The sample therefore was revisited, and newly-created pages were found and included into the sample.

20 Time Frame

As the research is interested in the ongoing process of Information Warfare, there is no specific event or time period on which the research could anchor itself. I believe a six month period is appropriate to get an understanding of these pages and the relations among them and ways it might be changing, as any longer period of time might be excessive considering time and resources restrictions. Furthermore the most recent time period was chosen for an easier access to the context and events that might be needed when making sense of specific content analysed. I therefore propose the time frame to be 2016/10/01–2017/04/01.

Tools

• For the data collection of the Facebook pages of interest I used the Facebook data extraction tool Netvizz v1.42. The following two specific modules available by the tool will be used: Page Like Network, and Page Data (for extraction of links and domains shared by each page). • For content comparison, Triangulation tool (developed by Digital Methods Initiative) was used. • For visualisation of Pages Likes Network Gephi 0.9.1 software was used. • For additional visualisations the Tableau Public application was used.

Data Collection

Using Netvizz and Gephi 0.9.1, the Pages Likes Network was mapped showing how the Facebook pages of interest are connected by liking each other or liking additional pages that connect them. Initially the Page Likes Network module was run among the pages of interest using a crawl depth of 0 to suggest the shared relations among these pages only. Then the crawl depth was increased to 1 to see the greater network and additional pages that were connecting the network.

To understand further relations between the pages of interest and see whether there exists a greater network among pages, the analysis of common links/domains and images among the pages was conducted. Using the Netvizz v1.42 Page Data module, the lists of photos, external 21 links and domains shared by each page was generated and compared. As the tool allows to differentiate between photos uploaded/shared and external links posted, I treated photos and external links as the same category of content, as within photos section, no specific differentiation can be made between photos/images uploaded by the page and shared from other pages. As I choose to treat images shared from other Facebook pages as an external link, I merged photo and link categories when collecting and formatting my data.

Data Analysis

Qualitative analysis of themes, narratives, discourses and content was conducted based on grounded theory principle (Bryman), meaning that various topics, categories and findings emerged through the close familiarisation with the data. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and content comparison analysis were used throughout the research to analyse and contextualise the data. By using CDA I intend to understand how meaning and realities are constructed through specific use of linguistics or narratives (Reisgl), and therefore deconstruct and reveal underlying discourses embedded within the network/community analysed. While it is common to adopt the CDA method while tracing and paying attention to ‘top-down relations of dominance’ (Tornberg and Tornberg 403), within social media communities, ‘power and dominance can be jointly produced’ (Tornberg and Tornberg 403) and not necessarily imposed by an elite. This shift in media dynamics therefore requires the analysis to start ‘more inductively by focusing directly on the recontextualizations of various social practices and then exploring and identifying common discourses, underlying ideologies and tensions, and modifications within them’ (Tornberg and Tornberg 408). By taking a critical rather than descriptive approach (Reisgl), I rely on contextualising the findings and problematising the ways these discourses can be shaped for the purposes of Information Warfare. I aim to emphasise specific problematic power relations, agendas and strategies that are energising these communities.

Content Narrative/Type analysis

To understand what topics and rhetoric these pages use and whether there exist any narratives or other common features binding these pages, 50 most engaged posts from each page were content-analysed. The sample of 50 posts per page was considered to be sufficient to represent the general tone of the page. The content of the posts was initially open coded — generating 22 initial concepts from data, and eventually the theoretical/selective coding was used to assure that codes emerging inform the research question and interest. Using the grounded theory principle and constant comparison method, the codes were kept active till the saturation of codes scheme was reached (Strauss and Corbin). Eventually, 21 key categories and codes emerged, informing not only a particular narrative that pages promoted, but also the manner in which the content was presented, which I will call a style/type. If the narrative or the type appeared at least a single time within the 50 most engaged posts of the page, the page was marked as containing the narrative/ type. The categories included:

Narratives: • Anti-NATO — critical towards NATO and its actions. • Anti-US — critical towards various US policies and politicians, as well as towards the US involvement in foreign policies. • Anti-western liberal values — critical towards various progressive western liberal values, usually in terms of gender equality, gay rights, anti-racism, inclusive society etc. • Anti-EU — critical towards European Union and its policies; sceptical towards euro-zone and euro replacing the local currency Litas in 2015. • Anti-Lithuania — critical towards well-being and living conditions in contemporary Lithuania. Radically negative portrayal of various issues such as emigration, huge taxes, people starving, etc. • Anti-Lithuanian government — critical towards Lithuanian mainstream politicians, traditional parties (mostly Conservative and Liberal), government as well as active political figures from 1990s movement for independence. This narrative can range from constructive criticism to mockery. • Pro-Russian — supportive of the closer economic and political relations between Lithuania and Russia, general support and admiration to Russia and its society. • Pro-Kremlin — supportive of Russia’s policies and socio-political actions, admiration towards statements and actions made by Kremlin. • Pro-Putin — supportive of and expressing admiration towards Vladimir Putin. • Pro-USSR — admiration towards the socio-economic lifestyle and well-being during the times of Soviet Union, commonly expressed through comparison that life used to be better then.

23 • Anti-mainstream media — critical towards the local mainstream media and news outlets (delfi.lt, 15min, alfa.lt, lrytas.lt, etc.). Involves claims that these major news sites are spreading misinformation. • Racism — racist content, often in relation to Islamophobia and refugee crisis. • Homophobic content • Anti-fascism — claims that there exist neo-fascist trends in Lithuania and in Lithuania’s mainstream politics; critical towards these trends. • Anti-Russophobia — critical towards scepticism towards Russia, mocks the discourse on the possibility of Russia’s aggression and military actions. • Anti-capitalism — critical towards western capitalism and expresses concerns over rich-poor dichotomy. • Anti-experts — critical towards various public statements made by various experts of their fields. • Children’s rights — concerned with children and family rights, usually involving discourse on pedophilia.

Types/styles: • Speculative content — speculative opinions, fake news and facts, conspiracy theories. • Entertainment and other — content that is not socio-economical or political, usually includes health, humour, life-style, etc. • Trolling — humoristic political content, usually intended to mock and criticise specific political socio-economical issues using humour or images.

Each page was profiled in relation to these mostly reappearing codes. To illustrate the specificities of certain narratives, to avoid generalisation and channel the exact tone of the narratives, various images and memes found throughout the pages will be used as a reference point to illustrate the specificities of these narratives.

Page Likes Networks

To analyse the Page Likes Network of the pages of interest, a number of variables were considered such as the number of likes a page has received, post activity per hour, modularity (detection of communities within network, which is done by implementing the Louvain method), 24 as well as network betweenness centrality. It was expected that from the Page Likes Network not only shared liked pages will be connecting these pages, but specific discourses and narratives that could be interpreted from certain links (preliminary research suggests that various anti- pedophilia sites are a major connection point for some of the pages, due to specific events and scandals that were happening in Lithuania a few years ago). I therefore propose to use critical discourse analysis (Reisgl) to analyse the narratives within the network generated. Through identification and contextualisation of these narratives and interests of this network, we can identify agendas and strategies these communities use as tools for mobilisation and communication.

Furthermore, more Facebook pages that suit the research could be found.

Content Traffic Analysis

By extracting the links shared by each page during the time frame and comparing them, new additional information about the network and its infrastructure was extracted, adding a new dimension to the Page Like Network’s illustration of the communities. The shared content was treated as traffic of information and narrative, which by being circulated, bound the pages in terms of narratives and discourses. By running detailed triangulation among the links shared by the pages, different strengths of bond between the pages were exposed (some pages having no shared links/content, while others have over 20 shared links and other content). Furthermore, the comparison analysis of the domains and links shared allowed the research to get a better understanding of the network outside the Facebook platform, revealing the blogs and news sites referred to and trusted by these communities. The domains and links therefore were interpreted as tools used by the community to communicate, suggesting another dimension of connectivity among pages that might not be initially seen within the Page Like Network. Furthermore it allowed us to identify the authoritative information sources among the community and to get a better understanding of the spread of information within this community.

The findings about the discourses within the Page Likes Networks and the results of the pages links comparison and content analysis were combined with the existing literature on social media to draw conclusions on how social media enable the contemporary Information Warfare and how

25 these various agents can use these affordances to energise and implement various narratives and discourses for their own interests.

26 Findings

Narratives and Types

When analysing the content of every Facebook page from the sample, some key narratives, themes and types of content emerged (Figure 1).

Figure 1. The most common narratives and types shared by the pages researched 27 The most significant characteristic that can be seen in Fig. 1 is a noticeable lack of direct support and admiration towards the Kremlin’s policies and the Russian president Vladimir Putin (columns pro-Kremlin, pro-Putin), which one would not expect from the pages that are blamed for spreading pro-Kremlin propaganda. While it is not common within the sample to find explicit admiration or support towards Russian policies, there exist other more implicit narratives that need to be taken into account. The most significant one could be a strong reappearing anti- russophobic rhetoric (Fig. 1, column anti-russophobia). The anti-russophobia narrative is part of the previously discussed humanitarian dimension of Russia’s foreign compatriots policy (Maliukevicius). While generally speaking, anti-russophobia and similar humanitarian discourses are in no way necessarily bad or controversial, in the case of the pages analysed it is used to critique and mock anyone opposing or critical of Russia (Appendix 2, row anti-russophobia). The anti-russophobia narrative is directed against the political atmosphere in Lithuania, which due to the 2014 Ukraine invasion has been highly concerned with the possibility of Russian military operations towards Baltic countries. In this context, the anti-russophobia narrative usually mocks these concerns, normalising the image of Kremlin policies as rational and normal, and anyone who disagrees as paranoid and irrational. Furthermore, the military tension between Russia and Lithuania is used to construct a strong anti-US, anti-NATO narrative. Within this narrative the US and its political figures are treated as occupants and invaders (Appendix 2). Many sub-narratives in relation to this notion of anti-western values emerge, in relation to racism, homophobia and children’s rights. Multiple times within these pages the content had homophobic and islamophobic material (Fig. 1, columns Homophobic content and Racists content), in both cases the negative portrayal is related to EU policies (such as refugee in-take quota, or the sensational blaming of Merkel for taking in immigrants after every terror act in the last half a year, Appendix 2). The narrative of children’s rights and pedophilia has been also constantly emerging in relation to western-values. The exact logic and reasoning behind the relation of concerns over pedophilia/children’s rights and anti-western values is not always clear, but it is loosely based on the assumption that western progressive values promote sexual perversion which would lead to pedophilia or children being raised in nontraditional families (Fig. 1, column Children’s rights). Due to various negative associations with the western world, the pursuit of stronger economic, social and political ties with the western world is criticised. Therefore, even though the positioning of Russia within the political standpoints of these groups is usually expressed through neutrality, the portrayal of other agents in an unflattering manner

28 and demoralisation of progressive liberal values works in favour of the construction of Russia’s image.

The narratives criticising contemporary Lithuanian government and contemporary Lithuanian politics are the most prominent (Fig. 1, anti-Lithuanian government). By critiquing contemporary Lithuanian politics and politicians, the overall disappointment of the governing powers since independence in the 1990s is expressed. The current president Dalia Grybauskaite, renowned politicians who were involved in the 1990s struggle for independence (Vytautas Landsbergis, Valdas Adamkus), all the major traditional parties and their leaders (Conservative, Liberal, Social-Democrats), are constantly mocked and criticised, speculatively blamed for corruption, treason, stupidity, paranoia and more (examples in Appendix 2). It is followed by the more general narrative, which I condensed as anti-Lithuania, which claims that living conditions and well-being in contemporary Lithuania are particularly poor. While the narrative expressing nostalgia for the times of the Soviet Union is less likely, in many cases it could be supported and assumed in relation to dominant narratives that quality of life is now worse (Appendix 2, row Contemporary Lithuania). This logic is followed by a critique of Capitalism and concerns over poverty in Lithuania and the increasing gap between rich and poor (Figure 1, column Anti- capitalism). Interestingly many of the pages are identifying with the far left-wing politics and ideologies such as socialism, marxism or communism (Appendix 1). There are a number of smaller sub-narratives that work in support of the ones emphasised in Fig. 1, but did not make the table due to their inconsistency and complexity.

While many of these narratives would seem well-meaning and even virtuous as well as popular among many left-leaning people globally, these pages support them through sensational scandalous stories, speculative controversial opinions, and conspiracy-fuelled misinformation. While this feature is a type and not a narrative itself, it is an essential part of understanding and conceptualising the content of these pages. The sensational rhetoric is used to back every other narrative whether it is hostility towards the government and politicians, critique of western politics and values. Another common feature for the narratives and discourses of these pages is the practice of trolling which, in the context of this research and these pages, is political content presented in the form of humour, satire or mockery. The only pages that were not sharing content of this nature were those representing actual news sites, such as Laisvas laikrastis, Infa, LDiena.lt and Sputnik (Fig. 1 column Trolling). Many news sites within the sample, including 29 those just mentioned self-proclaim to be alternative news sites. These sites together, supported by many other pages in the sample, show a strong anti-mainstream media sentiment, criticising them for misinformation and blaming them for providing speculative fake news. Interestingly, many of the pages had a reasonable amount of non-political content, and shared content related to lifestyle, humour, entertainment and other. Pages such as ‘Juntines Karalystes Lietuviu Bendruomene Tinklas' or ‘Rimti anekdotai, be cenzuros... ir ne tik... :))))’ as specified in Appendix 1, are not by nature political and mostly share a different kind of content. However, the analysis of their fifty most engaged posts suggest that the political narratives and sentiments seen in other pages, are not alien to these non-political communities.

These narratives are common to the extent that it links the pages into a shared discourse and says a lot about the overall tone of the community. Here specific narratives identified can coexist in various surprising ways and reinforce each other; for example, a number of pages being able to simultaneously promote anti-fascist narratives that criticise xenophobia and post content of a racist nature. Coexisting anti-xenophobic and racist content suggests a lot about specific narrow ways these communities use humanitarian narratives to construct their own specific discourses. It is the assemblage of these various narratives that is important to understand and contextualise, as simply labelling these narratives on their own might fail to communicate the nature of particular discourses.

Page Likes Network

The Page Likes Network of the thirty-page sample can be illustrated by Fig. 2 (a more detailed version of the network can be found in Appendix 3). The overall network is noticeably held together and has various clusters close to each other. Within the main central cluster of the network there are specific sub-communities that can be identified (and shown through different colour schemes based on calculated modularity and community detection algorithm). The existence of these communities are interpreted as illustrating the specific ‘cultural affinity patterns foregrounding post-demographic2 variables’ (Rieder 349) which suggests that nodes in the network are ‘actively organising themselves around social objects’ (DMI). While the majority

2 ‘The term post-demographics also invites new methods for the study of social networks, where of interest are not the traditional demographics of race, ethnicity, age, income, educational level or derivations thereof such as class, but rather tastes and other information supplied to make and maintain an online profile’ (DMI) 30 of the pages from the sample are somehow interconnected forming the central cluster, there do exist a few pages that have no visible relation to the rest of the network. Quite surprising is the positioning of the page by the major openly pro-Kremlin media house such as Sputnik and news sites that have been exposed to have tight but secret connections with Russia RuBaltic.Ru and Baltnews. As the three pages are known to be Kremlin sponsored media sources, none of them have any connection to the rest of the network or among each other. The page ‘Labusai rusofobai’ is also seen as separate from the main cluster, which could be explained due to it being active only for two weeks prior to the data collection and therefore not liked by other pages within the sample.

Figure 2. Page Likes Network graph (the size of the node represents the network betweenness centrality; the colour of the 31 nodes and links detects and identifies communities within network) (full PDF of the network in Appendix 3) Within the central network, we do see various sub-communities (Fig. 2, communities illustrated by colour) being rather highly interlinked and coexisting close to each other. Nodes of the pages ‘Juvenalinė transvesticija’, ‘Lietuvis idiotas’, ‘Lietuvos Mešlasaugos Klanas’, ‘Kova’ and others act as gates connecting high numbers of pages that initially would not be part of the network. These gates not necessarily connect initially disconnected subcommunities but rather links number of separate unrelated pages to the overall network. These gates in a sense mostly link, manage and provide the network with flow of outside information and content as well as growing the network by allowing access to initially unrelated pages.

‘Jungtines Karalystės Lietuvių Bendruomenė’, as described in Appendix 1, is the popular community page for emigrants to the UK and therefore is not surprisingly closely surrounded by Lithuanian emigrant communities worldwide, which becomes the main reason why it has the most substantial community within the network generated. The size of the nodes within Fig. 2 represents the betweenness centrality which is a metric detecting the strategic positioning of the node, and the node ‘having high betweenness centrality is considered to be able to ‘influence the group by withholding or distorting information in transmission’’ (Rieder 352). The nodes and pages in this position act as bridges for social capital (Rieder 352). In this regard, the ‘Jungtinės Karalystės Lietuvių Bendruomenė Tinklas’ is rather an active agent within its large community, and is followed by many other pages within it. It therefore is an influential page which is positioned to bridge its content and narratives to the emigrant communities that would not otherwise be exposed to the narratives. Other pages with high betweenness centrality within the network are ‘Lietuvos Mėšlasaugos Klanas’, ‘“Drąsos kelias” politinė partija’ (this node, within its community, I will explain in detail in the upcoming paragraph) and ‘Juvenalinė transvesticija’.

The community coloured with pink contains and links most of the alternative news and information sites, such as ‘Infa’, ‘EKSPERTAI.EU’, ‘LDiena.lt’, ‘versijos’ and ‘Nesisteminė žinisklaida’. This pink community is mostly held together and influenced by the ‘“Drąsos kelias” politinė partija’ and its many other branches (nodes mentioning Drąsos kelias in their page name) as well as ‘STOP pedofilijai Lietuvoje’ (STOP Pedophilia in Lithuania). The activity surrounding the topic of Drąsos kelias and anti-pedophilia sentiment is due to particular events and scandals that happened in Lithuania in 2012. The Drąsos kelias party in Lithuania is a populist political party, which was founded in 2012 as an anti-corruption platform and fuelled by the huge scandal 32 uncovered by an individual, Drasius Kedys, who was claiming that the Lithuanian legal system whitewashed a pedophilia ring, his daughter being one of the victims. To make it more interesting, a few key figures accused by Kedys were found murdered, with the main suspect being Kedys himself, who shortly afterwards went into hiding and then was found dead3. While at the time of the scandal the mainstream media covered the event excessively, the popularity of the event has faded away after a few years. Fig. 2 and the pink coloured sub-community reveal an alliance between the pages in support of this party and the number of alternative news sites from the research sample (‘Nesisteminė žiniasklaida’, ‘LDiena.lt’, ‘Infa’, ‘Lietuvos informacija’).

The turquoise coloured community is the second largest, most interconnected community within the network. This community involves many core pages from the research sample such as ‘Kubilistano Respublika’, ‘Lietuvos Mėšlasaugos Klanas’, ‘Lietuvis idiotas’, ‘Lietuviai, Vyganto Kelerto informatyvus puslapis’, ‘Lietuvos žiniasklaida skleidžia propagandą’. The first four pages mentioned are highly saturated with memes and trolling, alongside the other narratives described in the previous section. When trying to make sense of this community and to determine what ties this group of nodes so close to each other, looking at the other pages involved within the network is not much help. Among the already mentioned pages, the turquoise community contains pages such as ‘Anonymous Pabaltijoje’ (Anonymous in Baltics), ‘Jezus Kristus’ (Jesus Christ), ‘Psichiatrijos ligninė’ (Psychiatry hospital), ‘KGB’, ‘Satanism’, ‘Bedančiai’ (Toothless), ‘Teisinė pagalba’ (legal aid), ‘Britain First’, and ‘CCCP’ just to name a few. It is difficult to determine any clear social ideological viewpoint or narrative that connects these and many other pages within the community and holds it together. The purpose of many of them is entertainment/humour (for example the ‘Bedančiai’ page simply photoshops Lithuanian celebrities without teeth) or satire (‘Jezus Kristus’ contains memes depicting Jesus Christ). However, within this satirical corner of the network there is rather a huge number of pages with varying political content. The pages that have been analysed during this research show many signs of promoting problematic narratives. The placement of these politically dubious pages across this rather entertainment-focussed and light-hearted community is to a certain extent worrying and raises questions about the spread of information and misinformation especially within networks like this.

3 for further information on the case, research the case of Drasius Kedys or Drasos Kelias 33

Interestingly, when looking closer to the bright green community centred around ‘Juvenalinė transvesticija’, nodes of socially liberal and progressive pages such as ‘LGBT Balsas’ (LGBT Voice) and ‘Tolerantiško jaunimo asociacija’ (Tolerant youth association) can be found. This finding is interesting as the narrative analysis (Fig. 1) shows a rather radical orthodox viewpoint among these communities which puts it into opposition to the mainstream liberal progressive associations. At the same time, at the edge of the orange community surrounding emigrant population is the node representing Lithuanian president Dalia Grybauskaite as well as the Lithuanian liberal party ‘Liberalai’ and many other public initiatives such as ‘Kultūros ministerija’ (Culture Ministry) or project ‘Kurk Lietuva’ (Create Lithuanian) — which has been the object of criticism by the community researched (Fig. 1, column Anti-Lithuanian government). Across the network, closer to the orange community, but reaching beyond that are official pages of multiple mainstream news sites such as DELFI.lt, 15min, Alfa.lt and others — reoccurring targets of the pages’ critiques (Fig. 1, column anti-mainstream media; Appendix 2, row anti-mainstream-media). The network suggests that mainstream Lithuanian news sites and progressive political actors are more linked to the overall Facebook network of controversial misinformation pages in Lithuania than for example Kremlin-funded sites such as ‘Sputnik’, ‘RuBaltic’ or ‘BaltNews’. As I will argue later, this close network connection between assumingly incompatible pages in a way respond to the echo-chamber argument and suggest existing levels of exposure to between different political communities and information sources. When understanding the context and content within the network it is clear that links between certain communities (as in this case between the community researched and the nodes representing more mainstream-liberal viewpoints) does not imply direct influence or authority over one another but shows how these communities are aware of information flows outside their network. These communities are not isolated to their own networks and communities, but engage with the overall mediascape in different ways and through different topics.

The last interesting finding that caught my attention while familiarizing with the Page Likes Network (fig. 2) was the page ‘Raudonojo meškiuko pėdsakais/Tracking red teddy bear footsteps’, which is a grassroots organised page that tracks, shares and discusses the pro-Kremlin propaganda and misinformation across Lithuania. Additional research suggests there is another website of the same nature called ‘Trolių medžiotojai’ (Troll hunters), which did not appear on the network. I already have found the recent journalist coverage of the existence of voluntary 34 anonymous groups of Lithuanians who call themselves Lithuanian elves (as in opposition to Russian trolls) who claim to patrol the Lithuanian mediascape and counter troll comments and misinformation (Dapkus). The visible grassroots mobilisation to track and counter social media propaganda should be taken into account when conceptualising contemporary Information Warfare strategies.

Content Traffic and Shared Content Analysis

While the Page Likes Network (Fig. 2) does allow us to understand the relationships among these many websites and how these pages organise around social objects and discourses, it does not provide information on the actual content and information traffic among the pages within the sample. Fig. 3 represents the content shared between any two pages in the sample during the period of six months. The shared content in this case implies the traffic of information, narratives and discourses across the network; it also identifies shared authorities and illustrates a strength of bond between the pages. Furthermore, it reveals the connection among pages that was not visible within the initial Page Likes Network (Fig. 2), it reveals hidden connections among the pages that would not be noticeable unless comparing the information shared among all these pages.

35

Figure 3. Shared Content between the pages diagram

First of all, while the Page Likes Network (Fig. 2) showed no networked connection between the central main cluster of the network and the Kremlin-funded news outlets ‘Sputnik’, ‘Baltnews.lt’ and ‘RuBaltic.Ru’, Fig. 3 reveals that these news pages have shared content with multiple other Facebook pages within the sample. Even though the figure does not visualise the direction of content shared, the Facebook pages of these three news sites predominantly share their own content (links to the articles from their news sites). This suggests that other Facebook pages do share information supplied by the three official Kremlin-friendly news sites and treats their information as authority. The website ‘Top 10 propagandos klaidu’ has shared content from RuBaltic.Ru and Baltnews.lt over forty times within the period of six months. Other pages that have been sharing the content from these sites include ‘Tautos Balsas’, ‘Jungtinės karalystės

36 Bendruomenė Tinklas’, ‘Lietuvos Mėšlasaugos Klanas’, ‘Nesisteminė Žiniasklaida’, ‘versijos’ and others.

The particularly strong bond through the shared content can be seen between the pages ‘Jungtinės Karalystės Lietuvių Bendruomenė’, ‘Tautos Balsas’, ‘EKSPERTAI.EU’, ’Lietuviai’, ‘Top 10 propagandos klaidu’, ‘Infa’, ‘Lietuvos informacija’ and ‘Lietuvos Mėšlasaugos Klanas’. As mentioned before, it is not merely shared content that is circulating through these connections, but narratives, discourses and attitudes. Once this kind of bond is overlapped on the pages’ corresponding strategic position within the Page Likes Network portrayed within Fig. 2, it becomes clear that shared/circulated content represented in Fig. 3 is exposed within various different communities in the network. As discussed previously ‘Jungtinės Karalystės Lietuvių Bendruomenė’ is highly surrounded by various other emigrant Facebook communities and exposes to its audience the same content as visible among other more radical communities of the network.

Fig. 4 visualises the popularity of the domains among the sample pages. The colour (the darker, the more popular) suggests how common the domain is among all the links shared across the pages in the sample. The darkest purple colour within nodes facebook.com and baltnews.lt suggest that the links with these domains were the most common in the pool of all the links posted across the page sample, during the period of six months. The popularity of the links with the facebook.com domain suggests the overall popularity of content uploaded and shared through Facebook, such as photos, videos or posts. This makes it important to analyse the photo and meme culture, and the way it is circulated through these networks.

37

Figure 4. Most popular domains shared (The colour of the node represents the popularity of the domain within the whole sample (the darker the more popular); the size of the node represents the popularity of the domain among the links common to at least 2 pages)

The size of the circles represents the amount of times the domain appeared among the links that were common among at least two pages. Interestingly, the results are not that different as it is the same five domains most frequently appearing: infa.lt, ekspertai.eu, rubaltic.ru, facebook.com and baltnews.lt. The frequent sharing of these domains suggests the authority they have over information production, as most of the traffic within the network analysed is created and sourced from these domains. Two of these domains are identified as Moscow-funded news agencies; the other two, major Lithuanian alternative news sites; and the third being Facebook, which suggests

38 grassroots produced content. The network largely remains within its Facebook medium and uses other sources only as mediums to share written work or information.

39 Findings Analysis

The findings expose a number of attributes and characteristics of the community analysed that could clarify why these pages are commonly associated with contemporary Information Warfare, and the role of social media in enabling these new and questionable practices. The most straightforward starting point is the list of narratives that was generated to represent the themes and types of content shared among the community. The majority of these narratives (anti- western, anti-US, anti-Lithuanian government, homophobia) would not be channeled through the mainstream media in Lithuania. In this way, social media is the setting where unpopular and controversial narratives like these can be published and distributed. However, the key factor that matters here is not simply the ability of individuals to express unconventional opinions, but rather how groups and communities of people organise around these narratives and their underlying discourses. The online community, through the close circulation of the specific narratives motivated by the underlying discourses, eventually create their own sense of reality. This is a characteristic that social media actually shares with traditional mass media — ‘they involve similar forms of social cognition’ (Tornberg and Tornberg), meaning similar ways of mediating ‘between the micro and macro levels of society by constituting the link between discourse and action, thus explaining how discourses transform social practice’, and therefore linking ‘dominance and discourse by affecting how individuals and groups interpret the world and act upon this interpretation’ (Tornberg and Tornberg). While not containing traditional top- down power relations as they are inscribed through mass media, the communities on social media are organised and motivated by the underlying discursive powers and through these power they move from just another online group to an actual social environment. To sum up, social media not only allowed unpopular narratives to be shared and posted, but enable a number of them to assemble and crystallise into a specific field of discourse and through that discursive power, to become a community or environment with its own reality. And while theoretically, social media’s ability to allow communication beyond the hegemony of mainstream mass media should be celebrated and encouraged, the forming of specific problematic communities like those at the centre of this work should be critically evaluated and the discursive powers motivating these communities need to be contextualised and taken into account. Most importantly it is not through spread of separate narratives and themes but through discursive power transforming the group of pages into a voice that this phenomenon can be seen as becoming a tool for the contemporary Information Warfare. 40 When trying to make sense of the underlying discourses defining the community researched, the most recognisable are the various narratives that are criticising western political powers as well as current Lithuanian politics (Anti-NATO, Anti-US, Anti-EU and Anti-Lithuanian government narratives). While there does exist a analytical aspect of this critique (usually condemning western cultural imperialism or its colonial history, exploitive nature of capitalism, corruption etc.) it is only a part of the whole general discourse that the community is organised around. The moral aspect of the critique is essential to take into account. The importance of moral grounds are expressed not only through the straightforward Anti-western values narrative, but through multiple humanitarian narratives backing it, such as anti-fascism and anti-Russophobia, as well as children’s rights. The pages researched, in various direct and implicit ways, attempt to demoralise the powers they oppose and to challenge de facto progressive morality and values of western democracy. As mentioned before, through the children’s rights narrative, an attempt is made to emphasise the pervasiveness of liberal values; the community’s logic also links it to their homophobic views. Through the narratives demonising the mainstream media and expert opinion (anti-mainstream media and anti-expert), it is aiming to challenge the trustworthiness and competence of these sources, usually by pointing out the cases the administrators of the page consider speculative, misinformative or plain stupid. As mentioned, mockery through memes and trolling is also a common feature in which the community expresses its political opinion. Most of these narratives in different ways aim to challenge the current prevailing power and political discourse in Lithuania, whether it is on ideological basis, moral grounds, credence or through simple mockery. Through the strong anti-Lithuanian government rhetoric and complaints about living conditions, as well as through attempts to emphasise the hypocrisy of western democracies, there is also an attack on the concept of Lithuanian Independence. This narrative is supported by a subtle movement towards the implication that quality of life in the times of the USSR was better. I would say that at the very core of these narratives is the underlying discourse which disagrees with the current geo-political direction that Lithuania has been taking since its independence in the 1990s: to become part of the western democratic world.

On the other hand, this community and the discourses that empower it do not aim to engage with the power relation issues it discusses, neither does it try to start a constructive dialogue or suggest ways to deal with perceived problems. While key narratives are dominant within the 41 community and even repetitive in their tone and message, the logic it uses is also highly inconsistent and contradictory. The same pages simultaneously spread content that is both anti- fascist and xenophobic, or defend rights of ethnic minorities, condemning Russophobia, and chant racist islamophobic and anti-western tolerance memes. Even further, while criticising mainstream media for misinformation and inaccuracy, these pages share speculative conspiracy theories from anonymous blogs with highly questionable veracity. Through the narratives, the community does not simply attempt to challenge a specific hegemonic power that it associates with western democracies and proof of its weakness, but to rather spread mistrust, confusion and make any individual these narratives reach question the normativities it does not agree with.

So far, a close look at these narratives and their assemblages reveals specific discursive nuances that are at the core of the community researched. It is a challenge to Lithuania’s direction of becoming part of the western democratic world. This is done through all means possible, which means not only healthy constructive criticism, but also through attempts to demoralise, demonise and corrupt anyone representing and aiming for this direction. It is also clear that it aims to encourage its community members and those around it to question and distrust the mainstream environment, causing confusion, suspicion and divide .

The question arises over the extent to which such ‘questioning’ and provocation to mistrust mainstream discourses and narratives actually escapes the community within which it is articulated. Here I would like to introduce a different perspective on how social media accommodates these problematic communities and their discourses in a dangerous way, for which I look at the infrastructure of the community researched. Two major nuances emerged from the findings: pages being surrounded by different communities, which I call ‘sub- communities within the network’, and an ‘exposure/receptiveness of the community to the events outside the network’s filter bubble’, which aims to react, appropriate and respond to the events and narratives channeled through the mainstream discourses. By sub-communities within the network, I want to draw attention to how different pages within the sample researched, while sharing the same radical narratives and tone, are also very different and are surrounded by audiences not necessarily associated and in dissimilar ways. While some sub-communities within the network are of a humoristic nature, others are directly linked to specific political parties or surrounded by some specific motives around which people mobilise (such as anti-pedophilia activism for example) and other positions, themselves within ‘neutral’ communities (for example 42 the page ‘Jungtines Karalystes Lietuviu Bendruomene Tinklas’, blending in and reaching out to the overall Lithuanian emigrants network across the globe). Through this placement, the discourse representatives across different sub-communities, the same narratives are channeled to the audiences that might initially not be interested in these narratives. Additionally, not all of the pages analysed initially appear to have a political purpose. In a number of cases, the pages produce mostly non-political content, only occasionally slipping in jarringly controversial content, usually still in the form of humour and therefore hardly detectable by an uninformed audience. Such cover for the spread of controversial information therefore works in two ways: it attracts audiences that initially would attempt to stay away from political issues, and it normalises various initially unpopular opinions through humour, entertainment etc. Furthermore, there exist more advantages of distributing the content and narratives through the spread of plurality of different pages. Due to various issues, such as reports of hate speech and flagging of extremist content, pages within the network are likely to have a short life and high possibility of being blocked or deleted (which has been evident even in the short timeframe of conducting this research). The plurality of pages working around the same discourse therefore assures that the network would be sustained and continue to share information and grow even as specific pages are blocked or deleted. Not to mention that especially as some of the pages within the network are not explicitly political or radical, they sustain a large following as they are less likely to be confronted by those moderating the content in social media.

When it comes to another characteristic, which I described as a deliberate exposure, I am interested in the ways the network analysed engages with the overall mainstream mediascape. As acknowledged in the findings section, within the network there is a clear trace of more mainstream pages and sources, such as various popular news sites and media houses, groups representing and advocating for progressive liberal values or famous Lithuanian politicians such as the Lithuanian president Dalia Grybauskaite. This suggests that the main network of radical communities are aware and up-to-date with the events and opinions communicated by these channels, despite the ideological differences. Would this relation visible within the likes network suggest that a filter-bubble or echo-chamber effect does not exist? Probably not. While these pages might be exposed to the materials posted by the sites on the other side of the social- political spectrum, this does not mean that their followers and community are provided with an objective, evenly distributed amount of information and opinions. The content analysis suggests a rather unusual and radical tone in which the pages researched respond to and engage in 43 dialogue with events and content produced by the opposite side of the spectrum. The following of more mainstream pages within the network then rather represents aims to immediately respond to the mainstream opinions and reality by supplying their own take on them. These pages appropriate the mainstream narratives and construct their own alternative interpretation. This response is then channeled to their audiences, in this way presenting themselves as a relevant source of news and constantly supplying its community with a side to stories suitable for their key discourses and narratives. It is through this perpetual responding to the events and news that the network is energising its community and challenging the assumed moral superiority of the mainstream liberal powers.

There exists another nuance within the discursive circulation of these narratives that I would like to emphasise and call ‘false empowerment’. By false empowerment I mean the “what if I am right and everyone else is wrong” attitude, which is at the core of the community and becomes a very problematic aspect of it. It is important to understand that these communities are convinced that anyone following and believing the mainstream media are misguided and manipulated by propaganda. Ironically, the network sees itself as being liberated from the narrow and biased discourses of mainstream politics, and takes pride in its ability to think critically. With this in mind, while constantly claiming how unfair, subjective and biased mainstream media is and how people need to be liberated by being exposed to a greater variety of media, this community itself is mostly exposed to rather narrow and repetitive narratives that are the basis for any other interaction with opinions from the opposite side of the social-political spectrum. Their interaction and exposure to the stories channeled by other sources is, to a certain extent, delusion. The community is not actually engaging or trying to understand the motives and opinions of the discourses they are criticising, but select the surface narratives that could be used to stir anger and mistrust. The comfortable assumption that social media platforms such as Facebook could act as a nexus where one chooses the variety of information sources they want to see and that any opinion is just a click away is rather dangerous. It renders the filter bubble effect invisible and that is what is happening within the community of interest. While constantly engaging with the sources, none of it is done effectively. Any details and narratives from the opposing sources are handpicked, reappropriated and then channeled to the audiences. All this is done within community that is certain that they are the ones breaking away from biased brainwashing norm-setting mainstream politics.

44 Now it is more clear why the community analysed has been associated with Russian Information Warfare. The community and its network/infrastructure within social media has become a platform to spread and popularise unconventional discourses that attempt to challenge and corrupt mainstream social/political/economical direction towards the model of western democracies, and therefore popularise the alternative — which happens to be a closer relationship with our neighbour in the East. While it is not the task of this work to attempt to prove that Russia’s military operations are directly or indirectly involved in the activities by these groups, I believe it is possible to discuss how these groups have become an essential platform and tool for contemporary Information Warfare.

While no claims can be made over the direct influence or relationship between the two, intuitively speaking it is possible to see how in this particular case, Russia gain from the existence of such groups and the beliefs they advocate. The lack of traceability of the relationship between grassroots online communities, their activity and official military warfare operations and strategies is probably the most significant danger when it comes to imagining such controversial communities becoming a platform for Information Warfare. While in some cases, such as with content published by RT or Sputnik, it is accurate to assume that the Russian government has approved and sponsored the message (Gallagher); in the case of social media pages, there usually are no direct links that could prove such substantial connections. It is not only difficult to make a clear distinction of whether certain social media activities and the content they produce are organically generated or whether it is part of Information Warfare aimed to affect general public opinion and atmosphere, but it could also be dangerous and inaccurate to make these assumptions. This is due to the power of social media content by default being seen as organic and sincere. Naturally, the opinions and voices heard from the citizens of the country is considered more valid and more worth taking into account than those that are known to be influenced by some third party and useful for the outside power. Making a voice heard and identified as part of the democratic debate could become a dangerous tool for those attempting to influence and interfere, and social media sites and grassroots activism provides a perfect platform for such activity, which has become commonly known as astroturfing. Some pages within the sample, while championing the narratives that are in favour of Kremlin actions, policies or other ideas supported by Kremlin-associated media, are denying any relation to or control by the Kremlin (Appendix 1, row Lietuvos Mėšlasaugos Klanas), and as seen in the Facebook Page Likes Network (Fig. 2), there are no direct links between the 45 overall network and the Kremlin-funded news sites (Baltnews, Sputnik and Rubaltic.ru). It is indeed understandable why it would be useful for this kind of network to deny and hide any relations and influence from any third party, as it would make the community and its activities appear organic. If Russia’s intentions and messages are communicated by local communities, they cannot be labeled as propaganda and therefore discredited or ignored without undermining democratic principles.

Through the obfuscation of any distinction between these groups’ voices being organic activity or platform for propaganda, social media enables more efficient ways to spread and popularise narratives that are part of Information Warfare strategies. While in this way the amount of direct top-down influence that an authority in conventional understanding of propaganda would have over the network is restricted, there are other means to weaponise such activities. When evaluating the role of such grassroots social-media native communities as platforms for warfare, questions arise whether it is possible to gain from this grassroots movement without direct managerial involvement. Similar questions and discussion have been visible in the west, in relation to the complicated relationship between US President Donald Trump, his official campaign and highly controversial far-right groups. As experts claim that ‘Trump is energising hate groups’ (Schreckinger) or ‘Trump has galvanised the otherwise marginal world of avowed White nationalists’ (Confessore), while the groups themselves state that they memed Donald Trump into office, it does appear that each side gained through such indirect allegiance. Can the same be applied to the case of Russian Information Warfare and the controversial grassroots communities resisting the west and rooting for Russia? As seen in the findings, despite no visible infrastructural connection between the community researched and the Kremlin-funded news and information sources, a huge amount of content circulated among the network is actually produced by these exact sources. Rubaltic.ru, Baltnews.lt and ekspertai.eu as previously discussed — all known to officials as being ‘cogs in Kremlin’s baltic disinformation machine’ (Springe) — are also the main information and news sources for the overall community. By becoming the de facto information source, the relationship, while not direct, is in a way solidified as those behind the news sites (which is the Kremlin’s intentional agenda) set narratives, ideas, problems for the rest of the community. I am not trying to speculate on suggesting that all this intentional conscious warfare strategies that this network is, but rather show how through social media communities and discourses generate new gates and ways to influence and affect societies within which it is generated. 46 Propaganda 2.0.

In relation to the many characteristics of the Information Warfare operations traced throughout my research and analysed in the previous sections, I would like to return and discuss the concept of propaganda and its use within western society. The contemporary conventional understanding of propaganda is closely linked to the way it has been encountered, practiced and conceptualised during 20th century military operations and the Cold War in particular. It is then that the democratic multi-media surround (and the Internet as the ultimate progression of it) has been largely propagated as the fundamental opposite to authoritarian propaganda. The new communication technologies predicted by McLuhan in his imagined Global Village were supposed to represent a new libertarian mode of governance which would prevent horrors and injustice caused by authoritarian regimes. According to this scenario, propaganda was a totalitarian attempt to impose strategic narratives and ideologies to various populations. Propaganda was, and still is today, understood as any message or media product that is initiated by those in power with a goal to inject and popularise their agendas to the general masses through the means of media.

In the case of the pages researched and their alleged connections to Russian Information Warfare, none of these characteristics fully apply, or at least are impossible to pinpoint and prove. As mentioned, there is rarely a singular narrative that is intended to be shared, and this contemporary case rather aims to spread confusion and mistrust. However these social media groups are spreading rebellious anti-authority and anti-establishment atmospheres, challenging the confidence and stability of mainstream politics, complicating the comfort of progressive liberal morality, all the while highly relying on the discourses and narratives supplied by the Russian Information mechanism. It is indeed different from the history textbook example of propaganda. However, the default assumption that the practices observed and discussed are fundamentally different from propaganda due to the possibility of them partly consisting of organic emancipatory social media activity only harms our chances to make sense of events happening today. This conventional understanding of propaganda (in terms of its use during the 20th century) does not allow society to fully engage with new Information Warfare. Even further, such understanding of propaganda not only limits our ways to effectively evaluate and respond to the contemporary Information Warfare, but also can be deliberately weaponised. As seen through 47 the findings, any attempts (grassroot or political/official) to call out any suspicious activities as being strategically sponsored and organised (essentially naming it propaganda) is mocked or treated as provocation/aggression in itself. The mockery element could be seen through the memetic joke ‘Russians are attacking’ (Appendix 2) where any suspicion of organised warfare from Russia to Lithuania is showed as irrational paranoia. On the other hand, the accusations over ‘spread of propaganda’ could be countered by the groups accused as being aggression and provocation especially in terms of attack on the humanitarian narratives such as anti-facism, human rights or anti-russophobia (which we know the community researched is vocal about). Any critique towards the content and concerns of these groups can be framed as anti-democratic, fascist and attempting to preserve the status quo.

I therefore believe that such weaponization and advantage taken from the normalised, prevailing trust in the democratic, impartial nature of social media warrants a revisitation and reconceptualisation of notions such as propaganda or Information Warfare. While there are various attempts by the general public, nations and other bodies to engage with various Information Warfare operations (as discussed within the literature review), many of these efforts are complicated by confusion and lack of certainty in defining propaganda or Information Warfare. It is more common to suggest that while today’s Information Warfare is highly influenced by 20th century propaganda strategies and built on experiences gained, it is currently far more complex and should not be put under the same umbrella term of propaganda. However, the term has far too much semantic weight and utility to be wilfully confined to a relic of the 20th century. The term propaganda should be revisited rather than replaced (with ‘Information Warfare’ for example) and forgotten because it still continues to imply something sinister and has other pejorative associations (Cull, Culbert and Welch). A new conceptualisation of propaganda is necessary to make it possible to problematize the dangers of these various social media activities and to engage and respond to cases of the operation of contemporary Information Warfare.

Interestingly, those most actively labelling (or at least trying to label) the network researched and its content as propaganda were grassroots organised groups. As mentioned in the findings section, a few Facebook pages have been actively observing and engaging with the controversial pro-Kremlin pages, mostly by identifying the content that can be considered propagandist and encouraging people to counter them by blocking it as extremist and inappropriate content. These 48 groups are rather vocal in using words such as propaganda or even accusing those participating in these pages of being ‘Kremlin paid agents’ (‘Raudonojo meškiuko pėdsakais/Tracking red teddy bear footsteps’). At the grassroots level, the engagement between these two groups is usually quite simplistic, predictable and its overall effects are hard to evaluate. It usually follows the logic of the pages analysed in my research being accused of working for the Kremlin and spreading Russian propaganda, and then responding by calling out counter-groups for being paranoid fascists spreading US propaganda. Such an exchange of insults and accusations between the two sides of the spectrum, usually followed by attempts to report each other’s content for being extremist is not necessarily efficient as both camps conduct the exact same practice of ‘brigading’, and might just add to and accelerate the existing polarisation. However, these grassroots civilian groups that attempt to expose propaganda and misinformation in their surroundings do something that has not been done by technological companies nor the nation states dealing with the same cases — they popularise the very idea that propaganda can be spread easily through social media and they prevent controversial topics being normalised within our mediascape without notice. While not necessarily always doing objective, organised work, these grassroots counter-propaganda campaigns and pages are popularising the discourse of Information Warfare, and simply labelling various suspicious activities as propaganda is drawing attention to the existing conflicts within our mediascape and dangerous radicalising narratives among us. Despite these notable attempts, it is questionable whether it will ever be enough to counter well-funded and experienced information operations organised by the experts in their fields. More substantial actions however from the side of nations and public organisations in relation to these groups are needed.

Unfortunately there are many more complications with official bodies accusing something as being propaganda and therefore obstacles with actively dealing with such complicated networks that are growing and spreading within social media. Despite this, the issues and dangers are real and cannot be denied or ignored. The reconceptualisation of propaganda would in no way work as a new guideline for political action, but rather encourage to engage with this issue and situate the dangers of social media among us. We therefore need a reconceptualisation and a new take on propaganda that would be more suitable for the 21st century Information Warfare operations taking place within web 2.0 communities — Propaganda 2.0 — the introduction of such a notion would empower the masses to perceive new dangers within their social mediascapes and allow nationstates to ensure the discourse on these issues is communicated and dealt with. 49

So what’s next?

I have spent the most part of my work listing and explaining the difficulties of countering and dealing with the issues discussed and criticising the current actions taken, whether it is by the groups organised via social media or official bodies such as the European Union. How should our society proceed in the face of this somewhat new danger? The research conducted and the analysis of the findings not only suggest the nature of the issue but also point to possible ways to engage and tackle it. While my interest and expertise is mostly within the case of Russian Information Warfare and its operations in Lithuania, I believe a more general understanding of the issue could be drawn from the findings of the research. Many of my arguments could be applied to any other case that is dealing with the appropriation of democratic emancipatory communication platforms and their affordance by turning the organic civil participation into tools that spread polarisation and chaos within societies worldwide.

So as explained in detail in the previous section, I believe the terminology used to talk about these new dangers needs to be revisited in order to create a more unified general discourse and dialogue on the exact threats within the social media sphere. This renewed vocabulary would clarify the overall communication and empower people as well as those in power to deal appropriately with the cases of exploitation of the social media sphere.

As an overhaul of the overall discourse cannot be introduced in a day, meanwhile other actions need to be taken. The most widely discussed strategy in response to misinformation has been fact-checking and raising awareness of the spread of misinformation. This is exactly what has been done by the East StratCom task force and other similar organisations. However, concerns are raised that simple fact-checking is not an efficient counter-strategy, mostly due to the huge amount of content produced through multiple channels targeting various audiences across the globe which makes it impossible to respond to each specific post or article that contains misinformation. While there are huge amounts of content produced that need to be confronted, my research shows that most of it is based on specific key narratives, rhetorics or sentiments (for example, mocking the fears of Russia’s attack or advocating for anti-pedophilia are re-emerging themes within Information Warfare in Lithuania). Rather than putting effort into countering specific cases, various agencies need to work to understand these themes carrying the overall 50 Information Operations within different cultural contexts or locations and to provide adequate counter-narratives. While social media giants such as Facebook finally acknowledge how their platform can be exploited for coordinated offences and has taken initiative in dealing with spread of misinformation and ‘false amplification’ by introducing a ‘disputed’ label or improving recognition of inauthentic accounts (Gallagher), it is still not clear how successful these steps are in dealing with such pluralistic micro-organisations and the tendency of this warfare to adapt and respond to different contexts. The content, the form of messages and the way discourses are narrated depends on the target audience and the importance of these narratives should not be excluded from making sense of the contemporary Information Warfare. Local efforts need to be made to identify these content specific narratives that underlie the overall production of the rest of the content and find ways to supply and communicate them to the audiences that are targeted by Information Warfare strategies.

A worthy example could be a recent initiative by a Lithuanian crowed-funded TV channel Laisves TV. As mistreatment and xenophobia towards Russian ethnic minorities in Lithuania has been one of the key narratives on which Russia’s Information Warfare has been operating, the channel has started producing an online political satirical talk show Держитесь там (Hold on, there!) in Russian language and for Russian speaking audiences. The show is produced by the same team producing the most popular Lithuanian political satire show of the same name (in Lithuanian). While the show has received a lot of support and encouragement from local and foreign Russian speaking communities, the creators have publicly expressed their concerns over the fact that they have been losing their advertising revenue due to huge amounts of viewers marking it as extremist or inappropriate content. The show however has never intended to be extremist or radical and works on the basis of supplying entertaining and intelligent political coverage for local communities of ethnic minorities. Could it be that an attempt to start a friendly political discourse between Lithuanian mainstream politics and Russian ethnic minorities by discussing the narratives that before have been covered only by the Kremlin-initiated network is a threat for Information Warfare Strategies? That would be a question for future work, but it does encourage us to think about more productive ways to counter Propaganda 2.0.

51 Conclusion

During my research I spent a large amount of time following, familiarising with and trying to understand a set of Facebook pages in the Lithuanian media-sphere that are perceived by the general public as being part of the pro-Kremlin propaganda machine. Through close analysis of this phenomenal community, I aimed to situate the network of these groups in relation to the concept of Information Warfare and see how it is new social media communication practices that have enabled this hard-to-define or categorise activity, which is increasingly problematising the neutrality and democratic aspects of our society.

Findings show a few essential features of the community researched that facilitate a better understanding of the role of such communities in contemporary Information Warfare operations. First of all, a set of specific narratives was found to be circulated among the pages analysed. The most significant theme binding the community was a harsh resistance to western democratic powers: their politics, values and influence over the region. A strong dissatisfaction and criticism towards Lithuania, its mainstream politicians, media and quality of life were also vocally expressed. These narratives are supported by analytical criticism, attempts to demoralise the opponents, to question their expertise and trustworthiness or simply to mock or expose. While rhetoric directly supporting and admiring Putin, the Kremlin’s policies or Russia’s influence in the region was less common (while still evident in a number of pages), the main underlying discourse energising the community (attempt to challenge the west, and Lithuania’s direction towards becoming part of it) is clearly compatible with seeing a turn towards Russia and the Kremlin as an alternative for Lithuania. Social media not only allows narratives that would be excluded from the mainstream social political discourses to be shared, but it enables individuals and citizens to mobilise around these narratives and create communities and networks based on it. Such an organically organised community becomes a platform not only for those sharing the narrative to come together, but becomes a voice for the discourse that it represents. The findings also suggest how through social media the same narratives can be presented among different sub- communities. The network visualisation shows how the pages analysed can be surrounded by political, information/news, humanitarian or humanistic sub-communities. Despite different intentions of each page, they all spread and represent the same ideological message. Social media in this way allows a subtle exportation of the narratives and discourses as well as the normalisation of some, especially when it is supplied in terms of humour or satire. Another 52 ability that social media provided for this unpopular voice is its real-time reaction to any events happening within mainstream politics, in this way constantly appropriating narratives, responding to them with an alternative take — constantly carving its own reality. Finally, it is because of social media's emancipatory, democratic image that the community members are falsely empowered by their own discourse. While these guerrilla groups are criticising the stupidity of those trusting in mainstream politics and media propaganda, the community itself is exposed to the same repetitive narratives backed by questionable sources.

While these groups operate as organically mobilised communities and do not have any direct visible linkage with the strategies of the Kremlin’s propaganda network, it does not mean it should not be considered part of contemporary Information Warfare. The network analysed is not only a vocal supporter of the discourses that are in the interest of Russia, but findings show that they are popularising its intended agenda. Content traffic and shared domains comparison shows that significant amounts of circulated information and sources are coming from news sites that are owned or funded by Russian officials. The network therefore, in its own language and words, communicates the agenda approved by those strategizing Information Warfare operations, which makes it an essential part of contemporary Information Warfare. The grassroots character by default assigned to these communities, due to their social media origins, not only complicates the traceability of these practices within organised warfare but also makes the voices and concerns more substantial and valuable. The opinions coming from civilians have to be taken into account if one is to claim to exist under democratic modes of governance. Furthermore, through such natural organisation enabled by social media, the content is produced and narratives reproduced without the expenditure necessary in traditional top-down authoritarian propaganda. We see that the network analysed was able to flourish as a perfect platform and tool for Information Warfare due to the social environment and assumptions enabled by social media. Despite how problematic and important such activity is, it is still uncommon to associate networks like these with the label of propaganda or warfare. In west Information Warfare and propaganda are still commonly imagined in terms of direct top-down military operations, where the content is carefully designed and produced by malicious actors and foreign political forces. In this sense operations can be categorised as propaganda only if there exist evidence or proof linking specific informational content and the warfare operations and strategies. And while part of this image is still probably true, this narrow understanding of propaganda allows for new ways and strategies to flourish and reinvent. The community analysed and its main features do not match the 53 textbook example of propaganda or warfare strategies, but contemporary Information Warfare operates through new means such energisation and support of organically formed communities. The difficulty of arguing that such a community is problematic due to lack of direct evidence of being part of Russian information warfare is a huge issue. While any official claims can backfire as speculative, unjustified, groundless accusations, the grassroots attempt to confront such groups is usually met by similar brigading, mocking people for paranoia or calling them fascists. The ignorance of how such communities become a platform for Information Warfare is dangerous as it allows influence to grow and spread. I believe that the first step in situating the issue is by realising that social media can be successfully weaponized as a tool for Information Warfare and that the 20th century image of propaganda is not sufficient to explain the nuances of information operations in the 21st century. It is not only grassroots communities that should be taking the step forward and confronting these communities by calling them propaganda, but officials and academics need to revisit the term and apply its pejorative associations to accommodate the dangers of 21st century strategies.

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60 Appendix 1

The list and descriptions of the Facebook pages researched

61 name translated name link facebook id about translated about section likes language links to external pages

https://www.facebook.com/Laisvas- Laisvas Laikraštis Free Newspaper Laikra%C5%A1tis-463773110455370/? 463773110455370 Objektyvių naujienų laikrašris Objective News Website 1457 Lithuanian http://www.laisvaslaikrastis.lt/ ref=py_c Kviečiame jungtis visus neabejojančius mūsų žiniasklaidos šališkumu ir propagandos skleidimu.135 straipsnis - Lietuvos Respublikoje karo propaganda draudžiama.

"Propaganda – tai bendravimo forma, kurios tikslas, pateikiant šališkus argumentus, daryti įtaką bendruomenės požiūriui arba pozicijai. Propaganda We welcome everyone who has no doubt about how our media is subjective and spreads propaganda. ‘Propaganda - is a form of paprastai yra kartojama ir paskleidžiama įvairiomis formomis, siekiant sukurti norimą auditorijos požiūrį..." communication, which goals to influence community’s viewpoint and position, by providing subjective arguments…’ the idea of this website was Lietuvos žiniasklaida Lithuanian media is https://www.facebook.com/ 754023391333997 born because of obvious spread of propaganda from the mainstream Lithuanian news sites. It’s not a secret that in Lithuania there exist ‘anti- 1247 Lithuanian - skleidžia propagandą spreading propaganda ziniasklaidapropaganda/?ref=py_c Puslapio idėja kilo dėl akivaizdaus mūsų pagrindinių lietuviškų naujienų šaltinių propagandos brukimo piliečiams. Niekam nepaslaptis, kad lietuvoje Russian’ or ‘Pro-Western’ atmosphere, which in many cases becomes a paranoid propaganda and a tool for personal interests. We want to be tvyro 'antirusiškos' arba 'provakarietiškos' nuotaikos, kurios neretai virsta į paranojišką propagandą, bei asmeninių interesų įgyvendinimo ar objective so in this page we will post subjective news from DELFI, 15MIN, LRYTAS and other. We invite you to do the same. problemų užglaistymo įrankiu.

Norime likti objektyvūs, todėl šiame puslapyje talpinsime DELFI, 15MIN, LRYTAS ir kitų lietuviškų portalų šališkas naujienas. Kviečiame tai daryti ir jus.

PAKILKIT, ŽMONĖS PAVERGTIEJI! Niekam ne paslaptis, kad paprastam žmogui gyvenimas Lietuvoje - blogas. Jei būtų kitaip, nematytume masinės emigracijos, kuri, šalį palikus kone 1 mln. žmonių, gali būti įvardijama kaip lėtai, bet užtikrintai 25-erius metus vykdomas EKONOMINIS LIETUVIŲ TAUTOS GENOCIDAS. Kas RISE, PEOPLE WHO ARE ENSLAVED! It’s not a secret, that the life of an ordinary ketverius metus - rinkimai; perstumdomos vyriausybinės kėdės, apsikeičia vietomis "pozicija" su "opozicija", bet, nepaisant gražiai skambančių person in Lithuania is bad. If it wasn’t a case, we wouldn't see mass-scale emigration, which when country is left by nearly 1 million. people can pažadų, jokių liaudžiai naudingų permainų nematyti. Paprasti žmonės tik labiau skursta, o saujelė oligarchų ir bankininkų lobsta iš svetimo kraujo ir be called as slow, but certain 25 years lasting ECONOMIC GENOCIDE OF LITHUANIANS. Every 4 years we have election; parliament chairs prakaito. Gyvenimas nyksta, klesti išnaudojimas, korupcija ir neteisybė, galvas kelia neofašistai, homoseksualistai, pedofilai bei kitokie "teisių" are reshuffled, position and opposition swap places, but despite nice promises, there are no changes. Ordinary people are getting poorer, and reikalaujantys iškrypėliai. Visas valstybės aparatas, visa teisinė ir politinė sistema, visos "tradicinės" politinės partijo - buržujų kapitalistų rankose Socialistinis Liaudies Socialist people’s front https://www.facebook.com/SLFLietuva/? bunch of oligarchs and bank people are getting richer from others blood and sweat. Life is dying, exploitation, corruption and injustice is 922979904405071 esantis ginklas jų kovoje prieš darbo žmones, siekiant iš jų plėšti, juos išnaudoti ir žeminti. Joks vyriausybinių kėdžių perstumdymas šito nepakeitė ir 667 Lithuanian - frontas politinė partija political party hc_ref=PAGES_TIMELINE booming, there are more neofascists, homosexuals pedofiles and others perverts who want more ‘rights’. The whole legal and political system, negali pakeisti, nes šito priežastis - ne kuri nors atskira vyriausybė, o KAPITALISTINĖ SANTVARKA, kuri būtinai remiasi svetimo darbo išnaudojimu, the whole ‘traditional’ political parties - is the weapon of capitalists against the work people, which seeks to steal from them, exploit them and to spekuliacija, plėšikavimu ir apgavyste. Sakykime atvirai - tikros valstybės neturime - turime tik Vakarų kapitalo koloniją. Kraštą, kurį įtakos zonomis humiliate them. There is not reshuffling of parliament chairs that can change this, because the reason for this is not any specific government, dalijasi godūs klanai. Būtent ši santvarka ir ja grindžiamas oligarchų klasės viešpatavimas yra pagrindinė Lietuvos negandų - masinės emigracijos, but CAPITALISM. Only by participating in unions, but without raising questions about elimination of capitalist order, we won’t achieve anything; nedarbo, skurdo, kapitalistų ir bankininkų savivalės, moralinio ir kultūrinio nuosmukio - priežastis. Eidami iš vien su sisteminėmis partijomis mes, but if we create SOCIALIST ORDER, we will stop banishment of Lithuanian people to west and we will eliminate exploitation. Lietuvos darbo žmonės, negausime nieko, tik pažeminimą, apgaulę ir išnaudojimą. Vien tik dalyvaudami profsąjungose, bet nekeldami kapitalistinės santvarkos panaikinimo klausimo, mes nieko nepasieksime; o jei sukursime SOCIALISTINĘ SANTVARKĄ, tai sustabdysime Lietuvos žmonių išvarymą į vakarus, panaikinsime išnaudojimą ir oligarchų savivalę

https://www.facebook.com/baltnewslt/? Информационно-аналитический портал BALTNEWS.lt начал работу 1 октября. Инициатива его создания принадлежит группе литовских Baltnews.lt Baltnews.lt 749591908443941 6577 Russian http://www.baltnews.lt/ ref=py_c журналистов. // Informacinis analitinis portals BaltNews.lt pradėjo dirbti spalio 1 d. Jo sukurimo iniciatyva priklauso Lietuvos zurnalistu grupei

Sputnik Lietuva: Sputnik Lithuania: baltic https://www.facebook.com/SputnikLietuva/? 1744289579224 - - 249 Lithuanian http://sputniknews.lt/ baltijos naujienos news ref=py_c 877

Analitinis portalas Baltijos regione. Svertinis ir laiku analizė sudėtingų, kartais prieštaringo mišinio politinių, socialinių ir ekonominių, istorinių ir A balanced and timely analysis of the complex, sometimes contradictory combination of political, socio-economic, historical and cultural factors RyBaltic.Ru RyBaltic.Ru https://www.facebook.com/rubaltic/?ref=py_c 361996777230933 kultūrinių veiksnių Baltijos regiono šalių plėtrai skirtas suteikti skaitytojui susidaryti aiškų vaizdą apie įvykius ir prisidėti prie geros kaimynystės in the development of the countries of the Baltic region. It intends to give the reader a clear picture of the events and promote the development 12739 Russian http://rubaltic.ru/ santykių tarp šalių plėtrai. of good-neighborly relations between countries.

JUNGTINĖS KARALYSTĖS LIETUVIŲ BENDRUOMENĖ - TINKLAS visus Lietuvius ir Lietuviškas grupes vienijanti facebook'o grupė Jungtinėje Karalystėje.

Ši paskyra ir yra atvira visiems JUNGTINĖS KARALYSTĖS LIETUVIAMS, nepriklausomai nuo pažiūrų ir siekių, taipogi nepriklausoma nuo LR LITHUANIAN COMMUNITY IN UNITED KINGDOM - NETWORK. Facebook page uniting all Lithuanians and Lithuanian groups at Untied Jungtines Karalystes Lithuanian Community URM'O. Kingdom. This page is opened for all LITHUANIANS AT UNITED KINGDOM, independently from their viewpoints and aims, also it’s https://www.facebook.com/JKLBTINKLAS? Lietuviu Bendruomene in the United Kingdom 135250203185702 independent from LR URM’O. This groups also does not belong to the closed corporations LITHUANIAN ASSOCIATION UK LTD, which claims 3301 Lithuanian http://www.tinklas.co.uk/ ref=stream Tinklas Net Ši grupė taipogi nepriklauso uždarai akcinei bendrovei LITHUANIAN ASSOCIATION UK LTD, kuri save deklaruoja kaip JUNGTINĖS KARALYSTĖS to be LITHUANIAN COMMUNITY IN UNTIED KINGDOM, even though has no moral or juridical base for that. This page is administrated by LIETUVIŲ BENDRUOMENĖ, nors tam neturi jokio moralinio ir juridinio pagrindo. Britain’s Lithuanian News Site ‘TINKLAS’

Grupės administratorius - Britanijos Lietuvių Žiniasklaidos Tarnyba "TINKLAS".

https://www.facebook.com/ekspertai.tv/? EKSPERTAI.EU EKSPERTAI.EU 202086296515497 Naujienos trumpai, Politika, Antimafija, Kultūra, Užsienis, Video, IT žinios Short news, Politics, Anti-Mafia, Culture, Foreign news, Video, IT news 2395 Lithuanian http://www.ekspertai.eu/ ref=py_c

https://www.facebook.com/naujojilietuva/? 1623963967819 Swearwords are automatically filtered and deleted. Images and hyperlinks are deleted. We welcome discussion. deli is for Stupid people. https://www.youtube.com/ Lietuviai Lithuanians Keiskmažodžiai automatiškai filtruojami ir trinami. Paveiksliukai ir hypernuorodos trinamos. Diskusija sveikintina. Daunams - Delfis. Sveiki atvykę! :D 11921 Lithuanian ref=py_c 277 Welcome! :D BitprintLtd

https://www.facebook.com/ Tautos Balsas Nation’s voice 344641525723821 - - 1654 Lithuanian Gediminas Juskevicius gediminas.juskevicius.5/ https://www.facebook.com/Lietuvis- Lietuvis idiotas Lithuanian Idiot idiotas-809010865804656/? 809010865804656 - - 80 Lithuanian http://natribu.org/ fref=pb&hc_location=profile_browser

Būk Lietuvis,Kovok UŽ Be Lithuanian, Fight for https://www.facebook.com/ Šis puslapis yra skirtas pasidalinti informacija,kuri palaiko Neringą Venckienę,Mergaitę, partiją "Drąsos Kelias",bei kitas antisistemines partijas ir This page is here to share information, which supports Neringa Venckiene, the girls, party ‘drasos Kelis’, and other anti-system parties and http://www.ustream.tv/ 313137132113790 4014 Lithuanian Lietuvą Lithuania NestovekPoMedziu/ judėjimus.http://www.ustream.tv/channel/nestovekpomedziu movements channel/nestovekpomedziu

Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucijos 25 str. : "Žmogus turi teisę turėti savo įsitikinimus ir juos laisvai reikšti. Republic of Lithuania Constitution article 25: ‘Person has a right to have their beliefs and to express them. Person should not be prevented Top 10 propagandos Top 10 propaganda https://www.facebook.com/propagandaLT/ 136391149759190 Žmogui neturi būti kliudoma ieškoti, gauti ir skleisti informaciją bei idėjas" from looking for, getting and spreading information and ideas’. [This page gives] overview of propaganda spread by TV and other mainstream 32785 Lithuanian - klaidu mistakes media… We invite all citizens to mobilise into non-violent groups of resistance Televizijos ir media propagandos apžvalga... Kviečiame tautiečius burtis į nesmurtinio pasipriešinimo grupes

https://www.facebook.com/ http://revoliucija.org/ don’t Kova A Fight 574371032637748 Revoliucinės minties portalas. Page for revolutionary thoughts 1195 Lithuanian Kova-574371032637748/ check some weird scam

Serious anecdotes, Rimti anekdotai,be https://www.facebook.com/rimtibecenzuros/? Do you want daily dose of good humour? You re at the right place! :) You will definitely prolong your life here with a dose of good humour :)) without censorship… 132138236820031 Nori geros humoro dozės? Tu pataikei būtent čia!:) Čia tikrai prailginsi savo gyvenimą gera juoko doze:)) Spausk "Patinka" ir Tu jau su mumis! :) 176767 Lithuanian - cenzuros...ir ne tik...:)))) fref=ts Click ‘like’ and you are onboard! :) and more…:))))

62 https://www.facebook.com/ versijos versions 251363748234147 Kitokios naujienos Different news 2474 Lithuanian http://versijos.lt/ versijos-251363748234147/ Truth is told by a person, who don’t get any money from anywhere, who is not sponsored by anyone and who write because he/she believes in Nesisteminė https://www.facebook.com/ Tiesą rašo tik tas, kuris negauna jokių pinigų iš niekur, niekas jo neremia, ir jis rašo iš idėjos kuria tiki. Jis tiki, kad kada nors geris nugalės blogį. unsystematic media 177155895669721 their ideas. This person beliefs, that one day good will win agains evil. these people are idealists and only because of these people that the 7206 Lithuanian - žiniasklaida nesistemineszinios/ Tokie žmonės yra idealistai, ir tik ant tokių laikosi pasaulis... world still goes on.

http://infa.lt/ https:// https://www.facebook.com/infa.alternatyva/? When seeing how the main MIPspread disinformation, we just thought, that there must be a counterweight for that. That’s why we chose to be Infa Infa 461846317306134 Matant didžiųjų MIP teikiamą dez-info tiesiog pamanėme, jog jai būtina atsvara. Todėl pasirinkome būti infa - info alternatyva. 2190 Lithuanian www.facebook.com/groups/ fref=pb&hc_location=profile_browser infa - information alternative pilietines.santarves.forumas/

Žinios ir naujienos Produktai https://www.facebook.com/LDiena.LT/? LDiena.lt LDiena.lt 565061660262331 Smegenų ploviklis News, Products, Washing liquid for brains, noddles on ears, bag of fog. 830 Lithuanian http://ldiena.lt/ fref=pb&hc_location=profile_browser Makaronai ant ausų Miglos maišas

https://www.facebook.com/KomentarasLT/? Karštas komentaras Hot Comment 519494588077774 Naujienų portalas norintiems žinoti kas vyksta,o ne kas atsitiko... news site for those who want to know what is happening and not what happened 15016 Lithuanian http://www.komentaras.lt/ fref=pb&hc_location=profile_browser

https://www.facebook.com/ relevant information collected into one place from the main Lithuanian websites. the readers can suggest their information sources - we will add Lietuvos informacija Lithuania’s information lietuvos.Informacija/? 895110863928798 Aktualiausia informacija surinkta į vieną vietą iš pagrindinių Lietuvos tinklapių. Skaitytojai galite siūlyti savo info šaltinius - mes pridėsime į srautą. 1806 Lithuanian - them to the stream. hc_ref=PAGES_TIMELINE&fref=nf https://www.facebook.com/Lietuvos- Lietuvos Mėšlasaugos Lithuania’s dung- Klano veikla Lietuvoke. Lietuvoje teisingumas baigiasi tada, kai prasideda teismas. Maskvai ir KREMLIUI nedirbame, kas tiap supranta, prašom ten the activities of the clan in Lithuania. In Lithuania justice ends when court trial starts. We don't work for Moscow and Kremlin, who understand it M%C4%97%C5%A1lasaugos- 485343434824791 14143 Lithuanian - Klanas security Clan* kreiptis. like this, we recommend to contact there. Klanas-485343434824791/

Vyru ne gimstama o One is not born a man, https://www.facebook.com/buk.vyras/? Žinome, kad mūsų visuomenė gimdo daugybę berniukų, Lithuanian 439559779429141 We know that our society give birth to many boys, but unfortunately, do not grow many men 48438 - tampama but become ref=page_internal tačiau, deja,išaugina visai mažai vyrų... /Russian

We are for litas in https://www.facebook.com/LitasLietuvai/? Mes už litą Lietuvoje 127938097381342 Ne euro Lietuvoje No to euro in Lithuania 3711 Lithuanian - Lithuania fref=pb&hc_location=profile_browser

https://www.facebook.com/ Juvenalinė Juvenalinė transvesticija yra orientuota labiausiai į alternatyvių liberalių-nacionalsitinių-socialistinių pažoūrų jaunimą, bet kviečiami ir visokie Juvenaline transvesticija is oriented mostly towards youth with alternative liberal-nacionalist-socialist views, but we welcome and all kind of Juvenile Transvestition juvenalinetransvesticija/? 980960998623406 118 - transvesticija kosmonauttai bet kokio amžiaus ir genderio cosmonauts, any age or gender fref=pb&hc_location=profile_browser

https://www.facebook.com/Rusai- 1158125510935 [written in broken Lithuanian] hi my name is andrius i am soldier patriot from Lithuanian military my goal is to warn you about dangers from Lithuanian Rusai puola Russians are attacking Sveiki mano varids andrius as esu karis patrijotas is lietuvos karomines mano tikslas ira jusu puslapio perspeti apie rusijos kelema gresme 49 - puola-1158125510935787/?ref=py_c 787 russia (broken)

https://www.facebook.com/Labusai- Labusai rusofobai Labusai** Russophobics 231016600707184 218 Lithuanian - rusofobai-231016600707184/?ref=py_c

https://www.facebook.com/rezidentas/? Rezidentas Resident 422922611171683 Rezidentas - tai įdomios bei naudingos informacijos šaltinis kiekvienam esamam arba būsimam Anglijos imigrantui rezidentas - it is source of interesting and useful information for every current and future English immigrant 5784 Lithuanian - fref=pb&hc_location=profile_browser

https://www.facebook.com/ Lithuanian Globalizmas. istorija. Globalism. History. GlobalizmasIstorijaDabartisAteitis/? 257880650997810 507 , English, - Dabartis. Ateitis Present. Future "Begalės žmonių nekęs Naujos Pasaulio Tvarkos ir mirs bandydami pasipriešinti jai." H.G. Wells ,, The New World Order '' fref=pb&hc_location=profile_browser Russian

https:// Vyganto Klerto Vygantas Klertas’s https://www.facebook.com/vkelertas/? 554823814615892 - - 564 Lithuanian matricalietuvoje.wordpress.co informatyvus puslapis informative page ref=py_c m/

Lietuva - Eurazijos Lithuania - Euraasian https://www.facebook.com/Lietuva-Eurazijos- 1667105096887 Lithuanian - - 131 - kryptis direction kryptis-1667105096887978/ 978 /Russian

*a direct, literal translation of the name; such a word does not exist. **Labusas - a term used in Russia to refer to people from Baltic countries.

62 Appendix 2

Images and Memes from the pages researched illustrating the specificities of the narratives

64

anti-russophobia

‘Russians are attacking you? ‘Hello, national security!??? My ‘We will stop Russia’s aggression!’ ‘The whole world is Kremlin and all Everywhere you go you see Kremlin’s ‘What are you in for?’ ‘I posted on ‘The recent attacks by islam neighbour is watching Russian TV’ ‘Treatment of severe mental disorder’ the people in this world - its agents!’ hand? Some beatniks are spreading Facebook that I love Russia’ terrorists in Paris and other propaganda? Putin wants to occupy European cities perfectly shows Lithuania? DONT WORRY! Vilnius what a huge threat for Europe is Psychiatric hospital is ready to help Russia’ you’

anti-US/ anti-NATO

‘LOOK HERE IS THE ‘NATO in Lithuania - new jobs for ‘Prime Minister: we will need to AGGRESSOR…’ locals’ adjust to the new USA politics’

anti-EU

‘Just a comparison, nothing more…’ ‘Merlkel and immigrants’ ‘More than 10 thousand Germans ‘Where should we go for the went into streets to support holidays?’ Merkel’s candidacy’ 65 anti-Lithuanian government

‘Siberia 2020’ ‘What are you doing? You are ‘Trump, Russians are ‘If you think I should be put in ‘Parasites that have been surviving from stealing our money?!’ ‘Look! attacking me…’ jail res like and share’ Lithuanians hard work for over 26 years There are Kremlin’s agents Vytautas Landsbergis now and who don’t know what a real work among you!’ ‘It’s been 26 years is’ (Lithuanian conservative party) and it still works’

Contemporary Lithuania

‘We live in a country, where we feed ‘Lithuanians! Come back!’ ‘Lithuanian 2017’ ‘How the tax system works’ prisoners for free but not students…’

anti- mainstream media

66

‘Garbage for your body, Garbage for your mind’ Appendix 3

Page Likes Network graph

The size of the nodes represent betweenness centrality The colour detects different communities within the network

67 Baltnews.lt Baltnews.lv

Baltnews.ee

Labusai rusofobai

RuBaltic.Ru Vyrų Klubas Alfa Vyras - Sėkmingo vyro mąstymas

Vyru ne gimstama o tampama

Mes už litą Lietuvoje

Nacionalinis interesas

Lietuvos Nacionalinė Filharmonija Kūlgrinda Išgyvenimo ABC AJ+ Vocativ Lietuvos ŽEMEI reikia savanorių

Marius Jonaitis

Sputnik Latvija: Baltijas ziņas versijos

Latvia Today BenNews Simkin ТАСС Sputnik Lietuva: Baltijos naujienos Lietuvos informacija Политика Mega Tractors Wtf videos Sputnik Литва: новости Балтии lopas CashmoОлесь БузинаEsther - Сообщество the Wonder PigThe Independent Молния Military Power

EKSPERTAI.EU Bosh NKVD ShaltmiraThink TwiceНовости Первого канала КинопанорамаМилиция Infa valdziai,seimui ne!!! ЯEVOLUCIONA Lietuvos žiniasklaida skleidžia propagandą Kurier Wileński Anonymous Britain First HistoryScienza TimeВежливые di Confine Люди. Армия. Россия Martial Tribes - Martial Arts KGB KRESY.PL Europos sąjungos minusai ir pliusai Drąsos Keliu Я Путешественник faktai.lt LDiena.lt

Memes and Fans Partijos "DrąsosStop kelias" skalūninėms Vilniaus dujoms skyrius Lietuvoje Chevron Go Home Stop Vaccine Anonymous

Satanism

Satan's Temple Koncervatorius Respublika.lt Politinė partija ,,Drąsos kelias" Alytaus skyrius KGB Stodama į ES Lietuva pralošė viską

"Drąsos kelias" politinė partija Išminties Milijonierius Anonymous LT Oficialus politinės partijos "Drąsos kelias" profilis FB Top 10 propagandos klaidu Lietuvos Mėšlasaugos Klanas Pasilinksminkime Голодный вареник кушает вафли Lori Pyrstas Nesisteminė žiniasklaida Pacany.LT Alkas.lt Koldūnai Būk Lietuvis,Kovok UŽ Lietuvą Tautos Balsas

Ofisinis planktonas

Lodorius Partijos "Drąsos kelias" Kauno rajono skyrius Литва сyyка Смешная Laisvas Laikraštis Darbo Šėtonas Pragaro Valdovas STOP pedofilijai Lietuvoje! Jonavos rajono apylinkės teismas Bomžpakiai Finger CCCP

Блатной Pildyk UNILAD ArtŪr'as " Abonentas " Zuopis

Teisinė pagalba Suaugusiems Lietaus ašara В. B. Ватникас Prietaisas Annonymus Pabaltijoje Lietuvos Mentai ,prokurorai ir kiti teisesauginiai banditai Rimti anekdotai,be cenzuros...ir ne tik...:)))) Rimti anekdotai,be cenzuros ir ne tik - Mažoji Mergaitė Mašenka Street FX Motorsport & Graphics Alaus Brolija (LT) Lietuvos darbo birža ir savivaldybės - tiesa apie LR gyvenimą Владимир Путин Debilai.lt Modern Lithuanians Die Straftaten der BundesrepublikCarson Deutschland Lueders Rusai puola Lietuvių kalba yra labai graži Россия - Российская Федерация - Russia Kefyras Lil Shady Психиатрическая лечебница Aš myliu muziką Lietuvis idiotas Briedzio Kalnas Augink atsakingai Atostogos Pajūryje Vyganto Kelerto informatyvus puslapis Brolis Lietuvis XXL ЖЕСТЬ Balsas.lt Lietuva - Eurazijos kryptis S.A.R.S. World of Animals

Sia Magazin Mokslo Pasaulis The Ugly Face of Lithuania Attila Hildmann Three Letter Movement - Zed 1 ŠŪDAI Skoften.net isvyke.lt Lietuvos Mentai Justas Empresariales Aš myliu savo šeimą! Mokslo įdomybės Obuolys MattyBRaps FunTime Lietuvos Kedagalviai Jėzus Kristus Bedančiai Lithuanian Best Vines Lituanistai (iš miestelio)

Aš myliu savo mamą Alfa.lt Karštas komentaras Psichiatrijos ligoninė Linksmos ir idomios naujienos Režisierius Emilis Vėlyvis Dar pažiūrėsim! grozioguru.lt Šūdmaliai Nemokami renginiai YouTube Šiandien Sužinojau Rūkymui NE ! Tautininkų Sąjunga TV3 televizija Mes - Hamburgo Lietuviai linksmiau.net Demotyvacija.lt NusišypsokMyliu Madą Lietuviška muzika! Lietuvos dailės muziejus Горячий комментарий LIETUVOS NEATRASTOS VIETOS Lietuvos Respublikos Seimas Kubilistano Respublika Ryto suktinis Birmingham Lietuviai Nebūk besmegeniu Poilsis WolverhamptonPalangoje Lietuviai Gyvenk linksmiau Lietuva senose fotografijose Mamos receptai Nacionalinė Dailės GalerijaLietuvos nacionalinis dramos teatras ApieVestuves.lt Beatos Virtuvė MANO VIRTUVĖ Lietuviai Dakare 15min

We Are Change Pasaulio idomybes LOGIN Drasius Kedys Šiaurės Airijos Lietuviai Ramuneart Facebook DELFI.lt Kultūros ministerija MarozaiLithuania

Dalia Grybauskaitė WikiHackers News App Tiesa ir Mitai apie Mokesčius UK Europlius.com - inovatyvios žiniasklaidos portalas Globalizmas. Istorija. Dabartis. Ateitis Lietuviai NEMOKAMOS PDF KNYGOS!!! Join The Resistance - Universal Infomation Database -

Yra šalis

Norvegijos lietuvių bendruomenė Lietuvių Pasakos Draugystės Tiltas Baltic Way 25th anniversary commemoration Kita Lietuvos Emigrantų Partija Norvegijos Lietuviai Washington Post Cake World Bakery Nedelia.Lt Esti Lati Liti Noriu atostogu! Kaunas Stiliausidėjos.lt Jungtinės Karalystės Lietuvių Bendruomenė Tinklas Italijos Lietuvių Bendruomenė Romoje - Comunità Lituana a Roma, Italia Lietuva lrytas.lt Lithuanian language PLB - Pasaulio Lietuvių Bendruomenė Keliauju pigiai PLC Leidiniai Sukarinta vaikų vasaros skerdykla Sutanų nuo/dėmės KREPŠINIO ŠIRDIS Liberalai Užkalnio Skaitytojų Klubas Neformalai Lithuanian Girls Radijo stotis M-1 Lithuania

uklietuvis.com EC Lighthouse Kurk Lietuvai Patriotai.lt Oksfordo Lietuviai, Oxford Lithuanians anarchija.lt Pasaulio lietuvių jaunimo Kongresas Surrey lietuviai

Pasaulio lietuvių žinios Romuva - Lietuva Newcastle'o Lietuviu Forumas London Lietuviai Embassy of Lithuania in Washington, D.C. Romuva - Anglija Piratų Partija Tarp mūsų mergaičių Lietuviai Londone Raudonojo meškiuko pėdsakais / Tracking red teddy bear footsteps Skype BRITANIJOS LIETUVIŲ ŽINIASKLAIDOS TARNYBA TINKLAS LRT Lituanica Pasaulio lietuvių jaunimo susitikimas Lithuanian National Basketball Team Londono grietinėlė - skelbimų lenta Prancūzijos lietuvių jaunimo sąjunga Londono lietuvių šv. Kazimiero parapija

B'UK JKLJS - Jungtinės Karalystės Lietuvių Jaunimo Sąjunga Underground Pub Naujoji Kairė 95 / New Left 95 Dolce Vita by Laura Antifa Lietuva Lithuanian Chamber of Commerce in the UK - LCCUK Anglijos Noriu - Pirkti Parduoti Nuomuoti Anglijos Mamytės

Passport Journal Olympic Pavojų Lietuvai tendencijos Lietuvos Respublikos Ambasada Londone / Lithuanian Embassy in London

Juvenalinė transvesticija LKFL Anglija.lt Anime Lietuva Jazzu Marozai DarbasLondone.comlietuviai.co.uk Skullmanija UDUMBARA dvasinio ugdymo ir sveikatingumo centras Marozai.LtBrolis už brolį

Anglijos Lietuviai Marozai Londonietė Lietuvos Kentai ir Marozai Muchamorai Gayline Lietuvių Klinika Londone Marozai.eu Kinas be po(pco)rno ValstybinisKundalini Tautos Frontas Joga ir Dvasine Numerologija UK Smiles - lietuviškos odontologijos klinikos Kentai.lt Baltic Metal Videos Muchamorai.lt Rebyata.lt Lietuvių Krikščionių Bažnyčia Londone Respublikinė Vilniaus Psichiatrijos ligoninė Marozai Dvasinė Alternatyva We Can FFeel Antifa info LT AntakalnioDvasinis Lyderis psichiatrijos Karkė konsultacijų centras, Žolyno poliklinika Wacken Metal Battle Lietuva Dvasingų pažinčių tarnyba "Meilės Harmonija" MarozaiATA: Antireliginės Tolerancijos Anarchija Tolerantiško jaunimo asociacija Marozai MAROZAI.lt Master of Wisdom - The PLACE for Spirituality & Psychology Without the B.S. Anime Lietuva.Pilviškių marožaiMarozai.lt-Paskutinei.gaidziaiAnime lietuva Angliya - Britain's biggest Russian newspaper Muchamorai.lt Marozai.lt Xujne Lituanica Kūrybinio, dvasinioMarozai ugdymo klubasDvasinio šeimai augimo,"Gyvenimo gydymo sodai" ir kelionių draugija Marozai.LT Marozai LYSA Lietuvos neformalai Muchamorai Devės marozai Ramūnas Bartulis LGBT Balsas Marozai.Lt Dvasingi Filmai Sielai Įkvepiantys pokalbiai su Evelina Dvasinis Kardas Blink 182 Lietuva BrahmaMarozai.LT Kumaris Pasaulinis Dvasinis Universitetas.Vilnius GayLine.lt Dvasinės ir fizinės gerovės centras-tradicinė kūno priežiūra

Dvasinis Pažinimas Dvasinio Tobulėjimo Blogas

VU MF Vaikų ir paauglių psichiatrijos SMVT

LSMU SMD Psichiatrijos būrelis

VU MF SMVT Psichiatrija

Kova

Jonas Biliūnas Zigmas Angarietis

So Pa Ho Chi Minh STOP iškrypėlių paradams

Mao Kim Il-sung Янонис, Юлюс Communist Party of LithuaniaCommunist Party of Greece Motiejus Šumauskas

Socialistinis Liaudies Frontas politinė partija Antanas Sniečkus Joseph Stalin Lenin Felix Dzerzhinsky Left-wing nationalism Vincas Mickevičius-Kapsukas Che GuevaraAntanas Mackevičius

Rezidentas Appendix 4

The content traffic diagram: the amount of content shared between the pages

69 Lithuanian Community in the UK Net RuBaltic.Ru EKSPERTAI.EU Lithuanians Nation’s Voice Baltnews.lt

Lithuanian Idiot Socialist People’s Front political party

Be a Lithuanian, Fight for Lithuania! Lithuanian media is spreading propaganda A Fight

Free Newspaper Top 10 propaganda mistakes

Sputnik Lithuania: baltic news Serious anecdotes, without censorship…and more… :))))

Lithuania - Eurasien direction versions

Vyganto Klerto informative page

Unsystematic media

Globalism. History. Present. Future.

Infa

Resident

LDiena.lt 1-2 Labusai rusofobai 3-10 Hot Comment 11-20 Russians are attacking Lithuania’s information >20 Juvenile We are for litas in One is not born a man, Lithuanian dung— Transvestition Lithuania but becomes security clan