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Intensified Multilateral Cooperation on Global Public Goods for Health: Three Opportunities for Collective Action

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Intensified Multilateral Cooperation on Global Public Goods for Health: Three Opportunities for Collective Action Intensified multilateral cooperation on global public goods for health: three opportunities for collective action POLICY PAPER NOVEMBER 2018 KEY MESSAGES • Global public goods (GPGs) for health are essential to achieving global health goals. “GPGs for health” is shorthand for a set of collective action activities that address transnational health challenges. These activities are categorized as (i) traditional GPGs (e.g., global health research and development [R&D]), (ii) control of negative regional and global externalities (e.g., pandemic preparedness), and (iii) global health leadership and stewardship (e.g., global convening to build consensus). Our definition thus encompasses a broader set of investments that goes beyond the purely economic definition of a GPG.¹ • There is substantial underinvestment in this critical area, with only about one-fifth of all donor financing for health directed at GPGs. The lack of investment was starkly exposed by the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa where underfunding of global health R&D meant that there was no Ebola vaccine, therapeutic, or rapid diagnostic test; in addition, outbreak surveillance and preparedness systems performed poorly. • Multilaterals are well placed to deliver support for GPGs given their clear global or regional mandates. To examine this potential role, we conducted a new analysis based on (i) a review of strategic and financing documents produced by the four multilaterals that provide the most development assistance for health (DAH): Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance (Gavi), the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund), the World Bank, and the World Health Organization (WHO), and (ii) 42 key informant interviews with senior leadership in these and other organizations.² The analysis shows that multilateral health agencies have all signaled their intention to step up investment in support of GPGs and intensify their cooperative activities to collaborate more closely. • Further, there is significant convergence in support of three immediate opportunities for collective action—by Gavi, the Global Fund, the World Bank (including the Global Financing Facility [GFF]) and WHO (including the Global Polio Eradication Initiative [GPEI])—to help address the global neglect of GPGs for health: » Improving the production, quality, and use of health data » Accelerating the development of and access to new health technologies, not just in low-income countries (LICs) but also middle-income countries (MICs) » Strengthening global health security, particularly epidemic and pandemic preparedness. Intensified multilateral cooperation on global public goods for health: three opportunities for collective action • POLICY PAPER | 1 1 INTRODUCTION: WHY FOCUS ON GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS FOR HEALTH? In its Global Health 2035 report published in 2013, the Commission on Investing in Health issued a “wake- up call” to the international community, arguing that donors are neglecting critical GPGs for health.³ The Commission highlighted the huge funding gaps for developing new health technologies, preparing for pandemics, and fostering global health leadership and stewardship. Shortly after Global Health 2035 was published, these gaps were starkly exposed by the Ebola outbreak in West Africa. Underfunding of global health R&D meant that there was no Ebola vaccine, therapeutic, or rapid diagnostic test; in addition, outbreak surveillance and preparedness systems performed poorly.4 In the wake of Ebola and other recent outbreaks (e.g., Zika in Latin America and Nipah in India), along with other threats such as antimicrobial resistance that go beyond national boundaries, there is growing realization that GPGs for health are essential to achieving global health goals. Multiple studies have shown, for example, that the health-related Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will be difficult to achieve without new health technologies.5,6 Recent research has begun to quantify the size of the funding gap for GPGs for health and the impressive returns to investment in many different GPGs. For example, a study led by Duke’s Center for Policy Impact in Global Health suggests that the annual funding gap for neglected disease product development is at least $1.5-2.8 billion over the next five years.7 The study also found that the current pipeline is unlikely to produce several health tools that would be game- changing, such as highly effective vaccines for HIV, tuberculosis (TB), malaria, or hepatitis C. The returns to investing in GPGs for health, including R&D, are significant and wide-ranging (Box 1). Box 1. The returns to investing in GPGs for health • Developing a 70% efficacious HIV vaccine could reduce new infections by 44% over the first decade;8 every dollar invested in HIV vaccine development could return up to $67.9 • In the United States alone, over 160,000 polio deaths and about 1.1 million cases of paralytic polio have been prevented by the polio vaccine, developed through an initial investment by the March of Dimes of about US$26 million; the investment generated treatment cost savings of around $180 billion.10 • The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control has prevented millions of deaths and averted large costs.11 Yet delivering support for such GPGs is inherently difficult.12 As the economist William Nordhaus notes: “if problems arise for global public goods, such as global warming or nuclear proliferation, there is no market or government mechanism that contains both political means and appropriate incentives to implement an efficient outcome.”13 Donor governments have not prioritized GPGs: only about one-fifth of all donor financing for health is directed at GPGs for health.14 Donor governments are also increasingly being more explicit about using bilateral funding to support their own foreign policy agendas and domestic objectives, an additional threat to global cooperation on transnational health concerns.15, 16 Intensified multilateral cooperation on global public goods for health: three opportunities for collective action • POLICY PAPER | 2 A new agenda for the multilateral institutions Multilaterals are well placed to deliver support for GPGs given their clear global or regional mandates.17 In the current climate of growing worldwide nationalism and populism, the multilateral institutions now find themselves well positioned to become a countervailing force in taking international collective action and supporting GPGs for health. All the major multilateral health agencies have signaled their intention to step up their activities in support of GPGs (Box 2). Box 2. Examples of multilateral agencies’ interest in GPGs for health • World Bank President Jim Kim has made “a much expanded role for the World Bank Group in the Global Public Goods agenda” a priority for his second term (2017-2022).18 The Bank’s shareholders recently designated $100 million in income or profit from its lending specifically to support GPGs, a decision by the bank’s shareholders “to spend ‘collective’ money for the collective or common good at the global level.”19 • The World Health Organization (WHO) decided on GPGs for health as one of three strategic shifts in its latest Global Programme of Work.20 • The Global Fund’s 2017-2022 strategy includes $194 million for “Strategic Initiatives”—catalytic investments that cannot be delivered through country grants, many of which are GPGs for health (e.g., malaria elimination and piloting malaria vaccine introduction).21 • Gavi’s deliberations about its 2021-2025 strategy include ways in which GPGs for immunization (e.g., market shaping to bring down vaccine prices) could be made available to benefit vulnerable children in a world where the divide between developed and developing countries becomes increasingly blurred. In addition to signaling their intent to scale up investments in GPGs for health, the multilateral agencies also want to intensify their cooperative activities. For example, Gavi, the GFF, the Global Fund, and the World Bank Group have formed the “4G Initiative” to collaborate more closely on global health financing and transitions. Given these two important strategic shifts—towards greater support for GPGs and towards intensified cooperation—there is a clear opportunity for the multilaterals to help address the global neglect of GPGs for health. Our policy analysis: aims and methods Our policy analysis aimed to clarify this opportunity. We wanted to address the question: to what extent do GPGs for health represent shared priorities across the multilaterals and present opportunities for increased collective action? We believe this analysis is timely, given that the multilaterals are currently redefining their roles in a changing global health landscape and in the face of multiple upcoming replenishments. One high-level panel convened by the Center for Global Development (CGD) argued that the multilaterals must “recalibrate their missions, rethink their values, and work better as a collective system if they are to stay relevant.”22 We focused on the four multilaterals that provide the most development assistance for health (DAH): Gavi, the Global Fund, the World Bank (including the GFF), and the WHO (including the GPEI). We reviewed relevant published literature, and strategic and financing documents produced by the four organizations, and conducted 42 key informant interviews (see Annex 1 for a list of key informants). Intensified multilateral cooperation on global public goods for health: three opportunities for collective action • POLICY
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