THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION: HALTI, HUMAN RIGHTS. AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. 1957- 1994
Andrew S. Thompson Department of History
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts
Faculty of Graduate Studies The University of Western Ontario London, Ontario September 1999
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From 1957 to 1994, the various governments of Haiti have for the most part practiced autocratic and oppressive means of maintaining order. With the exception of a brief ten month period from December 1 990 to October 199 1 in which the democratically elected Father
Jean-Bertrand Aristide was president. state-sponsored violence, arbitrary arrests and torture. and censorship were all consistent fixtures within the political system. Dr. Fran~ois"Papa Doc"
Duvalier and his son Jean-Claude remained in power tiom 1957 to 1986 by employing both the military and a paramilitary group known as the "Tonton Macoutes" to systematically eliminate all actual or suspected opposition to their presidencies. Similarly. the respective military governments that followed tiom 1986 to I994 of General Henri Namphy. Lieutenant-General Prosper Avril. and Lieutenant-General Raoul Cedras all operated on the notion that internal force and repression. as opposed to rule of law. were the keys to their governments' stability. security. and longevity,
Outside Haiti, the international community looked upon these regimes' human rights violations with disfavour, yet was rarely willing to act in order to ameliorate the situation.
The purpose of this thesis is to prove that the three major components of the international
community -- concerned governments in Canada and the United States. the United Nations and
the Organization of American States, and Human Rights Non Government Organizations (NGOs)
-- at various instances acted both in concert and against one another to create a policy for
protecting human rights and promoting democracy in Haiti that gradually became more and more
interventionist. Beginning with Dr. Franqois Duvalier's election in 1957, this thesis will show that
the international community had an initial reluctance to interfere in Haiti's domestic affairs that
was gradually disregarded in the 1970s and early 1980s for a policy whereby concerned foreign .. . 111 governments linked human rights to development assistance. This policy of linkage lasted until the
Haitian revolution in 1986, at which point the international community saw the end of
Jean-Claude Duvalier's presidency as an opportunity to use developmental aid to encourage
Haiti's new governments to create democratic institutions. as well as honour human rights. With the free and fair election of Aristide on 16 December 1990. it appeared as though the pressure tiom the international community had helped bring an end to military rule in Haiti. Eight months later, however, the Haitian military led by Lt.-Gen. Cidras staged a coup d'etat. exiling Aristide tiom the country. The international community responded to the coup by imposing various economic sanctions and embargoes. When these actions failed. the United Nations and the United
States threatened to use military intervention. which ultimately forced the drjacro regime to
relinquish power in October 1994. Following Aristide's return. the United Nations stationed
troops in Haiti in order to prevent another coup from taking place. The result of this foreign
intervention from 1957 to 1994 was that political conditions in Haiti shifted from an authoritarian
system to one in which outside forces imposed democracy and protected human rights. Before beginning my examination of Haiti's relationship to the international community. I would like to thank the following people and organizations for making this study possible. David
Hodges and his staff at the Good Samaritan Hospital in Limbe, Haiti for introducing me to the difficulties in keeping an NGO alive in Haiti. Meus Mavene for showing me a richness to the
Haitian identity that is often overlooked in the literature on Haiti. Helen Hussey for her constant support and correspondence. Human Rights Internet for the use of their catalogues. The staff at
Robarts Library at the University of Toronto for helping me find documents. The staff at the
Georgetown University Library in Washington. D.C. The staff at the USAID Library also in
Washingon, D.C. Derek McBean, Samantha Millar. and Bruce De Muy for their editing; my brother, Alan. for his assistance in soniny through documents; and Alison De Muy for her unconditional willingness to act as a sounding board for my ideas. My advisor, Dr. D.H. Avery, for encouraging me to pursue this project. And my classmates in History 506 -- Alison, Chad.
Chris, Michael. Paul. Robin and Vera -- for putting up with my constant banter about the importance of NGOs. TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page CERTIFICATE OF EXAMINATION ...... ii
.KKNOWLEDGMENTS ......
TABLE OF CONTENTS ......
GLOSSARY ......
INTRODUCTION ......
CHAPTER ONE -- SECURlNG THE PRESLDENCY: PAPA DOC. BABY DOC, AND THE MANIPULATION OF INTERNATIONAL OPNON, 1957-1986 ...... 24
CHAPTER TWO -- UNFOUNDED HOPES AND FALSE PROMISES: THE TRANSITION FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY, 1986-1990 ...... 53
CHAPTER THREE --IMPOSING DEMOCRACY ON HAlTI: ARJSTIDE. EMBARGOES, AND THE RISE OF NGOS. 199 1- I994 ...... 75
CONCLUSION ...... 10 I
NOTES ...... 109
BlBLiOGRAPHY...... ,...... 1 20
VITA ...... -129 GLOSSARY
AI -- Amnesty International .4PN -- Assemble Populaire Nationale CEP -- Consiel Electoral Provisoire CHADEL -- Centre Haitien des Droites et Libertes Publiques CIA -- Central Intelligence Agency C IDA -- Canadian International Development Agency CNG -- National Governing Council CON ACOM -- National Committee of the Congress of Democratic Movements ECOSOC -- Economic and Social Council FRAPH -- Front pour I' Avancement et le Proges d'Haiti GNP -- Gross National Product H AC HO -- Haitian- American Community Help Organization ICC -- International Control Commission [DB -- Inter-American Development Bank INS -- Immigration Naturalization Service MICIVlH -- Civilian Mission in Haiti MJL -- Movement des Jeunes de Labadie MNF -- Multinational Force NBC -- National Broadcasting Corporation NGO -- Non-Government Orsanization OM -- Organization of American States PAHO -- Pan-American Health Organization PDCH -- Parti Democrat Chretien Haitien PEP -- People's Unity Party P.L. 180 -- Public Law 480 PPLN -- People's National Liberation Parties CrN -- United Nations UMCEF -- United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund UNMIH -- United Nations Mission in Haiti UNTMlH -- United Nations Transitionary Mission in Haiti US -- United States USALD -- United States Agency for International Development VSN -- Volontaires de la Securite Nationale WOH -- Washington Office on Haiti
vii Until recently. protection of human rights has rarely been a priority in the Haitian political culture. Crimes against the integrity of the person. the neglect of the Haitian population's basic needs, and the denial of civil and political rights were all common practices among the various
Haitian governments from 1957 to 1994. whether it be under Dr. Franqois "Papa Doc" Duvalier.
Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier. General Henri Namphy. Lt.-Gen. Prosper Avril, or Lt.-Gen.
Raoul Cedras. The common traits among these Haitian administrations was that they all relied upon torture. arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, and assassination to maintain order. They were also yuilty of ignoring issues concerning poverty, drought, malnutrition. inadequate medical facilities. and mass unemployment. Nor did they ever seriously consider allowing freedom of expression or the risht to participate in the political system.' These Haitian presidents could afford
to commit these crimes because institutions designed to protect the individual tiom abuses of
authority, namely an autonomous judiciary and legislature, were virtually nonexistent in the
country. In a democracy, these institutions would traditionally be independent of the executive
According to the US Senate Co~nrnittceon Foreign Relations. human rights violations are: crimes against the integrity of the person the neglecting of vital needs. and the denial of civil and poiitid rights. Crimes against the integrih of the person include: "torture. cruel. inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment; arbitrary arrest or imprisonment: denial of a fair trial. and invasion of the home." Crimes negkcting vital needs involve the government's disregard for its citizens' right to food. shelter. health care. and education. Crimes against the individual's political and civil rights include: "freedom of speech, of press. of assembly. and of religion; the right to participate in government: the right to travel freely within and outside one's own countp:and the right to be free from discrimination based on race or sex." US.Congress. Senate, Committee on Foreign Rctations. Country Rewrts For Human Ri~htsPractices For 1979 (Washington D.C.: GPO. 1980). pg. 2. HAITI
branch of government.' Yet in Haiti, coun rulings favoured the state, and supporters of this one
party system were continually elected into the Parliament. The result of which was the formation
of a monolithic political system that lacked any legal restraints upon state authority.
Dictatorships and state endorsed human rights abuses. however. are not unique to Haiti.
Other Latin American and Caribbean nations have also at one point or another during the latter
half of the 20th Century practiced inhumane forms of maintaining state authority. Chile, the
Dominican Republic, and Cuba are but a few examples. But Haiti in relation to these other
southern hemisphere nations is rather unique. For one, it is an isolated Francophone nation amidst Table I. I Haiti -- Social and Economic Indicators:
Haiti: Life Expectancy 1
source: USAID CO~~IO" ( :-+. : Presentation Fiscal Year 1989, 240 .------annex Ill "Latin America and the 5 ; Caribbean". r i:. - lm5 lws la5 1970 IOIO Cat.
a region that is predominantly Spanish. Second. it is the poorest country in the western
hemisphere. Third, it is a black republic with black leaders Instead of a hierarchy of colour in
which those of lighter skin occupy the executive, in Haiti, national identity is centered around its
history as a black nation whose roots and allegiance lie with Africa, and not with the rest of Latin
.4merica or the Caribbean. Finally. Haiti is a nation in which the recent democratic system was
imposed by the international community after 1994. Prior to this date. the political culture had
largely been a product of Dr. Franqois Duvalier's presidency, 1957- 197 1. It was he who
transformed the government so that its primary knction was to ensure the perpetuation of his
power. Under his rule. state institutions such as the army and the militia existed to protect the
government from internal and external threats. Spies and informants lured by the promise of
material wealth and status infiltrated every sector of Haitian society, relentlessly looking for any
signs of opposition to the state. Newspapers exalted the achievements of his government. Even voodoo priests capable of harnessing the energy of superstition sometimes entered the political sphere, granting the power of the gods as another means of protecting Duvalier from harm.
Dr. Frangois Duvalier was elected to office in 1957 because the Haitian tnilitary leaders believed he was the ideal candidate who would win the support of the people. but would not diminish the strength of the army. He was black. charismatic. nationalistic. educated, and fluent in both French and Creole. But what the anny did not realize at the time was that Papa Doc was also ambitious and cunning. He understood that the secret to holding onto power was to play one competing group off against another. to build one up while simultaneously knocking another down. Upon winning the election, the first thins Duvalier did was institutionalize the Tonton
Macoutes. an unofficial, pro-Duvalier militia whose purpose was to not only look For dissent within the general population but to also act as a rival against the my.'Once this militia was tirmly in place. Duvalier then fired all of the highest ranking army officers, replacing them with a multitude of lower ranking officers who commanded units that were too weak to stand up to the
militia.' Following this. he prohibited non-Duvalierists from entering the military academy, created
an official militia, the ("orpsdrs i blo?ri~iresde lcr Sr~7rriirNatio~rale (VSN), and infiltrated the
army with Tonton Macoutes.
Despite this massive overhaul of the armed forces. Duvalier had enough political sayto
realize that the military was still a powefil institution in Haiti. According to a study by Haitian
anthropologist Michel S. Laguerre, Papa Doc knew that he needed the my'ssupport to remain
in office, and so to compensate for the army's loss in status, he took precautions to ensure that a
career in the army remained a viable route for upward economic mobility. In addition to limiting
recruitment to Duvalierists, he raised every soldier's salary and eliminated his taxes. He then encouraged those in the armed forces to use their position as employees of the state to extract protection money 60m vendors within their communities.' The cumulative effect of these two steps was that he created a system whereby the military had a vested interested both in keeping
Papa Doc at the head of the country and in keeping the populace under control.
.Mer effectively reducing the collective power of the army, Duvalier then used the Macoutes to censor any civilian institution capable of organizing an uprising against his government. For instance. priests preached knowing that government agents were in the congregation. Professors at the universities taught with the President's henchmen in their classrooms. The media inside the country wrote knowing that members of the militia read their articles. Professional associations and unions organized in an atmosphere where fear of government reprisal compromised any solidarity they may otherwise achieve. Even soccer teams and the boy scouts met knowing they were vulnerable to interference tiom the state."
Still. Duvalier did not stop there. In his restructuring. the Macoutes had become a powefil entity -- too powerful for his liking Tc keep them in check, Duvalier initiated the same "divide and conquer" approach that had worked so effectively with the army. He did this by first of all
including the poorest elements of Haitian society into their ranks, encouraging them with
promotions and monetary rewards to discover, report, and then neutralize any Macoute that might
be in league with those who opposed the government. After securing the loyalty of the lower
echelon of the militia, he then concentrated on satisfying those Macoutes with the most influence
on the Haitian people: the Voodoo priests. To keep them content, he organized a Macoute
division that was reserved only for those who communicated with the Voodoo gods.' Their
primary responsibility was to employ superstition and the threat of magic as a means of keeping
the rest of the Macoutes in line. Within only a few years, Duvalier had created such a comprehensive system of checks and balances upon all sectors of society that no one inside Haiti publicly opposed his decision to declare himself "President-for- life" in 1964. The secret to his success was that he left nothing to chance. Consequently, his grip on the country was so strong that. although many Haitians tried, no one could dislodge him. Of all the possible threats to his reign, time was the only uncontrolled factor On 2 1 April 197 1 death took him peacefblly in his sleep, and he finally relinquished power to his son, Jean-Claude.
The Baby Doc Duvalier era began with a series of reforms desiged to limit the state's control over the people. Among the measures was the disbanding of the Tonton Macoutes, and more lenient laws regulating the press. In 1977. he released 90 political prisoners for a Christmas amnesty and ratified the inter-American Convention on Human Rights ' Yet, despite these initial
steps towards a less oppressive state, the Haitian constitution still contained legislation that
sanctioned the use of state violence. Of particular importance to the Haitian government was the
.AntiCommunist Law of 28 April 1969, which gave the government the right to imprison, and
even execute, anyone deemed to be a threat to national security.'' As more and more accounts of
government abuse began to accumulate, it became clear to the international community that little
had changed since Papa Doc's death. The Haitian government still had a flagrant disregard for the
well-being of the people, and the purpose of the state was still to uphold the power of the
President. The final humiliation to the Haitian people came in a referendum in 1985 regarding the
development of political parties, in which the government announced that 99 98% of the 2.4
million voters had voted in favour of maintaining the President's right to name his successor.'"
By 1986. the nation had had enough of Jean-Claude Duvalier. Haiti's massive trade deficit,
the widespread tax evasion by government officials. the executive branch's embezzlement of foreign aid and his inability to combat the ;\frican Swine Fever epidemic of 198 1 to 1984 all suggested proof that the President was an incompetent leader. Moreover, by marrying a divorced, mulatto woman, Michele Bennett, in a Catholic Church ceremony in May 1980, Duvalier provided hrther evidence that he cared little for the feelings of the black, devoutly Catholic majority of Haitian society. Consequently. as an anti-Duvalier revolution broke out across the country in January 1986, the military knew that Duvalier had lost control of the country To
protect itselc the army did the only thing that would keep its power intact: it staged a military
coup d'etat. Led by General Henri Namphy. the army exiled the now powerless President
Duvalier to France. promised to disband the Tonton Macoutes. and added amendments to the
constitution that prohibited anyone formerly connected to the Duvaliers From running for office.
But what General Narnphy did not realize was that seizing power and holding onto it were
two entirely different thinys Jean-Claude' s departure had created a political vacuum in t he highest
office of the executive branch of the government, and for the first time in twenty-nine years that
position was now open to those who had previously been contained by the Tonton Macoutes. in
violently challenying the status quo, the people of Haiti had shown that they could be a powerful
Force against the state if sufficiently provoked. Therefore, whoever would be the next president
would not have the luxury of ignoring their voice. At the very least. he or she would have to give
the impression that Haiti was becoming a more open society. Being aware that his command of
the country was extremely fragile. Namphy announced that an open election for the presidency
would take place on 29 November 1987. To oversee the election. he set up the Conseil Electoral
Provisoire (CEP),a committee under the authority of the new constitution that consisted of a
cross-section of the various sectors of Haitian society.'' Much to the dismay of Haitians and the
international community. this movement towards popular participation only lasted long enough for the army to reinforce its recent status as the dominant institution in the country. According to a report from Amnesty International, as the date of the election drew nearer, the anny aligned itself with the supposedly defbnct Tonton Macoutes and massacred thirty citizens in the
Port-au-Prince suburb of Carrefour Fouille so that the Haitian military might claim that Haiti was too unstable to proceed with the election." Under the guise that the country was in a state of emergency, Namphy then disbanded the CEP. replaciny it with his own officials, and then made
Franqois Leslie Manigat, a civilian with loyalties to Namphy, the provisional president in January of 1988. Six months later. Namphy removed Maniyat and assumed power himself. Ironically, he only lasted two months: in September he was. in turn. replaced by Lieutenant-General Prosper
Avnl.
Like those of his predecessors. Avril's government relied upon terror tactics to halt any political movements within the general public. On 15 June 1989, the army disrupted a meeting of the hlowmr~,tdes Jezcrws de hhadie (the Labadie Youth Movercent. MJL). killing four members on the grounds that they were spreading Communist ideas throughout the countryside IJ One
month later, the government arrested members of the 7kt KO/&Po'otr Yotr Moii\mar~ l'i Pryizerr
Ayisyerl (Working Together for a Movement of Small Haitian Peasants) for commemorating the
death of 140 peasants who had been massacred on 23 July 1987 in the northwestern city of
lean-Rabel. I' Later that year, the human rights group Americas Watch reponed that Avril' s
supporters arrested and tortured Jean Robert Lalame, the leader of the pro-democracy Assemhit:
Popiilaire Natioriole (National Popular Assembly, APN), for supposedly making "outrageous
proposals" concerning state refom.'' In addition to these crimes, prison conditions under Avril's
yovement remained unbearable. the media faced constant harassment, individual protesters
received beatings, and the government reksed to hold an election until the international community agreed to resume its flow of developmental aid. Finally, in 1990 the pressure from inside and outside the country became so great that Avril announced that elections would take place on 16 December. To his credit, he then reinstated the CEP, had the army conduct the election in a manner that the ictemational community deemed was fiee and fair, and stepped-down when Father Jean-Bertrand Anstide received 670h of the popular vote. In The result of the election was that for the first time in most Haitians' memory, the people appeared to now have an influence on the political system. But as is the case of so many Latin American and
Caribbean nations. in Haiti the ties between the army and the office of the President ran so deeply into the political culture that it would take much more than an election to remove the military
%om the affairs of the state. Eight months after Aristide assumed office, Lt.-Gen. Raoul Cedras and the army staged a military coup d'etat.
.4ristide was ousted because he had began his tenure with a series of reforms designed to redistribute the wealth between the richest and poorest sectors of Haitian society. One of his first initiatives was to enact legislation that wouid guarantee all industrial workers a minimum salary of
five dollars a day. ! ' This anyered the wealthy merchant class who operated the country's factories.
Sensing that Anstide had alienated himself from Haiti's business class, Cedras staged the coup
d'etat, forcing the newly-elected president to seek asylum in Venezuela on 1 October 199 1.
The Organization of American States (OAS) responded to the coup by calling for an end to
all military shipments to Haiti. Its hope was that Cedras would step down once the Haitian
military and militia had exhausted their stockpiles of ammunition. When this sanction proved
ineffective, the United Nations Security Council ruled in favour of two trade embargoes that
lasted from 16 July 1993 to 16 October 1994, which prohibited the shipment of petroleum
products and commercial goods. The impact of the international community's actions on Haiti's volatile economy and society was devastating. Without access to foreign markets or goods the factories in the cities shut down, he1 became scarce. and. in desperation, people pillaged relief supplies before they reached their intended destinations. Furthermore, as Haiti grew more and more isolated from the rest of the world, riots gripped the tiny nation To maintain order. a paramilitary organization known as the
F'rotrt pour I '..ILWIC~~UIII el k Progr3.s d 'Haiti (FRAPH) lashed out at any pro-Anstide demonstrators. On 1 I May 1994, in an effort to yive some semblance of control, General Cedras named Judge Emile Jonaissant provisional president. It was an empty gesture. Both men knew that their hold on power was temporary and tenuous: the pressure from the UN directed boycott was simply too strong. So a policy of compromise was proposed. To save face. Cedras agreed to step down on two conditions: the first was that the Haitian Parliament grant amnesty to those previously involved with the coup; the second was that histide name a Prime Minister who was acceptable to the army.'' Aristide refused to concede to Cedras' demands on both counts. balking at the suggestion that he should have to share power with the military.
To break the deadlock, US President Bill Clinton sent a high profile delegation to Haiti: former President Jimmy Carter. former US. Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell. and Senator Sam
Nunn. Chairman of the US.Senate Armed Services Committee. The delegation's mandate was to
Haiti to neyotiate Anstide's return to power. To reinforce its position, the UN Multinational
Force (MM) was standing by should the Haitian atmy not cede to Carter's demands. Fomnately.
military intervention was not necessary. Judge Jonaissant signed the Governors Island Agreement
at 12:O 1 a.m. on 16 October 1994. thereby bringing an end to not only the embargo, but also to
t hirty-eight years of authoritarian government in Haiti. To Haitians, the battle to restore Arktide to power was but another reminder of a long and bitter history of conflict and bloodshed. Yet for scholars in the Western Hemisphere, the years preceding Aristide's return, 1957 to 1994, provide a case study in the transition from autocratic rule to a democratic government that honours the rights of the individual. The relevant literature dealing with Haiti's political development over this time period can be organized into four thematic categories.
The first deals specifically with Haiti's political climate during the Duvalier years. It includes
three recent works. and two from the 1960s. The five books are: Jean-Pierre Gingras' Duvalier
Caribbean Cvclone: The History of Haiti and its Present Government ( 1967), Bernard Diederich
and Al Bun's Papa Doc: The Truth About Haiti Today (1969), Elizabeth Abbott's Haiti: An
Insider's History of the Rise and Fall of the Duvaliers ( t988), Michel-Rolph Trouillot's Haiti:
State Against Nation ( 1990). and Michel S Laguerre's The Militam and Society in Haiti ( 1993).
Gtnyras' is the most theoretical of the five studies. His central thesis is that Frangois Duvalier
justified his human rights abuses by following the Hobbesian principle that too much individual
tieedom within the general population bred indolence and insurrection.'" Although more recent
historiography tends to perceive Francois Duvalier's human rights violations as a defensive
reaction to preserve the security of the state, and not as a means of protecting society tiom itself
as presented in Hobbes' Leviathan, Gingras does provide interesting comparisons between Papa
Doc's regime and those of such historical and literary figures as: Hitler, Napoleon. Lenin. Hegel.
Nietzche. Dr. Fautus, Albert Camus, and Toussaint Louverture.
Burt and Diederich see Dr. Frangois Duvalier's rule of Haiti as a product of two primary
factors. The first was the acquisition of American military munitions and training from 1957 to
1963; the second was a comprehensive propaganda campaign designed to improve his image both at home and abroad. These American journalists stationed at the US Embassy in Port-au-Prince during the early 1960s believe the training that Haitian soldiers recieved from the US Marines provided the Haitian military with the expertise to repel the guerrilla attacks from the Dominican
Republic between 1963 and 1965. Similarly. the purpose of the propaganda was to generate revenue through tourism as a means of compensating for the loss of US developmental assistance in 1963. Although their study offers a tremendous amount of detail and insight into the relationship between the US State Department and the Franqois Duvalier government, the major weakness of this study is that the publisher did not include notes or a bibliography, and thus it is difficult for rezders to substantiate their arguments.
As a Canadian academic in Haiti (she has a Ph.D. in history tiom McGill University).
Elizabeth Abbott also believes that the Duvaliers' resilience to political change was due to two circumstances. The first was their ability to exploit the populace's fear of the voodoo relision.
Indeed. she aryes that Papa Doc convinced the general Haitian population that he did such things
as: speak with the dead. eat the souls of those he killed, and inhabit Jean-Claude's body aRer he
died in 197 1 ." The second factor was that Jean-Claude Duvalier was able to acquire aid from the
international community between 197 1 and 1986, and that he ultimately fell in 1986 largely
because he lost this financial assistance from abroad. While at times it appears as though Abbott is
more concerned with captivating prose than with historical accuracy, her work is important
because it illustrates how Haitians rely upon their folklore as a method for explaining a particular
event or predicament.
Trouillot, on the other hand, looks at the Duvaliers From an anthropological perspective. The
main argument of his study is that Papa Doc Duvalier's rise to power was the culmination of a
process that began in the eighteenth century with the development of a the plantation economy. He believes that since the coffee. cacao, and sugar cane crops required a cheap source of labour, landowners first used state power to keep the workers on the fields. Consequently, what developed were little regional pockets of varying degrees of authoritarian rule run by local officials whose well-being was directly tied to the production of export crops.'' These pockets remained regional until 19 15. when the United States began its occupation of Haiti. The US left in
1934, but in this 19-year period the Marines helped develop Haiti's intiastructure, centralized the government. trained the army and supported a series of mulatto governments.:' This meant that by
1957, economic, social, and political systems had developed to the point where authoritarianism could bnction on a national level. The only element that was missing for the creation of such a regime was an ideological reason for the state to use force in maintaining order. For Papa Doc. this justification was himself Soon after takiny office he proclaimed, "Je suis le drapeau Haitien,
Uni et lndivisible. Franqois Duvdier" Crimes against his government were, therefore. crimes against Haiti. Hence. the _eovenment's security became synonymous with national security. State violence thereby became the easiest, most efficientmeans of protecting himself
Michel Laguerre suggests that the Franqois Duvalier government's longevity depended upon a delicate balance between "the military and the civilian society. between the military and civilian yovemment (or military government). and between the civil society and the civilian
government."'-' Laguerre's thesis is essentially that Papa Doc retained power by convincing the
military. through intimidation and financial and social incentives, that an alliance to support him
was in each side's collective best interest. Revolution erupted in 1986 because Baby Doc lost
control of this delicate balance, meaning he could no longer provide adequate reason for the army
to protect him from the wrath of the civilian population. General Narnphy's ascendency after the
revolution was, therefore, in part a movement to establish the supremacy of the armed forces. What separates this study and others dealing with government abuses in Haiti is that Laguerre focuses upon the economic exploitation of the general populace. He believes that equilibrium between the executive government, the military, and the civilian population remained intact from
1957 to 1986 because the Duvaliers encouraged individual Haitian soldiers to extract protection money from farmers and local artisans. The result of this economic system was that it fostered loyalty towards the Duvaliers among the Haitian military since these soldiers' economic well-being depended upon the state's ability to control Haitian civilians.
The second category of historiography covers the political atmosphere in Haiti during the reform period from 199 1 to 1997. The principle texts in this section include: Jean-Bertrand
.bstide's Aristide: An Autobiogra~hv( 1992) and his book Dignity ( 1995); The Haiti Files:
Decoding the Crisis (July 1994)' edited by James Ridgeway; Roland I. Perusse's Haitian
Democracv Restored. 199 1 - 1995 ( 1995); twin P Stotzky 's Silencing the Guns in Haiti: The
Promise of Deliberative Democracv ( 1997); and John R. Ballard' s Upholding Democracy: The
United States Militarv Campaim in Haiti. 1994- 1997 ( 1998).
Aristide's first book. ibistide: An Autobiosra~hv,is a self-agrandizing account of his life
prior to the coup, in which he sees himself as an international reformer of comparable stature to
Martin Luther King Jr. and Mohandas Ghandi? Dignity is essentially a continuation of this
interpretation. It covers the events during Lt.-Gen. Cedras' occupation of Haiti, 199 1 - 1994. Even
though many of the arguments in Diqity regarding the United States' reaction to the coup are
similar to those found in documents and reports from human rights NGOs, its shoncoming is that
Aristide refuses to take responsibility for his role in the negotiations to restore him to power,
preferring instead to leave his readers with the impression that he was a victim of Washington's
manipulation. Ridgeway's The Haiti Files is of a similar genre as Dignity in that it criticizes US actions during Cedras' coup. The book consists of a series of essays and primary documents from academics and human rights organizations: the central focus is a series of conspiracy theories involving US covert action before and during the embargo. Apart from the obvious difficulty in proving many of the arguments (many of the US State Department and CIA documents are still classified), the main problem with the book is that it was published before the end of the UN and
OAS embargoes. Consequently, the essays dealing specifically with the role of the international community tend to be simply chronological accounts of the major events during this four year period, and lack an appreciation of more contemporary developments. The real value of the book is its rich primary documents. Those of particular note are the ones %om Senator John Keny and the Srmlr Forripi Rr1arroti.s ( 'mnrnr~~er,S~~hcc~rnrnirtrr oil 'Itrrorism, Narcwti~:~md
Ir~ternatror~al0percztiot1.s regarding the Haitian military's involvement in drug trafficking between
Colombia and the United States. between the mid- 1980s and the early 1990s.
Perusse's study also lacks context. An American journalist by profession. his account of the
CIN's ht~rdpoavrtactics leaves the impression that this struggle was an isolated incident. As a result, he does not consider Aristide's ousting to be another stage in the long process of developing responsible gvernment in Haiti. He sees the institutional changes alter the embargoes, such as the establishment of an apolitical police force. as new, permanent fixtures in Haiti's
political culture when in 1995 it was much too early to tell whether or not democracy would
survive in Haiti." The reason for this unfounded optimism is that he assumes that democracy in
Haiti had to be restored. One might argue, however, that one recognized Free and fair election
does nor constitute a democracy. For Haiti to truly have been a democracy, the Haitian
government would have had to end political intimidation, and there was little evidence to suggest that violence did not take place while Aristide was president from December 1990 to October
199 1 . Despite this narrow perspective, Haitian Democracy Restored. 199 1 - 1995 does an
excellent job of proving that the United States led the embargo against Haiti in order relieve
domestic pressure involving rehgee and racial issues, not to protect Haiti's fledgling democracy.
Of the five authors in this section, only Stotzky sees the 199 1 military coup as a product of
the Duvalierist state. A professor of law at the University of Miami. who served as an advisor for
President Aristide. Stotzky discusses the difficulties in bringing democracy to a country whose
military. political. and comrnercid leaders have little desire to honour human rights. He argues
that in order for Haiti to success~llymake the transition From authoritarianism to democracy. all
Haitians must take advantage of momentum created by the embargo and slowly begin to
internalize the value of universal suffrage and rational discourse. Otherwise, they will continue to
suffer tiom authoritarian governments and the protection of human rights will never become
entrenched in Haiti's political culture."
The final book in this category. Ballard's Uoholdina Dernocracv, is a study of the military
tactics used in Haiti during the three years immediately following the coup. It is intended for
students of military history, not political scientists or political historians. For instance, Ballard
does not attempt to explain the motives behind US involvement in Haiti after 1994; yet as a
serviceman stationed there, he does provide valuable insights into the difficulties that
peacekeepers have in maintaining peace without compromising the safety of either fellow
peacekeepers or Haitian citizens.
The third category of historiography includes sociological studies that focus upon population
movement in Haiti, developmental aid, and the relationship between NGOs and both the Haitian
government and the United Nations. This group iricludes works such as: Paul Dejean's Haitians in Ouebec: A Sociological Profile (1980); Politics. Proiects. and Peoole: Institutional
Develooment in Haiti (1986), edited by Derick W. Brinkerhoff and Jean-Claude Garcia-Zamor;
T.A. Keenleyside' s essay "Developmental Assistance" in Robert Matthews and Cranford Pratt ' s
Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policv (1988); Brian H. Smith's More Than Altruism: The
Politics of Private and Foreign Aid ( 1990); NGOs. the UN. and Global Governance ( 1996), edited by Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Gordenker; and William Korey's NGOs and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights ( 1998).
In general. the usefulness of these studies is not in the specific information they o&r so much as the philosophical questions that they raise concerning the role that NGOs play in the promotion of human rights. For instance, The Haitians in Quebec discusses the work that the Haitian anti-Deportation Committee (CHAD) did in the early 1970s in making sure the Canadian
Government made a distinction between political and economic rehgees." In contrast to this direct form of lobbying. the authors of Politics. Projects. and People examine the efficacy of various grassroots methods of promoting human rights. such as the formation of peasant councils
designed to redistribute wealth between those who produce the crops and those who sell them,"
or medicinal and nutritional programs that look after the basic needs of a community." Along
these same lines. Keenleyside aryues that democratic governments in the first world should grant
or revoke developmental aid depending on the receiving government's willingness to comply with
the human rights standards set by the international community."' Similarly. Brian H. Smith
believes that the Canadian International Development Association (CIDA) and the NGOs that it
hods are hndarnentally misguided in that they espouse apolitical developmental assistance, yet do
nothing to alter the balance of power in a country run by an oppressive government." The last two studies in this section examine the process through which NGOs have gained legitimacy within the United nation^.^' Both essentially argue that NGOs have seen themselves as the social conscience of the United Nations; however, the authors of NGOs. the UN, and Global
Governance are somewhat more cynical than William Korey While they admit that NGOs have alerted the United Nations to human rights abuses and humanitarian crises, they also accuse many
NGOs of using a method of lobbying known as "relief pornography," which is a term used to
describe the process of raising hnds with pictures of starving children that are intended to
'-wrench the donor's hem and portray a sense of helplessness."" The implication associated with
this term is that NGOs are not objective agencies. but instead manipulate their audiences in order
to achieve their end objective. That being said. Korey, is much less skepticai of the role that
NGUs played in promoting human rights, especially in the United Nations His book is essentiallv
a tribute to human rights organizations who endured a tremendous amount of opposition in the
UN tiom Third World governments in the mid- 1970s. and yet were so passionate about ending
crimes against the integrity of the person that they continued to see the ECOSOC Council as a
viable forum for voicing their di~content:'~
The fourth and final category includes political theories regarding the various hypothetical
formulas for bringiny democracy to a country with a tradition of authoritarian rule. The principle
works in this section are: Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy ( 1986).
edited by Guillermo 0' Donne11 et al.; Robert Dahl's Democracv and its Critics ( 1989); and
Canada Amone Nations 1995: Democracy and Foreign Policy (l995), edited by Maxwell A.
Cameron and Maureen Appel Molot. Although all three studies focus on Latin America rather
than on Haiti, many of their ideas are relevant to conditions in Haiti. For instance. O'Donnell's
discussion of shifts towards democracy following the collapse of an authoritarian regme is relevant to what was taking place in 1986 after Duvalier left office. Similarly, Lawrence
Whitehead examines the difficulties in preserving democracy once a country has begun the transition from authoritarian rule. According to his theory, three components must exist if a country is to survive as a democracy: "pressure to transfer to democracy. [external] support for
fledgling democracies, and a firm stance against antidemocratic forces."" Obviously, there are
parallels between this model an.d UN and OAS actions after the coup against Aristide. In contrast,
theorists like Robert H. Jackson prefer a so) power approach to democracy involving NGOs at
the yrassroots level. He argues that all the hard power tactics really do is impose an artificial
system that is prone to reverting back to an authoritarian regime once the international presence in
that country disappears. '" Other theories with practical application to Haiti are: Dahl's
legal-procedural versus structural approach to implementing democracy; Adam Przeworski's
model in which an authoritarian regime's durability depends upon its ability to limit the number of
available alternatives open to the elite sectors of a given country;" and Alfred Stepan's ideas
surrounding the viability of using a military government as an intermediary step in a country's
evolution towards democracy.''
In terms of the primary documents concerning Haiti's political situation from 1957 to 1994.
there are a number of valuable sources From the United Nations, the American and Canadian
yovemments, and human rights NGOs. The UN documents, which are published on microfilm by
the UN, include such items as letters from Haiti's Department of Foreign -airs regarding the
guerrilla raids by ex-Haitian military officials residing in the Dominican Republic from 1963 to
1965, as well as resolutions passed by General Assembly and the Security Council regarding
economic sanctions and the prospects of military intervention during Lt.-Gen. Cedras' coup from
1991 to 1994. For documents produced by the United States, there are three important sources. The first is the Declassified Documents Series, which is a set of declassified US State Department and CIA reports and telegrams fiom the 1950s and 1960s that reveal Washington's view of the Franqois
Duvalier government. The second important resource is the US Agency for International
Development (USAID) fiscal year reports to Congress fiom 1975 to 1992. Although these reports do not go into great detail on specific assistance projects in Haiti. they do provide the total dollar amount the American government spent on health and medicine. infrastructure development, and education in Haiti. They even list the amount ofmilitary assistance in the Form of arms. munitions. and traininy granted to Haiti prior to the US government's decision to
withhold aid in 1963. The last of the three sources from the US is the Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States Series. This publication includes the public statements, whether it
be an address to Conyress or an interview with reporters, issued by the various presidents. The
strength of this n?pOR is that it is a verbatim account; the limitation of this source is that these
statements were often scripted by speech writers and spin doctors. and thus it lacks the candor
and honesty that is found in the Declassified Documents Series.
In terms of primary documents published by the Canadian government concerning Canada's
relationship to Haiti, the annual reports and the news releases of the Canadian International
Development Agency (CDA), and the House of Commons Debates are the most valuable. Like
the US AID reports, the CIDA documents are important because they provide a record of
successes and failures of Canadian developmenta1 projects in Haiti afier 1 973. Similarly, the
Commons Debates is usehl for its verbatim account of the opposition parties' reaction to policies
issued by the Mulrooey and Chretien governments regarding Haiti. What makes this thesis unique From other studies of Haiti's oppressive governments is that this is a comparative study that examines the United Nation's, the Canadian and American governments', and NGOs' reactions to human rights abuses in Haiti. Much of the current selection of scholarly literature focuses on the American ~overnment'sinvolvement in Haiti, either unilaterally or in conjunction with the UN. However. academics often overlook or discount the importance of NGO lobbying in not only creating awareness about oppression taking place in
Haiti. but also in persuading the UN and concerned foreign governments to confront the various
Haitian regimes. For this reason, the reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch receive a considerable amount of attention in this thesis. The rationale for focusing upon these two organizations, instead of the dozens of other private organizations who have protested against human rights abuses in Haiti, is that these are the two largest, and each has consultative status with the United Nations. as well as considerable access to the Canadian and American governments. Furthermore. these two NGOs also conducted investigations inside Haiti, and often had contact with Haitian government officials. Unfortunately. there are limitations to these reports that one must take into consideration. For one. the human rights experts preparing these reports
cannot reveal their sources for fear that they could jeopardize the safety of those who agreed to
participate in an interview. This means that readers require a certain amount of faith in the
accuracy of these documents. One way of overcoming this limitation is to look for corroborating
evidence among the reports of a number of human rights NGOs. For instance, if Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch each found evidence that Haitian prison officials tortured
prisoners, then it is reasonable to conclude that prison conditions in Haiti are inhumane, at least by
Canadian and American standards. However, it is also important to keep in mind that these NGOs
often have an agenda. In much the same way that relief pornography focuses upon the horrors of famines and natural disasters, groups like Amnesty International and Americas Watch publish accounts of graphic and violent abuses that often involve a description of a particular method of torture or execution in order to stimulate their readers into becoming active in their crusade against human rights abuses. Consequently. only the crimes that these groups Feel are newsworthy are revealed to the public. As a result. their evaluations of human rights conditions in countries like Haiti are often much harsher than those conducted by the UN or concerned foreign governments
The shortcornin!: with the literature surrounding the political developments in Haiti, the role of the international community. and the political theories regarding the promotion of democracy and human rights is that there is an underlying paternalistic assumption that only the First World can bring democracy to the Third World. Ry assuming that the American or Canadian systems of democracy are the models that countries like Haiti should strive to imitate, these authors reduce authoritarian societies into a series of simple variables that can be manipulated to produce a desired system of rule. For instance, most scholars believe that a society is better off if its non-elected public institutions such as the military and the judiciary are apolitical. It is Furthermore better off if the government is responsible for the basic needs of the people. if there are inclusive
elections with multiple political parties, if there is a system of due process governing the legal
boundaries of all public officials, and if there is a constitution guaranteeing the rights of the
individual. as ideally modeled on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
For Haiti. protecting human rights has been impossible without outside assistance, largely
because of a number of obstacles preventing the country from ever becoming a true democracy.
One such barrier that originated from the Franqois Duvalier years was the dominance of the
executive branch of the Haitian government. If the international community expects this to change in the near future it should not forget the resilience to change of those who profited from the oppressive political system from 1957 to 1994. Another hurdle obstructing Haiti's chances of becoming a democracy that values human rights is the will of the international community. In the
five years following the end of Lt.-Gen. Cedras' coup. 1995-1999. human rights NGQs and the
United Nations continue to monitor Haiti's development. but concerned foreign governments,
notably the United States, have shifted their attention to other trouble spots in the world. While it
can be argued that the protection of political Freedoms depends upon Haitians' resolve to
introduce democratic values into their political system, the question remains whether this is
possible without international assistance. If it is, then the movement to promote human riyhts in
Haiti has not been in vain. If it is not. then Haitians will continue to live in a pseudo democracy
where law enforcement is under United Nations supervision, and Dr Franqois Duvalier's legacy
of oppressive government rule will continue to haunt Haiti's political tradition. CHAPTER ONE
SECURING THE PRESIDENCY: PAPA DOC. BABY DOC, .AND THE hI-ANIPULXTION OF INTERXATIONAL OPI'NION. 1957- 1986
For the Duvalier family dynasty of Franeois and Jean-Claude, state security took precedence over human rights. In the 79 years from 1957 to 1986 in which they each occupied the position of
Haiti's Head of State. the role of the state focused primarily upon protecting the President. For internal threats. the government of Haiti employed the military and Tonton Macoutes against anv real or perceived opposition. External threats, however. were largelv beyond the control of the
Duvaliers. since neither man could control the anti-Duvalier feelings outside Haiti. Thus. to combat opposition attacks from beyond Haiti's borders Fran~oisand Jean-Claude Duvalier each
solicited the assistance of one or more sectors of the international community.
For Franqois Duvalier's presidency. 195% 197 1, assistance from the United Nations and an
alliance with the United States government were the two most viable means of shielding his
government from attack. From 1957 to 1962. he built up the strength of the state by acquiring
hnds for development assistance From both the UN and the US, including military training for the
Haitian military by US Marines. In 1962. US-Haitian relations deteriorated after Duvalier had a
falling out with US President John F. Kennedy over both human rights abuses in Haiti, and the
treatment of officials at the US Embassy in Port-au-Prince. To mend relations, the Duvaiier government unsuccessfidly attempted to forge an alliance with Washingon during the Cuban
Missile Crisis of October 1 962 by endorsing American actions against Fidel Castrc. When this failed. Duvalier turned to the United Nations Security Council for assistance in protecting his state. As Haitian rebels located in the Dominican Republic invaded the countryside along the border from 1963 to 1965, his yovernment argued that the UN must act since these attacks inhnged upon Haiti's national sovereignty. While no UN assistance was forthcoming, Duvalier did reinforce the legitimacy of his government in the eyes ofthe international community. while his security forces eventually prevailed against the Haitian rebels.
For Jean-Claude Duvalier. the external threats to his presidency did not come in the form of military invasions. but rather %om international condemnation of the Haitian government's human rights record, especially from NGOs. In the early 1970's. the human rights NGO Amnesty
International (AI) was gradually emerging as an independent member of the international community capable of swaying international opinion against the Haitian yovernment. Although pressure from A1 did not pose a direct danger to Jean-Claude Duvalier's presidency. it jeopardized his yovemment's ability to acquire developmental assistance from the Canadian and
American governments. each of whom had begun issuing relief grants in 1973 To curb the
criticism, the government of Haiti announced a series of legislative reforms in the late 1970s
designed to protect human rights. In response. A1 questioned the Haitian government's sincerity.
It found that lean-Claude Duvalier still relied upon state violence in maintainins order. In the
early 1980's. the rest of the international community agreed with Amnesty International. and
subsequently began to revoke its assistance grants. By 1986, the people of Haiti had had enough
of Jean-Claude Duvalier's government. The loss of foreign hnds had lowered their already dismal standard of living, and in February, Haitians revolted against the government. To save himself
Haiti's President tled to France, thereby ending 29 years of Duvalier rule.
.4side From the removal of a dictator who was guilty of human rights abuses. the significance of the revolution went far beyond simply the termination of the Duvalier dynasty. For Haitians, the post-Duvalier years offered a chance to establish a democratic political system. For the international community. the end of the Duvalier era represented a shift in its relationship to Haiti.
What had begun as a policy of noninterference in Haiti's domestic affairs during Franqois
Duvalier's Presidency had evolved to the point where foreign governments were willing to invoke chanye by linking developmental assistance to major improvements in Haiti's human rights record.
Although linka~edid not necessarily guarantee quantifiable results. the international community's touyli stance towards Jean-Claude Duvalier in the 1980s illustrated two specific changes that had taken place in its relationship with Haiti since 1957. The first was that the protection of human rights was becoming increasingly important as a foreign policy objective, particularly for the US and Canada, who for the purposes of this study will be the two concerned governments under
examination. The second. and perhaps the more important of the two. was that pressure %om the
international community had indirectly lead to the removal of an oppressive yovemment. While
Haitians had actually overthrown the Duvalier government. a key catalyst in the revolution had
been the economic and financial pressure of the international community which had devastated the
Haitian economy. And although no one outside Haiti advocated that violence and bloodshed be
the method for removing the country's dictator, there was little sympathy for "Baby Doc" when
he was forcibly ousted. For the first four years of Fran~ois"Papa Doc" Duvalier's presidency, 1957- 196 1. Haiti was an active member of the United Nations. During this period the government of Haiti embarked upon a series of joint rural development projects througn LJN associations whose focus was humanitarian assistance. such as the United Nations International C hildrens' Emergency Fund
(UNICEF). For the most part. Duvalier's government and UNICEF concentrated their efforts on health and sanitation matters such as malaria control. treatment for syphilis and yaws. and sewage management. They also initiated literacy programs For teachers and nurses. The cost of these projects was divided between the two parties, with UNICEF paying for the initial setup costs and the government of Haiti supplying the labour and providing subsequent funds necessary to keep the program in operation. The cumulative price of these projects was $4.562.8 10 (US) for
UNICEF and $200,000 (US) for the Duvalier government.! Although the UNICEF records do not go into great detail about the degree of cooperation between Duvalier and UNICEF, the process of sharing costs suggests that the United Nations deemed the Haitian government a willing partner in the struggle against poverty and disease. Granted. UNICEF is an apolitical organization whose mandate is to assist in the well being of the world's population; however. the Duvalier government's behavior within the United Nations General Assembly indicated that the new
President was committed to raising the standards of living of his citizens. For instance,
representatives fiom the Duvalier government sat on a committee with the United States. Canada.
Pakistan and Venezuela that wrote the resolution entitled "Freedom from Hunger Campaign." Its
purpose was to distribute surplus food stocks from those nations with an abundance of food to
those countries suffering from drought and famine without creating a dumping system that altered
the global price of that particular commodity. The significance of this resolution and the UNICEF
joint projects was that they illustrate that the Fran~oisDuvdier government not only understood the inner workings of the United Nations, but that it also could work within the system to create the impression that the President was a responsible statesman within the international community.
The efkctiveness of this tactic was twofold. First. by presenting himself to the international community as a humanitarian, Duvalier reduced the chances that the United Nations might initiate an inquiry into the internal problems of his country. Second, he increased the likelihood that member governments would be sympathetic to his cause in the event that external forces threatened his regime. Therefore, his government's involvement in the UN can be seen as a preventative measure. Duvalier knew that it was in his best interest to try and win favour within the UN -- particularly with the United States -- since he had virtually no control over the views of the international community. The Tonton Macoutes were capable of handling any uprisings within the country; yet it was the international community that ultimately determined whether or not threats 60m outside Haiti would have any chance of deposing Duvalier. It could either come to his rescue or let him fend for himself against enemies in the Dominican Republic and Cuba with larger and better equipped armies. For this reason. the Haitian government did everything in its
power to persuade the intemational community that the President Franqois Duvalier was worth
protecting.
From the beginning of his presidency, Papa Doc understood that his security was more
assured should he acquire the backing of the United States. In the late 19505, this was not a
difficult task to accomplish. Although the Eisenhower Administration threatened on a number of
occasions to withhold military and economic aid because the government of Haiti was neither
protecting the safety and property of US citizens, nor hlfilling its role in joint fund operations. the
US was not serious about completely abandoning Duvalier. In 1958 for example. the US Marine Corps began a training program for the Haitian Army despite full knowledge that these soldiers were responsible for the beatings and arbitrary arrests of a number of Haitians labelled as subversives Nor was there any US protest over the closure of opposition newspapers, or for the government's decision to punish the people of Port-au-Prince by imposing a two month period of
Marshall Law in the summer of 1958 after an eight-man insurrection force (five of whom were
Americans) staged an unsuccessful coup against Duvalier ' The American Embassy in
PoR-~u-P~~~c~justified this decision to aid Duvalier by issuing a statement whereby the Marine
Corps' mission was to teach "the Haitian Army to carry out its constitutional hnction of defending the national temtory and, as President Duvalier has stressed publicly, to refrain from politics and to improve its professional status."' Needless to say. Duvalier was thrilled. Without this support, he could never have otherwise afforded a professionally trained army. particularly because the 1958 coffee harvest had been too low to offset the decrease in Haiti's foreign exchange reserves and credits ' In many respects, the US assistance provided the perfect outcome for Papa Doc AAer very little negotiating, he had acquired a military capable of maintaining internal stability and repelling externai threats, and it had cost him virtually nothiny.
The irony of the US Marine training prosram was that it led Duvalier to believe that he could depend upon Washington for more fimding. Following the failed coup attempt. for example. he told the American Embassy that President Rafael Trujillo, military dictator of the Dominican
Republic, was financing a revolution aimed at giving the Dominican Republic complete control of the entire island of Hispanola." Much to Duvalier's dismay, the United States disagreed with his
appraisal of Trujillo, largely because the US Marines had also trained the Dominican Republic's
military, and did not feel that the Dominican Republic was expansionist. Still, Duvalier was
relentless in his quest for American aid. In July 1959, he offered to donate territory for an American submarine base so that American soldiers on Haitian soil might act as a deterrent against external insurrections. The Eisenhower Administration, however, was not interested at that particular point in time, since it saw little strategic value in establishing a base of operation in
Haiti.'
Despite the setback, Papa Doc continued to solicit support. ln May 1960. he told the US
Embassv that Haiti was in danger of becoming Communist if it did not receive more hnds for combating hunger and unemployment. Once ayain. the US State Department rehsed to comply, considering the request to be nothing more than a "thinly veiled threat."Wuvalier then asked for a
5-year moratorium on interest payments to US agencies, as well as permission to renege on its share of any US-Haitian joint development projects.'' The US Embassy said it would study the matter; however. the feeling there was that the Haitian President was once again attempting to exploit American fears of Communist expansion. when in fact there was little evidence that
Haitians found appeal in Mantist ideologies. If Duvalier wanted an alliance with the United States. his deception would have to be more effective; or he would have to yive Washington the only
thiny that the poorest nation in the world could give to the richest: public support durins an
international crisis. .As it turned out, the first opportunity to win the graces of the United States
came in October of 1962.
While the world waited anxiously for the Cuban Missile Crisis to be resolved. Haiti's Foreign
Affairs Department used the US-USSR confrontation to strengthen its relationship with
Washington. In a letter dated 25 October 1962. Haiti's Permanent Representative to the United
Nations, Carlet R. Auguste, informed the UN Security Council that the Haitian government was
aware of the severity of the situation and had already ordered the navy to patrol the Haitian coastlines in search of Cuban exiles.'" From a military perspective. the additional naval support to the US blockade that had begun the day before was inconsequential. But from a symbolic perspective, Duvalier's actions appealed to the Kennedy administration, who realized that Haiti's geographic proximity to Cuba gave it a strategic wonh in Washington's struggle against Soviet and Cuban expansion. It was not surprisiny, therefore, that Haiti's foreign minister Auguste would begin his letter to the LrN claiming that Duvalier wished to defend "Wcstem Democracy" along with the US. " The choice of language indicated that Auguste understood the ideology of the Cold War. He knew that it was politically astute to stress that Haiti represented democracy and Cuba represented communism; he knew that it was Christianity versus atheism.'' Of course. as in all diplomacy. nothing is unconditional. In exchange for its support at the Security Council, the Duvalier government wanted a "good neighbour" policy with the United States.
Unfortunately. Auguste does not explain the meaning of this term and so it is impossible to know
for sure whether this entailed either more trade or actual military assistance in the event that Haiti
should face a crisis of its own.
Another aspect of the letter that is unclear is why Duvalier chose to broadcast his position in
the Security Council. The Organization of American States had already suspended Cuba's
membership earlier that year (a motion which Haiti had supported) and obviously he knew that
Haiti's condemnation of Castro would do little more than reconfirm the Duvalier government's
disdain for communism. A possible explanation for his proclamation was that Duvalier's officials
appreciated the Security Council's legal authority to bring the international community to war. If
there was ever to be a conflict in the Caribbean, the Security Council would likely act upon
recommendations from the OAS and judge whether those involved deserved assistance. Since the
United States was the most powerful member, it would be the one to lead the United Nations into combat. So in telling the Security Council that it completely supported the United States' effon to resolve the Cuban Missile Crisis. Auguste was attempting to bolster Duvalier's image with the
United States. l3
If this was in fact the goal of the Duvalier government. then the communications with the
Security Council indicate that the Haitian President's ministers had a tremendous amount of
Foresight. They knew that power in Haiti could change hands at a moment's notice, yet they also knew that a president's longevity in his country depended upon the strengh of his military forces.
By praising the United States through international soverning agencies, they were anticipating a challenge to his authority, preparing for a time when they might call upon the international community to assist in suppressing an attack against Haiti.
In the spriny of 1963, such a situation emerged when the Dominican Republic mobilized its troops along the border. President Juan Bosch, who won the I96 1 election after Trujillo was assassinated. justified this action by accusing Duvalier of violating the diplomatic sanctity of the
Dominican Republic's embassy in Petionville, Haiti. For its pan. the Duvalier govemment denied any wrongdoing, claiming that the embassy was housing ex-Haitian military officials from a rebel group known as the (-'amoqziirrswhose loyalties were to former Haitian President Paul E.
Magloire.14To help resolve the standoff, Haiti's Minister of Foreign Affairs. Rene Chalmers
exercised the provisions of .4rticles 34 and 3(I) of the CM charter to summon the Security
Council to order.'' His complaint was that the Dominican Republic had infhnged upon Haiti's
national sovereignty on three fronts: it had protected these alleged criminals; it had disseminated
anti-Duvalier propaganda on the Dominican Republic radio; and it had threatened to intervene
militarily if the Haitian rekgee claimants in the embassy were not granted safk asylum to the
Dominican Republic.'VIaitian officials argued that. as an international governing body, it was the Security Council's duty to convince Bosch's troops to back off. The Dominican Republic responded by maintaining that it was Haiti who was the aggressor, and that its troops were simply preparing to defend Dominican Republic territory. l7 On this occasion, the Security Council decided that the OAS was better suited to handle the conflict than the UN.
Initially, this decision appeared to be a wise one. As the OAS began its investigation, tension between the two countries seemed to be temporarily on hold. Ultimately, this peace did not last.
On the night of 4 Aupt 1963, an invasion force from the Dominican Republic attacked villages in the northeastern part of' Haiti near Cap-Haitien. The Haitian government protested to the OAS, claiming that the Dominican Republic had supplied 300 Haitian nationals under the command of ex-Haitian General Leon Contave with ammunition and military equipment so that they might overthrow the Duvalier regime1' The Haitian Foreign Minister shrewdly argued that this action violated the provisions of the Caracas Convention on Temtorial and Diplomatic Asylum of 1954, and that if neither the OAS nor the UN intervened. there was nothing to prevent these rebels from recruiting more exiles into their terrorist groups. Should the international community do nothing,
Chalmers warned. then the Haitian yovemment would take matters into its own hands and the result would be "bloodshed and the loss of life.""'
Much to Duvalier's dismay, this warning had no effect. On 8 August 1963, General Contave led the rebels in another attack against the Fort Liberty mybarracks in the village of Derac, in which three of the ~i~lor~~uiresdr la Skuritk NutI'o~~afe(VSN) were wounded and a handfbl of the invaders were killed. Again, the Haitian government accused the Dominican Republic of
sponsoring the attackers, claiming that it had supplied them with uniforms, grenades, automatic
firearms, and military jeeps.'(' Although the army was able to repel the raid, Duvalier's officials
saw this as only a minor victory. As long as disaffected former Haitian soldiers had the means to acquire military supplies, the Haitian government would have to continually be on its guard. To do this, he would either have to stretch his military resources all along the long border or rely upon the international community for assistance.
This resulted in a second attempt by Chalmers to gain intemational support. Unlike Duvalier who had little patience for diplomacy, Chalmers was a competent statesman who appreciated the importance of winning sympathy within the United Nations. Consequently, three weeks after the initial attack. he sent two letters to the Security Council. The first warned them that if the UN did not act quickly. these small battles could eventually threaten hemispheric security and international peace; while the second criticized the OAS for not fulfilling its role as a mediator.''
Indeed, he accused the Chairman of the OAS. Gonzalo Facio of Costa Rtca. of taking too long to dispatch a commission designed to separate the two armies. Since the OAS had proved ineffective, Chalmers argued that the Security Council was obliged under Article 54, chapter 8 of the UN charter to monitor any conflict that might threaten international peace.'' The Security
Council disagreed. It remained tirm in its policy that this was a regional conflict that fell under the jurisdiction of the OAS.
By September, the Haitian government was desperate for assistance from the Security
Council. and it sent a nineteen-page report listing the deficiencies of the OAS' performance. Its
first criticism was that the Commission of Inquiry had begun its investigation by unduly dismissing
the Haitian interpretation of events, deciding instead to rely solely on information provided by the
Dominican Republic and the American media." The second complaint focused on the fact that
the OAS had taken fifteen days before responding to the Haitian request for help. When observers
from the Commission finally did anive at the border, they depmed after only one week of
investigation, which Chalrners argued. was not enough time to adequately assess whether or not Bosch's government was guilty of using former officers in the Haitian myas weapons against
Duvalier. In addition to these two procedural flaws, Chalmers believed that the OAS was pressuring each nation -- Haiti and the Dominican Republic -- to sign separate resolutions. which was quite improper. Under no circumstances. he argued. was Haiti prepared to sign any treaty without a legal guarantee that the Dominican Republic was also bound to the same code of conduct. And in the event that the United Nations did send troops to settle the conflict, Chalmers was completely against the formation of a Latin American peacekeeping force to settle the contlict on ethnic or cultural grounds since Haiti was a French nation in a region that was
predominantly Spanish. He implied that it was inevitable that any OAS policing force would be
sympathetic to the arguments of the Hispanic Dominican Republic.
Despite these criticisms. Chalmers was carefbl not to be too critical of the OAS. He realized
that the chances of the Security Council taking action was remote. Security in South America and
the Caribbean fell under the jurisdiction of the OAS. and so in all likelihood it would continue to
be the agency to investigate the affair For this reason. he took great care to make sure that his
appeal to the UN simply indicated that in this particular occasion the OAS did not have either the
means or the desire to adequately enforce a settlement." Therefore, Chalmers concluded that the
only recourse for Haiti was to once again take its concerns to another body that had the resources
to enforce peace in the region.'
Much to the Haitian government's dismay. the Security Council was unable to stop the
attacks. On the morning of 24 September 1963, forces from the Dominican Republic staged a five
hour assault on a military base in the Durnnaminthe district in the northeastern region of Haiti.
The major difference between this and previous attacks, however, was that this time Duvalier was
ready. Due to the international community's inability to stop the Camoquins from pillaging Haitian villages and destroying the coffee fields. Duvalier had placed the myand the Tonton
Macoutes on alert. When the two sides finally came to blows, the Haitian forces badly outmatched the rebels: once the fighting was over, thineen rebels including one of the leaders behind the raids, ex-Captain Blucher Philogene. lay dead.'"
With this military victory, Duvalier brought a momentary reprieve to the conflict. Philogene's death was a major loss t.o those who opposed the President, and the battle had shown that
Duvalier's security forces were capable of suppressing small scale raids. Still Duvalier did not feel secure. As long as the Dominican Republic provided a sanctuary for these rebels. he could never frilly eliminate the problem. All his forces could do was attempt to obstruct the rebels From either reaching the Presidential Palace in Port-au-Prince, or sabotaging Haiti's agricultural and industrial areas.
To compound his problems. the United States protested ayainst the Haitian army's actions.
Unlike Eisenhower. President John F Kennedy had been appalled by reports of homfic accounts of repression in Haiti. particularly since the US no longer felt it needed Haiti in its campaign to
contain Soviet influence. As a result, Washington subsequently ordered all military and
developmental assistance payments to end after 1963. Duvalier's response was violent and
immediate. He lashed out at the US .Ambassador, exiling him back to the United States." The US
Embassy in Port-au-Prince warned the US State Department that with the upcoming 1964 US
Presidential election, Duvalier might continue his anti-American tirade on the assumption that the
next government would resume aid in order to avoid what it termed the "Negro problem."
whereby Washington inadvertently portrayed the "image of [a] big wealthy US browbeating [the]
first Negro republic."" It was a price the US State Department was willing to pay. When Lyndon
B. Johnson assumed the Presidency after Kennedy was assassinated on 22 November 1963. the U&eJ Stares Ager~q.+r ln~nturiundDevelopment (USAU)) discontinued all military and developmental assistance programs with the exception of its malaria reduction program. US AID would continue to withhold developmental aid until 1973. two years after Papa Doc' death.
Foreign Minister Rene Chalmers realized that if his government was to successfUlly sway international opinion against the Dominican Republic (and win back the support of the United
States). it would need to prove that these attacks were directed at the people of Hispanola. and not just at Duvalier .And so, when tension between the two countries flared up again in June of
1964. he accused the Bosch government of usins the conflict with Haiti as an excuse to both suspend the liberties of the people of the Dominican Republic in order to solidify its position, as well as to harm the well-being of Haitian citizens.'" Consequently. when Dominican Republic planes and warships armed with machine guns and rocket launchers violated Haitian tenitory off the coast of Cap-Haitien in July. Chalrners at no point suggested in his correspondence with the
UN that Duvalier was the principle target. Instead. he argued that the intention of the crews in
these vehicles was to shoot down Haitian warplanes protecting Haitian tenitorid waters.'" What
lent credibility to Chalrner's argument that the invaders were attempting to disrupt stability within
Haiti was that they chose Cap-Haitien and not an area closer to Port-au-Prince.
The United States did not fail for this ploy. The US State Department warned its new
Ambassador to Haiti, Benson E. Timmons 111, that Duvalier was "basically devious and
untrustworthy," capable of "mercilessly exploiting any weakness." The State Department then
wrote: "[the US Government] should restrain its natural altruistic impulses toward Haiti. We can
lose before we begin if we show ourselves too eager to come forward with too many goodies.""
Two months later. US suspicions of Duvalier appeared to be justified. In April 1964. the US State
Department informed Timrnons that it had reason to believe Haiti's President was about to purchase a shipment of guns from a number of Italian arms firms. Another report issued a few months later revealed Duvalier had acquired $1 million worth of weapons from an arms dealer in
Florida named "Denis."" The purpose of these weapons, according to the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) report Opportrrnitiesfor C'ommrmist E.~uploirationb~ Latin Amcrka. was to provide the Govemment of Haiti with the means for controlling the army and the general populace.
Significantly, these shipments did not bother the CIA. Haitians were not Communists.
Although Duvalier ignored the vital needs of Haiti's citizens. the US intelligence officials in Haiti reported that "most Haitians [were] so completely downtrodden as to be politically inert.""
Furthermore, the CIA found that neither of Haiti's Communist parties, the P~~uplr'.s Ninio~ml
I.ihrmtior~Parties (PPLN) and the People 's Ihty Pwp (PEP), were militant, and thus posed little threat to the Government of Haiti. Only if Duvalier was to be displaced did the CIA believe that these groups might make significant strides and even that was unlikely given the strength of the Macoutes. in terms of Haiti's allegiance to either superpower in the Cold War, the State
Department was sure that Duvalier was in the US' corner. ''
The United States' confidence in Duvalier's stability swayed, however, in November 1964.
The previous week, Duvalier had placed the armed forces on alert because of rumours that outside forces who opposed his "Presidency-for-life" campaign were planning an invasion. On 4
November. the US State Department confirmed this speculation after its intelligence agencies
discovered what it considered a band of roughly 150 anti-Duvalier exiles leaving the Miami area.
Their suspected objective was to sabotage the power company in Port-au-Prince en route to
overthrowing the government." -4s expected, Duvalier was livid. He sent Chalmers to the US
Embassy to demand that the United States Govemment put a stop to the invasion at once. In his report back to the State Department, Timmons referred to Chalmers' demeanor as "menacing," and confessed that the Haitian Minister of External Affairs had threatened to link the invaders to lower-level officials in Washington who were acting behind the backs of their superiors to prevent the US From taking action. Tirnmons assured Chalrners that the United States was doing everything in its power to prevent any overseas invasion. Obviously the US military and intelligence communities did not want to facilitate a communist foothold in Haiti. On 5
November, US Customs Agents arrested a group of Cuban and Haitian exiles in Miami. charging them with shippins illegal arms out of American territory. '" In many respects. the arrest was a watershed point for American-Haitian relations, for it revealed to both parties that the United
States felt the Caribbean was more stable with Papa Doc in power, than without. If that meant coming to his rescue while ignoring his human rights violations, then so be it For US foreign
policy advisors. it was a small price to pay for hemispheric security.
The Duvalier government received more assistance in 1965 after the OAS finally reacted to
the civil war taking place in the Dominican Republic. At the end of 1963, the Bosch government
and the military had entered into a violent conflict, whereby the leadership of the country was at
stake. By 1965. it appeared as though Bosch's forces had the upper hand. This troubled the
United States, which for quite some time had suspected that Bosch was a communist. For
President Johnson, the presence of one communist nation in the Caribbean was more than enough.
In late April he and the OAS sent 22,000 troops to the Dominican Republic to restore order.:'
For Haiti, OAS involvement in the civil war represented the perfect O~~ORU~I~Yto turn the
international community against the Haitian rebels residing in the Dominican Republic. In
midJuly, Chalmers sent a telegram to both the Secretarygeneral of the OAS and the President of the Security Council indicating that the rouyhly 100 ex-Haitian military officials that the Bosch government had aided had long ago been indoctrinated by "Castroite C~mrnunism."'~Many of
these men, he claimed, were once active leftists in the Plaine de Cul de Sac region of Haiti but had
fled for Cuba and the Dominican Republic just prior to 1957, where they were "welcomed and
made use of.""' Now. seven years later, these men were a threat to both national security in Haiti
and democracy in the Dominican Republic.
The irony of this claim was that for the preceeding two years the Haitian Ministry of Foreiyn
.Wairs had preoccupied itself with keeping outsiders, particularly troops tiom its Caribbean
neighbors. from disrupting the country's internal stability. However, now that OAS troops
occupied the Dominican Republic, Haiti encouraged intervention. When Cuban and Soviet
representatives at the UN accused the United States of violating international law. Chalmers
supported the actions taken against communists." The hypocrisy of this stance was that,
depending on the situation, the Duvalier government either appeared to be a zealous advocate for
the rights to national sovereignty. or a staunch supporter of any movement to contain communism
in the Caribbean. it even volunteered to turn over any Dominican and Haitian Communists
residing in Haiti to US authorities provided the US Embassy supplied a list of names. Ambassador
Timmons declined the offer because he suspected that the Haitian government would use the
information to intimidate the friends and families of those whose names were on the list. Aside
from this transparent request, the Haitian Ministry of Foreign Affalrs' ability to wear whichever
hat depending on the situation was a brilliant example of realpolitik. Its concern was with keeping
foreign military forces out of Haiti. By switching its policy back and forth between the two
extremes, C halmers was creating a system of safeguards, both implicit and explicit, that allowed
his government to remain the most powerful institution in the country. The next opportunity for the Duvalier government to protect itself came at an OAS meeting at the end of 1965. That December, the Haitian government sat on the committee that drafted the
m~dthe Protectiotr of Their Idependencr and Sovereip~ty.The primary purpose of this meeting was to review the OAS' commitment to Article 15 of its Charter. The original article stated that
No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever. in the internal or external affairs of my other state. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the state or against its political, economic and cultural elements."
The OAS then added the following condition:
. . . no State may use or encourage the use of measures of an economic or political character to coerce another State and to obtain from its advantages of any kind and that, in particular. States shall not organize, assist. foment. finance, incite or tolerate subversive. terrorist or armed activities against another State or interfere in civil strife in another State.''
The importance of these two provisions was that they prohibited all other foreign governments from using force against Haiti: however. the resolution was powerless in stopping those who had no affiliation to a yovernrnent from interfering with Haiti's domestic affairs. For instance, on 20 May. Haiti's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Raoul Siclait, wrote a letter indicating that at 8: 15 a.m. that morning, two unidentified airplanes had dropped bombs on the cities of Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien, damaging a number of buildings. one of which was the Presidential Palace. The Haitian government believed that the aggressors were two
Haitian exiles who had been living in the United States. It did not know, however, whether or not
these men had obtained the aircraft in the United States. Sinclait wanted the Security Council to
ascertain the plane's origin. The next day, two foreign jets flew over Gouave, and the Dominican
Republic's army mobilized along the border. Again, Siclait wrote to the Security Council. The Dominican Republic's actions, he argued, were more than simply a threat to Haiti's sovereiynry.
Instead. he implied that the catalyst for the attack had been a 1 5-minute news broadcast on NBC television in which the reporter had not only been very critical of Duvalier's oppressive methods of governing, but had also indicated that the Haitian President would be removed From power in the near future." Had this been a telecast by the US government officials, then the OAS or the
UN could in theory have asked that these reporters be reprimanded. But censoring an independent news media corporation was something that neither the OAS nor the UN was inclined to do.
Whether Franqois Duvalier realized it or not, NBC's broadcast was evidence that values towards human rights abuses in Latin America and the Caribbean had changed since he first assumed office. In 1966. fourteen human rights NGOs had met with the ECOSOC Council of the United
Nations to support the Costa Rican proposal for a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.'
Two years later. Amnesty International brought its concerns about the Haitian yovemment to the
UN General ~ssembly."The significance of these actions by NBC and A1 was that slowly but surely, the protection of human rights was making its way onto the international political agenda.
Fortunately tor Franqois Duvalier, this latest crisis with the Dominican Republic never
amounted to an armed conflict, and the international human rights movement against his regime
was still too small to seriously effect him. Consequently, from 1968 to 197 1 he faced little
pressure from the international community to treat the people of Haiti in a humane manner. In
fact. prior to this three year period, the UN and US had each been a crutch for Duvalier. They had
given him developmental assistance and a theater to air his fears about activities in Cuba and the
Dominican Republic. In turn, he had used the various councils in the United Nations both to build
an alliance with the United States, and to help create legislation that would shield the state from external threats. One reason for Duvalier's success in dealing with the US and the CM was that the men he sent as representatives, such as Chaimers and Sinclait, were extremely clever diplomats who understood not only Haiti's national rights through international law, but also the climate of the Cold War. Whether during the Cuban Missile Crisis or the civil war in the
Dominican Republic. they took advantage of Washington's fear of Communism in the Western
Hemisphere. using it as an excuse to acquire financial and social assistance. Although the Haitian zovernment lost much of this aid in 1963, the state was never seriously in jeopardy. Only on 2 1
April 197 I, after Duvalier died in his sleep, did the people of Haiti set a brief reprieve tiom his violent methods of maintaining state security.
On 78 April 197 1. the United Nations General Assembly received Jean-Claude "Baby Doc"
Duvalier into the international community.* it welcomed him because he represented more than just the newest world leader: he also represented a chance for Haiti to become a more tolerant society In his first two years in office, it appeared as though he was living up to these expecta!ions. For instance. in 1972. Jean-Claude Duvalier announced that he would disband the
Macoutes and release 132 po!iticai prisoners in 1972. Many in the intentional community saw these actions as positive steps towards a more just society for all Haitians. To help Haiti's new
President improve the living conditions. governments in Nonh America and Europe allotted more hnds fiom their developmental assistance programs to Haiti. Over the next ten years aid rose
fiom roughly $9 million (US) to $106 million (US)."
In 1973, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) made its first
contributions to Haiti. CIDA's mandate was to combat "endemic poverty" through programs
designed to stimulate economic and social systems.* Before 1973. CIDA had directed its developmental assistance programs in the Caribbean exclusively at Commonwealth countries such as the West Indies Federation, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, the British Honduras, and the Barbados. In 1973. however, CIDA modified its mandate to include countries with a GNP of
$375 per capita or less. with priority going to those under $200. As the poorest country in the
Western Hemisphere (its GNP per capita was estimated to be between the range of $280 and
$320), Haiti qualified for a grant of $150, 000 (US) "' The purpose of this money was to subsidize agricultural projects currently being administered in Haiti by the government of France. These included. erosion control, commercial networks and storage facilities, agricultural credit, more efficient farming techniques, and educational programs involving health and nutrition. All of these projects took place in conjunction with the government of Haiti. The following year. CIDA increased its donation to 57 24 million (US)."'
The United States Agency for International Development also resumed developmental
assistance in 1973. .After ten years of withholding government-to-government aid, US AID felt
that Jean-Claude Duvalier had sufficiently improved the sovernment's human rights record to
warrant $6,156,000 in bilateral assistance. Prior to 1973, all hnds to Haiti were channeled
through development NGOs through Public Law 480 (P L 480) Title 11, which authorized grants
for emergency relief and economic development. As was the case with CIDA, the purpose of
hnds goiny to either NGOs or the Government of Haiti was to subsidize ongoing projects. One
such NGO was the Hairiotz-American Cbrnmccnity He@ Orgaf~ization(HACHO). Its projects
included: road construction, the rehabilitation of irrigation canals. reforestation, on-farm storage
systems, and a malaria reduction campaign. Ofthe money going directly to the government of
Haiti, $1.6 million was supposed to go towards a Small F'armer Development Program." But this influx of funds from Canada and the United States was not the only significant change to take place in 1973. That year the people ar Amnesty International published their first comprehensive evaluation of the political climate in Haiti under Jean-Claude Duvalier's rule. They found evidence of roughly 400 known cases where the government was detaining Haitian citizens for political reasons. While in prison, these men and women were subject to various forms of tortures including: '-clubbiny to death. rnaiminy of the ears and genitals. food deprivation to the point of starvation, and the insertion of red-hot pokers into the back passage."" In addition to
these atrocities, captives suffering %om tuberculosis. malaria, or diarrohea did not receive medical
treatment or the right to speak with a priest. Furthermore. executions were frequent and the dead
did not receive a Christian burial." The most common charge asahst these prisoners was a
violation of Haiti's Anti-Communist Law of 1969?
Amnesty International also found that Jean-Claude Duvalier's announcement back in
December of 1972 regarding the release of 132 prisoners was false, and that most of the inmates
had been released while his father was still president. Based on this information. At concluded
that Jean-Claude Duvalier had deliberately lied to the international community." Whatever his
motive had been for issuing this falsehood was of little consequence; now he had lost any
credibility with the largest and most prominent human rights NGO in the world. In retrospect, it
was naive of him to think he could fool Amnesty International. It was a mistake that would haunt
him for the duration of his presidency. From this point on. Amnesty International consistently
broadcast just how tembly he treated Haitians who acted in opposition to his yovemment. But
would anyone listen? The answer to this question was both yes and no. Concerned foreign governments in Canada and the United States subscribed to the theory that satisfying a country's basic needs was the best way eliminate human rights abuses. The
principle behind ths argument was that economic and social development would lead to stability,
which in turn would lead to a democratic system of government that honoured the rights of the
individual. One of the guiding principles of this argument was that the desperately poor are the
ones to suffer when a donor yovernment uses foreign aid as leverage against an abusive regime.
which was an indirect. long-term approach that assumed political cultures evolve alongside
changes in the living conditions. This contradicted Amnesty International's approach which was
direct lobbying for specific short term gains (i.e. the release of a particular political prisoner)
Although these two methods of intluencing the political and social climate of a developing nation
are not necessarily mutually exclusive, the international community sent Jean-Claude Duvalier a
mixed signal. For example, .Amnesty International demanded that the government of Haiti allow
teams of experts into the country to monitor government activities. At the same time, however.
individual governments and international governing organizations who had the means to use hard
power diplomacy, supported Jean-Claude's regime with bilateral and multilateral assistance. As a
result of this lack of solidarity between NGOs and International Governing Organizations (IGOs),
there was very little external pressure on the Haitian govemment to honour human rights.
Furthermore. Haiti's President was also relatively free From criticism inside the United Nations
since NGOs granted consultative status under Article 7 1 of the ECOSOC Council were not
allowed to name specific governments in their reports.'" The reality of this dichotomy was that as
long as national governments and NGOs continued to follow different policies, Jean-Claude was
able to receive developmental assistance without having to worry about economic boycotts and
economic sanctions over his government's human rights abuses. Hence, in 1974-75, the Haitian government secured aid from the Canadian International
Development Agency for two projects. The first was a $3 million (US) gant over a six year period from CDA for the creation of a Vocational Training Centre in Port-au-Prince. The second was a $1.8 million integrated Regional Development Program to repair soil damage in the valley that housed over 300,000 Haitians between Petit-Goave and Petit-Trou-de-Nippes." CIDA felt that both projects were successful enough to warrant a tenfold increase in $rants to Haiti. The following year ClDA added $2 million over a five year period to the Nippes project and sent another $1 17 million in Food assistance.'' ln 1977-78, CIDA committed $39 million to Haiti over the next four years. $2 1 million of which was allocated to Nippes and $2 million to the Haitian
Red Cross for drought relief."' To put these numbers in context with the levels of aid from other major donors, these contributions were second only to that of the United States. who gave roughly 3.5 times more than Canada."'
From 1976 to 1978. the United States Agency for International Development issued $42.
878,000 in government-to-government yrants. In addition to the projects that began in 1973.
USAID also worked with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Pan-American
Health Organization (PAHO) on a Disaster i'rrpclredr~ess Proyrct. As well, it foresaw spending
another $86 million over the next five years for a F'ud-fur- Work Program designed to develop
Hait's food crops."'
While these projects were taking place, Amnesty International struggled to find information
regarding human rights abuses in Haiti. In a letter to Bill Brown of the human rights NGO
Washington Office on Latin America dated 14 April 1976. Michael Zischke of AI confessed that
he was unaware of any report that had been published within the last two years on the Duvalier
govemment The problem was that his organization did not have any hard evidence to confirm a variety of allegations."' One such example of At's difficulty in checking the accuracy of its information occurred in December 2976 when Jean-Claude Duvalier announced that his govemment was granting a Christmas Amnesty to 90 political prisoners. The experts at AI did not believe that he was serious, and so they launched an investigation. What they found was that the
Haitian government had only released about 30 prisoner^."^ To confirm their findings, they asked the Haitian ~ovemmentto publish a list of all the prisoners it claimed to have freed. Jean-Claude's officials ignored this request. It saw AI as a nuisance that lacked any diplomatic or legal authority in Haiti that could be kept at bay by denying it access to information. Besides. Jean-Claude
Duvalier government claimed it had bigger problems to deal with than answering questions about the condition of Haitian political prisoners.
During the early 1970s. large numbers of Haitians had taken advantage of both Jean-Claude
Duvalier's ambivalence towards exiles and the belief that even the unslulled worker could escape poverty by fleeing the country in tiny wooden boats heading for other countries in the Caribbean, with many others heading for the United States. Up until 1979. the Haitian boat people had not warranted much international attention. 1980. however, was an election year in the United States. adthe topic of illegal aliens was a contentious issue in the southern states. Five thousand
Haitians had already landed in the southern US. not to mention the thousands of others from the
rest of the Caribbean and Latin America. The residents of these states along the southern coast
and the US-Mexican border did not want any more. They pressured the US government to do
something about these people who, they claimed, were abusing the welfare system and ruining
neighbourhoods.* To his credit. President Jimmy Caner did not give into public pressure. and
rehsed to forcefblly repatriate those who had fled from the Duvalier and Castro regimes. Instead, he appropriated $100 million dollars through Executive Order 12244 for a housing program for the Haitian and Cuban rehgees at Fort Allen in Puerto Rico.
Amnesty International was unsure of how to react to Carter's actions. It approved of the principle behind providing a temporary sanctuary in Puerto Rico. but did not think highly of the screenins process. It felt that US officials lacked the language skills and training to be able to distinguish between political and economic rehgees."' Another concern it had was that the
Haitians and Cubans were being treated like prisoners, rather than asylum seekers. Washington
appeared to have a sense of urgency to resolve the boat people problem. What made this
particular scenario critical for US officials was that illegal migration had the potential to balloon
into an unmanageable situation: already, one hundred-and-fifty rehgees from Haiti and Cuba were
landing on the American coastline each day Only Jean-Claude Duvalier could prevent the exodus
of Haitians at the source, since he could stop them fiom leaving in the first place. The preferred
scenario would be for his government to end political violence in the hope that Haitians would no
longer feel compelled to leave the country Unfortunately for A1 and the US government.
Jean-Claude Duvalier had no intention of endiny internal repression in Haiti."
In October 1980. Haitian authorities arrested 26 people on the grounds that they had
communist leanings. Of particular note was the arrest of Sylvio Claude, the President of a radical
activist group known as the Pmi Democrate ('hrerirn Haitien (PDCH).According to interviews
Amnesty Lnternational conducted with PDCH members, Claude was arrested for including a
picture of lean-Claude amongst foreign leaders who had recently been removed fiom office."' The
government considered this to be a threat to the President. Others arrested with him included:
Yvens Paul, radio journalist and amateur thespian; and Lafontant Joseph Secretary-General of the
Ligue Haitlmne cles Droits Hz~mains.While in prison, many of these men had their hands tied behind their legs md were then beaten with sticks.'' In addition to this, Amnesty argued that there had been four reasons why the trial for these 26 Haitians was unfair: the defendants were not granted lawyers until four days before the trial. there were no witness tesrifylng against them, "not all jurors understood French (the language of the court). and some jurors had connections to the security forces."""
The significance of the exodus of Haitian refugees and Amnesty International's exposure of human rights abuses was that they came at a time when Haiti's social and economic stability was in jeopardy. Hunicane Allen in 198 1 damaged Haiti's agricultural production. and the Amcan
Swine Fever epidemic of 198 1 had caused the decimation of the Haitian Creole pig population, thus eliminating a major source of protein in the average Haitian's diet."' On top of these problems, Haiti's bauxite reserves were almost depleted. tourism was on the decline. and CIDA refused to renew the Integrated Regional Development Program because the Haitian government had not paid its share of the costs." Of the two development agencies, only USAID continued to supply aid as part of the frzterrm Swirze Hrpopiil~ior~project. In addition to this. the Reagan
Administration granted the government of Haiti an extra $5 million in emergency economic aid (it gave the rest of the Caribbean, excluding Cuba. another $345 million)." and signed an agreement
with the Duvalier yovernment in 198 1 that permitted the US Coast Guard to forcehlly repatriate
Haitian boat people.
Another important aspect of the timing of Amnesty International's report was that it came
when the rest of the international community was taking an increasing interest in human rights
violations occumng in Haiti. For instance, Americas Watch issued four separate reports on human
rights violations in Haiti from 1983 to 1985 that ranged from such topics as: arbitrary arrest and
detention. electric shock tonure against opponents, as well as curtailment of freedom of the Press under the Anti-Communist Law of 1969." The United Nations also published four human rights reports on Haiti. Similarly, in a speech to the ECOSOC Council, the Canadian government expressed its desire that the LJN use its influence to convince oppressive states like Haiti of the value of individual freedom." Finally, the human rights group Waslungton Office on Haiti (WOH) sent a report to the United States Congress indicating that the Duvalier government had violated
Section 540 of the Foreign -4ssistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1985 regarding compliance with American aid regulations. WOH claimed that this meant Haiti should no longer be eligible for US assistance."
The result of the campaign that had begun with Amnesty International back in 1973 was that the international community now saw the protection of human rights in Haiti as a higher priority, and, fiankly, Jean-Claude Duvalier was an easy target. He was a vicious dictator in a tiny country that posed little if any threat to global security. Should he fall From office. the balance of power in the Western Hemisphere would not change. Furthermore. like his father before him, he was viewed as a despicable person. And so when revolution erupted in Haiti in January and February of 1986 to protest destitute living conditions, no foreign government felt any sympathy for
lean-Claude Duvalier as he boarded a plane to escape the riots that would eventually see his
Tonton Macoutes dragged into the streets and killed by angry mobs. When asked by a reporter
whether the United States would grant Haiti's exiled leader asylum, President Ronald Reagan
indicated that Jean-Claude Duvalier had not asked to come, and the United States had not offered
to take him. 76
Although Jean-Claude Duvalier shared his father's obsession with power. he lacked Franqois'
shrewdness. During his fifteen years in office he had not adapted well to the changes in attitude of the international community. Unlike his father's government whose officials had at least attempted to mould its actions within the UN and the OAS to fit each dilemma, Jean-Claude Duvalier's
government was much less active in these international arenas, and thus did little to defend or
explain its human rights abuses to the rest of the world. As a result, when Amnesty International
began reporting on the crimes of his government, Jean-Claude Duvalier's most common response
was a careless public statement full of easily detectable falsehoods. Moreover, whereas Franqois
Duvalier had the luxury of ruling during a Cold War era when the United States felt it had no
other option than to protect the government of Haiti from both Cuba and the Dominican
Republic. Jean-Claude Duvalier was expendable, largely because of new variables in the
international system as the US and the USSR were moving towards detente. In addition, instead
of creating the impression that he was powerful dictator capable of maintaining stability,
Jean-Claude Duvalier's government showed its inability to use developmental assistance hnds
effectively and his well-publicized human rights abuses made him appear as though he was a
clumsy. pathetic ruler living off the system created by his legendary father In the end. it was his
lack of vision and imagination when dealing with the criticisms of the international community
that cost him his presidency. CHAPTER TWO
UNFOUNDED HOPES AND FALSE PROMISES THE TRANSITlON FROXI DICTATORSIZIP TO DELIOCKACY, 1986- 1990
The international community, as represented by the UN. NGOs. and concerned foreign governments. saw President lean-Claude Duvalier's departure to France on 7 February 1986 as an opportunity for Haiti to make the transition From dictatorship to democracy The international community felt that with its assistance. Haiti could create a political infrastructure whereby elections and referendums that had previously been examples of state corruption could now have the potential for allowing peacefbl transitions from one government to another. The international community also hoped that instead of intimidation and politically motivated killing. future
c.governments might gradually adopt rule of law as the measure for justice and state accountability.
Finally, there was a feeling that Haiti could become an active participant in the UN and OAS. and that it could normalize its relations with the Canadian and American governments. Obviously.
there was a tremendous amount of change that needed to take place. Yet for those monitoring
Haiti's development, it appeared as though a new, more just way of life was about to emerge from
the wreckage of the 1986 revolution.
The governments in Haiti who assumed power between 1986 and 1990, however, did not
share the international community's enthusiasm For either creating a democracy or eliminating human rights abuses. In the five years that followed Jean-Claude's departure, four governments -- two military, two civilian -- relied upon violence as a means of preserving order and state security.
At the same time. each of these four Haitian governments tried to convince the international community that it was an intermediary government on route to establishing a political culture that valued human rights. The irony of this posturing was that none of these governments were elected in a free and fair election. General Henri Namphy (7 February 1986 to 17 January 1988. 20 June to 18 September 1988) took control of the country after the revolution. Leslie Manigat ( 18
January to 20 June 1988) won what many considered a fixed election and was displaced by
Namphy after six months in ofice. Lt.-Gen. Prosper .i\vril( 18 September I988 to 1 1 March
1990) staged a military coup d'etat against Narnphy. And Judge Enha Pascal Trouillot ( 10 March to 16 December 1990) was appointed by Avril as a puppet leader
.As Haiti shifted from one regime to another. the international community reacted to each successive yovemment with cautious optimism. Human rights NGOs. the L'N. and concerned governments in Canada and the United States all recognized the various Haitian governments as
separate entities to be judged according to their individual human rights record: however. they
also had a limited tolerance for each Haitian administration. Once a human rights NGO or the
United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) uncovered evidence of either human
and civil rights crimes, or failure to hlfill promises to create democracy, they pressured concerned
foreign governments to take action. This in turn. usually resulted in revoked developmental
assistance. Granted. this negative publicity from NGOs and the withholding of foreign knds were
both limited and indirect forms of forcing the government of Haiti to comply with human rights
standards. and results were not guaranteed. But if nothing else, these forms of pressure revealed
an international commitment to Haiti that had not existed during the Duvalier eras, when mere lobbying for human rights improvements had prevailed. Now in the post-Duvalier era, concerned foreign governments, the United Nations, and human rights NGOs wanted democracy and civil rights for Haitians along with an end to violent government crimes, and they were prepared to adopt vigorous policies to achieve this goal.
Although never overtly articulated, the international community initially believed that Haiti's chances of becoming the Western Hemisphere's newest democracy were yreatest if its neighbours honoured its right to self-determination. This meant that the transition from the post-Duvalier era should be an internal matter to be resolved by the citizens of Haiti. Concerned foreign governments and NGOs would continue to provide technical and legal assistance so that Haiti possessed the resources to become a democracy; but the onus for change rested upon the
National Governing Council (CNG), the provisional military Qovernment under General Henri
Namphy. to set the schedule for local and federal elections. constitutional reform and the depoliticization of the armed forces. Therefore. if democracy was to become a fiaure of the
political system, Haitians had to be the ones to initiate reform. No one else could do it for them.
At the time. noninterference was the most feasible option available to the intemational
community for a number of reasons. Besides the obvious frailty of a democracy imposed by
outside forces. Haitians were also weary of any foreign intervention. which stemmed From the
days of the American occupation of Haiti from 19 15 to 1934. If the international community was
to send observers to oversee and assist the new government on matters of domestic policy. it
would essentially be an admission that the world did not feel that Haiti was ready for the right to
self-determination. The uncertainty associated with this laissez-faire policy was enormous. but no
other choice was really available. Given the disarray after the revolution, the international community's only option was to place its faith in the Haitian military as it was the only institution capable of stabilizing the country, even though that institution had been an accomplice to human rights abuses during the Duvalier era.
Human rights NGOs like Amnesty International and Americas Watch viewed the absence of checks and balances upon the National Governing Council with skepticism. Whereas foreign governments were more willing to discount human rights abuses as an intermediary stage to democracy, these NGOs believed that the abolition of arbitrary governing was a prerequisite to democracy. From the Canadian and American governments' perspective, the transition to democracy was very much along the lines of the legal-procedural theory in the sense that they saw
political change as a long term process that began with a strong central government who would
hold a Free and Fair election upon establishing order, which in turn would then lead to a political
system that valued human rights. From the human rights NGOs' perspective, however, democracy
began with human rights. IF government repression compromised tieedom of speech or freedom
of assembly, then the legitimacv of an election was also in question. In a sense. the two opposing
approaches created a clticke,~-or-he-scenario. Both wanted the same end. but disagreed on
the means of achieving that end.
From a theoretical and ideological standpoint, the motivation behind the policy of
nonintervention was to test the universality of democracy. lf the poorest country in the Western
Hemisphere could overcome obstacles of disease. massive poverty and inequality amony classes,
severe environmental degradation, active paramilitary groups (the Tonton Macoutes and the
Leopards) and adopt western views on electoral competition and guarantees of individual
freedom, while still attempting to fblfill the basic needs of the population, then democracy could
be successfbl anywhere.' These expectations were lofty considering it was impossible to predict an accurate timeline for the completion of the transition. In retrospect, they were too unrealistic.
Haiti simply possessed too many economic and hstorical barriers to successfblly make the transition on its own. The country had still not recovered from the Ahcan Swine Fever epidemic of 198 1 - 1984, the economy was stagnant. the tourism industry was virtually nonexistent. and the military remained the strongest player in the political arena. Thus. by limiting itself to diplomatic
pressure involving deveiopmental aid as a reward for adhering to a set of prescribed rules, foreign
governments and lGOs did not offer adequate incentive for the provisional government of Haiti to
relinquish power and overcome these obstacles.' One reason for the limited pressure was that the
concerned foreign governments believed that the various Haitian governments from 1986 and
1 990 all wanted a democratic political system. They assumed that with Jean-Claude Duvalier's
departure. a more progressive executive could emerge in the wake of the revolution,
What the international community did not realize was that the military simply filled the void
created by Jean-Claude's absence. After the revolution. the relationship between the military and
the general population remained the same: the Haitian masses had not suddenly become
empowered. They may have displaced the president and the Macoutes. but the military had
remained relatively unscathed. Moreover, with Jean-Claude's fall. the military no longer had to
compete for power with the Duvalierists. The system of checks and balances upon the army's
strength that had previously been a fixture during the Duvalier era had disappeared. Consequently,
the army and the Duvalierists reversed positions. Instead of the army having, to answer to the
civilian government and the Macoutes, the Duvaliensts now had to comply with the whims of the
military. Unfortunately, it was a reversal of fomne that ultimately did nothing to ameliorate the
plight of the Haitian people. Nonetheless, the intemational community initially endorsed the CNG because it gave every indication that it was intent on reforming Haiti's political system. In October of 1986, Haiti's representative to the United Nations told the General Assembly that General Namphy would turn
Haiti into a responsible member of the international community by developing a "healthy political democracy" able to prevent the reemergence of a dictatorship and address the needs of the 4.5 million Haitians living in absolute poverty ' It was an impressive goal. and Namphy appeared to be carwing out his promises. Upon talung office. he scheduled the tirst and second rounds of the presidential elections for November 1987 and February 1988, freed political prisoners left behind from the Duvalier regime, welcomed back former exiles, and announced that there would be an aggressive campaign against those in Haiti who profited from the intemational drug trade.' Two months later. he showed the international community that Haiti was ready to participate in solving qlobal issues by voting in favour of a number of United Nations humanitarian projects in support b of the UN Decade of Cultural Development. as well as a motion condemning products that were
deemed harmhl to "health and environment "' On the human rights front. a team of experts from
the ECOSOC Council led by Canadian Michel Gauvin -- an outspoken diplomat who had
previously served in Hanoi. the Congo, and the Dominican Republic. and had also served as
chairman of the UN International Control Commission (KC) duriny the Vietnam War -- were
satisfied that the CNG was relying less upon terror and intimidation and more upon due process
of law to maintain order. Of the six human rights cases it presented to the Council. only one
involved a crime against the integrity of persons that took place after Jean-Claude's departure
Born Haiti." Considering the level of abuses that had been committed during the days of Papa and
Baby Doc, these isolated disturbances represented a remarkable progression forward. For Canada, Namphy's rise to power was more than just a victory for democracy in the
Western Hemisphere: it was an opportunity to divert much of the criticism facing the Mulroney
Sovemment for its relationship with Haiti during the Jean-Claude era. During the 1986 revolution, as the attention of the international community focused on Haiti. the Liberal Party had begun to accuse the Conservatives of unwittingly allowing CIDA Funds to be redirected into the hands of
Haiti's wealthy landowners. The Mulroney government had rebutted by claiming that CIDA worked primarily through Canadian businesses and NGOs, with only a small tiaction of the total payment going to the Sovernment of Haiti. However. the opposition had touched upon a controversial issue. In the years prior to the revolut~on,both the United Nations and human rights
NGOs had on numerous occasions denounced Jean-Claude Duvalier as a compt and oppressive
Head of State, and so it was quite conceivable that at least a ponion of Canadian development assistance had at one point or another been misappropriated towards less than humane enterprises. The Liberals had wanted this to end. In February 1986 as riots erupted. they had demanded that the Canadian government withhold aid and eliminate foreign investment and financiny until Duvalier honoured human riyhts and democracy.' Their feeling was that if ClDA could not guarantee that funds would reach their intended destination, then there was no way of knowiny whether Canada was indirectly contributing to the abuses. The Conservatives had responded that withholding aid would punish the people of Haiti more than it would Duvalier. especially at such a volatile time when the economy was in such a state of disarray. Still. the
Liberals were not convinced, yet they knew of no other solution. To cut off hnds entirely would jeopardize the work and safety of the 2000 Canadians working through NGOs in Haiti, yet there
was no other way to ensure that Duvalier did not divert the money that his government had
allotted for development projects towards arms and munitions. With Narnphy taking office, however, this problem virtually disappeared. Unlike Jean-Claude' s regime, the National
Governing Council did not have an obvious history of human rights abuses or corruption, meaning all the controversy over the misuse of CIDA hnds was for the moment no longer relevant to any hture relationship between Ottawa and Port-au-Prince. In fact, the change in Haitian yovemments put immediate pressure upon the Canadian govemment to renew its commitment to developmental assistance in Haiti since Namphy needed the support of the international community in preparing for a subsequent transfer of power to an elected civilian government.
In March 1987, CIDA responded to the needs of the CNG by granting $10.5 1 million in government-to-government bilateral assistance to Haiti. roughly three times the amount it had given the year before.' The primary purpose of this money was to train Haitian officials for the upcoming November elections."Following this announcement, CIDA sent the Minister of
External Relations. Monique Landry, to Haiti to discuss Canada's role in the government of
Haiti's new hrterim ilerrfopmo~tProgram, as well as to invite General Namphy to the Summit of la Francophonie in Quebec City in September of 1987.'"As the closest geographical Francophone nation to Quebec. Haiti had long been an important source of immigration for "la Belle Province." both skilled and unskilled. Now that Jean-Claude was out of office, and human rights abuses
seemed to have stopped, there was little reason for French-Canadians not to welcome Haiti into a
group of French nations that could appreciate Haiti's cultural isolation within a region that was
predominantly Spanish.
The United States Agency for International Development also placed a tremendous amount
of faith in Namphy's government. Prior to the revolution, the United States government had cut
off aid to the Duvalier government after President Reagan had announced that the incidents of
human rights abuses had violated the terms of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985." But with Jean-Claude in France, USAD now asked Congress to hnd a program geared towards the fulfillment of basic needs and the promotion of private sector development in light assembly manufacturing as well as a reduction of export taxes on Haitian
coffee. The reasoning behind this policy was that other than the obvious humanitarian benefits of
developmental assistance, it was in the best interest of the United States if Haiti had a stable
political environment, especially given its ~eographicproximity to both Cuba and the Panama
Canal.'' The Republican Congress ayreed even though Haiti had never been a threat to American
national security, or a communist client state. As a result, USAID received finding for various
projects involving: reforestation. basic health and education. irrigation development, school
feeding programs. and a continuation of the Interim Swine Repopulation project to combat the
effects of the African Swine Fever epidemic. As had been the case with CIDA and the Canadian
government. the Republicans saw General Namp hy as a partner capable of not only helping
Haitians. bct also assisting the economic interests of the United States.
The mistake that CIDA and USAID made in assisting the sovemment of Haiti was that they
both believed that Narnphy was not interested in retaining power They thought that his primary
concern was to reestablish law and order by weeding out the remaining elements of the Duvalier
era so that the country could freely elect a new civilian president. Alas. it was an easy mistake to
make. In the first four months into his term, Namphy had already set a timeline for the next
Presidential elections, and had promised to disband the Tonton Macoutes. Eight months later, the
National Governing Council had created a constitutional assembly consisting of various sectors of
society whose responsibility was to rewrite the constitution to include checks and balances upon
the power of the President and the Haitian military. For instance, the CNG created the position of
the Prime Minister who had the power to object to any cabinet appointments. It also limited the military's role in law enforcement to occasions when the police were unable to hlfill their role in maintaining order. Once completed, the new constitution was overwhelmingly accepted on 29
March 1987 in a nationwide referendum.
Afier only twelve months in office. these were all remarkable steps forward in the transition towards democracy. By strengthening the legislative institutions while simultaneously weakening the influence of those who had traditionally held power, General Narnphy gave the impression that he had embarked upon a much more comprehensive reform program that than was called for in a legal-procedural approach to democracy. It was an ambitious campaign. Nevertheless, there was no reason to suspect that the political environment would deteriorate.
But this would soon change -- in July 1987. wide scale. state-sponsored violence broke out during the tirst phase of the elections Among the first to report that the democratization process had been sidetracked was the human rights group Washington Office on Haiti (WOH). who believed that the reasons for violence were associated with the CNG's decision to ban Church groups and union leaders from ('etrtmlr Al/?otrome des 7kuvaillrrrr.sHtrrtrera from fielding candidates. To combat the protests. the military resorted to violence to keep the demonstrators under control. " Four weeks later, WOH reported that the Tonton Macoutes. in league with wealthy landowners. had massacred anywhere from 300 to 700 peasants in the rural town of
Jean-Rabel suspected of belonging to the popular peasant goup i'rr Amam (Heads Together)."
The significance of these events was that in less than one month, Haiti had reverted to a repressive
state. For one thing, it was now obvious that the Macoutes continued to intimidate without fear of
reprisal, despite Narnphy's promise to disband the group. Worst of all, it appeared as though the
army was making no effort to conduct the elections in a safe environment. Unfortunately, these
newly exposed crimes were only the beginning. November 1987 was a particularly violent month in Haiti. As the second round of
Presidential elections neared, Duvalierists began an aggressive campaign to reclaim what they had lost to the revolution. Article 29 1 of the new constitution barred anyone formerly associated with the Duvaliers From running for office. This not only excluded the Macoutes but also those who had made their livelihood as bureaucrats and politicians under Francois and Jean-Claude Duvalier.
Since they could now no longer protect their interests through government, violence was the most feasible alternative for this group. On 2 November, the Duvalierists burned down the Provisional
Electoral Council (CEP) headquarters, attacked human rights activist and leader of the Christian
Democratic Party. Sylvio Claude. and fired machine guns at a voter registration office. all because
the government had deemed 12 of the 35 presidential candidates ineligible to mn for the
presidency because of their Duvalierist affiliations " Still, the international community watched
on, hoping that General Namphy and the army would soon regain enough control of the country
to provide a safe environment for a fair election. This hope never came to pass. On 29 November.
armed assailants gunned down thirty people in line to vote in the suburb of Carrefour Fouille.
Port-au-Prince shutting down the election and the CEP: and the Haitian military took another 46
Haitians from the same area to the Fort Dimanche penitentiary where they were killed for their
pro-democracy demonstrations.
Outside Haiti, members of the international community wondered what had gone wrong. The
people at Amnesty International blamed the Tonton Macoutes and the army. They felt that the
attack was part of a covert plan on the part of the Namphy government and the Duvalierists to
create the impression of political instability, thereby justifymg the postponement of the elections. '"
In the United Nations General Assembly, Cuba attributed the killings to "Yankee Imperialism,"
accusing the superpower of assisting the military junta (with financial aid and diplomatic support) and then remaining silent after the massacre took place. Any military intervention on the part of the United States under the pretext of "saving lives," Cuba argued. would be interpreted as a blatant violation of Haiti's right to self-determination in the same context as the Bay of Pigs invasion in 196 1. the occupation of the Dominican Republic in 1965. and the invasion of Grenada in 1983." The United States rebutted the Cuban claim by stoppiny aid payments to Haiti and then accusing Castro's government of funding those who disrupted the elections.'"n Canada, the opposition Liberal Pany blamed Namphy and the CNG for the attack upon the innocent voters and immediately called for the Mulroney government either to reduce aid or cut it otfaltogether.
The Conservatives replied that they needed more information before they could make a decision and that any action the government took would be in concert with LIN policy "' Eight days later, the Mulroney government gave in to opposition pressure and recalled Canada's ambassador to
Haiti. The significance of the uproar was that regardless of who was directly or indirectly responsible for the events at Carrefbur Fouille. in the end General Namphy and his cohons had lost all credibility with the international community His indifference towards the massacre
Followed by the dismissal of the CEP showed the world that he was no better than his predecessors, and that he had no intention of turning power over to a Freely elected civilian
president.
Canada and the United States each assumed that they could weaken Narnphy's power base by
using government-to-government bilateral aid as leverage and by publicly voicing their
disapproval. On 8 January 1988. the Canadian International Development Ayency announced in a
press conference that all funds for Haiti would be channeled solely through NGOs, private
Canadian businesses, and multilateral organizations until the present government of Haiti
conducted an internationally recognized electi~n.'~'Similarly, the United States Agency for lnternational Development issued the same demand, and reduced total economic assistance to
Haiti from $96.5 million in 1987 to $36.9 million in 1988 after the failed election attempts ." Yet, in hindsight, neither CIDA nor USAID had made a bold decision. To withhold aid was to succumb to an isolationist sentiment whose appeal was disassociation without any meaninghl commitment to finding a solution. In many respects linking development assistance to human tights was the ideal solution for the Canadian and American governments since NGOs and multilateral organizations still received funding. The advantage of cutting government-to- government assistance was that neither Canadian nor American government could be accused of abandoning the victims of state oppression.
Luckily, withholding aid seemed to work. Shortly. after the aid transfers stopped. General
Narnphy announced that another round of presidential elections was scheduled for 17 January
1988. .Alter all the commotion, he suggested democracy had only been set back seven weeks.
Still. the international community was weary of Namphy's promise. and as the date approached, there were speculations whether its actions had been sufficient in bringing about an end to almost two years of military rule.
In the end. General Namphy defied the democratic process by fixing the election so that
historian Francois Leslie Maniyat was the victor. a ploy that the international community could
not in good conscience recognize as "free and fair." The ECOSOC Council (which at the time had
been reviewing human rights abuses in Haiti since the 1986 revolution) considered the election to
be fraudulent. citing a number of instances where the CNG had violently obstructed those who
were unsympathetic to the army from running for office. Just prior to the November 1987
elections. there were even more brutal actions: assassination attempts against the leaders of
opposition parties. including the CEP and the National Committee of the Congress of democratic Movements (CONACOM); the killing of foreign journalists on the 29 November by military and paramilitary personnel; and the murder of lawyer and presidential candidate,Yves Volel, on 13
October 1987." Two weeks later. the ECOSOC Council issued another report that criticized the government of Haiti hostility towards an independent judiciary, an autonomous police force and a more humane prison system I'
Despite these reports indicating that human rights conditions in Haiti had deteriorated. the
United Nations was unwilling to interfere, arguing that it should remain an internal matter for the
people of Haiti to resolve. Consequently. the ECOSOC Council decided against implementins
Resolution 1503, which gave it the legal authority to conduct a "confidential examination of the
human rights situation."'" The rationale behind this decision was that Franqois Manigat deserved a
chance to reform the system on his own. Whether he was a puppet for Namphy or not. his was a
new constitutionally recognized government without a record of human rights abuses The UN
was taking an enormous risk in granting Manigat carte bfnmhe;however. ~twas a risk that it had
to take The UN needed a pressing reason if it was to infinye upon Haiti's national sovereignty,
and in January 1988. that reason simply did not exist.
The Canadian govemment responded to the 17 January eiection by publicly criticizing the
National Governing Council. In the House of Commons, Liberal MP Rene Oeullet called it a
"Macoute election," and asked the Mulroney cabinet whether or not they would recognize the
newly elected Manigat govemment. The Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for External
Relations. Michel Champagne, reluctantly admined that the best the government could do was
denounce the election. yet accept Manigat on the grounds that the Haitian Constitution
recognized the CNG as the legitimate governing authority until the election of a new president."
Whether the election had been free and fair or not. the Canadian government had to honour Haitian law, which meant that diplomatic pressure remained the most viable option. However, to persuade the Haitian government to yield to a free and fair election, the Canadian government sent a parliamentary delegation in March to meet with Manigat. This ultimately proved to be a meaningless gesture. Canada did not have the resources or the inclination to use force against
Haiti, and Canadian investment was but a small fraction of the total revenue coming into the country. By itself, Canada could be nothing more than a partner in a series of developmental
assistance projects and a source of income for Haitians whose relatives in Montreal sent money
home. Therefore. the only option left to the Canadian government was to continue to withhold
development assistance.
In Washington. the response was virtually the same. Like the rest of the international
community. the American government also saw the 17 January election as undemocratic and
illesi t imate; and like the rest of the international community, the American government was also
virtually powerless in preventing the CNG from abusing its authority because Washington had
already stopped making government-to-government aid payments in November 1 987 its only
other options were to consider the threat of a trade ernbaryo or military intervention. and neither
of these was feasible without the support of the international community given Cuba's
condemnation of previous American unilateral actions in the Caribbean. Like the UN and Canada.
the best the US could do was wait patiently to see if Haiti could solve its internal problems on its
own accord.
By June, the results were disappointing. In his first six months in office Manigat proved to be
just as unconcerned about human rights as had been his predecessors. The ECOSOC Council
reported that since January, social conditions in Haiti had become as oppressive as those of the
Duvalier era, citing a report that estimated that more than 500 Haitians had lost their lives to state-sponsored violence.'" Amnesty International found in its examination of the prison conditions that children were imprisoned alongside adults, (which was a violation of Article 26 of
the 1987 constitution), most prisoners did not receive a trial within 48 hours of being arrested,
forced confessions by torture were rampant, and prison latrines often consisted of a 5-gallon
bucket to be shared among the fifty inmates that occupied each cell.''
What became obvious was that the Manigat government. like its predecessors. would use any
means to ensure its own survival. That being said, it was also obvious that neither General
Namphy's nor Manigat's position was secure. The loss of hnds %om the international community
had angered the wealthy merchant class whose livelihood depended upon that revenue." Only
with strong leadership could the existing govemment hope to retain the support of the economic
elite. and Manigat was clearly not up to the challenge. The irony for Namphy was that his puppet
president. who was expected to defend the interests of the army in the govemment. had become
his Achilles heel. As long as Manigat remained in office. the govemment was unduly exposing
itself to insurrection. It was a situation that Namphy could no longer afford to tolerate. On 19
June 1988 he staged a military coup. thus assuming the mantle of power for the second time.
The difference between General Namphy's second term and his first was that now he made
no secret about his desire to govern through a military dictatorship. One day after taking office. he
ordered the army to arrest members of the L)rmocratic Group of Propssive Natio~~uiists.In
July, he had human rights activist Joseph Lafontant assassinated. He then suspended the
constitution and dissolved both houses of the National Assembly. Two months later, soldiers
killed 1 1 people, injured another 70, and then burned down St. Jean Bosco Church in a failed
attempt to assassinate the popular Catholic Priest lean-Bertrand Ari~tide.'~Whereas in 1986
Namphy had created the impression that he was a tolerant Head of State, he now made no attempt to hide hs desire to eiiminate all people and institutions capable of posing a threat to his presidency. His mistake, however. was that he went too far, even by Haitian standards. In his attempt to rule by decree, he created widespread opposition within almost all elements of the
Haitian people. Fearing a massive rebellion, the military hierarchy decided to cut it losses: six days after the St. Jean Bosco burning, the Haitian army under the command of Lieutenant-General
Prosper Avril removed General Namphy from ofice.
The international community's response to Avril's bold action was for the most part one of
cautious relief It was encouraged that General Namphy was no longer in power, but unsure
whether the new government's pledge to honour human rights and institute democracy was
serious or just another gesture designed to appease criticism from inside and outside the country.
To deternine the extent of Avril's sincerity, the United Nations' ECOSOC council launched a
comprehensive study of the human rights conditions within Haiti in February 1989. Its report
stated that Haiti had become only slightly more humane since Namphy had left the government.
listing several areas where the government had failed to reform itself. For instance, the new
Haitian government made no attempt to investigate human rights abuses that had occurred since
1986. and Lt.-Gen. Avril had allowed Franck Romain, the former Mayor of Port-au-Prince and
primary suspect in the attack on St. Jean Bosco, to flee to the Dominican Republic and was
maluny no effort to have him extradited. Furthermore, Avril had not reinstated the Conseil
Electoral Provisoire, prison conditions were still deplorable. and the judiciary was insufficiently
independent from the executive. Finally. regonal government heads continued to have complete
control over the wral areas, and no steps had been taken to create a civilian police force." Although Amnesty international's recommendations were all essential to creating a just society that made people accountable for their crimes, reform in Haiti had proved difficult in the past. For generations the political culture had revolved around an authoritarian system that served the needs of the rich and powerful. To change this situation was to encourage massive criticism from the most powehl sectors the society From a domestic perspective, the safest option for
Lt.-Gen. Avril was simply to protect the status quo by leaving the yovernment's regional officials to yovern as they pleased. To do otherwise, was to invite others in the army to remove him as he
had removed Namphy.
Given this reality, the Canadian and American governments still agreed to assist Lt.-Gen.
.Avril in reforming Haiti's political system. The Canadian International Development Agency
granted $22.1O million (US) ($10 16 million of which was bilateral assistance) and began a joint
four-year AIDS prevention proyram in conjunction with McGill University, the World Health
Organization (WHO), and the Pan- American Health Organization ( P WO)." In the United States.
Congress decided that Avril had sufficiently reformed the political system to warrant giving $50
million in economic assistance ($12 million more than in 1988) under the condition that
government-to-government aid would resume once a new government was democratically
elected. ''
While these grants were important for Haiti's stability, they ultimately came at a heavy price
to Haitian rehgee claimants seeking asylum in Canada and the United States. Coinciding with
Lt &en. Avril' s new govemment, the United Nations reported that conditions had slightly
improved. The Mulroney and Bush administrations each interpreted this to mean that the political
climate was no longer dangerous in Haiti. As a result, both governments embarked upon
repatriation programs for Haitians who had just recently come as refugees. In Canada. the Minister of Employment and immigration, Barbara McDougall, announced to the House of
Commons on 23 October 1989 that 50 Haitian refugee claimants were to be deported on the grounds that it was safe for them to return to Haiti. When opposition members protested, she stated that if the Haitians wanted to remain in Canada, each deportee was required to bring his or her case before the Immigration Rehgee Board (IRB).'"n the United States, the State
Department was even less sympathetic towards the plight of these rehgees. It claimed that since fear of political reprisal had disappeared along with Namphy, US immigration officials could continue to repatriate any Haitians arriving on the shores of Florida.
The tragedy of these policies was that the United Nations did not believe that the Avril government had created a safe environment for the people of Haiti. The ECOSOC Council reported that on 16 May 1989 Avril allowed soldiers to open fire on crowds of Haitian peasants.
Afterwards the military made arrests without warrants, suspended Article 1 of the Constitution, imposed curfews from 7 to 14 April 1989. and issued a decree prohibiting NGOs from acting "as executing agencies of foreign governments on the national temtory or working with cooperatives without prior authorization."" It also believed that the only reason he had announced an upcoming Presidential election on 3 April 1989, was that he feared for his life after members of
Jean-Claude Duvalier's Leopard Corps tried to kidnap him at the Presidential Palace on 5 April, but were intercepted by Palace guards. Gwen the severity of these abuses, the United Nations
disapproved of the Canadian and American positions towards Haitian refbgees.
Americas Watch concurred with the United Nations' evaluation that Lt.-Gen. Avril was not
really interested in altering Haiti's political culture. It cited nine individual cases of human rights
abuses, the worst of which involved crimes where the military used violence against specific
activist groups who opposed the government." The implication of Americas Watch's report was that Avril was as deceptive as General Namphy had ever been, and that his reforms were nothing more than ploys to acquire financial assistance from the Bush administration in order to ward off internal pressure. In Americas Watch's opinion, Avril was not a reformer; he was simply another dictator who tried to survive by telling the international community exactly what it wanted to hear.
The Canadian and American governments wanted to believe Lt.-Gen. Avril respected human rights and democracy because doing so allowed them to turn back Haitian refugee claimants.
Neither government could justifi supporting Namphy or refusing to accept the refugees without opening itself up to severe criticism. especially considering each had already stopped issuing developmental assistance What Avril's presidency, however, allowed them to resume humanitarian aid while at the same time repatriate any rehgees on the pretext that conditions were safe enough for them to return home.
Americas Watch criticized this new position. It claimed that President Bush's promise to grant an extra $40 million in developmental assistance. in exchange for both a freely elected government and a pledge that the army would agree to abide by the constitution. did not go far
enough in promoting human rishts in Haiti. Americas Watch wanted the United States to use its
influence to demand more reforms instead of inadvertently giving the Avril government the
impression that it could secure aid with only a minimal amount of change to the political system.'"
If the United States was truly interested in bringing democracy to Haiti, Americas Watch argued,
it should demand that the Haitian government comply entirely with the Haitian Constitution. A
free and fair election and the promise that the army would refrain From using force against the
civilian population were simply not enough. To appease Americas Watch, Avril would have to show that he was moving towards the creation of a civilian police force, an independent judiciary, freedom of the press, and prison reform.
By only asking for a limited reform, the United States had inadvertently showed that it was more concerned with ending the flow of rehgees than in promoting human rights and democracy.
To illustrate just how little pressure was coming fiom Washington, it was only after the European
Economic Community criticized Avril for imposing a state of siege from 20 to 30 January 1990 that the United States publicly condemned his government." Luckily for the United States and the
rest of the international community. the internal pressure against Avril was strong enough to
persuade him to concede the presidency on 10 March 1 990 to civilian Enha Pascal-Trouillot . Her
primary role as provisional president was to organize the next round of presidential elections.
As had been the case with Namphy, Manigat. and Avril. the international community
responded to Pascal-Trouillot's presidency with great enthusiasm. Four days after entering office,
CDA rewarded the new Haitian leader with $150.000 in humanitarian aid. Eleven days later. the
agency promised $1 million in food aid and what it termed "small, labour-intensive community
projects."'~inally.Minister for External Relations and International Development, Monique
Landry, pledged another S 1 million through Elections Canada for the upcoming Presidential
election.'" Similarly, US AID also increased its involvement in Haiti. It provided the new Haitian
sovernment with technical assistance. elections training programs, and observer missions for the
election. Other USAID projects included: a child survival services project, a job creation program,
and a rural reforestation project to be implemented by local farmers? At this stage. only Amnesty
International was skeptical of the new president's commitment to human rights. One of its
research missions had found, for example, that in addition to the usual attacks against various
activist groups, the government had arrested the populist leaders and then burned down their houses." The difference between Pascal-Trouillot and the other three leaders. however, was that she at least upheld her promise for a free and fair election.
Father Jean-Bertrand Anstide and his Lnvalas party's election victory on 16 December 1990 was a validation that the five years of pressure upon governments of Haiti for democratic reform had not been in vain. To many in the international community, the election marked an end to what had been a frustrating policy whereby the various foreign sovemments had been hoodwinked into supporting Haiti' s military governments under the Mse pretext that meaninyfid social and political change was taking place. For instance, the Canadian and American governments' decisions to link developmental assistance to human rights had had a negligible impact on each Haitian military government's willingness to hand over control to a democratically elected government. Yet the very act of revoking aid proved two things. First, that concerned governments and the UN were listening to human rights NGOs and soliciting their expertise. Second. that the international community was willing to hold Haiti up to international standards for human rights. as well as to
assist Haiti to reach those standards. Now with Aristide in office. it appeared as though the
intermediary stage from dictatorship to democracy was over. AAer 33 years of oppressive
governments, Haiti finally appeared ready to build upon the momentum of the election by creating
democratic institutions that promoted individual freedom and human tights. Little did either
Aristide or the international community know, however, that within eight months into his
presidency Haiti would once again fall victim to a military coup. CHAPTER THREE
IMPOSING DEMOCRACY ON HMTI: AFUSTIDE, EMBARGOES, AND THE RISE OF NGOS, 199 1 - 19%.
From I October 199 1 to 16 October 1994, human rights abuses in Haiti rivaled those committed during the Duvalier years. The man responsible for this latest wave of violations was
General Raoul Cedras .As leader of the Haitian military and a paramilitary force known as the
FRAPH (Front pour I' Avancernent et le Progres d'Haiti). Cedras opposed Father Jean-Bertrand
Artistide's political and economic reforms that Favoured a redistribution of power and wealth from the traditional Haitian landowners and merchant classes to the urban and rural poor. On the night of 30 September 199 1. Lt-General Cedras successfully staged a military coup d'etat, exiling
Haiti's first democratically elected President. To avoid an uprising from .hstide3ssupporters, he employed his forces in forcefully eliminating all people and organizations directly and indirectly associated with the Lavalas movement.
The international community was slow to respond to the coup All agreed that this was a devastating blow to democracy in Haiti, yet no one knew what course of action to take other than
diplomatic condemnation. The Organization of American States. for instance. responded by
cailing upon its members to suspend all commercial relations with Haiti. This solution, however, was ineffective since underground smuggling and shipments of goods to Europe continued to find their way into the hands of those who held Haiti hostage.
To compound the problem, thousands upon thousands of Haitians began to flee the country on tiny wooden boats destined for neighbouring Caribbean countries and the southern coast of
Florida. The US government's response to the refbgee crisis was to forcibly repatriate the "boat people" on the grounds that they were economic migrants, not political refugees. Human rights
NGOs protested against Washington's treatment of these Haitian asylum seekers, with advocacy groups such as Amnesty international and Human Rights Watch joining forces with high profile celebrities in a campaign to not only pressure the United States into reconsidering its refugee policy, but also take action in restoring Aristide to his position as president.
The erect of this NGO pressure was threefold First. the United States began a series of negotiations aimed at returning hstide to the Presidency, the most notable of which was the
Governors Island Agreement of July 1993. When these talks failed. the OAS and UN expanded
their economic embargoes to include all soods save for humanitarian supplies. Still. Cedras
retLsed to relinquish power. As a final resort, the US threatened to invade Haiti with a United
Nations Multinational Force (MNF). Ultimately, this latest ultimatum was successhl. Sensing that
he could no lonser withstand intemational pressure. Cedras stepped down after histide agreed to
grant him amnesty for his crimes against the people of Haiti. And on 16 October 1994, the coup
d'etat that had plagued Haiti for nearly 3 years was officially over as Aristide resumed office.
This pressure upon Cedras illustrated a final stage in the international cornmunity's
willingness to protect human rights in Haiti. Up until this latest coup, concerned governments, the
OAS, and the UN had never before been prepared to use economic sanctions and military force to
compel the government of Haiti to comply with international demands. Granted, never before had a refugee crisis premeditated such a drastic response. However, the economic sanctions and military threat were not as much a response to the plight of the Haitians as it was a reaction to the growing influence of NGOs on both the United Nations and concerned national governments.
Without grassroots pressure from these independent agencies. there was little reason for
Washington to alter its rehgee policy or seek a resolution. Moreover, when the US government finally began negotiations in order to resolve the crisis. it went through the United Nations
Security Council; its actions against Cedras were, therefore. legal according to international law.
This intervention had the effect of not only protecting human rights in Haiti, but also of enhancing the reputation of those NGOs who began the movement back in the 1 970s to end oppression under successive Haitian presidents.
Among those to first denounce the coup was the Canadian yovemment. From a purely fiscal
perspective, it had good reason to protest. The one million dollars Canada had invested in the
Haitian election now appeared wasted. From a political standpoint. there was also good reason to
condemn the coup. Cedras and his henchmen had violently obstructed democracy and violated
human rights. The ramifications of his actions affected not only Haitians -- of which there was a
sizable population living in Montreal -- but also all in Canada who valued a political system based
upon individual freedom. Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was particularly vocal about the
insurrection. In a highly energized speech to the House of Commons the day after the coup, he
addressed the usurpers as "gang of hoodlums," and promised that the government would do
everything in its power to restore Aristide to his rightful position as President.'
It was a remarkable speech considering that just two years earlier his government had
deported Haitians because it believed Haiti was no longer dangerous under Lt.-Gen. Avril. It was even more impressive in that Barbara McDougall, former Minister of Employment and
Immigration responsible for repatriating the refbgees in 1989, was now Canada's representative on the OM' mission to investigare the coup. in sum. in the course of two years Canadian authorities had shifted to a position of relative indifference over Haiti's internal living conditions to that ofheing a leadiny advocate for endiny human rights atrocities. It was a complete about-face. Yet, it was an about-face that no one in Parliament was willing to contest. Not one member challenged the hypocrisy of the government or accused Mulroney of ignoring the
problem. Parliament unanimously supported the Prime Minister's decision to end the deportation
of Haitian refugee claimants, cut of all bilateral aid to the Haitian government, and join the rest of
the international community in opposing the Haitian military.
Similarly, the Organization of American States was the first international governing body to
condemn the coup. On 3 October, it asked foreign governments and the United Nations Security
Council to impose diplomatic sanctions. and suspend all commercial relations. especially those
relating to the military. police. and security assistance in the fonn of arms and munitions ' If
Cedras was to yovern Haiti, the OAS wanted him to do so without any outside assistance. The
rationale behind the sanctions was that by weakeniny Cedras' position. the OAS could force him
into negotiating a settlement. Six days later, the OAS tested Cedras' resolve by sending a civilian
mission to Haiti, the OASIDEMOC, to negotiate an arrangement to return Atistide to office.'
Cedras balked at the effort. To Haitians. the OAS had never been a credible organization in terms
of settling conflicts in the Caribbean and there was no obvious reason to believe that things had
changed. Besides, the OAS' sanctions had a limited effectiveness since trade still took place
between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and European ships were still docked at Haitian ports.
If the OAS wanted to seriously cripple Cedras' access to foreign goods, it had to do more than preach about the injustices of the coup to the United Nations: it had to convince the United States to actively join in the effort to restore Aristide.
The Bush Administration had reservations about intervening in Haiti. At a press conference on 4 October in which Aristide was present, President Bush issued Executive Order 12775. which declared a state of emergency in Haiti. But when asked by reporters if he was willing to use force for Haiti as he had for Kuwait, the President replied: " .. the two situations are not parallel at all, entirely different."4Only if American lives were in danger would the American President agree to send American troops to participate in a multinational force. Othenvise, the burden fell upon the
OAS to solve the problem. Bush's reluctance went even t'unher in that it was not until the end of
October -- a whole month after the coup -- that his government finally issued Executive Order
12779, which ordered US public and private companies to freeze all Haitian assets, including overseas branches; halt all payments to the de fucm reyime; and prohibit all trade between Haiti and the US. with the exception of food products and informational materials.'
The US State Department's reason for the delayed response to the coup was that it claimed
that it had revoked support for .i\ristide because NGOs had found that his government was guilty
of human rights abuses. which had shifted from state-endorsed violence to dechotikqe. or mob justice. For instance, Amnesty International and Americas Watch each reported that military and
paramilitary personnel who had previously been protected by the state were now subject to
lynchings and/or a particular form of torture known as PGrr Lrhnm, a fom of punishment
whereby the victim had a burning tire placed around his or her neck." Both NGOs argued that
Aristide should have spoken-out against this popular vigilantism, and that hs government should
have conducted a more thorough attempt at upholding rule of law. The National Labour Committee (NLC), however, believed the American government's reluctance to intervene was in part due to large American commercial interests in Haiti.
Companies such as Wal-Mart, J.C. Penny, and Sears had been taking advantage of Haiti's inexpensive labour supply by paying their textile workers the equivalent of $0.14 (US) per hour without any benefits or pensions and they resisted any attempts to change this system. But one of
-4ristide's first priorities as president had been to convince the Haitian parliament to pass legislation that would raise the minimum wage to $0.37 (US) per hour, a policy which angered these US based multinatiod companies who objected to the increase in wages.' But with Cedras in control. the NLC found that American firms did not have to worry about rising wages because many of Cedras' supporters were wealthy Haitians who received the contracts fiom these large companies. Furthermore, the army had disbanded the unions, thus eliminating any job security that would otherwise have been guaranteed to the workers.
The victims of the United States' indifference to political conditions in Haiti after the coup were ultimately the boat people landing off the coast of Florida. In the immediate weeks following
the coup, the US State Department aryued that these people were escaping poverty, not a new
government that was more oppressive than the one before. And since these were labeled as
economic refugees, the United States was not obliged under international law to grant them
asylum. As a result, the US Coast Guard temporarily housed those that it intercepted on the high
seas at Guantanamo Bay. Cuba, where immigration the authorities screened for those with
legitimate fears of persecution, while the rest were forcibly repatriated. President Bush defended
this policy on the grounds that it was safer for Haitians to stay at home than to risk crossing the
sea. He wanted to send the message that repatriation would help discourage others thinking of
leaving. While evidence from NOSlater revealed that Bush's assumption regarding Haitians' motives for tleeing was untrue, the US President was correct that the voyage tiom Haiti to
Florida was danserous. The poor condition of the wooden boats, the lack of Fresh water, the sudden storms. and the hazards of shark attacks, all hindered the refbgees' chances of completing the journey. But what was left unsaid was that neither the Bush government nor the American public were enthusiastic about accepting and caring for what could potentially turn out to be tens of thousands of refuyees who were predominantly poor, unskilled. Negroes coming from a country where HIV was reaching epidemic proportions. When asked by reporters if the same policy would apply to Cubans if Castro fell, Bush answered that it would not because that would be an entirely different situation: if Castro were to be displaced, Cubans would be returning to
Cuba. not exiting, as was the case with Haitians king along with i2ristide's ousting."
Amnesty International was appalled at Washington's appraisal that the boat people were tleeing poverty. According to interviews it conducted. in just the first few days after the coup, the army had already murdered more than fifty civilians in the Cite Soleil district of Port-au-Prince. another thirty to forty in the district of Larnentin 54, and six more in Gonaives. There were even
unconfirmed reports of soldiers shooting at ambulances that were attending to the victims. In
addition to these atrocities, the FRAPH fired shots at Aristide's Lafamni Selavi orphanage simply
because of its ties to the exiled President, and Cedras arrested Lavalas supporters in the districts
of Carrefour Feuille and Les Cayes without warrant." Finally, on 7 October, Cedras appointed
Supreme Court Judge Joseph Nerrette provisional President, and on 14 October. Jean-Jacques
Honorate, Executive Director of the Clmne Hultien des Droites et Libertes Publiqwes
(CHADEL),the provisional Prime Minister. Both men had ties to the army.
The United Nations General Assembly reacted to these human rights atrocities by publicly
condemning Cedras. On 18 October. Canada's McDougall told the United Nations General Assembly that neither the international community nor the people of Haiti were willing to tolerate
Cedras' rule, and that the UN must use "moral force and political will" to return Anstide to power so that the crisis did not threaten democracy in the Western Hemisphere."'
Meanwhile, the OAS sanctions were proving ineffective against Cedras and his cohorts. Oil and petroleum products still found their way to the anny General Michel Fran~ois,Cedras' right-hand man, used his ties with to the Colombian Cali drug cartel to secure a source of revenue for the army." The only ones being punished by the OAS. therefore, were the people of Haiti and the humanitarian NGOs who relied upon hnds from foreiyn governments since it was impossible to ensure that food and medical shipments reached their intended destinations. Furthermore. as long as the army was in control, the OAS had no influence over looting or highjacking; and as long as European countries continued to trade with Haiti, the OAS lacked the resources to
adequately isolate Cgdras kom the rest of the world. Thus, Cedras' continued dominance over
Haiti proved that the OAS' limited sanctions were essentially a case of half-hearted hardpower
diplomacy that revealed little more than how unprepared the international community was at
confrontiny the Haitian military. The sticking point was that OAS members knew they had to be
forceful -- they could accept nothing less than the restoration of the democratically elected
sovemrnent. Yet, their dilemma was that they did not know how to prevent the FRAPH tiom
committing human rights violations while still guaranteeing that Haitians would have enough food
to eat. Neither did they know how to put a stranglehold on the economy while still preventing
rehgees from fleeing in greater numbers than ever before.
In sum, the OAS simply did not know how to appear strong and rnercihl at the same time,
and consequently it failed at each task. The reason for the failure was that none of its members
were willing to support the sanctions with any meaningfbl force, either economic or military. Nor were they willing to provide relief or shelter for those who fell victim to government coercion other than the makeshift camp at Guantanamo Bay. Neighbouring Latin American and Caribbean countries did not house Haitian asylum seekers. and much of the rehgee processing that was conducted by the US tmmigration Naturalization Service took place inside Haiti. These limitations revealed that no one wanted to seriously confiont the problem. Foreign governments wanted Cidras to step down but did not want to commit the necessary resources to force him tiom office.
The primary ramification of the OAS' deficiencies was that human rights abuses continued to go unchallenged. In January 1992, Amnesty International claimed that conditions in Haiti had never been worse. It reported that after three months, Cedras had completely eradicated all grassroots organizations. reestablished the authority of the regional governors known as the Chefs clr Sectiorr, issued "hit lists" on the radio, burned down houses, attacked both domestic and
foreign clergy. and had permitted his soldiers to perform rape as a "weapon of terror."" As
terrible as these crimes were, what made them worse was that no foreign yovernment seemed
committed to doing anythiny about them.
Another reason for the international community's lack of enthusiasm for intervention in 1992
was that Cedras' coup d'etat was primarily motivated by a quest for power. The crisis in Haiti did
not involve genocide or ethnic cleansing, as was the case with the atrocities committed in Bosnia
and Somalia. Neither was the Haitian army persecuting a specific group because of its reliyious
beliefs, or ethnic background. For that matter. the leaders of the coup were not espousing
communism or hoarding oil. No foreign invasion force had landed on the coast and taken over the
government. Haiti's national sovereignty had not been violated. This was a conflict in which the
aggressors were Haitians and the victims were Haitians. Other than the fact that one group wore green khakis and carried a gun while another was shoeless and unarmed, there were no physical differences between the protagonist and the antagonist. This crisis was not even a case of mulatto versus black. The only distinguishmg features were rich versus poor. strong versus weak, few versus many. Racism and the absence of any significant strategic or economic interests were also important factors in the international community's apathy; however. the cloudy distinctions between oppressor and oppressed, coupled by an eleven year bilateral agreement between the
Reagan and Jean-Claude Duvalier administrations that allowed the US to repatriate boat people. provided the Bush Administration with the perfect justification for ignoring international law
regarding rehgee protocol by classifying all those who fled Haiti into the category of economic
refugees. The only problem wth this policy fiom Washington's point of view was that by the end
of February 1992, the United Nations estimated that roughly 20.000 "economic" refusees had fled
in the four months since the coup, and more were tleeing everyday "
To resolve the boat people crisis. Aristide met with a Haitian Parliamentary Negotiating
Commission to draft a protocol agreement for his return. On 11 March, Haiti's Permanent
Representative to the United Nations, Fritz Longchamp. submitted an agreement containing
signatures ti-om Aristide and the two representatives fiom the Jefacto government to the General
Assembly. It was not a perfect document by any means. but at least both sides had reached an
initial compromise. The agreement stated that in exchange for the creation of democratic
institutions to protect civil liberties in Haiti, and the separation of the police and military, Aristide
would make two major concessions. The first was Article 4, which recognized the Prime Minister
as the legal Head of State an3 Government while the President was abroad. The second, Article 5,
granted a general amnesty to all except "common criminals." and disallowed "intervention by
foreign armed forces in the settlement of Haitian affairs."'" From Aristide's point of view. these were not minor concessions. He had agreed to pardon a terrorist and limit the international community's role in overseeing democracy. Indeed, in hindsight, Aristide believed he had conceded too much. Had the United States not pressured him to reach a settlement, he maintains that he would not have accepted these demands. Ultimately, it did not matter. Cedras reneged on agreement shortly after the Commission returned to Haiti. and with this diplomatic failure. the rehgee crisis worsened.
Washington estimated that by the spring of 1992, the total number of those who had left Haiti was close to 34.000. To prevent a hnher exodus to the United States. Bush issued Executive
Order 12807. the hrerdic.viorz of illepl dlierls on 24 May, which instructed the Coast Guard to repatriate Haitian refbgees without brinyiny ;hem to Guantanamo Bay. To Bush. these people were still economic refugees who were receiving $47 million in humanitarian aid tiom the US and
so they did not even warrant being screened by the Immigration Naturalization Senice."
Many in the international community looked upon Bush's decision with disfavour. In the
Canadian House of Commons, New Democratic Pany MP Dan Heap demanded that the
Mulroney government not only condemn the US President's refilyee policy, but also to implement
section 62 of the Immiqation Act which would allow Haitians to apply for entry into Canada.'"
Similarly. at the United Nations. Aristide argued that Bush had violated Article 33 of the
International Convention on the Status of Refigees, and that the High Commissioner for
Refbgees should consult the International Court of Justice to determine the legality of the
Executive Order."
Americas Watch agreed with Aristide. Not only did it denounce Executive Order 12807. but
it also highhghted the procedural errors that took place while the INS had still been operating its
screening process. For instance, Americas Watch found that the INS and Coast Guard screened and repatriated 10,562 rehgees on the grounds that they had only a "credible fear," not a legitimate fear. of being victimized if sent home." It particularly blamed Gunter 0.Wagner, Head of the INS mission in Haiti, for the lack of compassion, and claimed that he lacked the necessary expertise to legitimately judge each case since he knew little about either Haitian or US rekgee law To make matters worse, Americas Watch also discovered that INS interviews inside Haiti lasted only five minutes, two of which focused on the likelihood of persecution. and Haitian military officials were often present during the interviews, and were asked to deny or corroborate information."' These procedural flaws would have continued to go unchallenged had it not been for a lawsuit against Secretary of State James Baker by an American interest group known as the
Haitian Refugee Center (HRC).
To resolve the human rights and retkgee crises, Aristide turned to the United Nations to
intervene. Mer the failure of the protocol agreement, the OAS and Aristide had be,oun a new
round of negotiations to determine if the two sides could come to an agreement as to who would
be the Prime Minister. Aristide wanted Rene Preval, a man whose allegiance was to the Lavalas.
Parliament wanted either Marc Bazin. who was in league with Cedras. or Rene Theodore, the
leader of the Communist Party. Much to the dismay of the OAS. Aristide rejected both of these
choices. As a result. the army went ahead with Bazin, swearing him in on 19 June. In retaliation.
Aristide and the OAS called upon the international community to once again reinforce the
economic embargo and end all military shipments to Haiti. To persuade the world to comply with
the sanctions, Aristide stood before the General Assembly and delivered a speech that sounded
much like a religious sermon. He argued that that there could never be human rights in Haiti as
long as there were vast socioeconomic inequalities between the rich and the poor; not only in his
country, but also between the First World and the Third World. The implication of this statement was that the recent political problems in Haiti were not solely the result of an internal power struggle between two factions. On the contrary, they were a product of the global economy. He estimated that 3000 Haitians had died at the hands of the army since October 1991 because wealthy Haitians opposed his plans to promote civil rights and redistribute the nation's wealth.
"Blood is flowing," he preached. "[Tlhe corpses are being heaped up. Never has Haiti experienced such a ferocious and bloody dictatorship."'" He blamed the OAS for not imposing stricter sanctions. lf the crisis was to be resolved, Aristide believed the UN had to become involved. It was the only international body with the resources to end the conflict. Luckily For
Aristide. the UN agreed to assist the OAS, whose inabiiity to resolve the crisis once again became obvious as Cedras defiantly staged parliamentary elections on 18 January 1993.
Amnesty International concurred with Aristide's appraisal of the OAS' ineffectiveness it argued that the army had compensated for the embargo by forcing the peasants and townspeople to either pay protection money or flee the country.'' To raise awareness. -41 initiated a
letter-writing campaign aimed at ending Washington's retiigee policy and at reversing the State
Department's decision to deny human rights experts access to the refbgees still at Guantanamo
Bay in the letters. members were instructed to protest against two particular violations: first, the
lack of medical and legal assistance being given to those at Guantanarno Bay, particularly the 230
rehgees who were HIV positive and needed immediate attention; and second, Bush's Executive
Order 12807, which was in direct violation of Article 33 of the 195 1 UN Convention relating to
the Status of Refbgees. The letters were to be sent to newly elected President Bill Clinton,
Secretary of State Warren Christopher, the Attorney General, and Christine Sale, Acting
Commissioner of the INS. In Canada, the OAS' deficiencies was a controversial issue. The Mulroney government, who had brought Canada into the OAS in the autumn of 1989. found itself having to defend the organization in the House of Commons. Liberal MP Lloyd kwwonhy called the embargo a
"charade" because Europe had thus far refused to comply with the sanctions.'' The New
Democratic Party's Svend Robinson added to the condemnation by criticizing the United States for easing its sanctions the previous February under the pretext that the situation had improved.
Both men were appalled by the international community's lack of concern for Haiti. particularly when compared to the emort displayed in resolving the crises in Somalia and Bosnia. Canada. they argued, should not be an accomplice to international efforts that value some regions over others.
Moreover. they believed that Canada should dissociate itself from the OAS policy and pass a motion ursjng all other states to comply with the economic sanctions so that the people of Haiti will know that Canada had not forgotten them.
Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs Benno Friesen responded to the criticisms by accusing Axworthy of being preoccupied with "high-minded
principles" that were "far removed from anythiny to do with Haiti."" Friesen then explained that
the OAS and the UN were the organizations that would restore peace and democracy to Haiti.
And it was in these international arenas where Canada was having its greatest impact. For
instance. Canada's .Ambassador to the United Nations, Louise Frechette. had already called upon
the LrN to join the OAS in halting all petroleum and military shipments to Haiti. Granted, there
were problems with the current sanctions; however, to abandon the OAS was not the solution.
Only with solidarity, he argued, would Cedras' resolve break and Aristide be returned to power.
The Liberals countered that this was yet another example of government rhetoric without action.
In their opinion the Conservatives could do more. The Conservatives disagreed. When it came time to vote on Axworthy's motion for Canada to disassociate itself with the OAS effort, they defeated it in favour of remaining an active partner in the search to find a resolution to the Haitian crisis.
Despite the growing criticism from Aristide. Amnesty International and the Canadian government, the OAS and the United Nations remained firm in their decision to force a settlement through economic sanctions. Together they determined that the embargo would be most effective if foreiyn yovernments denied Haitian ships access to their ports. It was a subtle change in policy, but nonetheless. one that had tremendous implications to those Haitians with ties to American multinational corporations. The result was that by the spring of 1993. the first signs began to appear that the embargo was taking its toll on Cidras. On 27 June, he agreed to negotiations. and the two sides met at Governors tsland, New York. It was the first time since the failure of the protocol agreement that the two sides had sat down together.
The main difference with these negotiations and previous ones was that it now appeared as though Aristide had the upper hand AAer six days of discussion, both sides signed the Governors
Island Ageement which. among other things, gave histide the authority to choose the Prime
Minister in exchange for an end to the sanctions. It was an important victory since the Prime
Minister was the provisional Head of State while Aristide was in exile. This meant that whoever occupied the position could end the sanctions by creating a hospitable environment for Aristide's
return. Other victories for Aristide included: assistance fiom the international community in
reforming the police and judicial systems. as well as the resumption of developmental aid; the
adoption of law establishing a new police force; a new Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces;
his return to Haiti as president on 30 October 1993; and assistance from the UN Mission in Haiti
(UNMM) and the UN Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVM) in verifjmg that the military had complied with the ~greernent.'' The only other major concession on Aristide's part was that
Cedras continued to have amnesty once Aristide resumed office.
Many in the international community saw this as a victory for diplomacy. Mer two years of frustrating negotiations, Cedras had finally agreed to step down without military intervention.
Moreover. many anticipated that the mass exodus of refugees would abruptly diminish. Only
-4mericas Watch disapproved of the Agreement, claiming that the international community had faiied to acquire guarantees from Cedras that the FRAPH would honour Haitians' human rights in the interim period between the negotiations and Aristide's arrival in Haiti.''
To compensate for the inadequacies of the Governors Island Agreement. the United Nations drafted a list of additional demands known as the New York Pact, which dealt with human rights issues and institutional reform for the de fncto government to implement before Arktide's return.
Of particular importance, it called for an end to arbitrary arrests and torture, the release of political prisoners. respect for fundamental freedoms. compensation for victims of the coup. and
that those elected on 18 January 1993 "refrain From occupying their parliamentary seats until such
time as the constitutional institution empowered to consider this dispute has rendered its
verdict."'" To prove to Cedras that the UN and the OAS were serious about obtaining his
cooperation in these matters, the Security Council voted to impose a total oil and arms embargo
on 16 July, which lasted until 17 August.
While the principles behind the Pact were essential to the long term success of democracy in
Haiti, the problem with the document was that it asked too much of Cedras. too quickly. In less
than three months it expected him to virtually eliminate the traditional authority of the military and
paramilitary institutions, without any foreign military assistance. Whether out of a sense of
euphoria following the victories of the Governors Island Agreement, the UN and the OAS underestimated the difficulty Cedras had in dealing with those who had organized the military coup two years earlier. They had failed to appreciate that those behind the coup were fighting change. Back in 1990, they had removed .&istide because he had begun to attack the Haitian military's status as the most powerhl institution in the country. Furthermore. the majority of their demands in the first protocol agreement had involved limits to the power of the President. This meant that the coup was not just an anti-histide campaign: it was a battle to protect the status quo, and these elites were willing to kill in order to win. Therefore, it should not have been a surprise to anyone when Cedras could not, and did not comply with the Governors Island
Agreement. Frankly, he had no other choice but to resist. The international community had backed him into a corner. It should have realized this after the dr facto government rehsed to cooperate with the troops making up the UNMIH, disallowed the Canadian and American soldiers on board the (JSS Harlan C btinp from docking on 1 1 October 1993, and then assassinated
Arktide's Minister of Justice. Francois-Guy Malary, three days later for presenting Parliament with a proposal to create a civilian police force."
The United Nations reacted to the deception by passiny Security Council Resolution 873 on
I3 October. which called upon the international community to completely halt all shipments of
petroleum products until the army hlfilled its end of the agreement. In ignoring the Govemors
Island Agreement, Cedras had deceived the international community for the second time. and
made a mockery of their diplomatic efforts. If the OAS and the LrN wanted to retain any
credibility, they had no choice but to force Cedras to step down. Thus three days later, the
Security Council issued Resolution 875, which stated: "Prepared to consider hrther necessary
measures to ensure full compliance with the provisions of relevant Security Council res~lutions."'~
More than anything else, the Security Council's decision was a product of its frustration. Negotiations and economic sanctions had failed, which meant that left the CIN and the OAS had little other choice but to consider using military force against Cedras.
Human Rights Watch (formerly Americas Watch) approved of the decision to confront
Cedras. Its position all along had been that the Governors Island Agreement was responsible for the fbrther deterioration of human rights conditions in Haiti. It argued that in the three months since July, the FWHhad taken over Port-au-Prince, set tire to the suburb of Cite Soleil, and had denied the MIClVlH access to prisms. Furthermore, it felt that the United States had pressured .&-istide into conceding too much concerniny amnesty for the Haitian military in the
Agreement." Human Rights Watch wanted these men to face justice. In its opinion, Cedras and his cohorts should not receive a pardon simply because the intcmational community wanted to end a rehgee crisis. If the UN and the OAS were serious about long term stability in Haiti, they should use their resources to promote human rights by opposing a "blanket" amnesty, by increasing sanctions, by increasing humanitarian aid. by creating regional safe havens for rehyees. and by doing everything possible to ensure that assistance did not go to the yuilty parties.'''
Otherwise. it believed the situation would simply continue to deteriorate.
The United Nations Civilian Mission in Haiti's findings concurred with those of Human
Rights Watch. According to its investigations, I 1 1 cases of murder and summary execution had
occurred within the three month period of December 1993 to February 1994, which seemed to
confirm that even with renewed emphasis upon the embargo, the international community could
not stop human ri@s violations." For LIN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the report
was particularly disturbing. He feit that as the possibility of military intervention grew, the UN's
role was shifting from that of mediator to a prejudicial role in which it was the principle
organization responsible for finding a solution. President Aristide's biggest fear with the international community increasing its involvement was that the reibgees would continue to be treated inhumanely. While in Washington on 8
Februav 1994, he once again asked concerned foreign governments to protect Haitian refugees; however, the difference between this time and previous appeals was that now he asked Haitians to remain at home because of what he referred to as a "floating Berlin Wall" around Haiti. His rationale for the statement was that as long as the international community continued to forcefully repatriate Haitian refugee claimants, Haitians should not risk leaving the country." hpan from the obvious pleasure that the US State Department derived from Aristide's request. his statement was a sad testimony that international law had failed Haitians. Their forced repatriation had been a direct violation of four dift'erent UN and Inter-American declarations and conventions. Yet the policy had been in operation since the coup because United States domestic law took precedence over international law, meaning that international standards for human rights were admirable goals that in this case amounted to little more than rhetoric.
Fortunately for Haitians, high profile domestic pressure within the United States was makiny it increasingly difficult for Washington to maintain its rehgee policy of forced repatriation. The
latest group to protest was the Congessional Black Caucus (CBC), a committee whose role was
to promote and protect Afhcan-American interests in any new legislation. In the early months of
1994, it submitted two bills to the US government, H.R.No. 4 1 14 and H.R. 3663. The former,
entitled "Governors Island Reinforcement Act of 1994" was designed to persuade Clinton to end
the 198 1 agreement over refugees; and the latter, the "Haitian Refbgee Fairness Act," called for
the State Department to alter its policy towards the boat people so that it met the standards of
international law.j3Similarly, in a more publicized event, Randall Robinson, the Executive
Director of the human rights group TransAfrica. began what would eventually become a 27-day hunger strike on 12 April 1994 to protest against Executive Order 12807 on the grounds that it was motivated by racism. In support of Robinson's efforts, a group of Hollywood celebrities known as the Artists for Democracy in Haiti, which included such actors as: Robert De Niro,
Paul Newman, Julia Roberts, and Spike Lee, threw their support behind him, and six members of the US House of Representatives staged a protest on 22 April, whereby they were arrested on char~esof civil disobediance."
Amnesty international applauded all these efforts. For the previous two years, 1993- 1994, it had been tracking the condition of Haitians who had been repatriated by the United States. it had found seventeen cases of Haitians who were arrested after being returned to Haiti, one of whom was a man named Oman Desanges, who was murdered with "his eyes gouged out. his ear cut off. his stomach split. his hands tied, and a cord around his neck" because the lmrniyration
Naturalization Senice had mistakenly repatriated him after having agreed to grant him asylum."
The Clinton Administration. however. was slow in responding to the negative publicity.
Despite campaign promises to end the forced repatriation, the State Department continued to return Haitians to Haiti until May, at which point the American yovernment reluctantly agreed to provide safe-havens for the refugees. In midJune, Washington announced that it had negotiated an agreement with the Government of Jamaica permitting the INS to conduct interviews for
asylum on the US'S C'omjbri off the coast of Jamaica.
In Canada, the goup to adopt the cause of the Haitian people as its own was not an NGO.
but the Bloc Quebecois. With approximately 60 000 Haitian immigrants living in Quebec at the
time, many of the Bloc's constituents had family and friends in Haiti. Led by Lucien Bouchard,
the Bloc demanded on 10 May that the government disclose its position on the subject of military
intervention to end smuggling along the Haitian-Dominican Republic border. In response, the Minister of Foreign -airs, Andre Ouellet, indicated that Canada would send RCMP oficers to join an international police force consisting of Canadian, French, and Nigerian troops as part of the Governors Island Agreement, but until then the government would continue to use diplomatic pressure in aiding the UN and the OAS initiative in imposing an economic embargo.'~ltimately.
Bouchard felt that this was not enough. He wanted to force the Dominican Republic to comply with the embargo, so that the usurpers would lose control of the country. Two days later, as if on cue, Cedras named Judge Emile Jonaissant the provisional President. The Bloc was outraged, refemng to the whole affair in confronting the coup as a "masquerade."" Thus, it continued to press the Liberal government for a military solution to the crisis. Oeullet countered by arguing that thi international community should refrain fiom vioiating international law concerning the integrity of national sovereignty. Sill, Bouchard was unsatisfied. When the Liberals announced that Canada was about to halt all commercial flights to Haiti on 25 June, he interpreted this latest measure to be a sign that the embargo was failing. The Liberals disagreed. remaining firm in their decision to enforce economic sanctions. The next day, Bouchard raised the issue of intemational involvement in Haiti once again. This time he wanted know whether the Chretien government was pressuring the United States to use military intervention. His reason for asking: Anstide's term as
President was over in 1995."'
The LJNand the OAS were well aware that time was on the Haitian army's side. If histide's
term as Haiti's President expired, then the international community lacked the legal authority to
act against the clejcto regime. This meant that should Cedras remain firm, he could then hold an
election whereby the army's candidate won the presidency. On 6 May 1994, the United Nations
issued an ultimatum whereby if Cedras did not comply with the Governors Island Agreement by
2 1 May, it would reimpose a total economic embargo that would include all goods other than humanitarian relief. Cedras balked at the threat. He had resisted their demands for two and a half years and felt no need to comply with this latesi deadline. On 26 May, the UN and the OAS convinced the Dominican Republic's government to close the Haitian-Dominican Republic border.
The importance of this latest move was that for the first time since the coup. the international community seemed serious about eliminating the military's access to supplies. Still, Cedras was unfazed. On 1 1 July, he countered the move by expelling the MICIVIH.
Military intervention was now the only option open to the UN and the OAS. The embargoes had produced no rneaninyfid results, and public pressure to resolve the rehgee crisis would undoubtedly resume should the camps become too overcrowded. As a result, the IM Secuirty
Council passed Resolution 940 on 3 1 July, which called for the creation of a Multinational Force
(MNF). Its mandate:
to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure From Haiti of the military leadership. consistent with the Governors Island Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment that will permit implementation of the Governors Island Agreement. on the understanding that the cost of implementing this temporary operation will be borne by the panicipatiny Member States."'
Among the NGOs. Amnesty International had the greatest reservations about the use of
military force. While it agreed that the international community had to take action. it feared that
an invasion could lead to an increase in human rights abuses, at least in the shon term, from both
the Haitian military and from civilians seeking vengeance. If the MNF was not careful. then
dechoukage could sweep over Haiti. Another concern of AI's was that the MNF could potentially
commit abuses of its own, as had been the case with the peacekeepers in Somalia." Finally, it
feared that the forcefbl removal of the u'e facto regime might cause those governments
overseeing the refugee camps to assume it was safe for Haitians to return home, when in reality there was no reason to equate AristideTsreturn with an end to political repression. To prevent
Haitians from unduly being sent home, Amnesty International wanted the refugee screening stations to review each case on an individual basis before repatriation took place.
Despite these three concerns. the UN and the OAS prepared for an invasion. Their hope was that the threat of military intervention would be enough to scare Cedras and his men into conceding defeat. It was not. The Haitian military hierarchy considered it a bluff and refused to negotiate. This in turn. outraged Washington. On September 17, Clinton sent former President
Jimmy Carter. former US Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn. the chairman of the US Senate Armed Services Committee, to Haiti to present an ultimatum to the de fmro
government. To reinforce their bargaining position, the Multinational Force was ready to invade
should the Haitian army refuse to comply with the Governors Island Agreement. Sensing defeat.
Jonaissant signed the Agreement. To assist in creating an environment for Aristide's return. US
Lt.Gen. Henry H. Shelton formed a working relationship with Lt.-Gen. Cedras, whereby
American and Haitian soldiers would collectively maintain order. although the Americans agreed
not to interfere in conflicts between Lavalas and Cedras ~upponers.'~Once inside the country, US
troops then disabled Haitian heavy weapons units and raided FRAPH headquarters in
Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haitien. thereby dismantling much of the military and paramilitary forces'
c10ut."~
In Canada, members of the NDP and the Bloc Quebecois each thought that Carter's team had
been too accommodating to the Haitian military. When Parliament sat on 2 1 September, Svend
Robinson vehemently argued that the Canadian Government should denounce the agreement on
the grounds that it lacked Cedras' signature. For this to have been a true victory, he believed the
international community should have forced the man behind the coup to surrender instead of allowing him to flee to Panan~a.'~Bouchard agreed, claiming that the whole negotiation process was full of questionable circumstances. For instance, with riots and killing still taking place, he wanted to know if the Canadian Government had done anything to ensure that ibistide was satisfied with the US' actions." Ouellet answered these criticisms with a reaffirmation that
Aristide appreciated all that Canada had done since the coup, including Canada's decision to support Carter's negotiations. Bouchard interpreted this to mean that the Liberal government had played virtually no role in settling the crisis. To this. Ouellet responded that at least Caner's delegation had ensured that few UN lives would be lost, compared to the probable carnage of a full scale invasion. Alas, Bouchard was still not convinced. He claimed Oeullet's response was an admission that Canadian policy had consisted of more rhetoric than substance, and that Canada's role in the whole affair had been minimal. Regardless, the Chretien government was satisfied.
Mer three long years, Aristide was finally back in Haiti, state-sponsored human rights violations dropped significantly, the rehgee exodus was over. and the United Nations came out of the affair appearing as though it was a credible institution capable of resolviny most international crises.
Even though the Liberal yovemment had played a supporting role to American diplomacy,
many Canadians believed that Canada's most important role was just beginning. With .histide's
return assured, the House of Commons almost unanimously agreed that Canada was in the ideal
position to help build democracy in Haiti. Not only did members consider this the honourable
thing to do, they also felt that this was a perfect opportunity to not only enhance the Canadian
reputation for peacekeeping, but also to assume an independent position from the United States.
Only the Reform Party questioned the validity of allowing the Americans to invade and then
offering to "pick up the piece^."'^ When Aristide finally returned to Haiti on 15 October 1994, the UN, the OAS and their members were all once again optimistic for Haiti's future. With the Haitian army subdued, many believed that the worst of Haiti's problems were over. Yet Haiti still had much work ahead to ensure that there would not be another military coup in the near future; however. for the present. at least, the UN and the OAS saw an opportunity for the international community to help transform the judicial, prison. and law enforcement systems. Unlike in 1986 or 1990 when the W had left the transfer from dictatorship to democracy to the Haitian Government. it now wanted to play an active role in shaping Haiti's political evolution.
Even though the international community considered Aristide's return to the Presidency as a triumph for democracy and human rights. there is a cenain hypocrisy in threatening to use force to protect human rights. Yet, in Haiti's case, the UN Multinational Force was a necessary precaution. Under the illegal Cedras government, human rights abuses were rampant, and neither diplomatic pressure nor economic sanctions had proved effective. even after the intemational community sealed the Haitian-Dominican Republic border. That being said, perhaps the real victory was not in the final outcome, but in the manner in which the international community resolved the crisis. Had it not been for the pressure from NGOs and other concerned citizens
outside the public sphere in Canada and the United States, the Clinton administration would
probably have remained reluctant in altering its treatment of Haitian refbgee claimants. Moreover.
without the NGO pressure, the likelihood that the UN and the OAS would have returned Aristide
to office was unlikely. Therefore, one could conclude that the combined pressure of voluntary
groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch can influence the decisions of
concerned governments. Whet her through letter-writing campaigns, peacehl demonstrations, or hunger strikes, politicians will, at least, have to explain their actions. This implies that every once in awhile. as in the case with Haiti, grassroots pressure can provoke change. CONCLUSION
October 1999 will mark the fifth anniversary since the international community forced an end to military governments in Haiti. For many in Haiti and the international community, it will be a somber celebration. While it symbolizes the end of an oppressive era. it is also a reminder that
Haiti has still made little p:ogress towards a democratic political system. Although the army was dissolved on 3 1 December 1995. and police violence is now sporadic. the people of Haiti view
their government with a tremendous amount of cynicism. They see President Rene Preval as a
man who has abandoned them; who has left them alone to combat poverty, unemployment, and
illiteracy; who above all has been helpless in stoppins the remaining Macoutes and Duvalierists
from using their resources to intimidate the Lavalas. In sum, they see the government as an
institution that has little impact on their daily lives. especially for those who live outside the two
major cities.
The democratic institutions most dysfimctional are the country's law enforcement and
judiciary. According to Amnesty International. very little progress has taken place since 1996. For
instance, while prison conditions have moderately improved. judicial corruption and drchorikuge
continue to be staples of the justice system.' To compensate for these inadequacies, many
communities have formed committees known as Brigades de C'igrlmce, who act as pseudo-law
enforcement agents but have no actual legal authority. Another of Amnesty International's
101 complaints is that few perpetrators of past crimes have been brought to justice. The most notable example of this negligence is that the courts still have not indicted those responsible for the
Jean-Rabel massacre of 1987. Another problem for Haiti's judiciary is that it still has to meet the criteria on a number of UN guidelines concerning the independence of the judiciary and the role of lawyers and prosecutors, as well as basic principles such as security for those on trial, and an end to extrajudicial executions,'
The continued presence of a large number of UN personnel is another sign that Haiti and democracy are not yet ready for one another. As of June 1995, the UN General Assembly had decided that the UNMIH would be a shon term solution. LNMIH's intention was to remain only long enough for the Government of Haiti to restore order in a manner that was consistent with international human rights standards Despite initial successes in prison reform and the creation of the National Commission of Truth and Justice to investigate past crimes. its goal never came to fruition. As a result, histide asked the UN to extend MICIVIH's mandate until the new President
assumed office on 7 February 1996 after a number of incidents of sporatic violence between
wamny factions erupted at election offices, and a handfbl of local oficials and leaders of popular
organizations associated with the Lavalas movement were murdered.' UN members agreed to
Aristide's request because they believed the violence was in response to the new CEP's rehsal to
permit a number of candidates from running for office, and would subside once the election was
over.
Canada was one of the co-sponsors of this resolution. In addition to the 700 military and
police personnel serving under UNMH, the Canadian government's human tights experts sent to
monitor the election all felt that the immediate decrease in the number of human rights violations
since the Haitian military was disbanded was a sign that Haiti was moving towards a more just society. Significantly, the United States also endorsed Haiti's request for continued assistance. US
Ambassador to the W, Madelene Albright. argued that the international community had to help
Haiti build upon the momentum of its successfid first round of voting by helping the country
strengthen its judiciary.
In June 1995. the feeling within the UN was that the military aspect of the mission would end
after seven months. lf all went according to schedule. the new government's position would be
strong enough to promote democracy and human rights without the presence of UN soldiers. In
retrospect, it was naive to assume that Haiti's troubles would diminish with another election.
Perhaps the LJN was still caught up in the euphoria of restorins Aristide to the Presidency, and did
not anticipate that the division that had plagued Haiti from the Duvalier days was still brewing
underneath the surface, or that the soldiers whom they had supplanted would continue to threaten
the security of the new yovernment. Consequently, the UN military presence was not removed
until November 1997. at which point it was replaced by the United Nations Transitionary Mission
in Haiti (UNTMIH) police force which is still active to this day.
Although it does not appear as though the UNTMIH will be leaving in the near future, its
mere presence represents a new era in the international community's relationship with Haiti.
Never before has an international force landed on Haitian soil whose purpose was to promote
democracy, and not occupy the country. And never before has an international force valued
human rights over hemispheric security issues. Granted, the US has an interest in preventing
another outbreak of rehgees; however, the international community also favours helping Haiti
prevent another military junta from assuming power. This is a welcome change. During Francois Duvalier's reign, no foreign government, international governing organization, or human rights NGO seriously challenged the Haitian Government's human rights abuses. The United States' motive for noninterference was strategic in that the State Department
saw Papa Doc as a staunch anti-Castroite whose position was already stable enough to be left
alone. For that matter, the Canadian government did not share the United States7 fear of
communism, and had few economic interests outside the Caribbean Commonwealth worth
protecting. As a result. there were only a few instances of criticism of Haitian policies from
Canada between 1957 and 1973. At this time. the UN involvement consisted primarily of
developmental assistance and a forum for airing discontent, the OAS lacked the means to enforce
a treaty between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. and human rights NGOs were just beginning
to play a role in international arenas.
Under Jean-Claude Duvalier. the international community's involvement was just as
noncommittal. From 1973 until the early eighties. it was essentially NGOs like Amnesty
International that questioned the Haitian government's oppressive behavior. while the Canadian
and American yovemments were silent over human rights abuses, reasoning that the best way to
help the Haitian people was through humanitarian assistance. Through their respective aid
agencies, ClDA and USAID, they invested millions of dollars into developmental projects, some
of which reached its intended destination, some of which did not. Other countries also helped
Haiti. According to World Bank statistics, the total hnds Haiti received in international aid from
the international community between 1973 and 1981 was $477 million (US).' But after 198 1, this
altruism from the governments in Canada and the United States began to change as reports of
Duvalier's human rights abuses became more widespread. As Haitians became even more impoverished from the loss of foreign aid, they violently removed Jean-Claude Duvalier From office.
From !986 to 199 1, the international community adopted a cautious, even timorous policy with regard to the promotion of human rights and democracy in Haiti. During this period. concerned governments. the UN, and NGOs looked upon the various military ~ovemments as transitional governments preparing for long term improvements. As human rights abuses continued, the predominant feeling within the international community was that reforming the
Haitian government was an internal issue for the people of Haiti to resolve. The Canadian and
American governments continued to apply diplomatic pressure, but neither was willing to use force to persuade the Haitian military to concede power to a duly elected civilian government.
When the Haitian military junta finally held a free and fair election after four years, Haiti appeared to have established a legal-procedural form of democracy that required only limited assistance from the outside world. At the time. it seemed as though international diplomatic
pressure, coupled with internal dissatisfaction with Lt.-Gen. .i\vril, had been enough to produce
the change. Consequently, when Lt.-Gen. Cedras staged the coup in 1 99 1. foreiyn yovernments
hoped that economic sanctions would force the Haitian military would back down. The problem
with this was that the OAS and UN could not convince all nations to comply with the sanctions,
meaning Lt.-Gen. Cedras continued to have access to petroleum and munitions. But in the spring
of 1994, the international community bolstered its efforts to find a solution. The reason for this
renewed commitment was that NGO pressure upon the US govemment to change its practice of
forcefblly repatriating Haitian rehgees forced the Clinton administration to reach a settlement
with Cedras. Under the auspices of the United Nations, the US opted to use military force to resolve the situation. Luckily, force was not needed as Judge Jonaissant agreed to the UN's demands as outlined in the Governors Island Agreement.
Geven current conditions, the question remains: Has Haiti and the rest of the international community learned anything from their relationship with each other over the last fony-two years?
For Haiti, the answer appears to be no. Although democracy has only been in place for five years, it is a Fragile system that has the potential to collapse once the United Nations decides to leave. Granted, the army has been disbanded, and the police forces have become apolitical, but human rights violations, dechoukn~e.conuption, and intimidation are still present. The real test
for democracy's chances in Haiti may be the upcoming 2000 elections. If the international
community recognizes the new yovemment as the legitimate authority, then the UN and its
interested members, while still providing hnds For reform, could gradually withdraw its military
and monitoring personnel.
In reassessing the transition fiom dictatorship to democracy in Haiti as a case study in hreign
intervention, a number of important themes emerge regarding the various types of tactics available
to international community in contionting abusive governments. The one that requires the least
amount of effort on the part of concerned foreign governments is moral persuasion. or diplomatic
pressure. In Haiti's case, this involved using developmental assistance to entice the various
Haitian governments to govern in a humane fashion. This approach emerged in the 1970s as the
promotion of human rights began to gain widespread acceptance as a legitimate item on the
international political agenda. Prior to this point, the United States had for the most part remained
silent on the Haitian government's oppressive behavior, largely because of Franqois Duvalier's
reputation as a bulwark against communist expansion fiom Cuba; and the United Nations Security Council preferred to let the OAS handle the problems of terror within Haiti. A second tactic, which emerged in the 1990s. was economic sanctions involving the suspension of trade, and even a number of embargoes. The greatest barrier to the effectiveness of this type of persuasion is that it is difficult to coordinate, and can even become irrelevant should some countries continue to trade with the nation under sanction. In the case of the UN and OAS joint embargoes, it was not until they persuaded the government of the Dominican Republic to close off the
Haitian-Dominican border that they cut off Lt.-Gen. Cedras' access to petroleum products and
munitions. The final approach to confronting dictatorships such as those Found in Haiti was
multinational military intervention. Like the economic embargoes. this was a new phenomenon of
the 1990s. And like the economic embargoes. this was extremely difficult to coordinate. For
military intervention to be legal under international law, it must be recognized by the United
Nations Security Council. Furthermore, there must be a general willingness within UN member
governments to participate in a multinational invasion force During the coup in Haiti from 199 1
to 1994, the UN felt that Father Aristide's ousting warranted intervention. yet it was roughly
three years before the Security Council reached this decision.
This raises the question as to why in the first half of the 1990s the international community
suddenly felt it had to stop human rights abuses taking place in Haiti. Perhaps it was in pan due to
the end of the Cold War. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States no longer bit that it
was necessary to suppo~dictatorships in Latin America and elsewhere on the grounds that they
were containing communism. Another explanation is the rise of NGOs in the political arena, and
the influence these organizations are gaining in affecting foreign policy decisions. An example of
this trend was the Ottawa Process in the Land Mines Ban of 1997, in which NGOs were
instrumental in convincing the foreign national governments present at the convention to sign the treaty. A third possibile explanation for intervention in Haiti was that the United States wanted to resolve the Haitian boat people crisis. A fourth is that humanitarian issues were beginning to take precedence over national sovereignty, which meant that crimes against humanity, such as those that took place in Haiti. were grounds for foreign intervention in the domestic affairs of an oppressive state Regardless of whether the international community's reason for threatening to use force against Lt.-Gen. Cedras was due to one or a combination of these explanations, the three approaches to promoting democracy and a respect for human rights -- diplomatic pressure. economic sanctions. and military intervention -- are not mutually exclusive. br:; :.?stead can reinforce one another.
Still. there is reason to be cautious about any political conditions in a country where democracy is imposed and upheld by outside forces. In Haiti's case. it is still quite plausible that a paramilitary junta could once again control the country. Yet. given the international community's
commitment to creatiny democracy in Haiti, it is difficult to imagine that the United Nations. the
OAS. concerned national governments in Canada and the US. and human rights NGOs will not
once again intervene. This. if nothing else, suygests that there is reason to be optimistic about
Haiti's fbture. NOTES
Introduction
' U.S. Congress. Scnatc. Cornrmttee on Forclgn Rciatlons. Country Reports For Human hghts Practlccs For -1970 (Washington D.C.:GPO. 1980). pg. 2. - Thc legal-procedural approach to democracy is a "theoretical pcrspectivc that cluracteri~espolitical dcvclopmcnts by minimizing the role of historical considerations and institutionalized sets of social relationships and maximizing the importance of the legal and formal elements of political development." .4ccording to this theory. a niitiorl is considered a democracy If it has free and far elections. inclusive suffrage. the right to run for office. freedom of expression. and associatiom1 autonomy. Robert Dahl. Democram and its Critics. (New Haven: Yak University Press. 1'389). ' Accordng to Amnest, International. a Tonton Macoutc was a Voodoo bogeyman who carried liitlc ch~ldren away in bags. "Haiti: General Background." (London: Amnesty Intcmationd Publications. October 198 1). pg. 2.
'' Michel S. Laguerrc. Thc Militan and Society in Haiti. (Knowillc: University of Tennesse Press. 1993 1. pg. 12. ' Laguerrc is convinced that this system was the main reason why the army dtd not seriously resist Francois Duvalier's reforms to the militan. Mlitq. 97.153. " Michel-Rolph Trouillot. Haiti: State Aminst Na*. (New York: Monthly Rcvicw Press. 1990). pg. 158- 159. 7 Lagucrre. Militam. 138. henasWatch claimed that in 197 1 all Jean-Claude Duvalier ~llyd~d was rrorgani~cthe Macoutes into thc VSN. "Hati: Report of a Human fights Mission: June 26-29. 1983." (New York: Americas Watch in conjunction with thc Lmycrs Cornmittcc for [nternational Human hghts. August 1983). pg. 8. Similarly, Amnesty Intcrnational suspected tllat the Duvalier Government had only released 30 of the 90 prisoners and asked the Haitian Govemmcnt to publish a list of the prisoners so that it could verify that they had actually been rele;wxi. "Amnest): Intcrnational News Release. 9 January 1977." (London: Amnesty [nternatiod Publications. 1977). pg. 1. " According to a report produced bv Amnesty International in 198 1. the Anti-Communist law defined Communist activities as "all crimes awnst the security of the state. punishable by the death penalty." "Haiti: Human Rights Violations" October 1980 to October 1981." (London: Amnesty International Publications. November 198 I ), pg. 3.
") '.An Americas Watch Repon: Haiti: Human Rights Under Hereditary Dictatorship.- (New York: Americas Watch in conjunction with the Lawycrs Committee for International Human Rights. October 1985). pg. 2. " Amnesty International. Xuti: Death in Detention. Torture and Inhumane Prison Conditions." (London: Amnesty International Publications. December 1987). pg. 1. '' Amnesty International. .'Death in Detention" 1. 13 The MJL was an organization made up of peasant youth. Its mandate was to lobby for "land reform and an end to overcharging by market-tau collcction." Americas Watch. "Human Rights in hti:One Year Under General Prosper Avril." (New York: Americas WatchMational Coalition for Hartian Refugees. 11 September 1989). pg. 2. I4 Americas Watch "One Year." 4. '' Unfortunatel~.the Americas Watch report concerning Lillanne does not clabonte on the phrase "outr-geous proposals" so there is no indication whether he wanted to reform legal-procedural or structural institutions or how quickty he envisioned that this reform might take place. Americas Watch "One Year." 5. '%ne Fuller and Jocelyn McCalla. "A Repon by Americas Watch and the National Coalition for Haitian RcfUga and Caribbean Rights." (New York: Americas WatcNNational Coalition for Haitian Refuges. 1 November 199 1). pg. 7. 17 Roland I. Perusse. Haitian Democram Restored. 199 1- 1905. (New York: Universit)t Press of America. Inc.. 1995). pg. 53. I8 Perusse. Rcstorcd. 63. '" Jean-Pierre Gingns. Duvalier Caribbean Cvclone: The Histon. of Haiti and Its Present Corernmcnt. (New York: Esposition Prcss. 1967). pg. 98. '" Elimbeth Abbatt. Haiti: An Insider's Histon of the RIW and Fall of the Duvaliers. (Montreal: McGnw-Hill. 1988). pg. 8 1. ' Trouillot. Slate. 69. ? 7 -- Trouillot. State. 24. '3 L~~~cITc.Militiin. 12. " Jei-Benrand Anstide's Aristide: An Autobiocnphv (New York: Orbis Books. 1992). pg. 49. 63. and 107. -< -' Perusse. Restored. 129. :" [min P Stoczky. Silencing the Guns in Haiti: The Promise of Deliberative Democnq. (Chicago: The Uni\.crsity of Chicago Press. 1997). pg. 209. '' Paul Dejean. The Haitians in Quebec: A Sociobiologiwl Profile. (0ttawa:Tecumseh Pms. 1980). pg. 1 17, '' Glenn R. Smucker. .'Peasant Councils and the Politics of Community." Politics Projwts. and People: institutional Dmclo~mentin Haiti. cchtcd by Derick W. Bnnkerhoff and Jean-Claude Garcia-Zamor (New York: Praeger Special Studies. 1986). 94. --<> Dcrick W. Brinkerhoff. *"Resource Transfer and Institutional Sustainab~litv."Projects. 1 57. 9 I T.A. Kcenlqsidc. "Dmelopmcntal Assistance." Corning of Age: Readings in Canadian History Sins World War 11. dted by D.H. Awry and R. Hail (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Canada. 1996). pg. 356. " Brian H. Smith. More Than Altruism: The Politics of Private and Forcip Aid. (New Jersc).: Pnnccton University Press. 1990). pg. 120. " Wciss and Cmrdcnkcr define NGOs as public organi~ationsthat arc not '.profit-making corporations and banks. criminal elcmcnts (both organized crime and terrorists). insurgents. churches in their strictly religious function. transnational political parties and the mass communication media." NGOs. the UN. and Global Governance. (Boulder. Colorado: Lynne hcnncr. 1996). pg. 19. " Andrew S. Nntsios. ..NGOs and the 1M System in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: Conflict or Coopcration?" Global Governance. 7 1. " William Koq. NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human kghts. (New York: St. Martin's Prcss. 1998). pg. 15. 35 Lawcncc Whitchcad, "lntcrnational Aspccts of Dcmocratization." Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Promsfor Democracv. edited by Guillermo O'DOM~et al. (Baltimore: John Hopkins Universlh Press. 1986). pg. 44. '' Robcn H. Jackson. %forality. Democracy and Foreign Policy." Canada Amone. Nations 1995: Democracy and Foreign Pohedmxi by Maxwell A. Cameron and Maureen Appel Molot. (Ottawa: Carleton University Press. produced by the Norman Patcrson School of Intemationd AEairs. 1995). pg. -15. 37 Adam Prmonki. 5omc Problcms in the Study of thc Transition to Democracy." Transitions. 5 1-52. '"red Stepan. ..Paths Towards Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations.'' Transitions. 7 5.
Chapter One
I The rcason for the disparity in the contributions of UNICEF and those of the Duvalicr government was that for the many of the projects. UNICEF made an annual contribution whereas there is nothing to indicate in the UNICEF reports that Duvalier was required to riakc more than a one-time commitment. The above dollar figure for UNICEF represents the combined funds of five specific projects: malaria eradcation program. $752.000 (E/ICEF/L.1170. 8 February 1958): yaws and syplulis. $3.696.010 from I958 through to 1967 (E/ICEF/L. 1170. 8 February 1 959); pre-school fdngcampaign. $32.800 (E/ICEF/L. 1 199. 7 February 1 958); environmental su~itatiori.$67.000 (L'ICEFI'PI'L.i 14. 15 Nownber i9G 1). ;irld nutritiorw education. $15.000 (EIICEFI'PI'L.108, 25 Octobcr 196 1 ). The costs to the Duvalicr government were as follows: pre-school fccding campaign. $80.000: emironmental sanitation. $90.000: and nutritioniq education. $30.000. - UN. Gcncnl Asscrnbly. LINGA. A/C.2/L.459/Rcv.I. 24 Octobcr 1960. pg. 1. ' "Economic and Military Assistance. ICA Summary Agreement. Whitc House Memo. 7 Octobcr 1957." Documcnt 0028 12. Dee tassified Documents Series. Microfilm. Declassified 3 May 1985. pg. 1. '' -'Haiti. Anal>sis of Du\alicr Govcmmcnt. Dcpartrncnt of State Rcpon." Document 1807 1983. Dcclassificd Documents Scries. Microfilm. Declassified 19 May 1983. pg. 1. ' "Analysis." Dcclasslfied. 34. " "Department of State Memo of Conversation. 7 August 1958." Documcnt 002490 1982. Dedassificd Documents Series. Microfilm. Declassficd 60 June 1982. pg. 1. 7 Historian Walter LeFebcr subscribes to historian Richard E. Welch. Jr.'s theory that Cstro only adopted b1:mcisrn in late I960 after the Soviet Union agreed to purchase Cuban sugar in exchange for oil and industrial goods after a disputc erupted bctwccn the US md Cuba over Amcrican unwillingness to rcfinc Cuban oil in Cub. The American Age: US Foreign Poliq at Homc and Abroad. 1750 to the Present second cd. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 1994). pg. 568. s "Haiti. Haitian President Duvalier sends lcrtcr hinting Haiti will go Communist if more US aid is not forthcoming. Department of State. 3 1 May 1960." Document 1794 1903. Dcclassificd Documents Scrics. Microfilm. Declassified 19 May 1983. pg. I. " -.Haiti. Department of State suggests reply lo 71 12/60 lencr from Pmident Duvalier of Haiti concenung proposals for economic assistance to Haiti. Dcpartrnent of Statc Memo. 27 July 1960." Document 001796 1933, Declassified Documents Series. Microfilm. Declassrfied 19 May 1983. pg. I. 10 UN. Security Council. S/5 198. 27 Octobcr 1962. pg. 1. ' Sf5 198. 2. '' S/5198. 2. '' In another letter dated 29 Octobcr 1962. Chalmen told the Security Council that Haiti fully supponcd the U.S. proposal to dismantle the missile bases. and place a naval embargo around Cuba. UN. Security Council. S15 199. 29 October 1962. pg. 2. I J One of the Camoquins was Fran~oisBcnoit. a graduate of the US ar~tigucmllaschool in the Panama Canal Zone accussed of attempted murder of the Duvalier children Bernard Diederich and Al Burt. The Truth About Haiti Today (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1969). pg. 204. " Amcles 31 and 35(1) state that any member of the United Nations has the right to ask the Security Council to corrvenc if there is a threat to its national sovereignty. UN. Security Council. Sl5302.6 h4ay 1963. pg. 1. i 6 UN. Security Council, 953 14. 15 May 1963. pg. 2. 17 UN Security Council. Sl5315. 17 May 1963. pg. 2. I". I". Security Council. S15383.6 August 1963. pg. 2. 19 95383. 3. "' UN. Security Council. Sl5391. I? August 1963. pg. 2. UN. Security Council. Si54 1 1. 30 August 1963. pg. I. and S/54l6. 5 September 1963. pg. 2. 1-3 -- Article 54. chapter 8 on Regional Arrangements states: "The Security Council shall at all times be kept Myinformed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security." S/54 16, 1 'w.Security Council. S/5430. 20 September 1963. pg. 4. In the report Chalmers wmte that to ths point the OAS had been "impotent" against thesc insurgency forces coming into Haiti from the Dominican Republic. SlSJ30. 10. '5 Chalmers indicated that the Dominian Republic hdviolated Article 3 3 of the Tr-6 of Peace. Comrncrcc. Navigation and Extradition signed in 1894 between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Article 33 stated: "The Haitian Government and the Domin~canGovcmmcnt undertake ncvcr to permlt or tolcratc that an individual. a gang or 3 party should establish itself in their respectwe territories with a view to disturbing in any manner whatsoever the status quo in the ncighbouring state. They also undertake to remove from their territory or even to expel persons likely by their presence to create &stu&ances and disorders in the neighbouring smte." S/5430. 12. UN. Sccurip, Council. S/5433. 24 S~ptelnb~r1963. pg. 2. " ..Haiti. Utian Dissatisfaction with US Ambassador Drew. White Housc Memo." Declassified Documents Scries. Microfilm. Declmlficd I 1 May 1988. pg. 1. " "Haiti. Possible Motivation of Duvalier in requesting transfer of Moss. Hascy and Warren. Department of State. 12 December 1963" Document ot.) 1798 1983. Declassified Documents Series. Microfilm. Declassified 28 March 1983. pg. 1.
''I UN. Sccuritv Council. SI5740. 8 June 1964. pg I. In a lctter dated I July 1964. Chalmcrs argucd that Contavc had planncd to "dynamite bridges and petrol tanks. carry out acts of sabotage and arson all over the country. and assassinate the closest collaborators of Haiti's Head of State." UN. Security Council. S15793. 2 JuIy 1964. pg. 1. !I1 UN. Security Counc~l.S/5808. 9 July 1964. pg. I " The fim example comes from UN. Srmrity Council. Sl5841. 28 luly 1964. pg. 1. The second comes from UN. Security Council. Sl5928. 2 September 1964. pg. I. The signfunce of the second example is that even though the shots were fired at rrulitaq outposts. halier order his troops not to fire back for far that this might incite the Dominican army occupying thc border to cnrcr into Hati. " "Incoming Telcgnm. Department of State. 3 1 Januae 1961." Document 232F 1977. Declassified Documents Series. Mcrofilm. DeclassLficd 22 February 1977. pg. 3: and "Incoming Telegram. Department of State. 13 Februaq 1964." Document 23 3 B 1977. Dcclassificd Documents Series. Microfilm. Declassrfied 22 February 1977. pg. 5. " The information on the Italian arms shprnent comes from *.Haiti. US Desires to Pwent Italian E.xponing of Arms to Haiti. Dcpartment of State. 2 April 1964." Document 002527 1983. Declassified Documents Series. Microfilm. Declassified 6 January 1978. pg. 1. The information with regards to the shipment from Florida can bc found in "Incoming Telegram. Department of State. 20 July 1964." Document 1799 1983. Declassified Documents Serics. Microfilm. Declassified 18 April 1979. pg. 1. 3.4 "State Dcpament: Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Opportunities for Communist Ek~loitationin Latin America. 7 April 1964." Document Z82G 1976. Declassified Documents Series. Mmofilm. Declassfied 23 luly 1976. pg. 35. '' Waiti. Analysis and effects of current "Dwalier for Life" campgn on Haitian internal situation. Hrutian policy and US-btain relations. Department of State. 17 April 1964. Document 2529 1983. Declassified Documents Series. Microfilm. Declassified 6 Januaq 1978. 4. '' .'Incoming Telegram. Department of State. 6 November 1964." Document 618 1977. Declassified Documents Series. Microfilm. Declassified 30 January 1976. pg. 1. 37 LaFckr. The American Age 609. 3X UN. Security Council, Sl6533. 16 July 1965. pg. 3 "'96533. 3. -Lo In a lctter to the Secvrie Council. Adlai E. Stmcnson. the United States' Permanent Representative at the United Nations. wrote that President Johnson's reason for sending troops into the Dominican Republic was so that he could protect American citizens still in the country. W. Secwity CounciI. 963 10. 29 April 1965. pg. 1. Cuba and the Soviet Union. however. told the Security Council that the US violated international law concerning national sovereignty for imperialistic reasons. LN. Security Council, S/63 14, 30 April 1965. pg. 2. and UN. Security Council. 4 May 1965. pg. I. Haiti did not issue its statement supporting actions against communism until 16 July 1965. 96533. 41 Other mc~nkrsof thc OAS corniriittcu: included. Xrgcntina. kli~ia.Brad Chile, Caiombia. Costa Riu. Ecuador. El Salvador. Guatemala. Hondwds, Mesico. Nicaragua. Panama. Paraguay. Peru. Uruguay and Vcnezucla. UN. Gcncral Assembly.A/C. I/L.349/Rm 2. 9 December 1965. pg. 1. '' .WC.l/L.349/Rev2. 3. S/8593,2. 04.ECOSOC. EICN.JflrlGOII36. 15 March 1966. pg. I. '' Thc Haitian Representative at the UN was able to deflect ths criticism noting that the United States was guilty of genocide in Vietnam yet did not face similar accusiitions. WifIiam Korey. NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Ehnhts (NcwYork: St. Martin's Frcss. 1998). pg. 69. " UN. GeneraI Assembly. MAC. I 1 SISR. 168. 28 April 197 1. 47 Dcrick W. Brinkerhoff. Politics, Proiccts, and People: Institutional Development in Haiti. edited by Dcrick W. Brinkerhoff and Jm-Claude Garcia Zamor. (New York: Pncgcr Spccial Studies. 1986). pg. 5. 48 This mandate was first set forth in Prime Minister Trudcau's Forcign Policy Rcvicw of 1970. CIDG .4nnual Reoort. 1975. 1. 49 CIDA divides its grants into two categories: dsbursemcnts and commitments. In 1973. $40. 000 was in thc form of immediate disburscmcnts. whilc 1 10.000 went to future comitmcnts. This $150.000 was roughly 0.3'?!6 of CIDA's total contributions, CIDA. .4nnual Ard Re~lew.1974. J 1. (0 This figure represented 9.8% of CIDA's grants. Annual Aid Review. 1974. 4 I. il USAID. Connrcssional Presentation. Fiscal Year 1975, AMCX111: Latin America and the Caribbean f Washington. D.C. : GPO. 1975). 109-1 16. i2 Amnesty International. "Report on thc Situation of Political Prisoners in Haiti. 1973." (London: Amnesty International Publications. 1973. 1. i. 3 Amnestl; International. "Prisoners." 3 V Sce footnote 11 on page 5 of the introduction for a definition of the Anti-Communist Law. i5 Amnesty Intcrnationai. "Amnesty Hits at Haiti's -Cynicism and Dcception' Over Political Prisoners." (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1 March 19 73). pg. I. '' In 1980. Amnesty International was stopped in the middle of one of its reports to the UN after having implicated the Argentinian government in a number of human rights crimes. Thc UN set up a five-country commission to determine whether or not an NGO had the right to mespecific governments in its reports. Canada and the United States said it &d have that right: Uruguay. Ethiopia and Jordan said it did not have that right. Amnesty International lost by a vote of 3 to 2. Gaer. Felice D. "Reality Check: Human kghts NGOs Confront Govcmmcnts at the UN." NGOs. thc UN. and Global Gm cmcc(Boulder. Colorado: Lynnc Rcinncr. 1996). pg. 54. " CIDA. Annual Rewn. 1971-75. pg. 12. '"IDA. Annual Repon. 1575-76. pg. 59. 135. '' The fist statistic comes from CIDA Annual Report, 1977-78. pg. 20: the second comes from CIDA. "News Release 77-18." 30 Mav 1981, pg. 1. '' USAID. Congressionid Presentation, Fiscal Year 1978. Annex 111: Latin America and the Caribbean (Washington, D.C.: GPO. 1978). 129. 143.. "' CLDA. Annual Report. 1980-8 1. pg. 54. " Michael Zischke. .'Letter to Bill Brow Washington Office on Latin Ameriw." (London: hesty International Publications. 14 April. 1976). pg. 1. "' Amnesty International. .'News Relase." (London: Amnesty International Publications. 9 January 1977). pg. 30. * .. St.Louis. Missouri: Rcmarks and Question-and-Annver Session at a Townhall Meeting." Public Papen of the Presidents of the United Stales: Jimmv Carter (Washington D.C.:GPO. 198 1). pg. 22 10. and "Miami, Florid;l:Rcmarks and Questions-and-Answer Session at a Townhall Mwting. 2 1 October 1980." Public Pawrs of the Presidents of the Unitcd States: Jimmy Carter (Washington D.C.: GPO. 1% 1 r. pg 2388 "'Amnesty International. .'News Relase." (London: Amnesty International Publications. 6 November 1980). pg. 30. " On 12 November 1980. a ship hi1 of 106 Haitian refugecs landed on the Bahaman Island of Cayo Lobos. instad of grmting thcm asylum, the lml policc forcc procecdcd to bat thc rchgccs in front of forcign journalists. after which they were forced back onto thcir vcsscl and returned to Haiti. Amnesp International. "Haiti: Human Rights Violations: October l98O - October 198 1 ." (London: Amnesty Intcrnat~onalPublications. November 1% 1 ). pg. 3. a7 Arnncsv Intcmational. "October 1980 - Octobcr 1981 ." 1. OX Amnesty International. -'October 1980 - October 1981." 8.
"I' Amnesty International. "October 1980 - October 19%1 ." 5-7. 71 1 United Nations. General Assembly. N401132. 25 October 1985. 54. CTDA. "News Release 8 1-58," 28 November 1% 1. 1-2. r. ..Message 10 the Congress Transmitting Proposed Caribbean Basin initiative Legislation. 17 March 19x2.'' Public Paws of the Presidents of the Unitcd States: Ronald Reqm (Washington D.C.: GPO. 1983). pg. 3 15. n The Americas Watch reports referred to arc: "Report of a Human fights Mission: June 16-29. 1983." August 1983; "1984: Elemon: Duvaiier Style." March 1984: "lournalists in Jeopardy: The Haitian Reality." October 1984; and "Human Rights under Hercditap Dictatorship," Octobcr 1085. (New York: Amcricas Watch in conjunction with the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights). '' The United Nations reports are: E/CN..III9X3/SR.39. 3 March 1983; E1CN.U 1983ISR.40 22 March 1983: EJCN. J/Sub.2/198J/SR.29. 29 August 1984; and E.CN.4/1986/18. 24 January 1986. The document number for the Canadran government speech is: Canada. Department of Extcmal Mairs. External Affairs Statements and Speeches. 1984-1986. No. 84/17. 6 December 1084. pg. 3. " Washington Office on Haiti. -Rcpon to Congress: The Government of Haiti: Nonsompliance with thc criteria for U.S. Foreign Assistance." vol. 2 (Washington: October 1985). pg. 1-2. 76 "Informal Eschange With Reporters at Thomas Jefferson High School of Science and Technology in Fairfa\ Counp. Virgmia 7 February 1986." Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan (Washington: GPO. 1987). pg. 175.
Chapter Two
' According to political theorin Lawrence Whitehead. one of the biggcst problems facing Latin American countries trying to make the transition to democracy is that those pressuring for change live in liberal capitalist societies that are rich and stable. and thus do not have to face the same day to day difficulties that are present in developing nations. This does not mean that nations m Europe and North America should avoid pressuring these governments to respect the humrights and freedoms of its citizens. he is simply saying hat often industridized nations assume that democracy can fimction in any society regardless of cultural and economic influences. "International Aspects of Democratization" Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Propecl for Dernocracv, edited b! Guillemo O'Donnell et al. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 1986). pg. 8. ' Whitehead argues that democraq in the developing world depends upon three criteria involving the industrialized world's willingness to assist in the transition from authoritarianism to democracy: pressure on undemocratic governments to democratize themselves; support tbr fledgling democracies that are attempting to consolidmx and the maintenance of a firm stance agamst antidemocratic forces that threaten or omthrow established democracies." "International." 11. On a similar note. politid theorist Adam Pneworski believes that a country will only practice democracy whcn there are no other preferable alternatives. Therefore. in Haiti's case. democracy d~dnot establish a foothold because a military dictatorship was still a viable option for Narnphy's government. "Some Problems in the Study of the Tnmsition co Dernocrdq .'* Trmsitions From Authoritanan Rule: Pro~ectsfor Democram. edited by Ciulllermo 0' Donnell et al. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Prcss. 1986). pg. 5 1-2. UN. General Assembly. AN lPV.23.6 October 1986. pg. 17-8. ' A.4l/PV.23.60. UN. General Assembly. A/-tl/PV. 100. 12 December 1986. pg 12. " UN. ECOSOC Council. EjCN.4 l987/15.2-t Dcccrnbcr 1986. paragraph 103-04. 7 House of Commons. Dcbatcs, 3 Februaq 1986. 10367. ' In 1985. CLDA gave 57.67 million to Haiti. $3.58 of which was government-to-government bilateral assistance while the rest went to NCOs and food asistancc. CIDA. Annual Report. 1985-86, pg. 1 1 1. In 1986. the total was $2 1.28 million, S 10.51 of whch was government-to-government bilateral 'asslstance. ClDA. Annwl Report. 1986-87. 103 and 136.
" CIDA. "Ncws Rcleasc 87-1 7." 9 March 1987. 1. I" CIDA. "News Rcleasc 86-72.'' 24 November 1986. 3. It The only aid going from Washington to Haiti was either in the form of surplus wheat and vegetable oil under P.L. 180 Titlc I or to NGOs under P.L. 480 Title 11. Under he terms of the Act. the Prcsident of the United States has the right to withhold bilateral mistancc to any nation that the American govcmmcnt felt did not adequately honour the individual freedoms of its citizens. In 1985. the United States government gave $85.000.000 in surplus food stocks and another $30.173.000 to NGOs for a total of $1 15,173.000 undcr tire terms of P.L.480. USAID. Congressional Presentation, Fiscal Year 1987. Annex 111: Latin America and the Caribbean Wasllington. D.C.:GPO. 1987). 251. I' USAID. Convressional Presentation, Fiscal Year 1988. Annex 111: Latin America and the Caribbean (Washington. D.C. : GPO. 1988). 234-5. 13 Washington Office on Haiti. "Action Alert." (Washington. D.C.:Washington Office on Haiti. I July 1987). pg. I. i4 Washington Office on Hati. "Action Alert." (Washington. D.C.: Washington Office on Haiti. 28 July 1987). pg. 1. Is Washington Otfice on Haiti. Tkm-tic Process in Jeopardy in Haiti.+' (Waslungton Office on Haiti. 3 Yovember 1987). pg. I. l6 Amnee International. "Haiti: Deaths in Detention. Torture ad1nh-e Pnson Conditions." (London: Amnesty International Publications. December 1987). pg. 2. 17 W. General .4ssembly. A/42/875. 10 December 1987. pg. 3 I X UN. Security Council. S/1941O. 7 January 1988. paragraph 3-5. 19 House of Common. Debates, 30 November 1987. 1 1306-8 " CIDA. "News Release 8803." 8 Januap 1988. 2-3. " The monetary statistics come from USAID. Congressional Presentation. Fiscal Year 1989. Annex 111: Latin America and the Caribbean (Washington. D.C.: GPO. 1989). 222. and US AID. Conmional Presentation, Fiscal Year 1990. Annex 111: Latin America and the Caribbean Washngton. D.C.: GPO. 1990), 164. Under the terms of Section 569 of the Continuing Resolution. the United States Government had to bc s~cientlvsatisfied that democracy was being implemented before it would grant developmental assistance. USAID. Fiscal Year 1989, 229. '' UN. ECOSOC. WCN.4/1988MGON8. 16 Februaq 1988. 2. l3 UN. ECOSOC. E/CN.4/1988/SR.34. 1 March 1988. 19. '' UN. ECOSOC. E/CN.J/ 1988lSR.35. 1 March 1988. 2. 7 < - House of Commons. Dtbates, 2 1 January 1988. 12 177-8. '' UN. ECOSOC. EICN.J/ 1988/NGO/6.10 June 1988. 2. " Amnesty International. .*Haiti:Deaths in Detention. Tonure and Inhumane Prison Conditions." (London: Amncse Intcmtional Publications. December 1987). prj. 1-8 '' Michel S. Laguerre. The Militap and Societv in Haiti. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. IYW ). pg 179. ---6) Amnesty Intcmtional. "Nuti:Current Conccrns." (Londcx Amnesty International Publications. November 1988). pg. 3. '" UN. ECOSOC. EICN.U1989/40.6 Febmq 1%'). pmgnphs 15-'W. " CIDA. -.News Releasc 89-63." 1 December 1989. pg. I. -7 '- P.L. Title !I authorizes grants for famine relief and other extrdordimry assistance. and authorizes grdnts to promote economic dmeloprncnt. USALD. The Act for International Devclo~ment:A Prowm for thc Decadc of Dcvelo~ment:Obieaves. Concepts. and ~roposedPro~ris. (Washington. D.C. : GPO, 196 1 ). 83. Thc $50 million in dcvelopmenta1 assistance comes from USAID. Conjgessional Presentation, Fiscal Year 199 1. Annex 111: Latin America and the Caribbean (Washington, D.C.. GPO. 199 1). pg. 149. " House of Commons. Debates. 25 Oaokr 1989. 5092. U Article 1 includes 5 responsibilities of thc government: the trial of members ofthc milita~before thc ordinary courts: the perogatives and duties of the legislative power. exercised by the Chamber of Deputies and the Scnatc: the sharing of executive power between the Pmidcnt and the Prime Minister: the arrangements for Statc financing of procedures for consulting the electorate: and the ban on amending the Constitution by referendum. UN. E/CN.4/1990/44. 23 Jiw1900. 5-10. .- " E/CN.4/ 19 S)O/J.I. 6-0. '' The groups under attack were: the Labadie Youth Movement. K3y Farnrn (Women's House). the Nauonal Popular Asscmbiy (APN). the Local Popular Assembly (APL). and literacy workers in Northern Haiti. Other instances involves the arrest of those cornmcmorating the Jan-Rabcl massacre. and the absencc of witnesses at the tnds of Macoutes acused of committing vioient crimes. Americas Watch. "Human fights in Haiti: One Year Under General Prosper Avril," (New York: Americas Watch in mnjunction with the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees. 1 1 September 1989). pg. 2-9. :7 Americas Watch, "Avril." 1 3- 14. '* UN. ECOSOC. ElCN.411990/44/Add. 1. 34. j9 CIDA. "News Release 90-13." 14 March 1990. 1; and CIDA. "Ncws Rcleasc YO- 17." 25 March 1990. 1. lo USAID. Cong;ressional Presentation Fiscal Year 1002. Annex 111: Latin America and the Caribbean (Washington. D.C.: GPO, 1992). 774. -1 1 Amnesty International. "I-hti: A Summary of Amnesty Intcmational's Concerns under the Administration of President Ertha Pascal-Troullot" (London: Amnesty International Publications. September 1990). pg. 4-5. Chapter Three
1 House of Commons. Debates. 1 October 199 1. 3052. UN. Security Council. Si?3 109. 3 October 199 1. 34. UN. Security Council. S123 132. 9 October 199 1. 2-3 ..Exchange with Reporters Prior to Discussions ~lthPresident Jean-Bemd Anstide of &ti. 4 October 199 1." Public Pa~ersof the Presidents of the United States: Gmrne Bush (Washngton, D.C.: GPO. 1992). pg. 1260. ' "Message to the Congress Transmitting an Executive Order Prohbiting Certain Transactions with Hatti. ZS October l9Y 1." Public Pawn of the Presidents of the Unitcd States: George Bush (Washington. D.C. : GPO. lW2).pg. I?. " One such victim of PCrc Lcbrun was a man by thc name Josue Lafc2ncc. a parlimcntarian who was about to bririg a bolt: oC rw co~lCidc.nzt.against Lavalas Prime Miriisim Previti.' In tcrnls oC judiciai abuses. fonncr Duvalicrist Roger Lafontant did not receive a fair trial for his attempted coup against Aristidc and was subsequently killed on 30 September while serving his sentence in the National Penctentiaq. Amnesty International. "Haiti: Human R~ghtsViolations in the Aftermath of the Coup D'etat. October 199 1." (London: Amnesty International Publications. October 199 1 ). pg. 3. Anne Fuller and Jocelyn McCalh of Americas Watch also reportcd incidents dechoukagc. "A Report by Americas Watch. the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees and Caribbean hghts." (New York: Americas Watch/Natiod Coalition for Haitian Refugees. 1 Novemkr 199 1). pg. 6. Aristidc has since denied the charges. In both his autobiography Aristide and his book entitlcd Dixnity. hc claims never to have endorscd violcnce as a means of controlling opposition. I The Unitcd States Agency for International Dcvclopmcnt also had d~agrcedwith Aristidc's reform. argumg that it would stifle cconomic growth bj malung Haiti less compctitivc in light assembly indusmcs. Thc National Labour Committee. "Sweatshop Development." The Haiti Files: Dccodinr thc Crisis edited by James Ridgeway. (Washington. D.C. : Essential Books. 1 994). pg. 1 35-44. ' "Interviews with NBC Owned and Operated Television Stations." hblic Pa-wrs of the Presidents of the United States: Geor~cBush (Washington. D.C. : GPO. IW!), pg. 1494.
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Conclusion
I Amnesty International. "Haiti: A Question of Justice." (London: Amnesty International Publications. January 1996). pg. 7-10; and Amnesty International. "Haiti: Still C~ngOut for Justice." (London: Amnesty International Publications. July 1998). pg. 3. ' Amnesty International. Trying.' 4 1. UN. General Assembly. Ai491926.23 June 1995. 5. Josh Deaind and David H. Kinley nI. .'.Export-Led' Development." The Haiti Files: Decodine the Crisis edited bv James hdgcway (Washngton. D.C.:Essential Books. 1994). pg. 123. BIBLIOGRAPHY
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