Virtues in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas Thomas F

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Virtues in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas Thomas F Theological Studies 58 (1997) VIRTUES IN THE THEOLOGY OF THOMAS AQUINAS THOMAS F. O'MEARA, O.P. [Editor's Note: The theology of virtues formulated by Thomas Aquinas follows an Aristotelian model in which the virtues, as new quasi-faculties, flow from a distinctive life form, grace. The author shows how this theology, evident inAquinas's works and long a theme of the Dominican school, has important ramifica­ tions (often overlooked) in today's ethics of virtue.] ECENT YEARS have seen the publication of studies advocating an R orientation for Christian ethics based upon virtue. Stanley Hauer- was, Alasdair Maclntyre, Paul J. Wadell, Jean Porter, Daniel Mark Nelson, and others are associated with this approach.1 To many who had known and experienced Roman Catholic moral theology in the decades before Vatican II, this invitation to a restoration of virtue ethics, when it first appeared, was somewhat unexpected and surpris­ ing. Some Catholic schools and religious orders had been sustaining theologies of virtues for one or more centuries, and those approaches had continued up through the 1950s. Also a few Catholic moral theo­ logians during the middle third of the 20th century had been develop­ ing new approaches (distinct from forms of neo-Scholasticism) in which virtue had an important role and which expanded ethics* horizons through modern biblical studies, Christology, and theories of person­ ality and social analysis. During the past years some Protestant ethicians have found an eth­ ics of virtue attractive. Why? Perhaps because it seemed to be original and yet had a venerable pedigree; it was formal but not legalistic, human but not transcendental. An ethics of virtue, unlike approaches based on natural law, can suggest biblical words. However, in arguing for the value of virtues, often as a reaction to the recent history of secular liberal or Protestant ethics, some new advocates of an ethics of virtue have largely ignored the distinct and diverse history of Catholic THOMAS F. O'MEARA, O.P., is the William K. Warren Professor of Theology at the University of Notre Dame. He obtained his Dr.theol. degree from the Ludwig- Maximilian University, Munich. Among his many publications in the area of fundamen­ tal and historical theology, one can cite his recent volume Church and Culture: German Catholic Theology from 1860 to 1914 (Notre Dame, 1993). A new book will be published this September entitled Thomas Aquinas Theologian (Notre Dame, 1997). 1 See William C. Spohn, "The Return of Virtue Ethics," Theological Studies 53 (1992) 60-75. 254 AQUINAS AND VIRTUES 255 moral theology which century after century had included not a few theologies centered on virtue. Some advocates of virtue ethics adopted the posture of discovery and originality. But for Catholics this discovery occurred as the ethics of virtue was completing a cycle of influence within Catholic moral the­ ology; any claim of a restoration of an ethics of virtues overlooks the many presentations on virtues in Catholic moral theology from 1860 to 1960 (or from 1560 to 1860) in numerous neo-Scholastic journals and multivolume moral treatises. If influential Catholic moral theology texts such as those by Arthur Vermeersch, Heribert Jone, and Aloysius Sabetti took an approach drawn from the commandments, neverthe­ less not only manuals but also catechisms and devotional books often treated virtues. Recent summonses to an Aristotelian-Scholastic ethics have been accompanied at times by a monitory tone: modernity is evil, and Catholicism is slipping into a modern abyss by setting aside its Baroque seminary form of moral theology. For enthusiasts of these ethics of virtue it must have been disappointing that the wide world of Roman Catholicism did not join immediately and universally in this renewed discussion of virtues. But that could hardly have been ex­ pected: something from the past can be represented in a new form, but the course of history never repeats itself, nor does it go backwards.2 Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas were understandably summoned to be the advocates and sources of an ethics drawn from virtues. For me, as an outsider to the field of ethics, my long Thomistic education within the Dominican Order raises questions about this rehabilitation of an ethics of virtue in the name of Aquinas. Should a teaching on virtues be extracted from Aquinas's commentaries on philosophical texts or from blocks of philosophy situated within his theological works? Was Aquinas's theology in its principles and focus actually centered on the virtues? What lies at the heart of new virtue-based approaches? Is it Aristotle, Aquinas, neo-Thomism, neo-Aristotelianism? What is the re­ lationship of recent interpretations of virtues to the venerable schools of moral theology such as the school of Alphonsus Liguori or a centu­ ries old tradition of Thomist interpretation like the Dominican school? Some contemporary ethicians and philosophers cite Aquinas without seeing if his theology supports their interpretation. Stanley Hauerwas originally presented an ethics where virtues described in Aristotelian language were linked to biblical phrases and the imitation of Christ, or where "natural virtues" were changed by the character of a story, 2 Otto Hermann Pesch, looking at neo-Thomist teaching on virtue a few years into its postconciliar decline, sketched its limitations and its "perduring significance"; see his "Die bleibende Bedeutung der thomanischen Tugendlehre," Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 21 (1974) 359-91 (summarized and abbreviated as "The The­ ology of Virtue and the Theological Virtues," in Changing Values and Virtues, Concilium 191 (Glen Rock, N.J.: Paulist, 1987) 81-97. Interestingly the papal overview of moral theology, Veritatis splendor, seems to omit virtue ethics, and the new Catholic Catechism does not choose it as its ethical framework. 256 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES whether of Jesus or the community,3 but recently he has mentioned that for Aquinas (whose theology "can give the impression that all Aquinas is doing is 'topping* Aristotle's virtues with faith, hope, and charity"4) virtues become true or Christian or not vicious through char­ ity. But how this happens, the secondary role of charity, and the real milieu of a supernatural order, life, and telos are not explained; Chris­ tian life, character, and virtues lack a real ground, or, at least, the source and ground of Aquinas. Alasdair Maclntyre linked his thought to Aquinas through occa­ sional references, but his books, perhaps because he is writing for a secular audience, do not give access to Aquinas's theological context. Virtues—whether they are infused or acquired is not discussed—are "qualities which enable men to survive evils on their historical jour­ ney"5 rather than empowerments of the Holy Spirit's life in men and women. There is a mention of "that charity which is a gift of grace"6 described vaguely as something which "alters the conception of the good for man in a radical way; for the community in which the good is achieved has to be one of reconciliation,"7 but grace is not specified as a dynamic quality nor is its place in a supernatural order outlined. Maclntyre states a higher goal concerning "man's true end ..., a mat­ ter of faith"8 but locates what is central in Aquinas's view of Chris­ tianity only in a vague "goodness of God"9 rather than in trinitarian life. "Actual grace" is referred to Aquinas,10 but this term and its kind of grace is proper to the Baroque commentaries and absent from Aquinas. Daniel Mark Nelson's observation, "A theology of grace, for Thomas, is a necessary supplement to a morality of virtue," turns Aquinas's perspective upside down. One can suspect at times in theoreticians of 3 S. Hauerwas, Character and the Christian Life: A Study in Theological Ethics (San Antonio: Trinity University, 1975) 81-82. Compare his further remark, "To be sanctified is to have our character determined by our basic commitments and beliefs about God ..., to have one's character determined in accordance with God's action in Jesus Christ" (ibid 203,227); also The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1983) 103. 4 S. Hauerwas, "The Difference of Virtue and the Difference It Makes: Courage Ex­ emplified," Modern Theology 9 (1993) 256. Other writings fail to consider the supernatu­ ral source of virtues by employing the excuse that some recent theologies have severely separated nature and grace; this might be true of schools of neo-Thomism in past cen­ turies but it does not justify referring to Aquinas and omitting his harmonious interplay of grace and nature (Vision and Virtue: Essays in Christian Ethical Reflection [Notre Dame: Fides, 1974] 119). 5 A. Maclntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1981) 175. 6 A. Maclntyre, Whose Justice1? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1988) 182. 7 A. Maclntyre, After Virtue 174. 8 Ibid. 167. 9 A. Maclntyre, Whose Justice? 192. 10 Ibid. 164. 11 D. Nelson, The Priority of Prudence: Virtue and Natural Law in Thomas Aquinas and the Implications for Modern Ethics (University Park: Pennsylvania State Univer­ sity, 1992) 1-2. AQUINAS AND VIRTUES 257 virtue a naturalist or Pelagian tone, as in Paul Waddell's view: "Hap­ piness is lasting intimacy with God, but it is a kinship possible only when we are enough like God in goodness to have union with God. This is what the virtues help achieve, the ongoing, penetrating remaking of ourself through habits that make us godly. We need to develop the virtues because godliness does not come naturally to us, nor does it come easy."12 The activities of acquired virtues, however, are for Aquinas infinitely distant from divinization in virtue by the Spirit.
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