Fkom UNRWA To : The 1952 lkansfer of Responsibilities for Refugees in Israel Alexander Bligh

The transfer of responsibilities from How Significant Was the Size of the peasants) in the north, plus the UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Rehrgee Population in Israel? Bedouins of the , most of them Work Agency for Refugees refugees, who numbered about in the Near East) to Israel in July 1952 The total number of Arab refugees 16,000-18,000 people (3,500 families) was a significant step in the resettle- emanating from the 1948 armed con- in 25 tribes (3 ~lans).~Mostof these fig- ment of the refugees in the sovereign flict in Palestine is important for un- ures are based on the official census territory of Israel. It doubles in impor- derstanding the magnitude of the and the estimate of Yosef Weitz, an Is- tance considering that Israel was the issue, yet it has never been easy to cal- raeli official responsible for land and only Middle Eastern country to take culate. It is also important to determine settlement issues. over from the UN agency. However, the proportion of Arab refugees to After the conclusion of the April the significance of this step should also other Arab citizens and the total Jew- 1949 armistice agreement between Is- be compared with at least two more ish population of Israel, in considering rael and the Hashemite Kingdom of factors: the ratio between the refugees the political, financial, and military ef- Transjordan, the number of Arabs in found in Israel and the total Arab post- forts invested by the Israeli govern- the area under Israeli sovereignty in- 1948 refugee population, and the ratio ment. Further, any Israeli contribution creased dramatically. In April 1949, between the Israeli refugee population aimed at solving the internal refugee about 20,000 refugees were found in and its total Arab body. Comparing issue should be assessed against the twenty villages in northern Israel, and these two sets of figures might facili- proportion of the total number of refu- 7,000 more lived in the port town of tate an understanding of the reasons gees and those living in Israel. A~re.~Adding the number of refugees for the disappearance of the problem Most figures given are only esti- in the south, the refugee population at in Israel, yet have no effect whatsoever mates which put the number of refu- that time stood at more than 40,000. on the refugee issue in its entirety. gees at the end of the war between This figure was later used by the Israeli In the following pages an attempt 600,000 and 760,000.' In contrast, the government in a letter to the chief made to analyze the reasons behind number of Arab citizens in the newly UNRWA representative in the Middle UNRWA's suggestion to Israel to take created State of Israel was carefully East, in which Israel agreed to assume over, and the processes that led Israel calculated based on the results of the the organization's duties on its terri- to reluctantly accept this proposal. Of first Israeli census (held on 8 Novem- tory. The letter stated that, originally, course, this move represented an op- ber 1948). One of the reasons for this the number of refugees in Israel had portunity to resettle the Arab refugees census was to determine the extent of been about 48,O ,but at the time of the left behind in what became the State of the security risk posed by the Arab letter (mid-1952 it stood at 20,000. It is Israel. However, there are other rea- population of Israel, the refugees in- clear from a var ety of sources that the sons for the total disappearance of the cluded. Thus, bearing in mind the number used !the Israeli govern- term "refugee" from Israeli terminol- method and the purpose, it is logical to ment for internal calculations, as well ogy. First, the fact that this country assume that some effort was indeed as diplomatic approaches, did indeed never formally recognized in its legis- invested in those calculations. More- stand at 48,000.' lation the distinctiveness of this par- over, the question of facts and figures Thus, the number of Arabs living in ticular population. Further, treatingall should not only be studied on its own, Israel as of 31 December 1950 stood at Arabs in the same way, subjecting but the number of refugees in Israel 170,000;~about one-third of them were them all to military government, should always be mentioned in terms refugees. Of these, the number of peo- helped galvanize one politically moti- relative to the total number of Arabs in ple taken care of by UNRWA in north- vated population of refugees and non- Israel. That number stood at around ern Israel was about 25,000: 21,001 refugees. But those issues are beyond 102,000 in the fall of 1948.2 A few Arab refugees, 2,995 Jewish refugees, the scope of this article. months later, in January 1949, the and 891 Arabs from the demilitarized number of refugees in Israel, based on zone along the Israeli-Syrian border. figures used by the UN, stood at This picture did not change much two Professor Alexander Bligh teaches history at the Department of History, Hebrew University, 40,000.3 At the same time, Israeli years later in regard to the number of , Israel, and was a visiting professor sources used the figure of 30,000:' refugees on UNRWA's list. At this at York Uniwsity, Toronto. 11,000-12,000 (among them 4,000 time, UNRWA and Israel were en-

Rejkge, Vol. 14, No. 6 (November 1994) 7 gaged in negotiations for the transfer did not serve as a role model for her to Israel had to be interpreted by Arab of responsibility for the refugees in Is- neighbours. governments as making Israel admit rael. The only major difference was its formal guilt in creating the problem. that the total number of refugees was UNRWA Interest and Expectations Perhaps the issue of guilt associated identicalto the number of those helped United Nations' organized involve- with taking care of the refugees was by UNRWA, meaning that all other ment in the refugee issue began in the main reason for the Arab govern- displaced people were already taken August 1948 with the establishment of ments' consistent refusal to take over care of within the Israeli system. This the Disaster Relief Project. In Novem- from UNRWA in their sovereign terri- might indicate that by late 1950 the ber 1948, the United Nations General tories, in spite of the economicbenefits problem of about 28,000 refugees was Assembly established the United Na- which might have accompanied such already res~lved.~UNRWA figures tions Relief for Palestine Refugees. an agreement. Even though Syria was cited by British diplomats1° speak of This body was replaced by the United seen by UNRWA as the most likely 12,000 Arab refugees already resettled Nations Relief and Works Agency candidate in addition to Israel, the in Israel, and thus removed from the based on the General Assembly reso- takeover never materialized.16 On the 1949 number of UNRWA-supported lution. This agency began its activities other hand, the policy of making Israel recipients. This number was further in May 1950, entrusted with projects responsible for the refugees only reduced in the following months by for the permanent resettlement of refu- withinits borders, and not for the refu- another 3,000 refugees. Thus, the Is- gees in Arab countries and in Israel. gees all over the Middle East, is evi- raeli ministerial committee discussing Even before the establishment of dent from contemporary diplomatic resettlement was able to reclassify the UNRWA, the foreign powers involved correspondence, which strongly sug- refugees: 7,000 would not need any in the refugee issue adopted a distinct gests that resettlement schemes in help; 5,000 would need jobs in Israel; policy regarding Israel. It became evi- Arab countries were usually offered to and about 5,000 were hard-core wel- dent over time that Israel was treated refugees found only in other Arab fare cases. The date of this meeting, differently from the Arab countries. countries.17 only two months after the transfer The Western powers, led by the United An additional element of policy was from UNRWA, strongly suggests that States and Great Britain adopted," as identified and acted upon in the early the Israeli government believed the early as 1949, a three-layer approach in 1950s: considering that UNRWA did UN figures to be exaggerated and thus, dealing with the Israeli dimension of not possess the resources to build in- through recounting and not through the refugee issue: frastructure for the refugees in Israel, resettlement, in eight weeks, the num- 1sraekopposition to the principle of or elsewhere, and the quick pace of bers were further reduced." The 1952 repatriation is the foundation of development in Israel in order to ac- figures were 17,000 and 16,500 Arabs12 any future Israeli and international commodate hundreds of thousands of for May and November, respectively. policy;15 this, obviously, does not Jewish newcomers, the relinquishing Of these, about 40 percent were con- rule out public lip service in the of powers to the local government sidered to be "hard-core" cases, mean- form of repatriation demands from might lead, in the view of the Agency, ing they could not support themselves. Israel. to the integration of the refugees into Stated differently, that was the actual Israel is eager to resolve the prob- the emerging infrastructure.18 number of refugees cared for by lem of those refugees within its bor- The outcome of these policies could UNRWA, and the number which Israel ders to eliminate a potential be only a re-examination of the role of took upon itself to deal with upon the security threat, and aiming to mani- UNRWA in Israel. Indeed, in 1950 the transfer of responsibilities from the fest that the issue is more humani- Western powers began to consider the Agency to the government of Israel.13 tarian than political. possibility that UNRWA would not be Reducing the relative representa- Israel is suspicious of unfriendly the exclusive means of dealing with the tion of the refugees within the Israeli United Nations organizations and refugees in Israel.19 This concept, at Arab population from about 28 per- their agencies. first only theoretical, became the cent to about 10 percent in four years UNRWA-~O~~C~~Sbased on these policy of UNRWA when, in 1950, it almost eliminated the problem within premises indicated Israel as an obvi- faced dire financial straits. An internal the Israeli borders. A few years later, ous candidate to take over from UNRWA memorandum of December the term "refugee" disappeared from UNRWA, and made Israel a testing 1950 advocatesa transferring respon- the Israeli discourse. This change was ground for ways of tackling the issue. sibilitiesto local governments as a cost- largely due to the Israeli takeover from Moreover, the Western powers in- saving measure, since these authorities UNRWA in 1952. However, relative to sisted on initiating a resettlement proc- would be less exposed to refugee pres- the whole body of refugees in the Arab ess in Israel, in order to appease the sure and excessive demands from countries, the reduction was rather in- Arab countries whose support for the UNRWA officials, would have better significant: from about 3 percent to West was essential with the raging means of verifying the precise number about 2 percent. On this level, Israel Cold War. Transferring responsibility of refugees, and thus would commit

8 we,Vol, 14, No. 6 (November 1994) less funds to this population than the were resumed in early 1952, and the tion~~~with Israeli diplomats revealed UNRWA, while maintaining the same two parties agreed on 18 May 1952 that the budgetary burden on Israel result- level of treatment. Under these circum- UNRWA was to terminate its activities ing from a possible transfer of respon- stances, Israel was not a natural place on 1 September 1952, and that Israel sibility. According to an Israeli for savings, since UNRWA allocated would not be given any financial aid diplomat in charge of the negotiations, only 3 percent21 of its distribution for the project. That date was later to be about 8,000 of the 20,000 refugees budget to refugees in Israel. However, changed to 1July upon the request of taken care of by UNRWA would con- considering the political implications, the Agency (however, UNRWA was to tinue to constitute "hard-core" welfare Israel could serve as a starting point continue delivery of supplies until 1 cases. Consequently, Israel would accepted by all parties. September 1952). have to put together a detailed tirneta- The diminishing role of UNRWA in ble and additional sources of financ- Israel and the organization's acute fi- Israeli Reaction and Apprehension ing. nancial crisis may help explain its ap- The transfer of responsibilitieswas not Concurrently, the United StatesSec- proach to Israel. In December 1950, smooth on the part of Israel. Most of retary of State was concerneds with UNRWA first askedz2 Israel to take the refugees foynd on Israeli soil had the slow pace of resettlement in Jordan, over the Agency's activities in the been granted Israeli citizenship in late but did not believe that the individual country. The offer was the result of the 1948 and early 1949. Consequently, Arab countries (Jordan included) United Nations General Assembly any change in the way refugees were would accept greater responsibilityfor resolution in November that direct re- treated by non-Israeli agencies was, the refugees. Consequently, he and the lief cannot be terminated as provided from the very beginning, unwelcomed Administration were determined to for in a prior resolution, and author- and perceived as a foreign intervention see at least Israel contribute its share to ized the Agency to furnish such relief, in Israeli domestic affairsz7Because of the resettlement process. Responding for which $20 million would be re- suspicions regarding any initiative to U.S. pressure,35 and based on quired for the period 1July 1951 to 30 along these lines, especially coming UNRWA estimate that the annual ex- June 1952. This came on top of an exist- from UN circles, and the productive pense for its activities in Israel would ing UNRWA deficit of over U.S.$2.6 cooperation between the Israeli gov- be some US$5 million, Israel suggested million (about 10 percent of its overall ernment and UNRWA," it was unnec- gradual withdrawal of UNRWA. budget).23This resolution spelled a essary in Israeli eyes to change the However, Israeli insistence on receiv- loomingfinancial crisisfor the Agency, current modus operandi into something ing about one-half of the estimated and a need to turn over responsibilities that might become more costly, both in costs for "hard-core" cases from to local governments wherever possi- financial and diplomatic terms. The UNRWA was interpreted by the U.S. ble. However, since UNRWA had a Israeli-UNRWA cooperation even as another ploy to delay the transfer of UN mandate only in the economic and enabled the two parties to reach29a de responsibility. As a result, Americans humane fields, no change in the posi- facto agreement denying refugees infil- decided to pressure Israel by using tion of this body could in any way be tratingIsrae1fromLebanon UNRWA's their leverage stemming from the fact interpreted by the Arab countries as a assistance in Israel. On a different that Israel was a large recipient of U.S. total UN withdrawal from its commit- level, in 1951 Israel began distributing bilateral aid for refugee expenses ments to a political solution to the refu- supplies to its refugees, overlapping through UN channels. This American gee issue.% Thus, Israel was offered UNRWA activitie~,~~and presumably resolution was immediately conveyed several financial incentives, including paving the way for a unilateral takeo- to the governments in Beirut and Am- a grant of $2 per capita per month (wel- ver. man with the hope that Israel would fare cases only, so that the approximate Israeli displeasure with the pro- now agree to transfer of responsibility value of this part of the offer was about posed changes was evident in April as of 1July. $170,000 annually), and a lump sum of 1952 when Walter Eytan, Director On 18 May 1952, largely as a result $1-1.5 million for the total refugee General of the Foreign Office, used of American and UNRWA pressure, population, provided Israel took over very reserved language in stating31 1srael notified36the Director Generalof on 1 April 1951. One month after the that he "thought that Israel had agreed UNRWA, Ambassador Blandford, deadline, and due to the fact that Israel in principle" to the move; similar lan- that it agreed that UNRWA would be did not respond, UNRWA withdrew guage was used in discussions with relieved of further responsibility for its proposals. However, the United British diplomats. This, coming in the the refugees in Israel. That Israeli States approached Israel in December wake of negotiations for the Israeli agreement was reiterated at a meeting 1951?5 Shortly thereafter, Israel indi- takeover of United Nations Interna- between Blandford, the Prime Minis- cated it would take over from the UN tional Children's Emergency Fund ter of Israel, the Director General of the and absorb more than 20,000 refugees (UNICEF) activities already at the end Foreign Ministry, and Mr. Michael living in Negotiations be- of March 1951:~ was indeed taken as a Comay, in charge of negotiations with tween the Organization and Israel setback for UNRWA. Further negotia- UNRWA at the Israeli Foreign Minis-

- Refuge, Vol. 14, No. 6 (November 1994) 9 try. The organization's goal at that support helped in maintaining some 7. PRO/F0371/914ll/EE1828/1, UNRWA Haifa Monthly report for November 1950; PRO/ point was to end all of its activities in opposition to the government and its F0371/91411 /EE1826/6, UNRWA monthly Israel as of 1July 1952, and withdraw efforts; it also contributed to these refu- report for December 1950 reports slight differ- all of its staff. gees being a source of cheap labour ence in numbers: total of 24,919; cf. PRO/ F03711 91411 /EE1828/14, UNRWA Haifa Israeli opposition to the proposed (since they already had some income monthly report for January 1951 speaking of change in responsibility was the result of their own). Furthermore, UNRWA 24,911; same range of numbers is repeated all of several considerations. Leading did not try to advance any solution to through 1951; ISA/PM244!5/1/Iarael Foreign Ministry/26 March 1952/From: the Foreign among them was deep-rooted suspi- the problem. Without the aid of the Ministry, Jerusalem, To: Israeli Embassy, cion of any foreign involvement in the Agency, Israel was faced with the task Washington; NA/RG&Q/TelAviv(1950-52)/ Israeli decision-making processes re- of solving the problem. One historical Box 18/Folder 571(PRWA)/S June 19521 From: The Ambassador, To: Washington, lating to Arab-Israeli relations, includ- precedent widely used39by Israel at transmitting a copy of the letter addressed to ing the refugee issue. Israel initiated a that time was that the success of the the UNRWA, by Michael Comay, of the Israeli gradual change in UNRWA-Israeli resettlement of Greek refugees in the Foreign Ministry; ISA/FM2406/ 17A/Israel operations even before the formal de- ForeignMinistry/3 September1952/From: the 1920s was in part the result of the fact International OrganizationsSection of the For- cision; that is, Israel found it necessary that the feeding of the refugees by in- eign Ministry, Jerusalem, To: the acting Dm- to resist a beneficial move only because ternational organizations was discon- tor General Foreign Office, Jerusalem. it was not the result of its own inde- tinued in the early stages and replaced 8. NA/RG&Q/TelAviv(1950-52)/Box 6lFolder 350127 June 1951/From:The First Seaetary, pendent decision making. This tactic by constructive resettlement meas- To: Washington; NA/RGU/Tel Aviv(1950- was only marginally affected by the ures. This precedent, impertinent as it 52)/Box8/Folder350/19 July 1951/From: The financial factor which, if compared might be looked at four generations Ambassador, To: Washington. 9. PRO/F0371/91410/EE1826/45, 19 December with other contemporary Israeli finan- later, did guide the Israeli authorities. 1951, From: UK Delegation to the UN General cial undertakings, was insignificant. Indeed, a sharp decline in the number Assembly, Paris, To: the Foreign Office, Lon- don, reporting views expressed by the Israeli Postmortem: Did the Transfer of of refugees in Israel was reported in late 1952. At about the same time, only Foreign minister in a discussion with the UK Responsibility Contribute to a Ambassadoc ISA/FM2445/l /Israel Foreign a few months after the transfer of re- Ministry/lB March 19521 From: Israeli Em- Solution? sponsibilities, a senior Israeli official bassy, Washington, To: the Foreign Minishy, UNRWA officialy ended its activities asserted that there was no longer a Jerusalem. 10, PRO/FO371/98505/EE1824/33,20 June 1952, in Israel on 1July 1952,j7but continued problem of refugees in Israel.* From: UK Delegation to Beirut, To: the Foreign providing supplies to refugees in Israel Office, London. until 1 September, and partially oper- Notes 11. ISA /FM2445/ 1/Israel Foreign Ministry18 ated even during October of that year. 1. . The Birth of the Palestinian Rcfu- September 1952/minutes of the ministerial gee Problem. New York: Cambridge University Refugee Affairs Committee. The number of refugees taken care of Press, 1987. pp. 297-98; cf. ISA/FM2444/191 12. ISA/FM2406/17A/Israel Foreign Ministry13 was 17,000 (7,000 would not need any Israel Foreign MinistryINews From the Coun- September 1952IFrom: the International Or- assistance, 5,000 would need welfare tries of the Middle EastIReport W3/ 25 Febru- ganizations Section of the Foreign Ministry, ary 194[9]/The Palestinian Refugees Jerusalem,To: the acting Director General, the payments, and 5,000 would need jobs). Problem-This document states (and this be- Foreign Offlce, Jerusalem. The process of changing responsi- came the basis for Israeli policy) that there 13. PRO/F0371/914lO/EE1826/44,l4December bilities for refugees within Israeli bor- were no reliable figures, but that the total 1951, summary of discussion between the Is- ders involved two sets of conflicting number of refugees did not exceed 600,000. raeli Ambassador, London, and the British 2. ISA/FM2444/ 191Israel Foreign Ministry/ Seaetary of State; NA/RG&Q/TelAviv(195LL interests. Israel, always suspicious of News From the Countries of the Middle East/ 52)IBox 14/Folder 571(PRWA)/18 April foreign intervention in its domestic Report #3/25February 194[9]/The Palestinian 1952/ From: Keeler, Tel Aviv, To: Washington; affairs, tried to slow down the process. Refugees Problem; ISA/FM2444/ l9/ Israel NA/RG&Q/TelAviv(1950-52)/Box 14 /Folder Foreign Ministry/2 June 1949/From: Dr. H. 571(PRWA)/28May 1952/From: The Ambas- UNRWA, on the other hand, hard- Meyuzam, Central Bureau of Statistics, To: A. sador, To: Washington. pressed to relieve its financial crisis Goren, The Foreign Ministry. 14. Early indication for a similar approach to Is- and eager to show some progress in 3. ISA/FM2444/19/Israel Foreign Ministry / rael can be found in PROIF0371 /75417/E263, News From the Countries of the Middle East/ 5 January 1949, in which a UNCCP official and resettlement, tried its best to speed it Report #4/20 April 1949lThe Palestinian a British diplomat exchange views on the Arab up. Looking back to the negotiations Refugees Problem. refugees. with UNRWA, Israel had every reason 4. ISA/FM2444/19/Israel Foreign Ministry/ 27 15. op. cit., Partial U.S. withdrawal from the repa- to be satisfied. After the transfer of re- May 1949IFrom: Yosef Weitz, To: the Foreign triation vrindvle, see: ISA/FM2444/19/Israel Minister; ISA/FM2445/2A/Israel Foreign ~oreign~ini~try/29Ma~l%9/ From: theU.S. sponsibilities, a senior Foreign Office Ministry1 18 December l952/ Written com- President, To: the Prime Minister, Israel; PRO/ official summari~ed~~the Israeli as- ments by the Advisor on Arab Affah to the FO37l/82595/El46l/l6/G, 12 September sessment of the change: Israel did not Prime Minister. . 1950, Top Secret, From: the British Embassy, 5. ISA/FM2444/ 19/Israel Foreign Ministry/ 1 Washington, To: the Foreign Office, London; benefit from the activities of the or- September 1949lMinutes of the Refugee Af- PRO/FO371/914lO/EEl826/1,28December ganization and neither did the refu- fairs Committee. 1950, From: the British Embassy, Baghdad, To: the Foreign Office, London; PRO/F0371/ gees. Aid from a foreign power 6. NA/RG&Q/Haifa/Box 1IFolder 350/57O.l/ 91410/EE1826/14,26 January 1951, UNRWA contributed to the alienation of that 350.21lFrom: the U.S. Consul, Jerusalem, To: the U.S. Consul, Haifa. national minority from the state. This Continued on page24/ see From UNRWA .. .