Yuliy Sannikov Department of Finance Stern School of Business, NYU http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/~sannikov 44 West Fourth Street, Suite 9-190 New York, NY 10012-1126 ______Professional Experience July 2006 – present Visiting Assistant Professor, Finance Department, NYU July 2004 – present Assistant Professor, Economics Department, UC Berkeley Fall 2003 Lecturer, Economics Department, Stanford University

Education 2004 Ph.D. in Business Administration Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford, California 2000 A. B. in Mathematics, Highest Honors, Minor in Applied Mathematics , Princeton, New Jersey

Research Interests Contract Theory, Corporate Finance, Security Design, , Dynamic Incentives

Honors and Awards Invited panel speaker in Economic Theory, summer meetings of Econometric Society, 2006 Review of Economic Studies Tour, 2004 Jaedicke Merit Award for Outstanding Academic Performance (Stanford GSB, 2000-03) Graduated from Princeton with Highest Honors (2000) President’s Award for Academic Achievement (Princeton, October 1998) Three Gold Medals in International Mathematical Olympiads (1994 – 1996) Graduated with High Honors from Sevastopol Visual Arts School (1994)

Teaching Experience Spring 2007: Financial Management (undergraduate) Fall 2004-Fall 2005: Organizer of the Economic Theory seminar Spring 2005: Repeated Games and Dynamic Contracts (graduate) Fall 2005: Game Theory (graduate) Fall 2003, 04 and 05: Microeconomics (graduate) Fall 2001 and 02: TA, Managerial Microeconomics (MBA)

Invited Seminar and Conference Presentation 2007: Columbia Finance, Columbia Economics, Stanford, MIT, NYU, Brown, Chicago, UCLA, SED 2006: AEA Meetings, NYU Finance, UCL, Harvard, UIUC, Washington University in St. Louis, Princeton, Banff Workshop, Meetings of Econometric Society, Cambridge, Yale, Wharton Finance, NYU Economics, Georgetown, Institute for Advanced Studies, Northwestern Finance, Duke/UNC 2005: UCLA, ASU, Caltech, SCE, SITE, NSF/CEME Conference, Harvard/MIT, UC Berkeley, Stanford 2004: Iowa, Rochester, University of Pennsylvania, University of Michigan, UC Berkeley, Northwestern Finance, Humboldt University, Oxford University, Universitat Automata de Barcelona, UCSD, Chicago GSB, Minnesota Macro Conference, Yale University, University of Minnesota, NYU, Princeton, Chicago, MIT, Harvard, Northwestern Economics 2003: Stanford, UC Berkeley

Research

Publications

“Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous-Time Agency Model,” with Peter DeMarzo, The Journal of Finance, December, 2006

“Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time,” forthcoming in Econometrica

“Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production,” with Andy Skrzypacz, forthcoming in AER

Working papers

“A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal-Agent Problem.” (2nd revise and resubmit in the Review of Economic Studies)

“The Role of Information in Repeated Games with Frequent Actions,” with Andy Skrzypacz (Revise and resubmit in Econometrica)

“Agency problems, Screening and Increasing Credit Lines.”

“Reputation Effects and Degenerate Equilibria in Continuous-Time Games,” with Eduardo Faingold

“Competitive Contracting and Employment Dynamics,” with Day Manoli

“Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring: Connection between Discrete and Continuous Time.”

“Efficiency in a Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring,” with Kyna Fong