MONITORING FACTORS AFFECTING THE SRI LANKAN PEACE PROCESS CLUSTER REPORT FOURTH QUARTERLY NOVEMBER 2005 – JANUARY 2006 CENTRE FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES TABLE OF CONTENTS CLUSTER Page Number PEACE TALKS AND NEGOTIATIONS CLUSTER.................................................... 2 POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT CLUSTER.....................................................................16 SECURITY CLUSTER.............................................................................................................26 LEGAL & CONSTIIUTIONAL CLUSTER......................................................................45 ECONOMICS CLUSTER........................................................................................................51 RELIEF, REHABILITATION & RECONSTRUCTION CLUSTER.....................58. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS & SOCIAL ATTITUDES CLUSTER...............................67 MEDIA CLUSTER.....................................................................................................................73. ENNOTES.....………………………………………………………………………...80 METHODOLOGY The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) has conducted the project “Monitoring the Factors Affecting the Peace Process” since 2005. The output of this project is a series of Quarterly Reports. This is the fourth of such reports. It should be noted that this Quarterly Report covers the months of November, December and January. Having identified a number of key factors that impact the peace process, they have been monitored observing change or stasis through a range of indicators. These indicators suggest trends for each factor. The factors have been grouped into a series of clusters which reflect critical dimensions of the peace process. The trends will suggest the level of change in each cluster and in sum will indicate how the peace process and its environment have been strengthened or weakened. This Synthesis Report will highlight the trends that emerge from the monitoring process and analyse them within the context of their respective clusters and between the clusters. This report is drawn from the more comprehensive Cluster Report which examines the various trends, factors and indicators in greater detail. - 1 - I. NEGOTIATIONS AND PEACE TALKS CLUSTER 1.1 Context In the previous Quarterly Report (August-October 2005) it was noted that the decision by the LTTE to engage in negotiations dealing with the CFA, be it a review of the CFA itself or of its implementation, contrary to its earlier opposition, had created new opportunities for the continued engagement of the parties and for the progress of the peace process. However, as noted in the report, the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were focusing on the “review” of the CFA from divergent positions, with the LTTE focussed on Article 1.8 of the CFA1 – the paramilitary question and the Karuna Group in particular and GoSL adopting a broader approach with particular reference to Article 2.1 dealing with “human rights.” In addition, the GoSL also looked at amending the CFA while the LTTE stuck to a position of implementing and reviewing the CFA. The Norwegian facilitators also expressed their lack of enthusiasm for any amendment to the CFA.2 A key trend identified in the report was that the GoSL was adopting a dual strategy of campaigning for international sanctions on the LTTE, while seeking to strengthen the CFA, the Peace Process and its own position within the process. This was discernible particularly in the aftermath of the assassination of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar where the LTTE was identified by the Government as the perpetrator. Yet another trend identified during the 3rd Quarter was that the LTTE was stepping up its efforts to force the Government out of the status quo of “no peace talks” and “no war” and to maintain the former’s strategic balance in the peace process. The report also noted a trend relating to the International Community which was beginning to shift emphasis from a general policy of “Constructive Engagement” with the LTTE to “Constructive Sanctions” against it. Here again the Kadirigamar assassination acted as a catalyst for a change in policy. The assassination posed a critical dilemma for the international community’s involvement in the Sri Lankan Peace Process and called into question the international community’s role and leverage. Over the last quarter there was increasing “disenchantment” on the part of the GoSL with Norway’s Role as facilitator/mediator , with increasing uncertainties and serious challenges. The uncertainty was further reinforced by a pre-election agreement between the Presidential candidate Mahinda Rajapakse and the JVP which sought to “reconsider” Norway’s role “given [its] unprecedented bias and partiality” as both the facilitator and chair of the monitoring mission.3 - 2 - Hence, while this last quarter produced a series of challenges that called into question some of the fundamentals of the current peace process it also offered a window of opportunity to strengthen the ceasefire and even revive the peace process. 1.2. Factors, Indicators and Trends Given that the GoSL and LTTE delegations did not meet for direct negotiations, the key development over the last quarter was on talks about talks, specifically on the CFA and its implementation. While a number of other aspects were covered in these talks-about-talks the dominant focus appeared to be the venue for talks. There were other related issues: the scope of talks (whether it should be a review of the implementation of the CFA, the ceasefire agreement itself or even whether it should be about substantive final and interim status issues), the urgent need to end the killings and violence, Norway’s role as facilitator and chair of the monitoring mission; and the role of the international community within the current peace process etc. Through tracing this main concern of talks on the CFA a dominant trend emerges that of a Consensus between the GoSL and the LTTE on a venue for talks and the CFA as the sole agenda for talks, with continuing differences as regards emphasis. There are additional trends which will be examined and which shed light on the shifts or stasis in the parties’ positions and that of the international community. Developments relating to “talks about talks” and the recommencement of negotiations with the LTTE during this quarter can be directly linked to political developments as well as to the security situation. In particular, the outcome of the Presidential Elections (See Political Environment Cluster) as well as the deterioration of the prevailing “No War, No Peace” situation into an “undeclared war” by the LTTE and an intensification of “proxy war” by the State (See Security Cluster) have a direct bearing on the Key Trends during this quarter. In addition, the role of the International Community in prevailing on the two parties to hasten the recommencement of direct talks was another key determinant. Trend 1: Consensus between the GoSL and the LTTE on a venue for talks and the CFA as the sole agenda for talks, with continuing differences as regards emphasis In the wake of the Presidential Elections of November 17th 2005 which saw the election of President Mahinda Rajapakse, on a platform challenging the framework of the existing peace process, and the LTTE’s policy of an enforced boycott of the elections in the North East seemed to suggest that the peace process, and the issue of negotiations on the CFA would become further complicated. The need for talks dealing with the CFA between the GoSL and the LTTE had already been agreed upon, - 3 - in principle, prior to the election, by the then Government of President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunge and the LTTE. While there was some contention between the parties on the semantics and scope of the exercise – as to whether it was a review of the CFA or of the implementation of the CFA - there was some acceptance that the talks would be on the latter. As noted in the previous report, the issue of the venue, however, proved particularly problematic with the GoSL offering locations such as no man’s land and the Bandaranaike International Airport while the LTTE suggesting Killinochchi or Oslo. The LTTE then withdrew from talks on talks suggesting a delay in negotiations until a new government was in place. Agreeing to meet seemed to be more difficult following the establishment of the new Government because it did not seek continuity with the stance taken by the previous administration. It challenged some of the fundamentals of the peace process such as the role of Norway, federalism as a model for the final settlement, the need for a Southern consensus before reaching an agreement with the LTTE and the validity of the CFA. Hence, it retreated from the position of consensus adopted by the previous GoSL by demanding a review of the CFA itself while maintaining the previous administration’s stand regarding venue. The LTTE for its part stuck to its demand of talks in Oslo and on the need for full implementation of the CFA, and a review of the implementation of the CFA if necessary. The period from the end of November 2005 to the last week of January 2006 was an intense period in the ‘no war, no peace’ situation with a dramatic escalation in violence in the North-East, a flurry of international mediation visits to address the growing crisis, and efforts by the parties to assert their demands while testing the limits of the other side and simultaneously voicing interest in a consensus for a venue