SUPPLEMENT 2

Interfacing Alarm Systems and Elevator Controls

Bruce Fraser SimplexGrinnell, L.P.

Editor’s Note: The relationship between fire alarm systems and elevator control systems, and how these systems interface with each other, has had a long history, one that is still evolving. This supplement summarizes the historical development of these relationships and provides insight into the requirements for ’ recall and elevator shutdown.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF occupants using elevators during a fire, it was FIREFIGHTERS’ RECALL AND important to prevent those occupants and visitors of the ELEVATOR SHUTDOWN building from using elevators during a fire. It was believed that the safer option was for everyone physically capable Background of using the to exit the building to do so. This strategy Safe operation of elevators has always been paramount to would also make elevators available to firefighters for stag- the elevator industry. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, ing their equipment on floors closer to the fire floor and attention was drawn to the impact of fire on elevator . for evacuating those individuals incapable of self-rescue. Thought was given to human behavioral actions as well as the electrical and mechanical aspects. In a high-rise Conflicting Codes building fire, for instance, passengers overcrowding an elevator in their panic to leave the building might disable Many individuals who must deal with the coordination of an elevator, or the elevator might actually be called to the building codes and standards understand that it is difficult fire floor by the actuation of a call button that has shorted to keep the building, elevator, sprinkler, and fire alarm or by one that reacts to heat. People unaware of the fire codes in step with each other — initially because of a condition on an upper floor might continue to use the general lack of coordination between the various code com- elevators to access the building. It was generally agreed mittees. Today, there is a concerted effort for cooperation that because of the various unsafe conditions faced by with the code-making bodies and the fire services. Still, it

Bruce Fraser of SimplexGrinnell in Westminster, Massachusetts, is a member of the Technical Correlat- ing Committee on Signaling Systems for the Protection of Life and Property. He also serves as a member of the NFPA Technical Committees on Supervising Station Fire Alarm Systems, Safety to Life, , Telecommunications, Clean Rooms, and Premises Security. In addition, Mr. Fraser is a member of ASME A17.1 Safety Code for Elevators and Escalators, Emergency Operations Committee.

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is easy to get out of sync because of the differences in ASME A17.1, 1984 edition, produced the requirement code cycles and the edition dates of the various codes that that only the elevator lobby and the elevator machine room jurisdictions adopt. For instance, NFPA 72, National Fire detectors were to be used to automatically recall Alarm Code, has operated on a 3-year cycle (e.g., 1996, elevators. 1999, 2002, 2007; the exception being from 2002 to 2007), During this time, smoke detectors had no specific in- whereas ASME A17.1, Safety Code for Elevators and Es- stallation requirements other than ASME A17.1 referenc- calators, has operated on a multiple-year code cycle with ing that smoke detectors be installed in accordance with published yearly addenda or supplements that can be NFPA 72E, Automatic Fire Detectors, Chapter 4. Smoke adopted by jurisdictions (e.g., 2000, 2002[a], 2003[b], detection technology was still in its relatively early stages, 2004, 2005[a], 2005[S]). ASME A17.1, 2004 edition, is so the building owners continued to experience difficulties the 17th edition of the Safety Code for Elevators and Esca- with instances of elevators returning (being recalled) as a lators; its current supplement was issued on August 12, result of unwarranted actuation. These 2005, and is referenced as ASME A17.1[S], 2005 supple- events were responsible for a groundswell reaction from ment, which was effective as of February 12, 2006. building owners to disconnect the recall function, and it also led to installation of systems with questionable relia- bility. Various configurations of smoke detectors were Firefighters’ Recall Introduced being installed using different wiring methods and even In 1973, ASME A17.1b, Supplement to the 1971 Elevator intermixing of single station smoke alarms and system Code, introduced a new rule (Rule 211.3) that contained, smoke detectors. Coordination between electrical contrac- among other things, a requirement for ‘‘Firefighters’ Re- tors and elevator contractors didn’t happen on a regular call.’’ The new rule applied to all automatic non-designated basis, and installation guidance was sorely lacking. attendant elevators that traveled 25 ft above or below the designated level. Elevators having to comply with ASME NFPA’s Involvement A17.1 were now required to be ‘‘recalled’’ to a specific ‘‘designated’’ floor upon actuation of either a ‘‘3-position, NFPA’s first mention of smoke detectors used for firefight- key switch’’ (manual recall), or by smoke detectors located ers’ recall appeared in the 1987 edition of NFPA 72A, in elevator lobbies (automatic recall). The designated floor Installation, Maintenance and Use of Local Protective Sig- was usually the ground floor because that was usually the naling Systems. The section was titled ‘‘Elevator Recall for location where first-arriving firefighters entered the build- Firefighters’ Service,’’ and it required that smoke detectors ing to evaluate the situation. Firefighters were to be the only located in elevator lobbies and elevator machine rooms individuals to have access to the keys for the 3-position key used to initiate firefighters’ service recall be connected switch. They would use this feature to capture and gain to the building . And, unless otherwise control over the elevator(s) for their use in fire fighting permitted by the authority having jurisdiction, only those and assisting those not capable of evacuating on their own. detectors could be used to recall the elevators. The feeling During this time period, smoke detectors were not was that as long as the elevators were not in danger from nearly as reliable and stable as they are today and the fire (as determined by elevator lobby and machine room industry was plagued with unnecessary smoke detector smoke detectors), they could continue to operate for use actuations and recalled elevators. In the 1970s, smoking of building occupants. And, of course, the other reason was not frowned upon or prohibited in as is the was that there would be less risk of incurring nuisance common practice today. Ashtrays were often placed right alarms that would be disruptive to building occupants and under or in close proximity to the elevator lobby smoke bad public relations for the building owner. detectors. Passengers would take their last puff and deposit The actuated detector, in addition to initiating recall, their smoking material in the ashtray prior to boarding the was required to initiate an alarm condition on the fire alarm elevator — that last puff often led to trash in the ashtray system and annunciate the zone from which the alarm igniting and a quick ride down to the designated level! originated. ASME A17.1, 1981 edition, introduced recall of eleva- Both acceptance testing and periodic testing were per- tors to an ‘‘alternate’’ level. This requirement called for a formed in accordance with requirements in NFPA 72E, smoke detector in the main lobby to cause recall to an 1987 edition, and NFPA 72H, Testing Procedures for Local, alternate level (other than the designated floor). Also intro- Auxiliary, Remote Station, and Proprietary Protective Sig- duced was a new requirement for smoke detectors in the naling Systems, 1988 edition. elevator machine room to recall the elevators to the ‘‘desig- NFPA 72A, 1987 edition, also required that for each nated’’ floor. group of elevators within the building, two elevator zone

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circuits be terminated at the elevator controller. The opera- 72F, Installation, Maintenance and Use of Emergency tion had to be in accordance with ANSI/ASME A17.1 Voice/Alarm Communication Systems, 1985 edition), into Rules 211.3–211.8. Essentially, the smoke detector in the a single publication, NFPA 72, Installation, Maintenance, designated lobby of recall would actuate the first circuit, and Use of Protective Signaling Systems, 1990 edition. and the smoke detectors in the remaining lobbies and eleva- There were no changes made to the paragraphs relating to tor machine room would actuate the second circuit. The elevators in NFPA 72A, 1987 edition. reason for the two circuits was to be able to differentiate The ASME A17.1, 1990 edition, added a requirement the signal coming from the smoke detector at the designated for all elevator cars to be provided with an illuminated elevator landing from all the other smoke detectors at the visual and audible signal system (’s helmet sym- other elevator lobbies and elevator machine room. If that bol). The would illuminate during recall to alert pas- detector at the designated level actuated, it would be indica- sengers that the car is returning nonstop to the designated tive of fire conditions in that area, so the elevators would level. In reality, unless passengers were taught or otherwise then be recalled to an ‘‘alternate’’ level. The ‘‘alternate’’ shown what the light meant, it was doubtful as to the level would be determined at the discretion of the authority value this feature provided the average elevator passenger. having jurisdiction (usually the local ). Exhibit S2.1 shows an illustration of the firefighter’s hel- Smoke detectors for elevator recall were also required met symbol. Later, this visual symbol will be discussed in to initiate an alarm even with all other initiating devices another application. on the circuit in an alarm state. The reason for this require- ment was to ensure the reliability of the recall operation because some fire alarm initiating device circuits could not support having all devices in alarm at one time and 25 mm 25 mm still guarantee the smoke detector used for elevator recall (1 in.) (1 in.) min. min. would operate. Two examples (drawings) were placed in the appendix of NFPA 72A recommending wiring configuration for the 25 mm (1 in.) min. smoke detectors for a new installation as well as for an elevator retrofit situation. The standards at this time did General note: Grid is for scaling purposes only. not require electrical supervision of these control circuits. Fig. 2.27.3.1.6(h) VISUAL SIGNAL In 1989, ASME A17.1b addressed smoke detectors in hoistways. Smoke detectors were allowed to be installed EXHIBIT S2.1 Firefighter’s Helmet Symbol. (Reprinted from ASME A17.1a, 2005, by permission of the American in any hoistway, but they were required to be installed Society of Mechanical Engineers. All rights reserved.) in hoistways that were sprinklered. The hoistway smoke detectors, when actuated, were to cause recall to the desig- The 25 ft travel criterion was dropped from ASME nated level. Also, the elevators must react only to the first A17.1b, 1992 supplement, so the Firefighters’ Service Re- recall signal. In other words, if the detector at the desig- call then applied to all automatic non-designated attendant nated level actuated and then shortly after the third floor elevators regardless of the travel distance. elevator lobby detector actuated, the car would be recalled to the alternate floor of recall and not the designated level ASME A17.1 [1993] (14th Edition) because the detector at the designated level was the first to actuate. This requirement was added because it was In 1993 liaisons between the NFPA 72 Technical Commit- believed that the first detector to operate would have a tee on Protected Premises Fire Alarm Systems and the high probability of sensing a fire in its vicinity, whereas ASME A17.1 Emergency Operations Committee were es- there would be a fair chance of the smoke migrating to other tablished and were effectively communicating to coordi- locations and tripping the detectors and giving conflicting nate their code activities. Requirements were more instructions to the elevator controllers. complex, and it was essential this communication and co- In 1990, NFPA consolidated some of the signaling operation continue. More specific application details were standards (NFPA 72A, Installation, Maintenance, and Use surfacing, such as the requirement that smoke detectors in of Local Protective Signaling Systems, 1987 edition; NFPA the hoistway might be installed below the lowest recall 72B, Auxiliary Protective Signaling Systems for Fire Alarm level and when actuated, those detectors would now cause Service, 1986 edition; NFPA 72C, Remote Station Protec- the elevator car to be sent to the upper level of recall. tive Signaling Systems, 1986 edition; NFPA 72D, Proprie- Reasoning for that change was to keep the car away from tary Protective Signaling Systems, 1986 edition; and NFPA the fire.

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NFPA 72 Changes [1993] when actuated, will send the car to the alternate level. Again, the reasoning was to use the recall level furthest In 1993 NFPA further consolidated the signaling standards from the fire condition. to form what is now NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm Code. Reference to hoistway smoke detectors was added in this NFPA 72 Changes [1996] edition to correlate with ASME A17.1, 1990 edition. The result required hoistway detectors to cause recall of eleva- In the 1996 edition of NFPA 72, smoke detectors in tors to the designated level. hoistways were prohibited unless the top of the hoistway The 1993 edition of NFPA 72 also, for the first time, had a sprinkler. If the top of the hoistway was sprinklered, addressed elevator recall in buildings that were not required then ASME A17.1b, 1995 supplement, required a smoke to have a fire alarm system. Those buildings having eleva- detector to be installed to initiate recall prior to having the tors and no building fire alarm systems and having to main line power shut down. comply with ANSI/ASME A17.1 must now have an ‘‘Ele- The reason for not wanting smoke detectors in vator Recall and Supervisory Panel.’’ This panel is essen- hoistways is obvious. The adverse environmental condi- tially a fire alarm control unit (now defined as a ‘‘dedicated tions of most elevator hoistways, with dirt and contami- function fire alarm control unit’’) specifically used to pro- nants and varying air velocities caused by elevator piston vide signals to the elevator controller to initiate elevator action, initiated many unwarranted or ‘‘nuisance’’ recalls. recall, but not notify the occupants of the building or the Because smoke detectors in hoistways were (and still are) fire department. Additionally, this control unit was used difficult to service and to perform periodic testing on, to initiate removal of elevator main line power prior to smoke detectors were often sadly neglected, allowing them sprinkler operation should the building have sprinklers in to become dirty, overly sensitive, and prone to causing the elevator machine room or hoistway. The main reason nuisance recalls. for this requirement was to ensure these critical elevator Another section added to the 1996 edition of NFPA recall systems were installed with the reliability of building 72 allowed other appropriate automatic fire detection to fire alarm systems, which included the supervision (moni- be used in place of smoke detectors in those situations toring for the integrity) of circuit wiring and secondary where the environment was unsuitable for smoke detectors, power meeting the requirements of NFPA 72. such as unheated elevator lobbies commonly found in Also in the 1993 edition, the term control northern climates. functions was introduced. The section on fire safety control A ‘‘third’’ control circuit was added to the existing functions addressed those components and interfaces that ‘‘designated’’ floor of recall and ‘‘alternate’’ floor of recall are meant to increase the level of life safety and property circuits. This third circuit was to operate when a hoistway protection in buildings. The following are examples of or machine room smoke detector actuated. It was to annun- such fire safety control functions: door holding, door re- ciate separately at the fire alarm control unit and other leasing, door unlocking, elevator recall, shunt trip, fan required annunciators. The purpose was to alert firefighters control, smoke hatches, and stairway ventilation. The sec- and other emergency personnel of a potential problem that tion on fire safety control functions reinforced the require- might cause unsafe elevator operation and, indeed, they ment that the circuits from the fire alarm system to the may soon lose elevator power. elevator controller(s) had to be monitored for integrity. At this time there was confusion in the industry be- A section on shutdown of main elevator power was cause ASME A17.1 had not yet introduced the third circuit also added in the 1993 edition of NFPA 72 primarily as a as an elevator requirement. In the works was a proposal result of the ASME 17.1 requirements that now addressed to ASME A17.1 that would cause the firefighter’s helmet the concerns of sprinklers in elevator machine rooms and symbol in the elevator car to flash to indicate impending hoistways. These sprinkler requirements were driven by danger if firefighters were to continue to use the car under national building codes. This subject is discussed in greater ‘‘Phase II — Emergency In-car Operation.’’ Under ‘‘Phase detail later under the topic ‘‘Main Line Power Disconnect II,’’ the elevator is controlled by firefighters by way of a — Shunt Trip.’’ special key that permits firefighters to override other safety controls. The firefighters can then use the elevator for ASME A17.1b [1995] staging their equipment and for evacuating people. ASME A17.1b, 1995 supplement, included a new require- ASME A17.1a [1997] ment addressing the condition (as with many hydraulic elevators) where the elevator machine room is on the desig- Some fairly substantial changes were made in terminology nated level. Smoke detectors in the elevator machine room, in the 1997 supplement of ASME A17.1. The title of sec-

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tion ‘‘211.3b Smoke Detectors’’ was changed to ‘‘211.3b mechanisms, etc.) were customarily installed in spaces Phase 1 Fire Alarm Activation.’’ Also, the term fire alarm called machine rooms. Recent elevator technology has led initiating devices replaced the previously used term smoke to what is now referred to as ‘‘machine room-less’’ elevator detectors. This change was intended to recognize that systems. Some elevators today have the equipment in other smoke detectors may not be the most appropriate choice spaces, such as mounted on the elevator car itself. So, now, of detection to initiate elevator recall when environmental when referring to locations where smoke detectors are conditions exceed those for which the smoke detector is installed for the purpose of initiating recall (elevator lob- suitable. bies, elevator hoistways, and elevator machine rooms), additional reference is made to elevator machine rooms ASME A17.1b [1998] ‘‘including machine space, control room, and control space.’’ A new paragraph was added to the 1998 supplement of Where NFPA 72, 1999 edition, addressed three sepa- ASME A17.1 requiring that the actuation of a fire alarm rate circuits per each group of elevators within a building initiating device in the elevator machine room or in the for the purpose of interfacing the fire alarm system with hoistway cause the visual signal (firefighter’s helmet) in the elevator system, NFPA 72, 2002 edition, addressed the the affected elevator car to flash. This addition provided potential of having more than three circuits. Wording was the change needed for correlation with the ‘‘third circuit’’ changed from ‘‘three separate elevator control circuits’’ to requirement added in the 1996 edition of NFPA 72. ‘‘a minimum of three separate elevator control circuits.’’ The reason for that change was that in some instances, two NFPA 72 Changes [1999] (or more) separate hoistways could share the same common There were no substantive changes related to elevator recall elevator machine room. An ASME A17.1 requirement is in the 1999 edition of NFPA 72. See changes to power to provide a danger signal to elevator cars (by flashing the disconnect requirements later in the section on ‘‘Elevator firefighter helmet symbol) if there is fire in an elevator Shutdown and Sprinklers.’’ hoistway or an elevator machine room. The reasoning be- hind the change was that if the fire was in one hoistway, ASME A17.1 [2000] (16th Edition) the signal should not be given to the elevator car in the other hoistway where there may be no immediate danger. The 2000 edition of ASME A17.1 was harmonized with Of course, if the fire occurred in the common machine the Canadian CAN/CSA B44 Elevator Safety Standard. In room, the signal would be sent to the cars in both hoistways. addition, the entire code was reformatted and renumbered Annex material was added to advise against installing using a decimal numbering system. smoke detectors in outdoor locations or locations that are Some heading changes were made, for instance, ‘‘Fire- exposed to weather, such as unenclosed elevator lobbies fighters’ Service – Automatic Elevators’’ was changed to in open parking structures, because those environments ‘‘Firefighters’ Emergency Operation – Automatic Eleva- can exceed the parameters of detector listing and further tors.’’ And, ‘‘Phase I Fire Alarm Activation’’ was changed could result in unwanted alarms and unnecessary recall of to ‘‘Phase I Emergency Recall Operation by Fire Alarm elevators. If a smoke detector has undergone testing and Initiating Devices.’’ But, the content did not change essen- subsequent listing as acceptable for the anticipated environ- tially. Some rewording and paragraph modifications were ment, then, of course, that device would be appropriate for made to accommodate the differences that still exist be- installation in that case. tween the United States and Canada. Where differences exist between ASME A17.1 and CAN/CSA B44, there ASME A17.1a [2002] Supplement is wording such as ‘‘In jurisdictions not enforcing the NBCC . . .’’. The NBCC refers to the National Building There were no changes in requirements to the emergency Code of Canada, so used in that context, that particular recall operation in this first addendum to the 2000 edition code requirement would apply to the United States. of ASME A17.1.

NFPA 72 Changes [2002] ASME A17.1b [2003] Supplement Several correlation changes occurred in the 2002 edition There were no substantive changes in requirements for of NFPA 72. Wording was added to include consideration emergency recall, but wording was modified to reaffirm for new elevator technology that alters the way we have the intent of where fire alarm initiating devices used for traditionally thought of elevators. Various elevator compo- the purpose of initiating emergency recall were to be in- nents and equipment (drive motors, controllers, braking stalled. The fire alarm initiating devices were required to

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be installed in conformance with NFPA 72 and located as edition. The reference to ‘‘shunt trip’’ is used because it follows: (1) at each floor served by the elevator; (2) in the is that method that is predominantly used to disconnect associated elevator machine room; and (3) in the elevator the elevator main line power. hoistway, when sprinklers are located in those hoistways. When the term main line power is used here, it does not mean ‘‘complete’’ or ‘‘total’’ power. It means the power ASME A17.1 [2004] 17th Edition that drives the elevator itself. Those circuits that would No new requirements were introduced to the existing emer- not be shut down would include the following: gency recall requirements. • Branch circuits for car lighting, receptacle(s), ventila- tion, heating, and air conditioning ASME A17.1a [2005] Supplement • Branch circuit for machine room/machinery space No new requirements were introduced to the existing emer- lighting and receptacle(s) gency recall requirements. • Branch circuit for hoistway pit lighting and recepta- cle(s) ASME A17.1S [2005] ‘‘Special’’ Supplement Because of the potential danger from water shorting This release is a ‘‘special’’ supplement that was published and bridging electrical components and because it is con- as a result of an ad hoc committee tasked with addressing sidered hazardous to have water on the elevator brake the issues associated with the advancement of new techno- (braking system) of traction elevators, especially when the logies being used in today’s design and of car is in motion, the requirement to disconnect the elevator elevator equipment. The committee looked at the various main line power prior to the release of water from the safety aspects of the new equipment and its installation, sprinkler system was included in ASME 17.1, 1984 edition. and recommendations were put forth in proposals that ad- The concept was to remove main line power from the dressed equipment located in traditional hoistways and elevator to stop the car and prevent it from moving prior machine rooms as well as what is now termed ‘‘machinery to a sprinkler releasing water that could get onto elevator spaces, control spaces’’ that may be found either inside or electrical components or the elevator brake. There was a outside the hoistway. concern that ‘‘shorting’’ of control and safety circuits could No new requirements were introduced to the existing result in dangerous situations such as uncontrollable mo- emergency recall requirements. tion and running of the elevator with doors open, and so on. On traction elevators there is the additional concern of NFPA 72 Changes [2007] getting water on the brake while the car is moving, which could result in uncontrolled braking and failure to stop A significant rewrite of some of the paragraphs of the safely. Elevator Recall for Firefighters’ Service section was made The original theory for elevator shutdown was to use with the intent of improving clarity, readability, and conti- a as the means to actuate shunt trip. The nuity. following sequence was intended: The section is now arranged with general requirements leading in to three distinct sections specific to the output 1. A smoke detector used for elevator recall would sense signals from the fire alarm system to the elevator control smoke and initiate recall. system, namely, Designated Level Recall, Alternate Level 2. The elevators would be recalled immediately (with or Recall, and Visual Warning. without passengers) to the floor of recall and doors open. 3. Heat buildup causes heat detector to actuate, which initiates main line power shutdown. ELEVATOR SHUTDOWN AND SPRINKLERS 4. Power is removed from elevator and the car cannot be Since its inception, the requirement in ASME A17.1 for used until power is manually restored. shutdown of elevator main line power has been the cause 5. Further heat buildup causes sprinkler to fuse, releasing for confusion in the industry and also has been very contro- water to control fire. versial. The following paragraphs try to provide some back- In ASME A17.1a, 1994 supplement, the wording ground and insight on the subject. changed to ‘‘upon or prior to the application of water from sprinklers.’’ Effectively, the rewording now allowed Main Line Power Disconnect — ‘‘Shunt Trip’’ sprinkler waterflow switches to initiate main line power Main line power disconnect, commonly referred to as disconnect in addition to the previously used heat detectors. ‘‘shunt trip,’’ was first required by ASME A17.1, 1984 Built-in delays were not allowed in the waterflow switch

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(such as the retard mechanism furnished with many flow mechanism, which is exactly the condition that is trying switches that could be set to provide as much as a 90 second to be avoided. delay in initiating a signal). The reason flow switches are Heat detectors also had to be installed within 2 ft of provided with built-in delays is to prevent false tripping each sprinkler head in the elevator machine room and from ‘‘water hammer’’ caused by changes in pressure in hoistway. This spacing was to ensure the heat detector the water supply. At this time, the heat detector appeared sampled, as nearly as practicable, the temperature that the to be the most widely used as well as preferred option sprinkler was sensing. because waterflow switches (without retard mechanisms) The second area for confusion was a requirement in were prone to causing unwanted and unwarranted recall NFPA 72A, 1987 edition, Installation, Maintenance and of elevators. Today, the use of more reliable check valves Use of Local Protective Signaling Systems, under the sec- has minimized this problem. tion for ‘‘Installation and Design’’ that stated ‘‘The of automatic control functions shall not inter- fere with power for lighting or for operating elevators.’’ Power Disconnect Initiated from the Fire Alarm This requirement remains in NFPA 72, 2007 edition, as System paragraph 6.16.2.1. Elevator main line power shutdown is Confusion existed for years over a couple of code sections, a fire safety control function, and the operation is intention- one on a sentence in earlier editions of the National Electri- ally designed as such. This operation does not interfere cal Code, Article 620 (Elevators), under the section cov- with operating power for the elevators; it instead controls ering ‘‘Disconnecting Means and Control.’’ It stated that the power shutdown. ‘‘nor shall circuit breakers be opened automatically by a NFPA 72 Elevator Shutdown (1999) fire alarm system.’’ Some interpreted this as a requirement that the heat detector used to actuate shunt trip could not A weak link in the reliability of ‘‘shunt trip’’ was recog- be associated with or connected to the fire alarm system. nized and addressed by NFPA 72, 1999 edition. It was In fact, what was intended was that the elevator power often found during periodic testing of the shunt trip feature should not be shut down when the fire alarm system was that the power needed to trip the shunt trip breaker was activated by just any fire alarm initiating device in the not available. This lack of power was usually because a building. Many were not aware of the programming capa- circuit breaker that supplies the needed power was in the bilities that fire alarm systems have that allow for matrixing off position. The requirement for supervising that power of various inputs and outputs. So, for years, a separate was established in NFPA 72, 1999 edition. Absence of the circuit, not connected to the fire alarm system, was com- power required a supervisory signal to be indicated at monly used to accomplish elevator main line power discon- the fire alarm control unit and required annunciators. An nect. Unfortunately, much of the time the circuit conductors example of a typical method of providing the elevator were not monitored for integrity (supervised). This over- power shunt trip supervisory signal was included in the sight meant that a broken wire or open circuit could go Appendix. undetected until testing revealed the problem and also NFPA 72 Elevator Shutdown (2002) meant the circuit could be out of commission when needed in an emergency. These instances emphasize the need for In NFPA 72, 2002 edition, it was made clear that the critical circuits to be monitored for integrity, as is the case initiating devices (heat detectors and flow switches) used with fire alarm initiating device circuits. to initiate main line power disconnect (shunt trip) are re- In the 1993 edition of NFPA 70, National Electrical quired to be monitored for integrity by the fire alarm control Code, the troublesome reference to the fire alarm system unit. As mentioned previously, if the initiating devices were was removed to avoid the confusion. The requirements not connected to the fire alarm system, a broken wire, for regarding the means to achieve elevator shutdown were instance, could disable the circuit and go unnoticed until also more clearly defined in NFPA 72 [1993]. If heat detec- found during periodic testing. This requirement increases tors were used to shut down elevator power prior to sprin- the operational reliability of the circuit and helps to ensure kler operation, the heat detector was required to have a the shunt trip feature will operate properly when called on lower temperature rating and higher sensitivity when com- in an emergency. pared to the sprinkler. Obviously, in order to accomplish ASME A17.1a [2005] Supplement the desired sequence, the heat detector must actuate earlier than the sprinkler under the fire condition. If the sequence In this supplement, wording was added to require that heat somehow occurred in reverse order, water could be released detectors and sprinkler flow switches used to initiate power on live electrical components as well as on the braking removal comply with the requirements of NFPA 72.

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ASME A17.1S [2005] ‘‘Special’’ Supplement fluids, NFPA 13 does not require sprinklers at the bottom of the hoistway (discussed further below). If no sprinklers This special supplement included significant rewrites of are installed anywhere in the hoistway (including the eleva- certain chapters. Unfortunately, when a large modification tor pit) then there is no requirement for initiating devices is made to a code, there is the potential for something to be installed anywhere in the hoistway for either recall ‘‘slipping through the cracks’’ or the undoing of some or shutdown. It is important to recognize that this applies previously coordinated efforts. The following issue may to passenger elevators only and not to freight elevators. be cause for some confusion until it is addressed in a future So, for freight elevators, the sprinkler at the top of the edition. hoistway is still required and, therefore, so is the smoke Previous editions of ASME A17.1 exempt the power detector (or other automatic initiating device), as well as removal requirements for sprinklers in the pit if the installa- the heat detector used for power disconnect. tion complies with the NFPA 13 requirement for installa- NFPA 13 requires sidewall spray sprinklers to be in- tion of sprinklers at or less than 24 in. from the bottom of stalled at the bottom of each elevator hoistway not more the pit. The new wording is in more of a performance than 0.61 m (2 ft) above the floor of the pit. However, language and makes the decision very subjective. A com- there is an exemption for the sprinkler requirement for parison of the wording follows: enclosed, noncombustible elevator shafts that do not con- Wording prior to A17.1S [2005] tain combustible hydraulic fluids. Realistically, this exemp- ‘‘. . . means shall be provided to automatically dis- tion is rarely observed and more than likely, sprinklers will connect the main line power supply to the affected elevator be installed in elevator pits. In addition, the ASME A17.1 upon or prior to the application of water from sprinklers 2000 and 2004 codes and supplements ASME A17.1a located in the machine room or in the hoistway more than [1997] through ASME A17.1a [2005] indicate that main 24 inches above the pit floor.’’ line power disconnect is not required if those sprinklers Wording of A17.1S [2005] are installed no more than 0.61 m (2 ft) from the floor of ‘‘. . . where elevator equipment is located or its enclo- the pit. However, this prescriptive exemption has been sure is configured such that application of water from replaced in ASME A17.1S [2005] Special Supplement with sprinklers could cause unsafe elevator operation, means subjective language and not the clear exemption that earlier shall be provided to automatically disconnect the main line editions provided. (Refer to previous section ASME power supply to the affected elevator upon or prior to the A17.1S [2005] ‘‘Special’’ Supplement for additional de- application of water.’’ Note: there is no longer mention of tails.) It is therefore extremely important to know what sprinklers installed 24 inches or less from the bottom of edition of ASME A17.1 is in force. the pit. In any event, current requirements for elevator recall initiated from the pit allow initiation from either a sprinkler Sprinklers and Fire Alarm Initiating Devices in waterflow device or from an automatic fire detection ini- Hoistways tiating device (usually a heat detector). A review of the requirements of ASME A17.1, Safety Maintaining a high degree of reliability for the fire Code for Elevators and Escalators; NFPA72, National Fire alarm system is fundamental to the purpose of the National Alarm Code; and NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of Fire Alarm Code. For that reason, paragraph 6.16.3.7 of Sprinkler Systems, considered collectively, would suggest the 2007 edition permits the use of other automatic fire that there may be no need to install fire alarm initiating detection devices where ambient conditions prevent the devices for the purpose of initiating main line power dis- reliable use of smoke detectors. Elevator hoistways are connect (shunt trip) in hoistways of passenger elevators. often locations where ambient conditions exceed those for If the hoistway of a passenger elevator is noncombustible which the smoke detectors have been tested and listed. and the car enclosure materials meet the requirements of When automatic fire detection devices are needed within ASME A17.1 (which should be the case with all new a hoistway, the selection of the devices must consider elevator installations), then NFPA 13 does not require system reliability as well as the performance needed to sprinklers at the top of the hoistway. Thus, with respect to provide the intended system operation. requirements for the top of the hoistway, if the sprinkler In summary, when sprinklers are installed in an eleva- is not needed, then the corresponding requirement for the tor hoistway (either at the top or bottom), appropriate auto- smoke detector that would be used for recall goes away as matic fire detection devices are required to provide elevator well as the corresponding requirement for the heat detector recall. (See 6.16.3.12.1 and 6.13.3.12.2 of the Code.) If used for power disconnect. Further, if the noncombustible any of these installed sprinklers are located more than 0.61 elevator hoistway does not contain combustible hydraulic m (2 ft) from the floor of the pit (ASME A17.1a [2005]

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and earlier), or where elevator equipment is located or its tion to building occupants/emergency responders; and the enclosure is configured such that application of water from use of compartmented and pressurized lobbies/vestibules. sprinklers (in any location) could cause unsafe elevator Consistent themes relative to the needed process in- operation (ASME A17.1S [2005]), appropriate automatic cluded utilizing a risk/ analysis, involving firefight- fire detection devices are required to provide power shut- ers in the decision making, and involving the appropriate down. Requirements for elevator shutdown are addressed committees (A17.1, B44, model building and fire codes, separately from those for elevator recall, and ASME A17.1 and NFPA Codes and standards). prohibits the use of smoke detectors for the purpose of The two active task groups resulting from the work- power shutdown. It is worthwhile to note that main line shop efforts (Task Group on the Use of Elevators by Fire- elevator power shutdown is always required when sprin- fighters and Task Group on the Use of Elevators for klers are installed in the elevator machine room. Occupant Egress) are performing comprehensive risk/ hazard analyses of various emergency scenarios plus the Workshop on Emergency Use of Elevators residual and the mitigation of the hazards. The task groups have estimated completion sometime late 2007 In March 2004, a workshop co-sponsored by ASME, to early 2008. The groups will then put forth their conclu- NFPA, NIST, ICC, IAFF, US Access Board, and others sions and outline their recommendations. The task groups, was held in Atlanta, Georgia, to consider the challenges made up of various industry components (research, fire of evacuation of high-rise buildings in fire and other emer- service, architect and engineering, codes and standards gencies. It was a three-day conference with over 120 life makers, disability interests, and other industry members), safety professionals attending from various communities have embarked on a journey that will command a Hercu- concerned with high-rise safety and egress. There were lean effort. two distinct focus points, one on the use of elevators by These efforts will most certainly culminate in a signifi- firefighters and one on the use of elevators for occupants cant impact on the interface and interaction between sprin- during emergencies. The participants were split up into kler, fire alarm, and elevator systems. breakout groups to develop recommendations as to how elevators in high-rise buildings could be put to better use during emergencies. The goal was to develop proposals CONCLUSION that could be submitted to various code-writing organiza- A historical perspective has been given here to help provide tions for consideration. A steering committee made up a better understanding of both the actual code evolution and of all the sponsoring organizations reviewed the breakout some of the thought processes that went into the interface groups’ recommendations and formulated plans for the requirements for elevator and fire alarm systems. During next steps to be taken and also to identify the appropriate the past decade it became very evident that the issues faced standards-making bodies to which to direct the proposals. in addressing these challenges were ones that were not Some of the consistently repeating themes were as follows: ‘‘black or white.’’ There were, and continue to be, many • The culture change since 9-11 and the reluctance of varying shades of gray. One thing, though, is very clear. occupants to stay in place and await further instruc- There is now a spirit of willingness and cooperation be- tions tween industry, code enforcement, and the fire service to • Elevators not meant to be a substitute for stairs continue to work together to find the best solutions to • Evacuation of people with mobility impairments achieve the highest level of safety and reliability for the • Water entering hoistways passengers and emergency personnel who use elevators. • Lack of firefighter confidence in using elevators With more focus on improving building evacuation time • Entrapment caused by activation of shunt trip by rethinking and improving the egress process, with per- • Re-educating people to use elevators for egress after formance-based design approaches, and with new technol- years of ‘‘don’t use the elevators — use the stairs’’ ogies providing more options, that cooperation will need instructions to continue as we face even more difficult and challenging decisions ahead. There were also repeating recommendations from the breakout groups such as mandatory adoption of ASME REFERENCES A17.3 everywhere; ensuring the reliability of Phase I and Phase II operation; better training of firefighters on elevator ANSI A17.1 A, Safety Code for Elevators, 8th edition, operation; enforcing the building emergency plan; sprin- American National Standards Institute, New York, NY, klering all buildings; the need for ‘‘real-time’’ communica- 1971.

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ANSI A17.1b, 1973 supplement to ANSI A17.1 A, Safety Safety Code for Elevators and Escalators, 17th edition, Code for Elevators, 8th edition, American National ASME International, New York, NY; 2004. Standards Institute, New York, NY, 1971. CAN/CSA-B44, Safety Code for Elevators, Canadian ANSI/ASME A17.1, Safety Code for Elevators and Esca- Standards Association, Rexdale (Toronto), ON, Can- lators, 10th edition, ASME International, New York, ada. NY, 1981. NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Sys- ANSI/ASME 17.1, Safety Code for Elevators and Escala- tems, 2007 edition, National Associa- tors, 11th edition, ASME International, New York, tion, Quincy, MA. NY, 1984. NFPA 70, , 2005 edition, Na- ANSI/ASME A17.1b, 1989 supplement to ANSI A17.1, tional Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA. Safety Code for Elevators and Escalators, 12th edition, NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm Code, 2007 edition, Na- ASME International, New York, NY, 1987. tional Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA. ASME A17.1, Safety Code for Elevators and Escalators, NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm Code, 2002 edition, Na- 13th edition, ASME International, New York, NY, tional Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA. 1990. NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm Code, 1999 edition, Na- ASME A17.1b, 1992 supplement to ANSI A17.1, Safety tional Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA. Code for Elevators and Escalators, 13th edition, NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm Code, 1996 edition, Na- ASME International, New York, NY, 1990. tional Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA. ASME A17.1a, 1994 supplement to ANSI A17.1, Safety NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm Code, 1993 edition, Na- Code for Elevators and Escalators, 14th edition, tional Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA. ASME International, New York, NY, 1993. NFPA 72, Installation, Maintenance, and Use of Protective ASME A17.1b, 1995 supplement to ANSI A17.1, Safety Signaling Systems, 1990 edition, National Fire Protec- Code for Elevators and Escalators, 14th edition, tion Association, Quincy, MA. ASME International, New York, NY, 1993. NFPA 72A, Installation, Maintenance and Use of Local ASME A17.1a, 1997 supplement to ANSI A17.1, Safety Protective Signaling Systems, 1987 edition, National Code for Elevators and Escalators, 15th edition, Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA. ASME International, New York, NY, 1996. NFPA 72B, Auxiliary Protective Signaling Systems for Fire ASME A17.1b, 1998 supplement to ANSI A17.1, Safety Alarm Service, 1986 edition, National Fire Protection Code for Elevators and Escalators, 15th edition, Association, Quincy, MA. ASME International, New York, NY, 1996. NFPA 72C, Remote Station Protective Signaling Systems, ASME A17.1, Safety Code for Elevators and Escalators, 1986 edition, National Fire Protection Association, 16th edition, ASME International, New York, NY, Quincy, MA. 2000. NFPA 72D, Proprietary Protective Signaling Systems, ASME A17.1a, 2002 supplement to ANSI A17.1, Safety 1986 edition, National Fire Protection Association, Code for Elevators and Escalators, 16th edition, Quincy, MA. ASME International, New York, NY, 2000. NFPA 72E, Automatic Fire Detectors, 1987 edition, Na- ASME A17.1b, 2003 supplement to ANSI A17.1, Safety tional Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA. Code for Elevators and Escalators, 16th edition, NFPA 72F, Installation Maintenance and Use of Emer- ASME International, New York, NY, 2000. gency Voice/Alarm Communication Systems, 1985 edi- ASME A17.1, Safety Code for Elevators and Escalators, tion, National Fire Protection Associaton, Quincy, 17th edition, ASME International, New York, NY, MA. 2004. NFPA 72H, Testing Procedures for Local, Auxiliary, Re- ASME A17.1a, 2005 supplement to ANSI A17.1, Safety mote Station, and Proprietary Protective Signaling Code for Elevators and Escalators, 17th edition, Systems, 1988 edition, National Fire Protection Asso- ASME International, New York, NY, 2004. ciation, Quincy, MA. ASME A17.1S, 2005 special supplement to ANSI A17.1,

2007 National Fire Alarm Code Handbook