ANZSOG Case Program From emergency to urgency: the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (B) 2016-189.2

It has proved CERA’s eternal struggle. Act too quickly and it is authoritarian and rash; too slowly and it is a lumbering government beast holding the recovery back. Somehow both of those criticisms are valid (, 16 April 2016). As 19 April 2016, and the end of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority’s mandate approached, like the rest of New Zealand was basking in unusually warm temperatures. People were flocking to the central city to enjoy the Family playground, one of three of CERA’s ‘anchor projects’ to be completed. Public disapproval had however put a stop to CERA’s $7 million proposal to develop nearby Victoria Square. Although signs of demolition and seismic devastation were still everywhere to be seen, new commercial developments were springing up on the fringes of the CBD, where some 80% of land was ‘sorted’ with completed buildings, buildings under construction or confirmed plans for building.1 Only the damaged cathedral stood in limbo, awaiting a decision to break the deadlock over whether it should be replaced or restored.2 Out in the suburbs, a majority of home owners had reached agreement with their insurer, often after lengthy argument, though a hard core of cases remained to be resolved. Cleared of its houses, much of the red zone resembled a safari park with open grassland broken here and there by trees and plants that were once garden features (Exhibit 1).

This case was written by Janet Tyson for Associate Professor Michael Di Francesco, Australia and New Zealand School of Government. It has been prepared from published materials as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. Cases are not necessarily intended as a complete account of the events described. While every reasonable effort has been made to ensure accuracy at the time of publication, subsequent developments may mean that certain details have since changed. This work is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Licence, except for logos, trademarks, photographs and other content marked as supplied by third parties. No licence is given in relation to third party material. Version 05092016. Distributed by the Case Program, The Australia and New Zealand School of Government, www.anzsog.edu.au

1 Ombler, J. ’80 percent success’, letter to The Press, 16-04-2016 accessed 9-06-2016. 2 The decision was between the Anglican Church as owners of the Cathedral, wanting to replace it, and the Greater Christchurch Building Trust wanting full restoration. On 7 July 2016, the government announced a working party to come to a final decision.

Five years after the 22 February earthquake had ‘released a surge of community feeling and creative optimism’ in their city’,3 the people of Christchurch were preparing to have greater involvement in their future. Over the month of July 2015, 1600 people made submissions on the Draft Transition Recovery Plan Greater Christchurch Earthquake Recovery: Transition to Regeneration. Christchurch City Council made a detailed submission, credited with giving the council a much stronger partnership role.4 Most members of the public ‘called for a locally-led recovery with more say from the public’.5 In Barnaby Bennett’s view, ‘[t]he only way to increase the speed of the rebuild and involve the people of Christchurch is to return leadership of the rebuild to the local council and communities, with Government in a support capacity’.6 According to Bennett, ‘The current structure set up to deal with the earthquake recovery is not working, and has resulted in both delays and the exclusion of the public from participating in the recovery.’ While that view was shared by a number of people, the establishment and operation of CERA was judged to be a success, albeit with varying degrees of qualification. The seismic sequence that struck Christchurch was acknowledged to be an exceptional series of events, calling for an extraordinary response. Recovery efforts walked a tightrope between ‘reasonable process and rapid decision-making’ in the view of Minister Gerry Brownlee, and he rated CERA’s contribution to a very positive recovery with multiple benefits for Christchurch as ‘7.5 out of 10’. 7 What could be changed? ‘A lot more power to do things more quickly, to be honest.’8 He saw the Central City Development Unit (CCDU) 100-day Blueprint plan for the central city and ‘cooperation among strategic partners’ as successes to highlight. Challenging insurance claims, assisting vulnerable property owners to make insurance decisions and move out of their damaged homes and progressing the insurance claims of shared properties such as apartment blocks or units, were among the problems the minister identified.9 Despite innumerable delays, progress was being made with the plan to rebuild the central city, Michael Wright wrote in The Press. Given the global scale of the disaster that struck the city, ‘A good chunk of CERA’s achievement in Christchurch can be measured in things that haven’t happened; the real estate and insurance markets didn’t spiral out of control, homeowners were not left languishing in broken homes on broken land or (entirely) at the mercy of insurers’.10 Savill’s Christchurch property expert Ryan Geddes said the Blueprint achieved its objective of creating a more commercially-attractive core. ‘You have guys that have put their faith and money into the city and are developing huge, iconic buildings for generations to come.’11 On the other hand critics saw the establishment of CCDU as the time when CERA, originally agile and ground breaking, became increasingly bureaucratic. Investment banker Tim Howe, pointing to the relative speed of new commercial development outside the CBD, said that the political model worked against encouraging investment. ‘Because CERA and CCDU were government departments officials could not speak freely with the business community and all dealings had to be at arms’ length. Ideas could never flow. Worst of all for investor confidence was that the Government and the Christchurch City Council were often at odds.’12

3 McCrone, J. ‘A city less ordinary’, The Press, 25-07-2015 accessed 9-06-2016. 4 Meier, C. ‘Council claws back power,’ The Press, 4-07-2015 accessed 9-06-2016. 5 Stylianou, G. ‘2015 in Canterbury: The year in review: Rebuild’, The Press, 26-12-2015 accessed 9-06-2016. 6 Meier, C. ‘Locally led recovery support huge’, The Press, 30-07-2015. 7 Stylianou, G. ‘The CBD five years on’, The Press 20-02-2016. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Wright, M. ‘Cera - success or failure?’, The Press, 16-04-2016 accessed 9-06-2016. 11 Stylianou, G. ‘Have the anchor projects anchored Christchurch’s central city?’, The Press, 20-02-2016. 12 McCrone, op.cit.

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In January 2016, Sweden-based New Zealander Gregory Simons, having surveyed 600 people, identified a ‘significant gap’13 between how officials and ministers viewed the region’s recovery and how residents felt about it. He cited land zoning decisions, delayed EQC settlements and shoddy repair work, as well as a lack of public consultation as leading to a ‘distinct deficit of trust in key officials and organisations. Instead respondents trust certain individuals, non-governmental bodies and social media much more’.14 The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet’s report for the 2015 financial year noted that CERA had achieved Government-imposed standards relating to communication, planning and progress monitoring, but fell short against demolitions, land purchases, and the construction of anchor projects.15 The original 16 anchor projects had already been trimmed back to 10, with Ngāi Tahu for example deciding not to become involved with a cultural centre. The major concern was continuing delays with consortium plans to build a central city convention centre. The Treasury’s view that ‘significant issues’ stood in the way of completing it and other future anchor projects was dismissed by Gerry Brownlee as ‘utter tripe’.16 Despite the funding and efforts CERA poured into its communications, and the fact that the Community Forum advising the minister had met 55 times, people like Leanne Curtis of volunteer insurance advocacy group CanCERN suggested that ‘There’s a lot of putting information out that doesn’t hit the mark’.17 CERA was praised for some individual consultations, for instance about the proposed earthquake memorial, and the future of red zone land in Waimakariri. But commentators like Suzanne Vallance of Lincoln University felt there should have been an ongoing deliberative process. ‘The more complex and controversial an issue is, the more deliberative and inclusive the consultation process should be.’18 When it came to land zoning decisions, CERA could never meet the insatiable demand for information. The Minister’s use of the ‘draconian’ powers given to him in the CER Act proved to be limited, and as the quarterly reports to parliament reveal, almost entirely devoted to decisions about land and property and justifiable as giving people some certainty to get on with their lives. Opposition MPs debating the first reading of the Greater Christchurch Regeneration Bill, while generally in support of the increased local leadership, suggested that the time for extraordinary powers had passed.19 On the other hand, a failure to use the CER Act to implement the zoning system would eventually result, in 2016, in an Appeal Court ruling that, as the decisions did not have the force of law, compensation payments had to be made to the ‘Quake Outcasts’, the owners of bare and uninsured land.20 On Thursday, 31 March 2016 the Greater Christchurch Regeneration Bill passed into law, taking over from the CER Act on 19 April in what was reported as ‘a win for local power’, specifically amendments pushed for by opposition parties and the city council.21 Regenerate Christchurch, jointly run by the Government and Christchurch City Council would replace CERA. Reporting through a board with both government and Council appointees, it would have first sight of planning proposals, although Gerry Brownlee as Minister Supporting Greater Christchurch Recovery would retain veto powers.22 The Minister is required to give ‘particular regard’ to Regenerate Christchurch’s recommendations, as well

13 Stylianou, G. ‘Social media filled gap for disillusioned post-quake’, The Press, 15-01-2016 accessed 9-0602016. 14 Ibid. 15 Stylianou, G. ‘CERA misses key recovery targets’, The Press, 27-10-2015 accessed 9-06-2016. 16 Price, R. ‘Rebuild report “disrespectful”’, The Press, 9-04-2016 accessed 9-06-2016. 17 Meier, C. ‘Cera doubles PR budget, staff, as “work increases”’, The Press 20-07-2015. 18 Harvie, W. ‘Cera rarely sought input on projects’, The Press, 19-11-2014 accessed 9-06-2016. 19 Hansard, Greater Christchurch Regeneration Bill, First Reading, 22 October 2015. 20 http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/308920/'quake-outcasts'-continue-court-battle 21 Meier, C. ‘Council claws back power’ The Press, 4-07-2015 accessed 9-06-2016. 22 Wright, M. ‘Latest version of rebuild bill reins in minister’s power’, The Press, 31-03-2016 accessed 12-07-2016.

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as consultations with the City Council, Environment Canterbury, Ngāi Tahu and the new Crown agency Ōtākaro Ltd. Ōtākaro is a commercially-oriented Crown entity set up to deliver anchor projects. The Greater Christchurch Group, a new unit of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, has a co-ordination and monitoring role for the new arrangements.23 Regenerate Christchurch has been given a maximum life of five years, before it reverts to full council control, which may take place sooner all going smoothly. A range of agencies such as Land Information New Zealand have picked up the functions previously performed by CERA, with the Canterbury District Health Board taking on the still growing challenge of managing the community’s psychosocial recovery. Given that the qualities required to lead successful recovery have been described as ‘a cross between Mother Theresa and Stalin’,24 it is unsurprising that opinions about Gerry Brownlee as Minister for Earthquake Recovery cover a wide spectrum from approval to outrage, with concern that he retains most of his CER powers such as land acquisition, and will have undue influence even with new governance and consultation requirements. However, there is widespread acknowledgement of the challenging task he faced, the courage needed to take difficult decisions, and appreciation for the strong voice he had given to the city. The has already noted and acted upon a number of the learnings from short but intensely busy life of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority,25 although it is unlikely to set up a permanent agency to retain the specialised skills acquired by CERA.

23 Brownlee, G. Media Release ‘Government backs Christchurch Regeneration’ www.beehive.govt.nz 26-05-2016. 24 Michelle Mitchell presentation, ANZSOG Conference 2014. 25 Regulation Review Committee 31 July 2015.

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Exhibit 1:

80 Bealey Avenue, Heritage listed building demolished after the earthquake

Bridge over the Avon River

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Christchurch Cathedral after

Margaret Mahy Family Playground Source: http://www.futurechristchurch.co.nz/central-city/margaret-mahy-family-playground

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