and role in the Karabakh conflict

Dr. Benyamin Poghosyan, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The second Karabakh war ended with November 10 trilateral , , Russia statement which opened the way for Russian peacekeepers' deployment in Nagorno Karabakh.1 The second Karabakh war has resulted in Armenia's capitulation. The unrecognized Nagorno Karabakh Republic lost approximately 75 percent of its territories, including parts of the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region within its 1988 borders. However, despite the clear defeat of Armenia, the conflict has not been solved. Azerbaijan was not able to invade the whole territory of Nagorno Karabakh and currently, some 3000 square km of the territory is being controlled by Russian peacekeepers effectively creating a de facto Russian protectorate. The trilateral statement stipulates the possibility of the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeepers after 5 years, but few if any believe that such a scenario is possible. The Post-Soviet history proves that Russian soldiers do not leave territories and Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria are good examples of this. Russia is going to create another military base in the South Caucasus, headquartered in , and will keep its presence there as long as possible.

Role of Russia before, during, and aftermath of the second Karabakh war

The Karabakh conflict is one of the protracted conflicts in the Post – Soviet space. Started in 1988 as a struggle of Karabakh Armenians to join Soviet Armenia, it was then transformed into Armenia – Azerbaijan war, which ended in May 1994 by Armenia's victory. Not only the former territories of Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region, but also 7 adjacent regions of Azerbaijan (Aghdam, Fizuli, Jebrail, Zangelan, Kubatli, Lachin, and Kelbajar) fell under the Armenian control. During the first Karabakh war Russia, despite its significant weakened positions, supported Armenia and Karabakh and deterred Turkey's intention to invade Armenia in spring 1993. After the war Russia was pursuing a balancing policy between Armenia and Azerbaijan seeking to keep both states under its influence. Russia was also one of the Minsk Group Co- chairs along with the US and and was mediating between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Faced by the growing Azerbaijan and Turkey threat Armenia has no options than to deepen its military and political alliance with Russia. Armenia agreed to host a Russian military base and border

1 Armenia, Russia, Azerbaijan sign deal to end Karabakh war, https://www.dw.com/en/armenia-russia-azerbaijan- sign-deal-to-end-karabakh-war/a-55550069.

troops, and joined the Collective Security Treaty Organization and Eurasian Economic Union. Meanwhile, Russia wants to control all South Caucasus, and not only Armenia. After the 2008 Russia – war brought bilateral relations to their lowest point, the key task for Russia was the increase of its influence in Azerbaijan.

Given the growing tensions between Russia and the West after the 2014 crisis, the former Soviet space has been transformed into Russia – West battlefield, which increased the significance of Azerbaijan for Russia. Azerbaijani leadership was well aware of these developments and viewed possible rapprochement with Russia as a reliable tool to bring back Karabakh under Azerbaijani control. Since the 2000s Azerbaijani President intensified its cooperation with Russia. This included large scale arms purchases (up to 5 billion USD)2, as well as the launch of economic projects, such as the North-South international transport corridor (connecting India with Northern Europe via Iran, Azerbaijan, and Russia), the establishment of Russia- Iran – Azerbaijan energy corridor, etc. However, behind of all these projects, there was a thinly veiled Azerbaijani intention to use its newly established friendship with Russia to force Armenia to bring back at least part of the lost territories. Azerbaijani leadership was sure, that Russia had sufficient leverage and influence over Armenia to force concessions. Russia itself was not against mediating a deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which could solidify its positions in both countries.

Thus, in 2013 Russia came up with the "Lavrov plan". It envisaged the eventual return to Azerbaijan of security zone - territories outside of the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region - (5 regions Aghdam, Fizuli, Jebrail, Zangelan, and Kubatli had to be returned immediately and remaining two regions – Lachin and Kelbajar, had to be returned within a year while keeping a land corridor connecting Karabakh with Armenia), and the deployment of Russian peacekeepers along the new line of contact. Russian leadership had a clear vision that the deployment of Russian peacekeepers in Azerbaijan will significantly increase its influence over while making Armenia even more dependent on Russia. Initially, both Armenia and Azerbaijan were cautious regarding this new plan. President Aliyev was reluctant to allow Russian troops back to Azerbaijan (last Russian soldiers left Azerbaijan in 2012 after the closure of the Russian radar station in Gabala), while Armenians sought to receive recognition of Artsakh’s independence or unification with Armenia as a reward for returning 7 regions to Azerbaijan.

After the "Velvet revolution" of 2018 the new Armenian leadership rejected all options elaborated or discussed before the revolution, including Lavrov's plan. Meanwhile, some overt anti-Russian actions by 's government have significantly deteriorated Armenia – Russia relations and changed the previous balance of power in the region, when Armenia was

2 Azerbaijan purchases military products worth $5 bln from Russia, https://tass.com/world/1019588.

perceived as a reliable Russian ally. Given the decline in Russia – Armenia relations, most probably President Aliyev decided to accept the Lavrov plan, hoping that Kremlin will either force Armenia to accept it or will allow Azerbaijan to start the large-scale war and will not support Armenia. Meanwhile, the significant changes in Russia – Turkey relations since Summer 2016, including the establishment of Astana format to deal with the Syrian crisis, and bilateral agreement on Idlib reached in March 20203, created an opportunity for Turkey to seek to actively negotiate with Russia on Karabakh conflict and even seek Russian consent to support Azerbaijan militarily if Armenia takes down Lavrov plan. After the Armenian final refusal to accept that plan in April 2020, despite Russia's warning that a big war was coming in that case, most probably Russia gave Azerbaijan a green light to start the war with the active involvement of Turkey to force Armenia to accept Lavrov's plan. Azerbaijan may not start the second Karabakh war without Russian tacit consent and, most probably, some sort of Russian – Turkish understanding was there too. Thus, the war launched by Azerbaijan on September 27 was the result of Armenian leadership's irresponsible foreign policy including overt anti-Russian actions and its decision to reject Lavrov's plan and choose instead the war. Not surprisingly, Russia was not very active in supporting Armenia during the war. Russia has supplied additional weapons to Armenia since early October 2020, however, these supplies were intended to allow Armenia to slow down Azerbaijani advancements but not stop them. Russia was waiting to see Azerbaijan taking control over the seven regions and then to sign a deal allowing the deployment of Russian peacekeepers. However, the trilateral November 10 statement which ended the second Karabakh war was much tougher for Armenia than the original Lavrov plan. In the Lavrov plan, there was nothing about the establishment of a joint Russia – Turkish peacekeeping monitoring center in Azerbaijan, nothing about a land corridor to connect Azerbaijan with Nakhijevan, and nothing about 30 percent of territories of the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region to be given to Azerbaijan, while all these points have been included in the November 10 statement. Thus, if Lavrov's plan aimed at solidifying solely Russian positions in the region, the war resulted in a significant increase in Turkey’s influence, which could not make Kremlin happy.

Russia now faces new challenges, which would not be in place if Armenian leadership agreed to accept the Lavrov plan in April 2020 or President Putin’s offer to stop the war on October 20, 20204. Thus, while giving its consent to Azerbaijan to start the war, Russia was caught by surprise seeing how Azerbaijan and Turkey were taking more than Russia thought to give.

3 Russia and Turkey agree ceasefire in Syria's Idlib province, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/05/russia-and-turkey-agree-ceasefire-in-syrias-idlib-province.

4 Putin says Armenia could have stopped the war and kept Shusha, https://eurasianet.org/putin-says-armenia-could- have-stopped-the-war-and-kept-shusha.

However, Kremlin was successful in forcing Azerbaijan to stop its military operations short of fully controlling Nagorno Karabakh and keeping some 3000 square km. of territories as a Russian controlled protectorate.

As of now, one thing is clear, Nagorno Karabakh is unable to protect itself from Azerbaijan if Russian troops leave Karabakh, and given the current line of contact, Karabakh needs years if not a decade to establish new defense lines to be able to repel any potential attacks of Azerbaijan, In this context, the presence of Russian peacekeepers are an absolute necessity if Armenia and Karabakh do not want to see the entire Armenian population of Karabakh leaving their lands.

Meanwhile, Russia managed to realize its top strategic goal - to establish a de facto military base in Karabakh, thus strengthening its positions in the South Caucasus and, in particular, in Azerbaijan. Most probably, starting from the beginning of 2021 Russia will start to disseminate Russian passports among the population of Karabakh, which will give the Kremlin additional leverage to keep its military presence in Karabakh. During his November 17, 2020 interview President Putin hinted that Russia may recognize the independence of Nagorno Karabakh if Azerbaijan would attack Russian peacekeepers, in the same way, as Russia did in South Ossetia in August 2008. By keeping the Russian base in Karabakh and by taking control of Armenia – Nakhijevan border Russia also gained additional influence over Armenia. As a matter of fact, now Armenia is more dependent on Russia than any time since Armenia has gained independence in September 1991.

The upcoming Biden administration may create new problems for Russia. Most probably, the new US administration will pursue a tougher policy on Russia seeking to weaken Kremlin positions in the Post – Soviet space, including the Black Sea region and the South Caucasus. In both regions, one of the key tools for the US to fight against Russia could be Turkey. The US administration will seek to bring President Erdogan back into the Western orbit or will make efforts to replace Erdogan during the upcoming Presidential elections in Turkey. In both scenarios the cooperation/competition equilibrium of Russia – Turkey relations may be shifted towards the greater competition or even rivalry. In these circumstances, the Russian military base established in Karabakh may play a vital role in securing Russian strategic interests in the region and in balancing Turkish influence in Azerbaijan.

The Role of Turkey in the Karabakh conflict

Turkey has a historic connection with the region since the Ottoman times and has been a strategic competitor of Russia in the last 300 years. Despite its recent history of turbulent relations with the US, Turkey is and in the foreseeable future will be the key NATO member and the US views Turkey as an effective conduit to implement its policy in the South Caucasus. Not surprisingly the US supports the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey alliance, which has clear anti- Russia features. Turkey has systemically increased its economic influence in Georgia which has effectively been transformed into the transit corridor to connect Azerbaijan and Turkey through the network of pipelines and highways. The Russia – Georgia tensions clearly contribute to Turkey's goal of strengthening its positions in Georgia.

However, the asset of Turkey in the South Caucasus is not Georgia but Azerbaijan. They share ethnic and language similarities which have been emphasized by the former Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev’s famous slogan “One nation, two states”. However, – Baku's strategic relations have much wider implications. Both states were at the roots of the establishment of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking states, an intergovernmental organization created in 2009 and uniting Azerbaijan, Turkey, , Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan as full members and Hungary as observe state.5 This organization is an embodiment of Turkey’s desire to gain strategic influence in Central Asia and unite Turkic speaking states' capacities. Given the growing Chinese influence in Central Asia where Beijing has surpassed Russia in terms of economy and has gradually increased its military sales there,6 this organization may be used by the USA as an important tool in pushing forward its anti-China policies in the region. Another role of this organization could be to trigger anti-China protests in the Xinjiang autonomous region of China on behalf of another Turkic speaking people - Uyghurs. Meanwhile, the growing number of Muslim populations in Russia, mainly concentrated in the North Caucasus and Tatarstan, makes this organization an effective tool to trigger also instability in southern parts of Russia.

However, Turkey lacks a direct connection with Central Asia and the missing point for Ankara was Armenia and the Nagorno Karabakh Republic. Not surprisingly, the inaugural summit of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking states was organized in Nakhijevan, and very often Azerbaijani leadership speaks about Armenia and the Nagorno Karabakh Republic as the only obstacles for the unification of the Turkish world spanning from Turkey till the borders of China.

Currently, Turkey has approximately 10 km of land border with Nakhijevan Autonomous Region, an Azerbaijani exclave surrounded by Armenia and Iran. Meanwhile, before the 2020 second Karabakh war Armenia and the Nagorno Karabakh Republic separated Nakhijevan from mainland Azerbaijan by some 180 km of land (45 km territory of Armenia and 135 km territory of Nagorno Karabakh Republic).

As a result of the 2020 Karabakh war, Azerbaijan regained control over the 135 km of Nagorno Karabakh Republic – Iran border. This will significantly contribute to the realization of Turkey's dreams to unite the Turkic world under Ankara's leadership making small 45 km of Armenia's

5 About Turkic Council, https://www.turkkon.org/en/turk-konseyi-hakkinda.

6 Kennan Cable No. 52: In Russia’s Shadow: China’s Rising Security Presence in Central Asia, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no-52-russias-shadow-chinas-rising-security-presence- central-asia.

territory the only land separating Turkey from Azerbaijan and Central Asia. These developments will boost Azerbaijan's positions in the region which in turn means a strategic increase of Turkish influence in the South Caucasus. The inclusion in the November 10 trilateral statement of the provision to establish land routes connecting Nakhijevan with Azerbaijan within three years was a clear victory for Turkey. In this case, Turkey will be much better positioned to compete with Russia in the region.