Congressional Take Home Package on Counter Terrorism Policies

Produced by RAND December 11, 2001

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1. Trends in Terrorism Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (2001) John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt Old Madness, New Methods: Revival of Religious Terrorism Begs for Broader U.S. Policy (Winter 1998-99) Bruce Hoffman Countering the New Terrorism, Chapter Two: Terrorism Trends and Prospects (1999) Bruce Hoffman The New Face of Insurgency (2001) Daniel L. Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau and David Brannan

2. Biological Terrorism Anthrax Attacks, Biological Terrorism and Preventive Responses (Nov. 6, 2001) John Parachini Deny Victory to Anthrax Terrorists (Oct. 17, 2001) John Parachini Terrorism, Infrastructure Protection and the U.S. Food and Agricultural Sector (Oct. 10, 2001) Peter Chalk

3. Technology and Terrorism Biometrics: Facing Up to Terrorism (2001) John D. Woodward, Jr. Challenges and Choices for Crime-Fighting Technology: Federal Support of State and Local Law Enforcement (2001) William Schwabe, Lois M. Davis and Brian A. Jackson

4. Homeland Security Advance Executive Summary--Third Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction ("Gilmore Commission") (The final report of the Gilmore Commission will be released in late December and will be available through RAND) (Oct. 13, 2001) Michael Wermuth, Project Director After 9/11: Stress and Coping Across America (2001) Mark A. Schuster, M.D., P.h.D., et al. * FAA: A Failure on Aviation Security (Oct. 8, 2001) USAF Gen. (ret.) John Michael Loh and Gerald Kauvar Safeguarding the Skies (Sept. 30, 2001) Brian Michael Jenkins Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues, and Options (2001) Eric V. Larson and John E. Peters

5. Foreign Policy Confronting Iraq: U.S. Policy and the Use of Force Since the Gulf War (2000) Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman Afghanistan: The Consolidation of a Rogue State (Winter 2000) Zalmay Khalilzad and Daniel Byman

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* Available only through the web or printed versions. Networks and Netwars The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt

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Afterword (September 2001): The Sharpening Fight for the Future1 Theory has struck home with a vengeance. The United States must now cope with an archetypal terrorist netwar of the worst kind. The same technology that aids social activists and those desiring the good of all is also available to those with the darkest intentions, bent on destruction and driven by a rage reminiscent of the Middle Ages. Soon after we put the finishing touches on this book, terrorists attacked New York and Washington. In doing so, they confirmed the warnings (in retrospect, too briefly stated) in Chapter Two that information-age terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda might pursue a war paradigm, developing capabilities to strike multiple targets from multiple directions, in swarming campaigns that extend beyond an incident or two.2 And, as Chapter Two said was increasingly likely, these terrorists used Internet email and web sites for their communications, sometimes relying on encryption and steganography for security. The picture emerging of these terrorists’ network(s), although still obscure, also substantiates the analysis in Chapter Three, which discusses how criminal and other networks have cores and peripheries, with members playing varied, specialized roles. Chapter Three also explains how to attack such networks and their financial and other operations. Moreover, al-Qaeda and its affiliates resemble the SPIN-type organization and dynamics illuminated in Chapter Nine. Finally, in Los Angeles, the terrorist events had the effect of mobilizing the innovative Terrorist Early Warning Group discussed in Chapter Four.3 This book is suddenly much more pertinent than we had expected.4

If Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network is the principal adversary—as seems likely, although other possibilities, including sponsorship by a rogue state like Iraq, cannot be discarded yet—then it may prove useful to view the network from the perspective of the five levels of theory and practice we elucidate in Chapter Ten (organizational, narrative, doctrinal, technological, and social).5 First, at the

______1This is an expanded version of the “Coda” that ends the paper by Ronfeldt and Arquilla (2001) posted online at First Monday (http://firstmonday.org).

2The idea of terrorists developing a war paradigm is outlined more fully in Lesser et al. (1999) and in Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini (2000).

3We are grateful to Paul de Armond, author of Chapter Seven, for a September 12, 2001, email that spelled out the ways in which these terrorist attacks took advantage of netwar and swarming paradigms and noted that the U.S. response should include a skillful information strategy.

4Meanwhile, the literature on other aspects continues to expand. Additions we like include Kalathil and Boas (2001), Kapstein (2001), Metzl (2001), and Tarrow (2001)—all of which bear, in one respect or another, on the prospects for improving cooperation between governments and nongovernmental organizations. Also see “Special Issue on Mapping Globalization,” American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 44, No. 10, June 2001, edited by Eszter Hargittai and Miguel Angel Centeno and supported by the International Networks Archive (based at www.princeton.edu/~ina).

5Joel Garreau, “Disconnect the Dots,” Washington Post, September 17, 2001, offers additional discussion, based on interviews with social network analysts, about how to attack a terrorist network. II Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy organizational level, we see a major confrontation between hierarchical/state and networked/nonstate actors. For the United States and its friends and allies, one challenge will be to learn to network better with each other. Some of this is already going on, in terms of intelligence sharing, but much more must be done to build a globally operational counter-terror network. A particular challenge for the cumbersome American bureaucracy will be to encourage deep, all-channel networking among the military, law enforcement, and intelligence elements whose collaboration is crucial for achieving success. U.S. agencies have been headed in this direction for years—in the areas of counternarcotics as well as counterterrorism—but interagency rivalries and distrust have too often slowed progress. Regarding al-Qaeda, the organizational challenge seems to lie in determining whether this network is a single hub designed around bin Laden. If this is the case, then his death or capture would signal its defeat. However, the more a terrorist network takes the form of a multihub “spider’s web” design, with multiple centers and peripheries, the more redundant and resilient it will be—and the harder to defeat.6 In a somewhat analogous vein, it is worthwhile to note that since Napster’s activities were curtailed by legal action in the United States, more free music is being downloaded and shared by loose peer-to- peer networks. Also, note that, despite the dismantling of the powerful Medellín and Cali cartels during the 1990s, drug smuggling by a plethora of small organizations continues to flourish in Colombia. The risk is that small, more nimble networks may spring up as successors to a defeated large network. Second, at the narrative level, there is the broad contention of Western liberal ideas about the spread of free markets, free peoples, and open societies versus Muslim convictions about the exploitative, in- vasive, demeaning nature of Western incursions into the Islamic world. To use Samuel Huntington’s phrase, this conflict involves a “clash of civilizations.” Also, at the narrative level it might be deemed a “time war” (term from Rifkin, 1987), in that this terrorist mindset is, in a sense, so tribal, medieval, absolutist, and messianic that it represents an effort to challenge the 21st century with 16th century (and earlier) ideals—as well as to ruin Americans’ hopes about their future. Indeed, it may be advisable for U.S. strategy to approach this conflict more as a time war than as a clash of civilizations. Bin Laden is an Arab Muslim, but that is not the only context in which to view him. He resembles, in many respects, some of the more fanatical figures out of Norman Cohn’s The Pursuit of the Millennium (1961)7 and Eric Hoffer’s The True Believer (1951).8 Bin Laden is not clinically “insane,” but he and his appeal are culturally and temporally perverse.9

______6 A study with inputs from various researchers, “Special Report: Al-Qaeda,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 2001, pp. 42–51, provides an extensive analysis of al-Qaeda’s organizational structure, history, and activities. The analysis views al-Qaeda as a kind of “conglomerate,” with both formal vertical and informal horizontal elements, making it a partial hybrid of hierarchical and network forms of organization.

7Consider this statement from Cohn (1961, pp. 314–315) about messianic religious fanaticism, known as chiliasm, that coursed through Europe in the Middle Ages:

In the Middle Ages, the people for whom revolutionary Chiliasm had most appeal were neither peasants firmly integrated in the village and manor nor artisans firmly integrated in their guilds. The lot of such people might at times be one of poverty and oppression, and at other times be one of relative prosperity and independence; they might revolt or they might accept the situation; but they were not, on the whole, prone to follow some inspired propheta in a hectic pursuit of the Millennium . . . Revolutionary Chiliasm drew its strength from the surplus population living on the margin of society—peasants without land or with too little land even for subsistence; journeymen and unskilled workers living under the continuous threat of unemployment; beggars and vagabonds . . . These people lacked the material and emotional support afforded by traditional social groups; their kinship-groups had disintegrated and they were not effectively organized in village communities or in guilds; for them there existed no regular, institutionalized methods of voicing their grievances or pressing their claims. Instead, they waited for a propheta to bind them together in a group of their own—which would then emerge as a movement of a peculiar kind, driven on by a wild enthusiasm born of desperation.

8Consider this statement by Hoffer (1951) (from a Harper Perennial edition of Hoffer’s book issued in 1989, pp. 11–12) about “true believers” who enter into radical mass movements: For men to plunge headlong into an undertaking of vast change, they must be intensely discontented yet not destitute, and they must have the feeling that by the possession of some potent doctrine, infallible leader or some new technique III Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy

To this basic imagery, the United States has made a point of adding that these terrorist attacks were “acts of war” against not only America but also against “the civilized world,” and American public opinion has been quickly galvanized by the revival of the Pearl Harbor metaphor. Indeed, the disproportionate nature of the terrorists’ use of force—including the mass murder of civilians—can only reinforce feelings of righteous indignation. Against this, the perpetrators are likely to exalt their own “holy war” imagery, which they will have trouble exploiting beyond the Islamic world—and they cannot do even that well as long as they remain concealed behind a veil of anonymity. But while the United States may have the edge in the “battle of the story” in much of the world, it will have to think deeply about how to keep that edge if U.S. forces are sent into action in any Middle Eastern countries. The development of the new field of “information strategy” is needed more than ever (see Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1999, including the notion of creating “special media forces”). Third, in terms of doctrine, the al-Qaeda network seems to have a grasp of the nonlinear nature of the battlespace, and of the value of attack from multiple directions by dispersed small units. If this is indeed a war being waged by al-Qaeda, its first campaign was no doubt the bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996, followed by a sharp shift to Africa with the embassy bombings of 1998. In between, and since, there have been a number of other skirmishes in far-flung locales, with some smaller attacks succeeding, and others apparently having been prevented by good intelligence. Thus, bin Laden and his cohorts appear to have developed a swarm-like doctrine that features a campaign of episodic, pulsing attacks by various nodes of his network—at locations sprawled across global time and space where he has advantages for seizing the initiative, stealthily.10 Against this doctrine, the United States has seemingly little to pose, as yet. Some defensive efforts to increase “force protection” have been pursued, and missile strikes in Afghanistan and the Sudan in 1998 suggest that the offensive part of U.S. doctrine is based on aging notions of strategic bombardment. Needless to say, if our ideas about netwar, swarming, and the future of conflict are on the mark, the former is not likely to be a winning approach; a whole new doctrine based on small-unit swarming concepts should be developed. It is possible that the notion of “counterleadership targeting” will continue to be featured—this was tried against Moammar Qaddafi in 1986, Saddam Hussein in 1991, Mohamed Aidid in 1993, and against bin Laden himself in 1998. Every effort to date has failed,11 but that may not keep the United States from trying yet again, as this seems a part of its doctrinal paradigm. Besides, if bin Laden is the only hub of the al-Qaeda network—possible, though unlikely—his death, capture, or extradition might turn the tide in this conflict. Fourth, at the technological level, the United States possesses a vast array of very advanced systems, while al-Qaeda has relatively few— and has great and increasing reluctance to use advanced telecommunications because of the risks of detection and tracking. But this category cannot be analyzed quite so simply. The United States, for example, has extensive “national technical means” for gathering intelligence and targeting information—but perhaps only a small portion of these means have utility against dispersed, networked terrorists. Orbital assets—now the linchpins of American

______they have access to a source of irresistible power. They must have an extravagant conception of the prospects and potentialities of the future. Finally, they must be ignorant of the difficulties involved in their vast undertaking. . . . On the one hand, a mass movement . . . appeals not to those intent on bolstering and advancing a cherished self, but to those who crave to be rid of an unwanted self. A mass movement attracts and holds a following not because it can satisfy the desire for self-advancement, but because it can satisfy the passion for self-renunciation.

9A further comparison, drawn from Greek myth and tragedy, is that bin Laden aims to be the Nemesis of American hubris. This goddess of divine retribution is sent by Zeus to destroy mortals afflicted with this capital sin of pride, the pretension to be godlike. However, bin Laden may yet reveal that he has a “hubris-nemesis complex.” For background, see Ronfeldt (1994).

10For recent additions to the theoretical literature, see Johnson (2001) on “swarm logic,” and Bonabeau and Meyer (2001) on “swarm intelligence.” Swarming may benefit from advances in “peer-to-peer computing.” On this, see Oram (2001).

11The Russians succeeded in killing Dzhokhar Dudayev during the first (1994–1996) Chechen War—apparently triangulating on him while he used a cell phone—but the networked Chechens did quite well in that war, even without their “leader.” IV Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy intelligence— may prove of little use against bin Laden. At the same time, al-Qaeda has access to commercial off-the-shelf technologies that may prove a boon to their operations. Fifth, at the social level, this network features tight religious and kinship bonds among the terrorists, who share a tribal, clannish view of “us” versus “them.” Al-Qaeda’s edge in this dimension ties into its narrative level, with Islam being the pivot between the story of “holy war” against “infidels” and the network’s ability to recruit and deploy hate-filled, death-bound strike forces who evince a singleness of mind and purpose. Against this, the United States faces a profound defensive challenge at the social level: How will the American people, despite the arousal of nationalism, react to the potential need to become a less open society in order to become more secure? If the Pearl Harbor metaphor—key to the American narrative dimension—holds up, and if U.S. operations result in successful early counterstrikes, then there may be unusual public solidarity to sustain the “war against terrorism” at the social level. But something of a social divide may emerge between the United States and Europe over whether the response to the attack on America should be guided by a “war” or a “law enforcement” paradigm. In summary, a netwar perspective on the various dimensions of the struggle with al-Qaeda—again, if this is indeed the key adversary, or one of the them—renders some interesting insights into both the context and conduct of this first major conflict of the new millennium. At present, bin Laden and al- Qaeda seem to hold advantages at the social and doctrinal levels, and apparently in the organizational domain as well. The United States and its allies probably hold only marginal advantages at the narrative and technological levels. In terms of strategy, there appears to be less room for al-Qaeda to improve. However, its sound doctrinal and solid social underpinnings might be further enhanced—and a vulnerability removed—if it moved further away from being a hub network revolving around bin Laden. Indeed, this may be an optimal strategy for al-Qaeda, since it is delimited from waging an open “battle of the story” at the narrative level, its one other apparent strategic option. For the United States and its allies, there is much room for improvement—most of all at the organizational and doctrinal levels. Simply put, the West must start to build its own networks and must learn to swarm the enemy, in order to keep it on the run or pinned down until it can be destroyed. The United States and its allies must also seize the initiative—including by applying pressure on any states that harbor or sponsor terrorists. To be sure, the edge at the narrative level in the world at large must be maintained, but this should be achievable with an economy of effort. The crucial work needs to be done in developing an innovative concept of operations and building the right kinds of networks to carry off a swarming campaign against networked terrorists. Because, at its heart, netwar is far more about organization and doctrine than it is about technology. The outcomes of current and future netwars are bound to confirm this. V Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy

BIBLIOGRAPHY Arquilla, John, and David Ronfeldt, The Emergence of Noopolitik: Toward an American Information Strategy, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-1033-OSD, 1999. Arquilla, John, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, “Information-Age Terrorism,” Current History, Vol. 99, No. 636, April 2000, pp. 179– 185. Bonabeau, Eric, and Christopher Meyer, “Swarm Intelligence,” Harvard Business Review, May 2001, pp. 107–114. Cohn, Norman, The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Messianism in Medieval and Reformation Europe and Its Bearing on Modern Totalitarian Movements, New York: Harper Torch Books, 1961. Hoffer, Eric, The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements, New York: Harper & Row, 1951. Johnson, Steven, Emergence: The Connected Lives of Ants, Brains, Cities, and Software, New York: Scribner, 2001. Kalathil, Shanthi, and Taylor C. Boas, “The Internet and State Control in Authoritarian Regimes: China, Cuba, and the Counterrevolution,” First Monday, August 2001, Vol. 6, No. 8, http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue6_8/kalathil/. Kapstein, Ethan B., “The Corporate Ethics Crusade,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 5, September/October 2001, pp. 105–119. Lesser, Ian O., Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini, and Brian Jenkins, Countering the New Terrorism, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-989-AF, 1999. Metzl, Jamie F., “Network Diplomacy,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Winter/Spring 2001, p. 796. Oram, Andy, ed., Peer-to-Peer: Harnessing the Power of Disruptive Technologies, O’Reilly & Associates, 2001. Rifkin, Jeremy, Time Wars: The Primary Conflict in Human History, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987. Ronfeldt, David, The Hubris-Nemesis Complex: A Concept for Leadership Analysis, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-461, 1994. Ronfeldt, David, and John Arquilla, “Networks, Netwars, and the Fight for the Future,” First Monday, October 2001, Vol. 6, No. 10, http:// firstmonday.org/issue6_10/index.html. Tarrow, Sidney, “Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions in International Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 4, 2001, pp. 1–20. OLD MADNESS NEW METHODS Revival of Religious Terrorism Begs for Broader U.S. Policy

By Bruce Hoffman August 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. One of the world’s leading experts on terrorism, Bruce Indeed, the religious imperative for terrorism is Hoffman has rejoined RAND as director of the Wash- the most important defining characteristic of terrorist ington, D.C., office after four years at the University of activity today. The revolution that transformed Iran St. Andrews in Scotland, where he served as chairman of into an Islamic republic in 1979 played a crucial role in the Department of International Relations and director the modern advent of religious terrorism, but it has not of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political been confined to Iran, to the Middle East, or to Islam. Violence. His latest book, Inside Terrorism, was pub- Since the 1980s, this resurgence has involved elements lished by Columbia University Press in 1998. of all the world’s major religions as well as some smaller sects or cults. “I acted alone and on orders from God,” The characteristics, justifications, and mind-sets said Yigal Amir, the young Jewish extremist who assas- of religious and quasi-religious terrorists suggest that sinated Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in they will be much more likely than their secular coun- November 1995. “I have no regrets.” Amir’s words could terparts to use weapons of mass destruction—that is, have been uttered just as easily today by Islamic Hamas nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Four inci- suicide bombers of buses and dents in particular—the Tokyo nerve gas attack, the public gathering places in Israel; Oklahoma City bombing, the 1993 bombing of New The emergence of by Muslim Algerian terrorists who York City’s World Trade Center, and the 1998 attack on have targeted France with a cam- U.S. embassies in Africa—indicate that terrorism may religion as a driving paign of indiscriminate bombings; be entering a period of increased violence and blood- force behind the by Japanese followers of Shoko shed. The connecting thread linking these four other- increasing lethality Asahara, whose Aum Shinrikyo wise unrelated incidents is religion. sect perpetrated the March 1995 The emergence of religion as a driving force of international nerve gas attack on a Tokyo behind the increasing lethality of international terror- terrorism shatters subway in hopes of hastening a ism shatters some of our most basic assumptions new millennium; by members of about terrorists. In the past, most analysts tended to some of our most the American Christian Patriot discount the possibility of mass killing involving chem- basic assumptions movement, who bombed the ical, biological, radiological, or nuclear terrorism. Few Alfred P. Murrah Federal Office terrorists, it was argued, knew anything about the tech- about terrorists. Building in Oklahoma City a nical intricacies of either developing or dispersing such month later; or by Arab Afghans linked to Osama bin weapons. Political, moral, and practical considerations Laden, the alleged Saudi mastermind behind the also were perceived as important restraints. Terrorists,

12 RAND REVIEW / WINTER 1998Ð99 we assured ourselves, wanted more people watching Mourners gather to honor former than dead. We believed that terrorists had little interest Israeli Prime in, and still less to gain from, killing wantonly and Minister Yitzhak Rabin on the indiscriminately. day after his The compelling new motives of the religious assassination by a Jewish religious terrorist, however, coupled with increased access to extremist on critical information and to key components of November 5, 1995. weapons of mass destruction, render conventional wisdom dangerously anachronistic. And while it is true that the increasingly virulent threats posed by religious terrorists require increasingly superior military responses and deterrent measures, the ultimate solutions lie far beyond military strategy alone. Driven by value systems and worldviews that are radically different from those of secular terrorists and that are largely impervious to military counterattacks, religious terrorism demands vastly revised national and international diplomatic and cultural strategies that aim to strike at its root causes.

Resurgence of Religious Terrorism The connection between religion and terrorism is not new. In fact, some of the English words we use to describe terrorists and their acts today are derived from the names of Jewish, Muslim, and Hindu religious CORBIS/ELDAD RAFAELI groups active centuries ago. The etymology of “zealot,” Recovery workers for example, can be traced back to a millenarian Jewish pitch American sect that fought against the Roman occupation of what flags to conse- crate the floors of is now Israel between 66 and 73 A.D. The Zealots waged Oklahoma City’s a ruthless campaign of both individual assassination Alfred P. Murrah Federal Office and wholesale slaughter. Similarly, the word “assassin” Building, bombed is derived from a radical offshoot of the Muslim Shi’a on April 19, 1995, by individuals who, between 1090 and 1272 A.D., fought the Christian associated with crusaders attempting to conquer present-day Syria the American Christian Patriot and Iran. The assassin, literally “hashish-eater,” would movement. ritualistically imbibe hashish before committing murder, an act regarded as a sacramental or divine duty designed to hasten the new millennium. Finally, the appellation “thug” comes from an Indian religious association of professional robbers and murderers who, from the seventh century until their suppression in the mid-19th century, ritually strangled wayward travelers as sacrificial offerings to Kali, the Hindu goddess of terror and destruction. Until the 19th century, religion provided the only justification for terrorism. Only in the past century has religious terrorism tended to be overshadowed by ethnonationalist/ separatist and ideologically motivated terrorism. These categories include the anticolonial, nationalist PICTUREQUEST PHOTO

RAND REVIEW / WINTER 1998Ð99 13 1990s, the proportion of religious terrorist groups RELIGIOUS INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS ON THE RISE among all active international terrorist organizations 70 All international terrorist groups grew appreciably. In 1994, 16—nearly a third—of the 64 Religious terrorist groups 49 identifiable organizations could be classified as reli- 60 56 gious; in 1995, their number grew yet again, to 26— 49 50 48 46 nearly half—of the 56 organizations identified. In 1996, the most recent year for which complete statistics are 40 available, only 13 of 46 identifiable groups had a dom- 30 26 inant religious component (see figure). Nevertheless, religion remained a major force behind terrorism’s Number of groups 20 16 13 rising lethality. Groups driven in part or in whole by a 11 11 10 salient religious or theological motive committed 10 of 2 the 13 most lethal terrorist acts of 1996. 0 1968 1980 1992 1994 1995 1996 It is perhaps not surprising that religion should Year become a far more popular motivation for terrorism in SOURCE: The RAND-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism is a the post–cold war era as old ideologies lie discredited computerized database of international terrorist incidents that have occurred worldwide from 1968 to the present. The chronology has been continuously by the collapse of the Soviet Union and communist maintained since 1972, first by RAND and since 1994 by the Centre for the Study ideology, while the promise of munificent benefits of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews, Scotland. from the liberal-democratic, capitalist state—apparently triumphant at what author Francis Fukuyama has movements of Jewish terrorist organizations in pre- termed the “end of history”—fails to materialize in independence Israel; the Muslim-dominated National many countries throughout the world. Liberation Front in Algeria; the overwhelmingly Finally, it must be contemplated that we may be on Catholic Irish Republican Army; their Protestant the cusp of a new and potentially more dangerous era counterparts, such as the Ulster Freedom Fighters, of terrorism as the year 2000—the literal millennium— Ulster Volunteer Force, and Red Hand Commandos; approaches. One cannot predict the effect that this and the predominantly Muslim Palestine Liberation pivotal symbolic watershed might have on religion- Organization. Although these groups evidence a strong inspired terrorist groups who feel impelled either to religious component, it is the political, not the reli- hasten the redemption associated with the millennium gious, aspect of their motivation that is dominant. The through acts of violence—as the Aum sect in Japan has preeminence of their ethnonationalist or irredentist already attempted to do—or, in the event that the year goals is incontestable. 2000 passes and redemption does not occur, to attempt In fact, none of the identifiable international ter- to implement Armageddon by the apocalyptic use of rorist groups active in 1968 could be classified as weapons of mass destruction. The pattern of religion- religious—that is, having aims and motivations of a inspired terrorism over the past few years alone predominantly religious nature. Perhaps this is only to suggests that the potential for still more and even be expected at the height of the cold war, when the greater acts of violence cannot be prudently discounted. majority of terrorist groups were left-wing, revolutionary Marxist-Leninist ideological organizations and the Intensity of Religious Terrorism remainder were ethnonationalist/separatist groups Terrorism motivated in whole or in part by religious typical of the postcolonial liberation movements of the imperatives often leads to more intense acts of violate 1960s and early 1970s. Not until 1980—as a result lence producing considerably more fatalities than the of the repercussions of the 1979 revolution in Iran— relatively discriminating acts of violence perpetrated do the first “modern” religious terrorist groups appear. by secular terrorist organizations. Although religious For these groups, the religious motive is paramount. terrorists committed only 25 percent of the recorded By 1992, the number of religious terrorist groups international terrorist incidents in 1995, their acts were had increased exponentially (from 2 to 11) and ex- responsible for 58 percent of the terrorist-related fatal- panded to embrace major world religions other than ities recorded that year. The attacks that caused the Islam as well as obscure sects and cults. During the greatest numbers of deaths in 1995—those that killed

14 RAND REVIEW / WINTER 1998Ð99 eight or more people—were all perpetrated by reli- tive and deadly types of terrorist operations than secu- gious terrorists. The reasons why religious terrorism lar terrorists—and reinforces the tendency to embrace a results in so many more deaths than secular terrorism far more open-ended category of “enemies” for attack. may be found in the radically different value systems, Even more disturbing is that, in some instances, mechanisms of legitimization and justification, con- the aims of contemporary religious terrorist groups go cepts of morality, and worldviews embraced by the far beyond the establishment of a theocracy amenable religious terrorist. to their specific deity (e.g., the creation of an Iranian- For the religious terrorist, violence is first and fore- style Islamic republic in Algeria, Egypt, or Saudi most a sacramental act or divine duty executed in Arabia). These aims can embrace, on the one hand, response to some theological demand or imperative. mystical, transcendental, and divinely inspired imper- Terrorism thus assumes a transcendental dimension, atives or, on the other hand, a vehemently anti- and its perpetrators are consequently undeterred by government form of populism that reflects far-fetched political, moral, or practical constraints. Whereas secu- conspiracy notions based on a volatile mixture of lar terrorists, even if they have the capacity to do so, seditious, racial, and religious dicta. In this respect, rarely attempt indiscriminate killing on a massive the emergence of obscure, idiosyncratic millenarian scale—because such tactics are inconsistent with their movements—such as the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo sect political aims and therefore are regarded as counter- and the American Christian white supremacist mili- productive, if not immoral—religious terrorists often tias—alongside zealously nationalist Islamic groups seek to eliminate broadly defined categories of ene- represents a far more amorphous threat than secular mies and accordingly regard such large-scale violence terrorist groups. The members of the Aum sect in not only as morally justified but as a necessary expedi- Japan; the fanatical Jewish groups in Israel, such as ent to attain their goals. Religion—conveyed by sacred Eyal, of which Yigal Amir was a text and imparted via clerical authorities claiming to member; the Christian Patriot speak for the divine—therefore serves as a legitimizing movement in America; and some A bridge needs to force. This explains why clerical sanction is so impor- of the radical Islamic organizations be found between tant to religious terrorists and why religious figures are in Algeria, Lebanon, and Israel do often required to “bless” terrorist operations before not conform to our traditional mainstream society they are executed. models of the secular terrorist and the extremists. Religious and secular terrorists also differ in their organization. Traditional groups constituencies. Whereas secular terrorists attempt to had a defined set of political, social, or economic appeal to actual and potential sympathizers, religious objectives, and however disagreeable or distasteful terrorists seek to appeal to no other constituency than their aims and motivations may have been, their ideol- themselves. Thus, the restraints imposed on secular ogy and intentions were at least comprehensible. terrorist violence—by the desire to appeal to a tacitly supportive or uncommitted constituency—are not Countering Religious Terrorism relevant to the religious terrorist. This absence of In terms of the countermeasures that the government, a broader constituency leads to the sanctioning of military, police, and security services can employ almost limitless violence against a virtually open- against these new types of adversaries, the first and ended category of targets: anyone who is not a member most immediate challenge is simply identifying them. of the terrorists’ religion or religious sect. These ethereal, amorphous entities will often lack the Religious and secular terrorists also have starkly “footprint” or modus operandi of an actual, existing different perceptions of themselves and their violent terrorist organization, making it more difficult for acts. Whereas secular terrorists regard violence as a way intelligence, law enforcement, and other security spe- to instigate the correction of a flaw in a system that is cialists to get a firm idea of their intentions and basically good, religious terrorists see themselves not capabilities, much less their capacity for violence, as components of a system worth preserving at all but before they strike. A second challenge is unraveling the as “outsiders” seeking fundamental changes in the reasons why many “fringe” movements or hitherto existing order. This sense of alienation further enables peaceful religious cults suddenly embark on lethal the religious terrorist to contemplate far more destruc- campaigns of indiscriminate terrorism.

RAND REVIEW / WINTER 1998Ð99 15 These primarily investigative, intelligence, and seditious and intolerant beliefs before they take hold academic research issues need to be addressed before and become exploited by demagogues and hate- effective countervailing and mongers. Across the United States, progress can also be In many pockets deterrent measures can be con- seen in this respect. A number of community groups sidered. Traditional approaches and political action committees are attempting to of the American and policies may not be rele- counter the spread of ignorance, hate, and simplistic hinterland, the vant, much less effective, in conspiracy theories that are used to explain complex the face of religious terrorism. economic phenomena and thus acquire new recruits challenge is to Strategies that have been used to the antifederalist movement. Through a series of develop educational successfully in the past—such “town hall” meetings featuring plain-speaking, com- programs to as political concessions, finan- monsense presentations that communicate important cial rewards, amnesties, and lessons in a vernacular as accessible and relevant to mitigate grassroots other personal inducements— the local populace as that peddled by the conspiracy alienation. would be not only irrelevant but theorists, people gain a more critical perspective from impractical, given the religious which they can challenge the assertions of the sophists terrorists’ fundamentally alienated worldviews and and refute the homespun ideologies that lie at the core often extreme, resolutely uncompromising demands. of their odious belief systems. Above all, the profound sense of alienation and The immense challenge of countering religious isolation of these cults and religious movements needs terrorism at home is dwarfed, however, by that of to be vigorously counteracted. A bridge needs to be ameliorating anti-U.S. sentiment abroad. In no region found between mainstream society and the extremists is this problem more acute than in the Middle East. The so that they do not feel threatened and forced to with- bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and draw into heavily armed, seething compounds or to Tanzania last summer once again brought into sharp engage in preemptive acts of violence directed against focus the intense enmity felt by some Muslims toward what they regard as a menacing, predatory society. the United States. The rise of Osama bin Laden and his Demonstrable progress arguably has been made worldwide Islamic revolutionary movement, al-Qaeda along these lines in the United States. The nonviolent (“The Base”), is a case in point. The movement flows resolution of the 81-day standoff between the from a regionwide perception that America cares only Freemen, a Montana militia organization, and the about Israel and access to oil—and not about national FBI in April 1996 stands in marked contrast to the rights to self-determination and truly democratic debacle three years before in Waco, Texas, where 74 domestic institutions. In this respect, the use of persons were killed, including 21 children. By skillfully U.S. military force—even in self-defense or to prevent employing the tactics of negotiation and the non- terrorist attacks—is seen by many as symptomatic of a confrontational approaches developed during previ- heavy-handed foreign policy. ous encounters with antigovernment and white Clearly, every country must retain the right to supremacist groups, the authorities defused a poten- retaliate or use military force to defend itself. But the tially explosive situation, obtained the surrender of 16 issue here is whether more subtlety—or a mix of policy heavily armed Freemen who had barricaded them- options—might be more appropriate. For example, selves at the isolated ranch they had dubbed “Justus only 12 of the 267 persons killed in the Nairobi and Township,” and avoided the bloodshed that had Dar-es-Salaam bombings were Americans. The vast accompanied previous incidents. majority of the casualties were Kenyan and Tanzanian But while patient negotiation and minimum force embassy employees and ordinary passersby. Among have an important role to play in specific instances, the victims, too, were many Muslims. Indeed, in the particularly sieges, there is a more widespread problem wake of the tragedy, there were many reports of mod- of intense, often paranoiac, antigovernment senti- erate Arab opinion leaders throughout the Middle East ments in many pockets of the American hinterland. having been appalled by the death and injury brought Here, the challenge is surely one of developing pre- so callously to their brethren by terrorists acting in emptive educational programs to mitigate grassroots the name of Islam. Yet, in a stroke, the United States alienation and polarization and to stop the spread of vitiated this sentiment with cruise missile attacks. This

16 RAND REVIEW / WINTER 1998Ð99 AN ANCIENT SCOURGE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM

Religion has been the major driving force behind international terrorism during the 1990s. As described below, the most serious terrorist acts of the decade—in terms of the number of people killed or the political implications—all have had a signiﬁcant religious dimension.

■ 1992 onward: Bloodletting by Islamic extremists in Algeria has claimed an estimated 75,000 lives.

■ February 1993: Thirteen car and truck bombings shake Bombay, India, killing 400 and injuring more than 1,000, in revenge for the destruction of an Islamic shrine.

■ February 1993: Islamic radicals bomb New York City’s World Trade Center, attempting to topple one of the twin towers onto the other, reportedly while releasing a deadly cloud of poisonous gas.

■ December 1994: Air France passenger jet is hijacked by terrorists belonging to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), who plotted unsuccessfully to blow up themselves, the aircraft, and the 283 passengers on board precisely when the plane was over Paris, which would have caused the ﬂaming wreckage to plunge into the crowded city below.

■ March 1995: Apocalyptic Japanese religious cult releases sarin nerve gas in Tokyo subway system, killing a dozen people and wounding 3,796 others, with reports that the group also planned to carry out identical attacks in the United States.

■ April 1995: Members of the American Christian Patriot movement, seeking to foment a nationwide revolution, bomb the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Ofﬁce Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people.

■ JulyÐOctober 1995: GIA unleashes a wave of bombings in Paris Metro trains, outdoor markets, cafes, schools, and popular tourist spots, killing 8 and wounding more than 180.

■ November 1995: Jewish religious extremist assassinates Israeli premier Yitzhak Rabin, viewing it as the ﬁrst step in a mass murder campaign designed to disrupt the peace process.

■ FebruaryÐMarch 1996: String of attacks by Hamas suicide bombers kills 60 people and turns the tide of Israel’s national elections.

■ April 1996: Machine-gun and hand-grenade attack by Egyptian Islamic militants on a group of Western tourists kills 18 outside their Cairo hotel.

■ June 1996: Religious militants opposed to the reigning al-Saud regime in Saudi Arabia perpetrate truck bombing of U.S. Air Force barracks in Dhahran, killing 19 people.

■ November 1997: Terrorists belonging to the Gamat al-Islamiya (Islamic Group) massacre 58 foreign tourists and 4 Egyptians at the Temple of Queen Hatshepsut in Luxor, Egypt.

■ August 1998: Attackers believed to have been ﬁnanced by Saudi Arabian dissident Osama bin Laden bomb U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 257 people, including 12 Americans, and injuring more than 5,000 in Kenya, and killing 10 people and injuring dozens in Tanzania. Bin Laden had issued a fatwa, or Islamic religious edict, as part of his worldwide campaign against the United States. An estimated 5,000 adherents throughout the Muslim world allegedly are prepared to follow his summons to battle.

is not to say that the attacks were unjustiﬁed or unnec- never be eradicated completely. The complexity, diver- essary—only that an important, and often exceedingly sity, and often idiosyncratic characteristics of religious rare, opportunity may have been lost to inﬂuence terrorism imply that there is no “magic bullet”—no opinion in the region against terrorism and against the single, superior solution—that can be applied to all terrorists claiming to act in the name of Islam. cases. Yet this fact only reinforces the need for multiple The resurgence of this ancient breed of adversary, creative solutions, if not to resolve, then at least to the religious terrorist, means that nothing less than a ameliorate both the underlying causes of religious ter- sea change is required in our thinking about terrorism rorism and its violent manifestations. Only by expanding and the policies needed to counter it. Perhaps the most our range of possible responses will we be able to target sobering realization in confronting religious terrorism our resources prudently and productively in ways that is that the threat—and the problems that fuel it—can will have the greatest positive effect.

RAND REVIEW / WINTER 1998Ð99 17 Countering the New Terrorism Chapter Two: Terrorism Trends and Prospects

Bruce Hoffman

For a copy visit www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR989 or call 703.413.1100 extension 5431.

The bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 demonstrate that terrorism is—and will remain—a central threat to international security as we approach the 21st century. Earlier events such as the June 1996 massive explosion outside a U.S. Air Force housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, that killed 19 persons and wounded nearly 500 others, and the bombing the previous November of a joint Saudi-American military training center in Riyadh that killed four persons and wounded nearly 40, had already heightened concerns about terrorist targeting of U.S. military as well as diplomatic personnel and assets abroad. This chapter examines facets of terrorism and likely prospects. We focus first on trends in international terrorism and, in particular, on the reasons behind terrorism’s increasing lethality. We then consider the implications of these trends, with special reference to force protection and base security issues. Finally, we offer some concluding thoughts and an assessment of terrorism trends and patterns of activity. Trends In Terrorism Although the total volume of terrorist incidents worldwide has declined in the 1990s, the percentage of terrorist incidents resulting in fatalities has nonetheless grown. This section examines the reasons behind this trend and its implications for patterns of terrorist activity. Terrorism’s Changing Characteristics In the past, terrorism was practiced by a collection of individuals belonging to an identifiable organization that had a clear command and control apparatus and a defined set of political, social, or economic objectives. Radical leftist (i.e., Marxist-Leninist/Maoist/Stalinist movements) organizations such as the Japanese Red Army, the Red Army Faction in Germany, and the Red Brigades in Italy, as well as ethno-nationalist terrorist movements such as the Abu Nidal Organization, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and the Basque separatist group, ETA, reflected this stereotype of the traditional terrorist group. They generally issued communiqués taking credit for—and explaining in great detail—their actions. However disagreeable or distasteful their aims and motivations may have been, their ideology and intentions were at least comprehensible—albeit politically radical and personally fanatical. Significantly, however, these more familiar terrorist groups engaged in highly selective and mostly discriminate acts of violence. They targeted for bombing various symbolic targets representing the source of their animus (i.e., embassies, banks, national airline carriers, etc.) or kidnapped and assassinated specific persons whom they blamed for economic exploitation or political repression in order to attract attention to themselves and their causes. Even when these groups operated at the express behest of, or were directly controlled by, a foreign government, the connection was always palpable, if not necessarily proven beyond the shadow of legal doubt. For example, following the 1986 retaliatory U.S. air strike on Libya, Colonel Qaddafi commissioned the Japanese Red Army to carry out revenge attacks against American targets. In hopes of obscuring this connection, the Japanese group claimed its Libyan-sponsored operations in the name of a fictitious organization, that of the “Anti-Imperialist International Brigades.”1

______1See Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998, pp. 188–189. I II Countering the New Terrorism

Similarly, Iranian-backed terrorist operations carried out by Hizbullah in Lebanon during the 1980s were perpetrated under the guise of the so-called “Islamic Jihad.”2

Today, the more traditional and familiar types of ethnic/nationalist and separatist as well as ideological group have been joined by a variety of organizations with less-comprehensible nationalist or ideological motivations. These new terrorist organizations embrace far more amorphous religious and millenarian3 aims and wrap themselves in less-cohesive organizational entities, with a more-diffuse structure and membership.4 The bombings in Kenya and Tanzania evidence this pattern. Unlike the specific, intelligible demands of past familiar, predominantly secular, terrorist groups who generally claimed credit for and explained their violent acts,5 no credible claim for the embassy attacks has yet been issued. Indeed, the only specific information that has come to light has been a vague message taking responsibility for the bombings in defense of the Muslim holy places in Mecca and Medina and promising to “pursue U.S. forces and strike at U.S. interests everywhere.”6 Further, the embassy attacks themselves do not appear to have been undertaken by a specific existing or identifiable terrorist organization but instead are believed to have been financed by a millionaire Saudi Arabian dissident, Osama bin Laden, as part of his worldwide campaign against the United States. In February 1998, for example, bin Laden supplemented his publicly declared war on the United States (because of its support for Israel and the presence of American military forces in Saudi Arabia) with a fatwa, or Islamic religious edict. With the issuance of this edict, bin Laden thereby endowed his calls for violence with an incontrovertible theological as well as political justification. To this end, he is believed to be able to call on the services of an estimated 4000–5000 well-trained fighters scattered throughout the Muslim world.7 By comparison, many of the traditional, secular terrorist groups of the past were generally much smaller. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, for example, neither the Japanese Red Army nor the Red Army Faction ever numbered more than 20 to 30 hard-core members. The Red Brigades were hardly larger, with a total of fewer than 50 to 75 dedicated terrorists. Even the IRA and ETA could only call on the violent services of perhaps some 200–400 activists whereas the feared Abu Nidal Organization was limited to some 500 men-at-arms at any given time.8 The appearance of these different types of adversaries—in some instances with new motivations and different capabilities—accounts largely for terrorism’s increased lethality in recent years. There are a number of implications for terrorism that perhaps portends for increased violence and bloodshed. Terrorism’s Increasing Lethality

______2See Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis, Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, and London, 1977, pp. 62–63, and U.S. Department of Defense, Terrorist Group Profiles, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1988, p. 15. 3An example is the Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese group responsible for the 1995 sarin nerve-gas attack on the Tokyo subway system. 4See, for example, the analysis in Neil King, Jr., “Moving Target: Fighting Terrorism Is Far More Perilous Than It Used to Be,” Wall Street Journal Europe, August 25, 1998. See also the discussion below on the emergence of amateur terrorists as evidenced in the 1993 bombing of New York City’s World Trade Center. 5Indeed, some groups—such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army—not only claimed responsibility for attacks but issued warnings in advance. The communiqués of various European left-wing terrorist groups have often been sufficiently voluminous to warrant their publication in collected volumes. See, for example, Yonah Alexander and Dennis Pluchinsky, Europe’s Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organizations, Frank Cass, London, 1992, passim; and Red Army Faction, Texte der RAF (RAF Texts), Verlag Bo Cavefors, Malmo, Sweden, 1977, passim. 6Quoted in Tim Weiner, “Bombings in East Africa: The Investigation; Reward Is Offered and Clues Studied in African Blasts,” New York Times, August 11, 1998. 7Marie Colvin, Stephen Grey, Matthew Campbell, and Tony Allen-Mills, “Clinton gambles all on revenge,” Sunday Times, London, August 23, 1998. 8U.S. Department of Defense, Terrorist Group Profiles, 1998, pp. 5, 35, 61, 64, 56, and 118. III Countering the New Terrorism

Although the total volume of terrorist incidents worldwide has declined in the 1990s (see Figure 1), the percentage of terrorist incidents with fatalities has increased. According to the RAND-

SOURCE: The RAND-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism Figure 1—Number of Worldwide Terrorist Incidents, 1991–1996

St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism,9 a record 484 international terrorist incidents were recorded in 1991, the year of the Gulf War, followed by 343 incidents in 1992, 360 in 1993, 353 in 1994, falling to 278 incidents in 1995 and to only 250 in 1996 (the last calendar year for which complete statistics are available).10 Indeed, the 1996 total was the lowest annual tally in 23 years. This overall paucity of activity, however, was not reflected by a concomitant decline in the number of fatalities. On the contrary, 1996 was one of the bloodiest years on record. A total of 510 persons were killed: 223 more than in 1995 and 91 more than in 1994. In fact, the 1996 death toll ranks as the fourth highest recorded in the chronology since we began monitoring international terrorism in 1968. Significantly, the U.S. Department of State in its own authoritative compendium and analysis, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996, cites a similar increase in international terrorism’s lethality.11 Hence, even though the State Department and the RAND-St. Andrews Chronology have different criteria for defining incidents (which, accordingly, produces different numerical tabulations),12 we arrive at the same funda-mental conclusion: even while terrorists were less active in 1996, they were significantly more lethal. This development was mostly the result of a handful of so-called terrorist “spectaculars”—that is, the dramatic, attention-riveting, high-lethality acts that so effectively capture the attention of the media and public alike. Hence, although the number of international terrorist incidents that killed

______9The RAND-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism is a computerized database of international terrorist incidents that have occurred worldwide from 1968 to the present. The chronology has been continuously maintained since 1972 (when it was created by Brian Jenkins), first by RAND and since 1994 by the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at St. Andrews University, Scotland. The incidents in the chronology are concerned with international terrorism, defined here as incidents in which terrorists go abroad to strike their targets, select victims or targets that have connections with a foreign state (e.g., diplomats, foreign businessmen, offices of foreign corporations), or create international incidents by attacking airline passengers, personnel, or equipment. It excludes violence carried out by terrorists within their own country against their own nationals, and terrorism perpetrated by governments against their own citizens. In this respect, it is emphasized that the data collected in the chronology comprise only a fraction of the total volume of terrorist violence, which in turn comprises a fraction of the violence of ongoing armed conflicts. Accordingly, the data contained in the chronology are not necessarily a definitive listing of every international and domestic terrorist incident that has occurred everywhere since 1968. Its value, accordingly, is as a means of identifying terrorist trends and projecting likely future terrorist patterns. 10For the purposes of the RAND-St. Andrews Chronology of Terrorism, terrorism is defined by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of the cause. Terrorism is thus taken to mean violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm in the pursuit of political aims. 11Indeed, the second sentence of the first paragraph of the State Department report notes that “the total number of casualties [in 1996] was one of the highest ever recorded. . . .” Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1996, U.S. Department of State, Publication 10433, Washington, DC, April 1997, p. 1. 12The principal numerical differences between the RAND-St. Andrews Chronology’s figures and the State Department’s are in total number of international incidents (the State Department’s figure is 296), number of fatalities (the State Department cites 311), and number of incidents with fatalities (the State Department notes 45 compared with the 60 that we identify). IV Countering the New Terrorism eight or more people increased only slightly in 1996 (from eight in 1995 to 13), the effect was nonetheless profound in that it was this relatively small number of incidents that accounted for the year’s dramatically high body count. International terrorism’s overall trend toward increasing lethality is also reflected in the percentage of international terrorist incidents that result in one or more fatalities. For example, only 14 percent of all incidents in 1991 killed anyone, rising to 17.5 percent in 1992, 24 percent in 1993, and 27 percent in 1994 before reaching a record high of 29 percent in 1995. During 1996, admittedly, this percentage declined, as only 24 percent of incidents resulted in deaths. But at the same time, it should be recalled that even this smaller percentage is higher than the 17 percent average recorded during the 1970s and the 19 percent average during the 1980s. A number of reasons account for terrorism’s increased lethality. First, there appears to be a pattern that suggests that at least some terrorists have come to believe that attention is no longer as readily obtained as it once was. To their minds, both the public and media have become increasingly inured or desensitized to the continuing spiral of terrorist violence. Accordingly, these terrorists feel themselves pushed to undertake ever more dramatic or destructively lethal deeds today in order to achieve the same effect that a less ambitious or bloody action may have had in the past. For example, when Timothy McVeigh, the convicted bomber of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, was asked by his attorney whether he could not have achieved the same effect of drawing attention to his grievances against the U.S. government without killing anyone, he reportedly replied: “That would not have gotten the point across. We needed a body count to make our point.”13 In this respect, although the April 1995 bombing of the Murrah Building was doubtless planned well in advance, McVeigh may nonetheless have felt driven to surpass in terms of death and destruction the previous month’s dramatic and more exotic nerve-gas attack on the Tokyo underground (perpetrated by the Japanese religious sect, the Aum Shinrikyo) to guarantee that his attack would be assured the requisite media coverage and public attention. This equation of publicity and carnage with attention and success thus has the effect of locking some terrorists onto an unrelenting upward spiral of violence to retain the media and public’s interest.14 Similarly, Ramzi Ahmad Yousef, the convicted mastermind of the 1993 New York City World Trade Center bombing, reportedly planned to follow that incident with the simultaneous in-flight bombings of 11 U.S. passenger airliners.15 Second, terrorists have profited from past experience and have become more adept at killing. Not only are their weapons becoming smaller, more sophisticated, and deadlier,16 but terrorists have greater access to these weapons through their alliances with various rogue states. During the 1980s, for example, Czechoslovakia reportedly sold 1000 tons of Semtex to Libya and an additional 40,000 tons to Syria, North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. All these countries, it should be noted, have long been cited by the U.S. Department of State as sponsors of international terrorism.17 Indeed, a third reason for terrorism’s increased lethality, and one closely tied to the above point, is the active role played by states in supporting and sponsoring terrorism.18 In its 1997 review of

______13Quoted in James Brooke, “Newspaper Says McVeigh Described Role in Bombing,” New York Times, March 1, 1997. 14See, for example, David Hearst, “Publicity key element of strategy,” The Guardian (London), July 31, 1990; and David Pallister, “Provos seek to ‘play havoc with British nerves and lifestyle’,” The Guardian (London), July 31, 1990. 15James Bone and Alan Road, “Terror By Degree,” The Times Magazine (London), October 18, 1997. 16For example, the bomb used to destroy Pan Am 103 in 1988 is believed to have been a dual-timer/barometric pressure detonation device, constructed from less than 300 grams of Semtex plastic explosive, no bigger than the small radio it was concealed in. See “Explosive Detection Systems Boosted, Blasted at Hearing,” Counter-Terrorism and Security Intelligence, February 12, 1990. 17On a state visit to Britain in 1990, Czech president Vaclav Havel observed that, “If you consider that 200 grams is enough to blow up an aircraft . . . this means world terrorism has enough Semtex to last 150 years.” Quoted in Glenn Frankel, “Sale of Explosive to Libya Detailed,” Washington Post, March 23, 1990. 18See Cindy C. Combs, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, Prentice Hall, Saddle River, New Jersey, 1997, pp. 86–88; Bruce Hoffman, Recent Trends and Future Prospects of Iranian Sponsored International Terrorism, RAND, R-3783-USDP, March 1990, passim; and Walter Laqueur, “Postmodern Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 5, September–October 1996, pp. 26–27. V Countering the New Terrorism global terrorism patterns, the U.S. State Department designated seven countries as terrorism sponsors: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. With the exception of the Sudan, which was added in 1993, each of these countries has remained on the list of terrorism patron-states for more than a decade.19 The assistance that these governments has provided has often enhanced the striking power and capabilities of ordinary terrorist organizations, transforming some groups into entities more akin to elite commando units than the stereotypical Molotov-cocktail wielding or crude pipe-bomb manufacturing anarchist or radical leftist.20 State sponsorship has in fact a “force multiplying” effect on ordinary terrorist groups. It places greater resources in the hands of terrorists, thereby enhancing planning, intelligence, logistical capabilities, training, finances, and sophistication. Moreover, since state-sponsored terrorists do not depend on the local population for support, they need not be concerned about alienating popular opinion or provoking a public backlash. The attraction for various renegade regimes to use terrorists as “surrogate warriors” has arguably increased since the 1991 Gulf War. The lesson of Iraq’s overt invasion of Kuwait, where a UN- backed multinational coalition was almost immediately arrayed against Saddam, suggests that future aggressors may prefer to accomplish their objectives clandestinely with a handful of terrorist surrogates. Not only could such small bands facilitate the destabilization of neighboring or rival states, but if done covertly (and successfully), the state sponsor might escape identification, retaliation, and sanctions. Accordingly, terrorists may in the future come to be regarded by the globe’s rogue states as an ultimate fifth column—a clandestine, cost-effective force used to wage war covertly against more powerful rivals or to subvert neighboring countries or hostile regimes.21 Terrorism therefore could be employed as an adjunct to conventional warfare, and as a form of asymmetric strategy vis-à-vis the United States. Fourth, the overall increase during the past 15 years of terrorism motivated by a religious imperative encapsulates the confluence of new adversaries, motivations, and tactics affecting terrorist patterns today (see Figure 2). While the connection between religion and terrorism is not new,22 in recent decades this variant has largely been overshadowed by ethnic- and nationalist-separatist or ideologically motivated terrorism. Indeed, none of the 11 identifiable terrorist groups23 active in 1968 (the year credited with marking the advent of modern, international terrorism) could be classified as religious.24 Not until 1980 in fact—as a result of repercussions from the revolution in Iran the year before—do the first “modern” religious terrorist groups appear,25 although they amount to only two of the 64 groups active that year. Twelve years later, however, the number of religious terrorist groups has increased nearly six-fold, representing a quarter (11 of 48) of the terrorist organizations that carried out attacks in 1992. By 1994, a third (16) of the 49 identifiable terrorist groups could be classified as religious in

______19Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1996, p. 29. 20It is unlikely that an ordinary (e.g., nonstate-supported terrorist group) could have mounted the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks at Beirut International Airport. In addition to the complex logistical and intelligence support that was provided to the terrorists, the weapon they used was not of the sort found in the typical terrorist group’s arsenal. The truck bomb that destroyed the barracks and killed 241 Marines consisted of some 12,000 pounds of high explosives, whose destructive power was enhanced by canisters of flammable gases attached to the explosive device by its designers. The explosion was described at the time by FBI investigators as the “largest non-nuclear blast ever detonated on the face of the earth.” Quoted in Eric Hammel, The Root: The Marines in Beirut, August 1982–February 1984, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, San Diego, California, 1985, p. 303. 21Accusations of Iran’s fomenting subversion in Bahrain and its alleged role in the bombing of the Khobar Towers military housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in July 1996 and of a joint Saudi-American military training facility in Riyadh in November 1995 may already be indicative of this trend. 22As David C. Rapoport points out in his seminal study of what he terms “holy terror,” until the 19th century, “religion provided the only acceptable justifications for terror” (see David C. Rapoport, “Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 78, No. 3, September 1984, p. 659). 23Numbers of active, identifiable terrorist groups from 1968 to the present are derived from the RAND-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism. 24Admittedly, many contemporary terrorist groups—such as the overwhelmingly Catholic Provisional Irish Republic Army; their Protestant counterparts arrayed in various Loyalist paramilitary groups like the Ulster Freedom Fighters, the Ulster Volunteer Force, and the Red Hand Commandos; and the predominantly Muslim Palestine Liberation Organization—have a strong religious component by virtue of their membership. However, it is the political and not the religious aspect that is the dominant characteristic of these groups, as evidenced by the preeminence of their nationalist and/or irredentist aims. 25These are the Iranian-backed Shi’a groups al-Dawa and the Committee for Safeguarding the Islamic Revolution. VI Countering the New Terrorism character and/or motivation, and in 1995 they accounted for nearly half (26 or 46 percent) of the

SOURCE: The RAND-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism Figure 2—Religious Versus Other Terrorist Groups 56 known terrorist groups active that year. In 1996, however, only 13 (28 percent) of the 46 identifiable terrorist groups had a dominant religious component. Nevertheless, despite this decline in the 1996 figure, religion remained a significant force behind terrorism’s rising lethality. Groups motivated in part or in whole by a salient religious or theological motivation committed ten of the 13 terrorist spectaculars recorded in 1996.26 The implications of terrorism motivated by a religious imperative for higher levels of lethality is evidenced by the violent record of various Shi’a Islamic groups during the 1980s. For example, although these organizations committed only 8 percent of all recorded international terrorist incidents between 1982 and 1989, they were nonetheless responsible for nearly 30 percent of the deaths during that time period.27 Indeed, some of the most significant terrorist acts of recent years have had some religious element present. These include

• the 1993 bombing of New York City’s World Trade Center by Islamic radicals who deliberately attempted to topple one of the twin towers onto the other;

• the series of 13 near-simultaneous car and truck bombings that shook Bombay, India, in February 1993, killing 400 persons and injuring more than 1000 others, in reprisal for the destruction of an Islamic shrine in that country;

• the December 1994 hijacking of an Air France passenger jet by Islamic terrorists belonging to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the attendant foiled plot to blow up themselves, the aircraft, and the 283 passengers on board precisely when the plane was over Paris, thus causing the flaming wreckage to plunge into the crowded city below;28

• the March 1995 sarin nerve-gas attack on the Tokyo subway system, perpetrated by an apocalyptic Japanese religious cult (Aum Shinrikyo) that killed a dozen persons and

______26The Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, was responsible for three incidents (which killed a total of 56 persons); the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front for two (killing 37); a shadowy Saudi Arabian dissident group for two (causing 30 fatalities); the Egyptian al-Gama’a al-Islamiya for one (18 persons died); unspecified Kashmiri rebels for another incident (where eight persons died); and the Turkish Islamic Jihad for the remaining one (in which 17 persons perished). 27Between 1982 and 1989, Shi’a terrorist groups committed 247 terrorist incidents but were responsible for 1057 deaths. 28The hijackers’ plans were foiled after the French authorities learned of their intentions and ordered commandos to storm the aircraft after it had landed for refueling in Marseilles. VII Countering the New Terrorism

wounded 3796 others29; reportedly the group also planned to carry out identical attacks in the United States;30

• the bombing of an Oklahoma City federal office building in April 1995, where 168 persons perished, by two Christian Patriots seeking to foment a nationwide race revolution;31

• the wave of bombings unleashed in France by the Algerian GIA between July and October 1995, of metro trains, outdoor markets, cafes, schools, and popular tourist spots, that killed eight persons and wounded more than 180 others;

• the assassination in November 1995 of Israeli Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin by a religious Jewish extremist and its attendant significance as the purported first step in a campaign of mass murder designed to disrupt the peace process;

• the Hamas suicide bombers who turned the tide of Israel’s national elections with a string of bloody attacks that killed 60 persons between February and March 1996;

• the Egyptian Islamic militants who carried out a brutal machine-gun and hand-grenade attack on a group of Western tourists outside their Cairo hotel in April 1996 that killed 18;

• the June 1996 truck bombing of a U.S. Air Force barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, where 19 persons perished, by religious militants opposed to the reigning al-Saud regime;

• the unrelenting bloodletting by Islamic extremists in Algeria itself that has claimed the lives of more than an estimated 75,000 persons there since 1992;

• the massacre in November 1997 of 58 foreign tourists and four Egyptians by terrorists belonging to the Gamat al-Islamiya (Islamic Group) at the Temple of Queen Hatsheput in Luxor, Egypt; and

• the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 that killed 257 and injured some 5000 others. As the above incidents suggest, terrorism motivated in whole or in part by religious imperatives has often led to more intense acts (or attempts) of violence that have produced considerably higher levels of fatalities—at least compared with the relatively more discriminate and less lethal incidents of violence perpetrated by secular terrorist organizations. In brief, religious terrorism32 tends to be more lethal than secular terrorism because of the radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimization and justification, concepts of morality, and Manichean world views that directly affect the “holy terrorists’” motivation. For the religious terrorist, violence is a sacramental act or divine duty, executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative and justified by scripture. Religion therefore functions as a legitimizing force, specifically sanctioning wide-scale violence against an almost open-ended category of opponents (i.e., all peoples who are not members of the religious terrorists’ religion or cult). This explains

______29Murray Sayle, “Martyrdom Complex,” The New Yorker, May 13, 1996. 30Nicholas D. Kristof, “Japanese Cult Planned U.S. Attack,” International Herald Tribune (Paris), 24 March 1997; and Robert Whymant, “Cult planned gas raids on America,” The Times (London), March 29, 1997. 31It is mistaken to view either the American militia movement or other contemporary white supremacist organizations (from which McVeigh and his accomplice Terry L. Nichols came) as simply militant anti-federalist or extremist tax-resistance movements. The aims and motivations of these groups in fact span a broad spectrum of anti-federalist and seditious beliefs coupled with religious hatred and racial intolerance, masked by a transparent veneer of religious precepts. They are bound together by the ethos of the broader Christian Patriot movement that actively incorporates Christian scripture in support of their violent activities and use biblical liturgy to justify their paranoid call-to-arms. For a more detailed analysis, see Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, pp. 105–120. Further, it should be noted that McVeigh openly admitted to interviewers his belief in Christian Patriotism and involvement in Patriot activities, thus tacitly admitting his adherence to the theological belief system briefly described above. See Tim Kelsey, “The Oklahoma suspect awaits day of reckoning,” The Sunday Times (London), April 21, 1996. 32For a more complete and detailed discussion of this category of terrorist organization, see Bruce Hoffman, “Holy Terror: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated By a Religious Imperative,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 18, No. 4, Winter 1995, which was also published by RAND under the same title, P-7834, July 1993. VIII Countering the New Terrorism why clerical sanction is so important for religious terrorists33 and why religious figures are often required to “bless” (e.g., approve) terrorist operations before they are executed. Fifth, the proliferation of amateurs taking part in terrorist acts has also contributed to terrorism’s increasing lethality. In the past, terrorism was not just a matter of having the will and motivation to act, but of having the capability to do so—the requisite training, access to weaponry, and operational knowledge. These were not readily available capabilities and were generally acquired through training undertaken in camps run either by other terrorist organizations and/or in concert with the terrorists’ state sponsors.34 Today, however, the means and methods of terrorism can be easily obtained at bookstores, from mail-order publishers, on CD-ROM, or over the Internet. Terrorism has become accessible to anyone with a grievance, an agenda, a purpose, or any idiosyncratic combination of the above. Relying on commercially obtainable bomb-making manuals and operational guidebooks, the amateur terrorist can be just as deadly and destructive35—and even more difficult to track and anticipate—than his professional counterpart.36 Amateur terrorists are dangerous in other ways as well. The absence of a central command authority may result in fewer constraints on the terrorists’ operations and targets and—especially when combined with a religious fervor—fewer inhibitions about indiscriminate casualties. Israeli authorities, for example, have noted this pattern among terrorists belonging to the radical Palestinian Islamic Hamas organization in contrast to their predecessors in the more secular, professional, and centrally controlled mainstream Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) terrorist groups. As one senior Israeli security official noted of a particularly vicious band of Hamas terrorists: they “were a surprisingly unprofessional bunch . . . they had no preliminary training and acted without specific instructions.”37 In the United States, to cite another example of the lethal power of amateur terrorists, it is suspected that the 1993 World Trade Center bombers’ intent was in fact to bring down one of the twin towers.38 By contrast, there is no evidence that the persons we once considered to be the world’s arch-terrorists—Carlos, Abu Nidal, and Abu Abbas—ever contemplated, much less attempted, destruction of a high-rise office building packed with people. Indeed, much as the “inept” World Trade Center bombers were derided for their inability to avoid arrest, their modus operandi arguably points to a pattern of future terrorist activities elsewhere. For example, as previously noted, terrorist groups were once recognizable as distinct organizational entities. The four convicted World Trade Center bombers shattered this stereotype. Instead they were like-minded individuals who shared a common religion, worshipped at the same religious institution, had the same friends and frustrations, and were

______33Examples are the aforementioned fatwa (Islamic religious edict) issued by bin Laden and the one issued by Iranian Shi’a clerics in 1989 calling for the novelist Salman Rushdie’s death; the “blessing” given to the bombing of New York City’s World Trade Center by the Egyptian Sunni cleric Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman; the dispensation given by extremist rabbis to right-wing Jewish violence against Arabs in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza; the approval given by Islamic clerics in Lebanon for Hizbullah operations and by their counterparts in the Gaza Strip for Hamas attacks; and the pivotal role over his followers played by Shoko Ashara, the religious leader of Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo sect. 34Examples include the estimated dozen or so terrorist training camps long operated under Syria’s aegis in Lebanon’s Bekka Valley; the various training bases that have been identified over the years in the Yemen, Tunisia, the Sudan, Iran, Afghanistan, and elsewhere; and, of course, the facilities maintained during the Cold War by the Eastern Bloc. 35Examples of “amateurs” include the followers of Shoko Ashara who perpetrated the Tokyo nerve-gas attacks; the two men who were convicted of mixing fertilizer and diesel-fuel together to bomb the federal building in Oklahoma City; the Algerian youths deliberately recruited into the terrorist campaign that was waged in Paris between July and October 1995 which had been initiated by their more professional counterparts in the Armed Islamic Group (see the discussion immediately below); and Israeli Prime Minister Rabin’s assassin. 36Indeed, the situation that unfolded in France during this time period provides perhaps the most compelling evidence of the increasing salience of amateurs recruited or suborned by professional terrorists for operational purposes. French authorities believe that, while professional terrorists belonging to the Algerian GIA may have perpetrated the initial wave of bombings, like-minded amateurs—drawn from within France’s large and increasingly restive Algerian expatriate community—were responsible for at least some of the subsequent attacks. 37Quoted in Joel Greenberg, “Israel Arrests 4 In Police Death,” New York Times, 7 June 1993; and Eric Silver, “The Shin Bet’s ‘Winning’ Battle,” The Jewish Journal (Los Angeles), June 11–17, 1993. 38Matthew L. Wald, “Figuring What It Would Take to Take Down a Tower,” New York Times, March 21, 1993. IX Countering the New Terrorism linked by family ties as well, who simply gravitated toward one another for a specific, perhaps even one-time, operation.39

Moreover, since this more amorphous and perhaps even transitory type of group will lack the footprints or modus operandi of an actual, existing terrorist organization, it is likely to prove more difficult for law enforcement to build a useful picture of the dimensions of their intentions and capabilities. Indeed, as one New York City police officer only too presciently observed two months before the Trade Center attack: it was not the established terrorist groups—with known or suspected members and established operational patterns—that worried him, but the hitherto unknown “splinter groups,” composed of new or marginal members from an older group, that suddenly surface out of nowhere to attack.40 Essentially part-time terrorists, such loose groups of individuals may be—as the World Trade Center bombers themselves appear to have been—indirectly influenced or remotely controlled by some foreign government or nongovernmental entity. The suspicious transfer of funds from banks in Iran and Germany to a joint account maintained by the accused bombers in New Jersey just before the Trade Center blast, for example, may be illustrative of an indirect or circuitous foreign connection.41 Moreover, the fact that two of the group’s ringleaders—Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and Abdul Rahman Yasin—appear to have come to the United States specifically with the intent of orchestrating the attack raises suspicions that the incident may from the start have been planned and orchestrated from abroad.42 Thus, in contrast to the Trade Center bombing’s depiction in the press as a terrorist incident perpetrated by a group of amateurs acting either entirely on their own or as manipulated by Yousef, an individual portrayed by one of the bomber’s defense attorneys as a “devious, evil . . . genius,”43 the genesis of the Trade Center attack may be far more complex. This use of amateur terrorists as dupes or cut-outs to mask the involvement of a foreign patron or government could potentially benefit terrorist state sponsors by enabling them to more effectively conceal their involvement and thus avoid potential military retaliation or diplomatic and economic sanctions. The prospective state sponsors’ connection could be further obscured by the fact that much of the amateur terrorists’ equipment, resources, and even funding could be entirely self-generating. The explosive device used at the World Trade Center, for example, was constructed out of ordinary, commercially available materials—including lawn fertilizer (urea nitrate) and diesel fuel—and cost less than $400 to build.44 Indeed, despite the Trade Center

______39The four bombers appear to have joined forces based on their attendance at the same place of worship (a Jersey City, New Jersey mosque). Family ties played a part as well: Ibrahim A. Elgabrowny, who although not charged with the Trade Center bombing specifically, was nonetheless implicated in the crime and was convicted in the subsequent plot to free the bombers, is the cousin of El Sayyid A. Nosair, who was implicated in the Trade Center bombing. Elgabrowny was among the 13 persons convicted in the follow-on plans to obtain the bombers’ release, and was already serving a prison sentence in connection with the November 1990 assassination of Rabbi Meir Kahane. See Jim Mcgee and Rachel Stassen-Berger, “5th Suspect Arrested in Bombing,” Washington Post, March 26, 1993; and Alison Mitchell, “Fingerprint Evidence Grows in World Trade Center Blast,” New York Times, May 20, 1993. 40Interview with RAND research staff in New York City, November 1992. 41Federal authorities reported that they had traced nearly $100,000 in funds that had been wired to some of the suspects from abroad, including transfers made from Iran. An additional $8000 had been transferred from Germany into a joint bank account maintained by two of the bombers. Ralph Blumenthal, “$100,000 From Abroad Is Linked to Suspects in the Trade Center Explosion,” New York Times, 15 February 1993. According to one of the other convicted bombers, Mahmud Abouhalima, funds had also been routed through the militant Egyptian Islamic group, Gamat al-Islamiya, whose spiritual leader is Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, who was convicted in connection with the June 1993 plot, and by the radical transnational Muslim Brotherhood organization. Additional financing reputedly was provided by and via Iranian businesses and Islamic institutions in Saudi Arabia and Europe. Mary B.W. Tabor, “Lingering Questions on Bombing,” New York Times, September 14, 1994. 42Ralph Blumenthal, “Missing Bombing Case Figure Reported to Be Staying in Iraq,” New York Times, June 10, 1993. 43Richard Bernstein, “Lawyer in Trade Center Blast Case Contends that Client Was a Dupe,” New York Times, February 16, 1994. See also Tom Morganthau, “A Terrorist Plot Without a Story,” Newsweek, February 28, 1994. 44The Trade Center bomb was composed of some 1200 lb of “common sulfuric and nitric acids used in dozens of household products and urea used to fertilize lawns.” The detonating device was a more complex and extremely volatile mixture of nitro-glycerin enhanced by tanks of compressed hydrogen gases that were designed to increase the force of the blast. Richard Bernstein, “Lingering Questions on Bombing: Powerful Device, Simple Design,” New York Times, September 14, 1994. See also Richard Bernstein, “Expert Can’t Be Certain of Bomb Contents at Trial,” New York Times, January 21, 1994. Richard Bernstein, “Nitro-glycerin and Shoe at Center of Blast Trial Testimony,” New York Times, 27 January 1994; Richard Bernstein, “Witness Sums Up Bombing Evidence,” New York Times, February 7, 1994; Edward Barnes et al., “The $400 Bomb,” Time, March 22, 1993; and Tom Morganthau, “A Terrorist Plot Without a Story,” Newsweek, February 28, 1994. X Countering the New Terrorism bombers’ almost comical ineptitude in avoiding capture (one member of the group attempted to collect the deposit for the demolished rental truck in which the bomb was concealed), they were still able to shake an entire city’s—if not country’s—complacency. Further, the simple bomb used by these amateurs proved just as deadly and destructive—killing six persons, injuring more than 1000 others, gouging out a 180-ft-wide crater six stories deep, and causing an estimated $550 million in damages to the twin tower and lost revenue to the business housed there45—as the more high-tech devices constructed out of military ordnance used by their professional counterparts.46 Sixth, while on the one hand terrorism is attracting amateurs, on the other hand the sophistication and operational competence of the professional terrorists are increasing. These professionals are becoming demonstrably more adept in their tradecraft of death and destruction; more formidable in their capacity for tactical modification and innovation in their methods of attack; and more able to operate for sustained periods while avoiding detection, interception, or capture. An almost Darwinian principle of natural selection thus seems to affect terrorist organizations, whereby every new terrorist generation learns from its predecessors—becoming smarter, tougher, and more difficult to capture or eliminate. Terrorists often analyze the mistakes made by former comrades who have been killed or apprehended. Press accounts, judicial indictments, courtroom testimony, and trial transcripts are meticulously culled for information on security force tactics and methods and then absorbed by surviving group members. The third generation of the now defunct Red Army Faction (RAF)47 that emerged in the late 1980s is a classic example of this phenomenon. According to a senior German official, group members routinely studied court documents and transcripts of proceedings to gain insight into the measures employed by the authorities against terrorists. Having learned about these techniques—often from testimony presented by law enforcement personnel in open court (in some instances having been deliberately questioned on these matters by sympathetic attorneys)—the terrorists consequently are able to undertake the requisite countermeasures to avoid detection. For example, after learning that German police could obtain fingerprints from the bottom of toilet seats or the inside of refrigerators, surviving RAF members began to apply a special ointment to their fingers that, after drying, prevented fingerprints from being left and thus thwarted members’ identification and incrimination.48 As a spokesperson for the Bundeskriminalamt lamented in the months immediately preceding the RAF’s unilateral declaration of a cease-fire in April 1992, the “‘Third Generation’ learnt a lot from the mistakes of its predecessors—and about how the police works . . . they now know how to operate very carefully.”49 Indeed, according to a former member of the group, Peter-Juergen Brock (now serving a life sentence for murder), the RAF before the cease- fire had “reached maximum efficiency.”50 Similar accolades have in recent years also been bestowed on the IRA. At the end of his tour of duty in 1992 as General Officer Commanding British Forces in Northern Ireland, General Sir John

______Similarly, in April 1988 a Japanese Red Army terrorist, Yu Kikumura, was arrested on the New Jersey Turnpike while en route to New York City on a bombing mission. Kikumura’s mission was to carry out a bombing attack against a U.S. Navy recruiting station in lower Manhattan on 15 April to commemorate the second anniversary of the 1986 U.S. air strike against Libya. He is believed to have undertaken this operation at the behest of Libya’s Colonel Qaddafi. Between his arrival in the United States on 14 March and his arrest a month later, Kikumura traveled some 7000 miles by car from New York to Chicago, through Kentucky, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania, purchasing materials for his bomb along the way. Found in his possession were gunpowder and hollowed-out fire extinguishers in which to place explosive materials and roofing nails to make crude anti-personnel weapons. Kikumura was sentenced to 30 years in prison. See Robert Hanley, “Suspected Japanese Terrorist Convicted in Bomb Case in New Jersey,” New York Times, November 29, 1988; and Business Risks International, Risk Assessment Weekly, Vol. 5, No. 29, July 22, 1988. 45N. R. Kleinfeld, “Legacy of Tower Explosion: Security Improved, and Lost,” New York Times, February 20, 1993; and Richard Bernstein, “Lingering Questions on Bombing: Powerful Device, Simple Design,” New York Times, September 14, 1994. 46This is remarkably similar to the pattern of terrorist activity and operations that unfolded in France nearly two years later. See the discussion below. 47The RAF’s decision to disband (announced in April 1998) cited the group’s growing political estrangement and isolation, rather than governmental countermeasures, as the most important reason for its dissolution. 48See Frederick Kempe, “Deadly Survivors: The Cold War Is Over But Leftist Terrorists In Germany Fight On,” Wall Street Journal, December 27, 1991. 49Quoted in Adrian Bridge, “German police search for Red Army Faction killers,” The Independent (London), April 6, 1991. 50Quoted in Kempe, “Deadly Survivors.” XI Countering the New Terrorism

Wilsey described the organization as “an absolutely formidable enemy. The essential attributes of their leaders are better than ever before. Some of their operations are brilliant in terrorist terms.”51 By this time, too, even the IRA’s once comparatively unsophisticated Loyalist terrorist counterparts had absorbed the lessons from their own past mistakes and had consciously emulated the IRA to become disquietingly more professional as well. One senior Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) officer noted this change in the Loyalists’ capabilities, observing that they too were now increasingly “running their operations from small cells, on a need to know basis. They have cracked down on loose talk. They have learned how to destroy forensic evidence. And if you bring them in for questioning, they say nothing.”52 In this respect, it is not difficult to recognize how the amateur terrorist may become increasingly attractive to either a more professional terrorist group and/or their state patron as a pawn or cut- out or simply as an expendable minion. In this manner, the amateur terrorist could be effectively used by others to conceal further the identity of the foreign government or terrorist group actually commissioning or ordering a particular attack. The series of terrorist attacks that unfolded in France conforms to this pattern. Between July and October 1995, a handful of terrorists using bombs fashioned with four-inch nails wrapped around camping-style cooking-gas canisters killed eight persons and wounded more than 180 others. Not until early October 1995 did any group claim credit for the bombings, when the radical GIA, a militant Algerian Islamic organization, took responsibility for the attacks. French authorities, however, believe that although professional terrorists perpetrated the initial bombings, like-minded amateurs—recruited by GIA operatives from within France’s large and increasingly restive Algerian expatriate community—were responsible for at least some of the subsequent attacks.53 Accordingly, these amateurs or new recruits facilitated the campaign’s metastasizing beyond the small cell of professionals who ignited it, striking a responsive chord among disaffected Algerian youths in France and thereby increasing exponentially the aura of fear and, arguably, the terrorists’ coercive power. Finally, terrorism’s increasing lethality may also be reflected in the fact that terrorists today tend to claim credit for their attacks less frequently. Unlike the more traditional terrorist groups of the 1970s and 1980s who not only issued communiqués explaining why they carried out an attack but proudly boasted of having executed a particularly destructive or lethal attack, terrorists are now appreciably more reticent. For example, some of the most serious terrorist incidents of the past decade, the so-called terrorist spectaculars, have never been credibly claimed—much less explained or justified as terrorist attacks—by the groups responsible. Events include

• the 1995 sarin nerve-gas attack on the Tokyo subway; • the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Office Building in Oklahoma City; • the series of car bombings that convulsed Bombay in 1993, killing 317 persons; and • the huge truck bomb that destroyed a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires in 1994, killing 96. The in-flight bombing of Pan Am 103, in which 278 persons perished, is an especially notorious example. Although we know that two Libyan government airline employees were identified and accused of placing the suitcase containing the bomb that eventually found its way onto the flight, no believable claim of responsibility has ever been issued.

______51Quoted in Edward Gorman, “How to stop the IRA,” The Times (London), January 11, 1992. 52Quoted in William E. Schmidt, “Protestant Gunmen Are Stepping Up the Violence in Northern Ireland,” New York Times, October 29, 1991. 53For accounts of the bombing campaign, see, for example, Susan Bell, “16 hurt in Paris nail-bomb blast,” Times (London), August 18, 1995; Adam Sage, “Paris faces autumn of terror as fifth bomb is discovered,” Times (London), September 5, 1995; Adam Sage, “French hold 40 in hunt for bomb terrorists,” Times (London), September 12, 1995; Alex Duval Smith, “Police fight ‘war’ in French suburbs,” Guardian (London), November 1, 1995; and Craig R. Whitney, “French Police Arrest Suspected Leader of Islamic Militant Group,” New York Times, November 3, 1995. See also “Terrorism: Political Backdrop to Paris Attacks,” Intelligence Newsletter (Paris), No. 274, October 26, 1995, pp. 6–7. XII Countering the New Terrorism

The implication of this trend is that violence for some terrorist groups is perhaps becoming less a means to an end (that therefore has to be tailored and explained and justified to the public) than an end in itself that does not require any wider explanation or justification beyond the group’s members themselves and perhaps their followers. Such a trait would conform not only to the motivations of religious terrorists (as previously discussed) but also to terrorist “spoilers”—e.g., groups bent on disrupting or sabotaging negotiations or the peaceful settlement of ethnic conflicts. That terrorists are less frequently claiming credit for their attacks may also suggest an inevitable loosening of constraints—self-imposed or otherwise—on their violence, which may in turn lead to higher levels of lethality.54 Terrorist Tactical Adaptations Across the Technological Spectrum and Their Implications The trends described above shed light on a pattern of terrorist operations and tactical adaptation that underscores the dynamic and broad technological dimensions of the threat. These developments are likely to affect counterterrorism responses directly. A key factor contributing to terrorism’s rising lethality is the ease of terrorist adaptations across the technological spectrum. On the low end of the technological spectrum, terrorists continue to rely on fertilizer bombs. These bombs’ devastating effects have been demonstrated by the IRA at St. Mary Axe and Bishop’s Gate in 1991 and 1992, at Canary Wharf and in Manchester in 1996, by the World Trade Center bombers, and by the men responsible for the Oklahoma City bombing. Fertilizer is perhaps the most cost-effective of weapons, costing on average 1 percent of a comparable amount of plastic explosive. To illustrate, the Bishop’s Gate blast is estimated to have caused $1.5 billion55 and the Baltic Exchange blast at St. Mary Axe $1.25 billion in damage.56 The World Trade Center bomb cost only $400 to construct, but resulted in $550 million in damages and lost revenue to the business housed there.57 Moreover, unlike plastic explosives and other military ordnance, fertilizer and at least two of its most common bomb- making counterparts—diesel fuel and icing sugar—are easily available commercially and completely legal to purchase and store, and are thus highly attractive “weapons components” for terrorists.58 On the high end of the conflict spectrum, one must contend with not only the efforts of groups like the apocalyptic Japanese religious sect, the Aum Shinrikyo, to develop nuclear in addition to chemical and biological capabilities,59 but the proliferation of fissile materials from the former Soviet Union and the emergent illicit market in nuclear materials that is surfacing in Eastern and Central Europe.60 Admittedly, although much of the material seen on sale as part of this black

______54For a more complete discussion of the no claim/increasing lethality issue, see Bruce Hoffman, “Why Terrorists Don’t Claim Credit—An Editorial Comment,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring 1997, and the more concise version published as “A New Kind of Terrorism: Silence is Deadlier,” Los Angeles Times Sunday Opinion Section, August 18, 1996. 55William E. Schmidt, “One Dead, 40 Hurt as Blast Rips Central London,” New York Times, April 25, 1993; and Richard W. Stevenson, “I.R.A. Says It Placed Fatal Bomb; London Markets Rush to Reopen,” New York Times, April 26, 1993. 56William E. Schmidt, “One Dead, 40 Hurt as Blast Rips Central London,” New York Times, April 25, 1993. See also William E. Schmidt, “With London Still in Bomb Shock, Major Appoints His New Cabinet,” New York Times, April 12, 1992; “Delays Seen in London,” New York Times, April 13, 1992; Peter Rodgers, “City bomb claims may reach £1bn,” The Independent (London), April 14, 1992; and David Connett, “IRA city bomb was fertilizer,” The Independent (London), May 28, 1992. 57Although, after adulteration, fertilizer is far less powerful than plastic explosive, it tends to cause more damage than plastic explosive because the energy of the blast is sustained and less controlled (see Roger Highfield, “Explosion could have wrecked city centre,” Daily Telegraph (London), August 13, 1993). For example, the velocity of detonation of plastic explosive like Semtex occurs at about 8000 meters per second; the velocity of detonation of improvised explosives using ammonium nitrate (fertilizer) will typically occur at between 2000–3000 meters per second (depending on the mixture) and thus are less powerful (A. Bailey and S. G. Murray, Explosives, Propellants and Pyrotechnics, Brassey’s, London, 1989, pp. 33–34; and Jimmie C. Oxley, “Non-Traditional Explosive: Potential Detection Problems,” in Paul Wilkinson (ed.), Technology and Terrorism, Frank Cass, London, 1993, pp. 34–37. 58Roger Highfield, “Explosion could have wrecked city centre,” Daily Telegraph (London), August 13, 1993. 59For the most complete account of the Aum activities in this respect, see David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World: The Incredible Story of Aum, Hutchinson, London, 1996, passim. See also John F. Sopko, “The Changing Proliferation Threat,” Foreign Policy, No. 105, Winter 1996–97, pp. 12–14. 60See, for example, Graham T. Allison et al., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996; Frank Barnaby, “Nuclear Accidents Waiting To Happen,” The World Today (London), Vol. 52, No. 4, April 1996; Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris, and Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin, Westview Press, XIII Countering the New Terrorism market cannot be classified as special nuclear material suitable for use in a fissionable explosive device, highly toxic radioactive agents can potentially be paired with conventional explosives and turned into a crude, nonfissionable radiological weapon. Such a device would not only physically destroy a target, but contaminate the surrounding area and render recovery efforts commensurably more difficult and complicated.61 Finally, at the middle range of the spectrum one sees a world awash in plastic explosives, hand- held precision-guided munitions (PGMs) that could be used against civilian and/or military aircraft, and automatic weapons that facilitate a wide array of terrorist operations.62 In recent years, for example, surface-to-air missiles reputedly could be purchased on the international arms black market for as little as $80,000.63 Terrorists therefore now have relatively easy access to a range of sophisticated, off-the-shelf weapons technology that can be readily adapted to their operational needs. The potential impact of cyberwar and information warfare on societies in general and on military facilities, communications, and operations in particular needs also to be considered. Terrorists or their state-patrons could attempt to sabotage networks in order to disrupt communications or even orchestrate disasters. Equally likely is terrorist targeting of classified (or other access- controlled) information systems to obtain intelligence with which to facilitate operations, or for counterintelligence purposes to more effectively thwart counterterrorism efforts. What is clear, however, is information warfare’s potential force-multiplying effect on terrorist operations by providing such adversaries with either enhanced intelligence with which to facilitate more conventional terrorist operations or as a means to cause destruction and disruption without having to undertake actual physical attacks.64 Force Protection: The Example of IRA Targeting of British Forces in Northern Ireland The Provisional Irish Republican Army’s relentless quest to pierce the armor protecting the security forces in Northern Ireland illustrates the professional evolution and increasing operational sophistication of a terrorist group in affecting technological improvements and tactical adaptations. The first generation of early 1970s IRA devices, for example, were often little more than crude anti-personnel bombs, consisting of a handful of roofing nails wrapped around a lump of plastic explosive, that were detonated simply by lighting a fuse. Time bombs from the same era were hardly more sophisticated. They typically were constructed from a few sticks of dynamite and commercial detonators stolen from construction sites or rock quarries attached to ordinary battery-powered alarm clocks. Neither device was terribly reliable and often put the bomber at considerable risk. The process of placing and actually lighting the first type of device carried with it the inherent potential to attract attention while affording the bomber little time to effect the attack and make good his or her escape. Although the second type of device was designed to mitigate precisely this danger, its timing and detonation mechanism was often so

______Boulder, Colorado, 1995; William C. Potter, “Before the Deluge? Assessing the Threat of Nuclear Leakage from the Post-Soviet States,” Arms Control Today, October 1995; Phil Williams and Paul N. Woessner, “Nuclear Material Trafficking: An Interim Assessment,” Transnational Organized Crime, Vol. 1, No. 2, Summer 1995; and Paul N. Woessner, “Recent Developments: Chronology of Nuclear Smuggling Incidents, July 1991–May 1995,” Transnational Organized Crime, Vol. 1, No. 2, Summer 1995. 61For example, a combination fertilizer truck bomb with radioactive agents would not only have destroyed one of the World Trade Towers, but rendered a considerable chunk of prime real estate in the world’s financial nerve center indefinitely unusable because of radioactive contamination. The disruption to commerce that would be caused, the attendant publicity, and the enhanced coercive power of terrorists armed with such “dirty” bombs (which are arguably more credible threats than terrorist acquisition of fissile nuclear weapons) are fundamentally disquieting. 62See James Adams, Engines of War: Merchants of Death and the New Arms Race, Atlantic Monthly Press, New York, 1990, passim. 63See Steve LeVine, “U.S. now worries terrorists may get Stingers,” Washington Times, December 31, 1991; Robert S. Greenberger, “Afghan Guerrilla Leader Armed by U.S., Hekmatyar, Could Prove Embarrassing,” Wall Street Journal, May 11, 1992; and Richard S. Ehrlich, “For Sale in Afghanistan: U.S.-supplied Stingers,” Washington Times, May 21, 1991. 64See John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar is Coming!” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 141–165; Roger C. Molander, Strategic Information Warfare: A New Face of War, RAND, M-661-OSD, 1996; U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose Increasing Risks, Washington, D.C., GAO/AIMD-96-84, May 1996; John Deutch, Director of U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Statement before the U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 25 June 1996; and U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Minority Staff Statement), Security in Cyberspace, June 5, 1996. XIV Countering the New Terrorism crude that accidental or premature explosions were not infrequent, thus causing some terrorists inadvertently to kill themselves.65 In hopes of reducing these risks, the IRA’s bomb makers invented a means of detonating bombs from a safe distance using model aircraft radio controls purchased at hobby shops. Scientists and engineers working in the British Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) scientific research and development division in turn developed a system of electronic countermeasures and jamming techniques for the Army that effectively thwarted this means of attack.66 However, rather than abandon the tactic completely, the IRA searched for a solution. In contrast to the state-of-the art laboratories, huge budgets, and academic credentials of their government counterparts, the IRA’s own R&D department toiled in cellars beneath cross-border safe houses and in the back rooms of urban tenements for five years before devising a network of sophisticated electronic switches for their bombs that would ignore or bypass the Army’s electronic countermeasures.67 Once again, the MoD scientists returned to their laboratories, emerging with a new system of electronic scanners able to detect radio emissions the moment the radio is switched on—and, critically, just tens of seconds before the bomber can actually transmit the detonation signal. The very short window of time provided by this early warning of impending attack was just sufficient to allow Army technicians to neutralize the transmission signal and render detonation impossible. For a time, this proved effective, but the IRA has discovered a means to overcome even this countermeasure. Using radar detectors, such as those used by motorists to evade speed traps, in 1991 the group’s bomb makers fabricated a detonating system that can be triggered by the same type of hand-held radar gun used by police throughout the world to catch speeding motorists. Since the radar gun can be aimed at its target before being switched on, and the signal that it transmits is nearly instantaneous, the detection and jamming of such signals are extremely challenging.68 Finally, in the years before the 1994 IRA cease-fire, IRA units developed yet another means to detonate bombs using a photoflash “slave” unit that can be triggered from a distance of up to 800 meters by a flash of light. The device, which sells for between £60 and £70, is used by commercial photographers to produce simultaneous flashes during photo shoots. The IRA bombers can attach the unit to the detonating system on a bomb and activate it with a commercially available, ordinary flash gun.69 The sophistication of this means of attack lies in its simplicity. Accordingly, those charged with defending against terrorism cannot discount the impact and consequences of even improvised weapons using relatively unsophisticated means of delivery, since the results can be equally as lethal and destructive. Implications for Antiterrorism and Force Protection Although the technological mastery employed by the IRA may appear unique among terrorist organizations, experience has demonstrated repeatedly that, when confronted by new security measures, terrorists throughout the world will seek to identify and exploit new vulnerabilities, adjusting their means of attack accordingly.70 This point is pertinent to the threat posed by terrorists to U.S. Air Force assets and personnel. The availability of a wide variety of weapons—from the most simple and basic to more sophisticated and technologically “cutting edge”—coupled with the terrorists’ operational ingenuity has enabled at least some groups to stay

______65David Rose, “Devices reveal IRA know-how,” The Guardian (London), May 18. 1990. 66Michael Smith, “IRA Use of Radar Guns in Bombings Described,” Daily Telegraph (London), May 20, 1991. 67Smith, 1991. See also David Hearst, “IRA mines gap in army security,” The Guardian (London), April 10, 1990; David Hearst, “‘Human bomb’ fails to explode,” The Guardian (London), November 24, 1990; Jamie Dettmer and Edward Gorman, “Seven dead in IRA ‘human’ bomb attacks,” The Times (London), October 25, 1990; and Will Bennett, “Terrorists keep changing tactics to elude security forces,” Independent (London), December 17, 1991. 68Bennett, 1991. 69Nicholas Watt, “IRA’s ‘Russian roulette’ detonator,” The Times (London), March 16, 1994; and, “Photoflash bomb threat to the public,” The Scotsman (Edinburgh), March 16, 1994. 70As one high-ranking IRA terrorist explained, “You change your tactics to keep them guessing. It all depends on logistics. If you stick to one tactic, you can become predictable and be tracked down. They can find out when you work to a pattern.” Quoted in Will Bennett, 1991. XV Countering the New Terrorism ahead of the counterterrorist technology curve and repeatedly frustrate or defeat the security measures placed in their path. Relying on unconventional adaptations or modifications to conventional explosive devices, these organizations have been able to develop innovative and devastatingly effective means to conceal, deliver, and detonate all kinds of bombs. An important lesson, therefore, is not to disregard an adversary’s apparent lack of technological or operational sophistication and thereby be lulled into a false sense of security. In the context of terrorist attacks on Air Force assets, this has been demonstrated. In January 1981, a group of Puerto Rican terrorists penetrated the defenses surrounding the Muniz Air National Guard Base in Puerto Rico and, using simple explosive devices, destroyed eight A-7D fighters and one F-104 aircraft as well as damaging two other A-7Ds. Using relatively unsophisticated and comparatively inexpensive ordnance, they were able to inflict financial losses totaling more than $45 million.71 Moreover, even attacks that are not successful by conventional military measures can nonetheless still be a success for the terrorists provided that they are daring enough to garner media and public attention. Indeed, the terrorist group’s fundamental organizational imperative to act—even if their action is not completely successful but brings them publicity—also drives their persistent search for new ways to overcome, circumvent, or defeat governmental security and countermeasures. Accordingly, attacks at all points along the conflict spectrum—from the crude and primitive to the most sophisticated—must be anticipated and appropriate measures employed to counter them. Conclusion

Terrorists have targeted the United States more often than any other country.72 This phenomenon is attributable as much to the geographical scope and diversity of America’s overseas commercial interests and the large number of its military bases on foreign soil as to the United States’ stature as the lone remaining superpower. Terrorists are attracted to American interests and citizens abroad precisely because of the plethora of readily available targets; the symbolic value inherent in any blow struck against perceived U.S. “expansionism,” “imperialism,” or “economic exploitation”; and, not least, because of the unparalleled opportunities for exposure and publicity from the world’s most extensive news media that any attack on an American target assures. The reasons why the United States is so appealing a target to terrorists suggest no immediate reversal of this attraction. Indeed, the animus of many of the most radical Middle Eastern terrorist groups coupled with that of the principal state sponsors of international terrorism73—Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, North Korea, and the Sudan—suggests that the United States will remain a favored terrorist target. Accordingly, the U.S. Air Force, as an important vehicle of American overseas force projection and because of the diverse range of targets it offers, will likely remain a focus of terrorist activity. In terms of overall terrorism patterns and the future threat in general, the trends and developments examined here suggest three key conclusions. First, we can expect little deviation from established patterns by mainstream terrorists belonging to traditional ethnic-separatist nationalist or ideologically motivated groups. They will largely continue to rely on the same two basic weapons that they have used successfully for more than a century: the gun and the bomb. Changes will occur in the realm of clever adaptations or modifications to existing off-the-shelf technology (as demonstrated by the IRA experience) or the continued utilization of readily available, commercially purchased materials that can be fabricated into crude—but lethally effective and damaging—weapons (such as the explosive devices used by

______71See Alan Vick, Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest: A History of Ground Attacks on Air Bases, RAND, MR-553-AF, 1995, pp. 16, 154; and Bruce Hoffman, Terrorism in the United States and the Potential Threat to Nuclear Facilities, RAND, R-3351-DOE, January 1986, p. 9, and Recent Trends and Future Prospects of Terrorism in the United States, RAND, R-3618, May 1988, p. 42. 72Followed by Israel, France, Great Britain, West Germany, the former Soviet Union/Russia, Turkey, Cuba, Spain, and Iran. The RAND-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism. 73According to the U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism. See U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1995, De- partment of State Publication 10321, Washington, DC, April 1996, p. viii. XVI Countering the New Terrorism the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombers, the IRA in its operations in England, and the bombers of U.S. embassies in Africa). This adherence to a circumscribed set of tactics and limited arsenal of weapons will continue to be dictated by the operational conservatism inherent in the terrorists’ organizational imperative to succeed. For this reason, traditional terrorists will always seek to remain just ahead of the counterterrorism technology curve: sufficiently adaptive to thwart or overcome the countermeasures placed in their path but commensurably modest in their goals (i.e., the amount of death and destruction inflicted) to ensure an operation’s success. Traditional terrorist organizations will continue to be content to kill in the ones and twos and, at most, the tens and twenties, rather than embark on grandiose operations involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that carry with them the potential to kill on a much larger scale. Indeed, the pattern of definitively identified state-sponsored terrorist acts supports this argument. Despite the enhanced capabilities and additional resources brought to bear in these types of attacks through the assistance provided by radical governments and renegade regimes, without exception the terrorists’ weapons have remained exclusively conventional (e.g., not involving chemical, biological, or nuclear agents) and have mostly conformed to long-established patterns of previous terrorist operations. In this respect, rather than attacking a particularly well-protected target set or attempting high-risk/potentially high-payoff operations, terrorists will merely search out and exploit hitherto unidentified vulnerabilities in their more traditional target sets and simply adjust their plan of attack and tactical preferences accordingly. This conclusion suggests that it will be difficult to deter terrorists completely, as any security hurdles placed in their path will not stop them from striking, but likely only displace the threat onto a softer target(s). Second, the sophistication of terrorist weapons will continue to be in their simplicity. Unlike military ordnance, such as plastic explosives, for example, the materials used in homemade bombs are both readily and commercially available: thus, they are perfectly legal to possess until actually concocted or assembled into a bomb. These ordinary materials are difficult for authorities to trace or for experts to obtain a “signature” from. For example, the type of explosive used in the 1988 in-flight bombing of Pan Am flight 103 was Semtex-H, a plastic explosive manufactured only in Czechoslovakia and sold during the Cold War primarily to other former-Warsaw Pact countries as well as to such well-known state sponsors of terrorism as Libya, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and North Korea. In comparison, the materials used in the World Trade Center bomb, as previously noted, had no such foreign government pedigree, were entirely legal to possess, and could be traced only to an ordinary New Jersey chemical supply company. Hence, for foreign governments seeking to commission terrorist attacks or use terrorists as surrogate warriors, growing expertise in the fabrication of homemade materials into devastatingly lethal devices carries distinct advantages. Above all, it may enable the state sponsor to avoid identification and thereby escape military retaliation or international sanction. Terrorists, accordingly, will continue to use what they know will work. Most will not likely feel driven to experimentation with unconventional weapons, believing that they can achieve their objectives using readily available and/or conventional weapons. Third, combinations of new types of terrorist entities with different motivations and greater access to WMD may surface to produce new and deadlier adversaries. Terrorism today increasingly reflects such a potentially lethal mixture: it is frequently perpetrated by amateurs; motivated by religious enmity, blind rage, or a mix of idiosyncratic motivations; and in some instances is deliberately exploited or manipulated by professional terrorists and their state sponsors. In this respect, the increasing availability of high-tech weapons from former-Warsaw Pact arsenals and the proliferation of fissile materials from the former Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc countries74 coupled with the relative ease with which some chemical or biological warfare agents

______74Serious concerns have been raised about the evidently considerable security deficiencies and lax inventory and other control procedures that afflict the Russian nuclear archipelago—both military as well as civilian. It has been demonstrated that these once-lavishly funded facilities and their well-paid employees have languished in the post–Cold War era because of the often dire economic difficulties faced by Russia and the former-Soviet republics today. Accordingly, these same facilities are anemically funded, poorly managed, and beset with morale problems, creating the possibility of an illicit traffic in nuclear materials and accompanying black market in such goods that could be exploited or tapped into by terrorists, insurgents, revolutionaries, or other violent subnational entities. Research Brief

The New Face of Insurgency

During the Cold War, state support or sponsorship of State- insurgencies was a common instrument of foreign policy supported 44 for Washington and Moscow. The United States, for exam- Diaspora- ple, used the Nicaraguan contras as part of its policy to supported 19 contain (and roll back) communism, while the Soviet Refugee- 21 Union backed communist guerillas in countries such as supported Angola and Greece to further its influence. Regional powers also recognized the utility of insurgencies to promote Other outside support 25 their interests. Although such state support for insurgency did not 01020304050 cease with the end of the Cold War, the face of insurgency Number of active insurgencies since 1991 has changed in the post–Cold War era. Combining a broad NOTE: Insurgencies often have multiple sources of support. survey of all major insurgencies active since 1991 with a more detailed, qualitative examination (case studies) of player, frequently supporting insurgencies in their home- several of the most important insurgent movements active lands. For example, diasporas have played an important in the last decade, Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce role in helping Tamil rebels in Sri Lanka, Kurdish guerillas Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan try to in Turkey, and the Palestine Liberation Organization. understand this change by assessing post–Cold War trends Diasporas may become more important in the future in external support for insurgent movements. They focus because, unlike states, they are more reliable in funding on three questions: (1) What are the external sources of and do not seek to exert control over a movement. support for insurgencies today? (2) What motivates the different sources of support? and (3) How do different Finally, other sources of nonstate support—refugees, sources of support contribute to insurgent movements? foreign guerilla movements, religious organizations, wealthy individuals, and even human rights groups—have STATE AND NONSTATE SOURCES PROVIDE all played important roles in fostering and sustaining SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCIES TODAY insurgent movements, with refugees playing the most sig- The bar chart, drawn from the survey of 74 insurgen- nificant one. Refugee flows and insurgencies often feed cies active since 1991, shows the range of external support each other: The discrimination, violence, and misery that for insurgencies. As the chart suggests, state support typically accompany civil wars often produce refugees remains an important source of strength for many insur- who, in turn, contribute to the original conflict. gencies in the post–Cold War world, playing a major role MOTIVATIONS VARY BY TYPE OF SUPPORT in initiating, sustaining, bringing to victory, or otherwise assisting 44 of the insurgencies in the survey. However, in Not surprisingly, motivations for support vary by type the absence of the superpower rivalry that dominated the of support. States are primarily motivated by geopolitics— Cold War era, most of the current state support is a local increasing regional influence, destabilizing neighborhood rather than a global phenomenon, provided by neighbor- rivals, or otherwise ensuring a loud voice in local affairs— ing states that border the country in which the insurgency rather than ideology, ethnic affinity, or religious sentiment. is occurring. In contrast to states, diasporas are largely motivated As the chart shows, diasporas—immigrant communi- by ethnic affinity. Indeed, the concept of homeland is ties established in foreign countries—are an emerging almost inherent to the idea of a diaspora. Communities abroad often feel a genuine sympathy or guilt for the However, nonstate forms of support are also impor- struggles of their brethren elsewhere, and insurgencies tant. Financial assistance is far and away the most com- actively play on this sympathy and guilt to secure support, mon form of assistance diasporas provide, but some dias- occasionally relying on coercion when support is not vol- poras have also provided diplomatic support. Members untarily offered. of the Tamil diaspora have acted as de facto political representatives of the Tamil Tigers. Finally, Hezbollah has Refugees are generally motivated by a powerful desire used the Lebanese Shi’a diaspora to gather intelligence to regain their homeland or to restore their nation’s influ- abroad, including information that has helped Hezbollah ence over a part of a territory. Refugees may also back conduct terrorist attacks on Israeli targets overseas. insurgents for protection from predatory governments in their host country, from rival groups, or from bandit Poor and lacking even basic resources, refugees can forces. When rebel movements control refugee camps, seldom offer arms or money, but they can provide safe coercion can often explain why refugees proffer their havens and direct military support (e.g., manpower), espe- support. cially in the aftermath of mass refugee waves. Although the Taliban relied on Pakistan for arms, material, and STATES PROVIDE KEY FORMS OF SUPPORT; other basic support, it was formed among displaced NONSTATE FORMS ARE ALSO IMPORTANT Afghans, particularly those who had enrolled as seminary To be successful, insurgent movements have a variety students in Pakistan. of requirements. These include material requirements, Beyond refugees, other nonstate supporters have such as money, safe havens, and arms, and human sometimes increased an insurgency’s military power, requirements, such as training, intelligence, and direct mil- financial position, or diplomatic influence. However, over- itary support (e.g., foreign forces). The figure below illus- all, such supporters have not had the same impact on trates the types of assistance given by various supporters. insurgencies as states, diasporas, and refugees. States are clearly the significant contributors, often providing fighters with arms, money, and material, as well as IMPLICATIONS FOR ANALYSTS providing a safe place to organize and train. States also The end of the Cold War has fundamentally changed provide various types of diplomatic assistance, including the role external actors play in insurgent conflicts. helping insurgents represent their cause in international Understanding insurgent struggles today requires recog- fora and with major powers. nizing the changing agendas and limited means of state sponsors, the possible increase in the role of diasporas, and the rise of other nonstate backers. This recognition Form of Support States Diasporas Refugees Other Non-state includes understanding that not all outside actors are Money equally important—that their impact varies according to the needs of the insurgent movement and the context of its Safe Haven struggle. It requires understanding that the traditional, Diplomatic Backing country-based focus in assessing insurgencies is no longer Arms valid, given, for example, that Hezbollah works with Training Lebanese Shi’a in the triple border area of Argentina, Intelligence Paraguay, and Brazil. And finally, it requires understanding the importance of passive support—that besides track- Direct Mil Support ing the flow of arms, money, volunteers, and other active Inspiration forms of support, analysts must also look at what is not Significant Limited Minor done in host countries that allows diasporas and other contribution contribution contribution interested outsiders to operate freely.

RAND research briefs summarize research that has been more fully documented elsewhere. This research brief describes work done for the National Security Research Division; it is documented in Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements by Daniel L. Byman et al., MR-1405- OTI, 2001, 138 pp., $16.00, ISBN: 0-8330-3052-3, available from RAND Distribution Services (Telephone: 310-451-7002; toll free 877-584-8642; FAX: 310-451-6915; or email: [email protected]). Abstracts of RAND documents may be viewed at www.rand.org. Publications are distributed to the trade by NBN. RAND® is a registered trademark. RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis; its publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of its research sponsors. R 1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, California 90407-2138 • Telephone 310-393-0411 • FAX 310-393-4818 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, Virginia 22202-5050 • Telephone 703-413-1100 • FAX 703-413-8111 201 North Craig Street, Suite 102, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213-1516 • Telephone 412-683-2300 • FAX 412-683-2800 RB-7409-OTI (2001) abroad often feel a genuine sympathy or guilt for the However, nonstate forms of support are also impor- struggles of their brethren elsewhere, and insurgencies tant. Financial assistance is far and away the most com- actively play on this sympathy and guilt to secure support, mon form of assistance diasporas provide, but some dias- occasionally relying on coercion when support is not vol- poras have also provided diplomatic support. Members untarily offered. of the Tamil diaspora have acted as de facto political representatives of the Tamil Tigers. Finally, Hezbollah has Refugees are generally motivated by a powerful desire used the Lebanese Shi’a diaspora to gather intelligence to regain their homeland or to restore their nation’s influ- abroad, including information that has helped Hezbollah ence over a part of a territory. Refugees may also back conduct terrorist attacks on Israeli targets overseas. insurgents for protection from predatory governments in their host country, from rival groups, or from bandit Poor and lacking even basic resources, refugees can forces. When rebel movements control refugee camps, seldom offer arms or money, but they can provide safe coercion can often explain why refugees proffer their havens and direct military support (e.g., manpower), espe- support. cially in the aftermath of mass refugee waves. Although the Taliban relied on Pakistan for arms, material, and STATES PROVIDE KEY FORMS OF SUPPORT; other basic support, it was formed among displaced NONSTATE FORMS ARE ALSO IMPORTANT Afghans, particularly those who had enrolled as seminary To be successful, insurgent movements have a variety students in Pakistan. of requirements. These include material requirements, Beyond refugees, other nonstate supporters have such as money, safe havens, and arms, and human sometimes increased an insurgency’s military power, requirements, such as training, intelligence, and direct mil- financial position, or diplomatic influence. However, over- itary support (e.g., foreign forces). The figure below illus- all, such supporters have not had the same impact on trates the types of assistance given by various supporters. insurgencies as states, diasporas, and refugees. States are clearly the significant contributors, often providing fighters with arms, money, and material, as well as IMPLICATIONS FOR ANALYSTS providing a safe place to organize and train. States also The end of the Cold War has fundamentally changed provide various types of diplomatic assistance, including the role external actors play in insurgent conflicts. helping insurgents represent their cause in international Understanding insurgent struggles today requires recog- fora and with major powers. nizing the changing agendas and limited means of state sponsors, the possible increase in the role of diasporas, and the rise of other nonstate backers. This recognition Form of Support States Diasporas Refugees Other Non-state includes understanding that not all outside actors are Money equally important—that their impact varies according to the needs of the insurgent movement and the context of its Safe Haven struggle. It requires understanding that the traditional, Diplomatic Backing country-based focus in assessing insurgencies is no longer Arms valid, given, for example, that Hezbollah works with Training Lebanese Shi’a in the triple border area of Argentina, Intelligence Paraguay, and Brazil. And finally, it requires understanding the importance of passive support—that besides track- Direct Mil Support ing the flow of arms, money, volunteers, and other active Inspiration forms of support, analysts must also look at what is not Significant Limited Minor done in host countries that allows diasporas and other contribution contribution contribution interested outsiders to operate freely.

Anthrax Attacks, Biological Terrorism and Preventive Responses

John Parachini

CT-186

November 2001

The RAND testimony series contains the statements of RAND staff members as prepared for delivery.

RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of its research sponsors. Published 2001 by RAND 1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 201 North Craig Street, Suite 102, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-1516 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact RAND Distribution Services: Telephone: 310-451-7002; Fax: 310-451-6915; or Email: [email protected] ANTHRAX ATTACKS, BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM AND PREVENTIVE RESPONSES

Testimony of John Parachini

Policy Analyst RAND Washington Office

Before the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information

November 6, 2001

The opinions and conclusions expressed in this written testimony are the author’s alone and should not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. Anthrax Attacks, Biological Terrorism and Preventive Responses

Statement of John Parachini Policy Analyst RAND Washington Office

Thank you, Madam Chair, for the privilege and opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information. Information about the quality of the anthrax used in the letter sent to Senator Daschle indicates a potentially significant paradigm shift in the scope and magnitude of the bioterrorism threat. My remarks will focus on the potential perpetrator of the recent anthrax attacks. Examining who is behind these attacks provides a current case study to review the threat of bioterrorism. In my opinion, bioterrorism includes any organization, even a state, or individual who seeks to terrorize, incapacitate or kill with disease and biological material. In conclusion, I will review some preventive measures that aim to diminish the proliferation of biological agents to states and terrorists.

The sophisticated quality of the Anthrax used in the letter sent to Senator Daschle suggests that the bioterrorism threat has reached a new level previously viewed by many analysts, myself included, as possible, but unlikely. At the moment, this new level of threat is manageable, but we must take into account the profound implications of this shift if we are to devise effective preventive and protective policies.

There are at least three possible explanations for the origins of the sophisticated Anthrax contained in the letter sent to Senator Daschle; all of them have heretofore been considered possible, but unlikely. First, these attacks could be the clandestine act of a state either rolling towards wider conflict or secretly inflicting harm because it believes it can do so without detection and attribution. Second, a state could have engaged a

1 terrorist group to conduct the attack or provided the material to a sub-national entity for its own purposes. Third, a terrorist group or individual could have produced this sophisticated quality of anthrax itself or received assistance from scientists willing to sell their expertise. All of these three explanations represent a break with the historical precedents.

The historical data set of biological weapons use by states or terrorists, covertly or overtly, is very limited. 1 Given our potential vulnerabilities, it is a small wonder that states and terrorists have not used disease more often. Understanding why the use of biological weapons has been so infrequent may constructively focus our examination of the current anthrax attacks on measures to reduce the possibility of other attacks in the future.

STATE PERPETRATED BIOTERRORISM

When it comes to the feasibility of using biological weapons, states are most likely to have the resources, technical capabilities, and organizational capacity to assemble the people, know-how, material, and equipment to produce such weapons and to be able to clandestinely deliver them to valued targets. Mustering the resources and capabilities to inflict a devastating blow with biological agents has proven to be a formidable task even for states.

The quality of the anthrax sent to the U.S. Senate reportedly has characteristics generally associated with state biological weapons programs. Clandestine use of a biological agent by a state against the United States has traditionally been viewed as highly unlikely. Fear of devastating retaliation is generally believed to deter states from conducting such attacks. Retaliation would potentially be devastating because some uses of some biological agents can serve as strategic weapons. For example, wide dispersal of

1 For an insightful discussion of the history of weapons of mass destruction and their use by states and terrorists see, David Rapoport, “Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse,” National Security Studies Quarterly, Vol. V, No. 3, (Summer).

2 anthrax that could be aerosolized or strategic distribution of an infectious agent such as smallpox or plague could produce significant casualties and greatly disrupt life in America. Conventional wisdom is that states might use a biological weapon like anthrax as a weapon, but only as a last resort.

The United States and the former Soviet Union dedicated considerable national defense resources to their biological weapons programs, and both countries encountered significant difficulties along the way. Iraq also dedicated considerable resources to its biological weapons program; although Iraq’s effort was more successful than most experts imagined possible, it still encountered a number of significant challenges. A state’s ability to command resources and organize them for certain priority scientific and industrial objectives presents the potential for the greatest threat of bioterrorism. Given advances in biological sciences and the plethora of information made public about biological weapons in the last five years, other countries may have learned how to produce Anthrax with sophisticated properties.

However, there are three circumstances when a state might clandestinely wage biological terrorism. First, a state struggling for its existence might be willing to use biological weapons clandestinely as a means to forestall or to prevent imminent defeat. There is no historical example of a state responding with a biological weapon in a moment of desperate struggle for its existence, but it is conceivable.

While the Taliban government of Afghanistan might be an example of a government in danger of being eliminated, the anthrax attacks started before the United States commenced military operations. Even the logic that a desperate government such as the Taliban or Iraq’s Saddam Hussein might lash out against the United States as a desperate move seems improbable. The best the clandestine state attacker could hope for would be to inflict a large number of casualties and to avoid discovery. A successful state biological weapons strike, clandestinely delivered against the United States, might cause many casualties, but it would not lead to the end of the American form of

3 government or ensure the conquest of American territory. Short of a barrage attack of ballistic missiles, the U.S.’s ability to reconstitute itself remains robust. Even a significant clandestine biological strike on a major city would not topple the system of government in the United States. Thus, the inherent limits of hiding a significant attack constrain the realm of the possible.

Second, if a state felt it could attack with biological weapons and be undetected, it might do so. In the twentieth century, there are only two significant examples of states using biological agents clandestinely except during times of war. For example, in the First World War, Germany sought to disrupt allied logistical capabilities by infecting horses with glanders.2 The other case involves Japanese use of biological agents during its occupation of China. Only during wartime have states conducted indiscriminate attacks with biological weapons. In the few instances, the attacked state did not have the ability to respond with devastating force. Given the long and powerful reach of modern states, it is hard to imagine a state risking the political and military consequences of discovery.

A third situation when a state might engage in biological terrorism would be if it attacked its own citizens. In the 1980s, both the Bulgarian and the South African governments used biological materials to kill domestic political opponents. South Africa had a significant clandestine chemical and biological program that supported a major effort against regime opponents. Little is known about the Bulgarian program, but government operatives are believed to have assassinated a Bulgarian dissident in London with the toxin ricin, which they received from the Soviet KGB. Both of these cases entailed discriminate uses of biological weapons. Aside from state assassinations of regime opponents, states have been extremely reluctant to use biological weapons.

2 Mark Wheelis, “Biological sabotage in World War I,” in Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, Edited by Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Moon, SIPRI Chemical & Biological Warfare Studies No. 18, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press), pp. 35-61.

4 If the current anthrax attacks are the work of a state, this suggests that states might use biological weapons for non-strategic purposes. That is, the current anthrax attacks could be the work of a state that wished to inflict revenge on the United States. The state would not seek to conquer the territory of the United States or end the American system of government. The Iraqi government is one that comes readily to mind as a state that might have this motive. The United States defeated Iraq in military battle and killed many of its military personnel and civilians. But this is a theoretical explanation. Yet, at the moment, there is no evidence positively linking Iraq to the spate of attacks.

Other than the quality of the anthrax sent to the U.S. Senate and inferences one might draw about grievances other states hold against the United States, there is no evidence at the moment that a state is the perpetrator. It is imaginable that we are at the start of a war and another state is clandestinely attacking with anthrax as a diversion. Similarly, it is imaginable that the state perpetrating these attacks is willing to take great risks. And finally, it is imaginable, that a state is attacking the United States with anthrax as a trial to see how we respond. All of these scenarios are possible, but there is no evidence supporting them at the moment. Until additional evidence becomes available, state conduct of these attacks is highly unlikely.

While states can amass the resources and capabilities to wage biological terrorism, considerable disincentives keep them from doing so. A state that undertakes a clandestine attack using biological weapons risks the prospect of the attack being traced back to them. The response to an attack with biological weapons could be devastating, which gives states reason for caution.

STATE ASSISTANCE TO SUB-NATIONAL ENTITY

An alternative possibility is that a state has provided this sophisticated anthrax to a terrorist group. The terrorist group is either serving as a surrogate for a state or a state is transferring biological weapons to a terrorist group for its own purposes. Both

5 possibilities have heretofore been viewed as unlikely.

There are no widely agreed upon historical examples in the open source literature of states providing sub-national groups with biological weapons for overt or covert use. Money, arms, logistical support, training, and even training on how to operate in a chemically contaminated environment are all forms of assistance states have provided to terrorists. But historically they have not crossed the threshold and provided biological weapons materials to insurgency groups or terrorist organizations. State sponsors have a great incentive to control the activities of the groups they support, because they fear that retaliation may be directed against them if they are connected to a group that used biological weapons. Even if states sought to perpetrate biological attacks for their own purposes, they would probably not trust such an operation to groups or individuals that they do not completely control.

Some argue that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq is the type of state that might cross this threshold.3 In the case of Iraq, the leadership would probably make the decision to undertake such a risky operation. In most countries in an adversary relationship with the U.S. what is more likely than a conscious decision by a country’s command authority is that an unauthorized faction within a state might take it upon itself to use a sub-national group to do its dirty work. The alleged involvement of the Iranian government security services in the attack on American military personnel in Khobar Towers seems to be an example of this type of involvement. Thus, while the probability of states using sub- national groups or individuals to perpetrate a biological warfare attack on its behalf seems low, it is not zero.

Meetings between some of the September 11th terrorists and Iraqi intelligence

3 Laurie Myroie, Study of Revenge: Saddam Hussein’s Unfinished War against America, (Washington, DC: The AEI Press), 2000. See also Laurie Myroie, “The Iraqi Connection”, The Wall Street Journal, September 13, 2001, p. A20. For an alternative view of Iraqi involvement in the 1993 bombing see John Parachini, “The World Trade Center Bombers (1993),” in Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2000).

6 operatives raise the questions whether Iraq or a faction within the Iraqi intelligence service is involved. Thus far, there is no publicly available evidence linking Iraq to the September 11th terrorists or linking the September 11th terrorists to the anthrax attacks. However, the contact between the Iraqis and the terrorists is suspicious. Ongoing U.S. enforcement of no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq may cause Saddam Hussein to view his state in perpetual war with America. Given the dictatorial fashion in which Hussein rules the country, it is hard to imagine a rogue element within the Iraqi government acting without his knowledge and approval. Furthermore, the enforcement of the no-fly zones does not present an imminent challenge to the survival of the Iraqi regime. Thus, until new evidence becomes available, the contacts and the timing of the anthrax attacks remain suspicious, but provide no smoking gun.

SUB-NATIONAL ENTITY PERPETRATES BIOTERRORISM

Sub-national groups or individuals can develop or acquire their own biological weapons capabilities for clandestine use, but it is not easy. Terrorist groups and individuals historically have not employed biological weapons because of a combination of formidable barriers to acquisition and use and comparatively readily available alternatives and disincentives. Procurement of materials and recruitment of people with skills and know-how are formidable barriers. Even if some of the materials and production equipment are procurable for legitimate scientific or industrial purposes, handling virulent biological materials and fashioning them into weapons capable of producing mass casualties is beyond the reach of most sub-national groups or individuals.

In the last twenty years, there are only two significant cases of sub-national groups using or attempting to use biological weapons and a few cases where groups or individuals made efforts to acquire biological materials. In 1984, the Rajneeshees, a religious cult group located in Oregon, sought to win a local election by running its own candidates and intentionally poisoning local townspeople who they expected would vote

7 against them.4 Using their medical clinics, cult members ordered a variety of bacterial cultures from the American Type Culture Collection located in Maryland. They contaminated ten salad bars with a strain of salmonella, sickening at least 751 people. They used commercially available biological agents to incapacitate people clandestinely, because it was important for them to avoid attracting attention. The intentional character of the outbreak was not recognized for over a year, when members of the cult revealed details about the attacks to authorities in exchange for lighter sentences stemming from other charges.

The other case occurred more than ten years later, when another religious cult, a Japanese group called the Aum Shinrikyo, sought to develop and deliver biological agents against a number of targets. The Aum’s unsuccessful attempts at biological terrorism came to light after it released liquid sarin on the Tokyo subway.

The cult’s leader Shoko Asahara wrote songs about sarin. In addition to this pernicious obsession, Aum leaders had delusions of grandeur that far exceeded reality. They imagined a world they sought to create that was not constrained by the world in which they lived. To bring this imaginary world into being, they sought weapons they believed might trigger an apocalypse from which they would emerge as a dominant power. Aum leaders may have deluded themselves into thinking that their organization was a government and military-in-waiting, and hence, seeking to acquire weapons it believed states possessed seemed legitimate. Instead of seeking lower-grade pathogens, Aum sought pathogens that are generally associated with military biological weapons programs. Aum exhibited this unique combination of obsession, delusions of grandeur, and belief in an apocalypse they could launch that would enable them to reign like leaders of a state.

4 W. Seth Carus, “The Rajneeshees (1984),” pp. 115-137, in Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2000). See also, Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, William Broad, Germs: Biological Weapons and America’s Secret War, (New York, NY: Simon & Shuster), pp. 15-33.

8 In the years since the attack, fears that the Aum attempt to acquire and use biological weapons heralded a new age in such terrorism have been a constant refrain. Yet so much about the Aum is so unique that it is hard to imagine it ever being repeated. Japanese law enforcement authorities tend to make arrests only when they have an ironclad case against the perpetrator of a crime. There were several incidents prior to the March 1995 sarin attack on the Tokyo subway that in retrospect should have raised suspicion. Additionally, Japanese legal provisions protecting religious organizations from intense government scrutiny inhibited authorities from intervening until long after the group committed a number of heinous acts. The Aum leadership presents another anomaly. Shoko Asahara, Aum’s leader, was a controlling leader with an obsession with poisons. He wrote songs in praise of sarin. He also greatly admired another mass poisoner, Adolph Hitler. The leadership mindset of Aum explains a great deal about the group’s use of unconventional weapons. They were fascinated by the means to catalyzing an apocalypse more than they were fascinated by killing large numbers of people. In contrast, Timothy McVeigh, Ramzi Yousef, and Mohammed Atta were determined to kill large numbers of people and the means to do so was merely instrumental.

Two aspects of the Aum biological weapons experience deserve special note when considering the threat of biological terrorism. Aum’s global effort to procure biological materials for its nefarious purposes deserves much greater examination. While there is no open source information indicating that the Aum obtained any radiological, biological, or chemical materials in Russia, it certainly tried. That the group tried and succeeded in getting meetings with Russian scientists, some of whom had weapons expertise, is troubling.

Aum members also traveled to Zaire believing they could obtain samples of the Ebola virus. There is no evidence to indicate that they were successful in their venture. What may have inspired their trip was a newspaper account of a Japanese tourist who developed a hemorrhagic fever after returning from a game safari in Africa. In fact,

9 during period when Aum members traveled to Zaire there were no reported outbreaks of Ebola. Aum was trying to obtain biological material from infected people or corpses for weapons purposes. This highlights a very different source of material than the weapons laboratories of the former Soviet Union. It is probably easier to monitor scientific institutes that were once or are currently affiliated with weapons programs than it is to monitor the sites of deadly disease outbreaks that occur around the globe. Some thought and attention needs to be given to how natural disease outbreaks might be exploited for pernicious purposes.

BIOTERRORISM IN CONTEXT

While recent reports do suggest that we need to adjust our perspective of the bioterrorism threat, we should not lose sight of the scope and magnitude of the tragic events on September 11th and a number of other mass casualty terrorist attacks in the 1990s that involved conventional explosives, not nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. Amidst the evolving bioterrorism threat it is difficult to keep perspective on the relative dangers different terrorist attacks pose. Critical to our thwarting the designs of the perpetrator of the anthrax attacks and succeeding in the campaign of civilized society against barbarism is putting dangers into perspective and calibrating our actions accordingly.

In these uncertain times, it is important to maintain some perspective of the relative dangers. Despite the recent anthrax attacks, the history of biological warfare, terrorism, and crime is still much less deadly than that of the history with conventional explosives. While history is not a perfect guide to the future, it does provide a context for our thinking.

Since the future is impossible to see clearly, we must anticipate a number of possible scenarios. We need to take account of history and hedge against imponderables of the future. Although the prospects of a major biological terrorist attack are remote,

10 small-scale biological attacks are much more likely. In this light, the challenge before the government is how to put relative dangers in proper perspective and yet still hedge against future eventualities that are unlikely, but possible.

WHY HAS BW USE BEEN SO INFREQUENT?

The use of disease and biological material as a weapon is not a new method of warfare. What is surprising is how infrequently it is has been used. Biological agents may appeal to the new terrorist groups because they affect people indiscriminately and unnoticed, thereby sowing panic. A pattern is emerging that terrorists who perpetrate mass and indiscriminate attacks do not claim responsibility.5 In contrast to the turgid manifestos issued by terrorists in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, recent mass casualty terrorists have not claimed responsibility until they were imprisoned. Biological agents enable terrorists to preserve their anonymity because of their delayed impact and can be confused with natural disease outbreaks. Instead of the immediate gratification of seeing an explosion or the glory of claiming credit for disrupting society, the biological weapons terrorist may derive satisfaction from seeing society’s panicked response to their actions. If this is the case, this is a new motive for the mass casualty terrorist.

There are a number of countervailing disincentives for states and terrorists to use biological weapons, which help explain why their use is so infrequent. The technical and operational challenges biological weapons pose are considerable. Acquiring the material, skills of production, knowledge of weaponization, and successfully delivering the weapon, to the target is difficult. In cases where the populations of the terrorist supporters and adversaries are mixed, biological weapons risk inadvertently hitting the same people for whom terrorists claim to fight. Terrorists may also hesitate in using biological weapons specifically because breaking the taboo on their use may evoke considerable retaliation. The use of disease as a weapon is widely recognized in most

5 Bruce Hoffman, “Why Terrorists Don’t Claim Credit,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 9, 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 1-6.

11 cultures as a means of killing that is beyond the bounds of a civilized society.

From a psychological perspective, terrorists may be drawn to explosives as arsonists are drawn to fire. The immediate gratification of explosives and the thrill of the blast may meet a psychological need of terrorists that the delayed effects of biological weapons do not. Causing slow death of others may not offer the same psychic thrill achieved by killing with firearms or explosives.

Perhaps the greatest alternative to using biological weapons is that terrorists can inflict (and have inflicted) many more fatalities and casualties with conventional explosives than with unconventional weapons. Biological weapons present technical and operational challenges that determined killers may not have the patience to overcome or they may simply concentrate their efforts on more readily available alternatives.

Putting aside the spectacular quality of the Aum subway attack with liquid sarin, far fewer people died or were injured than in similarly spectacular attacks with explosives. In comparison to the bombings of the Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City, the Khobar Towers military barracks in Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, fewer people died as a result of the sarin release. In comparison with the recent attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the Tokyo subway incident, though clearly tragic, was simply an event of much smaller scale.

But even if the possibility of a catastrophic biological weapons attack is remote, government has a responsibility to do all that it can to prevent, protect against, and respond to events that seem unlikely. The challenge is to determine how much to prepare for a low-probability, albeit potentially catastrophic attack, while at the same time, guarding against not focusing enough on more probable events with significant, but not necessarily catastrophic, consequences.

12 NONPROLIFERATION MEASURES TO ADDRESS BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM

The recent anthrax attacks highlight a number of improvements the United States needs to undertake in order to better protect its citizenry against bioterrorism. The positive side of these frightening attacks is that they are forcing an upgrade of our capabilities to handle bioterrorism. I will focus most of my remarks on some long-term preventive tools. In the fight against bioterrorism, a full set of tools will be needed because there are no silver bullet solutions to the threat. The tools I discuss below complement others in the fields of intelligence, law enforcement, counter-proliferation, medical diagnostics and forensics, and disease surveillance, to name just a few.

Preventive nonproliferation measures can form the basis for a frontline of defense against attacks with biological weapons. After attack response is important because it can help limit the loss of life, destruction of property and political implications of an attack. However, after attack measures are not a substitute for preventive and preemptive measures. Completely eliminating the possibility of an attack with unconventional weapons is probably not possible, but reducing the opportunity for states and sub-national groups to acquired unconventional weapons is possible.

The United States rejected the text resulting from several years of negotiations toward a draft protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) as unsatisfactory for the task: preventing the proliferation of biological weapons.6 The challenge for the Bush administration is to reinforce the normative prohibition against biological inscribed in the BWC and at the same time propose measures that genuinely strike at the long-term problem of biological weapons proliferation to states and sub-national entities.

States trying to strengthen the BWC will meet this month, and the Bush administration will need to describe measures that the international community should

6 Statement by Ambassador Donald Mahley to the Ad Hoc Group of Biological Weapons Convention State Parties, July 25, 2001.

13 consider to counter the biological weapons proliferation problem. Given the events in the United States, the timing of a constructive international discussion could not be better.

There are three tools the international community should consider that address the problem of biological weapons that could form the basis for a new international approach to biological weapons proliferation. One portion of the rejected draft protocol that warrants consideration outside the context of the negotiations is the guidance on investigations of unusual outbreaks of disease.7 Early detection of unusual outbreaks of disease, rapid communication of a diagnosis, communication of the diagnosis to public health authorities and delivery of appropriate antibiotics, can save many lives and turn a potentially large outbreak into a manageable incident.8

These investigations do not necessarily require a new international agency like a Biological Weapons Convention Organization (BWCO). The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty provides one example of how a grouping of states could investigate agreed upon problems such as suspicious outbreaks. The findings of experts from regional groupings of states could be reported to the UN Security Council, the World Health Organization, an existing multilateral security organization in the region of the outbreak, and the individual states in the region of the outbreak.

Another option is described in a UN General Assembly mandate providing the UN Secretary General with powers to investigate alleged use of chemical and biological weapons. This provision permits the UN Secretary General to dispatch a group of qualified experts to conduct an investigation and report back to the General Secretariat or the UN Security Council. This model was outlined in the UN General Assembly under its resolution 42/37C in November 1988.9 In October 1989 a group of experts provided a

7 Michael Moodie, “The BWC Protocol: A Critique,” CBACI Special Report 1, June 2001, pp. 28-29. 8 Jonathan B. Tucker, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Relation Agencies of the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Improving Infections Disease Surveillance to Combat Bioterrorism and Natural Emerging Infections, October 3, 2001, (http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/testtuck.htm) (Viewed on October 9, 2001). 9 Draft Report of the World Health Organization on Chemical and Biological Weapons.

14 report on how investigations of alleged use might be conducted. Even if these investigations do not discover clandestine weapons programs, they will make a contribution to international public health. Enhanced monitoring of global disease outbreaks provides both a public health benefit and a security benefit. Thus, for every dollar or yen invested, there is a clear public health benefit and a potential security benefit.

A new global effort must be made to stop the proliferation of dangerous pathogens to irresponsible states, organization and individuals. There are almost 100 culture collections in the United States and more than 450 collections around the world. The U.S. improved its system in 1995 after an individual with ties to anti-government groups fraudulently sought disease cultures from a culture collection, but it still may require further improvements.10 A national baseline of where dangerous pathogens are currently located needs to be established. Additionally, a national registry should be established that lists all the scientists who are working with such pathogens. It is frightening to note what little regulation other countries have governing the transfer, storage, and use of dangerous pathogens.

The international community must strive to strike a balance between pathogen commerce for legitimate commercial and scientific purposes and preventing the transfer of deadly materials to people who will use them as weapons. The combination of national export controls and the Australia Group coordination is simply not sufficient for regulating commerce in pathogen samples. Many countries with culture collection do not participate in the Australia Group. Similarly, national laws governing exports of biological materials vary tremendous from country to country, and not all of them meet model international standards. New standards that are more universal in character and more appropriate to the commodity in question are needed.

10 Jessica Eve Stern, “Larry Wayne Harris,” in Jonathan B. Tucker (ed.), Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2000)

15 Finally, the current international legal regime system is inadequate for the current crisis in part because it focuses on the activities of states and not sub-national groups. While the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) does require each state party to pass and to implement national legislation penalizing individuals and companies that violate the provisions that apply to the state, many countries remain in technical violation of this requirement. Less than half of the CWC state parties have drafted implementing legislation, which is a troubling example of technical non-compliance.11 Additionally, among the countries that have enacted legislation, the issue of penal legislation has been inadequately addressed. The international community must urge CWC state parties to pass the required domestic legislation. This is one of those small, but important aspects of treaty implementation that the international community has not adequately addressed in an era when there is more attention paid to negotiations.

The Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation has proposed an international accord criminalizing possession, transfer and use of chemical and biological weapons by individuals. In essence, this draft convention provides the international legal framework to prosecute anyone, from the terrorist to the head of state, who uses chemical or biological weapons. The initiative seeks to fill a gap in existing international legal framework.

As the international community considers this valuable stopgap measure it also needs to consider how to ensure effective implementation. National governments need to provide adequate financial and law enforcement resources to make this convention meaningful. More treaties need to be complemented by the law enforcement capabilities sufficient to apprehend chemical and biological weapons terrorists and the political will to prosecute them to the fullest extent. Far too often the international community and national government bless unfunded mandates and expect results.

11 Barry Kellman, “National Legislation to Implement Legal Assistance and Cooperation, International Symposium: Cooperation and Legal Assistance for the Effective Implementation of International Agreements, The Hague, Netherlands, February, 2001. See also, Barry Kellman, “WMD Proliferation: An International Crime? The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 8, no. 2, Summer 2001.

CONCLUSION

The recent anthrax attacks represent a fundamental shift in the nature of the biological terrorism threat. Fortunately, the scope and magnitude of this shift is far less devastating than the events of September 11th. As we face this new phase of biological weapons terrorism, it is important to maintain perspective even though the ability of the perpetrator of the anthrax attacks to terrorize the country is distressing. Fortunately, there have been comparatively few casualties. These attacks should serve to spur government action on a number of fronts to strengthen our national ability to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons, deny and dissuade states and sub-national groups from using them, and develop rapid means to detect an attack and track down the perpetrator should preemptive and preventive measures fail.

17 Deny Victory to Anthrax Terrorists

By John Parachini

This opinion article was originally published in the International Herald Tribune on October 17, 2001.

WASHINGTON -- Are the anthrax attacks in America the work of Osama bin Laden's terrorist network? Reports that some of the suicide hijackers showed an interest in crop- duster aircraft make anthrax cases in Florida, New York, Nevada and Washington look very suspicious.

The terrorists responsible for the horrific attacks on Sept. 11 turned a comparatively ordinary vehicle of transportation into a weapon that produced mass casualties. Can the same be done with anthrax?

Terrorist groups or individuals can acquire and deliver anthrax, but it is not easy. The small-scale attacks in the United States so far illustrate the difficulty of using this deadly disease as an effective weapon. One person has died from exposure, but only a few others have shown symptoms or have been exposed, and they all are expected to recover. The capabilities required to inflict a massive attack are difficult for states with considerable resources, let alone a terrorist group that must operate in the shadows. The Japanese cult group that released deadly liquid nerve agent on the Tokyo subway in 1995 had resources equal to or greater than bin Laden's, but it failed in all its attempts to use biological weapons to harm large numbers of people. Why use deadly diseases when truck bombs or hijacked passenger airliners are easier to get and use? The anthrax terrorists, whoever they are, will succeed if people allow them to. By keeping in mind the modest scope of the anthrax attacks and not overreacting, we deny the perpetrators of these attacks their objective of terrorizing us into doing what they want us to do. These anthrax cases do, however, highlight some areas for improvement in America's response that can help reduce fear and anxiety, thereby denying the terrorists their objective. First, there is need to improve the speed and accuracy of identifying the presence of dangerous pathogens and determining if people have been exposed. Two or three days is simply too long. The wait only adds to public distress. Second, hoaxes and copycat attacks must be sharply reduced and the perpetrators severely punished. Hoaxes slow and divert the efforts of authorities to save the lives of real victims. When are apprehended, they should be subject to severe penalties that are widely announced to deter others from doing the same.

Finally, a new global effort must be made to stop the proliferation of dangerous pathogens to irresponsible states or individuals. The United States has recently improved its system for regulating commerce in dangerous pathogens within its borders, but similar constraints are largely absent in other countries.

Surely there is a workable balance between pathogen commerce for legitimate commercial and scientific purposes and safeguarding against the transfer of these deadly materials to people who will use them as weapons. The U.S. government has a responsibility to help the public put emerging dangers in perspective. The challenge is accurately assessing the relative dangers when panic encroaches on good judgment. Authorities at the federal, state and local levels have thus far done a good job of managing these attacks, but public forgiveness for imperfections in the response will not last. Genuine improvements in handling biological attacks are needed. At present there is no evidence of complicity between the Sept. 11 attackers and the anthrax cases. But even if a connection develops, the anthrax attacks thus far pose only a modest risk. Greatly reducing the health and terror impact of the attacks is clearly within our grasp.

The writer is a policy analyst in the Washington office of the RAND Corporation. He contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune. T E S T I M O N Y

Terrorism, Infrastructure Protection, and the U.S. Food and Agricultural Sector

Peter Chalk

CT-184

October 2001

The RAND testimony series contains the statements of RAND staff members as prepared for delivery.

TERRORISM, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, AND THE U.S. FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

Testimony of Dr. Peter Chalk

Policy Analyst, RAND Washington Office

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring and the District of Columbia, U.S. Senate

October 10, 2001

The opinions and conclusions expressed in this written testimony are the author’s alone and should not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research.

TERRORISM, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, AND THE U.S. FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

Statement by Dr. Peter Chalk,* Policy Analyst, RAND Washington Office

INTRODUCTION

Thank you Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government, Management, Restructuring and the District of Colombia the opportunity to testify on this important subject. Over the past decade, many states, particularly in North America and Western Europe, have made substantial investments in improving their ability to detect, prevent and respond to terrorist threats and incidents. This has fed into an increasingly well-protected public infrastructure throughout much of the developed world where, at a minimum, effectively developed vulnerability-threat analyses have been used to maximize both anti-terrorist contingencies and consequence management modalities. This investment in preparedness, training and response has helped with the development of viable incident command structures that now span the ambit of potential terrorist attacks,

* This testimony is based on the author’s cumulative knowledge of terrorism and threats to the US food supply. No Federal government grants or monies were used to prepare this written testimony. The opinions and conclusions expressed both in this testimony and the published work from which it is derived are entirely the author’s own and should not be interpreted as representing those of RAND of any of the sponsors of its research.

1 from conventional bombings to more “exotic” biological, chemical, radiological and nuclear incidents. Agriculture is one area that has received very little attention in this regard, however. Indeed, in terms of accurate threat assessments, response structures and preparedness initiatives, the sector continues to exist as a glaring exception to the wide-ranging emphasis that has been given to critical infrastructure protection in this country. This testimony aims to expand the current debate on public infrastructure protection and bio-terrorism by assessing the vulnerabilities of agriculture and the food chain to a deliberate act of agro-terrorism. For the purposes of this testimony, agro- terrorism will be defined as the deliberate introduction of a disease agent, either against livestock or into the food chain, for purposes of undermining stability and/or generating fear. Depending on the disease agent and vector chosen, it is a tactic that can be used either to generate cause mass socio-economic disruption or as a form of direct human aggression.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE US AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SECTOR AND IS VULNERABILITY TO SABOTAGE

Agriculture and the general food industry remain absolutely critical to the social, economic and, arguably, political stability of the US, indirectly constituting roughly two percent of the country’s overall domestic gross domestic product (GDP). One in eight people work in some component of agriculture – more if food production is included – making the industry one of the US’ largest employers.1 Cattle and dairy farmers alone earn between US$50 and US$54 billion a year through meat and milk sales, while roughly US$50 billion is raised every year through agricultural exports. The share of produce sold overseas is more

1 Comments made by Noreen Hynes during the International Conference on Emerging Infectious Diseases (ICIED), Atlanta, Georgia, July 16-19 2000.

2 than double that of other US industries, which gives agriculture major importance in terms of the American balance of trade. 2 These figures represent only a fraction of the total value of agriculture to the country, as they do not take into account allied services and industries such as suppliers, transporters, distributors and restaurant chains.3 The down stream effect of any deliberate act of sabotage/destruction to this highly valuable industry would be enormous, creating a tidal wave effect that would be felt by all these sectors, impacting, ultimately, on the ordinary citizen him/herself. Unfortunately, the agricultural and food industries remain highly vulnerable to deliberate (and accidental) disruption. Critical considerations in this regard include:

• The increased disease susceptibility of farm animals as a result of steroid programs and husbandry practices instituted to elevate the volume and quality of meat production as well as meet the specific requirements of potential vendors. These bio-technic treatments have increased the stress levels of exposed livestock and, in doing, have inadvertently served to lower their natural resistance to viral and bacterial infections.4 • The existence of a large number of agents that are both lethal and highly contagious to animals, many of which livestock are not routinely vaccinated against. At least 22 such diseases are known to exist. The bulk of these ailments are both environmentally hardy – being able to

2 Ellen Shell, “Could Mad Cow Disease Happen Here?” The Atlantic Monthly 282/3 (1998): 92; “Stockgrowers Warned of Terrorism Threat,” The Chieftain, August 19, 1999.

3 Terence Wilson et al., “A Review of Agroterrorism, Biological Crimes and Biological Warfare Targeting Animal Agriculture,” paper supplied to the author, 22.

4 Author interview with Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) officials, Washington D.C., July 1999.

3 exist for long periods of time in organic matter – and reasonably easy to acquire and/or produce.5 • The ease and rapidity by which infectious animal diseases are able to spread, reflecting the intensive and concentrated nature farming practices in the US. Most dairies in the country can be expected to contain at least 1,500 lactating cows at any one time, with some of the largest facilities housing as many as 5,000 to 10,000 animals. An infectious outbreak at one of these facilities would be extremely difficult to contain and could necessitate the wholesale destruction of all the animals. Models developed by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) suggest that a disease such as Foot and Mouth (FMD) could spread to as many as 25 states in as little as five days through the regulated movement of animals between farm and market.6 • The proliferation of food processors lacking sufficient security and safety preparedness measures. Several thousand facilities exist in the US, the bulk of which are characterized by lax internal quality control – typically only a fraction of the produce that originates from these

5 Principal among these include: • Foot and Mouth Disease • Classical Swine Fever Virus • African Swine Fever Virus • Rinderpest • Rift Valley Fever • Avian Influenza • Newcastle Disease • Bluetongue • Venezuelan Equine Encephalomyelitis Virus • Vesicular Stomatis • Lumpy Skin Disease

6 Author interview with US Department of Agriculture (USDA) officials, Washington D.C. and Riverdale, Maryland, 1999-2000. See also J. Ekboir, The Potential Impact of Foot and Mouth Disease in California: The Role and contribution of Animal Health Surveillance and Monitoring Services (Davis, CA: Agriculture Issues Center, 1999).

4 plants is actually subjected to end of line testing and screening – minimal bio-security and surveillance, inadequate product recall procedures and highly transient, unscreened workforces.7 These sites represent ideal locations for the deliberate introduction of bacteria and toxins such as salmonella, E. coli )157 and botulism. Moreover, because most processed food is disseminated to a wider “catchment” area in a relatively short period of time, a single case of contamination could have significant health ramifications well beyond the immediate source of introduction. • The increased production of genetically modified (GM) commodities. This particular development has served to exacerbate the potential threat of extremist violence being directed against both the food and agricultural industries. Problems in this regard have already occurred, with varying degrees of seriousness, throughout Western Europe, particularly in the UK and France.

IMPACT OF A MAJOR ATTACK AGAINST AGRICULTURE AND/OR THE FOOD CHAIN

The impact of a major agricultural/food-related disaster in the US would be enormous and could easily extend beyond the immediate agricultural community to affect other segments of society. It is possible to envision at least three major effects that might result.

Mass economic destabilization Perhaps one of the most immediate effects of a major act of biological agro-terrorism would be to create, mass economic destabilization, generating costs that could be expected to cross

7 Author interview with California Department of Health (CDHS) officials, Sacramento, August 2000.

5 at least three levels. First, there would be direct economic losses resulting from containment measures and the destruction of disease-ridden livestock. A study by the USDA has concluded, for instance, that if African Swine Fever (ASF) were ever to become entrenched in the US, the cost over a ten-year period would be $5.4 billion.8 Second, indirect multiplier effects would accrue both from compensation costs paid to farmers for the destruction of agricultural commodities and losses suffered by both directly and indirectly related industries. Over 1 billion GBP was paid in compensation to farmers affected by the recent FMD outbreak in the UK (claims for each farm were in the range of 116,000GBP); tourism receipts were also hit hard as a result of cancellations brought about by the quarantine of farms located in or near popular holiday destinations such as the Lake District.9 Finally, international costs in the form of protective trade embargoes imposed by major external trading partners would be manifest. Very much indicative of the potential scale of these losses was a blanket ban that was imposed on Taiwanese pork exports following a particularly devastating outbreak of FMD between March and July 1997. The embargo caused Taipei’s GDP by a full two percentage points almost overnight.10

8 See C. Renlemann and Spinelli, “An Economic Assessment of the Costs and Benefits of African Swine Fever Prevention,” Animal Health Insight (Spring/Summer 1994).

9 “Spring Returns to Rural Britain, But Not Tourists,” The Washington Post, March 16, 2001; “After Foot and Mouth,” The Economist, May 5th, 2001; “Farmers Paid 1Bn Pounds for Culled Animals,” The Daily Telegraph, June 30th, 2001.

10 Overall costs of the FMD outbreak ran to US$378.6 million during the four months. For further details see P.C. Yang, R.M. Chu, W.B. Chung and H.T. Sung, “Epidemiological Characteristics and Financial Costs of the 1997 Foot and Mouth Disease Epidemic in Taiwan,” Vet Rec 145/25 (1999).

6 Loss of Political Support and Confidence in Government A successful act of agro-terrorism would also serve to undermine confidence and support in government. Releasing contagious agents and contaminants against livestock or introducing them into the food chain would undoubtedly cause people to lose confidence in the safety of the food supply and could lead to questions over the effectiveness of existing contingency planning against weapons of mass destruction in general. Critics would also undoubtedly demand why the intelligence agencies failed to detect that an attack was imminent and why the agricultural sector was left exposed. The actual mechanics of dealing with an act of agro- terrorism may act as an additional trigger for public criticism. Mass eradication and disposal are likely to be particularly controversial and could quite easily elicit protest (and possibly violence) from animal rights and environmental groups. Containing a major disease outbreak would almost certainly necessitate the slaughter of hundreds of hundreds of thousands of animal. Euthanizing such volumes would be sure to generate widespread opposition from farmers, animal rights groups and possibly even the public (despite being a scientifically justifiable method of viral containment), particularly if culling operations involved the slaughter of susceptible, but non-disease showing livestock (fire breaker operations). The fact that the US has not experienced a major cattle or sheep outbreak in the era of public TV is especially important in this regard as it effectively means that no visual point of reference has been available to prepare the public at large for the consequences of containing such a catastrophe.11 Indeed, even countries that have been subjected to major agricultural disasters can be affected by such dynamics. The UK provides a case in point. The mass depopulation operations

11 Author interview with USDA and APHIS officials, Washington D.C. and Riverdale, Maryland, 1999-2000.

7 initiated to try and stem the 2001 FMD outbreak (many of which targeted seemingly health animals) engendered significant opposition from farmers, politicians (citing government over- reaction) and the public at large. 12 This, despite the fact that Britain had already lived through the enormity of the mad cow disaster in the early 1990s.

Social instability Beyond immediate economic and political impacts, bio- terrorist assaults against agriculture and/or the food chain have the potential to create mass panic, particularly if the catastrophe had a direct public health impact. The outbreak of a contagious zoonotic disease or a major food contamination scare would be most significant in this regard, especially in the event that human deaths actually occurred. Terrorists could use this to their advantage, allowing them to create a general atmosphere of fear and anxiety without actually having to carry out indiscriminate civilian-oriented attacks. The 1999 West Nile Virus outbreak in New York provides a partial insight into the type of mass panic that could be unleashed if a large-scale zoonotic epidemic were, in fact, to become entrenched in the US. The disease, which was previously unknown to America, quickly spread to humans, several of whom subsequently died as a result of massive heart and liver failure. An unprecedented public health scare ensued, the dimensions of which were further exacerbated by the epidemiological difficulty (at least initially) of definitively determining the pathogen’s type, source and transmission mode.13

12 Author interview with British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) correspondent, March 2001. See also “This Wretched Cult of Blood and Money,” The Times, May 23, 2001; “The Cruelty of This Cull,” The Sunday Times, May 20, 2001; and “Tactics Used on Half the Farms ‘Were Inefficient,’” The Daily Telegraph, May 22, 2001.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The US - more by luck than design - has not experienced a major agricultural or food-related disaster in recent memory. There has, as a result, been no real appreciation of either the consequences or threat potential of such an event taking place in this country. This has been reflected in the make up of the US agricultural emergency preparedness and response, which have yet to be given the resources necessary to develop into a truly integrated and comprehensive system that is capable of addressing mass, multi-focal contingencies. Equally, general bio-security and surveillance at many of the country's food processing and rendering plants remains woefully inadequate, with most also lacking effective and viable product recall/trace-back plans.

Specific weaknesses include:

• A lack of resources, particularly in relation to mitigating and containing large-scale disease outbreaks. • Insufficient personnel with training in foreign animal disease (FAD) recognition and treatment. • A declining diagnostician pool in general as a result of insufficient educational support for veterinary science. • An emergency management program that is essentially designed to deal with only one or two localized animal disease outbreaks at a time. • Inadequate forensic coordination between the agricultural and domestic criminal justice communities.

13 Comments made during a special panel on West Nile Virus during the International Conference on Emerging Infectious Diseases (ICEID), Atlanta, Georgia, July 2000.

9 • An emergency response program that relies on an unreliable passive disease reporting systems, and which is hampered by a lack of communication and trust between regulators and producers. • Insufficient food surveillance and inspections at processing and packing plants. • Inadequate response modalities to deal with food-borne diseases.

Measures can and, indeed, should be initiated to augment the effectiveness of the general agricultural/food response structure in the US. At least six policy recommendations can be made for the short and medium term. First, more investment should be made in human, physical and logistical infrastructure, especially with regard to FAD diagnostician training; regular preparedness and response exercises and programs; appropriate diagnostic facilities capable of supporting high level research into virulent foreign and exotic animal diseases; and integrated electronic communication systems between emergency management staff and field response personnel. Second, the overall veterinary science curriculum should be reformed, with a greater emphasis on large-scale animal husbandry and foreign/exotic disease recognition and treatment. Third, more attention needs be given on how to involve accredited local/state veterinarians in the USDA’s overall emergency management system (which would fulfill an important “force multiplier” function). Fourth, better coordinated and more standardized links between the US agricultural, criminal justice and intelligence communities need to be fostered, especially in the context of epidemiological investigations to establish whether a disease outbreak was deliberately orchestrated or the result of a naturally occurring phenomenon.

10 Fifth, a viable national agricultural insurance scheme that can be used to compensate farmers in the event of a major agricultural disaster needs to be developed (something that would also help to heighten the effectiveness of the passive disease reporting system upon which the USDA relies). Sixth, more effective bio-security, surveillance and emergency response at food processors and packing plants should be instituted, especially those that exist at the smaller end of the scale. Immediate measures that could be usefully initiated include more effective site security, increased background checks on seasonal employees and the development of clearly documented, well-rehearsed product recall plans.

Over the longer-term, concrete moves should be encouraged to standardize and rationalize food and agricultural safety within the confines of a single Federal agency that has both budgetary and programmatic powers over a wide spectrum of functional domains and jurisdictions. Such a body would help to streamline the patchwork of largely uncoordinated food safety initiatives that currently exists in the US, many of which have sought to only individually enact specific preparedness and response objectives. In addition, it would contribute substantially to the development of a national emergency animal and food disease response plan that both reduces conflicts and eliminates unnecessary duplication of effort.

Thank you for your time. I will be happy to respond to any questions that you might have.

11 Executive Summary of RAND Issue Paper IP-218∗ BIOMETRICS: FACING UP TO TERRORISM by John D. Woodward, Jr.†

As the nation recovers from the attacks of September 11, 2001, we must rededicate our efforts to preventing any such terrorist acts in the future. While there is no easy, foolproof technical fix to counter terrorism, the use of biometric technologies might help make America a safer place. Biometrics refers to the use of a person’s physical characteristics or personal traits to identify, or verify the claimed identity, of that individual. Fingerprints, faces, voices, and handwritten signatures are all examples of characteristics that have been used to identify us in this way. Biometric- based systems provide automatic, nearly instantaneous identification of a person by converting the biometric, for example a fingerprint, into digital form and then comparing it against a computerized database. This RAND Issue Paper discusses how biometric technologies could be used to impede terrorism in three critical areas: 1. Controlling access to sensitive facilities at airports, 2. Preventing identity theft and fraud in the use of travel documents, and, 3. Identifying known or suspected terrorists with a proposed counterterrorist application known as FaceCheck.

CONTROLLING ACCESS Sensitive areas of the nation’s ports of entry, particularly airport facilities, need to be safeguarded so that only authorized personnel can gain access to them. Currently, badges and tokens, such as a key or pass card, are used to identify authorized personnel and to control access to these areas. The system assumes that whoever possesses the badge or the pass card is the person who should be granted access, when in reality, badges and tokens are easily forged, stolen or misplaced. Security can be enhanced, however, by combining something a person must physically possess with something a person must know (such as a password or a personal identification number, PIN). The system is still easily compromised, however, because given the profusion of PINs and passwords and our difficulty remembering them, PINs are often written down on the card itself or on a piece of paper stored in close proximity to the card. Access control to sensitive facilities can be further improved by using biometric-based identifiers. In other words, instead of identifying an individual based on something the person has (a badge), or something he knows (a password or a PIN), that person will be identified based on something he is. For example, instead of flashing a badge, airline staff with a need to access sensitive areas of airports could be required to present a biometric, for example, their iris, to a sensor. From a foot away and in a matter of seconds, this device captures the person’s iris

∗ RAND issue papers explore topics of interest to the policymaking community. Although issue papers are formally reviewed, authors have substantial latitude to express provocative views without doing full justice to other perspectives. The views and conclusions expressed in issue papers are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of RAND or its research sponsors. † John Woodward, a former CIA operations officer, is a RAND senior policy analyst. To obtain a copy of this Issue Paper, please contact RAND’s Washington External Affairs office by email at [email protected] or call 703.413.1100 extension 5431. image, converts it to a template, or computer readable representation of the iris, and searches a database containing the templates of authorized personnel for a match. A match confirms that the person seeking access to a particular area is in fact authorized to access that area.

PREVENTING IDENTITY THEFT AND FRAUD Like badges and tokens, passports, visas and boarding passes can also be forged, misplaced or stolen. By placing a biometric template on such a document, for example, putting a template of one’s fingerprint (or other biometric) on a bar code, chip or magnetic strip on the document, we make it more difficult for someone to adopt a false identity or create a forged travel document. To ensure security, the biometric should be encrypted and inserted into the document by a digital signature process using a trusted agent, such as a U.S. embassy’s visa section.

IDENTIFYING KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TERRORISTS WITH FACECHECK We need a better way to identify individuals, whom we know or suspect to be terrorists, when they attempt to enter the United States. Biometric facial recognition systems could be immediately deployed to help thwart future terrorist acts. Such a FaceCheck system can be implemented in a way that uses public safety resources effectively and efficiently and minimizes inconvenience and intrusiveness for the average traveler. In general, facial recognition systems use a camera to capture an image of a person’s face, as a digital photograph. This image is manipulated and reduced to a series of numbers that represent the image in relation to the “average” face. These numbers are often referred to as a template, which is instantly searched against a “watchlist,” or computerized database of suspected terrorists’ templates. This search seeks to answer the question, “Is this person in the watchlist database?” A computer-generated match or “hit” alerts the authorities to the presence of a potential threat. The technology, however, is not perfect, and it has yet to be fully vetted in real world, operational settings. Although human beings generally can perform facial recognition processes fairly well, these activities are still very challenging for technological systems. Unless the photograph is captured under very controlled conditions, the system may have difficulty identifying the individual or even detecting his face in the photograph. The system works best when environmental factors such as camera angle, lighting, facial expression and others, are controlled to the maximum extent possible. If a person (including a terrorist) is coming to the United States from overseas, he or she likely passes through an immigration checkpoint at the port of entry. From the perspective of counterterrorism, this checkpoint is a chokepoint where the would-be terrorist is most vulnerable. This is the first and likely only place in the U.S. where he will be closely scrutinized by trained federal officials. Here is how FaceCheck can make the checkpoint a more formidable bastion. (See Figure 1 on the next page.) An individual processing through an immigration checkpoint at a port of entry should be subject to a FaceCheck whereby he or she would be required to pose for a photograph under completely controlled conditions. This way we minimize facial recognition’s technological imperfections, which derive in large measure from the system attempting to find a face in a crowd. The photograph would then be processed by the facial recognition system and run against a watchlist database of suspect terrorists. If the system indicates a match, this result would be confirmed by visual inspection by the authorities, and the person could be taken to a secondary interview for heightened scrutiny. Facial recognition systems do not necessarily have to be implemented to process every individual seeking to enter the United States. Rather, the authorities should use FaceCheck in a more strategic way. This would include using FaceCheck randomly; in targeted ways; and in conjunction with other information. Testers, or human guinea pigs, whose images have been entered into the watchlist database should be included in the immigration processing to rigorously evaluate the system—how well did FaceCheck do in identifying suspects? Moreover, while we do not have to use FaceCheck on all passengers entering the United States, we should consider setting up FaceCheck stations at ports of entry and have passengers pose for photographs as if we are using FaceCheck. In this way, we keep terrorists guessing as to where the systems are actually deployed or in use. We should also experiment with FaceCheck systems using closed circuit surveillance cameras to capture images clandestinely at certain ports of entry. In this way, we can learn how well such systems work in realistic operational environments and gain information to improve their technical capabilities. We also need to consider using FaceCheck for visa processing at our embassies and consulates overseas. We could easily require a visa applicant to submit to a photograph taken under controlled conditionsand then run a search against the watchlist database before issuing a visa. Dedicated, highly-trained terrorists may be able to defeat facial recognition systems, but at least we force terrorists to take additional steps that drain their resources and keep them on the defensive.

CONCLUSION There is no high tech silver bullet to solve the terrorism problem. But to the extent we can improve access control at sensitive facilities such as airports, reduce identity theft and immigration fraud, and identify known or suspected terrorists with FaceCheck, then we make terrorism more difficult in the future. Biometrics is one technology that can help us achieve the goal of a safer America.

Figure 1 - Countering Terrorism with FaceCheck Challenges and Choices for Crime-Fighting Technology Federal Support of State and Local Law Enforcement William Schwabe, Lois M. Davis, Brian A. Jackson

For a copy visit www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1349 or call 703.413.1100 extension 5431.

Executive Summary Under the American federal system most law is cast as state statutes and local ordinances; accordingly, most law enforcement is the responsibility of state and local agencies. Federal law and federal law enforcement come into play only where there is rationale for it, consistent with the Constitution. Within this framework, a clear role has been identified for federal support of state and local agencies. A major area of such support is technology-related with activities taking the following forms:

• Sponsoring research and development (R&D), • Testing and evaluating technology and developing performance standards for technology and its use, • Funding and otherwise assisting with acquisition of or access to technology, • Providing training in the use of technology and developing technology used in training, • Providing technology assistance by applying federal technology and expertise to specific problems, and • Providing information on technology and its use in law enforcement.

This report provides findings of a study of technology in use or needed by law enforcement agencies at the state and local level, for the purpose of informing federal policymakers as they consider technology- related support for these agencies. In addition, it seeks to characterize the obstacles that exist to technology adoption by law enforcement agencies and characterize the perceived impact of federal assistance programs intended to facilitate the process. The study findings are based on a nationwide Law Enforcement Technology Survey (LETS) and a similar Forensics Technology Survey (FTS) conducted in late spring and early summer 2000, interviews conducted throughout the year, focus groups conducted in autumn 2000, and review of an extensive, largely non-academic literature.

LESSONS FROM THE SURVEYS

Technological Lessons: Where Are We Now? One of the main goals of the RAND Law Enforcement Technology Survey was to identify what technologies were and were not available to law enforcement organizations around the country and to gauge their future technology needs. It was to obtain an answer to the question “Where are U.S. law enforcement departments now?” with respect to technology. Depending on how one frames this question, a macro-level answer could simply be a more comprehensive knowledge of the range of technologies that are and are not available to local police departments. The RAND surveys can provide such an answer. When asked about their current technology capacity, respondents identified a number of technologies that were not currently available and were not “unnecessary” (LETS, 22, 25-29). This resulted in a list of potentially needed technologies from the perspective of U.S. local law enforcement. The listing of the technologies, along with the percentage of local police departments lacking them, is II Challenges and Choices for Crime-Fighting Technology included in Table 1. The table is sorted in order of decreasing non-availability, down to a cutoff of 25 percent.1

When examining such a summary listing of unavailable technologies, it is important to place the survey responses in an appropriate context. Although the values included above are the percentages of law enforcement that indicated these technologies were both unavailable and not unnecessary, it is likely

Table 1 Technologies Not Available to Local Police

Not Available Not Available Technology Technology Detection and analysis of 79% Computers in patrol cars 58% cyberattacks Blister/nerve agent protective 79% Electronic listening 57% clothing Video conferencing 75% Night vision devices 57% equipment Kinetic energy projectiles 75% Vehicles-special purpose 45% Chemical agent detection 71% Crowd or riot control 44% Long-range video 69% Computer-based training 41% monitoring Stun devices/projectiles 68% Conference call equipment 36% Radioactive agent detection 66% Computer assisted dispatching 35% (CAD) Explosives detection 64% Integrated data bases 34% Polygraph equipment 64% Protective gloves, helmets, and 34% shields Fleeing vehicle interdiction 63% Audio-visual equipment to 30% equipment obtain evidence Concealed weapon detection 62% Training equipment 28% devices Bomb containment/ 60% disablement equipment SOURCE: LETS, 22, 25-29. Numbers are statistically adjusted percent of local departments

reporting technology is not available. that there is a significant barrier for a survey respondent (especially for a survey of this kind) to designate a technology as unnecessary.2 For example, it is the case that more than two-thirds of local police departments lack “necessary” radioactive agent detection equipment (Table 1). However, the degree of necessity of this technology might be appropriately calibrated by considering the net increase in public safety that might accrue from providing each of these departments a Geiger counter compared to providing training equipment to the 28 percent of respondents who lacked it (or upgrading the training equipment of the many respondents who indicated that theirs was insufficient). All technology acquisition decisions, whether they are made at a local or national level, are a calculus of trade-offs and it is important to remain cognizant that there are serious consequences of losing sight of that fact.

______1It should be borne in mind that because the surveys did not cover every current or potential law enforcement technology, this represents a limited slice of the technologies which are and are not available to local police departments. 2There is a legitimate personal and organizational interest not to refuse any resources that might improve the performance of the respondent’s organization even marginally. As a result, while it is unlikely that a circumspect observer would assert that each of the 57 percent of local departments that lack night vision capability truly “need” it, there is also a clear and reasonable rationale why many survey respondents indicated that they did. III Challenges and Choices for Crime-Fighting Technology

In addition to identifying technologies that are unavailable to state and local police organizations, the RAND surveys also asked for information on the age and quality of currently available technologies. By identifying their current technologies as either obsolete or “old but serviceable,” survey respondents also provided a list of technologies that may be candidates for replacement in the near-to-medium term. These responses are included in Table 2 in decreasing order of the fraction of departments characterizing them as “Obsolete” or “Old but Serviceable,” down to a cutoff of 25 percent (LETS, 22, 25-29). From the perspective of the policymaker, several things stand out from such a numerical summary of the survey results. Most striking is the fact that 18 percent—almost one in five local police departments—indicated that their administrative or accounting systems were obsolete; without such input from departments it would be difficult to see that such an “unglamorous” technology might indeed be a high priority for local police forces. Other entries on this table are less surprising. The appearance of computers and cellular telephones is not unexpected given the short product cycles and rapid obsolescence of those products. The appearance of ballistic-resistant armor (stab-resistant armor is not broadly available) on the list also holds a relevant lesson from the perspective of law enforcement technology policymaking. While bulletproof vests do “age” and become worn over time, studies have shown that the protective properties of the armor do not break down.3 As a result, the notion of an “obsolete” bulletproof vest is a complex one likely based more on the obvious importance of the technology (and its performance) to officers rather than the technology itself.

Table 2 Technologies in Need of Replacement by Local Police

Either Old but Obsolete Technology Obsolete Serviceable or Old Radio equipment 10% 46% 56% Training equipment 10% 35% 44% Administrative/accounting systems 18% 26% 44% Computers in workspaces 7% 34% 41% Audio-visual equipment to obtain evidence 12% 28% 40% Crowd or riot control 12% 25% 37% Protective gloves, helmets, and shields 9% 25% 34% Ballistic- and stab-resistant armor 8% 25% 33% Computer-based training 9% 20% 29% Integrated data bases 8% 22% 29% Conference call equipment 3% 24% 27% Vehicles—special purpose 4% 21% 25% Cellular telephones 2% 24% 25% SOURCE: LETS, 22, 25-29. Numbers are statistically adjusted percent of local departments reporting as indicated.

Conceptual Lessons: Where Do We Need to Go and How Do We Get There? These survey results are striking. There are large numbers of technologies that are unavailable to local police departments and many officers believe that the technology they have is aging and becoming obsolete. In an era when crime is becoming more and more technologically intensive, there are clearly serious technology needs in the law enforcement community. It is obvious that an important part of “where we need to go” as a nation in this area is to better outfit our law enforcement organizations with the technology they need to fight crime.

______3See “Old Armor Tests As Good As New,” http://www.nlectc.org/. IV Challenges and Choices for Crime-Fighting Technology

It is important, however, that consideration of these results does not stop at this level. Hasty examination of lists of “unavailable” or “aging” technologies can lead to the conclusion that the solution to the problem is to “just buy them what they need”; the assumption is made that laying out the situation “as it is now” implies only one course for how to get “where we need to go.” This simplifies discussion too far because, in reality, there are many ways to approach these problems that should be considered to ensure resources are not wasted and the nation gains the greatest benefit for its investments. Reading these results as a “shopping list,” for example, eliminates discussion of the important trade-offs that must be made among technologies, among what functionalities are truly “needed” by law enforcement at all levels, and the priority level of individual improvements. For example, a third of departments report that their workspace computers are “old but serviceable”; while making good computer technology available is important, the costs and benefits of upgrading all computers to “state of the art” must be weighed against the unavailable technologies above and also against other uses such as providing training to better use technologies that are already available, or performing R&D to generate the potential that superior technologies will be available in the future.

Barriers to Technology Adoption To address these many complex considerations in a coherent way, it is relevant to consider a general framework of the many obstacles that can get in the way of an organization, in this case a law enforcement organization, adopting new technology. These barriers impact whether organizations initially choose to adopt a new technology and, after they have chosen to do so, how effectively they put the technology to use. When considering the adoption of law enforcement technologies by local police, however, it is first important to point out that generalizing is difficult. There are significant differences among technologies that make it more or less likely that departments even want to adopt them; actual desire for a technology is a critical first “barrier” that must be passed before any more “practical barriers” matter. Rural departments, for example, were much more likely to indicate that they had no need for technologies used in crowd control. It is therefore irrelevant to discuss barriers inhibiting their adoption since pursuing undesired or unuseful technology is, by definition, counterproductive. For technologies that are desired by organizations, however, there are serious barriers to pursuing and utilizing them. For the broad classes of technologies included in the surveys, these barriers have been broken down into four classes:

• Costs-including both the procurement cost of a technology and the opportunity cost of that technology compared to other uses of resources. Includes implicit trade-offs and assessments of the benefits of new techniques or equipment. • Technology Risk-the risk that the technology will not perform as expected or fulfill the tasks desired of it. • Human Associated Risks-the risk that the members of the organization will not be able to adapt sufficiently to the new technology so it is not put to effective use or, in the extreme case, not utilized at all. • Unanticipated Potential Costs-the risk that new technology will have unintended consequences. In this context the primary unanticipated costs are in the area of liability risk or the risk of adverse public opinion associated with using a new technology.

In addition to asking survey respondents about the availability of technology, the RAND surveys also addressed these barriers to acquiring it. Of the reasons cited by respondents, cost routinely stood out as the primary obstacle to the adoption of new technologies. Such a result is not unexpected given that, at some price point, any technology becomes attractive for purchase and, until it reaches that level, cost does stand as an obvious initial obstacle to using the technology. If cost is a sufficient obstacle, none of the other barriers to adoption is relevant; if you don’t have the opportunity to adopt a technology because the cost is too high, how well you adopt it is not an issue. The fact that many respondents cited cost, however, likely also represents the important and difficult trade-offs that must V Challenges and Choices for Crime-Fighting Technology be made within police departments. Because of the labor intensity of their activities, technology acquisition must always compete with “placing more police on the street” or paying overtime to extend an investigator’s work on a pending case. In addition, because of the variety of ways police departments could allocate their funds, trade-offs among technologies are also likely to be very important. It is not just the cost of the technology that dictates its desirability but the perceived benefits that are associated with purchase. In this light it is not surprising that fewer large urban departments cited cost for some technologies that are particularly suited to solving the problems of an urban police force. But just as cost is clearly a barrier, other barriers to adoption are important as well. Departments are concerned about the technical risks associated with some technologies as expressed by their indicating that the “reliability/effectiveness” of the technology could be a barrier to acquisition. Smart guns stand out as such a technology where, if police departments are to adopt the technology, steps must be taken to develop it to the point where these concerns are satisfied. The human factors associated with technology adoption, as emphasized in concerns about training, training technology, and other sources of information are also clearly important for both law enforcement agencies and forensic science laboratories. The barrier that finding sufficient trained personnel poses to the effectiveness of forensic science laboratories stands as a troubling but important finding of this study. Currently, most law enforcement organizations’ technology adoption efforts are less affected by concerns of unanticipated effects like public opinion. Important exceptions exist to this trend, however, including stand off and direct electrical devices, once again emphasizing the differences that exist among technologies with respect to adoption barriers. Because of society’s interest in law enforcement adopting technologies and utilizing them effectively, crafting policies that reduce barriers to adoption is of clear interest. Approaches to address these barriers have focused on several areas: provision of technical information to reduce the uncertainties associated with new technology; R&D to reduce costs, broaden capabilities, and provide new technical options; directly providing technology or funds to purchase it; and training to address the human factors of technology adoption.

Sources of Technology-Related Support and Information To assess how these organizations were currently addressing these barriers to adoption, the RAND surveys asked about the sources of technology information and support which they regularly utilized. The most striking result in this line of questioning was the number of local departments that did not receive support from any source—on issues ranging from topics as broad as “technology testing and evaluation” to those as specific as “firearms tests.” On average, two-thirds of departments never received any technology support. Of those that had received technology-related support within the past year, the primary providers of that support were: a. In-house departments b. Local and state agencies c. Manufacturers and vendors. In-house departments and local and state agencies were especially important in terms of technology- related training received by local police. Between 46 and 58 percent of local police reported receiving training support from these three sources. Not surprisingly, in-house departments were the primary source of technology-related support for many of the categories listed. State agencies provided support for trace evidence analysis to half of the respondents and to 15–25 percent of respondents for a wide range of other types of support. Manufacturers or vendors provided support to 10–20 percent of respondents primarily in the areas of technology assistance, firearms tests, and technology testing and evaluation—in addition to support for training. Virtually all of the support for cybercrime investigations was provided either by in-house departments or local and state agencies. The majority of departments (64-83 percent) rely on trade VI Challenges and Choices for Crime-Fighting Technology magazines, colleagues, manufacturers, or word-of-mouth for information on law enforcement technology. About one out of five reported usually obtaining technology information from either Law Enforcement Online (LEO) or the National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Centers (NLECTCs). On specific technical topics, federal sources of advice and assistance were generally consulted by 2-6 percent of local departments. The relatively low apparent utilization of federal sources, both for technology support and information, is troubling from a policy perspective given that many sources utilized by police—including manufacturers, trade magazines, and Internet resources—have no incentive to provide impartial advice and many other sources are not in a position to provide either comprehensive or technically rigorous input. It is possible that these values reflect limited awareness of the programs or the limited capacity of the programs to provide support to many departments based on their current levels of budgetary and staff support.

Views on Federal Technology Assistance It is clear that federal programs designed to lower these barriers, whether through R&D, provision of technical information, support of training, or other activities are making some progress in making the technology adoption process easier for law enforcement organizations. Considering the views expressed by respondents who had received any of a broad range of federal technology assistance, a majority of departments and crime labs always believed that the aid had been at least “somewhat helpful.” However, many fewer of the respondents (often a small minority) indicated that the programs were either “very helpful” or “essential.” As a result, while the broadly positive views of federal support programs on the part of those departments that have benefited from them are encouraging, the low intensity of these views suggests that there is more that can be done to increase the relevance of the aid and advice and craft it to better serve the needs of local police. In general, respondents were more positive about federal initiatives (like supply of technology or grants of funds to purchase technology) that immediately and directly send federal resources to their organizations for use. It should be noted that the generally more positive view of federal programs by crime laboratory respondents to the survey suggest that these programs are more effectively reaching their intended audience. The relatively modest percentages of local law enforcement departments that are currently being reached by these programs suggests that they also have the potential to more broadly serve the needs of the nation’s police, provided sufficient organizational and financial resources are available. It would be counterproductive to encourage more police forces in the country to take advantage of these resources if the increase in demand would overwhelm the system and make it less effective for everyone.

BROADER POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND ISSUES When considering federal responses to these issues, it is important to consider policies not just in terms of the short-run but also how their long-term effects can be crafted to generate the most benefit. The programs that were viewed most positively by respondents to these surveys—direct provision of technology and transfer of federal monies to the local level for technology purchases—are uniquely short-run strategies. Although it is understandable why law enforcement practitioners, who are primarily asked to solve problems in the short term, would find the quick effects of these types of programs appealing, they may not be the best way of investing limited federal resources. Provision of money that is designated for technology support eliminates the trade-offs that must be made at the local level among competing potential uses for the resources; when a particular technology is mandated as a condition of support, even trade-offs among technologies may be eliminated.4 While providing a technology to a police force today will generate immediate benefit (assuming that the other barriers to adoption of the technology are overcome), the return on the investment will gradually decrease over

______4It should be noted that these effects have the potential to generate significant distortion in the way that funds are used at the local level since it is the competition among different potential uses and the trade-offs among alternatives that could lead to more efficient allocation. VII Challenges and Choices for Crime-Fighting Technology time as the system is worn out or becomes obsolete. It is possible that other programs, whose returns increase with time rather than decrease, might be better policy targets. One example of such an increasing returns target is the provision of technical training to help overcome human barriers to technology adoption. Training of individuals has the possibility not just to improve how individuals use today’s technology but improve their use of technologies in the future; the potential for trained individuals to spread their knowledge within their organizations provides the chance for increased returns on the investment even in the short term. The RAND survey results and findings from interviews strongly suggest the need for increased training, including training to use technology already available or being procured. This particular topic was brought up with respect to small rural departments all the way up to a large urban department with a billion dollar budget. Respondents spoke of considerable, wasteful redundancy in training curricula. Training technology is developing rapidly on many fronts, including law enforcement. Distance learning and interactive computerized training offer promise for overcoming at least some of the obstacles (e.g., lack of time and money) agencies face in training their personnel. Because of the apparent importance of training in addressing these issues, it is considered in more detail below. Like training, R&D can also address the technology adoption barriers of organizations, but it is a much more long-term strategy. It is only though research that new technological possibilities are discovered and current technologies are adapted and applied to the needs of law enforcement. Because of the unique characteristics of the law enforcement technology market, private firms may ignore roles in this area not taken by the public sector. The importance of research as an enabling approach to these problems—exemplified by the important advances in body armor and other technologies which outfit today’s officers—point out that, even though local forces may not see immediate benefits and, as a result, may not be as supportive of these programs, they are important nonetheless. Research and development can also take as a goal not only developing new technologies but improving those which are already available; selecting a target of providing rapid, cost-effective DNA analysis capabilities could go a long way toward removing the backlogs and staff shortages that currently prevent forensic laboratories from making their full potential contribution to law enforcement. Research and development therefore likely represents a unique role for government to support work that not only lowers adoption barriers for current technologies but attempts to apply novel technologies to other needs of law enforcement as well.

Differing Needs for Technology-Related Support In addition to considering the national level implications of technology assistance programs, policy in this area must address the differing needs of different police departments. We found significant di- vergence in the technology-related needs of law enforcement departments based on the size of the community and population they serve. Some of these reported differences might be simply due to the fact that larger departments have greater (and more complex) technology needs than other departments. Although these departments represent a small fraction of the total number of local police and county sheriffs’ departments in the United States, they also serve a much larger fraction of the total population. Further, larger departments are more likely than smaller organizations to have officers who specialize in technology-related issues (including training and grant writing). So in this sense, one might expect that the larger departments would be receiving greater federal support than the smaller agencies. At the same time, in the areas of funding for technology acquisition, training, and access to federal technology the differences by size of department are striking. These differences suggest that perhaps alternative approaches may be required in order to ensure the necessary level access to federal support in these key areas for both large and small departments.

Small Departments A majority of both rural and urban departments serving populations less than 25,000 indicated that acquiring technology to more effectively train personnel was a high priority. In addition, two-thirds of small urban departments also rated technology to improve command and control of operations as being VIII Challenges and Choices for Crime-Fighting Technology a high priority. Both types of departments tended to rate standards by which equipment could be judged or certified to be a lower priority than their other technology-related needs.

Moderate-Sized Departments Local police in urban settings serving medium-sized populations also placed a high priority on technology to improve command and control of operations. In addition, urban departments serving populations in the range of 25,000–75,000 considered information to help them make better technology-related plans and important decisions.

Large Departments and State Agencies Urban departments serving populations of 75,000–225,000 listed as high priority a variety of technology-related needs including technology to improve command and control of operations, interoperability, and to more effectively train personnel—as well as better training on technology presently available to their department. These departments ranked standards by which to judge equipment as a relatively low priority.

Priority Needs for Technology-Related Support The results of these survey studies also showed that some areas can be identified as particularly high technology priorities for law enforcement. As shown in Tables 3 and 4, a majority of departments gave a high priority rating to technology to more effectively train personnel and for command and control operations.

Training How important of a limiting factor training requirements are in terms of future acquisition varied across different types of policing technologies. Approximately 10 percent of departments considered training requirements to limit acquisition or use of night vision/electro-optic devices, vehicle stopping/tracking devices, and digital imaging devices.5 One in five local departments consider training requirements to be a factor limiting acquisition or use of digital suspect composites.

Table 3 Local Law Enforcement Agency Ratings of Technology-Related Needs

Percent Reporting Need as High Priority Technology-Related Need Technology to more effectively or efficiently train personnel 59% Technology for command and control of own agency’s operations 55% Technology for improving accountability within own agency 46% Information to make better technology-related plans and decisions 45% Technology for interoperability with other agencies 45% Training to use technology available or being acquired by own agency 43%

______5For the LETS survey to local police, percentages have been statistically adjusted to represent the entire population. See Appendix A for a description of the adjustment methodology. For the LETS survey to state police and the FTS survey to crime labs, results are reported as unadjusted percentages. IX Challenges and Choices for Crime-Fighting Technology

Standards for judging or certifying equipment or other technology 26% SOURCE: LETS, 9. Numbers are statistically adjusted percent of agencies responding as indicated.

Table 4 State Law Enforcement Agency Ratings of Technology-Related Needs

Percent Reporting Need as High Technology-Related Need Priority Technology for command and control of own agency’s operations 86% Information to make better technology-related plans and decisions 79% Technology for improving account ability within own 73% agency Technology for interoperability with other agencies 64% Technology to more effectively or efficiently train 60% personnel Training to use technology available or being acquired by own agency 57% Standards for judging or certifying equipment or other technology 54% SOURCE: LETS, 9. Numbers are percent of agencies responding as indicated.

Unweighted n=15.

The importance of training requirements as limiting future acquisition decisions showed no clear trends by size of population served by local police. The exception was in terms of use of tire deflation spikes: rural departments were less likely to view training as being important—possibly as a function of lesser need for these devices. Whereas, large urban (more than 225,000) departments were more likely to view training as being important—again, perhaps reflecting greater usage of these devices by these departments. State police departments showed a similar pattern in terms of the relative importance placed on training requirements in acquisition decisions vis-à-vis different policing technologies.

Command and Control Municipal/city police departments tended to rate as a higher priority technology for command and control of operations, for improving accountability within an agency, and computer hardware than did county police/sheriffs’ departments—although none of these differences were statistically significant.

A Special Need: Forensic Labs Because of initial findings from interviews and literature examination, a concerted effort was made to focus on forensic science capabilities. To this end the team conducted a survey to examine needs and current use. Major findings from the RAND Forensic Survey include:

• Most forensic laboratories have backlogs, due principally to lack of trained technical staff or lack of automated technology that could increase staff productivity; • When demand for forensic analysis exceeds supply—as is frequently the case—laboratory tests necessary for criminal prosecution are generally more likely to be performed than those needed for thorough criminal investigation. In particular, tests of evidence to identify controlled substances or to determine blood alcohol levels are almost always conducted because they are X Challenges and Choices for Crime-Fighting Technology

needed for prosecution, while tests of blood or semen evidence in murder or rape cases where no suspect has been identified are often not conducted because laboratories cannot afford to do them.

Laboratories prioritized their current needs as shown in Table 5. Additional staffing and training were emphasized in comments from many laboratory directors. In examining this situation the RAND research team noted that research and development focused on dramatically lowering the acquisition costs of a standard laboratory suite with a specified throughput capability is a unique approach to the resource problem at the local and state level. Research and development efforts aimed at redeveloping existing systems to achieve reliability or cost goals (in contrast to performance or new scientific goals) have been successfully undertaken by other federal agencies, notably the Department of Defense.

Underrecognized Needs As is the case for most R&D activities and “behind the scenes” product development, the final customers who purchase the resulting products are often unaware of what went into them. Consequently, it is not surprising that only about 20 percent of the departments responding to the RAND Law Enforcement Technology Survey were aware of having received any federal support in the

Table 5 Priorities of Forensic Labs Surveyed

Low/Not a Medium High Current Needs Priority Priority Priority Additional professional staffing 4% 17% 79% Continuing education/training on new technologies or developments 0% 33% 67% Additional laboratory space 17% 17% 67% Training on technology available or being acquired 3% 41% 56% Computerized system for tracking evidence 36% 27% 37% System for overall laboratory management 41% 28% 31% SOURCE: FTS, 15. Numbers are percent of laboratories responding as indicated. area of R&D or commercialization. Since most local departments do not perform R&D or generally request technology commercialization aid, there is little reason for them to be aware of these programs. The focus of many burdened departments and laboratories is necessarily short term on the immediate priorities of today; as a result, the long-term focus of R&D must seem distant from their current needs. Although local departments may not rate the importance of federal R&D, standards development, or commercialization as highly as direct funding, this should not be interpreted as “evidence against” the support of these activities. There is a real need for federal sponsorship in these areas because the law enforcement market is neither big enough nor lucrative enough to attract sufficient private sector R&D investment. Nearly three-fourths of local police departments and 42 percent of forensic laboratories reported that they had neither received nor requested any federal assistance in the technology evaluation or standards area. This apparent lack of utilization of federal standards setting and technology evaluation services is in marked contrast to the support of these activities that was expressed by participants in RAND focus groups. As one of our sources put it, “without federal support for technology standards and commercialization, the law enforcement community is destined to continue to be disappointed by vendors who try to sell them secondhand technology originally designed for other purposes.” XI Challenges and Choices for Crime-Fighting Technology

OVERARCHING ISSUES Throughout our research there were a number of larger issues that came to our attention. While some of these do inform our recommendations above, they are largely beyond the scope of the study or are not explicitly addressed in our survey work. They bear mention, however, if only to help remind policymakers of the larger context, problems, and prospects of employing technology more effectively with our law enforcement departments and agencies. Among the meta issues that were identified through our interactions with the law enforcement community are the following: Forensic Sciences. Crime laboratories are struggling to keep up with demand for their services. Substantial backlogs are not uncommon. While most laboratories appear to be able to conduct those tests of evidence needed to support prosecutions, many labs lack the capacity to support investigations equally well. Frequently, evidence is analyzed only after a suspect has been identified. Interoperability and Data Sharing. There is a great need for improvements in communications interoperability and data sharing among agencies. The technology for this exists and continues to be improved. Frequently what appears to have been lacking is the political will to go the extra mile to coordinate and cooperate with other agencies. Accountability and Risk Management. Technology has a role to play in increasing accountability of law enforcement officers both to their organization’s leadership and to the public. As technology makes it more possible for law enforcement to record interviews of witnesses and suspects, to ensure that physical evidence is properly collected and protected, and to avoid unnecessary damage or destruction of persons and property, these safeguards will become more in demand. Failure of law enforcement to keep up with technology in these areas may increase risks of both civil liability and losing criminal cases in court. Information Security and Privacy. Technology is making possible better surveillance and monitoring, as well as more comprehensive and accessible databases, which raise concerns about information security and privacy. Availability of Expertise. Certain expertise is in short supply and is prohibitively expensive for all but the best-resourced agencies. An obvious example is expertise in cybercrime investigation and, more generally, digital evidence analysis. Trends in Crime. Although one cannot predict whether or how long declines in crime rates will continue, it seems reasonable to prepare for increases in electronic crime (e.g., denial of service attacks, criminal transfer of funds by electronic means, possible forgery of digital signatures, etc.), continued public fear of gun violence and certain crimes (such as home-invasion robbery), and possible domestic terrorism (which may involve chemical or biological weapons). Public-Private Interfaces. Crime mapping and Internet technologies allow law enforcement agencies to make crime maps accessible to citizens and can be used for citizens to report crimes or hot spots. LoJack, GPS-equipped cellular telephones, and other privately purchased or leased security technologies can interface with public agencies, as can private security forces at business sites, on public streets, or in correctional facilities. To what extent should the public side of these interfaces be supported?

RECOMMENDATIONS As a result of an integrated assessment of each of these sources of information, we present the following recommendations. They constitute what the study team believes is a reasonable, yet forward- looking set of actions for federal technology-related support of state and local law enforcement.

• To avoid wasteful spending and to ensure technology is used to good effect, we recommend that federal initiatives providing technology hardware or software include provisions for training. It appears that all too often, procurements are made under the false assumption that “somebody else” will take care of training. XII Challenges and Choices for Crime-Fighting Technology

• To help law enforcement agencies make more effective and less disappointing technology acquisition decisions, we recommend continuing and publicizing federal testing, evaluation, and standards setting for technologies needed by state and local agencies. • To enhance public safety, we recommend providing data network access to all police and sheriffs’ departments that have unmet needs for it. No American community—large or small—wants its officers to lack information that could have been available to recognize and apprehend dangerous criminals wanted in other jurisdictions. • To meet the demands of investigation as well as prosecution, we recommend building forensic capability well beyond current levels. This could include providing screening-test technology to first responders, as well as increasing training, recruiting, and retaining forensic scientists. We recommend it include increased federal support of R&D of forensic science techniques and technologies. One possible focus of this R&D might be on lowering the acquisition cost for a standard, known throughput capability suite of forensic laboratory equipment. • To correct evident competitive disadvantages of smaller law enforcement agencies, we recommend that federal agencies make a serious effort to make it easier for rural and small urban police and sheriffs’ departments with real, unmet needs, to obtain funding and other technology-related support. Although some rural and small departments may have crime rates too low to warrant more substantial investment in modern technology, other rural or small departments suffer unmet needs because they lack political clout or skilled personnel available to write grant proposals. • As a cost-effective investment, we recommend increased federal funding of R&D of technologies that automate or otherwise increase productivity of what are presently labor-intensive or training-intensive processes. Such technology can help make high-quality law enforcement more affordable. • To promote police accountability and to provide more objective evidence of lawbreaking, we recommend that all or most patrol cars be equipped with video cameras and wireless networked computers. Videotaping provides objective evidence useful for suspect identification and prosecution, as well as for resolving complaints of police misconduct. Rapid access to current data on stolen vehicles, outstanding warrants, etc., can reduce officer uncertainty in confrontational situations. The most practical federal role in this may be in defining or developing equipment suites or standards, rather than in funding their acquisition. • To reduce confrontational uncertainty, risk of injury to officers and the public, as well as risk of confrontations escalating into civil disturbances or abuse of police power, we recommend continued federal support for the development, testing, and deployment of technology that can be carried in patrol cars or on officers to detect concealed weapons at a safe distance.6

These technology specific goals, if coupled with attention to the obstacles and challenges inherent in organizational technology adoption, could lead to more effective use of technology by law enforcement organizations nationwide which, we believe, has the potential to contribute significantly to public safety, long-run cost reduction, and justice.

______6It is also important to note that there are significant applications for any non-portable versions of this technology that might be produced during development of patrol car or police officer models. For example, stationary devices that could detect the presence of concealed weapons could be placed in schools and airports detecting the “arrival” of any weapons into a monitored area. Such technology, if it was made reliable and cost effective enough, could allow educational institutions in particular to devote less of their resources to security and more to the primary goal of student instruction. ADVANCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THIRD ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS OF THE ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

III. FOR RAY DOWNEY

31 OCTOBER 2001 THE ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

October 31, 2001 James S. Gilmore, III Chairman

L. Paul Bremer To Our Readers: Raymond Downey The tragic attacks of September 11, 2001, and beyond clearly demonstrate the George Foresman importance of preparing our nation to counter the threat of terrorism. These attacks William Garrison underscore the urgency by which we must act to formulate a comprehensive national Ellen M. Gordon approach to preparedness. I am pleased to provide this Advance Executive Summary James Greenleaf of the Third Report of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities William Jenaway for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction to assist in making the United William Dallas Jones States more secure. Paul M. Maniscalco John O. Marsh, Jr. Today our nation and its Allies around the world are engaged in military actions Kathleen O'Brien overseas to eradicate the threat posed by terrorists with global reach. This is a M. Patricia Quinlisk crucial step towards ensuring the security of our own citizens and others beyond our Patrick Ralston borders. Efforts are also focused on our homeland. The combined work of all three levels of government and the private sector seek to both prevent additional attacks William Reno and to identify, arrest and prosecute those who committed these acts and continue to Joseph Samuels, Jr. threaten our citizens. These efforts will not be finished quickly. It is imperative that Kenneth Shine America move forward rapidly and deliberately to strengthen its ability to prevent Hubert Williams future attacks and to respond if more occur. Reducing the fear of our citizens and making our nation more secure must be the highest priority.

To this end, we present additional recommendations for consideration. We stress Ellen Embrey that these recommendations should be reviewed in concert with those delivered in U.S. Department of our First and Second Annual Reports to the Congress and the President, in 1999 and Defense Representative 2000. We must:

Michael Wermuth RAND Project Improve Health and Medical Capabilities, both public and private, to ensure Director our ability to treat the full scope of potential casualties from a terrorist attack whether caused by a conventional weapon or a Weapon of Mass Destruction;

Improve Immigration and Border Control to enhance our ability to restrict the movement, by all modes of transportation, of weapons, weapons components or potential terrorists into the country and eliminate their ability to operate within our borders;

Please address comments or questions to: RAND 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, Virginia 22202-5050 Telephone: 703-413-1100 FAX: 703-413-8111 The Federally-Funded Research and Development Center providing support to the Advisory Panel Clarify the Roles and Missions on the Use of the Military in support of both emergency response and law enforcement related activities to ensure uses are appropriate;

Improve Security Against Cyber Attacks and enhance related critical infrastructure protection to ensure the security of essential government, financial, energy, and other critical sector operations against attack; and

Improve State and Local Capabilities, especially among the brave men and women who will be on America's front line to provide immediate response services as well as resulting recovery actions following an attack.

We emphasize in the strongest possible terms that these recommendations must be considered in concert with others as part of a clearly defined national strategy. Our national strategy must be built from the "bottom up", in a collective partnership of our communities, the states, the federal government and the private sector. The challenges we face are daunting but are nonetheless achievable. Our nation must have a clear understanding of actions we must accomplish quickly to ensure the safety and security of the United States. Above all else, we must always ensure that implementation of these actions holds in strict regard the protection of our Constitution and the preservation of our civil liberties.

Our Panel will deliver its Third Annual Report to the President and Congress in December 2001 with considerably more detail. The complete report will attempt to place the attacks of September 11, 2001, and subsequent actions by government at all levels into the context of previous recommendations of our Advisory Panel. This interim report provides an expedited summary of our findings and recommendations from our third year of work, as agreed to by the Advisory Panel in principle prior to the attacks, to inform the Congress and Administration in their on-going deliberations.

Sincerely,

/s/

James S. Gilmore, III Governor of Virginia Chairman IN MEMORIAM

On September 11, 2001, at a few minutes after 10 o’clock in the morning, Ray Downey, chief in charge of Special Operations Command, Fire Department of the City of New York, perished in the collapse of the North tower of the New York World Trade Center. Although the impending disaster was obvious following the prior collapse of the South tower, and with fearless disregard for his own personal safety, Ray stayed at his post with his people, all doing their job.

It is with increasing humility, but with a firm sense of our special privilege and high honor, that we dedicate the Third Annual Report to the memory of our great colleague and good friend, Ray Downey. Preface

In its enabling legislation, the Congress required the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction to submit three separate reports to the President and the Congress—on December 15 in each of the years 1999, 2000, and 2001. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the panel decided to publish this interim document to assist in informing the public debate, including the consideration of policy and legal changes by the President and Congress.

At its regular quarterly meeting, held 27-28 August 2001, the Advisory Panel adopted the conclusions and recommendations for its third report, which are set forth in this document in summary form. The Third Annual Report will include more detailed information on the Panel’s findings as well as background information and explanations that inform the recommendations. That report will be delivered to the President and the Congress by 15 December 2001.

Following the attacks, the Advisory Panel held a special session on September 24, during which it reviewed and validated the conclusions and recommendations for the third report contained in this interim report. In addition, the panel reviewed the recommendations made in its second report, issued December 15, 2000, and determined that each recommendation in the second report continues to have direct and significant relevance in the current environment. This document, therefore, also includes a summary of the findings and recommendations of the Second Annual Report.

Full copies of the First Annual Report (December 15, 1999) and the Second Annual Report (December 15, 2000) as well as copies of minutes of all Advisory Panel meetings, its enabling legislation, its current membership, and related information are available online at http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel, or in hard copy by written request to:

RAND 1200 South Hayes Street Arlington, Virginia 22202-5050

i Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

INTRODUCTION

The conclusions and recommendations included in this document are the result of almost three years of research and deliberation. The Advisory Panel began its work in 1999 by an in-depth consideration of the threats posed to the United States by terrorists, both individuals and organizations. A key finding in the first annual report was the urgent need for a comprehensive national strategy for combating terrorism.

By the second year, the Advisory Panel shifted its emphasis to specific policy recommendations for the Executive and the Congress, and a broad programmatic assessment and functional recommendations for consideration in developing an effective national strategy. These conclusions and recommendations are presented in detail in the Second Annual Report, published 15 December 2000, including the comprehensive research and analytical foundation for each recommendation.

For the past year, we have focused on several functional challenges to protecting the United States against terrorism in five specific areas:

Health and Medical Capabilities Immigration and Border Control Roles and Missions on the Use of the Military Security Against Cyber Attacks State and Local Capabilities

To understand the key conclusions and recommendations in this interim report, it is important to place the recommendations in the context of our previous research and analysis. Therefore, this interim report begins with a brief summary of the recommendations contained in our Second Annual Report.

1 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

SECTION I: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE SECOND REPORT

The capstone recommendation in the second report was the need for a comprehensive, coherent, functional national strategy:

The President should develop and present to the Congress a national strategy for combating terrorism within one year of assuming office.

As part of that recommendation, the panel identified the essential characteristics for a national strategy:

It must be truly national in scope, not just federal.

It must be comprehensive, encompassing the full spectrum of deterrence, prevention, preparedness, and response against domestic and international threats.

For domestic programs, it must be responsive to requirements from and fully coordinated with state and local officials as partners throughout the development and implementation process.

It should be built upon existing emergency response systems.

It must include all key functional domains—intelligence, law enforcement, fire services, emergency medical services, public health, medical care providers, emergency management, and the military.

It must be fully resourced and based on measurable performance.

The Second Annual report included a discussion of more effective federal structures to address the national efforts to combat terrorism. We determined that the solutions offered by others who have studied the problem provide only partial answers. The Advisory Panel has attempted to craft recommendations to address the full spectrum of issues.

The structure proposed by the Commission for National Security/21st Century (also known as the Hart-Rudman Commission) is one example. That commission proposed placing the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s Border Patrol under the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). This recommendation would not solve the broad strategic challenge of bringing together numerous other Federal agencies under a comprehensive strategic umbrella. Its focus is on the Federal operational response and does not include roles for all the other Federal, State, and local response entities that are critical components of the national effort. Therefore, we submitted the following recommendation:

The President should establish a senior level coordination entity in the Executive Office of the President.

2 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

The characteristics of the office identified in that recommendation include:

Director appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, at “cabinet-level” rank Located in the Executive Office of the President Authority to exercise certain program and budget controls over those agencies with responsibilities for combating terrorism Responsibility for intelligence coordination and analysis Tasking for strategy formulation and implementation Responsibility for reviewing State and local plans and to serve as an information clearinghouse Include an interdisciplinary Advisory Board to assist in providing broad strategic guidance Multidisciplinary staff (including Federal, State and local expertise) No operational control

We included a thorough explanation of these characteristics in our Second Annual Report. For instance, we determined that it is essential that this office have the authority to direct the creation, modification, or cessation of programs within the Federal interagency. It must also have strict authority to direct modifications to agency budgets and the application of resources. Only through such a process can there be any prospect of coherence and effective execution of implementation plans to support a national strategy once it is developed.

A critical role for this new entity is the coordination and advocacy for related foreign and domestic intelligence activities, including the development of national net assessments of threats. The entity must have authority and responsibility for tasking related intelligence collection and analysis, compiling related intelligence products from the various agencies, providing national threat assessments as a part of the national strategy, and for producing composite products for dissemination to designated Federal, State, and local entities as appropriate.

In addition to certain authority over the Federal Interagency, we recommended that the new entity have authority to review State and geographical area strategic plans, and at the request of State entities, to review local plans or programs for combating terrorism for consistency with the national strategy.

Finally, we determined that this entity does not need to be “in charge” of operations to combat terrorism. As the attacks of September 11 have clearly demonstrated, that responsibility will fall, at least initially, to State and local jurisdictions. The Federal Response Plan, which provides for Lead Federal Agency and functional responsibilities, works. That process does not need to be supplanted.

To complement our recommendations for the federal executive structure, we also included the following recommendation for the Congress:

3 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

The Congress should establish a Special Committee for Combating Terrorism—either a joint committee between the Houses or separate committees in each House—to address authority and funding, and to provide Congressional oversight, for Federal programs and authority for combating terrorism.

The philosophy behind this recommendation is much the same as it is for the creation of the office in the Executive Office of the President. There needs to be a focal point in the Congress for the Administration to present its strategy and supporting plans, programs, and budgets, as well as a legislative “clearinghouse” where relevant measures are considered. There are at least 40 committees and subcommittees that have some jurisdiction over the issue of terrorism. No existing standing committee can or should be powered with these responsibilities, because each existing committee is limited in its jurisdictional scope. Despite some attempts in this direction by the leadership of both Houses, no such entity has been created. In the House, the “Speaker’s Working Group” on terrorism was transformed, following the September 11 attacks, to a regular subcommittee of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence—a useful first step. In the Senate, the leadership has only established an informal working group, although at the time of this writing there appears to be some movement toward a special committee. Under this recommendation most existing committee authorities can be preserved.

Functional Recommendations

In conjunction with these structural recommendations, the Advisory Panel made a number of recommendations addressing functional requirements for the implementation of an effective strategy for combating terrorism. The recommendation listed below are discussed thoroughly in the Second Annual Report:

Enhance Intelligence/Threat Assessments/Information Sharing Improve human intelligence by the rescission of that portion of the 1995 guidelines, promulgated by the Director of Central Intelligence, which prohibits the engagement of certain foreign intelligence informants who may have previously been involved in human rights violations Improve Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) through an expansion in research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) of reliable sensors and rapid readout capability, and the subsequent fielding of a new generation of MASINT technology based on enhanced RDT&E efforts Review statutory and regulatory authorities in an effort to strengthen investigative and enforcement processes Improve forensics capabilities to identify and warn of terrorist use of unconventional weapons Expand information sharing and improve threat assessments

Foster Better Planning/Coordination/Operations Designate the senior emergency management entity in each State as the focal point for that State for coordination with the Federal government for preparedness for terrorism Improve collective planning among Federal, State, and local entities

4 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

Enhance coordination of programs and activities Improve operational command and control of domestic responses The President should always designate a Federal civilian agency other than the Department of Defense (DoD) as the Lead Federal Agency

Enhance Training, Equipping, and Exercising Improve training through better coordination with State and local jurisdictions Make exercise programs more realistic and responsive

Improve Health and Medical Capabilities Establish a national advisory board composed of Federal, State, and local public health officials, and representatives of public and private medical care providers, as an adjunct to the new office, to ensure that such issues are an important part of the national strategy Improve health and medical education and training programs through actions that include licensing and certification requirements Establish standards and protocols for treatment facilities, laboratories, and reporting mechanisms Clarify authorities and procedures for health and medical response Medical entities such as the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations should conduct periodic assessments of medical facilities and capabilities

Promote Better Research and Development and Developing National Standards That the new office, in coordination with the Office of Science and Technology Policy, develop a comprehensive plan for RDT&E, as a major component of the national strategy That the new office, in coordination with the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) establish a national standards program for combating terrorism, focusing on equipment, training, and laboratory processes

5 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

SECTION II: APPROVED RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE THIRD ANNUAL REPORT

This section highlights our recommendations to the President and the Congress, from the third year of our deliberations, which should be incorporated into a national strategy. They build on the recommendations in our first and second Annual Reports.

IMPROVE HEALTH AND MEDICAL CAPABILITIES

The nation’s health and medical systems, and their related public and private components, are under-prepared to address the full scope of potential terrorist attacks. The full integration of the public health community, emergency medical service providers, physicians, and hospitals into the entire emergency response process is required on an urgent basis.

We recommend that Federal, State, and local entities, as well as affected private-sector organizations, fully implement the American Medical Association (AMA) “Report and Recommendations on Medical Preparedness for Terrorism and Other Disasters.”

In our second report, we recommended that the new office in the White House establish a national advisory board composed of Federal, State, and local public health officials and representatives of medical care providers, as an adjunct to the new office in the White House, to ensure that health and medical issues are an important part of the national strategy. The first principal recommendation in the AMA report calls for the creation of a collaborative public- private entity at the national level to:

Develop medical education on disaster medicine and the medical response to terrorism; Develop information resources for the health and medical communities on terrorism and other disaster responses; Coordinate with Federal and State entities, professional organizations, and the private sector to develop model plans for terrorism and other disaster response; and Address the issue of reliable, timely, and adequate reporting of dangerous diseases.

The second recommendation in the AMA report encourages State, local, and specialty entities of the Federation of Medicine to become more involved in terrorism and other disaster response planning, training, and education. That recommendation directly supports our emphasis on the need for more close coordination among all entities with responsibilities for combating terrorism. We therefore recommend that the new office in the White House encourage this participation.

We recommend that States fully implement the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) Revised Emergency Management Standard.

This JCAHO standard (effective 1 January 2001) requires that accredited facilities establish and maintain a comprehensive plan for response to disasters and emergencies, including terrorism, within an all-hazards framework. The standard also requires that the plan address all aspects of response, including coordination with other response entities, reporting and other

6 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction communications processes, and training of critical personnel; and it includes an annual evaluation of the plan.

We recommend that the Congress provide sufficient resources to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for full implementation of the “Biological and Chemical Terrorism: Strategic Plan for Preparedness and Response” of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

This plan defines the critical steps to prepare public health agencies for terrorist attacks. These include enhancing epidemiologic capacity to detect and respond, establishing surveillance for critical biologic and chemical agents, enhancing training of public health professionals, enhancing communication and public education programs, and encouraging research.

We recommend that the Congress provide sufficient resources to the DHHS for full implementation of the “Laboratory Response Network for Bioterrorism” of the CDC.

This “collaborative partnership” of various Federal agencies, public health and emergency management entities, professional associations, and academia is precisely the approach envisioned by the advisory panel in its previous recommendations. The program’s mission involves developing critical laboratory capacity in the public health laboratories, fostering appropriate linkage with clinical laboratories, and integrating these capacities into overall emergency preparedness. The goals of the program are rapid detection, analysis, and communication of the findings to appropriate health and medical entities nationwide.

We recommend that the Congress provide sufficient resources to the DHHS for full implementation of the CDC Health Alert Network.

The network is specifically designed to improve communications within the public health community and with other emergency response entities, especially law enforcement and emergency management agencies. We encourage the further development and fielding of this and other communication networks, such as Epi-X and Pulsenet, to address the need for better vertical and horizontal communications, especially for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats.

We recommend that the DHHS, in coordination with the new office in the White House, develop standard models for medical responses to a variety of hazards.

Planning, training, and exercise tools must be developed, particularly mindful of the need to improve pre-hospital emergency medical services (EMS), especially for better coordination and communications with other response entities. They must also focus on the requirement to include rural communities. The planning tools should be designed to be community-based, tailorable to an individual jurisdiction’s unique requirements and capabilities, and should focus on EMS asset management, pre-hospital treatment and stabilization of patients, transportation, communications, and other coordination requirements that may span multiple hospitals and numerous response entities.

7 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

We recommend that the DHHS reestablish a pre-hospital Emergency Medical Services program office.

That action is necessary to support state and local EMS provider organizations for professional development, evaluation and planning processes, and other issues of EMS systems and operations. Presently there is no office at the Federal level that is responsible for addressing those issues.

We recommend that the Congress increase Federal resources available for those exercises that are informed by and targeted at State and local health and medical entities, both public and private.

More and better exercises are critical: to determine the adequacy of focused training; to test and improve the plans and capabilities of individual hospital facilities; to test coordination between health and medical entities; and that span the range of response entities. Exercises are especially important where biological agents are involved. Those exercises must be requirements-based from State and local input. Equally important, exercises must include evaluations, after-action reports, and statements of lessons learned, to assist in decisions for resource allocation and to guide future training.

We recommend the establishment of a government-owned, contractor-operated national facility for the research, development, and production of vaccines for specified infectious, especially contagious diseases.

The private sector is unlikely to be the answer to some of the more difficult vaccine issues. Direct government ownership or sponsorship is likely to be the only reasonable answer for producing vaccines for certain bio-organisms—anthrax and smallpox being at the top of the list. Limited production capabilities for small-market (i.e., military useful) vaccines are currently the largest hurdle facing DoD. That problem is significantly compounded for civilian bioterrorism preparedness.

We recommend that the new office in the White House, with advice from its related National Advisory Board and in coordination with the DHHS and Veterans Affairs (VA), review and recommend appropriate changes to plans for the stockpile of vaccines and other critical supplies.

The availability of vaccines and other critical medical supplies—at the right place and the right time—is likely to make a dramatic difference in the level of casualties that result from an attack. The Department of Veterans Affairs has certain responsibilities for stocking such supplies; the CDC and other HHS entities have other responsibilities. It is not clear that there has been adequate coordination and comprehensive planning for the execution of those responsibilities, especially with states and communities who will be responsible for ensuring the security and distribution of critical stockpiles and related activities. Those responsibilities and implementation plans should be clarified, coordinated, and transparent to all affected response entities in the health, medical, and emergency response communities.

8 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

We recommend that the new office in the White House, on the advice of its related National Advisory Board, and in coordination with the responsible Federal agencies, develop a comprehensive plan for the full spectrum of medical and health research for terrorism related medical issues.

That program must cover all aspects of detection, diagnosis, prophylaxis, and therapeutics. In developing such a plan, we again suggest the approach be, to the extent feasible, one of multi- purpose, broad-spectrum applications.

We recommend that the Secretary of HHS, in conjunction with the new office in the White House and its related National Advisory Board conduct a thorough review of the authorities, structures, and capabilities under Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) and National Disaster Medical System (NDMS).

It has been more than five years since a comprehensive inventory of medical capacities under the National Disaster Medical System has been conducted. It is by no means certain that “current” information on surge capacities developed under the NDMS agreements, such as available bed space, is valid. There continue to be issues of structure, location, and capabilities of the entities organized under the MMRS, and the Disaster Medical Assistance Teams, established under the NDMS.

We recommend that the new office in the White House develop an information and education program on the legal and procedural problems involved in a health and medical response to terrorism, and in coordination with the Department of Justice and the American Bar Association, consider the efficacy of model laws or other programs to enhance future responses to such events.

Policy-makers and response entities are faced with thorny issues, such as quarantine, containment, isolation, mandatory vaccination and other prescriptive measures, and scope of practice and other legal issues. There are significant civil rights and civil liberties issues involved, such as privacy matters, arrest procedures, and search and seizure authority. These activities create the potential for conflicts between local, State and Federal authorities. Some problems reflect a lack of knowledge about current law and regulation. Others arise from the disparity of the laws and the various procedures that may be required to implement them. The implementation of this recommendation should help to close both gaps.

We recommend that the new office in the White House develop on-going programs as part of the implementation of the National Strategy for public education prior to terrorist events about the causes and effects of terrorism; and for the coordinating public pronouncements during and following an attack.

The attacks of September 11, and other recent events, highlight the importance of adequate preparation and effective execution of a public information strategy. Development of a public awareness program on the causes and effects of terrorism should include media representation. Public information programs for the coordination of initial and continuing public pronouncements during and following an attack should focus on the requirement for coordinating

9 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction with every affected response entity at all levels of government in order to avoid confusing or contradictory statements.

IMPROVE IMMIGRATION AND BORDER CONTROL

The movement of goods, people, and vehicles through our border facilities is characterized by vast transportation, logistics, and services systems that are extremely complex, essentially decentralized, and almost exclusively owned by the private sector. The sheer length of our land borders allows hundreds of thousands of people annually to enter our country illegally. Enforcement efforts are hampered by the level of current resources and by a lack of full connectivity and information sharing among enforcement agencies at the Federal, State and local levels. Given the nature and complexity of the problem, the panel recognizes that we as a nation will not likely find the “100% solution” for our borders. We should, nevertheless, direct our efforts to make it harder to exploit our borders for the purpose of doing harm—physical or economic—to our citizens.

We recommend that the President ensure that all agencies with border responsibilities are included as full partners in the intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination process, as related to border issues.

Relevant, timely intelligence is crucial in the campaign to combat terrorism, especially to enhance the security of our borders. Better ways must be developed to track terrorist groups and their activities through transportation and logistics systems. This process is a “two-way street;” all entities involved must be willing to share information, horizontally and vertically between local, State, and Federal agencies. This will represent a departure from the current “culture” of many agencies to cloister information.

We recommend that the new office in the White House create an intergovernmental border advisory group, as part of the new office, with representatives of the responsible Federal agencies, and with State, local and private sector partners from jurisdictions with significant ports of entry.

Better cooperation is essential among those Federal agencies with border responsibilities, with State and local entities, with the commercial transportation and shipping industries, and with other private sector organizations. The entity that we propose could be modeled on the Border Interdiction Committee formed in the late 1980s to address the problem of drug trafficking across U.S. borders. This advisory board could assist the new White House office in developing immigration and border control programs and resource priorities without causing upheavals in existing organizational structures.

We recommend that the new office in the White House facilitate the full integration of affected Federal, State and local entities, including “port captains,” representatives of airports of entry, and border crossing communities, into local or regional “port security committees,” as well as into any adjacent Joint Terrorism Task Force (coordinated by the FBI), or other interagency mechanisms.

10 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

At the operational level, Federal, State and local agencies must act collectively and share critical information on all aspects of immigration and border control. Creating structures and mechanisms that will facilitate closer coordination of enforcement and related operations are essential.

We recommend that the new office develop a coordinated, fully-resourced plan for research and development, and for fielding and integration of sensor and other detection and warning systems.

Individual agencies have activities underway that are intended to enhance enforcement capabilities, through the use of static or mobile sensors and other detection devices. Valuable research and development is also underway in many agencies to improve those capabilities, especially in the area of non-intrusive inspection systems. There is, however, no comprehensive, prioritized plan among related agencies for critical aspects of such activities.

We recommend that the new office in the White House create a “Border Security Awareness” database system to collect and disseminate information about immigration and border control; and Congress should mandate participation of relevant Federal agencies and provide adequate resources to fund it.

The system could be modeled on an existing program of the U.S. Coast Guard called Maritime Domain Awareness. That system could be expanded to create an interactive and fully integrated database system for “Border Security Awareness.” It should include participation from all relevant U.S. government agencies, and State and local partners.

We recommend that the Congress enact legislation requiring all shippers to submit cargo manifest information on any shipment transiting U.S. borders at a minimum simultaneous with the arrival of such goods at any U.S. port of entry, with the imposition of severe penalties for non-compliance.

The United States must insist on strict compliance with reasonable identification and reporting requirements on the movement of people and things across our borders. Allowing after-the-fact reporting and waivers of these requirements is no longer acceptable. In the “Information Age,” the vast majority of cargo manifests—outbound bills of lading and related documentation—are in electronic format and readily transmittable to authorities.

We recommend that the President direct the establishment of “Trusted Shipper” programs within the relevant agencies of government.

Private sector operators of international transportation and other logistics systems already maintain extensive information that could be helpful in the early identification of terrorist activities to move people or things into this country. There are ways to use such information in a manner that will be advantageous to both enforcement officials and private sector entities. The underpinnings of the program will include providing incentives to those in the transportation and logistics sector who are willing to cooperate with enforcement authorities; implementation of industry self-policing procedures; advance provision of cargo manifest data; sharing existing “in-

11 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction transit visibility” data; and use of improved “smart” technology, such as tagging devices and other enhanced “machine readable” capabilities. In return, Congress should provide authority and resources to Federal enforcement agencies for granting incentives to Trusted Shippers, which could include facilitated shipping processes and financial assistance for enhanced technology.

We recommend that the Congress, in consultation with appropriate Executive Branch agencies, expand Coast Guard search authority to include vessels that are owned in majority percentage by U.S. persons.

In the past five decades, the percentage of commercial U.S. “flagged” vessels—those registered with a U.S. home port designated—has for a variety of reasons continued to shrink as a percentage of the total number of commercial vessels in service worldwide. Nevertheless, U.S. persons own fully or in majority percentage many commercial vessels flagged by other countries. Currently, the U.S. Coast Guard has statutory authority to inspect in international waters only U.S. “flagged” vessels. That authority must be expanded.

We recommend that the Congress increase resources for the U.S. Coast Guard for homeland security missions.

Coast Guard resources to perform its ordinary missions have been reduced in recent budget cycles, with no concomitant reduction in mission. With the increased requirement for enhanced homeland security, the Coast Guard must be provided adequate resources by the Congress to accomplish these critical tasks.

We recommend that the U.S. Government negotiate more comprehensive treaties and agreements for combating terrorism with Canada and Mexico.

Canada has been used by terrorists or would-be terrorists for attacks against the United States. In some cases, Canada has been unable under its current laws to take action against certain individuals who may, for example, be conspiring to perpetrate a terrorist attack against the United States. Country-to-country negotiations with both Canada and Mexico should be designed to strengthen laws and processes that will enhance our collective ability to deter, prevent, and respond to terrorist activities, to exchange information on terrorist activities, and to assist in the apprehension of known terrorists before they can strike.

CLARIFY ROLES AND MISSIONS ON THE USE OF THE MILITARY

Controversy, confusion, misunderstanding, and disorganization continue to surround the subject of the role of the U.S. Armed Forces to deter, prevent, or respond to a terrorist threat inside the borders of the United States. There are few comprehensive, carefully coordinated, well- understood plans and programs for how that may occur. Moreover, the structure and internal processes for accomplishing those ends is still fragmented and unclear. Most important, there are overriding civil rights and civil liberties implications.

12 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

We recommend that the National Command Authority establish a single, unified command and control structure for all functions for providing military support or assistance to civil authorities for natural and manmade disasters, including terrorism.

The command and control of military assets for deterring, preventing, or responding to terrorist acts is confusing. Some headquarters, such as Joint Task Force-Civil Support, only have responsibility for so-called “consequence management.” Others have very limited roles in a “crisis” situation. The creation of a single structure for all military activities in homeland security—an “all-hazards” entity--will greatly reduce confusion, and enhance coordination with other Federal entities and with State and local jurisdictions. A clearly defined, single chain of command will also facilitate better planning, training and exercises.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the development of more detailed plans for the use of the military domestically across the spectrum of potential activities, and coordinate with State and other Federal agencies in the creation of more State- or regional-specific plans.

There is currently insufficient planning to address the full spectrum of military activities—deterrence, prevention, response, mitigation, and recovery. Such plans are critical to address future threats and attacks.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Military Departments to institute specific training in units most likely to be involved in support to civil authorities, and to expand military involvement in related exercises with Federal, State, and local civilian agencies.

Training and exercising to plans is how the military prepares for its missions. There is no difference here. The one additional requirement is conducting coordinated exercises with Federal, State, and local civilian agencies that can reasonably be expected to receive support from the military. All exercises must include comprehensive evaluations and capture lessons learned.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct specific new mission areas for the use of the National Guard for providing support to civil authorities for combating terrorism.

The National Guard is a logical “bridge” between the military and civil authorities. The National Guard, in its Title 32 or “State” status, is subject to the control of the state governors. That allows them to be used for purely state missions, including in some cases being free of certain limitations imposed upon “Federal” military personnel. Elements of the National Guard are subject to being called into Federal service, alongside the Active Duty and other elements of the Reserve Components. National Guard units may need to be reconfigured to better support the “Homeland Security” mission. That will inevitably require new training doctrine, instruction, and exercises for Guard units.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense publish a compendium, in layman’s terms, of the statutory authorities for using the military domestically to combat terrorism, with detailed explanations about the procedures for implementing those authorities.

13 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

There continues to be considerable misunderstanding about the legal bases for military activities, including the use of the National Guard, inside the United States. Some believe that the provisions of the “Posse Comitatus Act” provide a significant bar to many such activities. Yet several statutes provide for the use of the military for assistance to civil authorities in a variety of emergencies. The “Stafford Act”1 provides broad authority for using the military domestically for responses to floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, wildfires, and other natural disasters and for intentional acts, such as terrorism. The “Insurrection Statutes”2 provide significant authority for use of the military to suppress domestic insurrections, rebellions, and unlawful combinations and conspiracies in the various states. Other statutory provisions, originally designed for counterdrug operations, have been expanded to include counter-terrorism operations domestically.3 There is also special authority for use of the military domestically to assist in combating biological and chemical terrorist incidents, which may, under certain exceptional circumstances, include direct involvement in arrests, searches, seizures, and the collection of specific intelligence,4 as well as authority to provide assistance in nuclear terrorism cases, which may also include participation in arrest, search, and seizure activities.5

It is important that these statutes and their limitations be well understood by Federal, State, and local entities and by the uniformed military as well. That knowledge should be imbedded in military training and exercises, and in exercises with other Federal as well as State and local civilian agencies.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense should improve the full time liaison elements located in the ten Federal Emergency Management Agency regions.

Although the Department of Defense now has liaison offices in the various FEMA regions, those have not been fully effective in coordinating with State and local emergency management agencies. Those liaison elements—known as Emergency Preparedness Liaison Offices—can assist in the necessary planning and coordination with State emergency authorities and through those authorities with local jurisdictions, including the development of fully integrated training and exercises to validate and improve response plans. The coordination of plans, training, and exercise should not be limited to “consequence management” functions, but should include the full spectrum of potential military activities. Those liaison elements should be staffed with a combination of active duty and Title 10 reserve personnel and National Guard personnel in a Title 32 status.

IMPROVE SECURITY AGAINST CYBER ATTACKS

Cyber attacks can be a mechanism for substantial injury, perpetrated either as the single method for destruction or disruption, or in conjunction with an attack with some other weapon. The problem involves national security, law enforcement, civil rights, and commercial and other

1 42 U.S. Code, Sections 5121, et seq. 2 10 U.S. Code, Sections 331, et seq. 3 10 U.S. Code, Section 374. 4 10 U.S. Code, Section 382. 5 18 U.S. Code, Section 831.

14 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction private sector interests. Given the fact that more than 80% of information systems are owned by the private sector, any solutions will require an unprecedented partnership between government and private entities. Rapidly increasing technological changes will continue to compound the problem. We must, therefore, seek innovative solutions in this exceptionally complex area.

We recommend that the President direct that the interagency panel on cyber security issues include representation from State and local government representatives, as well as the private sector.

The White House recently announced new initiatives for cyber security, including the creation of an interagency cyber security panel that apparently will be composed only of the representatives of some 23 Federal agencies. Given the nature of the issues involved, that panel should also include significant representation from State and local governments and from the private sector. The panel can make recommendations for the development of a comprehensive cyber security strategy that reflects the needs of all relevant “stakeholders.”

We recommend that Congress create an independent commission, tasked to evaluate programs designed to promote cyber security, to recommend strategies for better security, and to report its recommendations to the President and the Congress

Such a federal advisory body can assist materially in the development of strategies, policies, and priorities by providing an independent, objective assessment of Federal programs. That commission should be modeled on our Advisory Panel. Alternatively, if our panel is extended beyond this year, consideration could be given to expanding its mandate to accomplish this task.

We recommend that the President establish a government-funded, not-for-profit entity that can represent the interests of all affected stakeholders, public and private--national security, law enforcement, other government functions, and business and industry interests and concerns--to provide cyber detection, alert, and warning functions.

In our second report, we noted that the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has been ineffective in fully executing its responsibilities for critical infrastructure alert, warning, and response coordination, including cyber attacks by terrorists. Since that report, others have expressed similar concerns—notably the General Accounting Office (GAO). The entity that we propose would serve as a “fusion center” and clearinghouse, at or near real-time, for information on impending or actual cyber attacks. That entity should be a not-for-profit organization or a consortium of not-for-profit entities with recognized expertise in the field.

We recommend that Congress and the Executive Branch convene a “summit” to address, on an urgent basis, necessary changes to a wide range of federal statutes, in order to provide necessary protection and incentives for enhancing cyber assurance.

The law has not kept pace with rapid changes in information technology and systems, nor the need for effective response against those who would exploit them. Changes to such outdated legislation as the Communications Act of 1934, the Defense Production Act, the federal criminal

15 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction statutes, the Freedom of Information Act, as well as others, are indicated. Several members of Congress have developed an understanding of the issues and have introduced legislation to address some of those problems. Progress has, however, been slow. Requirements to update statutory authority will not wait for the “business-as-usual” process of extended negotiations. Congress and the Executive have recently demonstrated, with quick passage of major legislation to combat other aspects of terrorism, that they can work together on an expedited basis. That same urgency and level of effort should now be applied to cyber security.

We recommend that the Congress create a special “Cyber Court” patterned after the court established in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).

Federal prosecutors and investigators are often impeded by the lack of direct and timely application of existing procedures for obtaining court authority to conduct certain investigative activities where criminal cyber conduct is involved. Authority to use investigative tools for “tapping” criminal electronic transmissions or tracing electronic signatures often comes too late or not at all. There is a lack of complete understanding among many in the judiciary at large of the nature and urgency of cyber security. A court that is dedicated to criminal cyber conduct can develop the expertise to recognize and act more quickly in approving or disapproving special authority for investigative activities. Such a court is more likely to ensure that civil rights and civil liberties are fully protected. We envision an electronic, real-time, on-line, secure method for U.S. Attorneys anywhere in the country to contact a cyber judge on very short notice, subject to a prior expedited review (using a process similar to FISA applications) by the Department of Justice.

We recommend that the President establish an entity to develop and implement a comprehensive plan for research, development, test, and evaluation to enhance cyber security.

We envision a government-funded consortium of not-for-profit entities with expertise in the field. The Institute for Security Technology Studies (ISTS) at Dartmouth College is providing resources to form the basis for establishing such an entity, including formal discussions with experts about the structure of such an organization; a comprehensive national needs assessment developed from a survey of stakeholders in government (Federal, State, and local), academia, and the private sector; and the development of a definitive near- and long-term agenda for RDT&E for cyber security. This is a significant first step toward establishing the type of entity we envision, and may be the logical nucleus around which the President could form such an entity.

IMPROVE STATE AND LOCAL CAPABILITIES

Key Observations Based on Survey Data

Federal equipment and training programs receive high marks for relevance and usefulness in improving preparedness at the State and local level, but low marks for adequacy.

16 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

Many Federal programs are not coordinated with the “customer base”, and often do not fit within State and local strategies and operational response plans.

Federal equipment and training programs are too oriented toward major metropolitan areas, with little or no consideration for rural communities. The “120 Cities Domestic Preparedness Program” is one example.

Federal efforts lack coordination, not only with State and local entities, but also within the Federal family; many programs should be consolidated within one agency.

Awareness of Federal programs to assist States and localities is the main factor limiting participation, especially among small cities and rural communities.

We recommend that the new office in the White House serve as a clearinghouse for information about Federal programs, assets, and agencies with responsibilities for combating terrorism.

Survey data supports this recommendation, which was made in our second report. State and local responders indicate strongly that they are confused about what is available from the Federal government, both in terms of programs and offices to promote preparedness, and specialized Federal assets to support response to an attack. This confusion and lack of awareness of the Federal programs inhibits preparedness at the State and local level. It also may delay or prevent the deployment of Federal support assets in the event of an incident. In the short term, as the Federal government continues to reorganize to effectively meet the terrorist threat, confusion about Federal preparedness programs and Federal response assets is likely to increase. The confusion could be reduced considerably through the creation and distribution of various information resources, including:

Terrorism Preparedness Guide, including a listing of the various Federal programs that are available to State and local entities Terrorism Response Guide, including a full description of Federal assets and points of contact for requesting Federal assistance

We recommend that information and application procedures for Federal grant programs for terrorism preparedness be consolidated in the new office in the White House.

This action is necessary so that state and local responders can easily determine what is available. It can help to streamline and standardize the grant process to eliminate unnecessary application burdens. A common refrain from many state and local responders in the survey is that Federal grant programs for terrorism preparedness are uncoordinated, have different rules and requirements, and are unduly burdensome. This is consistent with earlier GAO findings and our previous reports. The variations in grant program requirements place an undue burden on local, particularly small rural and volunteer, organizations.

We recommend that Federal agencies with related funding and grant programs for States and localities coordinate those programs through the States.

17 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

State organizations in particular want Federal programs to be coordinated through state offices in order to ensure that they complement state-wide plans and requirements. While some improvements have been made in the last year, more outreach and coordination efforts are required. The haphazard Federal approach, which allows Federal agencies to provide assistance directly to localities, has caused significant coordination problems. It has also limited the ability of States to set comprehensive state-wide priorities and to ensure more effective allocation of resources.

We recommend that Federal agencies design related training and equipment programs as part of all-hazards preparedness.

State and local organizations that have participated in related Federal training programs tend to give them high marks for both relevance and usefulness. Nevertheless, they almost universally indicate that the training and equipment are not sufficiently comprehensive and is often exclusively devoted to “weapons of mass destruction.” More emphasis must be placed on designing training and equipment programs so that they are applicable to a broad range of hazards.

We recommend that Federal response assets be configured to support and reinforce existing State and local organizational structures and emergency response systems.

State and local survey respondents prefer that Federal entities perform supporting roles such as maintaining order and providing security logistics support. Federal response assets, including the military, must also be trained to operate within the Incident Command System (ICS) during response operations.

We recommend that related Federal training and equipment programs be redesigned to include sustainment components.

In most cases, Federal programs are designed to provide training and equipment support on a “one-shot” basis. Equipment programs must be designed to include spare parts and maintenance components, as well as replacement mechanisms. Refresher training for the initial training audience as well as cyclical training for new personnel is also critical.

ADDITIONAL TOPICS

This Panel will be meeting on November 12 and 13 to approve its complete Third Annual Report. In light of recent events, panel members have decided to examine a few additional topics and to consider adding them to the third report. These topics include: expanding and strengthening visa control and monitoring procedures, and enhancing entry controls and implementing exit controls; and locator tags, enhanced communications, improved vision capabilities, enhanced sensor technology, and more effective respirators for first responders.

18 Advisory Panel Members The Honorable James S. Gilmore, III, Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia, Chair L. Paul Bremer, Corporate Executive, and Former Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-Terrorism, U.S. Department of State Raymond Downey, Commander, Special Operations, Fire Department of the City of New York George Foresman, Deputy State Coordinator, Department of Emergency Management, Commonwealth of Virginia William Garrison (Major General, U.S. Army, Retired), Private Consultant, and Former Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command's Delta Force Ellen M. Gordon, Administrator, Emergency Management Division, Department of Public Defense, State of Iowa, and Former President, National Emergency Management Association James Greenleaf, Independent Consultant, and Former Associate Deputy for Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation Dr. William Jenaway, Corporate Executive, and Chief of Fire and Rescue Services, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania William Dallas Jones, Director, Office of Emergency Services, State of California Paul M. Maniscalco, Past President, National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians, and Former Deputy Chief/Paramedic, City of New York Fire Department, EMSC John O. Marsh, Jr., Attorney at Law, former Secretary of the Army, and former Member of Congress Kathleen O'Brien, City Coordinator, City of Minneapolis, Minnesota M. Patricia Quinlisk, M.D., Medical Director/State Epidemiologist, Department of Public Health, State of Iowa Patrick Ralston, Executive Director, Indiana State Emergency Management Agency; Executive Director, Department of Fire and Building Services; and Executive Director, Public Safety Training Institute, State of Indiana William Reno (Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, Retired), former Senior Vice President of Operations, American Red Cross Joseph Samuels, Jr., Chief of Police, Richmond, California, and Third Vice President, International Association of Chief of Police Kenneth Shine, M.D., President, Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences Hubert Williams, President, The Police Foundation

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Ellen Embrey, U.S. Department of Defense Representative Michael A. Wermuth, RAND, Executive Project Director R Health Research Highlights After 9/11: Stress and Coping Across America

s survivors of natural disasters, violent crimes, and Our Survey war attest, people who are victims or witnesses of a A traumatic event often experience symptoms of stress, We assembled a team of researchers who designed and con- sometimes for years after. But events in recent years have taught ducted a telephone survey of a nationally representative sample us that individuals need not be present at a catastrophic event of U.S. households three to ﬁve days after the attacks. The to experience stress symptoms. purpose of the survey was to determine the immediate reactions The terrorist attacks that shook the United States on of adults to the events and their perceptions of their children’s September 11, 2001 were immediately broadcast on TV screens reactions. Our primary goal was to learn whether people around across the nation. Remarkable video footage that showed the the country experienced symptoms of stress at rates anywhere events and their aftermath in graphic detail was repeatedly aired near those of people who lived within close proximity. In addi- after the attacks. Many Americans may have identiﬁed with tion, we hoped to learn something about how people coped the victims or perceived the unprecedented attacks as directed with their reactions. at themselves as well. Thus, even people who were nowhere near the locations of the attacks might have experienced substantial stress responses.

Some Questions We Asked

Adults Substantial Stress (%) Since Tuesday, have you been bothered by: Feeling very upset when something reminds you of what happened? 30 Repeated disturbing memories, thoughts, or dreams about what happened? 16 Having difﬁculty concentrating? 14 Trouble falling or staying asleep? 11 Feeling irritable or having angry outbursts? 9 At least one of the above? 44 (Possible responses were “not at all,” “a little bit,” “moderately,” “quite a bit,” and “extremely.” Substantial stress was deﬁned as an answer of “quite a bit” or “extremely.”)

Children Since Tuesday, has your child been: Avoiding talking or hearing about what happened? 18 Having trouble keeping his or her mind on things and concentrating? 12 Having trouble falling or staying asleep? 10 Losing his or her temper or being irritable? 10 Having nightmares? 6 At least one of the above? 35 Worried about his or her safety or the safety of a loved one? 47 (For children, stress was deﬁned as a response of “yes” on a two-point scale [“yes,” “no”]). R Health

Most Adults and Many Children Showed Signs of Other Ways of Coping Stress We found that people responded to the tragic events of Ninety percent of the adults surveyed reported experiencing, to September 11 in a variety of ways (see the figure). Most people at least some degree, one or more symptoms, and 44 percent of turned to others for social support, and many turned to their the adults reported a substantial level of at least one symptom religion or another source of spiritual guidance. More than 30 of stress (see box, “Some Questions We Asked”). While those percent donated money or blood, about 20 percent said they closest to the sites of attack had the most substantial stress, began to stockpile things like food or gas, and 60 percent respondents throughout the country, from large cities to small reported participating in group activities like memorials or communities, reported stress symptoms: 36 percent of respon- vigils, which can provide a sense of community. dents over 1,000 miles from the World Trade Center reported About 40 percent of people reported avoiding activities substantial stress reactions, compared with 60 percent of those (like watching television) that reminded them of the events. within 100 miles of the site. Health professionals have tended to regard avoidance as an Studies have shown that children who were exposed solely impediment to the emotional processing needed for recovery through television to such horrifying events as the Challenger from trauma. However, under these unusual circumstances disaster, the Oklahoma City bombing, and the Gulf War expe- and in the face of continuous TV coverage, avoidance may not rienced trauma-related stress reactions. We found that children necessarily have been an unhealthy response. were also profoundly affected by the events of September 11. Professional organizations like the American Academy of Thirty-five percent of parents reported that their children Pediatrics recommend that during crises, parents consider limit- showed one or more signs of stress, and 47 percent reported ing their children’s television viewing of the crisis and speak with that their children were worried about their own safety or the them about it. Nearly all parents we surveyed spoke with their safety of a loved one. children about the attacks. More than 80 percent of parents reported talking with their children for an hour or more, and 14 percent spoke with their children for a total of more than The Contribution of Television nine hours about the attacks. About a third of parents tried to limit the amount of TV news their children watched: Parents Adults watched an average of eight hours of TV coverage of the attacks on September 11, with nearly a fifth of the survey respondents reporting that they watched 13 hours or more. How Did People Cope? Those who watched the most television reported the most stress.

According to parental reports, children watched an aver- Talked about thoughts age of three hours of TV coverage about the attacks, with and feelings older children watching signiﬁcantly more than younger ones. Prayer/spiritual feelings

Among children whose parents did not try to limit their tele- Participated in public activity vision viewing, watching more television was associated with Avoided watching TV and having more symptoms of stress. other reminders We cannot say whether more TV viewing precipitated Donated blood or money higher stress levels. For some people, television may have been Bought food, gas, or supplies a source of information about the situation and what to do, and therefore may have provided a positive means of coping with 020406080100 stress. Others, especially children, may have reacted to the Percent repeated viewing of terrifying images with heightened anxiety.

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of younger children and of children who had more stress symp- that children—or adults—need help and ways to respond to toms were more likely to limit their children’s TV viewing. their needs. We also hope to identify activities that proved to be positive coping responses. Providing clinicians, clergy and other spiritual leaders, employers, teachers, school counselors, What Next? and others with this kind of information should enable them to respond quickly, as soon as symptoms appear, and guide people Studies of reactions to prior crises have shown that for most to more positive ways of coping in the event of further disas- people with indirect exposure, stress reactions wane with time. ters of this magnitude. However, the unprecedented nature of the events of September 11, coupled with the continued TV coverage and the ongoing threats that have followed, lead us to speculate that the psychological impact may not diminish as rapidly for some people. Reminders of the events may trigger a recurrence of stress For more information symptoms for some. We are now performing a follow-up survey to assess how people’s initial responses have changed with time Schuster, M. A., B. D. Stein, L. H. Jaycox, R. L. Collins, G. N. and to what extent individuals’ immediate responses predict Marshall, M. N. Elliott, A. J. Zhou, D. E. Kanouse, J. L. Morrison, S. H. Berry. “A National Survey of Stress Reactions After the later symptoms. September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks.” New England Journal of Because interventions are most effective when begun soon Medicine.Vol. 345, No. 20, November 15, 2001, pp. 1507–1512. after the precipitating event, we hope to identify early signs

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Abstracts of all RAND Health publications and full text of many research documents can be found on the RAND Health web site at www.rand.org/health. RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND Health furthers this mission by working to improve health and health care systems and advance understanding of how the organization and financing of care affect costs, quality, and access. RAND® is a registered trademark.

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RB-4546 (2001) Safeguarding the Skies

By Brian Michael Jenkins

This opinion article was originally published in the San Diego Union Tribune on September 30, 2001.

We may never know exactly how the hijackers seized control of four airliners on Sept. 11. The little evidence we have suggests they did it with small knives, cardboard cutters, and claims to have a bomb. They may or may not have worn red bandanas -- a psychological ploy.

Add to their weapons, real and imaginary, the element of surprise, the fact that they were a team rather than a lone hijacker, possibly some swift initial act of violence to intimidate would-be challengers, and everyone's knowledge of previous hijackings, which suggested that compliance rather than foolish individual resistance was the safest course of action.

How they persuaded or coerced pilots to surrender the controls we do not know. In the one aircraft where passengers realized what the hijackers intended, they were able to thwart their plans at the cost of their own lives.

If this scenario is more or less correct, then no FAA rules were broken. Had the 19 not hijacked or threatened to hijack the aircraft, they broke no laws. They could not be arrested for bringing on board items that passengers are permitted to carry. If we measure performance strictly by compliance with rules, security worked!

Of course, it did not. Procedures worked. Security failed terribly with catastrophic consequences. The Sept. 11 attacks underline the difficult task of defending against terrorism in general and the specific problem of aviation security. Finger pointing now serves no purpose. In the name of cheap, convenient air travel, Congress failed to require, industry failed to provide, government failed to enforce, and the public failed to demand adequate security.

New rules to prevent a recurrence of what happened on Sept. 11 are necessary. They will not suffice. Hastily enacted legislation, however well intentioned it may be, will not suffice.

We operate in a new environment. Aviation security, as the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security argued five years ago, but not strenuously enough, had become an issue of national security. That sense of urgence was not shared then; it was more business as usual. Now, however, it is clear that national security is at risk and the events of Sept. 11 demand that we fundamentally review the strategy, organization, financing, policies, procedures and performance of how we secure commercial and private aviation in this country.

The recommendations made by the White House Commission in 1997 do not offer a blueprint for what must be done today. Commissions are advisory bodies; they have no power beyond the persuasiveness of their arguments. Members of the commission were determinedly pragmatic. We saw no utility in making proposals that had little chance of acceptance, even less of implementation. We tried to improve security; we could not overhaul it.

The commission naturally focused on preventing the sabotage of airliners. Initially, it had been feared that a terrorist bomb had brought down TWA 800, which crashed in July 1996, killing all 244 persons on board. Evidence later pointed to mechanical failure.

Nonetheless, in the previous 11 years terrorist bombs had brought down a number of commercial jets killing nearly a thousand people including 271 who died at Lockerbie -- America's worst terrorist incident. And in 1996, authorities in the Philippines had luckily discovered a plot masterminded by Ramzi Yousef, (wanted for his participation in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing) to bring down 12 U.S. jetliners in the Pacific. A coordinated attack, breathtaking in its ambition, had it come off would have resulted in thousands of fatalities. It was a warning of the kind of terrorist thinking we face. Armed with knowledge of the plot, the FAA implemented special security measures and nothing happened. One of the frustrations in combatting terrorism is that successes are often invisible while failures are obvious.

The possibility that hijackers might intend to do more than seize hostages and change the destination of the plane was not unthinkable. There were a few precedents, but absent a hijacking in the United States for years, no specific countermeasures were proposed.

Security against terrorism is always reactive. The problem is that thinking as a terrorist might, I can conjure up more diabolical scenarios than any security system can protect against. The White House Commission mentioned three of these: attacks on commercial airliners with hand-held, precision-guided surface-to-air missiles -- it has happened a number of times overseas; cyber-attacks on vital information systems like air traffic control, and the deliberate contamination of an airliner with chemical or biological substances. But we offered no solutions.

The challenge is not formulating attack scenarios. It is trying to figure out how best to allocate security resources in an environment of uncertainty. Why not deal with all of them? To a certain extent that is necessary, but it dilutes and may divert resources. And still more threat scenarios, all plausible albeit remote, can be added, eventually swamping security efforts.

The Sept. 11 attacks demonstrate that compliance with rules does not equal good security. Security that is based solely on compliance with specific FAA rules ceases to be dynamic. It becomes predictable. An intelligent observer can watch the procedures, discern the vulnerabilities and exploit them as terrorists did on Sept. 11. If an army were to do exactly the same thing in every battle, it would soon be defeated. Rule-based security filters out the dumb; it lies wide open to the clever.

Aviation security has in the past relied upon a front-line defense. A proliferation of hijackings in the late 1960s and early 1970s mandated extraordinary security measures. Although sky marshals initially were deployed, a decision was made that the best place to conduct security was on the ground before passengers boarded the aircraft. In 1973, the United States implemented 100 percent passenger screening -- controversial at the time -- obliging every passenger to pass through a metal detector, put their carry-on luggage through an X-ray machine, and submit, if requested, to a hand search.

At the same time, diplomatic efforts succeeded in persuading more and more nations to prosecute or extradite all hijackers regardless of their cause. Hijackings declined dramatically, but did not cease entirely. Individuals still found ways to smuggle weapons on board, exploited less secure airports, used makeshift weapons, or simply claimed to have explosives.

On the airplane, the safest course of action was to keep the hijacker calm and get the airplane back on the ground where authorities could deal with the problem. Compliance, not resistance, made sense and it did work to save lives.

We now need to develop a multilayered defense. The front line would comprise the passenger screening, and luggage inspection now done at airports, but with better performance. The deployment of explosives detection technology should be accelerated. Additional passenger inspections can be carried out at the gate.

Security measures on the airplane can provide a second layer of defense. As it stands now, the biggest single improvement in security on the plane is the likelihood that any future hijacker will be beaten senseless by desperate passengers. Measures may include air marshals, sealed cockpits, armored cockpit doors.

The fact that pilots want to be armed betrays the lack of confidence in the current security structure by those who fly the planes. Should they be? It is an option. Certainly, no future adversary should be allowed to think that they might not be.

Technology offers a last line of defense. We can install technology to ensure that only an authorized member of the crew is at the controls. Upon a duress signal from the pilot or a significant deviation from the flight path, we can remotely switch on audio and video monitoring of the cockpit to see the situation. The technology also exists to disconnect whoever is in the cockpit and land the plane by remote control, although the safety of that approach needs to be demonstrated. Between the layers of security must be curtains of mystery -- unannounced changes in security levels, routines, and procedures that reflect the evolving threat and deprive the would-be adversary of certainty and confound his planning. These should be implemented without the need for the negotiation of new rules required under the current regime. One useful consequence of federalizing aviation security is the ability to treat security operations as classified information, thereby keeping it out of the hands of those who would use it as a road map.

A more professional security force is prerequisite to any significant improvement in aviation security. The current screening force is haphazardly recruited, unscreened, underpaid, inadequately trained and poorly motivated to do a very difficult job. People think screening is easy. It isn't. There is nothing inherently wrong with those who perform this difficult task, and in some places they do an excellent job, but performance is patchy. The problem is systemic. Competitive bidding for security contracts and high turnover rates among personnel encourage cutting corners.

One option is to create a professional national service encompassing screeners, ramp guards and air marshals, thus providing opportunities to make aviation security a career. Training can be conducted in a more creative way than mere classroom instruction. Realistic testing can prevent boredom and complacency and at the same time provide opportunities to offer instant cash rewards and points for promotion. National competitions can be held -- a security Olympics. Performance can be made a matter of personal pride and a means to personal advancement. At one time in our history, we turned conscripts, and in some cases young men given a choice between jail or enlistment, into good soldiers. We certainly can turn volunteers into a dedicated security force.

It should not take long to create a well-trained professional security force if we put our mind to it. People have referred to the Sept. 11 attacks as another Pearl Harbor. Eleven months after Pearl Harbor, we successfully landed an army of 100,000 men on the shores of North Africa. This is a less daunting task.

To do so will require a new organizational approach. We must consider every option except the continuation of the current contract-to-the-lowest-bidder system: A federal force has some advantages. A quasi-public aviation security authority also is a possibility -- autonomous but under contract to the Department of Transportation or Department of Defense in order to allow federal review, but not inappropriate industry or political influence over its staff. It will answer -- and it will answer -- directly to the American public. The era of overt and covert industry influence has to end.

The costs will run to several billion dollars a year. Yet, with approximately 700 million airline passengers a year in the United States, a security tax of three to four dollars per flight, an amount most passengers now would readily pay, security would be self- funding. This sum ought not to be part of the airlines' top line or an expense in calculating their bottom line. And it ought not to be subject to the annual budget negotiations in Congress. Put a tax on every airline ticket for security and direct the revenue stream to a trust which is to be used exclusively for its declared purpose. This idea surfaced in the Commission's discussions, but it was rejected as unwarranted and unsalable.

We must credibly re-establish air travel as being safe and secure. The vitality of our economy depends on it. The common defense of our nation depends on it. Our lives depend on it.

Brian Jenkins, an authority on terrorism, served as a member of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security and is a co-author of "Aviation Terrorism and Security." He is the senior adviser to the president of the RAND Corporation and a research associate at the Mineta Transportation Institute. I Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security

Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security Concepts, Issues, and Options Eric V. Larson, John E. Peters For a copy visit www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1251 or call 703.413.1100 extension 5431.

The overall objective of the research reported here is to help the Army understand a new mission area called homeland security. To achieve this, the research had the following principal, more instrumental, objectives. They were to (1) characterize the range of threats that need to be considered; (2) provide a methodology for homeland security; (3) delineate Army responsibilities; (4) describe additional force protection requirements that might be necessary; (5) evaluate capabilities, provide options, and highlight risks; and (6) help the Army explain its role in homeland security. A summary of our principal findings with regard to each of these six objectives follows.

CHARACTERIZING THE RANGE OF HOMELAND SECURITY THREATS

A Taxonomy of Threats

Chapters Four through Seven characterize the range of threats facing the nation in the four homeland security task areas and describe the most relevant policy considerations for dealing with these threats. Although most of these threats seem relatively remote now, the Army and DoD should continue its planning and preparations for the following:

The threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including high explosives, either against the population; critical national infrastructure; elected and appointed leaders at the local, state, or federal level; or U.S. military forces.

• The threat of specialty weapons, such as mortars, rocketpropelled grenades (RPGs), and man-portable air defense missiles, against the same targets.

• The threat of cyber attacks on mission-critical systems aimed at disrupting the continuity of military operations.

• The threat of WMD smuggling into the United States.

• The threat of large-scale refugee flows that can create threats to national security.

• The threat of the use of ballistic or cruise missiles against the nation.1

Our analysis suggests that most of these threats are relatively modest but possibly growing, as is the risk of surprise. With cyber attacks, it is particularly difficult to establish the degree of threat because of poor data and the somewhat alarmist nature of the debate.2 These “low but possibly growing” threats clearly justify planning and selective enhancement of local, state, federal, and military capabilities, but the Army needs to ensure that it is neither overrating the likelihood or consequence of future attacks nor beguiled by the most advanced threats at the expense of preparing for the most likely ones.

During the course of the study, the study team was asked to address the issue of threat campaigns directed at the continental United States (CONUS). Although such threat campaigns

1 Because it already is the focus of substantial effort, national missile defense is not addressed in the present report. 2 We generally agree with Betts’s (1998) argument that “the probability that some smaller number of WMD will be used is growing.” II Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security appear to be unlikely at present, they could pose important challenges if mounted by a committed future adversary. In particular, civilian and military leaders could face a dilemma if simultaneous attacks were made against military and civilian targets in the United States. Attacks on the military could disrupt mobilization for a major theater war (MTW), while simultaneous attacks on civilian targets could further tax mobilization capabilities, sapping those “dual-missioned” to warfighting and homeland security. Consequently, planning and capability development should consider the possibility of a sustained campaign that includes multiple attacks separated in space and time, and assigning missions to forces in ways that minimize potential tension between warfighting and homeland security activities. In particular, the Army should perform analysis, planning, and training to field multiple simultaneous Response Task Forces (RTFs).

A Definition of Homeland Security

Because at present no agreed-on definition for homeland security exists, we now provide our working definition:

Homeland [security] consists of all military activities aimed at preparing for, protecting against, or managing the consequences of attacks on American soil, including the CONUS and U.S. territories and possessions. It includes all actions to safeguard the populace and its property, critical infrastructure, the government, and the military, its installations, and deploying forces.3

While other definitions are certainly possible, the merit of the definition just presented is that it is clear about homeland security’s focus on military activities (as distinct from the activities of civilian organizations), its geographic specificity, and the potential targets it seeks to protect.

The taxonomy of threats and definition of homeland security suggest five key military task areas:

• WMD domestic preparedness and civil support;

• continuity of government, i.e., operations to ensure or restore civil authority;

• border and coastal defense, including the prevention of WMD smuggling into the United States and management of large-scale refugee flows that can create threats to national security;

• continuity of military operations, including force protection—primarily for deploying units—protection of mission-critical facilities and systems, and protection of higher headquarters operations; and

• national missile defense (not considered in this report).

A METHODOLOGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY

In Chapter Three, the report provides a method for assessing homeland security needs and options. The methodology is organized around a nomogram (Figure S.1) that enables planners to address, in turn, threat and risk assessment, performance levels and needed capabilities, design of cost-effective programs, and budgeting.

The nomogram was designed to address four key questions relating to homeland security:

• What magnitudes of events should the United States plan against for high-explosive, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and cyber threats? (Panel I, Threat Analysis)

3 We recognize that other departments and agencies have important roles to play in many areas related to homeland security. For example, and most notably, the FBI and FEMA play the key roles in crisis and consequence management. However, we reserve the phrase “homeland security” for the tasks performed by the armed services and the Department of Defense. III Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security

• What levels of performance will the nation demand in the national (local, state, and federal) responses to these events? (Panel II, Performance Levels and Needed Capabilities)

• What are the most cost-effective options for providing the capabilities that will address these events at the desired performance levels? (Panel III, Programming)

• What resources will be made available, and will they be sufficient to provide the necessary capabilities? (Panel IV, Budgeting).

Figure S. 1-Nomogram for Assessing Homeland Security Options

Answers to each of these questions are needed to ensure that proper resources will be devoted and the right capabilities will be developed for homeland security. The nomogram shows how decisions taken in each panel contribute to the larger analysis. A decision about the magnitude of the events to be planned against (m*) taken in Panel I is refined when a decision is taken in Panel II to provide a high level of capacity, which establishes performance criteria (c*) for assessing alternatives. The planning magnitude and performance criteria then set the stage in Panel III for designing cost-effective programs, and the total cost of these programs ($*) is traded off against other budgetary claimants in Panel IV. To be sure, behind each panel a great deal of policy discussion occurs, as well as analytic effort in the way of studies and analyses and modeling.

Our analyses suggest that despite a great deal of important work to redress shortfalls in local, state, and federal capabilities to address emerging threats to the homeland, the four key questions—one each associated with a panel of the nomogram—remain substantially unanswered. We believe that if national efforts are to be harmonized and made efficient, it is critical for the Army and others (the DoD, federal civilian agencies, and local and state entities) to collectively, and systematically, address these questions.

DELINEATE ARMY RESPONSIBILITIES

Chapters Four through Seven also delineate, in some detail, the Army responsibilities and capabilities in each of the four homeland security task areas that are the subject of this study.

In three of the task areas (domestic preparedness, continuity of government, and border and coastal defense), the Army is in a supporting role to civil authorities. In domestic preparedness, for example, federal Army participation will take place when the FBI (the lead federal agency for domestic crisis management operations) or the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (the lead federal agency for consequence management) requests the Department of Defense to provide military forces and capabilities to assist. National Guard forces also may, of course, participate through the state-level chain of command (the governor and adjutant general). IV Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security

In domestic preparedness, the Army appears to have the leading military role, based on its deep involvement in all aspects of the task area, including nonproliferation and counterproliferation activities; preparedness activities, such as training first responders; and support to consequence management. In continuity of government (COG) activities, the Army could have the leading military role, although it is difficult to say. In border and coastal defense, there are few indications that the Army would play the leading military role. In the continuity of operations task area, the Army essentially is responsible for the protection of its own forces, mission-critical facilities and systems, and higher headquarters. Protection of other potential targets seems likely to be on an “as assigned” basis.

General Versus Specialized Forces

One of the questions posed at the outset of this study involves the role of general and more- specialized units in homeland security. Both play important roles, with the specialized units delivering unique capabilities (e.g., medical care; nuclear, biological, and chemical [NBC] identification and decontamination; explosive ordnance disposal). The general-purpose units provide “deep pockets” and personnel for mass response to provide such services as emergency first aid, food, shelter, communications, clothing, and security. As the Army responds to the mandates of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation and other directives, both its general and specialized units are undergoing additional training to assist in domestic preparedness. For many of the specialized units, this has been a welcome development, because it has meant more opportunities to train in their main competencies. For example, medical units benefit from practicing treating patients whether the victims are combatants or not. For the general-purpose units, the additional training not only provides necessary skills but also represents another demand on their training time. The competition for training time needed for both domestic preparedness and units’ other missions requires careful management of mission-essential task lists.

Active-Duty and Reserve Component Forces

The Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 notes that eight Army National Guard (ARNG) divisions are available for employment in warfighting and other missions and suggests that some of them might be assigned to homeland security. The study suggests that, in some specific cases, substituting reserve component for active-duty forces would be a cost-effective solution, although it is not at all clear in which other cases this also might be true.

As argued in this report, however, the current threat levels do not appear to justify the assignment of substantial forces to homeland security missions. It also argues that assignment of missions and allocation of additional forces to homeland security should be based on threat and risk assessments that provide a justification for a given level of effort, and cost-effectiveness and tradeoff analyses that establish that the forces being assigned to the mission are the most effective and efficient solution to the problem, in light of the total pool of local, state, federal, and military capabilities available.

Nevertheless, the probability that threats are increasing does suggest that additional Army preparations for homeland security are warranted.

In Chapter Nine we evaluate the adequacy of current Army doctrine, organizations, training, leadership, materiel, and soldier systems (DOTLMS) for the four homeland security task areas and suggest areas in which short-term improvements can be realized at modest cost.

Additionally, given the poor understanding of the cost-effectiveness of alternative homeland security units or organizations, we also recommend that the Army aggressively explore alternative future operational concepts for homeland security that may be more cost-effective than the current ones (e.g., WMD Civil Support Teams). A combination of experiments and V Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security exercises to generate lessons learned, and efforts to design new future operational concepts that can be tested in these exercises and experiments clearly seems warranted.

To accomplish this, the Army might promote the use of joint warfighting experiments to test the likely responsiveness and capacity of the current DoD capabilities to perform homeland security missions. The Army can use the lessons from these experiments to refine its understanding of existing Army capabilities and limitations and thereby refine the WMD CST and other concepts.

The Army also should consider creating a Homeland Security Battle Lab to design and test alternative future Army operational concepts and organizations whose responsiveness and capacity is greater than the present ones. When experimentation and testing have confirmed the cost-effectiveness of these concepts, the Army can begin developing the doctrine, organizational templates, training, and equipment packages needed and, when the threat level warrants, determine the number of units that need to be fielded. Such an approach will improve the Army’s ability to provide the necessary capabilities as the threat changes.

DESCRIBE ADDITIONAL FORCE PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS

Although the threats to CONUS-based U.S. forces appear quite low at present, there is reason to remain concerned that adversaries may increasingly plan to use asymmetric attacks to target and disrupt the deployment of U.S. forces. Of particular concern would be a prolonged campaign of such attacks or attacks in numerous locations throughout the United States early in the deployment sequence. Either could severely tax the ability and willingness of commanders to continue the flow of forces to a warfighting theater in the face of threats to deploying forces. Such attacks obviously bring the war to the United States, causing a competition for resources and, essentially, forcing the United States to fight a two-front war.

Planning should focus on additional force protection for early deploying forces (e.g., the Ready Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division), their home stations, fort-to-port movements, and air and seaports of embarkation. Of particular concern is the potential threat to deploying airlifters and commercial aircraft, where hundreds of troops’ lives might be lost in a single incident. Capabilities for ensuring the security of fly-out zones should be assessed and, if necessary, augmented.

The Army also should begin planning now, while the threats are still somewhat remote, for ways to resolve a looming, future conundrum it may face. In the event of an asymmetric campaign of attacks on civilian and military targets in the CONUS during a wartime mobilization, not only could mobilization be disrupted, but fierce competition could arise for low-density units that have the dual mission of warfighting abroad and homeland security. Actions taken now can greatly reduce the possibility and consequences of such competition and better ensure force protection from fort to port and in-theater.

EVALUATE CAPABILITIES, PROVIDE OPTIONS, HIGHLIGHT RISKS

The Army needs to navigate a difficult course. On the one hand, it must avoid overrating the probability and imminence of the threats it faces and doing far too much at too high a cost. On the other hand, it needs to recognize that while the threats are reasonably low now, they are possibly growing, as is the possibility of surprise. While action is warranted, investments should be made strategically and selectively. The Army also needs to avoid taking actions that heighten public sensitivities about the role of the military in domestic law enforcement and in continuity of government.

The Risk of Doing Too Much or Too Little

The best way to negotiate the first two risks is to embrace an adaptive planning framework that bases investments both on an end-to-end analysis of threats and risks, including the potential costs of attacks on high-value targets, and an end-to-end, strategies-to-tasks analysis of what VI Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security capabilities are needed and the most cost-effective programmatic alternatives for providing those capabilities.

This approach would advocate a focus on low-cost, high-payoff actions. These include detailed studies and analyses, modeling, and simulations to illuminate alternatives and refine doctrine and organizational structures. They also include the design and fielding of prototype units that, once proven to be cost-effective solutions for providing needed capabilities with the desired responsiveness and capacity, can serve as the pattern for fielding additional such units or can be scaled up to larger units providing more substantial capability.

Analysis suggests that although estimating the rate at which the threats might grow is exceedingly difficult, they probably will grow over time, and additional future investments in the homeland security mission accordingly may be necessary. Given that expectation, it would be best for the Army to focus now on refining its concepts, doctrine, organizations, and forces before making additional largescale investments. For example, on further analysis and reflection, the Army might find that the best concept for its initial response may be a WMD Civil Support Team with a greater emphasis on bringing actual decontamination capabilities to bear than the current concept does.4 It also may find that the mobility requirements—and costs—associated with making Army contributions responsive enough to affect outcomes could be considerable.

Risks Attendant in Public Concerns About Domestic Military Operations

After a prolonged, hard-fought battle, the Army at the end of the 1990s is held in generally high regard by American civil society. The Army faces some risks to this standing, however, as it addresses the many sensitive issues engendered in homeland security. As Pamela Berkowsky, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support, recently described the task area of WMD civil support:

We do not call consequence management “Homeland Defense” but refer to it rather as “civil support.” This reflects the fundamental principle that DoD is not in the lead but is there to support the lead federal agency in the event of a domestic contingency. Likewise, we are sensitive to the concerns of civil libertarians and others regarding DoD’s possible domestic role. (Berkowsky and Cragin, 2000.)

In fact, the role that the Army and the other services play in most of the homeland security task areas is to provide support to civilian authorities, whether local, state, or federal. At the state level, for example, Army National Guard forces work for the governor. At the federal level, the Army works for the National Command Authority (NCA), and, in almost all situations other than civil disturbances when martial law is declared by the President, the Army supports federal departments and agencies.

Although such concerns have not often arisen in disaster responses (perhaps the closest analogy to WMD consequence management activities), using federal military forces in the United States to assist in the maintenance of law and order, for example, is strongly opposed by very vocal segments of the public and their elected representatives. Public concerns about posse comitatus and the military role in continuity of government are likely to remain important for the foreseeable future, insofar as they pose two sorts of risk: first, that such concerns, once activated, may interfere in the accomplishment of homeland security missions, and second, that once activated, they can erode public confidence in the Army as an institution.

While we believe that these risks are relatively modest, they need to be considered by the Army, and in any event they can be managed successfully through minor revisions to doctrine, training, and leadership programs and standing public affairs guidance for homeland security operations.

4 “WMD Civil Support Teams” previously were called “Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID)” teams but were recently renamed. See OASD (Public Affairs) (2000); Bacon (2000); and Berkowsky and Cragin (2000). VII Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security

Such revisions would help to sensitize future commanders to these larger issues, provide clear guidance on when and how posse comitatus and other laws do and do not apply, and provide the elements of broad public affairs guidance that emphasizes the Army’s supporting role to civil authority and, whenever it has been disrupted, whether at the local, state, or federal level, Army efforts to effect a speedy restoration of civil authority.

HELPING THE ARMY EXPLAIN ITS ROLE IN HOMELAND SECURITY

Throughout its history, the Army has been involved in homeland security. In other eras, the Army defended the nation’s coasts and frontiers, for example, and whenever needed, it has supported civilian authorities in responding to disasters, civil disturbances, and other national emergencies. As the nation’s servant, the Army will continue to provide for the nation’s defense, both at home and abroad, and the reemergence of homeland security as a serious mission finds the Army well- prepared to provide many of the needed capabilities.

Because the threats seem likely to grow and the missions may turn out to be challenging, the Army will increasingly need to focus on deterring or preventing, preparing for, and mitigating the consequences of attacks on the nation, while seeking to ensure civil authority or assist in its restoration at the earliest opportunity. This dual focus—on improving its performance in the missions it is assigned and on burnishing its image as a protector of the larger constitutional framework—will help ensure the Army’s ability to meet the challenges it faces.

The definition and taxonomy of threats described earlier also leads to “bumper stickers” the Army can use to explain its role in the four homeland security task areas that are the focus of this report (the “bumper stickers” are in quotation marks):

• “Protecting Americans at Home” (WMD domestic preparedness and civil support);

• “Ensuring Constitutional Authority” (continuity of government);

• “Protecting Sovereignty” (border and coastal defense); and

• “Ensuring Military Capability” (continuity of military operations).

CONCLUSIONS

Homeland security is a complex, sprawling subject sure to become an increasing topic of deliberation and debate both within government and outside.

Our work suggests that the principal unresolved issues in homeland security can be answered through DoD-wide deliberation over the four core questions of homeland security:

• For what types and magnitudes of events will the defense establishment plan?

• What levels of performance will be demanded of DoD and local, state, and federal actors in their responses to these events?

• What are the most cost-effective options—within DoD and across the entire “layer cake” of local, state, and federal actors—for providing the capabilities that will address these events at the desired performance levels?

• What resources will be made available, will they be sufficient to provide the necessary capabilities, and what opportunity costs or risks will be incurred as a result?

To properly answer these questions and to develop this new mission area, a great deal of analytic, experimental, and planning work clearly needs to be done on each of these questions. VIII Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security

Studies and analyses are needed to understand better the risks and cost implications of various “planning magnitudes”; what constitute realistic performance goals for preventing, managing, and responding to various types of threat; what the most cost-effective mix of military and federal, state, and local civilian capabilities to achieve desired performance levels is; and what the opportunity costs and levels of risk incurred with any given set of capabilities and budgets are.

These questions can be explored through the development and use of macro-level simulation, optimization, and other models, and the development of such models should be a priority for the Army and DoD. They could assist in understanding such issues as the optimal number and locations of stockpiles and mobility assets to ensure the desired level of responsiveness and the optimal allocation of resources among military, federal, state, and local entities to ensure the desired level of capacity to deter, prevent, or minimize the consequences of various threats.

It also will be important for the Army and DoD to engage in field experimentation and research and development (R&D). For example, before fielding large numbers of new units, it will be critical to experiment with alternative concepts and organizations—the current proliferation of WMD Civil Support Teams (formerly RAIDs), for example, offers the Army an excellent opportunity to learn lessons and identify best practices that can be used for further refinement of response concepts and organizations. Continued efforts should be directed at identifying the most responsive, most capable, most costeffective, and most robust contributions that can be made to the larger federal, state, and local response system, and these efforts should include consideration of needed stockpiles and mobility.

Another high priority for Army and DoD-wide R&D will be efforts that aim to reduce the unit costs of advanced capabilities, such as detection and assessment of chemical and biological agents, thereby allowing them to be inexpensively distributed to the local first responders who are likely to be the earliest to arrive at the scene.

As suggested above, Army leaders’ efforts would best be directed at ensuring that the capabilities developed by the Army for homeland security are grounded in a solid understanding of the threat (both the likelihood and potential magnitude of different types of attack), the cost-effectiveness of alternative concepts and programs, and the risks and opportunity costs associated with different levels and types of Army preparedness. In particular, although they seem unlikely to be faced with such a dilemma in the near future, Army leaders should begin considering the possibility that in a future mobilization for MTWs, active-duty or reserve component units that have dual missions of warfighting and homeland security could be faced with simultaneous taskings, posing a risk to the accomplishment of both the warfighting and the homeland security missions. To avoid such dilemmas, it will be necessary to organize homeland security capabilities in ways that minimize this possibility and to have a robust doctrine for ensuring that both missions receive the appropriate levels and types of forces.

Beyond stating the obvious point that homeland security is likely to grow in importance, it is difficult to say how the issue might evolve in the future. Nevertheless, the Army and DoD will be well-prepared to wrestle with the core issues if they embrace a long-term adaptive approach that ties resources to an understanding of both threat and cost-effectiveness and thereby efficiently provides the capabilities needed to prepare the nation for the emerging threats. I Confronting Iraq

Confronting Iraq U.S. Policy and the Use of Force Since the Gulf War Daniel Byman, Matthew Waxman

For a copy visit www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1146 or call 703.413.1100 extension 5431.

Successful coercion, a cornerstone of an effective foreign policy, depends on the proper application of military force. Despite its overwhelming military power, however, the United States often fails to coerce successfully. To help understand this problem, this study assesses attempts to coerce Iraq since the end of the Gulf War in 1991. Although Iraq remains hostile to the United States and its allies, Baghdad has also repeatedly compromised, and at times even caved, in response to U.S. and allied pressure. The story behind this mixed record illustrates Baghdad’s strengths and weaknesses and highlights general lessons about limits on the U.S. ability to bring its full power to bear when coercing foes.

AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK

Coercion is the use of threatened force, including the limited use of actual force to back up the threat, to induce an adversary to behave differently than it otherwise would. Coercion is typically broken down into two categories: deterrence (stopping an undesired action from occurring) and compellence (reversing an undesired action). In practice, however, distinguishing between these two is difficult. This report draws on both these categories to inform its overall conclusions about coercion. Coercion is a dynamic process. Just as the United States or another coercer tries to shape Iraq’s or another adversary’s behavior, so too does Iraq try to reduce the pressure imposed on it. Adversaries typically try to counter-coerce the United States, inflicting military, political, or diplomatic costs to force the United States to drop its threats. Any assessment of the U.S.-Iraq confrontation must focus equally on the U.S. capacity to apply pressure and on Iraq’s capacity to neutralize or reverse it.

Coercive success is often difficult to measure. The same action can have both positive and negative effects, particularly when long-term ramifications are taken into account. Many past studies of coercion have paid inadequate attention to the range of goals pursued by the coercing power. With the same action, the United States can succeed in forcing Iraqi troops off the Kuwaiti border even as it fails to stop Iraq’s nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) programs. Any study of U.S. attempts to coerce Iraq must recognize the many, often competing, U.S. goals in the region—both short-term and long-term. Taken together, these points suggest that successful coercion has as much to do with constraints on the coercer as with vulnerabilities of the adversary and that the balance of constraints and vulnerabilities can change over time. Coercing Iraq is not just about threatening it with air strikes and sanctions but about the interaction of two political systems within a broader international context.

IRAQ AS AN ADVERSARY

To understand why coercion succeeds or fails in a given case, it is necessary to understand what drives an adversary’s decisionmaking. Iraq is thoroughly dominated by Saddam Husayn and his henchmen: their vulnerabilities and aspirations are, for the purpose of coercion, Iraq’s vulnerabilities and aspirations.

Saddam ruthlessly maintains his hold on power, and keeping power is the dominant concern that drives his regime’s decisionmaking. All positions of importance are in the hands of carefully selected individuals, who are usually from trusted Sunni Arab tribes or families. Using his numerous and overlapping security services and select military units, the Iraqi dictator has II Confronting Iraq eliminated any potential rivals. These services and units suppress popular unrest and guard against a coup or assassination attempt.

In addition to fear and repression, Saddam uses political measures to solidify his rule. He tries to curry favor with core Arab nationalist supporters by pursuing Iraqi hegemony in the region and Sunni Arab domination within Iraq, objectives that Saddam believes in but also supports for instrumental reasons. Saddam also uses financial rewards to co-opt leading tribal figures and employs the media to trumpet his identity as a powerful leader to impress supporters.

Iraq’s strategic objectives reflect both Saddam’s personal ambitions and the desires of his core supporters. Four related goals drive Iraq’s strategy today: maintaining the current regime’s hold on power, ending UN sanctions, achieving regional hegemony, and building an NBC weapons capability. These goals reflect Saddam’s desire to end pressures that highlight Iraq’s current weakness and his ambition to lead the Arab world.

THE HISTORICAL RECORD

The United States has pursued several, often-competing objectives with regard to Iraq. First, the United States has tried to prevent any Iraqi aggression by keeping Iraq weak and maintaining a strong regional presence. Second, it has sought to reverse Iraq’s NBC programs. Third, it has pressed to change the Iraqi regime. A fourth, negative objective has also shaped U.S. policy: preventing instability among its allies that might result from U.S. actions. These four objectives underlie U.S. attempts to coerce Iraq since the Gulf War.

The United States, however, does not have a free hand in its Iraq policy. Washington has long feared that the sudden collapse of Saddam’s regime would lead to chaos in Iraq and provide an opening for Iran to increase its influence. Washington seeks to keep its regional and international allies behind its policies, and they often differ on the correct way to confront Saddam. The United States also is ambivalent about its commitment to Iraq’s Kurds and Shi’a. Although Washington feels a humanitarian interest in their well being, it does not want its regional policies tied to these communities. Similar ambivalence can be found in U.S. attitudes toward sanctions. Sanctions are viewed as an effective tool for squeezing Baghdad, but the United States has tried to reduce their impact on the Iraqi populace. Finally, domestic politics shape U.S. actions: no administration can afford charges that it is “soft” on Iraq. Political pressures provide U.S. decisionmakers with military flexibility, but they also limit policy options during crises and when planning for future dangers.

With these objectives and constraints in mind, a close look at the following eight attempts to coerce Iraq or to deter hostile Iraqi actions, sometimes in response to coercion, reveals a mixed U.S. track record:

• Saddam’s acceptance of the initial UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) inspections at the end of Desert Storm in 1991.

• The imposition of a protectorate over Kurdish-populated areas of northern Iraq in 1991.

• The creation of a no-fly zone over southern Iraq in 1992.

• Saddam’s 1992–1993 defiance of both the no-fly zone and UNSCOM.

• The U.S. response to the 1994 Iraqi buildup near Kuwait.

• Saddam’s 1996 incursion into the protected zone in northern Iraq.

• The 1997–1998 standoffs over UNSCOM inspections. III Confronting Iraq

• U.S. strikes in response to Iraq’s defiance of UNSCOM in December 1998.

Among the positive results, Saddam accepted intrusive UNSCOM inspections for many years after the Gulf War, a safe haven in northern Iraq, and no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq. More broadly, Iraq has generally refrained from aggression against its neighbors. But despite these concessions, Saddam at times defied the no-fly zones, invaded the northern safe haven, and systematically deceived inspectors.

Coercive threats have contributed to the successful containment of Iraq. Iraq’s regional influence, while increased from 1991, remains limited. A robust U.S. regional presence, a rapid surge capacity, and a willingness to use limited force probably have convinced Saddam that regional aggression will not produce results. Coercive threats contributed to containment by maintaining no-fly and no-drive zones and demonstrating regional unity in the face of Iraq’s attempts to intimidate its neighbors.

Stopping Iraq’s NBC programs has proven far more difficult, but coercive threats have achieved some success. Iraq probably has not attained a nuclear weapons capability, and progress on its biological and chemical programs has probably halted—making this effort at least a partial success when we recognize that, without UNSCOM inspections, sanctions, and other measures, Iraq would probably have a nuclear weapon and a range of biological weapons. Nevertheless, the broader U.S. goals of discovering the extent of Iraq’s programs, destroying them, and preventing Iraq from reconstituting them in the future have not been met. Inspectors never discovered the true scope of Iraq’s programs, much less destroyed them. Effective inspections ended early in 1998, and even the pretense of arms control has now been abandoned. Although information is scarce, Saddam is probably trying to continue some programs already and certainly will do so once sanctions and isolation end. While threats of force have persuaded Saddam at various times to accept inspections and instances of force have knocked out some of his NBC program resources, the various U.S. actions have not substantially induced a change in Saddam’s long- term policies towards acquiring such an arsenal.

Maximal U.S. goals regarding regime change were not met, but Washington’s efforts did not destabilize U.S. regional allies as some policymakers feared. Efforts to change the regime—by encouraging Iraqi elites to support a coup or the Iraqi populace to overthrow Saddam—probably are farther from success than at any time this decade. Saddam’s position at home appears stronger than in the past, and the Iraqi opposition is fragmented. Coercive threats nevertheless made this goal more realistic. The protected zone in the north, and the humiliations of air strikes, contributed to disgruntlement among Saddam’s followers, though not enough to induce a regime change. The United States avoided instability among its regional allies while making the limited progress described above. Saudi Arabia and Turkey, while hardly tranquil, remain loyal U.S. allies. They have supported several U.S. operations in the region without suffering domestic unrest.

U.S. domestic support has been strong with regard to the use of force against Iraq. In general, both the Bush and Clinton administrations enjoyed considerable support from Congress and the U.S. public for their efforts to punish Iraqi aggression and end Iraq’s NBC programs. In addition to supporting a large U.S. military presence in the region, the American people have strongly backed policymakers’ calls to combat proliferation among rogue regimes. If anything, the American people and U.S. Congress are often more hawkish than the administration leadership. As a result, the President at times has been criticized for not threatening or using enough force.

Allied and international support proved far less consistent than U.S. domestic support and posed a major challenge for U.S. policy. Although U.S. allies in Europe and other major powers initially strongly supported attempts to coerce Iraq, over time France, Russia, and China became increasingly critical of U.S. policy in the region and sought to end or curtail sanctions and inspections. Regional allies often did not support U.S. strikes on Iraq or sought to limit their extent to avoid criticism at home. Lack of consistent regional or allied support undermined the IV Confronting Iraq credibility of U.S. threats, encouraged Saddam to defy U.S. ultimatums, and restricted U.S. military options.

IRAQ’S VULNERABILITIES AND COUNTERMOVES

The various U.S. attempts to coerce Iraq reveal that Saddam is most vulnerable, and therefore most likely to give in, when his power base is effectively threatened. Maintaining the support and loyalty of key tribes, Baath party officials, military officers, and other elites is Saddam’s overriding concern. When Saddam’s power base can be effectively targeted, he is more likely to limit his foreign policy provocations, unless restraint would jeopardize his position at home. After Operation Desert Storm, Saddam’s domestic position was weak, and he feared that another blow from the anti-Iraq coalition would shatter it. His response to subsequent threats and weak air and missile strikes in the following years exposed his fear that coalition military strikes might discredit his regime. U.S. military strikes and other forms of pressure that risked humiliating Saddam, demonstrating his inability to respond to U.S. pressure and threatening his control over his power base, proved effective at forcing concessions from the Iraqi regime.

Fear of elite dissatisfaction also helps explain instances when Saddam has issued provocations or refused to back down in the face of U.S. pressure: Saddam was most intransigent when acceding to U.S. demands would decrease support among his power base. In 1996, for example, Saddam saw an opportunity to regain stature in the eyes of core supporters by ordering incursions into northern Iraq against Kurdish and other resistance forces. Perhaps the most important issue related to elite dissatisfaction is Saddam’s commitment to Iraq’s NBC programs. Although Saddam’s initial defiance on this score may be explained by his belief that deception would triumph over UNSCOM and that sanctions would soon be lifted in any event, eventually the possession of NBC became a source of Saddam’s prestige in the eyes of his core supporters.

Saddam is somewhat sensitive to the threat of popular unrest. This sensitivity is largely indirect, though, and arises mostly when unrest risks discrediting him with his power base. Saddam is committed to firm control over Iraq, with his Sunni Arab nationalist brand of chauvinism dominant. The predecessors to the Baath government fell, in part, because they failed to achieve peace at home. Moreover, as Saddam has portrayed himself as the defender of Iraq’s integrity (and Sunni Arab hegemony), continued Shi’a, Kurdish, and tribal unrest undercut this source of strength.

The prospect of defeat on the battlefield shapes Saddam’s tactics and the nature of his provocations—sensitivity reflected in what Saddam does not do rather than in observable Iraqi behavior. Saddam has not threatened his neighbors with military forces since the October 1994 buildup, which the United States countered with Operation Vigilant Warrior. The rapidity of the U.S. buildup, the strong ongoing U.S. regional presence, and the continuing weakness of Iraq’s conventional forces probably led Saddam to conclude that another buildup would at best result in an Iraqi withdrawal and at worst in the attrition of his forces. The prospect of military defeat also heightens the chances of both elite dissatisfaction and popular unrest, making Saddam even less likely to issue challenges that could be met on the battlefield. Strikes on military forces could lead officers to become dissatisfied with Saddam, seeing his continued rule as a threat to their lives and prestige.

Saddam does not respond passively to U.S. attempts to target his vulnerabilities and press his regime. Rather, he tries to tailor his response to exploit U.S. weaknesses whenever possible and he takes countermeasures to minimize U.S. pressure. These countermeasures include exploiting domestic suffering, complying incompletely with demands, trying to fracture coalitions, and repressing dissent. These countermeasures (most notably attempts to fracture coalitions) have at times failed or even backfired, but in general the Iraqi leader has managed to offset U.S. coercive pressure. V Confronting Iraq

IMPLICATIONS FOR COERCION

The Iraqi experience is rich with general lessons for coercing major regional powers in critical regions. When designing coercive strategies, policymakers must pay particular attention to the following issues:

• Recognizing adversary “centers of gravity.” When planning a coercive strategy, policymakers should strive to identify the target’s “center of gravity”—that which, if destroyed, would cause the enemy’s resistance to collapse. For Iraq, this appears to be Saddam’s relationship with his power base. When coercive threats placed pressure on Iraq’s center, they proved far more likely to move the regime. A center of gravity, however, will vary by regime and must be assessed and understood accordingly.

• Recognizing the dynamic nature of coercion. Coercion is a process, not an event. Planning must acknowledge that just as the United States is (or should be) performing a “center of gravity” analysis on the adversary, the adversary is likely doing the same on the United States or the coalition aligned against it. Because of overwhelming U.S. military capacity, many adversaries may try to undermine public support or fracture U.S.-led coalitions to offset coercive pressure.

• Understanding what cannot be affected. The United States can affect only the level of pain it inflicts, not an adversary’s willingness to accept it. Adversary regimes are particularly loath to give up power, and coercing populations to revolt or elites to carry out a coup is extremely difficult.

• Improving long-term planning. Policymakers and analysts did not anticipate Saddam’s survival, and U.S. policy suffered as a result. In future confrontations, the United States should conduct more low-probability, high-impact analysis and “red team” measures to explore the range of possible outcomes and make U.S. policy more robust.

• Recognizing self-imposed limits. The attempts to coerce Iraq reveal the degree to which self-imposed constraints, especially those generated by political and diplomatic concerns, limit the quantity and type of force the United States can threaten or use. These self- imposed limits often are far more effective in undermining coercion than are any measures taken by an adversary.

Adopting this framework when confronting adversaries in the future will make coercive threats more sustainable, more robust, and ultimately more effective. Equally important, it will help decisionmakers recognize limits on the use of force and avoid situations where coercive threats will fail in the short-term and undermine U.S. credibility in the long-term. RAND, Washington Office 1200 South Hayes Street Arlington, VA 22202-5050 (703) 413-1100 Ext. 5632 http://www.rand.org