Torts - Practice Question 1
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Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: a Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine Harvey S
Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine Harvey S. Perlmant A has a contract with B. TP interferes with its performance, to A's economic detriment. A might recover from B for breach of con- tract, but prior to 1853, in most circumstances, he could not re- cover against TP. In that year, Lumley v. Gye1 established a gen- eral principle of tort liability for intentionally interfering with a contract. Since Lumley, the interference tort has been applied evenwhere the interference is directed at an unenforceable con- tract or a relationship involving only an expectancy not yet formal- ized into a contract.2 Today, courts impose liability under the ru- bric of the interference tort in a variety of contexts, but they have failed to develop common or consistent doctrines. The absence of a coherent doctrine is understandable. The idea that a person should not interfere with another's economic relationships is easier to expound in the abstract than to apply in the particular. The expectations of the parties and, therefore, the acceptability of an interference differ radically depending on the context, terms, and subject matter of the relationship-whether it t Professor, University of Virginia Law School. Several persons commented on earlier drafts, including Tyler Baker, Thomas Bergin, Edmund Kitch, Jeffrey O'Connell, George Rutherglen, Stephen Saltzburg, and participants in the University of Virginia and Univer- sity of Iowa Faculty Workshops. I am particularly indebted to Robert Scott and Charles Goetz for their assistance. Linda Williams, Virginia class of 1982, and David Rosengren, class of 1981, provided valuable research support. -
The Standard of Care in Malpractice Cases Irvin Sherman
Osgoode Hall Law Journal Article 4 Volume 4, Number 2 (September 1966) The tS andard of Care in Malpractice Cases Irvin Sherman Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj Article Citation Information Sherman, Irvin. "The tS andard of Care in Malpractice Cases." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 4.2 (1966) : 222-242. http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol4/iss2/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons. THE STANDARD OF CARE IN MALPRACTICE CASES IRVIN SHERMAN Medical malpractice has been a controversial issue both in the press and in medical and legal circles in recent years. As a result, the public in general and the medical profession in particular have become increasingly aware of the professional conduct of doctors. In Califor- nia, "malpractice actions have become so prevalent that on the average one out of every four doctors is sued at some time for malpractice".1 The situation is not quite as serious in Canada. In 1965, the Canadian Medical Protective Association which represents 78% (15,500 out of 22,000) of Canadian doctors handled just 27 cases in- volving malpractice.2 It has been stated that, "the practising physician or surgeon is an easy target for the blackmailer. The disgruntled or unscrupulous patient can inevitably destroy the reputation of the most eminent physician or surgeon by an ill-founded action for malpractice." 3 The adverse publicity atributable to a medical negligence case, regardless how unfounded the action may be, can only have a detrimental effect upon the doctor's career, thus weakening the vital role he can play in contributing to the needs of society. -
Libel As Malpractice: News Media Ethics and the Standard of Care
Fordham Law Review Volume 53 Issue 3 Article 3 1984 Libel as Malpractice: News Media Ethics and the Standard of Care Todd F. Simon Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Todd F. Simon, Libel as Malpractice: News Media Ethics and the Standard of Care, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 449 (1984). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol53/iss3/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LIBEL AS MALPRACTICE: NEWS MEDIA ETHICS AND THE STANDARD OF CARE TODD F. SIMON* INTRODUCTION D OCTORS, lawyers, and journalists share a strong common bond: They live in fear of being haled into court where the trier of fact will pass judgment on how they have performed their duties. When the doc- tor or lawyer is sued by a patient or client, it is a malpractice case.I The standard by which liability is determined is whether the doctor or lawyer acted with the knowledge, skill and care ordinarily possessed and em- ployed by members of the profession in good standing.' Accordingly, if * Assistant Professor and Director, Journalism/Law Institute, Michigan State Uni- versity School of Journalism; Member, Nebraska Bar. 1. W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 32, at 185-86 (5th ed. -
Torts--Negligence--Substantial Factor Test
Case Western Reserve Law Review Volume 15 Issue 4 Article 13 1964 Torts--Negligence--Substantial Factor Test Russell B. Mamone Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Russell B. Mamone, Torts--Negligence--Substantial Factor Test, 15 W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 807 (1964) Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol15/iss4/13 This Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. 19641 Negligence - Substantial Factor Test While it is the right of the press ... to freely criticize and comment upon the official action and conduct of a public officer, false and de- famatory words ... are not privileged on the ground that they related to a matter of public interest, and were spoken or published in good faith.'7 Since Sullivan, of course, this is no longer either the majority or Ohio position. After the Sullivan case, good faith is a defense to a libel action and malice cannot be inferred from the falsity of the statement - it must be proved by the plaintiff to have actually existed in the mind of the critic at the time the statement was printed. What effect this decision will have upon the attitude of the country's newspapermen remains to be seen. Nevertheless, Sullivan should provide sufficient safeguards to enable an even wider and more open presentation of events and issues by responsible reporters and columnists. -
IN the SUPREME COURT of TENNESSEE at NASHVILLE May 23, 2018 Session1
06/19/2019 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE May 23, 2018 Session1 BENJAMIN SHEA COTTEN, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE ESTATE OF CHRISTINA MARIE COTTEN, DECEASED, ET AL. v. JERRY SCOTT WILSON Appeal by Permission from the Court of Appeals Circuit Court for Williamson County No. 2015-194 Michael W. Binkley, Judge ___________________________________ No. M2016-02402-SC-R11-CV ___________________________________ In this wrongful death action, the plaintiff estate seeks to hold the defendant liable for negligently facilitating the decedent’s suicide. While staying alone in the defendant’s home, the adult decedent committed suicide by shooting herself with a gun that was unsecured in the defendant’s home. The decedent’s estate sued the defendant, alleging that he should have known the decedent was potentially suicidal and that he negligently facilitated the suicide by failing to secure the gun while the decedent was in his home. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, and the Court of Appeals reversed. We hold that the evidence is insufficient for a trier of fact to find that the decedent’s suicide was a reasonably foreseeable probability; consequently, the decedent’s suicide constitutes a superseding intervening event that breaks the chain of proximate causation. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Reversed; Judgment of the Trial Court Affirmed 1 We heard oral argument in this case at Tennessee Technological University in Cookeville, Tennessee, as part of the Tennessee American Legion Boys State S.C.A.L.E.S. -
Thou Shalt Take Thy Victim As Thou Findest Him: Religious Conviction As a Pre-Existing State Not Subject to the Avoidable Consequences Doctrine
File: 5 Loomis.doc Created on: 12/14/06 4:44 PM Last Printed: 12/23/06 1:33 PM 2007] 473 THOU SHALT TAKE THY VICTIM AS THOU FINDEST HIM: RELIGIOUS CONVICTION AS A PRE-EXISTING STATE NOT SUBJECT TO THE AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES DOCTRINE Anne C. Loomis* INTRODUCTION As Gwendolyn Robbins’ seventy-year old father drove along a high- way in upstate New York, his car veered off the road at sixty-five miles per hour and turned over in a culvert on nearby farmland.1 After a long day of driving from New York City to Plattsburgh and back, he fell asleep at the wheel.2 Gwendolyn was a passenger in the car, and she suffered a severely damaged left hip and an injury to her right knee.3 Gwendolyn was faced with a choice: she could accept well-recognized and established surgical procedures, which would offer her the prospect of a good recovery and near-normal life; or, she could refuse these procedures and accept the inevi- table necrotic development in the bone structure of her injured limbs, which would ultimately lead to a wheelchair-bound life.4 For Gwendolyn, there was no question which option to take: the wheelchair-bound life. Gwendolyn was a devout Jehovah’s Witness, and she refused the surgical procedures because her religion prohibited blood transfusions, which the surgeries would require.5 When a defendant injures a plaintiff, tort law normally applies the “Avoidable Consequences Doctrine,” or the duty to mitigate damages. The plaintiff is expected to take reasonable steps to minimize her anticipated losses. -
Barry V. Quality Steel Products, Inc
****************************************************** The ``officially released'' date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ``officially released'' date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ``officially released'' date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Con- necticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be repro- duced and distributed without the express written per- mission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** NEIL BARRY ET AL. v. QUALITY STEEL PRODUCTS, INC., ET AL. BERNARD COHADE ET AL. v. QUALITY STEEL PRODUCTS, INC., ET AL. (SC 16700) Sullivan, C. J., and Borden, Norcott, Palmer and Zarella, Js. Argued September 11, 2002Ðofficially released May 6, 2003 Joel T. Faxon and David Beekman, pro hac vice, with whom was Andrew J. -
Independent Intervening Cause
Indiana Law Journal Volume 22 Issue 3 Article 16 Spring 1947 Independent Intervening Cause Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj Part of the Torts Commons Recommended Citation (1947) "Independent Intervening Cause," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 22 : Iss. 3 , Article 16. Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol22/iss3/16 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 1947] NOTES AND COMMENTS 289 fy his premises ;4 only then may he make the required appli- cation under the decontrol order. A landlord is not eligible to be considered for decontrol until both steps have been tak- en. An increase in rent without authorization is a violation of the regulations. 5 TORTS INDEPENDENT INTERVENING CAUSE P was riding in an automobile driven by D when it overturned. No one was injured, and the passengers of the car immediately set about to right the car. While assisting, P cut his wrist on broken window glass, for which injury he brought suit. D was found negligent in operating the automobile and liable for P's injuries. Held: Affirined, P's act was the normal response to the stimulus of the sit- uation created by D's negligence and not a superseding cause which would relieve D of liability. Hatch v. Smail, 23 N.W. -
The Linear Construct of a Negligence Claim
STATEWIDE LEGAL AUTHORITY SINCE 1878 MONDAY, MARCH 23, 2015 NJLJ.COM The Linear Construct of a Negligence Claim By Joshua Bauchner awyers can recite from memory the elements of a negligence cause of action: duty, breach, causation Land damages. However, what many practitioners fail to appreciate is that the order of the elements is critical only arises after first establishing that a defendant actually to any claims analysis. Only by first defining the scope and breached a duty owed to a plaintiff. As the New Jersey Dis- extent of an alleged duty can one determine whether that trict Court explained: duty was breached by a defendant, or if liability was trun- cated by a superseding or intervening cause. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has explained It is all too common for litigants to argue that an inter- that the doctrine of superseding cause focuses on vening cause “cuts off” a defendant’s duty to the plaintiff. In whether events or conduct that intervene subse- fact, before considering the effect of an intervening cause, a quent to the defendant’s negligence are sufficiently court must first determine that the defendant owed a duty to unrelated to or unanticipated by that negligence the plaintiff and breached that duty; in essence, finding that to warrant termination of the defendant’s respon- the defendant was, in fact, negligent but that the negligent sibility. Lynch v. Scheininser, 162 N.J. 209, 230, conduct did not cause the plaintiff’s injury. 744 A.2d 113 (2000). ... Courts resolve questions By engaging in a superseding cause analysis before of superseding cause by focusing on whether the consideration of the duty element, attorneys and judges intervening cause is so closely connected with the fail to determine what obligations to the plaintiff are rea- defendant’s negligent conduct that responsibility sonably foreseeable as a result of the defendant’s duty. -
Intervening Causes
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EVIDENTIARY RULES APPLICABLE TO PRODUCT LIABILITY CLAIMS: INTERVENING CAUSES By Lee Wallace The Wallace Law Firm, L.L.C. 2170 Defoor Hills Rd. Atlanta, Georgia 30318 404-814-0465 www.thewallacelawfirm.com [email protected] © 2008 In general, a party may not be charged with damages which he did not cause. "It is elemental that in order for one to be chargeable for cause to another, his negligence must have been the proximate cause of the injury sustained." Cain v. Georgia Power Co., 186 S.E. 229, 230 (Ga. App. 1936). On occasion a defendant defends itself by claiming an intervening third party caused the damage to the plaintiff. In such disputes, the defendant contends that it was not the proximate cause of what happened to the plaintiff. The Georgia Court of Appeals, however, has intimated that this general rule may not apply to products liability cases based on strict liability. In order to understand why the rule may not apply, this paper will first discuss the general rule, and then will discuss why it may not apply in products liability cases. I. THE GENERAL RULE AS TO INTERVENING CAUSES. The statutory law pertaining to intervening causes is set out in two Georgia statutes: If the damage incurred by the plaintiff is only the imaginary or possible result of a tortious act or if other and contingent circumstances preponderate in causing the injury, such damage is too remote to be the basis of recovery against the wrongdoer. -1- O.C.G.A. § 51-12-8. Damages which are the legal and natural result of the act done, though contingent to some extent, are not too remote to be recovered. -
Applying Strict Liability to Professionals: Economic and Legal Analysis
Indiana Law Journal Volume 59 Issue 1 Article 2 Winter 1983 Applying Strict Liability to Professionals: Economic and Legal Analysis Frank J. Vandall Emory University Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj Part of the Law and Economics Commons Recommended Citation Vandall, Frank J. (1983) "Applying Strict Liability to Professionals: Economic and Legal Analysis," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 59 : Iss. 1 , Article 2. Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol59/iss1/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Applying Strict Liability to Professionals: Economic and Legal Analysis FRANK J. VANDALL*T I. INTRODUCTION While the application of strict liability to injuries involving products has been expanding over the past few years,' no court has held that strict liability controls in a case involving a professional. 2 The policies underlying strict liabil- * Professor of Law, Emory University; Washington and Jefferson College, B.A., 1964; Vanderbilt University, J.D., 1967; University of Wisconsin, LL.M., 1968, S.J.D., 1979. I appreciate the contributions of my research assistant Marianne Bradley. t Copyright 1984 by Frank J. Vandall. All rights reserved. 1. See Keeton, Products Liability-Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10 CuM. L. REv. 293 (1979); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1961); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. -
Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights
TRESPASS, NUISANCE, AND THE COSTS OF DETERMINING PROPERTY RIGHTS THOMAS W. MERRILL* THE right to exclude intrusionsby others, we have it on high authority, is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are com- monly characterizedas property."' Yet the right to exclude is not one right;it is itself a collection or "bundle" of rights. With respect to prop- erty in land, for example, the rightto exclude dependsto a large extent on whetherthe intrusionin question is subjectto the commonlaw of trespass or of nuisance.2 Generally speaking, when the intrusionis governed by trespass, then there is no exception for de minimisharms, a rule of strict liability applies, and the landholdercan obtain an injunctionto prevent future invasions. When the intrusionis governed by nuisance, however, then there will be no liability absent a showing of substantialharm, as a rule the landholdermust show that the costs of the intrusionoutweigh its benefits, and even then the party subject to the interference may be awardedonly damages ratherthan an injunctionfor future harms. Thus, the right of a landholder to exclude means one thing with respect to certain intrusions-those subject to the law of trespass-but something altogether different with respect to others-those subject to the law of nuisance. * NorthwesternUniversity School of Law. I would like to thank Anthony D'Amato, FrankEasterbrook, Victor Goldberg,Carol Rose, MarshallShapo, and the participantsin a NorthwesternUniversity School of Law Faculty Workshopfor their helpfulcomments on earlierdrafts. ' Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979);see also PruneyardShopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S.