Makin, Notember 1943. J'rom: Colllllander 11Fth
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SSCRET CHAPBR III HAUL GUliJ'IRI QDTlW, PACIJ'IC Gilbert Ialand.1 Operation - Makin, NoTember 1943. J'rom: Colllllander 11fth ~hibioua .rorce. ~ R.preaentativea of the J'l:rTH .Amphibioue Corpe, ComGen 27th DiTiaion .Artillery and Commander 11FTH Jmphibiou1 rorce collabor ated on the preparation of ~val Qun!ire Plane. The Division represent atives apeoified the location, timing, and quantity of gunfire desired, at'ter a thorough 1tudy of intelligence charts, plan of maneuver, etc. The J'orce repreeentative wae then responsible tor acheduling the gun fire to achieTe theae re8'1l.lta coneiderin& the following: Bombardment ammunition allowance of each ahip. Batea of tire considered reaeonable. :lntilade effect on narrow necka of land to avoid excessive overs and 1horta in the water. A Tariety of range banda to obtain both plunging and point-blank fire. Beceasary maneuver• of ships to •ta.7 in aectors assigned. Visibility of target area. CoTeriJll; important area.a vith all 3 caliber• trom several differ ent ahipe to minimise effect of poaeible inter:i:uption of fire. AToidance o! croas-tire. AToidance o! two ahipe or batteries tiring at 1ame or adjacent te.rgeta at the aame time. Minimum hazard to ovn 1hipa, boats and troops. All the above requirements are eo intilllately related that all thoee concerned actuall_y worked together as one planning group. The close cooperation achieved wae moat aatisfactory. SeTeral conferences were held. The following officer• trom troop• and 1hip1 attended one or more of theae: Artillery Officers and Shore .11re Control Officer•. <Junnery Officer•. CollllWlieation otficera. Collllll8lldilll; Officers of Destroyers. Senior Aviators. l'iaTigaton. These conference• were inTaluable in ironing out misunderatandings and improvilll; the plane. They give the personal touch so neceaeary to malm any plan function amoothl_y. 'l'he following obaervatione were made: 3-l SZCRET :tU.VJ.L GUN7Ill - CINTRJ.L PACI1IC Harrow aeetor1 forced ship• to steam at Tery slow speed• and to reverae course often. Courae reversal is undeairable but vaa neeeaae.ry to obtain !ire e!!eet sought. Range pattern• vere in many eases very large. Deflection pat terns vere too amall. Mall,Y ahote tell into the water, principally in the lagoon, du to failure to keep MPI on the land. Plane •potting Hemed inet!ectiTe. Halt-aalvoa vere !ired by firing halt the turret•. 1\1' !irin& all turrets ~ery aalvo, one or two gun• from each, pattern should be reduced by leas mutual interference betveen projec tiles. Aleo, shift of MPI, by difference in turret alignment, will be minimized • ..lngle of tall vaa not great enough. Velocities are too great. If the range 1• increaaed to 15,000 yards to get a !airl;r large angle of tall lov l;rin& atolls are not Tiaible enough to allov good accuracy. This is a matter ot great urgency. In assessing the effect ot n&T&l gunfire, it ia diffi cult to dietingui•h between damage and caeualtiea directly reaul.ting from such tire, and thoae caused by aerial bombardment and etr&fbg. Thia h partieul.arly true in the area l;ring between Ule eaet and veat tank traps, which vae subjected to heavy attack by aurtace ve••el tires and by aerial bombardment on D-De.y, and by- atrial bombardment on D-l. Shore lire Control Communication• were excellent and. vere for a time the only link between the Taak lorce Commander and the authDrities ashore. Jrom: Commander Cruiser D1via1on Jour. The battleships and cruisers remained in their respec tive fire aupport sectors tor a period of two and a.ne-balf hours after the completion of the bo~bardment to provide call tire it requested. During this p riod these ships were vulnerable to aubll&l'ine attaoka in that they operated at elov speeds in a confined area and without anti submarine protection. It ie s~sted that large ships in a potential standby' for call fire duty, but not primarily deaignated therefor, be recalled to operate in eompaey at highu speeds than are peniiasible in their limited firing sector areaa. Jrom: Commander Task Unit 52. 2. 2 (Fire Support Group). The HIW MEXICO b.acl sixteen prostrations in magazine• due to high temperatures and ether t'umes. MISSISSIPPI and IDAHO aToid ad tbie condition by ventilating between pbaees. Until magazine ven tilation i1 proTided this will have to be done during prolonged fir ing in the tropics. No such difficulty vaa experienced in Aleutian vatera. SSCRET JUUL GUD'IU - CD'J!lil, PACIJ'IC froai Commander 1I1~ .Amphibioua J'oroe. !wo it.1111 that affected the pertormanoe ot bo\h naTal boabardaent 811U1Wli tion and 1erial bomb• were the unuaual condatenq ot the coral mald.n& 'lip the ialand, and the growth ot tall coconut palm1 that coTered a pod deal of the aurtace area. !he coral, being of com paratiT•l.7 •qGal conaia,en1:7 and without 1tr1ation or lamination, appar ently penDitted a deeper penetration ot a projectile on impact than that encountered in true earth, vith a reeultin& tendenc7 to funnel trapentation upward. It also impacted more uniformly from the point of detonation, the crater• ot both boab and 1hell being noticeably deeper, but l.eaa conical in form than those produced in earth. In sev eral caeea where 14" 9hell• had landed at aoae distance from the center of the concentration, it was po1aible to obtain an excellent obaerTation of the effect of the indiTidual projectile. It wa1 noted that in ID8IIJ' ca1a1 0 lov brush from 2 to 4 feet in height and within tour feet of the cratv-lip vaa lllDd splubed and Ha.red on the Bide n.ar the crater. but waa otherwise undamaged.; coconut trees were aut ott at heights r&n&in& from 8 to ten feet at 10 7arda tr01& the crater, to 26-30 teet at 35 7ard1. J'ra&mentation was indicated on some trunka as low as three feet at 35 yards. !he coconut trees. where dense, caused several heaTy cal iber shells and bombs to burst at heights estimated from six to twenty teet above the ground; an.d where this occured, destruction of growth vaa exceptionally hea'f7 for radii of from twenty-five to seventy-five feet troa the estimated point of ispact. One other i~em to be taken into consideration in ass eaaing the effect of naTal a.nd air bombarclment in thie operation, is the construction of detenaiTe worka encountered. !he low land level of the ieland, with a resultant high water table, cauaed the defenders to conatruot the bulk of their aheltera, revetaenta, pill-boxea, a.nd other 1tructures at least partially above ground. Very fev excavation• oTer tvo feet in depth were encountered, and although considerable qu.a.ntitie1 of cement were found on the island, Tery few structure• were of concrete. !he bulk of the shelters, pill-boxes, J.Dd other de feneive vorka were constructed ot loca and coTered with coral blocka a.nd earths for depths of from one to tour feet. Living quarters, ware houses, and other administrative structures were of very light frame work with galTanized iron cOTering or root. Control o! gunfire ca.n be divided into 3 periods: J'roa e.rriTal at obJective until after all prearranged fires a.re 0011pleted. Co111111&nder o! Group• and Unite must have control during thie period due to the complexit7 of the aituation. J'rom end of scheduled firea until demand for called firea tapers off. The Task Force Co11111ander can beat control the assignment of sup port ehips during thia period because he baa the beat information SZCRET B.U.U, GUNFill - CDTRAL PACIJIC regarding the aituation • .ltter the eecond period there is ao little demand for called fires tl:at it ie much more conTenient, and aat!etactory to have all ehipa and ehore fire control parties on t.he aame frequency, the T.1. Commander atill controlling. J'roa: CO USS DASBllLL - Tarava. One rapid fire gun or field piece vaa .-potted 100 yards eaat of the Burne Phillipa pier. 1hie gun vaa tiring into the boata and a.gainat adTancin& troops. Our Tilible t.roopa on the north shoreline vere cloae to thia gun and may have been tryin& to outflwlk it. Thie Teaael could not open fire. 'Ihe shore fire control party was notified at l.229 but we were not allowed to open !ire on th1a gun. At 1258 ve again reported to the S.F.C. that thia gun was firing from eaat edge of ar<' 216 and tried to get permiaaion to open fire on it without avail. The call !ire had all been directed well to eastward of this point and I atill did not baTe au!ficient knowledge of own troop moTeQente to open fire on 91' own 1nitiatiTe. At 1422 received ~ord that our ovn troop• were 100 yard.a east of .ai.rn11 Phillipe pier which ~-a• our estimate ot the enem;r gun position, eo I still vaa unable to •get that gan•. J'luotbermore. it appeared to Qe that all o".r !ire vaa being directed too tar to the eaetv&rd of our own troops. I couldn 1t eec acroae the 18- land and eo formed this opinion trom Tisu.al obaerTation of only the troope on the north ehore. 1 then moTed in aa close to the beach as poeeible and at 1452 vae convinced that we could get that gun without damage to ovn troop•. I ao informed the S .1'. C. and vae finally giTen permission to •get it-. We op•ned up purpose.ly abort waitin& to ••• 1! there would be l!lllY "complaintn trom the s.r.c.