SSCRET CHAPBR III

HAUL GUliJ'IRI

QDTlW, PACIJ'IC

Gilbert Ialand.1 Operation - Makin, NoTember 1943.

J'rom: Colllllander 11fth ~hibioua .rorce. ~ R.preaentativea of the J'l:rTH .Amphibioue Corpe, ComGen 27th DiTiaion .Artillery and Commander 11FTH Jmphibiou1 rorce collabor­ ated on the preparation of ~val Qun!ire Plane. The Division represent­ atives apeoified the location, timing, and quantity of gunfire desired, at'ter a thorough 1tudy of intelligence charts, plan of maneuver, etc. The J'orce repreeentative wae then responsible tor acheduling the gun­ fire to achieTe theae re8'1l.lta coneiderin& the following:

Bombardment ammunition allowance of each ahip. Batea of tire considered reaeonable. :lntilade effect on narrow necka of land to avoid excessive overs and 1horta in the water. A Tariety of range banda to obtain both plunging and point-blank fire. Beceasary maneuver• of ships to •ta.7 in aectors assigned. Visibility of target area. CoTeriJll; important area.a vith all 3 caliber• trom several differ­ ent ahipe to minimise effect of poaeible inter:i:uption of fire. AToidance o! croas-tire. AToidance o! two ahipe or batteries tiring at 1ame or adjacent te.rgeta at the aame time. Minimum hazard to ovn 1hipa, boats and troops.

All the above requirements are eo intilllately related that all thoee concerned actuall_y worked together as one planning group. The close cooperation achieved wae moat aatisfactory.

SeTeral conferences were held. The following officer• trom troop• and 1hip1 attended one or more of theae:

Artillery Officers and Shore .11re Control Officer•.

These conference• were inTaluable in ironing out misunderatandings and improvilll; the plane. They give the personal touch so neceaeary to malm any plan function amoothl_y.

'l'he following obaervatione were made:

3-l SZCRET :tU.VJ.L GUN7Ill - CINTRJ.L PACI1IC

Harrow aeetor1 forced ship• to steam at Tery slow speed• and to reverae course often. Courae reversal is undeairable but vaa neeeaae.ry to obtain !ire e!!eet sought. Range pattern• vere in many eases very large. Deflection pat­ terns vere too amall. Mall,Y ahote tell into the water, principally in the lagoon, du to failure to keep MPI on the land. Plane •potting Hemed inet!ectiTe. Halt-aalvoa vere !ired by firing halt the turret•. 1\1' !irin& all turrets ~ery aalvo, one or two gun• from each, pattern should be reduced by leas mutual interference betveen projec­ tiles. Aleo, shift of MPI, by difference in turret alignment, will be minimized • ..lngle of tall vaa not great enough. Velocities are too great. If the range 1• increaaed to 15,000 yards to get a !airl;r large angle of tall lov l;rin& atolls are not Tiaible enough to allov good accuracy. This is a matter ot great urgency. In assessing the effect ot n&T&l gunfire, it ia diffi­ cult to dietingui•h between damage and caeualtiea directly reaul.ting from such tire, and thoae caused by aerial bombardment and etr&fbg. Thia h partieul.arly true in the area l;ring between Ule eaet and veat tank traps, which vae subjected to heavy attack by aurtace ve••el tires and by aerial bombardment on D-De.y, and by- atrial bombardment on D-l.

Shore lire Control Communication• were excellent and. vere for a time the only link between the Taak lorce Commander and the authDrities ashore.

Jrom: Commander Cruiser D1via1on Jour.

The battleships and cruisers remained in their respec­ tive fire aupport sectors tor a period of two and a.ne-balf hours after the completion of the bo~bardment to provide call tire it requested. During this p riod these ships were vulnerable to aubll&l'ine attaoka in that they operated at elov speeds in a confined area and without anti­ submarine protection. It ie s~sted that large ships in a potential standby' for call fire duty, but not primarily deaignated therefor, be recalled to operate in eompaey at highu speeds than are peniiasible in their limited firing sector areaa.

Jrom: Commander Task Unit 52. 2. 2 (Fire Support Group).

The HIW MEXICO b.acl sixteen prostrations in magazine• due to high temperatures and ether t'umes. MISSISSIPPI and IDAHO aToid­ ad tbie condition by ventilating between pbaees. Until magazine ven­ tilation i1 proTided this will have to be done during prolonged fir­ ing in the tropics. No such difficulty vaa experienced in Aleutian vatera. SSCRET JUUL GUD'IU - CD'J!lil, PACIJ'IC froai Commander 1I1~ .Amphibioua J'oroe.

!wo it.1111 that affected the pertormanoe ot bo\h naTal boabardaent 811U1Wli tion and 1erial bomb• were the unuaual condatenq ot the coral mald.n& 'lip the ialand, and the growth ot tall coconut palm1 that coTered a pod deal of the aurtace area. !he coral, being of com­ paratiT•l.7 •qGal conaia,en1:7 and without 1tr1ation or lamination, appar­ ently penDitted a deeper penetration ot a projectile on impact than that encountered in true earth, vith a reeultin& tendenc7 to funnel trapentation upward. It also impacted more uniformly from the point of detonation, the crater• ot both boab and 1hell being noticeably deeper, but l.eaa conical in form than those produced in earth. In sev­ eral caeea where 14" 9hell• had landed at aoae distance from the center of the concentration, it was po1aible to obtain an excellent obaerTation of the effect of the indiTidual projectile. It wa1 noted that in ID8IIJ' ca1a1 0 lov brush from 2 to 4 feet in height and within tour feet of the cratv-lip vaa lllDd splubed and Ha.red on the Bide n.ar the crater. but waa otherwise undamaged.; coconut trees were aut ott at heights r&n&in& from 8 to ten feet at 10 7arda tr01& the crater, to 26-30 teet at 35 7ard1. J'ra&mentation was indicated on some trunka as low as three feet at 35 yards. !he coconut trees. where dense, caused several heaTy cal­ iber shells and bombs to burst at heights estimated from six to twenty teet above the ground; an.d where this occured, destruction of growth vaa exceptionally hea'f7 for radii of from twenty-five to seventy-five feet troa the estimated point of ispact.

One other i~em to be taken into consideration in ass­ eaaing the effect of naTal a.nd air bombarclment in thie operation, is the construction of detenaiTe worka encountered. !he low land level of the ieland, with a resultant high water table, cauaed the defenders to conatruot the bulk of their aheltera, revetaenta, pill-boxea, a.nd other 1tructures at least partially above ground. Very fev excavation• oTer tvo feet in depth were encountered, and although considerable qu.a.ntitie1 of cement were found on the island, Tery few structure• were of concrete. !he bulk of the shelters, pill-boxes, J.Dd other de­ feneive vorka were constructed ot loca and coTered with coral blocka a.nd earths for depths of from one to tour feet. Living quarters, ware­ houses, and other administrative structures were of very light frame­ work with galTanized iron cOTering or root.

Control o! gunfire ca.n be divided into 3 periods:

J'roa e.rriTal at obJective until after all prearranged fires a.re 0011pleted. Co111111&nder o! Group• and Unite must have control during thie period due to the complexit7 of the aituation.

J'rom end of scheduled firea until demand for called firea tapers off. The Task Force Co11111ander can beat control the assignment of sup­ port ehips during thia period because he baa the beat information SZCRET B.U.U, GUNFill - CDTRAL PACIJIC regarding the aituation •

.ltter the eecond period there is ao little demand for called fires tl:at it ie much more conTenient, and aat!etactory to have all ehipa and ehore fire control parties on t.he aame frequency, the T.1. Commander atill controlling.

J'roa: CO USS DASBllLL - Tarava.

One rapid fire gun or field piece vaa .-potted 100 yards eaat of the Burne Phillipa pier. 1hie gun vaa tiring into the boata and a.gainat adTancin& troops. Our Tilible t.roopa on the north shoreline vere cloae to thia gun and may have been tryin& to outflwlk it. Thie Teaael could not open fire. 'Ihe shore fire control party was notified at l.229 but we were not allowed to open !ire on th1a gun. At 1258 ve again reported to the S.F.C. that thia gun was firing from eaat edge of ar<' 216 and tried to get permiaaion to open fire on it without avail. The call !ire had all been directed well to eastward of this point and I atill did not baTe au!ficient knowledge of own troop moTeQente to open fire on 91' own 1nitiatiTe. At 1422 received ~ord that our ovn troop• were 100 yard.a east of .ai.rn11 Phillipe pier which ~-a• our estimate ot the enem;r gun position, eo I still vaa unable to •get that gan•. J'luotbermore. it appeared to Qe that all o".r !ire vaa being directed too tar to the eaetv&rd of our own troops. I couldn 1t eec acroae the 18- land and eo formed this opinion trom Tisu.al obaerTation of only the troope on the north ehore. 1 then moTed in aa close to the beach as poeeible and at 1452 vae convinced that we could get that gun without damage to ovn troop•. I ao informed the S .1'. C. and vae finally giTen permission to •get it-. We op•ned up purpose.ly abort waitin& to ••• 1! there would be l!lllY "complaintn trom the s.r.c. There wae none ao we apotted on and obliterated this p~1ition. The fire also unearthed a lot of Jape Juat east o! the guna poaition ao we opened on them.

A twin battery of about 5 inch caliber va.1 located at the western edge of area 207. Thie battery opened fairly on the RING­ GOLD and DASHIELL when we came through the 31:1oke screen. Thia vessel vaa. at the time engaged with another battery, but a heaTy offehore battery was straddling it frequently. I should judge a dozen he&Ty aalvoe landed •on" tbie battery without even •lowing its fire. We were able to ebi!t to this battery and shortly put it out of c0111111ieaion vith a lllinillum of aalToa, I presume the heavy battery vaa firing indirect prearran&ed fire, but ita inefficiency yaa noted.

A five or six inch bit v1ll silence almost AD.T land emplecec gun a1 effectively as a 16 inch hit or bomb since direet bite are required in any case. '!he five or eix inch battery hae all the advantage due to volume of fire and a1:1all pattern. It therefor talces much leas time and le1a expenditure by weight of metal to silence the shore battery. Thia comment doee not belittle the uae of heavy gun

3-4 SSC~ET H.AVJ.L GUliJ'lll - CD'f1W. PJ.ClJ'lC a:ld boab attack on installations, magazines, runw&)'e, etc.

lleoause of the lengthening of the r~ pattern and flat trajectoriea at short rangea, this Teasel !LD.d others outaide the ~OJl g.ot ~ •oTera•. Tliio to three shot• per ulTo vould clear the alight elnation ot the island, CMT7 clear ewer and down the rnerae dope and ricochet. 3poU1D« down onlT put shell• short on the near aide. Jor thh reaaon., 'boaibardaen.t of a flat atoll ahould not be tro11 leas than 3500 7ard.a range unl••• Tiaual obeerration is nec•••&r7. ~ 1 of th••• oTers• fro• outeide the lagoon caused ans:ioua aoaenta to beats 1 tranaporta and fire support ahipa in.aide the lagoon and delayed fire by the aupport ahipa. Theae 1 oTera1 were not often Tisible to th e •hip tirinc beoauae th• Doke from the land burate intenened. The ahipa in the ~on .ba4 a lot of luck and a lot of poor Jap ahootiD.f: on their •id•.

!'rom: Qwmery Officer, USS DASH 111.L( DD) •

too llUCh emphaeia was placed on teying to follow a acheclul.e after the land in& boata were in the l.&Boon. ~ thouch H.-Bov was de~ed until 0900 the boat. did not actually land until 0913 and nre Support 14 bad to cease fire at 0855 accordinc to ached.ul.e· and order. Bot eno~ reliance 1a placed on indiTidul comiand.ing officer• j~ent •• to neceaait7 for cont1Duing fire and probable del~ of boata, etc. In this caee eTeeything was Tery clear and the neceaaity for con­ tinuing fire appeared to be quite obTioua but it could not be continued bacanae of a achedule and because apparentl7 the oommandillf: officers of ftre Sllpport 14 could not be depeDded 11pon t'> aake a clear eaUmate of the situation vhen they vere only 1500 yards from the acene of action and the controllizag author1t7 was oTer the horizon.

DGARDIIG '!HE 18 MIIU'l!I GAP lll'l'WIEli 1 Cli.81 :Flll11 01 TBI llll StJPPORT GBOtJP ilD TBI LA.BDilfG 01 .A.SSAULT !OATS, L&BDIBG OP­ DATIONB il>CflllRE (ftP-167) STATES - 11 l!O! LAST MIIUD DILAYS OCCASIORID .BY Mill CADSBS MAT DSULT UI' THI ARR.ITAL 01 TBI .A.SS.AULT VAOS SO LOlfG .l1'fEB 4r!m PLADED TOO TU! !Bl PREPAli­ TlOB J'UUlS. IJ DILIVUBD o:i SCHEWLI., WILL BAR LOST SOME o:r '!BIIll UJ'BCTI'RNESS •••••••!O AVOID '1UU :IYU'l'U.lLI!llS 1~ SUPPOR! GROUPS SHOULD Olf 'MIIll on INITIATI'O DUY TBI TIMI 01 UZCU'l'IOI 01' !D PDP.AllTIOlf J'IlflS (OR REPli! '!'HD!)., ••••• SBIP OBSDYDS ill> AIR OlmDVERS MUST BE AIDT DOBUTG THB CRI­ TICAL PDlOD or 'l'HI BACH ASSAULT ro J'OLLOW 'Ml J.C'l'UAL MOVX­ MIHS 01 '1'D JIOJ.!S AID MAD J'IDS CORJ'OIM, 11

Jroa: Commander JIU SlJPPORT OBOtJP (53.4). (Commander Battleship DiTiaion Tvo.}

The term 11 ftre Sapport Comunder1 aa applied in this operation 1a a aianoaer. J.t no time during the fire aupport phaaee SZCRET BAV AL GUNJIBE - CEN'1'liL PACI11C

did the !reek GroU'D Commander baTe nor waa he in a poai t1on to exercise control over a~ fire aupport aectlon other than fire support section ONE. All requeate tor fire aupport originating on ehore were me.de di­ rect to the Attack Force Commander vho aaaigned fire support ahipe and SJC partiea to vork vi th those ships, The primary function of the lire Support Commander was to take charge of Teaaela not engaged in fire support and cover the tran.-porta. A more auitable title would baTe been "Support Co1111D&nder•, which function and title vaa aasumed when Operation Plan Al05-43 vae made effectbe the evening of D-day, 20 November 1943.

from: Commanding Officer USS ANDERSON (DD).

Do.ring the morning of the twenty-first patrolled the south shore as closely as poaeible at minimum apeed to answer callfi.l'e without delay.

Deplo;yment behind both lines could readily be aeen and information of enemy movements vaa giTen to Shore lire Control Party 82 in hope that it could be transmitted to field forces. We had pr.­ vioualy, hovevtir', been directed to fire only on specified targets. Rill AN OPPOliTOliITY JOB :ZJ'DCfIVll CI.OSI SUPPO:at WAS APPABDTLI MISSED OWiiG i'O LACK 07 CI.OSI COOllDIN.lTIOll,

From: Commanding Officer, USS RUSSELL. (DD).

Mier our shipe entered the lagoon north of :Bititu Island. and began shooting at the ieland in a southerly direction, the area for a coneiderable distance south of the island became dangerous, because 11 11 of maey oTere • .tn increase in apeed and turn away from the island to avoid being bit by thia tiring waa found necHS&l7 several times by this ship. In addition, it is .knovn that maey ehells, f11ed by ships located south of the bland, landed dangerouel.y close to our ehipa and boats in the le.goon, north of the island. At such ehort ranges, 1 nera" 111aeed the flat island and landed at great distances beyend the ial.&nd.

J'rom: Commanding Officer, USS Pl.tJS.lCOLA( CA).

The comparable rate of fire deliver~d ia &110 of interest. Planes from 2 C'8 and l CVL were scheduled to drop a total 258 tone of bombe over an operating period of 2 day1, The 3CA.a vere acheduled to fire 252 tons of RC projectile• in a period of 2 houra. :&r the use of maximum rate of fire, this could haTe been done in 30 minutea, all~ for del~ aDd. fatigue,

J'rom: Commander Cruiaer DiTia1on Thirteen.

!be Talue of deliberate bombardment of atoll objectivea, possibly for an entire day prior to "D" Day, ie belisved evident. l'aploy­ ment of plunging fire, whether by means of firing at lo11g9r ranges or by

3-6 S'.::CRET JIAVAL GUD'IU - CU'1'liL P.1CI1IC uae of reduced ebe..rgea, ia obvioualy necessary for mor e thorough des­ truction of heavily protected enemy poaitione.

1ro11: Coaander !aak Unit 50. 3. Z.

'lhia operation, as did the bombardment of VAKI, demon­ strated the difficulty of destroying well emplaced guns either by air or tJUrface bombardment. Many atraddles were obtained on th• guns, but hits were a matter of chance.

Jrom: ObHrvere R.por t.

Jmpty ahell caees, boxea and trash carelHsly thrown overboard durin« the bombardment hinder evaluation of periscope •aight• in&s1.

Tarawa provided the first teat on a large scale of naval gun fire api.inat strong atoll defenaea.

1ro11: Co11111ander Southern Attack lorce.

Pillboxes for automatic veapona and even riflemen had been scientifically constructed to withstand heavy bombardment, Around a concrete floor in a three to five foot excavation vaa built a 12-inch reinforced concrete wall. Outboard of this were alternate l a,yers of coral aand, cocoanut loga and aand bags to the final thickness desired, The roof vas constructed in the aame way. Coral aa.nd covered the en­ tire outside, tapering off gradually to prevent casting of shadows for photographic r9Tealllent and to provide effective camouflage. The en­ trance to these pillboxes, dU&Quta, and sheltera almost invariably wae made thro\l&h a trench conatructed to prevent direct frontal entry and direct fire into the ahelter. l"lame throwers appeared to have been the only effective weapon.a againat theH.

lArger d~uta and bomb proof eheltere were constructed in the same general m&ll.!ler. .1 large caliber hit on the side of the ahelter uaed later aa h.adquarters by the Collllll8.nding General, Second Marine Diviaion, had blown away a little of the outside layer of coral nand and penetrated approxiaiately three feet.

In mosi tnstancea, H.C. major calib0r shells penetrated unprotected reinforced cement if ~ly hit, 5"/38 AA common pro­ jectiles, made repeated direct hits on unprotected concrete without pene­ trating. Concrete, uuprotected by several alternate layers of coral sand, cocoanut log1 and sand b&gs, was unuau.al, and was noted only in t he case of the famous blockhouse in area 214, ~ich withstood destroyer fire and bombing for three daya, a.nd the coast defense gun barbettea on the south­ west point of the iaiand.

3-7 S2CRET NAVAL GUNFIB.E - CIN'l!RAL PACIJ'IC

Concrete, protected as described, will apparently re­ quire direct hits of heavy caliber A.P. projectiles before penetration 1e made.

SD "U. S. NAVAL PROVING GROUND RXPORT NO, 8-43 - liOTBS Ol'l PD- 1'0RMANCJ: or PROJECTILES AND ~~ms AGAINST SHORE INSTALLA.TIONS 1 DA.TD 24 DIOEM:BER 1943 J'OR ADDITIONAL IN.P'ORMATIOl!I ON THIS SUl!JECT.

Recommend.a tione.

That, it tire support 1hipa can be a11igned early, the initial fire aupport plans outline only in broad form the oTerall bom­ bardments effect desired, the general areas to be covered, and the type and amounts of ammunition to be expended for its accomplishment. That the details of fire schedule• and their coordination with maneuvers required, track charts, and other details of section and indiTidual ship problema, be delegated to J'ire Support Section Command.era for plan­ ning and solution.

That gunfire support plans for tuture bo11rbarclment of enemy held islands similar to ~ITITU embody the following&

Five general pha1ee of bombard:nent aa follows:

Initial counter-battery !ire againat known strong pointa using HC and AP projectiles, and commenci~ at ranges producing an angle of fall of 15 degreea,

General area bo~bardment using HC a.nd J.A common projectiles de­ livered at ranges between 10,000 and 5,000 yards,

Destruction of heaTy defenees, pillboxes, and du.gouts along the landing beaches by slow, accurate, and deliberate fire, ll9iDg AP and common projectiles, Thie fire is to be delivered at close ranges uaing pointer fire if practicable,

Heavy concentration fire at close range on landing beach areas during the boat approach,

Delivery of call fire by ships assigned after H-Hour,

Use of a rolling barrage system of fire rather than rad­ ical shifting of target areas during area bombardment,

Restriction of air burst firing for use onlr aa a wea­ pon of opportunity against exposed personnel,

Maximum uee of 40 mm batteries whenever range and other conditions permit, and control of these batteries by 5-inch gun directors

3-8 S'.::C:tET NAVAL GUNFIRE - CENTRAL PACIFIC if fire control installations permit.

Stationing of close fire 1upport ships in a favorable position relative to the landing beaches, and at closest safe naviga­ tion range, so ae to provide their continuous obserTation of the as­ sault boat waves, permitting these ships to decide at what time their fire must be ceased for safety of landing personnel.

Destruction of hulks, latrines, and similar potential machine gun nests located in favorable beach en:filading positions.

Plans for local supply of destroyer and light cruiser replacement ammunition, and depth cllarges.

From: CO USS :BUNKER HILL (CV).

CompgatiTe Ruulte of SU.rface Venel Shelling and Air Bombing.

It alread.J" has been stated that because of the lack of suitable photographs taken at the right moments, it is difficult to assess what damage vaa caused by air bombing and what was caused by shelling of the surface veaaela. However, ueing the available photo­ graphs, and the reports of pilots and gunners who obaerTed the areas just before and after the surface ehelling, it is po1sible to formu­ late some general conclusions.

During the dive and glide bombing by thi1 squadron on D-2 and D-1 Daya, and before the ahelling by surface veuels, a num- ber of the targets selected had been hit, a number of large fire• started amon& buildings and fuel dumps, and substantial damage ni­ dentl.y had been done. The island, however, presented no general pic­ ture of devastation. ilxcept for the targets which bad been under speci­ fic attack, the island looked as intact aa it did prior to the start af the attack. Our pilots did not see the island again until after the cruisers had shelled it on the afternoon of D-1 Day and after the 1!l!e and other surface vessels had bombarded it for some time on the morn­ ing of D-Day. The island at that time was al.moat completely devas­ tated. Buildings in some of the areae were levelled to the ground. What buildings were left atandin,; were shattered and blasted. The em­ bankments and gun positions along the shores of the beaches were torn and broken up. The coast defense gune were out of action. The entire island aeemed to be on fire. hen the palm trees were stripped of their leaTes and were burnin&.

It aeems clear that the shelling by heavy unite did more damage to the buildings and gun positions in several hours than the bombing and torpedo squadrons accomplished in two days. It has been pointed out that destruction of any of the gun positions would have required direct hits from the planes within areas averaging only

3-9 SECRET NAV.il GUN7IRE - CXNTBAL PACI1IC

about 25 to 30 feet in diameter. Such accuracy seems not within the capability of the dive-bomber. Of course dive-bombing could destroy euch positions if maintained long enough, but this operation indicates that the dive-bomber cannot do it efficientl.T. The percentage• against a direct hit within 1u.ch a small area are too great. »t-en against the buildings, some of which vere much larger in area and in ma.ny cases, clustered clo1e together, the results of dive-bombing were not isfactory. too sat­ A large number of bombs were dropped in the buildings areas, e.nd a very small number of buildings actually were destroyed,

'l'his ~peration aeeme to indicate that heavily revetted gun positions and large numbers o! buildings oa.n be most quickly and efficiently destroyed by a type of •saturetion" bombing or shellill&. In a naval task force, llUOh saturation can come only from the heavy face trar­ unite. It seems obviou1 that the dive-bombers, with their limited load.a, cannot provide the neceasary aaturation o! an area to accompliah its complete devastation within a short period of time.

Where sutficient carriers are present to completely cover and protect the heavy aurface forcea, as there were in this operation, it would seem practicable to have all the preliminary "softening up" and wrecking of the target inetallatione accomplished by shelling !rom the surface ships. 'l'he function of the carrierw during this period would ae to provide a strong fighter cover over the surface vessels. The dive bombers and torpedo planes would be ueed to bomb selected areas during the actual landing of the troops and for airground support miasion1. ho?ll: CollllllaJlder Southern Attack Force. Recommendations.

'!hat the following conclusions be used as a baais coordinating for air and gunfire support in future bombardments of ene1117 held ialande similar to !ITITU:

Naval gunfire can effectively ailence enellzy' ceaet d!:i'enee and J.A batteries, and will probably have to commence before there is sufficient light for air bombing.

Once gunfire has commenced, air bombardment against spec­ ific point targets such ae guns, dugouts, bomb proofs, etc., will be impracticable, as the entire target area will be completely covered by a cloud of duet and smoke. Even area bombardment will be difficult.

Naval gunfire should not be ceased !or air bombing attacks. This wae demonstrated by numerous air strik3s conducted in conjunction with gunfire, with safety to bombing planes.

Strafing of beaches is ineffective against type of beach defenses found on BITITU Island and should be considered only ae a weapon

3-10 S:::::!CRET JUUL GOIJIBI - ClllDA.L PJ.Cl1IC of opportunit7 ap111•t upoaed penoonel to 'ti. uHd after gunfire ill an area baa ce&Hd. The dedpaUoD of a filed hour and area for thil t7Pe of attack should be diaco11Umiecl.

It 1a belieTed that gaeoline bomb• 118,1' prOTe Tery •f• fectiTe ac;ai11at eD9117 beach d11&out peraoDnel. Teat• ahould be cond'QCted aa aoon aa poaaible.

DSfS l.U DING COIDUC'llD :BY TRI U. s. AJllY .lll.-JOBCK OB ml D'DC!ITDISS 01 J'Dll OIL, JWIADC mICllNID CWWLID (UI.LID G.UOLill), DUW. OIL, .um MllTUllS 01 V.illOUS PDCDT~ 01 UP.AIM 5ICDHID WOLINE WITH DIESll OIL JOR SilUUTIBG ABliS OSIBG AIBCIA.ft JOll !Bl PUJUI09 01 DUDDC!IOB BT C0111UGBilIOR •

.+MMlJHITIOB UPDDITCUS

••eel on the allovanoe• and incomplete r9P0rh froa ahip• siTinc -.aunts r..aini.Dg on hand, the follovinc expeud.itwH were .... 1A th• bolllaardae11t of Ul.d.A..

J'or acheclulecl Jor otMr lkl H&11!2ga !ot;a], 161B.C. MO 200 740 141 B.C. ~ 140 590 e•B.c. 690 120 810 61 B.C. 1690 770 2360 51 B.C. 1140 80 1.220 58 /38Jt,.A. COa 6950 8900 15850 51 /25U. co• 2816 690 3405

(623 ton• of boaba were dropped on U!Wf.A durinc Nonmber - 55 tone b7 ~ ahore 'baaed and. 468 ton• bJ' carrier baaed aircraft.) .

DPIRIDCI .A.! !AUW.t. DIMOBSDATID 1'JU.T: TBID I.AS NOT llgrGB J'BIP.u.A.!101 JI? .All AHD SHIP lllMJURIIRRT. ml DWVDt OJ BT.AL GUD'Illl AID .All J!ClCB+B!ICQT DID lll! CODOJIM '!OF''l'HI MOTJ:MD! OJ' .USAULT JK>A! 11.AT.IS. !AVAL GOB :till 11.U lWIHUD :BY SHOTS .um IICOCBl!S 1llOM on 1Ill SUPPOliT .ABl1. 1.ALLIHG .AMOIG SHIPS II uoma ADA. D.ISTRODB.S .AND SMALL CBA1T wm NOT USID '1'0 J'tJLL -'DY.Alltia 10ll CIDSE SOPPORT 01 TBOOPS .ASHOll.

3-ll SECRET

Salerno - September 1943. J'rom: ObeerTere .Report.

Bock•\ 11rt

Iamediatezy a.fter en•117 tire broke out u our tirat aaeault waTe waa advancing OTer the beach, the acout becan firin& roc­ kets at the •ne!Q' poeitiona aehore. Clo•iJIC the beach to within about 80 ya.rd• of the ahore, on the left t1.aDk of Green beach, aalvoa of ~ roakete at a time were tired in a pattern of an arc r&ngiJ:ic trom th• left flank limit dovn the beach to the right fl..anlc,. cover~ the entire area of Green leach.

Range of roclcet fir• waa 760 ,-arde, 00° a.ncl•. .£. t6W.l ot 34 rocbt• were tired in thh unner neeping Ule 'beach. firing period was about 20 eece.ada.

Scout boat officer made eure rocket fire waa over our troop•, who were pinned dowu on the ll.ach, and directed acainet Ute fla.8h of enem;y firing poaition•.

Do.ring the period of roclcet fire, all eneJQ' fire ceued. When rocket fire vaa terminated, en8JllT fire reeU11ed but waa noticeabzy leee in Tolume a.nd intend ty. It vaa turther noted that troa Ulen on, enemy fire waa directed main}¥ towards the acout boat.

later, through the interrogation of a wounded ~niian. prieoner, it was learned that thia priaoner had been part of a 111&.chine gun erev on Green beach that had ~een hit b,- a rocket. nu.a direct hit destroyed the machine gun po•ition, tillill8 three member• of the crew and voundi.ng the prieoner, he being the on}¥ aurvivor. 'Iha prieoner vaa still dazed by the 8%ploaion, but atteeted. to the effectiveneaa of rock~t fire on a target ae well aa to \>he demoralisi.ng effect of the exploaion.

J'rom: Marine Corpe ObaerTer Reports - Salerno.

On shore, there waa no evidence of extensive materiel damage caueed by the ten-minute rocket barrage fired juat twelve houre earlier. In fact, most of the probable targets appeared unscathed.

J'rom: Commander Eighth .Amphibious Force.

The LCT(R) opened up short of the bee.ch vith ranging salvos and delivered her full fire eight hundred ye.rd• south o! the des­ ignated beach. The firgt four Green aeaault wa.Tea then bad a choice o! SSCRET

either landing on the correct beach without the benefit o! the fire effect o! the rockets or landing aouth o! the designated beach. 1'hey choae the latter, a choice vhich left a pocket of enemy resistance be­ tween the Red and Qreen beaches and later reaulted in the abandonment of Green ~ch for aneral hours until the pocket could be wiped out.

Tim LCT(B) IS A COBVUDD LCT(2) OR (3), l!OTH :BRITISH TYPES, 1IB.IIG DTVDI 800 ilD 1000 5• liOCD'l'S WITH 3500 YilD MAXIMUM .RA.Nca. ltcOl!lllltAda tionp.

ftiat all close fire support craft be instructed to open up oTer and then decrease the r~ so as to &Toid hitting scout craft.

'?hat aore LCT(li)a be uaed in tuture assaults with a min­ imum o! two uaigned to each beach. All LCT(R)a should be more thorough- 1,y trained in order to inaure Ul.at the correct beach 1a fired upon. More pra.ctice tirings should be held by LCT(R)a to determine the correct ballistics of both 1ncendi8%7 and H.!. rockata.

J'ro11: Commanding Officer USS I.ST 355.

Sighted through binoculars one source of shelling on the beach about tvo points o!f starboard bov. Opened !ire with bow 40MM gun and held it steadily on \arget for about ten minutes. One German Mark TI Tiger Tank waa deatro7ed b;y our tire and another forced to abandon hie shelling attack. Other shore batteries which we were un­ able to locate continued their !ire.

J'rom: Commanding Officer USS SC-770.

It is recommended that SCa be aent in as cloae to the beach aa possible to aaaist LC!e in fighting machine gun battlea with machine gun nests ashore. Du.ring the morning of September 9, 1943, ve obaerTed aeTeral Lefs fighting such battles with one 20MM maclline gun. SCa could comfortably cet as close to the beach ae the two fathom curve and could turn loose !ire from one 40MM gun. three 20MM go.na, two fifty caliber and two thirty caliber aaehine guna ~inst shore installations. Such a barra«e ahoul4 be reasonably eftectiTe.

SD COMMEl'r ON LCI(L)a J.8 GUHBOATS OJJ P.A.Gi 19 01 THIS ClU.P!.iR.

1ro11: Colllll&llding Officer USS PHILADELPHIA.

The standard shore bombardlllent doctrine which limits the number o! rounds per gun per minute which it is pel'lllitted to fire at rapid tire rate 1e unsound vhen enemy tank• are under fire. Tanks move eo rapidly "1hen in the open0 that maximum rate of fire or near maxi.mum rate ehould be permitted when tanks are discovered in exposed locations.

3-13 S2CRET

Such a procedure not onq reeulte in hitting more tanks in a giTen time, but creates road blocks due to demoliahed and burning tanks and prevent• the tanka still capable of locomotion from aeek1nt; coTer rapidq.

Mter four ~· of shore bombardment during ~ and night periods, and under the conatant haraasing of en~ air attack•, ~he ah1p 1a compa.n.y began to ahov definite aigna of atrain and loae of e!fici•J1C7 due to loH of aleep and fatigoA. !hie vaa part1al1¥ corrected 'oy an oc­ casional aortie to aea for the night, but the air attack• were ao zmmer­ ouf> that it vaa neYer poHible to allow the men to catch up on their leep. It vaa found, al•o~ that the conatant neceasity to go to gen­ eral quartera to repel air attack• made it impoaa1bl• to prepare aDd Hrve regular meal.•. !aUle feeding on a\at1on waa reeorted to a.nd worked Tery well.

J'roa: Ool!ll!laDder Cruiaer DiTiaion Eigtit.

~ere waa an alltoet complete failure of the Shore J'i.re Control Perth to function in the early s~• of th• landinc. Dda atate:nent ~ be modified after receipt of reports fl"Oll the firing ahipa. A ber of reqiieeta for fire were receiTed fl"oa the DiTiaion .lrt1llei, Head.q1181"tera on the mwm and from the beachllaater. 71rS.Jl€ taaka in the Ticini ty of beachea were a llignad b)' Coliml8Jlder ~ak Group Bl.5 on Tery haz7 deacriptiona and dependence placed on deeiro7er top obaerTa­ t1on and, after 1000, on that of the oruieer aTi&tion pilota. The SOC pilot were inatrumental in clearing 1lp a bad aituation, '?hey spotted A.BERCROM.BIJ: and de troyere t time• in addition to th• cruiaera, tall of 9hot corrections being rel&Ted througb PBILADXLPHIA. In the after­ noon eTeral targets identi!ied aa tank:a by the aerial obaenera fro11 PHILADELPHIA and SJ.TJJllWl were tired upon and the attacka turned back, One group of aeven t&nka and a mobile gun were !luahed from a bl"U8h coTered area near 795100 cloae ~o the beach juat north of the 11ou*'h of the Sole .RiTer between the North and South fore•• and were d1aper•ed to the eaetward.

Copclueioga.

If naval go.n!1re s'llpport 1a to be effective at ~11gbt the ahore fire control parti~• muat fwlction. InTeetigation of the uee of a walky-tal.ll;r in this connection 1e recommend~.

Aerial obaenation with good vorlc by deatroyera and SAVANNAH Hrved to clear up tiring on the beachea but too tardiq. The Job was vell within the cruiaer capabilities had there been adequate shore ob1erTation.

'l'he spotting b)' the P5l planee vaa quih auoceaat'tll. 'l'he pallliling of apote to J.lllmCROMBIJ: by croup circuit waa alov 'but 15" guns should not be fired rapidly, 'l'he epotting ot oruiaer gunfire by P5le

3-14 SSCRET

i1 entirel.7 practicable. 'lhe 1hort atay of each flight of P5ls oTer the target, one-half ho1ll', wa1 a handicap but the tvo houre the plane1 vere on atation va1 of great asaistance. The report of the P51 ob- 1erTer that there waa no ene!llJ' resistance at the beaches nor any fir­ ing on the landill8 craft wa1 aialeading but did not HrTe to alter the planned action. Some form of aerial ob1erTation oTer the landing at tir1t light, preferably one capable of controlling gunfire h an eaaen­ tial element to 1UCceee.

The aaeignment by the DiTieion Artills~ Bead.quarters a! targets to be ooTered by n&Tal gunfire vithout the benefit of obeer­ Tation ia conaidered waatetul. of ammunition and da.ngeroua to personnel And condll.CiT• to a d&J:a8erou11 line of viehrul thinking. Barely 1a a 1hip 11 poaition eo accurately fixed that hitting can be e1tabli1hed without initial •potting. The onlT benefit of such firing that can be adT&nced ia the moral effect on the troop• haTing vhat they conceiT• to be eupporting fire.

The outstanding feature of the gunfire support {at Salerno: vaa the obaervation and epotting by the cruiser aviation pilota fol­ lnwed cloeely by the pertoraance of LUDLOW, BRISTOL and EDISOH in clo­ ·~ the beachea 1n the face of alarming reporte by the mine sweeping group command.era and operatint; 1n unsvept water• close to the beaches to deliver gunfire support by top epot. The cruiser commanders, SAVAB­ IAB And PHILADELPHIA, dAServe credit no leu tor taking their va luable ahip1 into vatera announced unaafe and maneUTer1ng in unavept areas to deliver trUpportill8 fire in depth o.nd against tanks and artille~ which might well have proven coatly objectiTea for troop•.

1'romz Commander Eighth Amphibious lore•.

la.val Gwifira Support in the first two day• vae not ea effective ae it had been at (Sicily). Thia was due mainly to the following faetora:

The le1aer dam8«9 to S1C radio equipment in the landing. The reports of neepe.r unit commanders which led co111111&nding officers of J"ire eupport veaaela to delay paasage through the ainefie lda. The difficulties encountered by the Landing lorce in orcan­ isinc aahore in the face of enemy action close to the beaches. The original plan provided supporting fire by four 1up­ po1·t croups, three of them consisting of a cruiaer and a destroyer each; the fourth, of the Monitor, HMS AMRCROIGIE. Thia plan had to be chan«•d on D - l ~ due to t he withdrawal o! the l!OISE !rom the atta.ck !ore•. The changea in the lire Support Plan neoeasitated by t.)l.11 vi tbdraval had to be promulgated by visual, and were not re­ oeiTed by \vo o! the fire support destroyer•. The fire support prob­ lem vaa further complicated b;y the restriction• impoaed on aupport1Jl8

3-15 SECRET

fire during the landing, due to the eurrender ot the Italian GoTern­ ment with i ta mill taey and 1:2&Tal force• •

.Because of the interference troa minefield•, fire 11up­ port groupa were not in position to deliTer supporting tire durin« the early hours of the aaaault. When they did get into position, they had considerable difficulty establishing co1111Un1oation with the Shore J'ire Control Parties, aeTer&l of whom had either lost or damaged their ra­ dio seta or beoame separated from each other. 'l'his lack of direct coa- 111Ull1cat1on resulted in some of the tire deliTered oa D-De;y being un­ obaerTed. Because it was unobaerTed, its e!!ect1Teneaa cannot be ac­ curately detel'llined, but it is belieTed that it vaa of considerable assistance to the Landing lorce, aa eTidenced. by the meaaace from the Deputy DiTiaion Commander o! the 36th DiTiaion who stated that the troops oould not have stayed on Blue and Yellow Beaches had it not been for the llaval gunfire; and 'b;r an unofficial report from the Shore J'ire Control Party to one destroyer, creditin« it with haTing knocked out eleTen Mark VI O.raan tanks. It is probable, howeTer, that it would haTe been eTen more efficient and productiTe of greater reaulta had the fire control aetup functioned as well as it did (at Sicily). Occasional shots froc shore batteries fell in the vicinity of the fire support groups, but these cauaed no d8Jll8&9 and interfered but little with their aoTements and actiTities.

Co1B111an ta from Tarious uni ta within the Fo roe indicate a gener&l belief that had the landing been preceded by a bombardment of the beaches by cruisers and destroyers, in addition to the direct sup­ port of LCSa, much of the opposition encountered there would haTe been knocked out and the aaaault rendered much easier. Some eYen go so far aa to intimate that tactical surprise by large landing forces ia a practical impoaaibility and that prelanding bombardment by naTal gun­ fire should be standard procedure. Had the landing (at Salerno) been preceded by heaT)' bombardment of the beaches, aome ot the machine guna ample.cad there might haTe been knocked OUt and the reaistance propor­ tionately web ~ened.

However, the loroe Commander 1a ot the opinion \bat a bo~bardment of beaches prior to the landing is by no means a panacea for all trouble• in the form of enemy resistance which may beset an assault force. It may, and probably vill, knock out some of the beach defenses, but it moat certainly ldll. ~ elimi.nate all of them, par­ ticularly in a night bombardment - without illumination of the target area; and it moat certainly will destroy the last vestige of surprise, tactical or otherwise. It is not only a flat declaration of intent to land at a giTen point, but it is also an excellent v~ to alert all enemy defenses within a radius of many miles. 'l'he reasons that lead an Army Co!lllllander to faTor an auaul t during dark:neas are the same reasons that make naval gunfire BUpport and direct air support leas effeet1Te during darkness.

3-16 S:SCRET

Recommendations.

1hat the organisation tor naTal gunfire support be con­ tinued in its deTelopment along its present sound line1.

That Army artillery units of the Landing Force be aa­ aigned well qualified radio technicians and radio operators. and that frequent co1111unioation exercises be held during the training period be­ tween tire support ships and Shore J'ire Control Partie1.

1hat during the planning and training period it be im­ pressed upon collllll&Il.d1 concerned that the ef!eotiTeness of Naval gun­ fire support depends largelJ' upon the knowledge ot ite eapabilitiee poaaesaed by the Army artillery command. and the et!icieney of 1hip to 1hore coJ11111unication1.

'lh&t in amphibious operations conducted from nearby base•. land baaed aircraft be me.de aTailable for fire observations.

AMMUNIUOll lll'ENDITOUS lli!ll. Salerno 6•/47 caliber BC 7531 4579 5•/3e ealiber J.J.C 6912 3527

3-17 SZCRET RAV.1L GUBJ'IRI

SOUTH PACI.rIC

Treaaury Ialand Ocgupation - October 1943.

J'rom: The Command.in& Officer. USS LCI(L) 23.

~ the fir1t operation for the converted LCI(L) type gunboat. thia action appeara to thia writer to have demonatrated the great potential value of heavily armed small craft in supporting landing operations ~inat hoatile beaches. Some reco~ndations re­ garding their use have suggested themaelvea in the meager light of thia one experience. The recommendations follow:

(a) That aupport gu.nboate accompany aaeault vavea all the V8;¥ to the beach. turning a~ only in time to avoid beaching themselves. 'lhis would provide flank cover for the aaeault wave to the le.et poeaible moment. in­ atead of exposing the flank ae occurred in thia action when thi1 veesel turned astern of the LCP1 at point (A).

(b) Tb.at support gunboat• whenever possible, be free of troops, in order that they ma.Y' retain complete mo­ bility thro~out the operation.

(c) !hat liaison be established between gunboate and shore fire control parties to enable gunboata to provide in­ telligent supporting fire after landings.

J'rom: Commander Task Group Thirty-One Point One •

.APDe commenced debarkation of troops, equipment, and eupplies at 0540 and the boats proceeded toward assigned beaches, covered by deatroyer gunfire and led by LCI Gunboats of the Second Transport Group, which had been detached at 0230 so as to arrive BLABCRE HARl!OR with the J'irst Transport G!-oup. Du.ring the approach to the beaches. the LOI Gunboats protected the expoaed fl.&nk of the assault vavee by counter battery fire against machine gun emplacements on the south coast MONO ISLAND, and Just prior to the landing, silenced a win­ barrelled, medium caliber automatic weapon on the l.Anding beach between the SAVXKE RIVER and J'.ALAMAI POINT. Destroyer gunfire ceased at 0622 and the first wave of boats hit the ms.in beach between the SAVEKl: RITD and JA.LAMIA POINT (ORANGE BE.ACHES) exactly at 0626, the new B-Hour. !l'he landiJ18 was aucceesf'll.l. altho~ opposed by machine gun and aniper fire.

The first use of the recently converted LOI Gnnboats vaa made in thie operation, and they proved to be very valuable. Having been converted in NOUN.EA, they arrived only one day prior to departure of the LCI(L)a on thh operation. The &rll8ment vas increased to l - 3 11 / 60 cal.• l - 40mm single mount. both centerline. 4 - 20mm -and 6 50 cal. machine guns. with additional crew to man the greatly auo.,11ented battery, It was immediately decided to a4d the two which were ready.

3-18 SECRET nut QOBJ'IRI - SOUTH P.A.CI1IC

ml DIPU>DCDT or nm LOI ( L) AB .A. ~T .il'J'OBDS J. MlW'lS 01 IDPIHG IXMEDUTJ: :BliCH DUDSIS D'O'TBALIZll DUUHG Tm: CRITI­ CAL PERIOD Al'TD NJ.VAL OUN J'Ill 1BOM URGER UNITS LIFTS AND UliTIL L:&ADING -'SSAULT nns HU TBJl BUCH. THEY PBOMISE TO .Bl 01 GRliT V~ J'OR CLOSE SUPPORT O'J' UlllfS ASHORI. '!'RE LCI(L)S WHICH ill DilfG COJIVDTKD J'OR GtJUill SUPPORT ORAn HAVE BID DISIGN.4T:ID LOS(L)(3). TD! WILL BE IQJJIPP.!D WITH l-3"60, 2-40MM TWIN AHD 4-ro..'Ol SINGLI AHD URYilfG "OOM.BINATIOIS O'J' ROODT U.WCBDS.

l!Wpre11 ~•ta lll!.1 - l!JoTember 1943.

:rroa: 00 USS TDRI (DD). i'he reaultt of tbe 9BRY 1a fire 1upport of thie landi11& empbaaised the impor~ce of position in tbe utilization of dewtroyers at fire aupport 1hip1 to neutralize a beach area preparatory to a land­ ing. The present flat terrain, thick tropical growth, and lack of other 1tructures in prspared defenaea, which are characteristic of beaches in this area, make it almost abtolutely neceaaary tbat destroyer• fir­ ing in support of a landing fire from extremely ahort range• and dir­ ectly at the target• vhich are de11red to be neutralized. From medium range1, the a.ngle of fire in not llU!ficient to giTe a plunging fire and it subject to interference from tree1 and other high objects in the area. J'ire !?'om extreme l'&llges vould take ad.Tantage of the trajectory of the destroyer'• 5"/38 battery and the angle of fall would be steep enoll&h to effectively reach varioua target•. However, to properly cower a iarge~ area from extreme rangH, it 1a abaolutely neMasary tbat air spot or ahore spot be proTided. In the initial phasu of the landing thia ia not alv~a poasible.

W1 th the preaen t tne beach defenaea uud by the J'ap­ aneee, our fire eupport ahipe mu.at either keep up their fire until the troope are alllloat at the beach or mean• of effectin& direct hita a.gainat gun emplacements and other defensea must be uaed. While it is realised that the knocking out of defenaea by direct hit• ia not neutralisation, neTertheleas, it it belieTed tbat with the preaeDt Jap­ aneae tactics and etructurea, tbat direct fire against their beach de­ fense• becomea a neceaait7 in the neutra.lization of any target area. 'l'his is becauee their atructurea are 10 stron& and well concealed, and so cloee to the beach line, that the7 are able to survive all except direct hita, and the minute the neutralizing fire is lifted, the weapons which they contain are swung into action. J'or this reason, where hydro­ graphy permits, it is believed that a fire support destroyer should be aa close to the beach as possible, as this allov1 them to continue their fire for a great length of time before interfering with troop m~ementa, placea them close eno~ to make visual observations as to enemy defenses which are being used against troop moTementa, and allows them to get full force and effect of direct fire with their flat trajectory guns againat

3-19 SECRET NAVAL GUNFIBE - SOUTH PACIJIC

these defonsea.

If the h,ydrograph,y does not peraU the fire auppor' destroyers to cloae range, then the use of aome shallow draft gunboat to carry out direct fire againat beach atrong pointa becomes a neceaaity for the proper neutralisation of the beach area.

Froo: Commander Destroyer Division Binet)'.

Due to a combination of early morning haze, mountainous background and an early morning eun, it waa 1.mpoesible for the (Anthony) to obserTe either the target area (.Puruata Island) or the !all of ahot, maldng reliance upon plane epot mandatory. It ia believed that the aame conditions plus smoke and duet trom the dive bombi~ attack by Blue planea, and the bombardment of Torokina Point area by the other unite, interfered vith the plane 1potter reducing the (Anthony'•) rate of fire. All it dev­ eloped, the position of the (Terry) permitted cloae obserTation of the (Anthony'•) fire and more effective spotting could have been done from the (Terry) than from the plane. As a total of only twenty nine Japaneae armed with rifle• were eventually located on Purus.ta Iala.nd failure of the (Anthony) to expend all of the ammunition allotted to this target did not materially effect the operations.

It is eu,ggested that in a similar tu.ture situation, the inclusion in the aaaault wave of one or more &l'lllored. LCI type gunboat• employing a high rate of fire from a 3• gun could materially neutralize the return fire and lend some fire 1upport until the boat vavea actually touch the beach. The time elapsing (in thi1 case five minutes) between the "cease fire• to the lire Support Unite and the time that the boata of the firet wave reach the beach is autficient for the defense to man key defense poeta not actually destroyed. by the preliminary bombardment. 1 The 5 shell• at the destroyera can do little more than temporariJ.T neu­ tralize prepared defense•.

II A SITUATION WKlRE O'l!DR MITHOD8 or OJSERU'l'ION ilE INllJ'EcTm, THE POSSIBILITUS or ST.lTIOJIING J. VISSIL TO OJURVI GUNJ'Ill SHOULD BE MBHE Ill MlllD. THI UTILITY or TD LCI(L) COIVDHD I!l'1'0 A OUl­ !OAT WAS ALSO ImMONS'fllAD.D II THI OCCtJP.ilIOI OJ !U DWt1Rr ISLANDS.

3-20 s::::c~ET QT.AL GUNJ'IRI

SOU'l'HYIST PACI7IC

Lapdin,e; at Arave, Hew Britain - December 1942. 1romi Comma.nder Deetroyer Squadron.

Attention vaa next directed to tracking the leading boat waYe tor OHAN~ BIA.CB with a Tiev to coordinating the bombardment on the beach with the approach of the boat vaTe to Poillt Able (B. en­ trance to PILILO PABSA!D). '!'Ile trackin& was done both visually and by r&dar. At the outHt H vaa found that the boa ta would be approx­ imatell' fiTe 11inute1 lat• in reaching Point Able and accordingly a five minute delay vae authorised in opening the bombarO-nt. !here&fter, it deTeloped that the boat• vould be turther de~ed in getting to Point Able and the lire Support Groups were authorized to prolong the bombard­ ment for fiTe ainutee. SU.baequent obaervatione reTealed that after reaehint; Point Able the boats did not immediately proceed into PlLELO PASSAGI but circled at the entrance: the bombardment bad ended b7 that time and the cauae of the del~ in entering the haa&«e is unknown. lroa: Commander Seventh .Amphibious force,

!he main bombardaent for the landing on OB.UlGE .Beach W&8 timea. to ceaae aa the head of the amphibian column re&ched the paaaage bebeen CAPX MERIU8 and PIL!LO ISLAND. The fiTe bombarding deatroyera were forced by the configuration of the coast and islands t.o bombard t'rom outside AB.AG ISLA.ND. Olteervation oTer the hlAnd and through gs.pa l!etveen iala.nda vae poor, Ovl!rbead fire waa , therefore, not emplo;,ed.

Unfortunately the de~ and disorganization in the amphibian column coul.4 n.ot be clearly appreciated by the CoJ11111Mder :Bombardment Group. .A.l.thouDi he delayed the bombardment ill accordance with the estimated progreaa of the leading ~faloea, the column wae •truD« out and the lead.era subuquentll' waited an additional period to allow the rear to cloae up.

DU il .D'FORT WAS RIGB!LY MADI J'OR CLOSE GUNJ'Ill SUPPORT TO CONJOBM !O MOnMDTS OJ' !D LUD>ING !OATS,

3-21

SECRET CHAPTER - IV

INTELLIGENCE

CENTRAL PACIFIC

Gilbert Islands Operation - November 1943

From: Commander Fifth Amphibious Force.

The following listed material is considered to be essential to any amphibious operation against a coral atoll:

(a) Charts, Maps, Diagrams, etc.

1. Combined chart and Intelligence map. This chart should be sufficiently accurate and complete to permit safe navigation of limited off shore areas and within lagoons. It should show location of beaches, nature of approaches to beaches, landmarks, important enemy installations ashore (particul.arly those near beaches), tracks of mine sweeping and fire support groups with­ in lagoons, transport areas within lagoons and any other information of value to naval personnel operating close off shore, within the lagoon, or ashore. The scale of this chart should be one inch - 1000 yards arxl the chart should be printed on sufficiently translucent paper as to permit its use on D.R.T. screens. Inasmuch as this chart should be of convenient size for use by Sllall craft it cannot include very much off shore area. It is intended principally for use of mine sweeping vessels, lagoon fire supporting vessels, landing and other small craft, transports and cargo vessels.

2. Offshore Chart. This chart should be accurate as to position, shape, and orientation of objectives and include principal teatures such as land marks, lagoon entrances, off shore navigation hazards, etc. It should show transport areas, landing craft and ship approach lines, lines of departure, gunfire support areas, location of assault beach­ es and other ini'ormation necess81"1 for units operating off shore. It should include off shore areas at least ten miles to seaward of the objective. The scale of the chart should be l~ = 2000 yards and the chart should be printed on paper suitable for use on D.R.T. screens. It is intended principally for use by off shore fire support vessels and transports.

3, Air and Gunnery Target Maps (large). This map should be of large scale and show all possible enemy installations as well as location of assault beaches. It should show all targets and target areas clearly marked and designat­ ed by number or otherwise. It is intended principally for use on board ship or ashore in directing ship and plane bombardment. 4, Air and Gunnery Target Maps (small). This map should be a small reproduction of item (3) above

4-1 SECRET INTELLIGENCE - CENTRAL PACIFIC for u.se in planes and by shore fire control parties.

5. Beach Diagrams. These diagrams should show graphically all possible details of assault beaches and approaches, approach lines, lines of departure, obstacles on beaches and off shore, beach defenses, beach exits and other information of value to landing craft to insure their scheduled arrival and disembarkation on designated beaches. In addition to plan views, enlarged contour and detailed sketches should be added if in­ formation is available. These diagrams are for use of transports and landing craft.

(b) Photographs.

1. Mosaics (large). These mosaics should be reproduced in as large a scale as possible consistent with retention of essential details and reason­ able convenience in handling. Separate mosaics showing both the prin­ cipal objectives and also the atoll as a whole should be issued. These mosaics are for use of Group Commanders, Commanding Officers of ships and Gunnery Officers, and also for use on board ships to famil­ iarize personnel with general features of the objectives.

2. Mosaics (small). These mosaics, a small reproduction of (1) above, should be of convenient size for issue to planes and small craft. 3. Vertical Photographs. Large scale vertical photographs or mosaics of landing beach areas should be prepared for issue to Janding craft and trans­ ports. They should be of appropriate size for use in landing craft and planes.

4. Oblique Photographs (large). These photographs should be from both high (300 ) and low (5°) angles and show important features of the shore approach, reefs, beaches, arrl inshore terrain. They should be of large size, as in the case of large mosaics, and should be issued to group commanders and all ships. They are of particular value to ships engaged in fire support ani to carriers for use in connection with bombardment.

5. Oblique Photographs (small). These should be conveniently sized reproductions of (4) above for issue to planes and landing craft.

6. Panoramas. These should consist of overlapping photographs of shore line taken from low altitude. They should show assault beach limits and prominent landing marks should be indicated. Submarine periscope

4-2 SECBET INTELLIGmCE - CENTRAL PACIFIC photographs have been found to be excellent for this i:-irpose. Pano­ ramas should be issued to al.l landing craft and be of appropriate siae. If they can be enlarged and still retain sufficient clarity of detail they are of value in indoctrination of boat orews aboard ship. Tbe following recommendations are lll!lde for the con­ duct of aerial and submarine reconnaissance which, it is believed, "'1ll provide the necessary detailed and accurate intelligence for use in future amphibious operations:

A Aerial Reconnaissance.

(1) Photographs.

(a) Photographs must be taken from angles th.at will elim­ inate gl.are. These photographs should be taken with camera pointed downward; which usually discloses sunken reefs more clearly.

(b) Vertical Photos. Complete stereo coverage of all reef, land and lagoon areas at different tide stages is a necessity. These sorties must be flown when sun-glare is at a minimum, preferable before 0900 and af­ ter 1600 local time. The scale of the photos of the land areas should be between 115,000 and ltl0,000, preferably the former. The larger the scale of photos of reefs and beaches, the more valuable they will be, and one stereo coverage of the lagoon and ocean reef at a scale of 1:5,000 or larger, at low tide, is necessary. Photos covering the entire lagoon are needed for charting channels, shoals, rocks, and for locating land areas correct­ ly. These may be at a sma.ll scale, around 1:40,000. Photos of large areas such as lagoons are preferred at this scale for reasons of economy and ease of handling. Certain portions of the lagoons will be designated by Task Force Commanders as Operating Areas and photographs at larger scale, both verticals and obliques, of these areas showing reefs and channels and shoals will be required. Color photographs have been found valuable in the interpretation of reef and beach conditions and in estimating relat­ ive depths of water in lagoons. At least one sortie at a scale of 1:10,000 is recommended.

(c) Oblique Photographs. Vertical photographs have been used as sources of information beyond the limitations of such photographs chiefly be­ cause no other sources were available. Underwater depths cannot be measured in vertical photographs. Therefore, oblique photographs of ocean and lagoon reefs and beaches at different stages of tides, in­ cluding a sortie at low tide, are necessary. On many of the islands the stand of palms and other SECBET INTELLIGENCE - CENTRAL PACIFIC

trees is so heuy at the edge of the beach that defenses and beach details cannot be seen in vertical. photographs; their existence can on.l;y be suspected and no details can be given. Oblique photographs will be invaluable wbere such conditions exist.

(1) Low obliques. Low obliques of ocean and lagoon reefs and beaches are vitally necessary for the atudy of de­ tail in the selection of landing beaches. 'These should be made at as close a range and low an alti­ tude as possible consonant with the risk involved. Sorties at different stages of tides, including one at low tide, should be flown. Care must be taken that the outer edges of the reefs are included in the photos. Photographs made with a 12" or longer f ocal length camera at a range of 4000 feet, at an angle of a.pproxilllately 5° with the horisontal. a.re r ecommended. These are to be made of the ocean and lagoon reefs and areas designated by tbe antbori ty issuing inst:nictione for the reconnaissance.

(2) High obliques. High obliques taken at an angle of about 30° with the horizontal., showing the approaches to tbe objectives, are desired; The areas will be desig­ nated by the authority issuing instructions for the r econnaissance.

(3) Reconnaissance reports. '- pilot's report of photographic reconnaissance mission containing infol'lllation regarding visual re­ connaissance by pilots and crews, such as weather, wind, direction and veloci cy, AA fire encountered and estimation as to the source of it, planes and vessels seen in area but not shown on photos, etc., is requested. (4) Labeling of Photographs. Photographs 11Ust be carei"ull.)' labeled with the following info:nnation: Date and Tiae. This must be accurate, and labeled either GCT of the Local Tiae Zone that is used. The derivation of tidal data is de­ pendent on the accuracy of this information. Focal Length of the camera. Altitude or range. In order to obtain an accurate scale of the photos, tbi8 must be given accurately. Name of island or atoll photographed.

4-4 SECRET IHTELLIG»ICE - CENTRAL PACIFIC

B Submarine Reconnaissance.

(1) General. A complete reconnaissance of the atoll is desired and any erldeoce of actirlt;y sbould be located, photographed and described. PortioD!I of the atoll believsd to contain installations or features of major interest should be clearly designated by the authority issu­ ing 1.nstructions for the reconnaissance.

(2) Photograpbs. Complete photographic coverage should be made of secti ons designated in accordance with paragraph (1) above and photographs should be taken so as to form a complete panorama of the area con­ cerned and be at maximum periscope height and minimum range conson­ ant with risk of discoveey. Views of prominent objects should be taken from several different angles. Wherever possible photographs should be taken from such points as to show the maximum amount of lagoon shoreline detail. The following infonnation should accompany eaoh photograph:

{a) A general description of the object photographed, with ari;y information gained from rlsual observation which might aid in understanding the photograph.

(b) The distance of the submarine off shore, and suffici­ ent sillultaneous tangents on nearby islands so that the submarine's position may be plotted with reason­ able accuracy.

(c) Date and time of taking photograph, carefully noted as either GCT or Local. (d) The true bearing on which the photograph was taken. The results of visual observation at the time photo­ graphs were taken should be reported in detail. Sketches or annota­ tions on maps or charts aid greatly 1n an understanding of such re­ ports. When locating an object such as a tower, true bearings should be taken from at least two locations, together with sufficient tangents on nearby islands to locate accurately the position of the submarine at the time each bearing was taken. If at all possible, photographs should be developed daily as a check on results being obtained,

(.3) Radar Coverage desired.

Any information from the P.P.I. radar equipaent aboard would be highly n.luable. The radar might be used to secure Dllvigational in­ formation and fixes, and the manner in which the radar works for these purposes will furnish most useful information.

4-5 SECRET DITELLIGENCE - CDITRAL PACIFIC

Photograpbs of tbe radar P.P.I. screen are usef'ul to correlate tbe appearance of tbe P.P.I. screen with the 1>0sition of tbe ship, so that radar operators approaching the islaDd for th'3 first time may identify blips appearing on tbe screen. In SOllle cases the islands are law and flat and apparentl)r ai.oAt t~tally l.Acldng 1n distinctive radar targets. Those that do appear should be identified so far as practicable.

Negative information la also desired, i.e., those locations where no identifiable blips appear. If pr~cticable, i.nfor­ ma tion is desired regarding the sectors in which each target is vis­ ible on the screen and the r&nge at •hich it fades out. Suggested procedure: During darkness observe isl8lld on P.P.I. from as 1118.JV angles as practicable; record ship positions where DO distinctive screen exists; when a distinctive screen appears, photograph it and record position of ship. Identification of blips may await later study of charts, aerial photos, etc., but comments or opinions made at the time of photograph should also be recorded. During retire­ ment from tbe islaDd, record position of ship at which blip disap­ pears. It L, recognized that it may not be practicable to do much night work, owing to the necessity for charging batteries.

A radar intercept receiver should be used •ben~ver possible, tuning over tbe entire radar frequency bands, searching for possible enemy radar signals. A log of signals hearcl, their frequen­ cy, pulse rate and other signal characteristics, and position at which intercepted should be rt-corded. Whenever possible take photo­ graphs of shore radar installations and also note locations, struct­ ural details and surrounding terrain.

From: Observer's Report.

It is believed that the delay in developing and de­ livering photographs waa not c&.1sed by photographic laboratories, but resulted from waiting for scheduled landing 8lld take-off t1llles on the carrier to which the photographic plane was assigned. The plane should be permitted to land on the fil"st carrier prepared to recove1 planes, even if it is not the regular base. Delivery of the prints should be given highest priority once they are ready, to the extent of making special catapult launchings if practicable.

4-6 SICRET

Jl'ro1u ec-ander U. S. Ma-nal Forces, Northwest A.rrican Waters. Introduction.

Tbie report, whl.cb 1s based on experience acqmred during the assaults on Jl'B:&fCB NORTH AFRICA (8 November, 191.2), on SICILY (10 July, 1943), and on MAPLES (9 September, 1943), a.Di duriD& the pl.anniJl8 phase of several operations which were never executed, lists the infonintion con.oerning enemy ground forces aod coast defen­ ses which bas been found necessary for e.aphibious planning ani the met.bods developed !or the presentation of this information to the Attacki.Jl8 Forces. Other pbaaes of iDtelligence required for amphib­ ious operations wlll be made the subject of separate reports.

A Baval Attack Force Commaoder, whether embarkiD& and landing 1n assault an A:rwy, a Corps, or a Division, bas need of certain inforaation concerning the enemy ground forces. In particu­ lar, be requires infon.ation concern.1.Dg the enemy ground forces battle order and the eDSlll,J coast defenses, that is, both harbor defenses ani beach defenses.

The la'fa.l. Attack Force Commander needs battle order inforation in order to fora a proper idea

Hecessa:ry background infol"lllation.

The intelligence section should collect aDd assimil­ ate a thorough background in the following subjects, for the mastery of which an acquaintance w1 th the enemy 1 s language is a distinct ad­ vantage;- the general organization of the enemy 1 s army, with special reference to infantry and artlllery; bis infantry weapons {rifles, automatic rifles, machine guns, mortars, anti-tank guns, infantry cannon, etc.); bis artillery (field, anti-aircraft, anti-tank, coast, railwey, and naval); and hie tactics in the defense, with emphasis on the infantry battalion.

When studying enE&Y artillery organization and weap­ ons it should be borne in mind that the responsibility for coast aro anti-aircraft defense rests with different services in different na­ tions. Within ov.r_own forces coast artillery and AA a.rtillelj" make up the Coast Arttil.ery branch of tbe a:rm;y. In the German armed

4-7 SECRIT DITELLIGEHCE - llEDITEIUWiEAB THEATRE

forces coast artillery comes under tbe Ha,,. and il artillery under the Air Force. In the Italian armed forces coast artillery was di­ vided between the Navy and the Fascist Militia.

In describing enEllG" artillery considerable contusion arises from the loose use of the terms "light", "medium", and •heavy•. Thus a 9Cm gun when used as anti-aircraft artillery is heavy, but when used as coast defense artillery is light. The terms should be carefully defined in the ligbt of a study of the artillery of the par­ ticular enemy and a decision reached in connection r.ltb the present­ ation of information as to whether to adopt the U.S. systea, in which, for example, the 155mm gun is "heavy" but the 1551111l howitzer "medium", or to adopt the enemy 1 s system. The new German tendnology, for in­ stance, divides Gen11an artillery into the following categories: leichte, mittlere, scbwere, and scbeerste.

Ground forces battle order.

The Naval Attack Force Commander is interested in a complete enemy ground forces battle order of the following units only: infantry, artillery, mechanized cavalry, and armored force. The cog­ nizant intelligence officer should present this battle order graphic­ ally by the use of Arlsy conventional aap ey11bols on an outline map. The symbols for artillery unite should indicate the caliber of their arma11eDt. Those for an11ored units should indicate the type of tank with which they are equipped, for tanks can, and do, fire at landing craft and even ships.

Information for the battle order map should non:ially be obtained from the Intelligence Vfficer on the staff of the Landing Force Commander or from a higher A.nay/Marine echelon or intelligence agency. It is an unnecessary duplication for the navo.l. intelligence officer to draw up his own battle order, as be will usually not have access to the sources available to the Landing Force: censored pris­ oner of war mail, interrogation of prisoners of war, radio intercept service, secret agents, etc. Further, it is highly deslrable that the Any/Marines and the Navy agree on the battle order. As the enEllllY ground forces, with the exception of coast artillery, are primarily an Army/Marine concern, the Navy should accept the Army/Marine battle order, bringing to the attention of the cognizant ('p..2 any information from naval sources bearing on the subject.

Coast artillery (harbor defe05e).

Enemy coast artillery is primarily a Navy concern, Consequently, the naval intelligence officer should make an exhaust­ ive study of !!!!_ sources.

The sources of information required for the different

4-8 SECRET INTELLIGENCE - MEDITERRA.'iEAN THEATRE

types of coast defenses are numerous: old military aod naval attache reports, secret agents, aerial photograph interpretation, interroga­ tion of prisoners of war, the study of the battle order of artillery units, and the study of the enemy's artillery ordnance. ln88111Uch as many coast defense installations are of a more or less pe:nnanent nature, proper attention should be paid to so-called "old" information, such as that contained in coast pilots, on scenic post-cards and other ground photographs, and in military airl naval attache reports.

More often than not, the primary, and occasionally the 0I1l7, source of information will be the interpretation of aerial photographs. This information must be supplemented. Not only do aerial photographs fail to reveal m8.J:\Y CD batteries which are in the sides of cliffs, in permanent forts, in buildings, or very skillf~ camouflaged, but they, at best, merely give the exact location of a battery, the diameter of the emplacement, and possibly the length of the gun within the emplacement. Thus, an aerial photograph interpret­ ation report will sq that "at N 983475 on the ISLAND OF X there is a 4-gun CD battery facing SE, diameter of emplacements, ~hich are circu­ lar, 42. feet".

An examination of the battle order reveals, however, th.at Battery D of the 14lst Artillery Hegiaent, armed with 4-152/37 guns, is stationed on the ISLAND OF X. An examination of the data on the enemy's artillery reveals further that the 152/37 Ansaldo gun b.as a maximum range of 23,800 yards, a rate of fire of one round in two miDUtes, a maxi.mwa elevation of 45°, etc. A study of the enemy's engineering principles used in the emplacing of artillery may indic­ ate that guns of the order of 75 mm to 105 mm generally have Emplace­ ments 15 to 25 feet in diameter, those of the order of 120 mm to 149 mm: 25 to 35 feet, those of the order of 152 11111 to 165 mm: 35 to 45 feet, etc. A more detailed study may bring to light that the enemy normally emplaces the 152/37 gun in a horseshoe concrete em­ placement 43 feet in diameter.

By thus correlating the information derived from aerial photograph interpretation with that gleaned from the enemy battle order, from a study of the enemy ordnance, and from a study of the enemy's principles of fortification engineering, the intelli­ gence officer ma;y state: "At N 983475 on the ISLAND OF X Battery D of the 14lst Arty Regt is emplaced facing SE; armament 4-152/37 Ansaldo guns, max. range 23,800 yds, rate of fire 1 round in 2 min­ utes, max. elevation 45°".

It has been found preferable to present intelli­ gence craphically. Descriptive text should be kept to a minimum, for fighting personnel just do not have the time to study long writ­ ten texts.

4- 9 SECRET INTELLIGENCE - YEDITERP.ANEA.N THEATRE

For the gunnery officers of the cruisers and des­ troyers assigned to sil.ence coastal batteries, for the pilots of the cruiser spotting planes, and for the infantry who are assigned th& mission of capturing a coastal battery by surprise attack, it has been found most usei'ul to distribute a sketch of a CD battery which is a direct tracing from an aerial photograph accompanied by a con­ cise written description. Sixteen such sketches were included in the Intelligence Annex for North African Operation. For Salerno Op­ eration, these sketches and accompanying descriptions were issued as separate "coast defense battery reports".

Normally an intelligence report, be it an aerial photograph interpretation report or otherwise, employs a special set of identifying numbers or letter-number combinations, when listing the coast defense batteries in a given area. These are rarely in harmol\)' with t~ose in other reports concerning the same batteries. Consequently, it bas been found most useful to use the ooordinates to identify the batteries. Thus all reports refer to the same battery in the same way, and the designation is meaningful.

Beach defenses.

Information on pill-boxes, weapon pits, trenches, wire, etc., is required for the different types of beach defenses. The most important, and usually the only, source of this information is aerial photograph interpretation. This material should be present­ ed graphically as far as possible, employing Army conventional map symbols.

Aerial photograph interpretation must be supplement­ ed. The intelligence officer must evaluate the beach defense in the light of his background concerning the organization of the enE!UIY in­ fantry units and concerning the enemy's defensive tactics. Thus, when examining the defenses of a given beach and the terrain immedi­ ately inland, he should endeavor to determine the general defensive plan of the opponent. For example, he may be able to deduce whether the given area is a comp&I\}', battalion, or regimental defense sector. By studying the battle-order simultaneously, he may be further able to deduce what unit is defending the area. SUch a study of enemy de­ fenses in the light of the battle order also assists the aerial photograph interpreters themselves, who thus have a guide as what to look for and where to look for it.

Mobile artillery.

To supplement his harbor and beach defenses, the eneDIY is making a constantly increasing use of mobile artillery, rail­ way artillery and mobile field artillery.

4-10 SECRET INTELLIGENCE - llEDITERRANEAN THEATRE

Railway artillery, which renders any stretch of rail­ road track a potential battery, is subdivided into "railway artillery" proper, that is, heavy caliber guns on railway trucks, such as the Italian 381/40, and so-called "armored trains". The term "armored train" is misleading, for the Italians had two cypes: treni blindati, or •armored trains" proper, and treni armati, or "armed trains". The "armed" trains usually mounted guns of 152 111111 caliber or less, and were normally well provided with AA protection. Railway guns usually employ prepared spur tracks which can frequently be detected in aer­ ial photographs. Tunnels furnish excellent concealment and protec­ tion for all fonns of railwa;y artillery, and should consequently be given considerable attention by the intelligence officer. A map or plot of defenses should include all railroad tracks, including spurs, and tunnels.

Mobile field artillery, or better "mobile coast ar­ tillery", is very elusive, and frequently combat intelligence alone will reveal its presence. It is of two general types. The first is the mobile heavy gun, of the order of 149 mm to 155 mm. The second is the light highly mobile "multi-purpose" gun, anti-aircraft, anti­ tank, anti-shipping (AA/AT/CD). The German 88 mm is an excellent ex­ ample of the latter t;ype. Exam:ination of the emplacements for a bat­ tery of German 88 1 s ("8, 8 cm. Flak 41") near SALERNO, ITALY, reveal­ ed that they were about 25 feet square and that the blast walls were hastily constructed of wood, hay, and straw.

Mobile field artillery is frequently held in reserve and moved into prepared positions when an alert is sounded. A given battery may thus have several alternate positions to which it may move. Consequently, the intelligence officer must remember that "empty emplacements" do not neeessarily mean "abandoned emplacements"; they may be "prepared emplacements" for a mobile battery.

Conclusion.

The intelligence section of the staff of the amphib­ ious task force commander must be prepared to collect and evaluate all the detailed and up-to-date information required to supplement the basic reports. In the usually limited time there must be prepar­ ed for issue to the assaulting and supporting units the various dia­ grams, graphic presentations and operational aids which have been found of great value in large scale landings. The information re­ quired to be worked up for this purpose includes:

(1) latest beach defenses from photographs; (2) new enEny emplacements and batteries; (3) latest information on enemy battle order; (4) estimate of ene111Y local scheme of defense.

4-11 S:S:CRET INTELLIGENCE - MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE

The following types of information should be collect­ ed, evaluated aoo disseminated by the Office of Naval Intelligence for strategic planning and as basic information to which Force Commanders can, in minimum time, add the specialized &M recent detailed inform­ ation required for an amphibious assaulti

(1) organization of enemy forces; (2) data on enemy weapons; (3) enemy tactics and doctrine of defense; (4) fixed fortifications; (5) terrain features, communications, etc. LIGHT FLEXIBLE ROlmD RELIEJ MAPS WILL me MADE TO ORDER ON SPEC UL REql.TEST ADDRESSID TO COMINCH. THESE RELIEF MAPS ARE MADE OF A :ro.AM SPONGE TYPE Ru:B.BER IN QUANTITIES UP TO 20 OR 30 COPIES OF THE ORIGINAL. 'Ii!E RELIEF MAPS OF A COASTAL A.REA WOULD BE MADE IN BECTIOUS .APPROXIMATELY 3' X 5' •

WOBX ON 100 TO 200 SECTIONS CAN ?roBM.A.LLY BE COMPLETED AND SHIPPED BY A.IR BY THE MODEL SHOP, COMPHIBTRALANT WITHIN 4 WllKS FOLLOWlllG RECEIPT OF ALL NECESSARY INTELLIGENCE IN:roB­ MATION AND INSTRUCTIONS WHICH SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING.:

(1) AREA .1ND GRID COOBDINATES OF MODil SECTIONS. (2) NUMBER OF EACH SECTION IN PRIORITY. (3) SCALE - 1/5000 WITH VERTICAL EXAGGERATION RE COMM.ENDED. (4) BEST !.il'S AVAILABLE. ( 5) 001-0?LETE VERT! CAL AERIAL COVERAGE. (6) OBLIQUE COVERAGE OF COASTLINE. ( 7) S.Al-O?LE COLOR SCHEJ.IE OR COLOR PHOTOGRAPHS OF AREA.

4-12 SECRET Illl'ELLIGEllC'E

SOUTH P!CIFIC

Treasury Island Occupation - October 1943

From: Commander Landing Craft Third Amphibious Force.

Prior to the issue of Commander South Pacific Opera­ tion Plan 16-43, but as a preliminary to such operations, a reconnais­ sance party consisting of two Haval officers and Marine officers and men was landed on MONO ISLAND of the TREASURY GROUP by rubber boats from a submarine the night of 22-23 August 1943. This party was evr.c­ uated by the same method on the night of 27-28 August 1943 and submit­ ted its report. The reconnaissance party dete.l"lll.ined that the best landing beach on MONO ISLAND was in BLANCHE HARBOR between the SAVEKE RIVER mouth and FALAMAI POiln'. This beach appeared suitable for all typeo of landing era.ft. Other s:nall beaches appeared \lSeable, one between M.ALSI and LUA POINTS and another at SOANCYrALU. The western cove of STIRLING ISLAND also appeared suitable although observed only from MONO ISLAND. ill beaches on MONO ISLAND had ample 1'8.ter supply nearby, but onl,y that between the SAVEKE RIVER am FALA.MAI POINT had sufficient dispersal and bivouac areas for the necessary troops. £here were signs of enemy patrols and activities such as tracks and cut trails, but no Japanese were sighted.

To obtain last mimite information a reconnaissance party consisting of two N.Z. A:rmy non-commissioned officers aoo some natives was landed by PT boat the night of 21-22 October 1943. The recormaissance party reported that friendly natives stated that the enemy had recently lan

Laooiag at EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAI - November 194J. From: Commander THIRD Amphibious Force. On the night of October 27 an advance party composed of two marine officers, one coast watcher and several native police boys was landed in the vicinity of ATSINlllA BAY to secure latest in­ formation of ena:oy strength and dispositions and to communicate this information to Commander Third Amphibious Force by radio. Efforts to establish radio communication were unsuccessful however.

The only available means of obtaining hydrographic information was by submarine. Air photos do not show reefs of pinnae-

4-1.3 SECRET INTZLLIGENCJ: - SOUTH PACIJIC les unless quite close to the surface, nor can they be tied in vi~h known shore positions. Charts of the Fcprees Augusta l!a.y Area were incorrect and incomplete. It was possible from submarine observa­ tions to select an approach course that promised to be free of danger but this was a narrow one-ship llUl.e. It was discovered later that many reefs existed on either aide of it.

From: Comia.nder Transpor .. Group 'l'hird .Amphibious Force.

Too much assurance was placed in the accuracy of reconnaissance reports and in the interpretation of photographs as to the suitability of the western beach areas ~here heavy lees of boats occurred. At a distnnce they appeared to be excellent, but actually were found too steep to properly beach landing craft in a moderate surf. Thie condition might have been determined by a low flying plane at the risk of machine gun fire from shore. The importance of accu­ rate knowledge of character of landing points whether they be sand beaches or coral reefs is obvious.

4-14 SECRET INTELLIGENCE

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

Landing at Finachhafen - September 1943.

Fro:n: Commander Seventh Amphibious Force. Only one set of obliques was available to the Seventh Amphibious Force by 17 September, Special low obliques and verticals had been previously requested, but had not been supplied. Sets of low verticals were taken on 19 September and delivered that night. T'ne set of black and white prints Wlfortun.ately included only one corneP of the beach and were valueless for beach information, A color photo, however, covered the beach and indicated shoal water off its southern half. This confirmed and interpretation of a photograph seen in Port Moresby, print of which was not available, On the basis of this fac­ tor it vas decided to beach only three LSTs simultaneously, instead of six as originally planned.

Reliable charts and maps of enemy-controlled waters and beaches have thus far been obtained only through special photo­ graphic reconnaissance, but the means available have proved inadequate to produce the requisite pictures in time for proper study and mapping of objective areas,

landing at DecemberArawe - 1943.

From: Commander Seventh Amphibious Force.

Plannill€; was further complicated by the wide separa­ tion of the various headquarters involved,

Few air photos were available for pla.n..,ing, but good photos were secured later and proved invaluable in final studies of the operation.

Enemy strell€;th in the Arave area was not expected to be core than 500.

The operation was designed initially for the capture of Ge.smata, but this plan was dro~ped whP.n it was decided that air facilities there were not required, Thie change delayed planning con­ siderably and little more titan three weeks was ultimately available.

4-15

SSCRET

LOGISTICS

QmlW.o PACIJIC 1943. Gilbert Ielapde Operation - November force. J'rom: Commander :ri!th .&mphibioua LSTa and launched in Sectional pontoon• were bro~t in on of them. Thia fail- early or effective use was not made the lagoon but and indoctrination, on believed to be due to the lack of training ure is employment ot th••• pon­ of the Shore and Beach Parties, in th• the part pontoon• ahould be explo~t•d The •lllJlloyment a.nd ueetulneas ot these toon•. 1 VRARJ' in good u.aable condition nax1mum. The availability ot IING S to the employment ot pontoona. considerably reduced the neceaaity tor at MAKIN uaable condition may not exiat. In future operation• wharvea in immediate

It ia recoJ:m:Dended that: authorities a.gr•• on curtailed Tabl•• (l) Army, Navy,and Marine baaed and supplies for ground troop• and ahore of Allowances of equipcent both to aeaault appropriate for atoll we.rtare, and applicable air units, also take into consider­ and garrison troope. Th• tables ehould elemsnts o! the captured positions. ation th• probable duration ot occupation be equipped only for that particular Troopa going into the ialands should service. eupplies ot assault and garrison (2) ~ipm• .t, ammunition, and list, so aa to avoid duplication ot troops be consolidated into a aingle categoriea ot troopa. the types o! mat erial carried by both it ia practicable to bring By a cocbination ot LCla and LSTe as great as six to eight hun­ troops into the landir:t; area trom distancea dred m1le6. of APA.a LCT(S)s are required for rapid unloading Additional a.re inTolved, are not useful where long distances o..r.d AXA&. These cratt preparation• are va:'..18.ble for r.arbor unloading. I! advance but are ~oat for use in a very ahort laur.chill& from LS~&, they can be ready cade for launched, in com.i:iesion and In one instance, at MAKIN, an LCT was tice. after immediate oreoarations began. equipped, and operating within on• hour be exploited to Tte use of tr.e sectional poc.toons should of traneportir.g them. Trained the i::a.xicu.::; in spite of the difficulty not yet been assembled and made avail­ crews fer iLetalling causeway& l:Ave able. should prove a val- Jor waves other than ae&ault waves DUXWS However, the transportation 118.ble supplecent to crossing coral reefs. is very serioua. :p1·o·c;lec for botr. types of vehicles 5-l en ~

.3 6

.. 2

.3

ORT

'i

110.1

049 996.0

172.0 180.0 iao.o 486.2

485.S 482.5' SlS.4

473.0 75.

S 444.4 TONS 461.8

1

1043.0

1456.o

6272.6

2842

9115.o

soos.o 2352.4

3989

1213.J

9n5.2

12560.o

216

FT.

8o781

60156 91189

43430 46010 46010 43400

8o810

81855 89687 CU 83499

1066oo

132933

650509 108387 108028

552266

241367

225507

165476

128886

1202775

161236

1202775

8

- - - 19640ll - - 8 8 0 8

s

17 18 12

11

0 0 0

66

0 o

GUNS

29

95

9S 95

5 9

s

- - - -

10

10 0

39 23 19 22 23

TRLR ll 12

20

12

18 so

110

149

149 199

&

74

59

60 56

57 4

16 17 17 16 34

35

JS

30

42

37

41 34

372 31

VEHTCLF.S

213 TRKS TRICED

585

110

SSS

695

.

.

&

.

G

N

Re-

tr.

uip

CARGO

&

&

q

Supp. ,

Intt

Equip. Equip. E

Equip

Tanks

Equip

1

& resupply Assault

Assault t:onstr. Assault

Cons

PACIFIC

Equip.

F.quip.

fYPE Coast se

SHIPPI smne same same

Materials, Ecµip. 1y

&

Mat'l. &

n

Combat p

Supplies,

IJDSnt

&

Supply !.

OF

e

Equip aup

Combat & LVTs,

D LVTs, LVTs,

Uedium Construction

Def. Constr AA

Defense Defense

Defe

Camp Construction Def. items.

AAF personnel F.quip.

lJef. Personnel F,qui

Def.

equip.,

CENTRAL

89

288

209 194 192

196 203 202

198

197

1

167

TOTAL

1760 1093

1367 1269 ll2

103 6598

- 7763 ll.65 LOADING

1073

1020 2308

7763

10071

OF

EM

273

18o 177 181 195

193 190 194 188 19.3

162

1311 1675 1210 1004 110 100

62o6 952

7326

1120

1024

2186

7326

9512

8 8

9 s 5

DETATI.S 69 56 2 59

3 15 lS 14 PERSONNEL 15 14

10

LOGISTICS

OFF 45

115

49 392

68

437

122

437

559

3

CA CA

CA

CA

Det. th

11

- &

z11

Y T

&

FIRST

DAY .3-165

11 "X" 11

GRP.

/57

Bn. Bn.

Bn

ECHE- ASSROM

98th

Troops

TWO

Elements

Detach. 3

, D

AND .BLT OHE

vision

19Jd

3

EMBARKED

Def.Bn.

Eng CA;A,S7thCA A.C.98th EngBn A,D/9Bth CA, A,B/98th CA Bn,

CA TWO

Di Def.

ECHELON Def.

ASSRON

GRP

l-lb5 Spec 2-165

A, T\VO

Battalion

PLUS 7th

GROUP

GARRISON

ASSAULT

ECHELONS

7th

ASSRON 7th

ASSRON

LST

ECHELON ORG'N D BLT BLT 27th Hq27Div Div

Deta~hloont Detachment Co. Go4th

Detachment 8o4th Btrys Det. Btrys K,93d ASSRON K/98d Btry· L/98d

other ASSAULT

Hqlst

GROUP

&

GROUP

ASSAULT

MA.KIN

MAKIN

LST

LON

Jl 78 MARTIN

1.000

179

LST 476

447 479 48o

481

482

GARRISON

MAKIN

THROUGH MAK:.:N, GARRISON

MAIL

GROVE -

-

AMERICA

-

CONSTANTINE SAN

I.

No. No.

No.

Total, No. No. No.

No.

No.

Total No.

Total,

Total,

Pl'. SHIP

PIERCE

CALVERT MAKIN-ASSAULT NEVILLE ALCYONE LST LEONARD

LST LST BELLE Sub

LST MAKIN IST LST LST LST

Sub LST TOTAL, CAPE ISi.AND CAPE MAKIN

YOUNJ

Sub

Sub

TOTAL

~

vi. S:SC~ET LOGISTICS - CEN'?li.L PACIJ'IC l 1rom: Comma.ndiil& Officer USS CALVERT.

It has been proved that LSTs and LCTs are needed to exped- 1 te the unloading of transports, During thie operation, it took this vessel two and one-half (2j-) hours to remove skids from LST 31 before vehicles could be unloaded,

Recommendation: That when LSTs launch their LC'I·, they al!o dump their skids,

!'.rom: Commrulder Transport Division Four - TARAWA.

After D plu1 l day, conveyor rollers were laia from the ramp to a point halfvay P..l.ong the pier to the beach, where trucks were used to pick up supplies and run them to a dump, Cases and boxes of supplies vere oushed along the conveyer rollers from the ramp to the truck loading po1r.t,

:Because of their 11gh~ draft (fourt&en inches) LCP(ll) plas­ tic boats, if fitted vith proper type outcoe.rd motors, vould be idoal for landing supplies and equipment, ae well as the rear echelon, on coral reefs. Combat loads carried in AP~ should be reduced to 450 tons. This can bo effected by reducing the number of rations carried to a ten da.y supply. The number of vehicles sMuld also be reduced t .us C'.ltting dcvn the a::ount of fuel required. Fractically nll low priority equip­ ment as well as a si::ia.11 percent~• of hi&h oriority equi~cent should be elimin.at•d. Loads in AKAi! should also be reduced altholJ.&h not to the sa.ce extent. Cargo in AXAs would be used to take care of shortages in APAs in the event of unforeseen eventualities. Low ~riority equ1~1!1!'nt could aleo be carried,

THE DECISION AS TO DAYS RATIO!iS, UlrITS OF FIP2, A?·IOt.'NT OF FL'D.. AllD OTHER SUPPLY TO BE ])':BARKED IS 3ASE.D Oli STRATEGIC .AS 'tfE.LL .AS TACTICAL COliSIDERATIOMS, HENC::: :10 AlUUTlWiY TOt.'NAGE TOT.AL C.Ui BE ESTA:BI.ISHED,

IN GE~iERA.I., THE l-!Oll VEHICLES J\VAlLABLE IN T.HE .BEAC!i AREAS, ':'EE MORE BAPIDLY UN.LOADING A!.'D CLE.A?.AUCE OF THE .B&ACP.ES PR2CRESSES.

Each APA, AKA, LST and LCT ehould oe equippeC. ..,..i th conveyor roll ere.

Balsa woo~ life raft~ were loaded with supplies and in Ee~­ eral cneee with 75 ~!!-'. gune, and were pusr.ed or paddled t~.r~~gh the &hal­ low water from the end of tr.a uier to the beacr.. Theee were in co~stant use until after D plu~ 3 day. The first two de~·e these life ra!'ts, after being unloaded at the beach, were reloaded with cP.eualtiee and pusced out to the boats awaiting,

5-3 S2CRET I.DGISTICS - C:i:NTB..il PACIJ'IC

MEDICAL

From: Commander FIFTH Amphibious Force.

Tne evacuation to hospital snipe at Fo.nafu\i seven hundred miles ayay durir.g early atages of operation 'W8.B not practicable. It h my opinion tr.at hospital ships should be brought into the combat area on D plus 3 and 4 for evacuation of the moat saver• casualties, if the APA8 are to be uaed for re~oval of combat teams, An ambulance plane (Coron­ ado tY?e) was used for evacuation of casualties from the APA.a and support groups at !-!akin to Fo.nafuti on D plus three. Some difficulty and delay in loading the plane was encountered due to anchorage of the plane in the cl:annel in which boat traffic was heavy. LCP(L)1 which were tee only boats suitable for tr.is operation, were ~ct equipped with cleats for stretcher loading thereby cutt.i~ do'tm the capacity of the boats and slow­ ing loading operations . The use of a float such as a modified life raft of the square box t:;pe used on some .AXAs would expedite loading of casual­ ties into an ambuJ.ance plane of the Coronado type.

The doubling of the medical section of beach parties proved unnecessary on ttia operation due to the light casualty load and the fact tr.at practically no opuoeition was encountered on R.d .Beach. I believe the augmented portion of the ~edical section should be retained aboard shi~ until operations show the best location for their utilization. On D plus two the augmented sections of the beach parties were recalled to the transports where their aervicea could be better utilized. Recommendations:

A. That one h~spital corpsman be trained and detailed in recording and reporting of casualties aboard each AXA and APA. B. That each LCP(L) of the force be equipped for handling of stretcher cases for loading of Coronado type ambulance plane, C. That Augmented J..ied.ical Section of beach party be retained aboe.rd the tr&nsport until tteir best utilization becomes apparent. D. That one life raft aboard each AXA be modified to furnish a lanC.ing float for use in loading Sea Plane Ambulance. E. Tr.et the fleg s~ip of each iivision of APAs be supplied with pin fixation apparatus for fracture reduction, of "Roger Ander­ son" or 11 Stader 11 type. F, Th.at a hospital !11.ip be made available on D plus tr.ree or four in combat area for evacuation of casualties from transports,

From: Observers 1 Reports.

Evacuation of casualties was not accordin£ to plan in that tl:.ey were not returned to the ship from w.r.ich they had come, The ship was not notified before their arrival alongside, and tte total n\l!Dber was grossly under-estimated, It seems that tLe system ,f evacuation to

5-4 SSCRET LOGISTICS - CEN'l!RAL PACIJ'IC the nee.rest ship was better than the planned removal to the parent ship, as this considerably reduced the time before medical tr~atment could be given. The lack of an approximate estimate of number expected, cowever, could have resulted in inadequate preparation.

In f'uture operations, vhere the medical forces of the beach party and shore party are unable to land on the beach, it is suggested that they be stationed in an LCM off the beach an! tr.at all boat coxswains carrying casualties be directed to report to t his LCM for first aid tr.at­ cent of the casualties and for instructions as to vhich transport t he casualties will be delivered.

From: Commanding Officer USS ORMSBY - TARAWA.

.It is believed that boats and not amptracs should be used in evacuating casualties from be.aches to ships, and that casualties be so arranged in boats so that the entire boat can be picked up at the rail and wounded taken to sick bay, Th.is is particularly important C.ur­ in& night hours. OBMSl!T boats all carried out ttese instructions aarl. are so fitted to hoist either by boom or at the davits. A considerable n1ll:lber of boats from other vessels neither could be hoisted by boom or at davits due to slings having been missing in some cases, and in others the slings were in bilges of boats under the stretchers.

5-5 SZCRET

LOGISTICS

Salerno - S!ptember 1943. l'rom: Collllll8.llder XIGHTB Amphibious ~ore•.

Opinion• formed after Sicily ae to the efficiency of varioue types of craft in u.nloading were cont'irmed in operation at s.u.muro. One LCM is worth several LCV(P)e, and LCTe are the moot eatisfaetor)' craft of all land1Jl& for unloading vehicles a.nd bulk cargo. 'lbe actu.tll unloading transports time for in this operation varied from 25 hours to 36 houra. conRiderable ~is ie a improvement over SICILY vhen the average t1m$ vae 55 hours. Much o! thie improvement was due to the employment of LCTa from the Jlorthern Attack Force. Other factors vere the excellent weather, extensive use of cargo netc, faster Ullloading at the be!l.Ches, etc. hen thie ti.J::e can be 1ub1tantie.lly reduced if a sufficient n:amber of LCHs and LCTs are availa~le and 1:t' craft are unloaded proll!lltly on e.rrive.l at the beeches. It that given is eotiaated good weather and enough LCTe to vork the hatches continuously out th with~ neceszity of waiting for carriera, a combat loading transport emptied can be in from 24 to 30 hGun. LCI(L)s werti also uaed to advantage load troope to un­ !r~m the 3 LSTs 'ld:lich accompanied the combat loaded transports. In Ooeration S.ALE.Rh'O, aa in Ooeration SICILY, DUKi'S used to best advantage. were not A few of them ~ere em9loyc~ unloadi~g LSTe near ti'e beach, but. for the r::oet part they wera either idle or used for tra.ns­ portat i~c ashore. It see~s that no matter what aesurancoe m~ be given beforeb~r regarding th9 employinent of DUKWS, circur.sta ces wil~ always arise wr.ich will orevent the Arrrzy co~ d fr l:l e'1suring tr.at tl.er O:

Reco.nmendat1ons.

l, That rail loading be e'Dnlo;1ed to tte i::a."tir.ium extent oracticable. It is far faster and more satisfactory than net loading. in every respect

2. ~bat the maximu::i nuc:ber of LCX(3)s and LCT(5)s vided for unloading be oro­ cargo from transports and cargo a~i9e . Tl.e latter cr::..ft are particularly valuable. '.:'hey are too large to be carried on dee~ and because of their slow speed, li~ited radius and pocr qualities, sea 6Qine; the proble::i of gett1.:ig the::i to the assault area may difficult prove a one, but once t~ere, they are easily the moat valuable the landing of all craft to Landle carGo between the al:ips and the beaches. l:ext to them the LCH(3) is most valuable, It is just too small, however to 1.andle ::iedi·.llli tanks and very la.::-g1 trucks satisfactorily, 3. TrP.t when usi:ig LCV(P)s to transport cargo, maximUl;i use 5-6 SECRET lDGISTIOS - KBDITDR•DU !RUfBI be :made of cargo nete, a net load being levered into the boat carried into the beach with the load still in th• net, and lifted out at the beach either by an ".A.1 frame on a DUXW or by a tractor crane. Thia require• four or more neta per boat. 4. That eTery effort be made to proTide au:t'ficient manpower at the beach to unload a.ll bulk cargo promptly.

5, That DUXWS aaaiat in unloading.

Unloading ot LS'l's on D and D plua One ~· vaa done mainl.7 oTer pontoon• inaamuch aa all aTailabl• LCTa were being uaad to unload tranaports, and the beach gradient vaa auch that they could not load directly onto the beach, Thia included three British LSTs of the Killer t;yp• (l!OXD., llHDISD and THRUSTIR), When f'lll.ly extended, the ramps ot th••• LSTe project• about 79 teat beyond their bov, The officer in command ot th••• cra:!t reported that there vas about 11.x to aeven feet of vater at the outboard end of the rampa and therefore they had to be unloaded oTer pontoon•.

In this operation, two LSTa (carrying Air force equipment) were completely loaded vith bulk stores and material totaling some five hundred tons apiece; alao LSTa in which the 15?th and l 79th RCTs of the Floating Beaerve vers embarked, carried in addition to their Tehicles, tan.lea, etc,, an estimated 150 to 200 t ons apiece of such stores and equipment, There were three double pontoon• aTailable in the force, all of which were beached promptly and used continuously.

:lxperience to date seems to indicate that there ia little probability ot eTer finding beaches vhoae gradient will permit unloading LST1 oyer the ramp directly onto the beach, and therefoll9, it must be accepted that LSTa normally vill be unloaded by one of three methods:

(a) If a port is available, by mooring bova on to a dock or pier; (b) and (c) - If unloading is done over the beac:!J.es, by pontoons, smaller landing craft and/or DUXWS.

Since it is impracticable to carry more than a fev pontoons vith any .A.tta.ek force s.nd since unloading bulk cargoes from LSTa must be done entirely by manual labor, those LSTs carrying bulk equipment auto­ matically become the last to unload because otherwise they would tie up the pont~one for an extended period and thus delay unloading vehicles, tanka, etc,, from other LSTa.

It 1e estimated that unloading bulk cargo from an LST over pontoons can be done at the rate of roughly one hundred tone per day • .A.t thia rate, it vill take from four to six days to completely empty a fully loaded one,

5-7 S2CRE1' U>GISTICS - MEDITEB.BARAH THliTBE

Many U. s. LSTs, notably those in the Milazzo end Termini to Salerno shuttle service, were loaded with from two to five hundred tons of bulk stores, This practice caused them to be held on the beaches fo~ periods as long as 24 hours because all these stores had to be man­ handled in the unloading process. This likewise slowed down the general unl~ading picture,

AN LST IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC LOADED WITH 26 CARGO TRUCKS, 23 MISC~LLA.~OUS VEHICLES, AND 367 TONS OF BULK CARGO ON THE TANX DEC'.iC CONSISTING OF RATIONS, :ruEL IN DRUMS, AMMUNITION AND OR­ GANIC GEAR, BY UTILIZING TRUCKS AND CARGO TRUCKS WAS UNLOADED IN APPROXIMATELY TWO HOURS. SEE DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF METHOD EMPLOYED IN CHAPTER DEVOTED TO LANDING CRAr'l'.

Some merchant vessels were found to be loaded with cargoes of mixed tinned gasoline and explosives such as land mines. In one in­ stance a small fire caused by a single bomb hit caused the loss of the entire ship and cargo when land mine explosions drove off the fire fighters, This ship could otherwioe have been saved.

Because of the lack of mechanical means for handling bulk cargo, LSTs are not well suited to transportation of this type of ma­ terial or equipment and it is recommended that they not be employed for this if other ships can possible be made available.

From: Commanding Officer USS .ARCTURUS.

Whenever a boat suffers engine trouble or hull damage, as they frequently do in this type of operation, the boat is broll&ht back to the ship for repair, Because of the need of all boats to send cargo ashore in the shortest possible time, th• damaged boats must be repaired immediately. In most cases the boats have to be hoisted aboard for re­ pair which suspends discharging at one hatch while the boat is being hoisted aboard and sometimes while it is being repaired aa well, If a special ship were designated for repairs with special booms and adequate deck space (e.n LST could be specially fitted) all damaged boats could be sent to that ship for repairs, leaving the cargo ship free for the important task of getting cargo ashore, If the Repair ship carried extra personnel for repair purposes and sufficient spare parts, it is believed she would be able to get the boats back into service faster than the cargo ship, which often has to improvise replacements for damaged or missing gear. In this line, the Salvage Tank Lighters could be carried on the Repair Ship instead of taking one of the tank lighters from the service of the cargo ship for salvage purposes.

5-8 SSC:lET LOGISTICS

SOUTH P.ACirIC

Treasury Islands Occupation - October 1943.

From: Commander Task Group THIRTY-ONE POINT ONE.

Th• transport units under Commander Task Group THIRTY-ONE POINT ONX in EATON, vere divided into five groups, each with tactical commanders cited. The First Transport Group consisted of eight .APDs screened by (three DDs). The Second Transport Group consisted of eight LCI(L)e, tvo LCI Gunboats, screened by (three DDs and three Al-ls). The Third Transport Group consisted of two LSTs screened by (two DDs), and YMSs 197 and 260. The Fourth Transport Group consisted of one .APc and thre' LCTs, screened by two PT boata. The Fifth Transport Group con­ sisted of one APc, six LCJ.ls, and an aircraft rescue boat. The five transport groups departed independently as indicated in paragraph 10, so timed to arrive at :BLANCHE llAR1lOR on 27 October as follows: Arrived Un11 Departed :BLANCilE HARllOR 27 Oso~ober lat Transport Group GUADALc.uul. l230 26 October 0520 2nd Transport Group GUADALCANAL 0400 26 October 0555 3rd Transport Group GUADALCAN.il 1930 26 October 1640 4th Transport Group BENDOVA 1200 26 October 0830 5th Transport Group LAMllO LAM1IO 1900 26 October 0830

The varying times of arrive.l were set to give each group :f'ull use of the beaches and permit its clearing the area prior to arrival of the next group, thus aToiding undue exposure to air attack of vessels awaiting opportunity to unload.

During the eleven days elapsing from the initial echelon until the unloading of the Third Zchelon, the following troops and sup­ plies were delivered at the TREASURY ISLANDS by ships and landing craft under CoCl!llailder Task Group THIRTY-ONE POINT O~TE:

Pereonnel 6,315 Rations 367 ton1 Drummed petroleum product• 422 ton1 Aml:iuni tion l,152 tone Vehicles: 169 cargo type 576 tons 29 canst.type 187 tons 155 special type 394 tons total 1,157 tone l,15? tons General cargo 772 tone 772 tons 3,870 tons While this was not a large operation, it wae somewhat com­ ~ licated due to the many types of craft involved and their great differences

5-9 SECRET LOGISTICS - SOtJ'l!H PACI7IO

in speed, In all. there were ten types. with speed1 varying from 35 to 6 knots, Sine• none of them could carry LC>f(3)a, it wa1 nece1sary for th• LSTa to tow one each, and to 1end s1.x other•, 1acort1d by an A.Pc, on their own power. on the eighty-five mile, open water trip from VELLA LAVJ:LI.A. Sine• but two LSTa could be spared for the lirst Echelon of this operation. additional equipment had to be carried in three LOT(5)s, This included the very important Badar equipment. loaded in one LCT, to­ gether with bulldozers and other engineering equipment for illll!lediate tran­ sfer froc BLANCHE H.ARllOR to SOANOTALU. when that poaition vas reported occupied end suitable aa a .Bad.ar site, This vas done on D minus 5 Daya a.od. in spite of very difficult terrain conditiona at SOANOT.ALU, with dense forests up to the beach, the Radar we.a placid in full operation, at the selected site, about 1600 yards inland, within leas than four days, and wa1 ready before Dog Day tor the l!OUGAINVILLX Operation,

Land1n.g at ?mPress J.ugusta Bay - Bovembll" 1943,

Frora: Commander Third .Amphibious l'orce,

On November 2 the second assigned objective was reached, .By November 4 access lateral roads running inland had been started. Sup­ ply of advance units was difficult due to swamps and abaence of roe.lie, Amphibian tractors proved invaluable in getti~g supplies and 8lllmunition forward and wounded back to tM rear. It va1 found that a small fighter strip could be const ructed on PURUATA PLA}j"'TATION but a reconnaissance patrol of on• cocpany was sent to determine a site for the main tvo-1trip airdome, A auitable site was located in the PIVA Area about two and a half miles north of TOROXIN.l POI~rr. The patrol was engaged by an enemy force on its return, losing on• :tilled and three wounded, In the mean­ time patrols were pushed in all directions and new positions for exten­ sion of th• perimeter were located,

Unloading details of 120 men on each ship and 200 men par ship on tho beach with the sole duty of unloading boats were required and furnished, .By repeated experience these numbers have been found to be the mini~'l.U:I which can keep the ships' booms working constantly, The training exercises at EF.ATE were invaluable, not only as a refresher in the mechanics of landing assault troops but particularly in teaching the details of rapid and efficient unloading,

On November 4, 1943, the 2d Echelon, LSTs 70, 207, 339, 341, 354, 395 and 488, Tranedivs 12 and 22 (8 APDs), with additional troops, supplies and squipQent eQbarked, and escorted by W.AI.I.ER, SAUFLEY, PHILIP, RENSliAW, EA.TON, SIGOURNEY departed GUADALCANAL and arrived at TOROXINA at 0600 Novemoer 6, 1943, Unloading proceeded slowly due to lack of d.velop­ i;;ent of beach facilities, Most of tl':.e cargo of the eight LSTs had to be unloaded at PURUATA ISLAND where beaching conditions were good but crowded, Unloading was not completed until 0300 NoveQber 7, when the convoy withdrew and returned to GUADALCANAL, The APDs were detached

5-10 s:::cRET LOGISTICS - SOUTH PACIJIC enroute and proceeded ahead in .order to debark casualties and to refuel at 'l'OLAGI in time to load for the 3d Echelon •

.Echelon 2.1, PRESIDENT JACKSON, PllSIDENT .lIW(S, PRESIDENT RAl'S, :nn.LER, LI1!RJ. and TITANIA. with the 148th CT Infantry Division e~­ barked, escorted by GUEST, W.ABRIGNTON, .BllliNETT, HUDSON, ANTHONY, WADS­ WORTH, BOPUNS, BOTirr, DORSXY and SOU'l'lliBD departed GUADALCANAL at 0100 on November 7 for TOROKIHA, arrivi~ November 8 at 0800. Unloading com­ menced at once but at 1140 the approach of many bogiee necessitated get­ ting ths formation und•rw&¥ to repel air attack, The eneJllY was able to launch a well-coordinated a~tack by about 20-30 dive bombers and 12-14 torpedo planes covered by 50-60 fighters, Seven plane•, mo1tly dive bombers, were shot down by the convoy and screen. The J'ULLER received one bomb hit, which though not disabling, killed five and wounded twenty, and seven near misses. Th• JACKSON vaa hit by one bomb which did not explode. Unloading was resW11ed but at 1600 ehips again got underway in view of impending air attack which was broken up by our fighters. At 1720 unloading waa again resumed, completed at 1830 and at 1837 ships d9J>arted in heavy rain with many bogies to eouth and west.

The 3d Echelon, with LSTe 446, 447, 449, 390, 397, 398, 472 and 166 with ( 8 APDs) escorted by WAI.LER, SAUJ'LEY, PHILIP, HENSHAW, CON­ WAY, and EATON departed GUADALCANAL on November 9 e.nd arrived. TOROKINA at 0600 on November 11, :Beach conditions were somewhat better developed and, although loading had been heavier than in the second echelon, un­ loading was completed and ships departed for GUADALCANAL at 1835. The APDs with casualties embarked had departed at 0830. The return to GUADALCANAL was made without incident.

The 4th Echelon, CLYMER, HUNTER LIGGETT, AMERICAN LEGION, CRESCENT CITY, ALCBIBA, ALHENA, with the 129th Combat Team of the 37th Division embarked, escorted by GUEST, WADSWORTH, BEN}!ETT, A.~THONY, TERRY, BB.A.INE, DORSEY and TREVER departed GUADALCANAL at 2300 on November 11, 1943, and arrived TOROKINA at 0700 November 13, having been molested but unharmed by many bogies during the night of November 12-13. Unloading wes completed and the ships departed at 1630, returnine to GUADALCANAL. Min._ sweepers DORSET and TREVER continued search for shoals to eastward of previously searched areas.

At noon Love on November 13, 1943, comm.and of BOUGAIKVII.LE position passed to the Commanding General Fifth Marine Amphibious Corpe, by agreement with ColllCander Task Force 31. Taek Force 31. cowever, ccn­ tinu•e to furnish naval and logietic support.

During the period November l to 13, 1943, the following troops, equipment and supplies were delivered at the IMPRESS AIJGUST4 BAY poeitions:

5-11 SZCRET U)GISTICS - SOUTH PACIPIC

SUPPLIES AND PERSOl."NEL IQlJIPMENT, TONS • Echelon 1 - 8 APA, 4 AKA 14,321 6,177 2 - 8 APD, 8 LST 3,548 5,080 2J.- 4. APA, 2 AXA 5, 715 3,160 83 - APD, 8 LST 3,599 5,785 4 - 4 AP A, 2 AXA 5.578 2,935 TOTAL 33,851 23,137

Including the above amounts, a total of 44,430 officers and men, and 40,338 tons of equipoent and supplies have been delivered from November 1-30, 1943, During this period a total of 1434 casualties have been evacuated by ships of this force, including sick,

Froo: Commander Transport Group, Trird knphibioua Force.

The loading YRS 11.:Dited ae follows:

JACKSON, AD.Al~S, HAYES - 520 tons each. CL!MER, LEG ION, LIGGETT, :roLLER - 500 tone each. CBESC:El.'T CITY - 440 tons ALCHIBA, ALHENA, LI.BRA, TITANIA - 550 tone each,

Total Tollil.9.ge - 6,177 tons,

From the actual times of unloading during the training per­ iod and with the improvements made in reloading, the predicted average time of unloading all APAs and .AX.A8 YRS ~ hours with a 2500 yard run to the beach,

The debarkation interval for the first and second assault waves of the Transports varied considerably between different shipa, particularly between those capable of "rail-loading" and those which could not do so.

The lilllitation on loadi~ of APA.a and AX.la to 500 plus or minus 50 tone was based on previously determined discharge rates, The amount carried was about ! a combat load for APA.a and about t for AX.As (about 1/10 deadweight capacity of AXAs). Careful planning on the part of Troop Commanders resulted in the eli~ination of all items not abso­ lutely necesaary for the first echelons and it was found not difficult to stay within the limits imposed, Additional advantages accrued in that adequate apace was thus made available for stowage of cargo to peniit:

(1) Equal balance in unloading time between all holds, (2) Easy handling, (3) Proportionate discharge of the various claases of supplies, such as ammunition, rations, fuels, etc., at a given time duriN; the unloading,

5-12 SSCRET LOGISTICS - SOUTH PACIFIC

SUfficient cargo nets were carried to uermit stowing moat of the loose cargo in nets in the holds. Thia ce.rg~ was then unloaded from the nets in the boats at th• beach. This type of loading insures unloading during a single '18.ylight period when the transport group is less vulnerable to air attacks by reason of adequate cover and maneuver­ ability. It ie based, of course, on the early follow up of subsequent echelons with the remainder of supplies a.nd equipment essential to con­ tinuance of the operation. Probably the most important modification with respect to cargo handling in an assault lending is modernization in hatch design. For an example, 56 power lifts are required in LIBRA and TITANIA simply to open up from main deck to nut1ber three hold, an operation which takes nearly three hours. Some means also is necessary to open hatches prior to arrival in the Transport Area. In the South Pacific, blessed with warmth and usually calm seas, hatches gen.erally have been left open upon departure !roe the port of embarkation and hatch covers hauled over, and much Taluable time saved in all ships. The nearest possible balance in area and volume of cargo holds ahould be obtained to permit flexibility in stowage of cargo. Ir­ regular hold shapes should be avoided. Bail-loading of LCVPa has again proved itself on ships so equipped, particularly for the first waves, and every effort must be made to equip ma.ximum number of J:PAa to operate in this manner.

HEW CONSTRUCi'ION J:PAS ilE :S:QPl.PPED TO PEBMIT RAIL LOADING o:r LCVPS, AJID THIS WILL .Bl POSSIBLE IN APAS IN SERVICE WHEN THE PID:SEHT WIRE IS :aEPLACED WITH A STRONGER .APPROVED TYPE •

.U.teration to provide accocmodations for ~00 t roops on AXAa is advocated. This will permit AXAa to handle their own beaches and ship unloading details from troops embarked with consequent elimination of the confusion and delay attendant upon transferring workin& and beach parties after arrival in the Transport Area. With ilAs loaded as c.es­ cr1bed in a foregoing paragraph, apace on the second deck can be made available for this purpose without detriment to the ship, particularly if bunks are of a portable type. In effect, tr.en, the present AKA.a vill becoce transports of small troop capacity but able, by reason of their larger nucber of L

5-13 S:SCRET LOGISTICS - SOUTH PAClJ'IC

Install 2 "jumbo~ booms on all APAs with independent handl­ ing equipment, Thie will peI'lllit carrying 4 LC2~(3) in these ships and !llllke them independent of assistance from other ships in assignment of LCM(3) in unloading, Standardize on 4 11 jumbo 11 booms in AXAs with allowance of 8 LCH(3) in order to handle heavy equipment from four holds expeditious~. All 11 .1umbo 11 booms should have power operated gays.

FOUR APAS IN SERVICE HAVE BEEN ALTERED TO PBOVIDE TWO HEAVY llOOl·lS A..'ID ADDITIONAL LCHS, ACTION IS BEING TAJG1N TO MAKE SIMILAR .ALTERATI0~15 IN ALL OTHER AP.A.S IN SERVICE EXCEPT SPECIFIED O~:ES TO WSICH THE ALTERATI ON IS NOT APPLICABLE BE­ CAUSE OF CHARACTERISTICS OR PROSPECTIVE USE.

PRESENT PLANS FOR OTHER THAN THE SMALL .AXAS PROVIDE FOUR 1!001-!S AND AB ALLOWANCE OF EIGHT LCM( 3) S.

From: Commanding Officer, USS GEORGE CLYMER.

SUl·!HARY.

11 11 Debarkation of trOO!JS: (Zero time - Lower all boats ). All boats launched ...... 19 min. Assault waves debarked •.....•...... •....• 37 min. Discharge of cargo: Overall hold working time ...... 5:10 Deduct time underway during,, .....• . ...•.....•.. 1:49 Air Attack (1300-1449) Net hold working til!le ...... 3:21 Total load in tons. . .• .. .• .. . • ...... • . . . . • 456 Tons per hour discharged .•...... , ...... , .. 137

Froc: Commanding Officer LST 395.

Pontoon trestle bridge was loaded aboard to be used tc bridge space between ship and shore.

Ship was beached at flank speed at Torokina Beach, llougain­ ville, 11ith all ballast tanks empty, There was 18 inches of water at bow and the sea was moderate, Ship grounded at 0620, 28 November 1943, and all ballast tanks were filled to anchor ehip in position. .Bridge building team augmented by Army Engineers from shore party illlI:lediately co::u:ienced setting up the bridge. Trestle bridge completed at 0804 and ready to commence unloading. Although bridge took considerable time to erect, it proved its value by expediting unloading and all vehicles were able to leave the shi!J under own po1·1er . .Ap-oroximately 45 feet of water was bridged, leaving a scaut 10 feet of shallow water to travel in, linlonding com;;.enced about 0830 and all cargo, including 780 drums of gnsoline, wns unloaded by 1220. Drums were rolled over the bridge, Shuttle trucks used for cargo were brought back aboard after their loads

5-14 S:ECRET LOGISTIOI - JSOt1'l!B PACI7IC were r111110Ted. :lighteen truckll and 1 J'ruebauf type trailer vere loaded for return to Iukwii. Treatle bridge diemantled and placed aboard by 1330 and 1h1p ready to r•tract. The uee or portable pontoon trestle bridge proTed on this echelon to eolTe the problem of adTerae beach condition•. A heavy 81.U'f WM running b7 1100 and 1tructure vaa eteady thro~out unloading. Load.a 'ap to 23 ton vere taken aero•• the trestle. The time taken to erect bridge wae definitelJ' vorthvhile to both ehip and disembarking units ae all ve­ hicles vere iJ.rr and mOTing under own pover. With one additional bey in bridge, vehicle• would haTe been on dry land. It i• propoaed to use 3 bav'• and 2 rampe in future vhich vill epa.n 60 feet. Two bays and 2 ramp• were ueed on thi1 trip. With e%perienced erection crews, time to erect bridge can be reduced one half.

J'rom1 Commander LST J'lottila live - Comment on Trestle Bridge.

One of the very Taluable features of this equipment ia that it can be completel,y d11ae1embled so that there are no heavy members, each of which can be readil,y handled. by man power. This bridge bas been aatisfactoril.7 tested a 1econd time at Torokina, and its continued use there desired by ComGenJMAC and Comnander Task Force 31. This equipment ia considered to be especiallJ' Taluable whe~ LST move• initially on to etrange and questionable beaches where surf and other beaching conditione as prevail at Toroldna are apt to be encountered. It is interesti~ to note that it took e%})erienoe to bring this valuable equipment to light, indeed, experience baa prOTed a most adept teacher in LS'l' operations. One of the requirements of thia bridge is that its erection must be ac­ complished by personnel familiar vith it, and the time element involved is dependent upon its skill. It is therefore necessary to have trained teams available to be placed aboard LST together with this equipment in order that a satisfactory set up could be efficientl,y and quickly achieved vhen landi~.

Comment on trailers.

Realizi~ ve had some "jury-rigged" trailers and that even with the good I.e. Crosse and Fruehauf Heavy Dnty trailer the optimum trailer for LST was still not had Commander LST Flotilla FIVE requested in reference (o) that an experienced trailer engineer or designer be associated with LST on its move to l!ougainville in order that this re­ presentative might et~ the problem of designin& a suitable trailer fer LST under ite present and prospective operating conditions and make specific recommendation in regard to the procurement of this optimum trailer. (Two U. S. A:rmy ordnance officers accompanied LST 395 on its second visit. Thus was professional knowledge of the trailer under fir~t hand contitions acquainted with the problem of unloadin& LST by its use and by actual practical demonstration. These gentlemen have recommended the ATHEY 20-ton trailer. War Department Technical Manual, 'I'M9-790B of December 15, 1942, as the optimum trailer. 5-15 SZCRET

LOGISTICS

SOUTHWXST PACIFIC

Occupation of ioodlark and Kiriwana Islands - Ju1y 1943, l'ro1:1: Comi:iander SEVEl?rn Amphibious Force.

Experience in this operation indicate tr.at LSTe can be un­ loaded relatively quickly with ~roperly organized and adequate unloading details, A teaJ!I collfOosed of about 300 men, fortified by a good beach, developed accesses, and with ample trucks available, completely un­ lo ~ded an LST of approximately 1100 tone of bulk loaded cargo in four­ teen hours. Loading and unloading times of course vary considerably with the naturt of tte load, conditions of the beach, and the efficiency of the unloading crew, The ca.xi=um time required for actual unloading dur­ inr, the operation was about 2~ hours, The average time was 18 hours,

Completely mobile loads proved to be a cost expeditious means of transporting equipcent and supplies in LSTe, With accesses and dispersal urepared in advance mobile loading permits rapid unloading of the LST on the beach, and also pernits rapid transporting of supplies to the dispersal areas without rehandling on the beach, LSTs with completely mobile loads were unloaded at Woodlark in as little as l hour 20 minutes, Tr.e average time was ~ to 3 hours,

In tropical waters it is feasible to transport a limited number of personnel in LCT(5)s. In this operation about twenty cen from the loading detail were transported on eech craft without hardship, Landing at Lae - Septe1:1ber 1943.

l'rou: CoC1Dander SEVENTH .Amphibious Force,

Unloadine; on D day was satisfactory with the exception of LCT(5)e. Each of these, containing 120 tone of bulk stores, beached at 0800 and were not clear until 1430, Thie was due to insufficient troops aesiened to unloading, It is essential for rapid unloading t~.at suffi­ citnt per sonnel be assigned to each ship for this purpose only,

On thP. other hand, unloading of LSTs each containing 400 men, 35 vehicles an~ 80 tons of bulk stores was excellent. One LST was unloaded in l hour 42 minutes, UnlonC.ing of the remainder was completed within 2 hours 15 minutes.

Subsequent to the initial unloading on the =orning of D d2.y, all beaching and unloading was done at night. Tr.e rate of unload­ ine was generally unsa tisfactory. One cause was undoubtedly intermit­ tent bombing of the beaches by enel'QY aircraft.

The n~ed for supplies on the beach must be balanced with the

5-16 SZCRET LOGISTICS - SO~ST PACI1IC

period of exposure to air attack enroute to and from the beach ouring daylight hours. Three hours appears to be the ma.xioum time which LSTs and LCT(5)s should be permitted to remain on the beach.

!bbarkation staffs, loadine officers, naval be~chmasters, and unloading detail should be ap~ointed sufficiently well in advance of the operation to enable them to obtain the necessary loading and un­ loading experience in preli.Jninary movecent9, training, and rehearsals. Bapid unloading of bulk stores is a most importent requirement ~hich can be achieved only by an experienced organization. The need for effi­ cient control and ndequa te, trained personnel in t!~ie phase of the op­ eration cannot be too strongly stressed. Because of an insufficiency of troops assigned to unloading in this operation, unloading of LCT(5)s vas generally unsatisfactory.

Rapid preparation and surfacing with mattine of beach exits and roads to dumps are essential if vehicles and stores are to be cleared from the beach promptly. Although an effort was cade to ceet this requirement in both tr.e rehearsal and the actual landing, in neither case was it satisfactory.

UNLOADING DATA Load Period on Remaining Rate per Echelon Craft Vehicles ~ Beach-Hours on Board hour-tons

4 6 LST 20 80 2.25 35.5 5 7 LCT(5) 120 6.00 20.0 6 4 LST 39 84 3.00 28.0 8 7 LSI' 35 00 2.5 32.0 9 6 LCT(5) 130 2.7 60~ 27.0 12 6 LCT(5) 125 3.0 20~ 33.0 14 7 LCT(5) 110 3.2 34.0 Repairs were made by USS RIGEL and LSTs 453 and 455. These LSTs were fitted out as repair and eupply ships. LST 455 was stationed at ~ORO:B! a• control and repair ship for northward covecents of landing c.·· ft until 12 Septecber, when she ""ae dhabled by bombing atteck, She was then relieved by LST 453, stationed at :Bl!NA, because of inadequate air protection at MORO:BE. The service• of theae ahips at a point twtwe~n the staging and assault areas proved to be of the greatest value. Medical

In outline, this plan involved the use of a first aid ship ct :BONA ae a collecting point for naval casualties. LST 464 was er.­ ployed for the purpose and was equipped with personnel and a considerable part of the equipment of one standard fifty-bed hospital unit.

The .A.uetralian Arr:J:y cedical plan necessitated evacuation to

5-17 S~CRET

BONA since their hospital accommodations at MORO!! were very limited. Army casualties were to be .vacua.tad from the beach, insofar aa vaa possible, only in LSTa and LCI(L)a. Those LCI(L)a which carr19d medical officers were distinctively marked. Jach LST carried a medical officer. In practice, LCT(5)a were employed principally for eupply to the far shore after D plus 3 days. Theee returned carrying wounded to MOBOBI where they were inapectea and serious cs.see put ashore. Other caeee were brought to llUNA by LCT(5)s or any other ehip available.

Casualties from the LSTa bombed on D day were partially collected before dark by two destroyers and brought to MOROlm, :lva.­ cu.ation from there was handled by destroyers and J.PDe.

As a result of the operation it was found that stretcher cases can be accommodated beat on the tank decks of LSTe. In an emer­ gency LCI(L)s can accommodate 6 stretcher cases, but this type of cra!t is not entirely satisfactory for the work, J.PCa have been used for stretcher cases, they lack adequate shelter and medical eta!! and accord­ ingly should not be uaed if more satisfactory craft are available.

Walkine; wounded can be accommodated satisfactorily in troop compartments of .APDs, LCI(L)a and LSTa.

Landing at 1'1.neehbaftn - S!ptember 1943,

From: The Commander SEV'ENTB J'J.eet.

Supply - The proven ability of the Amphibious Foree to run supply echelons to unload in darkness should overcome any fear of troops being stranded without supplies. In this operation supply for seven days only was landed at dawn on D day with the result that LSTs were on the return move~ent befare any serious air attack developed, ll;y the same token, the ground forces bad fever vehicles to conceal, lees bulk to move to dumps, and smaller labor requirements during the first twelve hours ashore. The remainder of the total 15 days supply was landed in 3 LSTs on the night of D-D ~l.

Unloading detail - The provision of a large trained un­ loading detail with each load of bulk stores paid dividends by enabling rapid unloading and reducing the tine craft remained on the beach exposed to air attack.

Naval lleachmaster - A .naval officer as lleachmaater is essential, The army officers in the shore party are not qualified to handle adequately purely naval functions.

Landing at .Arawe - December 1943. From: Commander SEVENTH .Amphibious Force,

5-18 SSCRET LOGISTICS - SOUTHWEST P.lCI1IC

Except for the troops and supplies landed with the assault yavee, all troops and supplies for the A.RAWE Operation were transported by LCTs ?-nd LCMs, escorted by PCs, .APce, SCs A.nd !MSs from CAPE CRETIN, New Guinea, a distance of about 70 miles across sea.

During the period 15-31 December 1943, the following ships of Task Group 76.5 (which vas cocprised of small craft only) were dam­ aged or sunk from enel!IY action:

APc I 21 sunk APc 2 and APc 15 damaged LCTs 82, 382, 384, 386, 387 and 396, damaged

The following enemy planes were shot down by these sl!lall craft:

22 definite 6 probables

As of 10 January 1944. the LCTs landed 3,100 troops, 6,287 tone of stores, and 451 Tehicles and guns at AB.AWE.

From: Commanding General, 2nd Engineer Special Brigade - GENERAL llPOR1'

Sled pallets and similar devices, such as the Inverkip sled, should be exploited to get maxilllUlll advantage of their use. This brigade r.as six Inverkip and six improvised sleds; 12 more lnverkips ho.ve been ordered. The tendency to ~erload these sleds must be avoided,

The 3/4 ton weapon carrier bas uroved to be the most sat­ isfactory vehicle for use in the initial stages before the roadways are ready, It has more power and ~aneuverability than the t ton and carries three tines the tonn..~ge. Instead of trailing 37 l!ll?I guns, it had proved better to preload them in the weapon carriers and unload them at their emplace~ents. The 3/4 ton trucks return to the craft after unloading the gun and then shuttle stores to the dumps. Jeeps trailing 37 I!llll guns often bogged down.

DUKWS take up so much cargo space (31 1 long, 8 1 wide 8 1 tall with top down) that they are not recommended for initial landings. They are very ueef'ul in unloading vessels not able to beach of subsequent echelons. Their use from LCTs and LSTe .,.·hich can beach is not reco=ended. In that connection, it is er.ipbasized tho.t DUKWS will operate land-water satisfactorily if maintenance is t horoughly 9erformed, The bad nane t hese vehicles got at Milne Bay was due, in our opinion, to the poor main­ tenance and peculiarly choppy waters in thP.t area, Our Amphibian Truck Company (5304th), by systematic maintenance, has kept a very high percent

5-19 S2CRET LOGISTICS - SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

of their vehicles in operation both at Ore and at Lae where 24 hour oper­ ation was necessary, These trucks wei~ 13,600 lbs, Even when preloaded with their [!18.Ximum capacity of 5000 lbs, they can be unloaded by the gear of Victory, Liberty, or equivalent ships, DUKWS have definite value when properly used and caintained, Unloading chutes, cargo nets, etc, must be included in their equipment,

Another advantageous use of DUK':TS is moving supplies from one bench to another as troops advance along the coast after the initial landi:ig, l.fuch rebandling will be avoided, ~en thus used, the forward beach should first be made ready by shore engineers end mate taken up by landing boats,

Still another use for DUKWS is to lay alongside a beached LOT ~nd take cargo over the sides while it is also being unloaded via the rar:ip, thus decreasing tte ti::ie for the LCT to re1?1ain on the Far Shore,

5-20