CONFIDENTIAL
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FUND ADB/BD/IF/2006/11 ADF/BD/IF/2006/11 17 January 2006 Prepared by: OPEV Original: English
Probable Date of Presentation to the Committee Operations and Development Effectiveness FOR INFORMATION Not Applicable
MEMORANDUM
TO : THE BOARDS OF DIRECTORS
FROM : Vasantt JOGOO Ag. Secretary General
SUBJECT : TANZANIA – REVIEW OF BANK GROUP ASSISTANCE STRATEGY TO THE AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT SECTOR *
Please find attached the above-mentioned document.
Attach:
cc: The President
* Questions on this document should be referred to:
Mr. G. GIORGIS Director OPEV Extension 2041 Mr. H. RAZAFINDRAMANANA Principal Evaluation Officer OPEV Extension 2294
SCCD : G .G.
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FUND
ADB/ADF/OPEV/2005/05/04 MAY 2005 Original: English
Distribution: Limited
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
REVIEW OF BANK GROUP ASSISTANCE STRATEGY TO THE AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT SECTOR
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN PRODUCED FOR THE EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE BANK GROUP
OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT
SCCD : G .G.
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS...... i EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...... iii
1. BACKGROUND...... 1 1.1 Objective and Scope of the Review 1 1.2 Approach and Methodology of the Review 1 1.3 Country Economic and Sectoral Context...... 2 1.4 Bank’s Group’s Historical Relationship with Tanzania ...... 4
2. GOVERNMENT’S ARD SECTOR STRATEGY AND BANK GROUP’S SECTOR ASSISTANCE STRATEGY...... 5 2.1 Government’s National Agriculture and Rural Development Sector Strategy...... 5 2.2 Bank Group ARD Sector Assistance Strategy...... 7
3. BANK GROUP LENDING OPERATIONS...... 9 3.1 Portfolio Composition and Status ...... 9 3.2 Relevance and Quality at Entry ...... 9 3.3 Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)...... 11 3.4 Efficiency...... 13 3.5 Institutional Development Impact...... 14 3.6 Sustainability...... 16 3.7 Aggregate Bank Group Assistance Performance...... 17
4. BANK GROUP NON-LENDING OPERATIONS...... 18 4.1 Portfolio Composition and Status ...... 18 4.2 Economic Sector Work and Studies ...... 18 4.2.1 Studies...... 19 4.2.2 Tanzania Agriculture Sector Review, 2002 ...... 19 4.3 Aid Coordination, Co-financing and Resource Mobilisation ...... 20 4.4 Aggregate Performance Assessment of Non-Lending Operations ...... 21
5. OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF BANK GROUP ASSISTANCE...... 22 5.1 Overall Performance – Lending and Non-Lending Operations...... 22 5.2 Impacts on Cross-cutting Themes...... 22 5.2.1 Poverty Reduction, Food Security and Gender...... 22 5.2.2 Environment...... 23 5.2.3 Private Sector Development and Community Participation ...... 23 5.2.4 Regional Integration...... 24 5.3 Counterfactual Assessment...... 24
6. CONTRIBUTORS’ PERFORMANCE...... 25 6.1 The Government and Executing Agencies ...... 25 6.2 The Bank Group...... 26 6.3 Co-financiers...... 27 6.4 Contribution of Exogenous Factors ...... 27
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
7. MAIN CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS AND CHALLENGES ...... 28 7.1 Conclusions...... 28 7.2 Lessons Learned...... 28 7.3 Recommendations for Feedback...... 30
LIST OF TEXT TABLES Page Table 3.1: Summary of Evaluation Ratings – Lending Operations 18 Table 4.1: Summary of Evaluation Ratings – Non-lending Operations 22
ANNEXES
1. Basic Project Information: Part 1 7 Part 2 1 Part 3 1
2. Project Performance Evaluation Ratings 20
3. Recently Approved and On-going Projects 4
4. Matrix of Key Lessons, Recommendations and Follow-up Responsibilities 2
5. Basic Indicators of Agriculture and Rural Development Sector Performance Data – Selected Years 2
6. List of Selected Key Documents Reviewed and/or Consulted 3
This report was prepared by Mr. Lawrence E. Eturu, Agricultural and Institutional Development Consultant under the overall supervision of Mr. F. Turay, following their mission to Tanzania in January-February 2005. Any further matters relating to this report may be referred to Mr. Getinet W. Giorgis, Director, Operations Evaluation Department (OPEV), extension 2041 or to Mr. F. Turay, Principal Post Evaluation Officer, OPEV, extension 3257.
i
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ADB African Development Bank ADF African Development Fund AIDS Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome AMSDP Agricultural Marketing Systems Development Programme ARD Agriculture and Rural Development Sector ASDP Agriculture Sector Development Programme ASDS Agriculture Sector Development Strategy CPRR Country Portfolio Review Report CSP Country Strategy Paper DAC Development Assistance Committee DADP District Agriculture Development Plans DASIP District Agricultural Sector Investment Project DRT Development of Research and Training EAC East African Cooperation EPCP Economic Prospects and Programming Paper ERP Economic recovery Programme ERR Economic Rate of Return ESAP Economic and Social Action Plan ESW Economic and Sector Work FAO Food and Agriculture organization of the United Nations FRR Financial Rate of Return GDP Gross Domestic Product GOT Government of Tanzania HDI Human development Index HIPC Highly Indebted Poor Countries ICB International Competitive Bidding ICR Implementation Completion Report IFAD International Fund for Agriculture Development IMF International Monetary Fund IMG Independent Monitoring Group LCB Local Competitive Bidding LGRP Local Government Reform Programme LIFDC Low Income Food deficit Country MAFS Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security MAMCOS Madibira Agricultural Marketing Cooperation Society MDGs Millenium Development Goals M-SACCO Madibira Savings and Credit Cooperative Society MTEF Medium-Term Expenditure Framework NAEP II National Agricultural Extension Project NAFCO National Agriculture and Food Corporation NALERP National Agricultural and Livestock Extension Rehabilitation Project NALRP National Agricultural and Livestock Research Project NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations NPES National Poverty Eradication Strategy OPEV Operations Evaluation Department PCR Project Completion Report PCU Project Coordination Unit
ii
PIU Project Implementation Unit PMU Project Management Unit PPER Project Performance Evaluation Report PRGF Poverty Reduction Growth Facility PRS Poverty Reduction Strategy PRSC Poverty Reduction Strategy Credit PRSL Poverty Reduction Strategy Loan PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper PSRC Parastatal Sector Reform Commission RDS Rural Development Strategy SADC Southern African Development Community SAL Structural Adjustment Loan SAR Staff Appraisal Report SGRM Selous Game Reserve Management Project SPFS Special Programme for Food Security T&V Training and Visit TARP II Tanzania Agricultural Research Project Phase II TAS Tanzania Assistance Strategy TLMP Tanzania Livestock Marketing Project UA Unit of Account UNDP United Nations Development Programme ZPRP Zanzibar Poverty Reduction Plan
iii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. Objective, Scope and Methodology of the Review
1.1 The study reviews the performance and impact of the Bank Group’s assistance to Tanzania’s Agricultural and Rural Development (ARD) Sector during the period 1978-2004 in order to draw lessons for improving the effectiveness of future Bank Group’s assistance in support of the country’s efforts in generating poverty reducing economic growth. The review covers seven completed projects and five studies, and five on-going projects, which were at various stages of implementation.
1.2 The findings of the review are based on analysis of data and information collected from relevant project documents and other literature relating to Bank Group’s and Government of Tanzania’s (GOT) policies, strategies and operations. The documentary sources were complemented with a field mission to Tanzania from 24 January to 11 February 2005, during which additional data and information was collected, and consultations were carried out with the officials of the GOT and of the development partner agencies. Visits to selected project areas and sites were organized to seek the views of farmers, traders, local communities, and regional and district administration officials as well as to observe current operating conditions.
2. Country Economic and Sectoral Context
2.1 In the period under review, Tanzania’s agricultural sector performance improved and remained stable with the changing overall policy environment - from socialist command to market orientation - but poverty remained high and pervasive. About 80% of the country’s poor - estimated at about 50% of the national population - live in the rural areas where agriculture is their main source of economic livelihood. Agriculture is thus the mainstay of the Tanzanian economy and its growth is crucial for poverty reduction, food security and foreign exchange earnings. The sector performed better during the post-1986 period, when real annual output grew by about 3% in the 1990s, compared to the period 1975-1985 when real output grew by less than 1% per annum. The sector’s annual shares of GDP and total exports stood at more than 45% and 55% respectively. This performance is considered low relative to its potential and reflects, to a large extent, the high dependence of the sector on rain-fed production and low-input technology that relies on human power for its application, as well as on the changing policy environment.
2.2 With the support of the development partners, Tanzania adopted in 1986 economic and structural adjustment reforms that started the economic transition from a socialist command type to a market-based economy. As a result, economic performance improved considerably - real GDP growth averaged 3% in the 1990s and rose to 6.2% in 2002 before dropping to 5.6% in 2003. Poverty, particularly in the rural areas, however, remained significantly high, thus constituting a key challenge for the GOT.
2.3 To enhance the fight against poverty, Government formulated in 2000 the country’s first Poverty Reduction Strategy and the second -- National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP)- in 2005. To complement the poverty reduction strategy, the Government formulated the Rural Development Strategy (RDS) and Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) to provide the basis for pursuing poverty reduction and food security objectives in the rural areas. The ASDS focuses on five strategic areas: (i) strengthening the institutional framework; (ii) creating a framework for commercial activities; (iii) identifying public and private sector roles in improving support services; (iv) strengthening marketing for inputs and outputs; and (v) mainstreaming planning for agricultural development in other sectors.
iv 3. Bank Group Assistance’s Performance and Impact
3.1 The Bank Group’s assistance to Tanzania’s ARD sector has been relevant, as it followed and supported overtime the Government’s national and sector development priorities and objectives, but it failed to address the issue of the inappropriateness of the Government’s sector strategic approach to poverty reduction and incentive structure during the socialist command economy management period. During 1975-1985, the GOT pursued, among other objectives, food self-sufficiency and increased foreign exchange earnings mainly through large-scale state farming, especially using irrigation methods, to increase food production. The Bank Group supported this GOT policy and injected substantial investment in the irrigation sub-sector, which became the most important area of Bank Group assistance up to the mid 90s. By focusing on irrigation, the Bank Group was to a large extent selective in its assistance to the sector. The Bank Group, however, failed to address the inappropriateness the GOT’s state farm approach and controls on poverty alleviation. The state farm irrigation projects were costly and inconsistent with the expectations of the poor small-scale farmers.
3.2 As the GOT launched its Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in 1986, the Bank Group introduced the Economic Prospects and Country Programme (EPCPs) to guide its interventions in the country during the period 1987-1995. The EPCPs supported the GOT’s ERP (ERP1 and ERP2), whose priorities included import substitution, food security and employment creation. During this period, the Bank provided support for agricultural rehabilitation, strengthening of research and extension, irrigation and livestock marketing. The period also saw the shift of the Bank Group’s focus to the small-scale irrigation projects in order to produce substantial impact on the livelihoods of the poor.
3.3 From the mid 90s to the end of 2004, the Bank Group’s country strategy papers (CSPs), agriculture and rural development policy and other strategic policy documents guided its assistance to the ARD sector. Although the Bank Group’s assistance during this period was more poverty-focused and consistent with the GOT’s strategies for the sector, it appeared to be less selective and coherent. Further, the Bank Group slowed down its approval of new projects, partly due to the poor implementation performance of the ongoing projects, some of which extended over ten years.
3.4 In general, the Banks Group’s assistance was relevant and efficacious with positive institutional development impact but was inefficiently delivered and unlikely to sustain its benefits. Rated against its intended objectives, the Bank Group’s assistance performed satisfactorily. Five out of the seven completed projects satisfactorily achieved their objectives, while two - the large-scale state farms - performed unsatisfactorily. While two of the three ongoing projects (TLMP and SPFS) were likely to attain their development objectives, the third project (SELOUS) was unlikely to do so. Most of the Bank Group funded studies were not only relevant but also satisfactory.
3.5 The Bank Group’s assistance was, however, largely inefficiently delivered and only three projects were rated as satisfactory on the efficiency scale. The Bank assistance was mostly characterized by over-extended implementation periods and under-utilization of the resources of the assistance. Most of the projects had under-utilized production capacities – the infrastructure and equipment in the big state farm projects including the rice mills were left idle. These inefficiencies, which fortunately decreased during the 1999-2004 programming cycles, were due in part to the unsatisfactory performance of the GOT and the Bank Group.
3.6 Overall, the Bank Group’s assistance had substantial impact on institutional capacity building and human resource development in the ARD sector. It improved the project development and management skills of the Project Management/Implementation Units (PMUs/PIUs) that carried out the day-to-day management. At the sectoral level, the PIUs linkages with the line ministries facilitated the coordination and implementation of Bank Group financed projects, and also provided opportunities for
v the capacity of the Ministries to be indirectly strengthened by the projects. At the sub-sectoral level, the creation and development of self-sustaining institutions was an innovation in some projects and programmes where smallholders were the primary stakeholders. Further, the institutionalization of some best practices such as management, marketing and financial services in the farmers organizations; the strong culture of participatory management, supported by self-reliant farmers’ grassroots organizations; a strong culture of research; and the unified extension system at the district level, amongst others, were some of the institutional best practices established in some projects.
3.7 The key results of the Bank Group’s assistance are unlikely to be sustained without continued GOT and external support. The large state farm schemes, in particular, are unlikely to be sustainable both technically and financially without substantial restructuring, while the research and extension projects have been sustained with continued GOT and donor funding. The smallholder rice schemes are, however, likely to be sustainable with further technical support.
4. Conclusions, lessons and recommendations
4.1 This review concludes that, notwithstanding some inefficiency in its delivery, the Bank Group assistance to Tanzania’s ARD sector during the period 1978-2004 had overall relevance and efficacy and its outcome can be considered satisfactory. The overall institutional development impact of the assistance was positive, but the results are unlikely to be sustainable for a major part of the portfolio. In sum, there is ample scope for improving the performance and impact of the Bank Group’s assistance to the sector.
4.2 The key lessons emerging from this review for the Bank Group are that:
i) reducing poverty through the Bank Group’s assistance requires not only that the Bank Group takes into account the GOT’s stated priorities for the sector and needs of the primary stakeholders, but also that it ensures the effective participation of the key stakeholders in identifying, designing and implementing the interventions - this should enhance the prospect of sustaining the strategic results of the assistance programme for the sector;
ii) the institutional and management structures of the Bank Group’s assistance have not been able to ensure their sustainability without continued external support, and is an issue that should be given serious attention by both the Bank Group and GOT and may require a drastic shift in the way the Bank Group assistance is to be delivered; and
iii) although the efficiency of implementation of the Bank Group assistance has improved overtime, there is room for further improvements by both the GOT and Bank Group instituting better performance standards.
1 1. BACKGROUND
1.1 Objective and Scope of the Review
1.1.1 This study was commissioned by the Operations Evaluation Department (OPEV) and was carried out from mid-January 2005 to end of March 2005. The study reviewed the Bank Group’s assistance to Tanzania’s Agricultural and Rural Development Sector (ARD), and assessed whether the Bank Group applied the most appropriate and effective lending strategy to support the country’s ARD policies and strategies so as to maximize the effectiveness of the country’s efforts in generating economic growth and reducing poverty. This report presents an independent, comprehensive and objective assessment of development effectiveness of the Bank Group’s on-going and completed aid policies, programmes and projects, processes and procedures to Tanzania’s ARD sector; and draws lessons at policy and strategy levels that may be applied to improve future operations. The findings of the review will complement similar reviews in other sectors, and will serve as inputs for the evaluation of the Bank Group’s country assistance and for the evaluation of overall African agriculture sector in the near future.
1.1.2 The review covers the entire ARD sector portfolio consisting of 12 projects and five studies as at 31 December 2004. Seven projects and five studies which have been completed, and three projects that are on-going but scheduled to close during 2005, are reviewed in detail, while two recently approved projects (the Agricultural Marketing Systems Development Programme and the District Agricultural Sector Investment Project) are also covered in summary for the purpose of assessing the extent to which the Bank Group has incorporated lessons from the past into its current intervention strategies. A summary profile of the projects and studies in the ARD sector portfolio is given in Annex 1, Part 1.
1.2 Approach and Methodology of the Review
1.2.1 As a general approach, the projects and studies were grouped into sub-sector clusters to highlight the strategic focus of the Bank Group in the ARD sector. The review also identified projects according to the periods they were appraised and approved, to highlight the fact that, overtime, the Bank Group’s and Tanzania ARD policies and strategies changed and the changes affected the approaches to new interventions. The grouping of projects according to sub-sectors and time periods is given in Annex 1, Part 2.
1.2.2 The review applied a two-part methodology, namely: a) documents review, which was complemented with a field mission to Tanzania from 24 January to 11 February 2005, during which: (i) additional data and information was collected, and consultations/interviews were carried out with GOT officials and officials of development partner agencies, and (ii) visits to selected project areas and sites were organised to observe current operating conditions and seek the views of farmers, traders, local communities, and regional and district administration officials. The preliminary findings of the field mission were shared with GOT officials on 11 February, 2005. The second part of the methodology consisted of detailed analysis of information obtained from the documents review and the field mission, and the evaluation of the individual projects using the benchmarks of relevance and quality at entry, efficacy, efficiency, institutional development impact, and sustainability. The results of the individual projects ratings (Annex 2) were aggregated (using simple averages of ratings) to arrive at the sub-sectoral and overall sector performance ratings that are discussed in chapters 3, 4 and 5. Chapter 6 discusses contributor’s performance while Chapter 7 discusses the conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations for follow-up actions.
2 1.3 Country Economic and Sectoral Context
1.3.1 Tanzania is one of the relatively large countries in Africa, occupying 945,000 km² in East Africa 884,000 km² of which is land area. With a population of 36 million (mid-2003) the average population density is 41 people per km², but this varies considerably from one area to another due to differences in rainfall and land productivity, as well as the distribution of tsetse fly, which have influenced the pattern of settlements towards higher rainfall and tsetse free regions where densities exceeded 100 per km². About 70% of the population lives in the rural areas, where over 90% of female and 78% of male employment are in the agriculture and rural development (ARD) sector. Poverty and unemployment levels are high: about 36% of the population still lives below the national poverty line and the level of human development is low1, while unemployment is recorded at about 15%-20% of the total labour force (2001). Nearly half of the unemployed live in urban areas and about 10% in rural. Dar es Salaam city alone has an unemployment rate of about 47% while in other major cities the unemployment rates are about 25%-30%. The unemployment is particularly serious among the youth in the 10-24 age brackets.
Macro-economic Developments
1.3.2 The Tanzanian economy has gone through very significant macro-economic policy land-marks since the country gained political independence in 1961. Following an inauspicious beginning, the Tanzanian Government pursued socialist policies from the mid 1960s until the mid 1980s characterised by central government direct interventions in economic activities. Over 400 parastatals were created, and efforts and expenditures were directed towards social development, including the collectivisation of rural populations. Although initially relatively high rates of GDP growth were achieved, the economy later experienced a series of destabilising shocks, including the oil price shocks of the early and late 1970s, the collapse of key commodity prices, droughts, the break-up of the East African Community and the War against the Amin Regime in Uganda. These shocks, coupled with the macro- economic short-comings of the system and the disincentives it created, led to a severe economic crisis as economic activity and production stagnated in nearly all sectors, causing mounting inflation and steep declines in per capita GDP.
1.3.3 With the support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in 1986, Tanzania introduced major social and economic reforms including initial steps towards the liberalisation of economic activities and provision of incentives for production and marketing. Macro- economic fundamentals were improved by these measures but economic growth, which initially responded well, was insufficient to significantly improve living standards or per capita GDP over the following ten years. Efforts to uplift the economy were generally protracted and there was a slow down of lending by the donor community. It was not until 1996 when the country returned to the IMF fold, through the three-year Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) signed that year, that international confidence was restored in the economy and aid and investments started flowing in again.
1.3.4 Since 1996 the Government of Tanzania (GOT) has consistently pursued reforms of the economy – which included privatization and/or divestiture of public enterprises (the parastatals) and the reorganization and restructuring of government services. Since the introduction of the three-year Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), arranged by IMF in 2000, the thrust of economic
1 UNDP’s 2004 Human Development Report showed Tanzania had a Human Development Index (HDI) of 162 out of 177 countries. World development Indicators 2004 ranked Tanzania under 181 in gross national income per capita and under 206 in PPP gross national income.
3 policy has been to sustain macro-economic stability through: (i) maintaining relatively strong economic growth; (ii) pursuing fiscal stability by increasing domestic revenue mobilization; (iii) controlling the expansion of broad money consistent with economic growth and inflation targets; and (iv) earning and maintaining adequate foreign exchange resources. Real GDP growth, which averaged 4.6% during 1996-2001, rose to 6.2% in 2002 but came down to 5.6% in 2003. The GDP outlook for 2004 and 2005 were projected in the recent GOT’s Economic Review Report and other reports as modest at 4.8% and 4.7%, respectively. The stability of growth in the medium term is expected to be backed by relatively strong export performance.
Agriculture and Rural Development
1.3.5 The agricultural and development sector is the foundation of the Tanzania economy, accounting for 45% of total gross domestic product (GDP) and over 70% of exports by value in 2002. Smallholder farmers (about 4.5 million farm families) produce about 55% of total agricultural output and over 80% of the value of marketed cereals. The smallholder farmers are the major producers of maize, sorghum, millet, cassava, rice, plantains and pulses, as well as cash crops like coffee, cotton, tobacco and cashew. Both the private and public sectors are involved in estates agriculture, but the private sector is dominant in tea, sisal and tobacco, while government estates are significant producers of rice, wheat, sisal, sugar and beef. The proportion of the population that depend on agriculture as a source of livelihood is estimated at about 78%, which is a slight reduction from about 83% in 1990.
1.3.6 The economic reforms of the past two decades have impacted on the agricultural sector growth, which during the 1970s had declined to less than 1% per annum. By creating and enhancing producer and other market related incentives, the reforms led to accelerated agricultural growth from 1% during 1976-1980 to 3% during 1980-1985, to 3.2% during 1986-1991, and to an average of 4% up to the turn of the millennium. Agricultural exports also expanded as export crop production expanded, from just 1.8% during the 1980s to 7.7% during the 1990s. Agricultural exports as a share of GDP rose from 13% in 1990 to 16% in 2002. In 2003, the agricultural sector grew at 4% compared to 5% in 2002 and 5.5% in 2001. The decline in agricultural sector performance was the result of drought which hit many parts of the country during 2003/04. A food security assessment carried out by the Government and other stakeholders in 2003 in the drought-affected areas established that 52 districts faced food shortages due to poor crop harvests that year. The drought had the overall impact of reducing crop production, which is the major contributor to agricultural GDP.
1.3.7 The ARD sector’s contribution to GDP and export earnings have been sluggish and virtually static over the long term. Faced with a rapidly increasing population, currently estimated at 2.6% per annum (1990 – 2003), sector growth has been insufficient to pull the majority of the population out of poverty. Several factors have contributed to this poor performance. Firstly, the rural infrastructure is under-developed (roads, land, etc), and secondly the available technology (hand hoe and hand tools) is inadequate for optimal exploitation of the land resources. MAFS statistics reveal only about 10% of arable land is, on average, cultivated per year (total arable land is estimated at about 48.7 million ha). About 94% of the cultivated land is used by small-scale farmers who practice customary tenure, while 6% is under large-scale farming.
1.3.8 Besides, technological advances have been very limited if not retrogressive. For instance, fertilizer consumption has declined from 110 hundreds of grams per hectare of arable land in 1979/81 to only 56 hundreds of grams in 1999/2001, and tractors per 100 km2 of arable land have declined from 35 in 1979/81 to 19 in 1999/2001. Irrigated land as a percentage of crop land increased marginally from 3.1% in 1979/81 to 3.3% in 1999/2001. Due to the use of inappropriate technologies, which are creating severe resource degradation and especially of the soil, the sector faces declining labour and
4 land productivity. The root causes of these constraints have been identified as the poor incentive structure and lack of or inadequate availability of appropriate inputs, credit, marketing and financial services, amongst others. To these must be added the vicious cycle of rural poverty which has the effect of limiting effective demand and investment capacity of rural people.
1.4 Bank’s Group’s Historical Relationship with Tanzania
1.4.1 The Bank Group began lending to Tanzania in 1971 with an industrial loan for an Oil Pipeline and Tankage Facility. Since then the portfolio has expanded to all the key economic and social sectors of the economy. The total cumulative approvals as of 31 December 2004 amounted to UA 910.92 million in 61 loans (UA 872.95 million) and 28 grants (UA 37.97 million). This has been used to finance 41 projects, 22 studies, 5 policy-based loans, 3 lines of credit to industry, and 2 SFM loans. The share of the ARD sector in the total country portfolio was 21%, and 2.4% of the cumulative Bank Group approvals for Africa. The historical trend of Bank Group operations (see Annex 1, part 2) shows that, from the beginning, the Bank focused on the agriculture and rural development, transport and public utility sectors, and has tried to maintain that trend. Although there was a decline in agricultural lending from the mid-1990s to 2001, this was reversed in 2002 and 2004 with the approval of two projects – the Agricultural Marketing Systems Development Programme (UA 16.90 million) in 2002 and the District Agricultural Sector Investment Project (UA 43.0 million) in late 2004.
1.4.2 The transport and the ARD sectors take a combined total of UA 440.61 million or 47.9% of the cumulative portfolio. The Bank Group policy is to focus on the directly productive sectors, and therefore considers its support to the agriculture and transport sectors as complementary. Transport is regarded by the Bank Group as an essential element of agricultural and rural development because of its importance to the marketing of agricultural produce and also to farmer’s access to inputs. This argument has been used by the Bank Group as partial explanation for non-intervention in the ARD sector during some of the periods especially from the mid 1990s to 2002. Other pertinent reasons, however, included the fact that the donors adopted a generally low key to lending following the deterioration in relationship with GOT during the early to mid 90s, which was improved only after the Danish Government intervened in 1993/94 by establishing an ad hoc Group of Independent Advisors to find ways to improve the relationship.2
1.4.3 Improvement in dialogue is seen as a key to maintaining good rapport. Overtime, the Bank Group has continuously improved its dialogue with the Government, through such instruments as the Economic Prospects and Programmes (EPCPs) from 1987 to 1995, and the Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) from 1996 to 2004. In 2002, the Bank carried out its first major review of the agriculture and rural development sector. This was a significant development in the way the Bank viewed its policy and strategy towards the sector. The sector reviews will be important tools in the Bank’s relationship with Tanzania.
2 The group was chaired by Prof. G. K. Helleiner. President Mkapa later used the Helleiner Report to redefine the relationship between the donors and GOT.
5 2. GOVERNMENT’S ARD SECTOR STRATEGY AND BANK GROUP’S SECTOR ASSISTANCE STRATEGY
2.1 Government’s National Agriculture and Rural Development Sector Strategy
2.1.1 Tanzania’s agriculture and rural development sector policies and strategies have evolved overtime with the changes in the political and macro-economic policy environments. This evolutionary process can be broadly divided into three periods (a) from the mid 1960s to the mid 1980s, (b) from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s, and (c) from the mid 1990s to the present time (December 2004). From the mid 1960s to the mid 1980s Tanzania pursued policies towards “African Socialism”, enshrined in the 1967 Arusha Declaration, which put great emphasis on fighting poverty, ignorance and disease. The cornerstone of the policy was the UJAAMA village – a rural agriculture collectivization programme aimed at modernization of the agricultural sector and making social services more accessible to the rural dwellers3. The policy initially encouraged progressive farmers to expand with the hope that others would follow their example, but it turned out that only the few who were recipients of state funds benefited and there was little impact on reducing rural poverty. It was therefore abandoned in favour of direct state controls, which saw the nationalisation of industries, trade and commerce, and major agricultural enterprises, amongst others.
2.1.2 While the UJAAMA policy had some positive impacts, especially in the political and social spheres4, it had failed in the economic sphere. The policy down-played the role of the private sector and of the individuals in economic production and trade since its ideological orientation was towards state controls and common ownership of productive resources. The result was a build-up of disincentives among producers which led subsequently to declining outputs and productivity in all sectors of the economy. Agricultural sector growth declined considerably, averaging less than 1% while exports declined by 6% per annum from the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s. The Government’s ARD policy and strategy response, which was contained in the 1983 National Agricultural Sector Policy, focused on increasing the production of cash crops to boost foreign exchange earnings, and food crops to improve food security and reduce food imports. The effectiveness and coherence of the policy response to the crisis was, however, weakened by the continued emphasis and reliance on parastatals as the institutional means to implement policy, and the multiplicity of policy decision centres in different Ministries and parastatals.
2.1.3 The process of economic reforms and liberalisation began in 1986 only after the GOT had become convinced that economic recovery could only come about with changes in economic management, namely the lifting of controls and allowing free play to the incentives structure in order to remove distortions. Significant policy shifts were therefore ushered during this period with the launching of the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), which introduced reforms aimed at creating a competitive environment for agriculture, industry and trade. The pivot of the reforms were exchange rate adjustments; prudent fiscal and monetary management; improvements of agricultural incentives; the reform of trade policy, and the gradual withdrawal of parastatal monopolies. Besides the ERP, the GOT launched the Second Union 5-year Development Plan 1988/89 – 1992/93 whose major objectives were: achievement of national food self-sufficiency; expansion of export production to improve the balance of payments; and consolidation of economic achievements under the ERP1. To focus on
3 It is estimated that between 1973 and 1978 over 85% of the rural population in Tanzania were resettled into more than 7,000 planned villages. 4 Through this policy, Tanzania achieved political and social cohesion which most countries in sub-Saharan Africa were unable to achieve after attaining independence.
6 poverty alleviation and enhancement of the social welfare of the people, a three-year Economic and Social Action Plan (ESAP also referred to as ERP2) was launched in 1989/90 as part of the 5-Year Plan. The Priority Social Action Plan (PSAP) under the ESAP targeted, amongst other things, improvement of food security. The role of women in economic development was also emphasised, while private sector development, which had been marginalised before 1986, was to be addressed through the Privatisation of Parastatals Programme launched in 1994.
2.1.4 From the mid 1990s until the present time (end 2004), Tanzania has achieved a significant improvement in macro-economic performance. GDP growth has averaged 5.3% over the past five years (reaching 6.2% in 2002 and 5.6% in 2003) and inflation has fallen to within single digits. Donor confidence, which had waned during the early to the mid 1990s, and saw the reduction or suspension of some aid flows, was restored with the signing of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) with the IMF in 1996, and opened the door for inflows of aid and investments. This enabled the GOT to enhance and deepen economic reforms through more privatisation of public enterprises, further liberalisation of economic activities, the redefining of its roles vis-à-vis the private sector, and withdrawal from direct economic control of production and trade.
2.1.5 The overarching national goal of the GOT during this period has been poverty eradication through broad-based and accelerated economic growth. The government formulated several sectoral and sub-sectoral policies and strategies towards achievement of this national goal, beginning with the Tanzania Development Vision 2025 in 1995 and the National Poverty Eradication Strategy in 1998. Over the period the various strategies were crystalised and sharpened into the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) which was launched in 2000. The PRSP focused on three sets of outcomes in the fight against poverty, namely: (i) reduction of income poverty through accelerated economic growth – the specific long-term targets are reduction in the ratio of basic needs poverty from 35.7% in 2000/01 to 17.8% by 2010, and of food poverty from 18.7% to 9.3% over the same period; (ii) improvement of human capabilities, survival and well-being; and (iii) containing extreme forms of vulnerability among the poor. The PRSP is GOT’s poverty “flagship” and is strongly supported by donors spearheaded by the IMF, the World Bank, the African Development Bank Group and other bilateral donors5.
2.1.6 The poverty reduction strategy recognises the crucial role of the agriculture and rural development sector in the overall achievement of the set goals and targets for poverty reduction. The GOT therefore formulated the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) in 2001 and the Rural Development Strategy in 2002 as complementary strategies to the PRSP. The ASDS establishes a framework for improving agricultural productivity and profitability in order to improve farm incomes, reduce rural poverty and achieve greater food security. The specific long-term targets for reducing rural poverty have been set as follows: (a) the proportion of the rural population below basic needs poverty line reduced from 38.7% in 2000/01 to 20.4% by 2010; (b) the percentage of rural food- poor people reduced from 20.4% in 2000/01 to 11.6% by 2010; and (c) agricultural growth rate accelerated from 3.4% to 5.2% per annum by 2003. The ASDS provides guidance for future interventions based on five strategic areas, namely: (i) strengthening the institutional framework; (ii) creating a framework for commercial activities; (iii) identifying public and private sector roles in improving support services; (iv) strengthening marketing efficiency for inputs and outputs; and (v) mainstreaming planning for agricultural development in other sectors.
5 In late 2004 the Bank Group approved a Poverty Reduction Support Loan (PRSL) of UA 50 million, which will go toward budget support to GOT during FY 2004/05. An earlier Structural Adjustment Loan 2 (UA 40 million), approved in September 2001, also supported Government’s poverty reduction efforts.
7 2.1.7 Following the formulation of ASDS, the government, in collaboration with stakeholders, developed the Agriculture Sector Development Programme (ASDP) in 2003 as the instrument for operationalising the ASDS. The ASDP framework and process document is part of the government’s operational responses to a set of policies, strategies and initiatives designed to re-orient and re- invigorate the national economy, and it defines three sub-components, namely: sector support at the national level where 20% of ASDP resources are intended to be invested; sector support and implementation at district and community level where 75% of the resources will be invested; and cross-cutting issues with other sectors at the national level (5% of resources).
2.1.8 The ASDP is currently being reviewed in the light of the experiences of the last three or four years, which have presented challenges to the process of formulating practical interventions in the agriculture and rural development sector that would constitute the content of ASDP. The current review process shows that the policy environment is not only complex but one that is continually evolving. While the principal goal is to achieve broad-based accelerated economic growth in order to eradicate poverty, there is an array of policies and strategies designed to establish an enabling environment to achieve this goal. To the extent that these policies support decentralisation of functions and service delivery and advocate for greater participation of stakeholders at all levels in the development process and try to limit the roles of government and enhance the private sector, they represent a major haul from the socialist path of the 1960s to the mid-1980s.
2.2 Bank Group ARD Sector Assistance Strategy
2.2.1 The Bank Group’s assistance to Tanzania’s agriculture and rural development sector evolved through the early years up to the late 1980s by closely following the policies and strategies of the Government of Tanzania as enshrined in the various development plan documents. The rationale of the Bank Group interventions were based on the fact that the identified projects were on the high priority list of the government’s development programmes. During these periods, the government’s own approach to seeking external assistance was mainly through preparation and documentation of priority shopping lists of projects which formed the basis for dialogue with the donors. National planning and development was generally driven from the top.
2.2.2 From the mid 70s up to the mid 80s, the Tanzania economy was in serious decline and the GOT’s overriding policy goal was to increase food and cash crops to meet food security needs and increase foreign exchange earnings, amongst others. However, given its strong socialist ideology, the government strategy to achieve these goals focused on large scale state farming, especially using irrigation methods, to increase food production. The Bank Group supported this policy and approved seven loans for the irrigation sub-sector. Irrigation became the most important area of Bank Group assistance up to the mid 90s, accounting for 82% of the total cumulative approved sector portfolio by 1995. The emphasis on irrigation in the early years up to the early 1990s was in line with the policy of the government at the time, which considered irrigation as an appropriate strategy to bring about stable agricultural production. From the Bank Group’s own perspectives, irrigation-based projects were preferred because they were perceived to yield better results than the rainfed ones which were vulnerable to climatic change6.
2.2.3 In the years following the GOT’s launch of the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in 1986, the Bank Group launched two Economic Prospects and Country Programme (EPCPs), the first in 1987 which covered the period 1988-1990 and 1991/92, and the second in 1993 for the period 1993 - 1995. The EPCPs supported the GOT’s policies and priorities as enshrined in ERP1, ERP2 and the Second
6 This perspective was clearly articulated in the Economic Prospects and Country Programme Paper for 1993 – 1995.
8 Union 5-Year Plan. Besides a Sector Rehabilitation Loan in 1987 (UA 28.55 million) which supported the rehabilitation of the agriculture and transport sectors, the Bank also approved two loans in 1988 (UA 6.17 million for National Agricultural and Livestock Research Project, and UA 6.52 million for National Agricultural and Livestock Extension Rehabilitation Project) to support the government’s plans for the institutional and organisational restructuring of the research and extension services, with the long-term objective of creating sustainable service delivery systems for appropriate technology for increased agricultural development.
2.2.4 The other significant projects approved by the Bank Group were the Kapunga Rice Irrigation Project in 1987 (UA 47.28 million); and Madibira Smallholders Agricultural Development Project in 1993 (UA 21.92 million). Kapunga Rice Project supported the government policy of import substitution, food security through food self-sufficiency, and employment creation) the Tanzania Livestock Marketing Project (TLMP) in 1992 (UA 9.21 million) while TLMP addressed the need for improving the livestock marketing infrastructure and increasing value-added in processing, which efforts would contribute to increased off-take of livestock from traditional producing areas to supply major consuming centres in the country and exports. Support to Madibira, on the other hand, not only reflected the Bank Group’s strategy for the irrigation sub-sector, but also opened the opportunity for smallholders’ participation and for minimising the role of the National Agriculture and Food Corporation (NAFCO) as part of the on-going Government’s liberation policy.
2.2.5 From the mid-90s, the Bank Group’s ARD strategy for lending to Tanzania was shaped by the experiences and lessons from completed and on-going projects. Among the key experiences were the very slow implementation performance of the projects due to delayed start-ups, procurement problems, slow disbursements, poor communications, etc, which often resulted in poor rapport between the Bank Group and the GOT. The Bank Group slowed down its approvals of new projects in the ARD sector from 1994 to 2004, approving only 4 projects totaling UA 66.58 million during this time7. Two of the projects approved during the 2002 – 2004 CSP reflected a new surge of commitment to the sector, which followed: a) the government’s development of a comprehensive sector strategy (ASDS), with an operationalisation programme (ASDP); and b) the Bank Group’s own comprehensive review of the sector in 2002. Since the mid 90s, the Bank Group has also emphasised the need to refocus its assistance towards interventions in fewer areas which can be better managed effectively and efficiently, and towards exploitation of synergies between its programmes, and linkages with programmes promoted by other development partners.
2.2.6 The Bank Group’s assistance to Tanzania’s ARD sector has also been shaped by its own 1990 Agricultural Sector Policy, and in recent years by its Ten-Year “Agriculture and Rural Development Sector Bank Group Policy” launched in 2000. In the current Bank Group’s policy the agriculture and rural development sector vision is “to assume a leading catalytic role, within the next decade, in supporting the technological, institutional, and policy changes that would trigger a lasting transformation of the rural economies of regional member countries (RMCs) by empowering their rural populations to improve their productivity and real incomes in an equitable and environmentally sustainable manner”. The new sector policy defines guiding principles for agricultural lending which focus four pillars development strategy, namely: poverty reduction and food security; accelerated economic growth; natural resource management and environmental protection; and human and institutional capacity building. The priority areas for core Bank Group assistance are defined as the
7 The CSP 1996 – 1998 envisaged no lending to the agriculture and rural development sector although Selous Game Reserve Management Project was belatedly approved towards the end of 1997. the special Programme for Food security (SPFS) was approved during CSP 1999-2001 as a one-off grant to FAO under the programme for Low Income Food Deficit Countries (LIFDCs).
9 provision of rural infrastructure; expansion of private sector agri-business; development and capitalisation of more effective private sector financial networks; improved natural resource management; capacity building and increased regional integration.
3. BANK GROUP LENDING OPERATIONS
3.1 Portfolio Composition and Status
3.1.1 The evaluation covers ten projects, seven of which have been completed while three are on- going but scheduled to close during 2005. Two new projects with as yet little or no implementation records, namely the ongoing Agricultural Marketing Systems Development Programme (AMSDP) and the yet to be effective District Agricultural Sector Investment Project (DASIP), are also reviewed (see Annex 3) with a view to assessing the changes in design and implementation concepts that might have been incorporated based on the experiences and lessons learned from past and on-going interventions. All these projects, including the new ones, have been financed with 15 loans and 3 grants. Six projects which account for 48% of the total ARD commitments and 72% of disbursed funds were approved between the period 1978 to 1988 – these are Dakawa, Tanga/Tabora, Zanzibar, Kapunga, NALERP and NALRP; three projects which account for about 20% of commitments and 27% of disbursements were approved during the 1990s – namely TLMP (1992), Madibira (1993) and Selous Game Reserve Management (1997); and three projects (the SPFS grant, AMSDP and DASIP) were approved during 2000-2004. The size of the portfolio reviewed and the source of financing is given in Annex 1, Part 3.
3.1.2 ADF loans (90% of the portfolio) were extended on standard ADF terms of 50 years duration with grace periods of 10 years; service charge of 0.75% per year on amount disbursed and outstanding; and repayment interest of 1% per year from the 11th to the 20th year inclusive and 3% per year thereafter. ADF also extended loans to cover substantial portions of the local currency costs of projects, which enabled it to finance from 80% - 90% of total costs of projects. The NTF loan financed only foreign currency costs and was extended for a 20 year term, with a five year grace period and repayment over 15 years. The other sources of financing were TAF (UA 1.77 million), ADB (UA 4.50 million) and an ADF grant to finance the capacity building component of DASIP.
3.2 Relevance and Quality at Entry
3.2.1 The Bank Group’s assistance to Tanzania’s ARD sector is assessed as satisfactory, in the overall, towards achievement of long-term national and sectoral development objectives. The assistance, as reflected in the projects financed, has been relevant and in line with the development thinking and priorities of the time. The portfolio has been reasonably well balanced and focused on the areas that are expected to respond to development needs of the country. There are, however, two qualifications to this overall assessment. Firstly, Bank Group did not maintain a consistent pattern in its interventions and commitments in any sub-sector. New project commitments, especially since the mid-1990s, tended to represent fresh starts elsewhere with little or no link to what had been implemented in the past. At the same time there have been no follow-ups to maintain a presence in those key sub-sectors in which the Bank Group invested substantially in the past. Among on-going projects that are scheduled to close during 2005 (TLMP, Selous G.R and SPFS), strategies for continuing or improving or expanding investments in those sub-sectors are not yet clearly identified, except for the District Agricultural Sector Investment Project (DASIP) which has been designed to replicate the participatory and operational aspects of the SPFS.
10 3.2.2 The apparent inconsistency and lack of linkages in the pattern of the interventions gives the impression of the absence of a good pipeline of potential bankable projects in the Bank Group’s programming cycles. The CSPs usually concentrate on macro-economic analysis and sector issues while providing broad indicative resource allocations to the priority sectors, but they do not clearly specify whether on-going or new projects would form the basis of assistance in the new cycle. Also, the CSPs do not often specify the actions needed to formulate new proposals; and they do not, moreover, ensure logical linkages between future or current developments with past developments. Without the consistent and expanding pattern of interventions, the scope of the Bank Group’s assistance was narrowed considerably, and in certain circumstances opportunities might have been missed.
3.2.3 Secondly, in the early years the Bank Group tended to follow Government policies and strategies too closely and perhaps at the expense of its own influence, which in certain instances led to the choice of strategy that was inappropriate and costly, as illustrated by the large irrigation projects financed under state farms arrangements. Although the principal objective of these projects was to increase food production (principally of rice) so as to reduce food imports and attain national food self- sufficiency, and further to create employment and improve the living conditions of the rural people, the choice of state farms would not have contributed to poverty reduction (improved living conditions of rural people) since the communities in the project areas were not involved in the production and trade of the state farm products. The products of state farms would also not necessarily contribute to food security of the households in the project area since the purchase and trade in grains was the monopoly of the Tanzania National Grain Milling Corporation which distributed the grain through its sales outlets located in major urban centers. From a wider macro-economic perspective, national food self- sufficiency and import substitution strategies represented an inward looking approach to economic development at the time, and their pursuit deprived the country of the opportunities for trade development and expansion. The GOT policy and strategy, by omitting the participation of smallholders who were the principal targets of development policy, was also flawed.
3.2.4 The efficacy of smallholders participation is demonstrated by: a) the reasonably good performance of the Madibira Smallholder Agricultural Development Project which incorporated the communities in the project area (5 villages); b) the resilience shown by the smallholders in Kapunga and Chimala where i) they consistently achieved higher yields and used irrigation water more efficiently than the NAFCO farm; and ii) they have continued operation to date (though at a lower acreage level) even after NAFCO was wound up in 2001; and c) there is a surge of smallholders renting land from the Care-Taker Committees of the ex-NAFCO farms in Dakawa and Kapunga. Other positive demonstrative effects of smallholders’ participation are illustrated by the SPFS project, and the Smallholders Rice Irrigation Project (in Tabora and Tanga), where the Bank Group promoted simple gravity flow irrigation technology in the traditional irrigation areas. The inclusion of smallholders in Kapunga (1987) and later in Madibira (1993) was partly on the insistence of the Bank Group and partly on the change of GOT policy following the introduction of the ERP.
3.2.5 The Bank Group’s participation in the National Agricultural and Livestock Research Project (NARLP) and the National Agricultural and Livestock Extension Rehabilitation Project (NALERP) illustrates the uncritical acceptance of the components of the projects as designed by the GOT and World Bank8. Some of the concepts, for instance the Training and Visit (T&V) extension methodology, were part of the overall World Bank Africa Extension Policy which the Bank Group took at their face value. The T&V methodology was very expensive and had proven unsuitable under African agricultural conditions. While joining in the financing of these projects the Bank Group did not
8 It should be emphasised that these projects were relevant and well prepared and appraised.
11 ensure that it had a place in the overall policy direction of research and extension. The lack of affective coordination arrangements in the two projects cost the Bank a niche in the two services as subsequent phases did not include the Bank Group.
3.3 Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)
3.3.1 Macro-economic and sector Goals: In terms of achievement of national food security and food self-sufficiency, the rice farms contributed to the reduction of the grant element of rice imports (i.e. food aid imports), which was one of the objectives of the government. Limited food insecurity is being eliminated where smallholders are actively involved in projects, such as in Madibira, Kapunga/Chimala, Kitivo/Mwamapuli and SPFS. However, the reduction in the overall rice imports could not be achieved even with the combined production of all schemes including those funded elsewhere by GOT and other donors. Rice imports increased from about 45,000 metric tons in 1985 to about 145,000 metric tons in 1994. MAFS statistics show that the value of total food imports rose from Tshs 26 billion in 1995 to Tshs 151 billion in 1998 and averaged Tshs 145 billion between 2000 and 2002. Although data on rice imports were not available for analysis, it would be reasonable to assume that the substantial increase in food imports would be contributed to by rice imports.
3.3.2 From a broader perspective, the projects can only be considered as contributing to the solution of a much bigger national problem of poverty reduction and food security but this contribution should not be unduly overstretched. Poverty and food insecurity are pervasive and demand not only concerted and comprehensive national actions, but international attention as well. Moreover, many of the important projects in the irrigation sub-sector have either ceased to generate outputs or are doing so marginally, which is an unsatisfactory situation.
3.3.3 Physical Outputs – Infrastructure: The Bank Group projects had substantial components of infrastructure development, which included land development, irrigation structures, access roads, buildings and houses, crop and livestock processing plants, marketing infrastructure, etc, which can also be regarded as intermediate outputs, or inputs into the realisation of final outputs such as crops and livestock. On the whole these were satisfactorily achieved, despite shortfalls in a number of projects, for instance: a) in research the Bank Group achieved 5 out of 6 research stations rehabilitated; b) in the extension project, only 160 out of 300 DivEO houses were constructed; and c) in Selous Game Reserve there was considerable under-achievement in roads, airfields, etc where, out of 7,000 km of roads only 1,220 km were rehabilitated and out of 25 airfields only 3 were rehabilitated. In the TLMP, all the planned (SAR) targets of infrastructure were achieved except stock routes. This was partly due to government policy directive in 2000 that livestock must be railed or trucked, which led to the number of kms of stock routes to be rehabilitated being revised downwards to 1,200 kms from 3,000 km at appraisal. Only 940 kms have been constructed. The Dodoma Abattoir and the Meat Industry Training Centre were completed and due for commissioning in March 2005.
3.3.4 Institutional and Human Resources Development: This was satisfactorily achieved in the research and extension services and in the livestock marketing sub-sectors: a) in research, the long- term training programme resulted in 4 PhDs, 16 MScs and 1BScs, which has greatly improved research capacity whose results are already evident in the releases of improved crop varieties, livestock, and improved disease and pest controls; b) in the extension service, the project provided long-term training which has improved extension service planning and management (five staff obtained PhDs, 22 received MScs and 10 BScs); c) in both research and extension the initial institutional and organisational restructuring laid the foundation for further assistance which was extended after the end of the projects and there is continuing donor assistance to these services; d) in livestock marketing, the project provided substantial technical assistance and has set up a Meat
12 Industry Training Centre; e) in Madibira, the institutional development focusing on the farmers organisations – MAMCOs and M-SACCO – are positive achievements; and f) there have been improvements in the working environments created by the projects – especially in research and training institutes, and in livestock marketing. The stock of trained project managers, accountants, engineers, procurement specialists, financial analysts, planners, monitoring and evaluation experts, and other technical specialists are an important human resource asset which is a positive contribution by the Bank Group financed projects.
3.3.5 Economic Outputs: The direct outputs of the irrigation and livestock projects provide a good measure of the achievements of economic outputs. In the irrigation sub-sector, the Bank Group supported two systems of irrigation farming in Tanzania, namely the large, capital intensive mechanized farms (Dakawa Rice Project and Kapunga Rice Irrigation Project) through the state parastatal NAFCO, and the smallholder systems in Madibira, Kapunga/Chimala, Tanga/Tabora and the SPFS areas. Both systems yielded output but the large capital intensive system has collapsed while the smallholders system has shown a certain degree of resilience (para 3.2.4). As state farms, Dakawa and Kapunga Rice Projects were closed in 1998 and 2001, respectively, and are now under the management of Care-Taker Committees established by the District Administration in the case of Dakawa and the Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC) in the case of Kapunga. These committees rent land to smallholders and other categories of farmers on a seasonal basis.
3.3.6 While efforts to rent out land by the Care-Taker Committees are positive they are ad hoc and unplanned, and since no proper records are kept of production and yields, performance of these smallholders cannot be assessed. The Care Taker Committees do not reside on site and the ad hoc activities of those who seasonably rent the land for rice production are not supported with any technical advice. In the case of Kapunga, the PCR indicates that an initial yield of 4.30 metric tons per ha was achieved in 1990/91 but thereafter yields plummeted to an average yield of 2.50 metric tons per ha compared to 5 tonnes as per the SAR. According to the PCR the target yields were not achieved despite the farm adhering to the recommended agronomic practices. It also points out that the SAR target yields did not relate to any particular variety, and that the SAR had not considered the possibility of disease and pest attacks which became one of the greatest hazards to rice production.
3.3.7 A comparison of yields of the smallholder schemes with those achieved in NAFCO farms over the same period reveals the better performance of smallholders. The Kapunga smallholders realised average yields of 2.9 metric tons per ha, while the Chimala smallholders realised average yields of 2.8 metric tons per ha over the four years 1990/91 to 1993/94. The Madibira Smallholders Scheme, which was implemented much later and started production in 1998/99, has achieved a steady but increasing yield each year, averaging 5 metric tons per ha over the period 2000/01 to 2003/04. The overall picture that emerges under the irrigation projects is therefore one of: (a) two failed state farms, with highly unsatisfactory ratings; (b) resilient smallholders in Chimala (and Kapunga); and (c) an emerging new model smallholder production system represented by Madibira. Both types of smallholders are rated as satisfactory.
3.3.8 Livestock Marketing: Although some of the components of this project (abattoir, meat training centre) were not yet operational at the time of evaluation the crucial components of marketing infrastructure and transport were operational and the overall assessment indicates satisfactory achievements of outputs.9 The effect of the rehabilitated marketing infrastructure has been a substantial improvement in the environment for livestock trade. The improved security of stock, availability of
9 The project is not yet fully completed and the project completion report (PCR) had not yet been prepared by the Project Management Team. It is scheduled to close in 2005.
13 water and other essential services, and better information have resulted in increased livestock being traded, with daily arrivals at Pugu market in Dar-Es-Salaam averaging 20 - 25 wagons of cattle. This improvement of supply of cattle to the Dar market, which was one of the objectives of the project, might not necessarily mean a real increase in the off-take of cattle traded from traditional areas. The achievement of the off-take target (from 9.8% to 13.7%) has yet to await the full impact of the project to permeate to the local farms. However, since the project targeted traders, the increase in cattle supply to the Dar market reflects considerable improvement in the transportation of cattle by traders. Railing and trucking, rather than trekking, has extended the market outreach of traders.
3.4 Efficiency
3.4.1 For all the Bank Group’s financed projects the financial and economic rates of return (FRR and ERR) were or could be estimated at the time of appraisal (SAR). Therefore, a comparison of these indicators at the time of the PCR and PPER for all completed projects would have provided a good basis for assessing the overall efficiency of the Bank Group assistance to Tanzania’s ARD sector. The exceptions are the research and extensions projects which focused mainly on the institutional and organizational restructuring of the research and extension services and on human resource capacity building. The financial and economic rates of return to research and extension services can only be assessed indirectly using derived inputs and outputs. The SAR, PCR and PPER (for extension only), did not, therefore, estimate the FRR and ERR for these projects.
3.4.2 The PCRs and PPERs have, however, only partially been available for a limited number of projects, and only Madibira Smallholder Agriculture Development Project has recent re-estimates of the financial and economic rates of return (PCR October 2004). The other project for which an independent study calculated the FRR and ERR in June 2004 is the Special Programme for Food Security. In the case of Madibira, the PCR has recalculated the FRR at 13% and ERR at 18% which, though not substantial, are improvements over the appraisal (SAR) rates of 9.37% and 12.44%, respectively. In the case of SPFS, the estimates of the FRRs ranged from 22% to 33% at the programme (district) level, and from 25% to 33% at the beneficiaries level. For the micro projects (input kiosks and small milling machines) promoted by the programme, the FRR was estimated at 27%, and for the combined kiosk/milling enterprise at 33%. These results suggest that through the programme the farmers could borrow money from the bank or any financial institution and repay the loans (bank borrowing rate was 20%). On the other hand, the estimates of the ERR ranged from 34% to 36% suggesting that the programme has a comparative advantage in the production of rice and maize. Both the Madibira project and the SPFS are smallholder schemes, with Madibira representing a more capital intensive model and the SPFS a low cost irrigation system.
3.4.3 The large mechanized schemes in Dakawa and Kapunga under the state farms arrangements were closed in 1998 and 2001 respectively. There was no PCR or SAR to be able to assess the past performance of Dakawa Rice Project. The Kapunga Rice Irrigation Project, on the other hand, had a PCR (December 1994) which recalculated the ERR and FRR at 11.3% and 10.3%, respectively, compared to 11.6% and 8% at appraisal, which were not significant improvements. The PCR was too optimistic about the prospects for Kapunga, because no improvements ever took place between 1994 and the project was closed. Both the Dakawa and Kapunga large farms no longer generate any benefits streams and cannot therefore be evaluated on FRR and ERR or the related cost-benefit analysis.
3.4.4 From the above discussions, the ERR and FRR could not be assessed for most of the projects financed by the Bank Group because consistent data was not readily available to facilitate such assessment. Moreover, for some of the projects financial and economic activities (transactions) have ceased, while for others (research and extension) the nature of the investment precluded the calculation
14 of the FRR and ERR. In these circumstances, other indicators of cost-effectiveness are relevant, such as over-extended implementation periods leading to resources being spread too thinly overtime, under- achievement of objectives, under-utilisation of capacity or under-utilisation of resources, or delivery of inappropriate technology, amongst others. These factors (which are summarized below) have combined to reduce efficiency of resources utilisation has resulted in unsatisfactory performance in the overall.
3.4.5 Over-extended implementation periods: Prolonged implementation periods characterized many projects - from an average of 6 years in 3 projects (Madibira, SPFS, Selous) to 14 years in 7 projects - from the time of approval to the actual completion date. Among the projects with the most prolonged implementation periods were Dakawa (15 years), Smallholder Rice Irrigation (16 years) and Zanzibar Rainfed Development (19 years). On the other hand, the average estimated length of implementation time at the SARs for most of the projects was 5.4 years. Therefore, projects were delayed by an average of 8.6 years. The slow or delayed implementation resulted in escalation of costs in many projects, which reduced the gain from purchasing at lower prices. In some cases, poor management of the procurement and disbursement systems resulted in the under-achievement of targets as in NALRP, NALERP and Selous G. R, amongst others.
3.4.6 Under-utilisation of capacity: Under-utilisation (and even non-utilisation) of resources is noted and recorded in most of the projects, for instance all the irrigation projects show low levels of land utilization: 56% in Dakawa and 83% in Madibira which has resulted mainly from underdevelopment of the land. Other resources not currently fully utilized are the irrigation structures in all schemes (whether big or small) which is partly due to some technical problems (e.g. leakages) but also due to limited availability of water in areas where water right restrictions limit irrigation periods. And related to this is the problem of inefficiency in the use of irrigation water which was reported in all schemes. For instance, the impact study of the SPFS in June 2004 reported that water use efficiency could be as low as 15%, while in Kapunga, a study in 2001 which compared water utilization efficiency between the smallholders and NAFCO farms showed that the latter’s efficiency was 45% while the former was 65%. The norm for water efficiency use was estimated to be 75% in the Usangu Plains.
3.4.7 Idle capacity is another major source of inefficiency. This is especially found in the large projects where large rice mills (Kapunga, Dakawa and Madibira) have been idle for several years. Buildings, machinery and equipment, rice processing plants, workshops, stores, etc. are idle and/or deteriorating in Dakawa and Kapunga. The cost of idle capacity is very high and was reported to be about Tshs 300,000 per month for the pumping station alone at the Dakawa Rice Project. In Madibira, the capacity of the rice mill has been reduced to a third of its normal operation because the three generators that produce the power are not syncronised and only one can work at a time. In any case, the mill ceased operation in April 2004.
3.5 Institutional Development Impact
3.5.1 The Bank Group assistance has made substantial contributions to institutional capacity building and human resource development in the agriculture and rural development sector in Tanzania. There are four broad levels at which this impact can be assessed or measured: a) the direct impact on project/programme management systems; b) impact on linkage with government ministries/executing agencies; c) impact on institutions created for long-term sustainability of development; and d) impact on the traditions and cultures of institutional governance. These are discussed below:
15 3.5.2 Project Management Systems have, over several decades of donor support to developing countries, become part of the systems of development management. In Tanzania the Bank Group extended assistance to projects through existing government ministries as executing agencies, except for Kapunga and Dakawa where it worked with NAFCO, a state parastatal, as executing agency. Project Management Units or Project Implementation Units (PMUs or PIUs) were set up to carry out the day to day management which included financial management, procurement, etc. The PIUs were staffed with qualified staff and received additional training in particular skills such as project planning and management, monitoring and evaluation, procurement, financial management and accounting, and disbursement procedures. Through the PIUs, therefore, the Bank Group built human resource capacity in special skills which ordinarily the government would not have had adequate resources to accomplish on its own. The PIUs offered opportunities for acquiring new skills and for learning new ways and approaches to managing development. This pool of expertise is available for the government and country to make the best use of in economic management. It is also available to the Bank Group to tap in any interventions.
3.5.3 Linkage with the Ministries/Executing Agencies: The PIUs’ linkages with the line ministries facilitated the coordination and implementation of Bank Group financed projects. In almost all the projects where the Ministries have provided key staff to the PIUs, the capacity of the Ministries have also been indirectly strengthened by the projects. Some projects, e.g. NARLP and NALERP, have directly targeted the institutional and organizational strengthening of the Ministries responsible for agriculture and rural development. Establishment of a unified extension system at the district and lower levels and of zonal research centers, all of which are aimed at decentralizing service delivery, are some of the achievements. The attempt by NALERP to create a unified central line of command down to the districts did not, however, succeed because such decisions at the central level are usually the prerogative of the political system of the country. The current split of the sector portfolio among several ministries is, however, seen by most of the senior GOT officials as presenting difficulties in the coordination of sector policy and strategy, due to the multiplicity of PIUs or management units, with the possibility that where the projects are many they can detract from the central focus of the ministries. This also leads to increased costs of government operations. The present effort to bring ministries together through the ASDP process is a commendable but very demanding effort.
3.5.4 The creation and development of self-sustaining institutions is an innovation in some projects and programmes which is a positive contribution of Bank Group assistance. In Madibira, for instance, the incorporation and setting up of the farmers’ management and financial systems organizations – MAMCOS and M-SACCO – are important innovations. While MAMCOS is responsible for the agricultural development, management and marketing aspects, M-SACCO is responsible for financial services – namely credit, savings and general banking services that facilitate the financing of farm inputs and marketing of farmers’ produce. Other important innovations along the same lines but with a different focus are the SPFS Farmers Field Schools (FFSs), Participatory Farmers Groups (PFGs), and Water Users Groups (WUGs) which are being registered as permanent legal entities for the sustainability of the programme. Village Wildlife Management Committees (VWMCs) in the Selous Game Reserve Management Project are another institutional development which, when fully functioning, will have positive impact on sustainable game conservation management in Selous Game Reserve.
3.5.5 Institutional Best Practices: Some institutional best practices can also be identified in some of the Bank financed projects: a) in Madibira, the institutionalization of management, marketing and financial services in the farmers organization is best practice and a viable future government and Bank Group exit policy; b) in SPFS, the strong culture of participatory management, supported by self- reliant farmers grassroots organizations (i.e. FFSs and PFGs) is good institutional practice; c) in both
16 the research and extension projects a strong culture of research has been created among the institutions and the research personnel, while in the extension the unified system at the district level is regarded as successful; and d) in livestock marketing, the project has reinvigorated the livestock marketing environment and instilled a sense of security and openness among traders who now provide information and pay trade fees and licenses regularly.
3.5.6 The focus of institutional capacity building and human resource development has been extended to the district and grassroots levels, and the positive learning experiences from the past projects have been replicated in the design of DASIP and the participation in the AMSDP. In the DASIP, the development of sustainable local institutions is combined with the promotion of best practices in organizational and management structures. For instance, the Farmer Capacity Building Component will build capacity of 10,000 PFGs through the district training programmes, while under the Community Planning and Investment in Agriculture Component, the capacity of 25 districts to plan, manage and monitor district and village agricultural development plans will be created. Support to Rural Micro-finance and Marketing in which 800 operationally sustainable Savings and Credit Cooperatives will be established is a development that is built on the concept that has been established in the Madibira and SPFS schemes.
3.6 Sustainability
3.6.1 Eight factors10 have been considered in assessing the sustainability of Bank Group financed projects but institutional/technical and financial sustainability are singled out as the most crucial for almost all the projects. The assessment reveals that the major component (89%) of the completed Bank Group’s ARD portfolio in Tanzania was constituted by the irrigation projects whose overall performance has been assessed as unsatisfactory on the sustainability benchmark. This poor performance is contributed mainly by the large, capital intensive ex-NAFCO farms at Dakawa and Kapunga which have been closed for several years and are no longer generating any production streams. Both are under care-taker management which rent out land on a seasonal basis to farmers who apply to cultivate rice. Under current circumstances these schemes are considered as unlikely to be sustainable both technically and financially. Their restoration depends on several factors but most notably on the privatization options that the Government is considering.
3.6.2 The smallholder rice schemes – the Madibira Smallholder Agricultural Development Project, the Smallholder Rice Irrigation Project, and the SPFS - on the other hand, have a strong possibility of being sustainable. Though technically modeled on Kapunga Rice Irrigation Project, the Madibira scheme has a strong smallholder base, which is drawn directly from within the villages of its location, and this is a major factor in favour of its likely sustainability. The scheme is run by the smallholders through their cooperative (MAMCOS) whose current management structure combines the agricultural development (technical) and the marketing (commercial) roles. This, however, places a heavy demand on the institutional and human capacity of the cooperative, which is already weak, and prevents a rapid development of a viable agro-business with strong business-oriented centres that respond strongly to markets. Continued technical support and the restructuring of the MAMCOS is necessary to ensure the scheme expands and sustains itself.
10 The factors are: technical soundness; economic and financial viability; government commitments; socio-political support; institutional, organizational and management effectiveness; environmental considerations; and resilience to exogenous factors.
17 3.6.3 The Tanzania Livestock Marketing Project (TLMP) is in the category of projects that have demonstrated potential for sustainability, even though re-estimates of its economic and financial viability are not yet available. Livestock traders, who are the key stakeholders, have the perception that the project has vastly improved the environment for their business. This perception has, in turn, improved the environment for implementing cost-recovery measures that were part of the project’s strategy for sustainability. The traders have responded positively and the project has exceeded its annual revenue target of Tshs 200 million (set in 1994/95) by 250% in 2003/04 when the annual collections reached Tshs 708 million. The project is set for privatization of its marketing infrastructure and the abattoir, amongst others, and has built sufficient institutional and technical capacity in the sub- sector to enable operations to continue after the project winds up at the end of December 2005. Both technical and financial sustainability are therefore likely.
3.6.4 In both of the TLMP and the SPFS, government commitment has played an important role in creating conditions for the likely sustainability of the projects by creating symbiotic relationships between public service provision and direct stakeholders/beneficiary participation. In both projects technical and advisory support have been implemented through the existing regional and district structures while ensuring that the farmers and traders carried out the economic and commercial activities. This approach has enhanced the prospect for successful implementation of cost recovery measures in both projects and it is also an approach that is reflected in the design of the recently approved projects i.e. the AMSDP and DASIP.
3.6.5 In the research and extension projects (NALRP and NALERP), the immediate and long-term sustainability issue is the flow of funds to support the maintenance of existing infrastructure and to finance on-going and/or new research and extension work. Successive interventions in research (TARPII) and extension (NAEPII) have continued to sustain the infrastructure rehabilitated and the activities initiated by the original projects. As these projects have also ended, a new successor project– Agricultural Services Support Project (ASSP) that aims to integrate support to these services has been formulated by the GOT and donors. Government commitment and continued donor support is thus essential to sustain research and extension services. The crucial issue for research is the effectiveness and efficiency of the research system, while for extension it is the effectiveness of the transfer of new technology from the research system to the farmers, as measured by the rate and pace of adoption.
3.6.6 From the above overview of sustainability possibilities of the various projects financed by the Bank Group, it can be concluded that a large component of the portfolio (big irrigation schemes, research and extension) cannot be sustainable without: a) substantial restructuring and possibly privatisation of some of the irrigation schemes to create conditions for commercial operations and thus revenue generation; and b) continued government commitment and donor support for research and extension. The Bank Group and GOT, while substantially developing institutional and human resource capacity, did not promote specific plans for financial sustainability of these projects, although in research there are continuing efforts to seek for a formula for private sector funding of certain aspects of research, and setting up of revolving research funds. The assessment of Madibira and SPFS, on the other hand, would confirm the resilience of the smallholder irrigation model and its superiority over the state farm approach. Besides being heavy loss-making operations, the large state farms were also affected by macro-economic policy changes and the institutional and organizational restructuring of the public services. These types of changes do not usually directly impact the smallholders, who can adapt their activities to new environments.
18 3.7 Aggregate Bank Group Assistance Performance
3.7.1 The analysis in the above sections leads to the overall conclusion that the Bank Group’s ARD sector portfolio in Tanzania has been satisfactory towards the achievement of long-term development objectives. The portfolio was broadly relevant to the country’s development assistance needs. This conclusion is based on the review of seven completed projects and three others that were scheduled to close down during 2005. The physical implementation of the latter was virtually completed and outputs were beginning to be realized. It also takes account of the recent improvements in project performance and the design of new projects. The projects were rated on a scale of 1 to 4 for each of the five evaluation criteria, where 1 represents highly unsatisfactory performance, 2 unsatisfactory, 3 satisfactory and 4 highly satisfactory. The experiences and lessons from these projects have sufficiently been taken into account in the Bank Group’s recent interventions in the sector (AMSDP and DASIP). Table 3.1 summarises the ratings and details are given in annex 2.
Table 3.1: Summary of Evaluation Ratings of Lending Operations
N°. Projects Relevance & Efficacy Efficiency Inst. Devpt. Sustainability Total Quality Impact 1 2 3 4 5 1-5 1. Dakawa 2.3 ( 2) 1.5 (1) 1.0 (1) 1.0 (1) 1.3 (1) 1.4 (1) 2. Kapunga 2.7 (3) 2.4 (2) 2.0 (2) 2.0 (2) 2.2 (2) 2.3 (2) 3. Madibira 2.8 (3) 2.7 (3) 2.5 (3) 2.7 (3) 2.6 (3) 2.6 (3) 4. SPFS 3.0 (3) 3.0 (3) 3.0 (3) 3.0 (3) 3.0 (3) 3.0 (3) 5. Zanzibar 2.4 (2) 2.5 (3) 2.0 (2) 2.3 (2) 2.0 (2) 2.3 (2) 6. Smallholders 2.6 (3) 2.6 (3) 2.3 (2) 2.4 (2) 2.5 (3) 2.5 (3) 7. NALRP 2.6 (3) 2.8 (3) 2.0 (2) 3.0 (3) 2.4 (2) 2.6 (3) 8. NALERP 2.6 (3) 2.8 (3) 2.0 (2) 3.0 (3) 2.4 (2) 2.6 (3) 9. TLMP 2.8 (3) 3.0 (3) 2.5 (3) 2.8 (3) 2.6 (3) 2.7 (3) 10. Selous 2.7 (3) 2.4 (2) 2.0 (2) 2.5 (3) 2.5 (3) 2.4 (2) Total 2.6 (3) 2.6 (3) 2.1 (2) 2.5 (3) 2.4 (2) 2.5 (3)
Note: (1) Adding is across for individual projects (2) Adding is downwards for evaluation criteria
3.7.2 The overall ratings of the six irrigation projects was unsatisfactory, although Madibira, SPFS and Smallholders Rice Irrigation Project were satisfactory. The highly unsatisfactory performance of Dakawa and Kapunga ex-NAFCO farms weighed the sub-sector down. With the exception of Selous, which is assessed as unlikely to achieve its objectives in its present form, the performance of the rest of the sub-sectors is satisfactory. Institutional development impacts were fairly substantial in most projects but largely limited to technical capacity, while efficiency and sustainability were unsatisfactory and unlikely, respectively, in the majority of the projects unless substantial restructuring of some projects is carried out.
4. BANK GROUP NON-LENDING OPERATIONS
4.1 Portfolio Composition and Status
4.1.1 The main non-lending operations of the Bank Group in Tanzania’s ARD sector were five studies and one sector review. These are listed in Annex 1, Part 3 b. The studies were a form of technical assistance to the country and therefore the resources and the expected outputs were a subject of formal agreements between the Bank Group and the Government of Tanzania. UA 3.30 million was approved for the studies of which UA 2.50 million was disbursed and the balance cancelled. The Kapunga/Madibira study was financed with an NTF loan of UA 1.20 million, while the rest of the studies were financed with ADF and TAF grants. The sector review, on the other hand, was undertaken
19 in 2002 within the context of the Bank Group’s strategic planning and the resources involved and the outputs were internally utilised. In addition, aid coordination, participation in co-financing arrangements with other donors and resource mobilization are regarded as part of the non-lending operations of the Bank Group.
4.2 Economic Sector Work and Studies
4.2.1 Studies
4.2.1.1 The Bank Group commissioned studies (see Annex 1 for details of study objectives and main components) to improve and strengthen the relevance and quality of its planned project interventions in the specific areas of irrigation, livestock and sugar industry. This was at a time when the Bank Group had no project identification and preparation reports of its own to guide the appraisal of the interventions. In the circumstances, the Bank Group relied on feasibility studies or reports of other organizations, such as the General Identification Missions of FAO, World Bank, etc. In the case of the irrigation sub-sector, FAO and the World Bank had carried out major studies in the early to late 1960s in the Rufiji River Basin and their reports provided detailed information on potential areas for irrigation development. These studies proved very valuable to the Bank Group which, after identifying potential project sites, commissioned studies to undertake detailed engineering designs for the envisaged projects.
4.2.1.2 Of the completed five studies, three yielded positive results. The Kapunga/Madibira Study resulted in two projects financed by the Bank Group, namely the Kapunga Rice Irrigation Project which was re-appraised and approved in 1987, and Madibira Smallholder Agricultural Development Project which was appraised and approved in 1993. The Dodoma Livestock Development Project resulted in the Tanzania Livestock Marketing project (TLMP) after the initial study of 1987/88 was revised by FAO/Investment Centre in 1991 and appraised by the Bank Group in 1992. The Kagera Sugar Estates Rehabilitation Study did not result in a project for the Bank Group, but the Government used the results of its findings to successfully privatize the Kagera Sugar Estates.
4.2.1.3 Both the Morogoro Village Irrigation Study and the Dakawa Integrated Irrigation (Phase II) Project Study did not result in any project financed either by the Bank Group or any other entity. The Morogoro Study was intended to determine the technical feasibility and economic viability of providing technical and financial support for the construction of four irrigation schemes of about 4,000 ha in Morogoro, in an area about 140 km west of Dar Es Salaam. The Study, which was approved in 1982, had by 1986 not yielded an acceptable report and was moreover marred by disputes between GOT and the Consultants. The Bank Group did not follow-up the results thereafter. In the case of the Dakawa Study, it had been the intention of the Bank Group to finance a second phase of the Dakawa Rice Project. Although the study was completed in 1995 and detailed reports availed to the Bank Group and the Government, no project has been appraised for financing either by the Bank Group or any other entity.
4.2.1.4 In terms of realizing investment opportunities for the Bank Group and other financiers, the studies produced positive results (para 4.2.1.1 and 4.2.1.2 above). Being such important tools, it is a surprise that the Bank Group has not made significant use of studies in the last ten years. There has also not been a serious follow-up of studies which were completed but had not resulted in any project financed by the Bank Group. Yet regular studies would ensure an active presence of the Bank in the sector, and would be among the means to build database on the sector.
20 4.2.2 Tanzania Agriculture Sector Review, 2002
4.2.2.1 The Tanzania Agriculture Sector Review was the first of its kind and represented a major advance over what has been discussed above. Its stated objective was to provide sector specific information on development conditions and the constraints and prospects for Bank Group assistance in the sector. It was an input into the 2002 – 2004 CSP for Tanzania and a base for agricultural programme formulation and assistance in the country. Within this broad objective the sector review provided a strategic framework for strengthening Bank’s dialogue with GOT and other donors on agricultural policy issues and country development programming, and contributed to an improved operational framework to support more effective investments for agricultural development (Executive Summary Page 1).
4.2.2.2 One of the major outcomes of the Sector Review was the decision by the Bank Group to concentrate on discrete investments within the five priority areas identified in the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS). In particular, the Bank Group decided to focus on a) institutional strengthening and capacity buildings; b) agricultural marketing and agro-processing; and c) natural resource management for sustainable development. The sector review specified options for the Bank Group as guided by its Agriculture and Rural Development Sector Bank Group Policy of 2000, and guiding principles which include, amongst others: sector-wide approach and strategic partnerships with the GOT, other donors, and civil society, amongst others.
4.2.2.3 In terms of approach, the Sector Review has been a major development which will most likely uplift the position of the sector in the Bank Group’s lending programme. Its main limitations were: a) it was mainly desk-based though coupled with consultations with GOT, donors, civil society and a Workshop of Stakeholders; b) while that was appropriate, the overall content was too general: crucial sub-sectors such as exports, food and livestock needed a much deeper analytical coverage; and c) a more comprehensive assessment of the performance and status of completed and on-going Bank Group operations should have been carried out as part of the Sector Review. These limitations were partly due to the fact that the Bank Group did not deploy adequate man-power and time to the exercise. The use of specialists would be justified in sector review work in order to provide coverage of important areas.
4.3 Aid Coordination, Co-financing and Resource Mobilisation
4.3.1 A review of the Bank Group’s overall country portfolio shows that it has had substantial co- financing arrangements with other donors, especially in policy-based lending operations. In the agriculture and rural development sector the Bank Group co-financed NALRP and NALERP with GOT and other donors. In the NALRP, the Bank Group was the co-principal financier with IDA and both contributed 35% to the project while the GOT and other partners (Netherlands, SPAAR, ODA and FRG/ISNAR) contributed 8% and 22% respectively. In NALERP, the IDA was the principal partner contributing 60% while the Bank Group and GOT each contributed 30% and 10% respectively. The only other project currently co-financed is the Agricultural Marketing Systems Development Programme (AMSDP) where the Bank Group is in partnership with the International Fund for Agricultural development (IFAD) and Irish Aid. The Bank Group is financing the Rural Marketing Infrastructure component which is about 50% of the total cost of the project.
4.3.2 Co-financing projects/programmes in partnership with other donors is a form of resource mobilisation for undertakings that one single financier alone might find too demanding on its resources. However, the Bank Group’s experiences with NALRP and NALERP co-financing arrangements (see section 6.3) pointed to an overall failure due to the absence of a coordination mechanism in advance of the implementation of the co-financed projects. The Bank Group’s
21 performance was poor on the overall (i.e. the implementation of its components was behind schedule by 2 or 3 years). The existence of an effective coordination mechanism could have caused some substantive improvements in the execution of the projects. In addition, the Country Office would be an important mechanism to bolster the Bank Group’s participation in any coordination mechanism.
4.3.3 Donor coordination in the country as a whole is a crucial issue for the effectiveness of development assistance in Tanzania. There is a large donor presence already but with differing aid interests, and it is not far-fetched to believe that competition in securing niches and comparative advantage positions can be important elements in donor relations. From the GOT’s point of view, it has been recognised that donor relationship could also degenerate, as it did in the mid 1990s, with adverse results for the country. The GOT has therefore initiated the Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS) which is aimed at restoring local ownership and leadership of the development efforts, as well as promoting partnerships in designing and executing development programmes. The TAS provides a five year strategic national framework articulating: the policy framework, national development agenda, priority actions, and the basic elements for promoting local ownership and leadership, and for building partnership.
4.3.4 The TAS is under the purview of the Independent Monitoring Group (IMG) which reports to the GOT-Donor Consultative Group where all donors review and/or evaluate their GOT-relationships with a view to forge a broad partnership. The TAS provides the mechanism for macro-level aid coordination and will be important in the long-run. The GOT and a group of donors including the Bank Group also initiated in 2005 the preparation of a Joint Assistance Strategy (JAS). The sectoral focus of aid coordination is, however, within the ASDP framework and process, which is aimed at operationalising the overall sector policy in line with the PRSP. Within the context of the ASDP, the Bank Group has approved an important intervention (DASIP) that is expected to become effective during 2005 and will be co-financed with Irish Aid. The presence of Bank’s Country Office is also positively impacting on Bank participation in aid coordination.
4.4 Aggregate Performance Assessment of Non-Lending Operations
4.4.1 In the aggregate, the performance of the Bank Group non-lending operations is assessed as having been satisfactory. The major components of the portfolio were five studies and one sector review work. Aid coordination and resource mobilization were other components but these were not rated as no agreed ratings formulas were available. Table 4.1 summaries the evaluation scores for the studies and sector work. Highlights are given below:
4.4.2 Relevance and Effectiveness: The portfolio was relevant to both the Bank’s vision, strategic plan and intervention strategy. They were also relevant to the issues to be addressed. The studies were assessed on the basis of the resulting investments (effectiveness) – hence Kapunga/Madibira study, the Dodoma Livestock Study and the Kagera Sugar Study achieved their intended goals. The Bank Group did not invest in Kagera due to untimely delivery of the study but it invested in Kapunga Rice Irrigation Project, Madibira Smallholders Agricultural Development Project and the TLMP.
4.4.3 Efficiency: This was measured in terms of the timeliness of the operation and in terms of the amount of resources utilized as against planned. Studies which utilized 80% or more of the approved funds were considered efficient, and those that utilized less than 80% were inefficient. Only two studies were efficient on this basis – i.e. Kapunga/Madibira Study and Dakawa II Study.
22 4.4.4 Aid Coordination: Aid coordination is a national issue in Tanzania and GOT and donors, including ADB, are now coming up with improved arrangements. With the Bank Group’s Country office in place, the Bank Group will be more effective in this area in the fuure. The experience with completed projects showed lack of coordination among donors (i.e. NALRP, NALERP).
Table 4.1: Summary of Evaluation Ratings – Non-Lending Operations
N°. Operations Relevance Effectiveness Efficiency Total 1. Kapunga Madibira Study 3 3 3 3.0 2. Morogoro Village Irrigation Study 2 2 2 2.0 3. Dodoma Livestock Study 3 3 2 2.7 4. Dakawa II Study 3 2 3 2.7 5. Kagera Sugar Study 3 3 2 2.7 6. Agriculture Sector Review 3 3 2 2.7 Total 2.8 (3) 2.7 (3) 2.3 (2) 2.6 (3)
5. OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF BANK GROUP ASSISTANCE
5.1 Overall Performance – Lending and Non-Lending Operations
The overall performance of the Bank Group’s assistance, based on the assessment of both the lending and non-lending operations, is regarded as having been satisfactory. In general, the efficiency of implementation of the assistance was unsatisfactory in both types of operations. Both operations were affected by lengthy delays in getting the programmes to full operational status, with the consequences of escalating costs, cancellation of funds etc. There is also a relationship between the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of non-lending operations and lending operations. The studies and sector work, when successful and efficient, can open the door to opportunities for lending. The non- lending operations generate a knowledge base that is crucial in assessing and analysing such opportunities.
5.2 Impacts on Cross-cutting Themes
5.2.1 Poverty Reduction, Food Security and Gender
5.2.1.1 Poverty, food security and gender are intertwined at the household and individual level and efforts to assess the impacts of Bank Group financed projects on them are fraught with methodological and data problems. In fact, a better idea would be gained from specific impact studies in selected project areas, which this evaluation could not do. Baseline studies to establish socio-economic conditions at the time of appraisals were also not instituted for almost all the completed projects under evaluation, and systematic performance data was not monitored and collected. In the circumstance, much of the assessment in this section is judgmental and is based on the expected results from implementing projects.
5.2.1.2 The impacts of the Bank Group assistance on poverty and food security cannot be isolated and measured from the overall impact of national development. Among the individual projects the likely impacts would vary. Hence, the large ex-NAFCO farms (Dakawa and Kapunga), while they initially contributed to an increase in grain production, did not have direct impacts on local poverty and food security because they produced for the state, and the incomes (and profits) from grain sales were for the state account. Rice sales were to the Tanzania Grain Milling Corporation which, through its distribution outlets, supplied the population. The food security of households accessing grains through these channels could have been improved in the process. Since these projects have been closed for
23 several years now, the current contribution to poverty and food security of these projects should be regarded as negative since the infrastructure and the land financed by the Bank and GOT are idle.
5.2.1.3 Unlike the large state farms, the smallholder-based schemes continue to operate and are producing grain and other products even though at a low level. These schemes are directly contributing to poverty reduction and improved food security of the families who are involved in them. The projects are also contributing to the food security of the communities around them and beyond. Observations of agricultural development in the villages of the surrounding areas show a strong demonstration effect of the schemes. Substantial increases in the acreage of maize, groundnuts, beans and other crops, for instance, are observable around the schemes including those which are closed.
5.2.1.4 The promotion of women participation was not a key target in most projects, especially in the projects appraised before the 1990s. Special emphasis was, however, given to gender balance in the Kapunga and Madibira projects as well as in Selous Game Reserve (buffer zone management) and SPFS. The achievements of projects in this direction have been weak and women participation has been observed to be very low. A study for the TLMP, for instance, found the participation rate of women to be only 4% in livestock marketing. In the SPFS the participation rate is less than 20% as against 40% envisaged by the project. Certain cultural norms still hinder full and active participation of women. The Ministry of Community Development, Women and Children Affairs has developed a national policy and strategy which demands the mainstreaming of gender affairs in all aspects of national developments. This is expected to facilitate better targeting of gender in future development interventions as shown by the new projects (AMSDP and DASIP) which have strong and specific gender dimensions in their designs.
5.2.2 Environment
5.2.2.1 Over 80% of the Bank Group’s ARD portfolio, which comprised the irrigation, research and extension projects, was approved during the 1980s and early 1990s before the Bank Group introduced mandatory screening of projects for environmental impacts. The fact that there have been no environmental disasters to date can be attributed partly to under-utilisation of the land and the physical infrastructure in the irrigation projects, and partly to the engineering designs which were of sound standards and could have therefore mitigated potential environmental problems that would arise from technical design. In addition, there already existed sectoral policies and laws that implied that compliance with certain environmental standards were required in project design, for instance, the Water Utilisation Act of 1974, the Forests Ordinance, the Fish and Crocodiles Act, etc. It was also the policies and strategies in some sectors such as research and extension to promote technologies that were inherently environmental-friendly, hence NALRP and NALERP had no adverse effects on the environment.
5.2.2.2 Projects implemented after 1992 (TLMP, Madibira, Selous Game Reserve, etc.) complied with environmental guidelines of the Bank Group, although their appraisal preceded the Government’s National Environmental Policy of 1997. On the overall, therefore, the projects appraised and approved during this period were and are adequately covered by the Bank Group and Government guidelines. Where projects were already under implementation, the Bank Group required full compliance and instructed new Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), as in the case of TLMP. This overall satisfactory conclusion does not underrate the potential damaging impacts to the environment by existing irrigation projects. In fact, there are environmental threats in Kapunga and elsewhere as a result of the onset of diseases and pests, soil fertility deterioration, and the unregulated use of the land by itinerary farmers who rent land from the care-taker committee on a seasonal basis. Poor crop
24 management and the planting of any variety of rice has resulted in the spread of wild rice which is reported to be an environmental problem.
5.2.3 Private Sector Development and Community Participation
5.2.3.1 The role of the private sector in the early years of Bank Group interventions was not given special consideration under the socialist framework of the time. The importance of the private sector emerged after the mid-90s following the deepening of economic reforms and the formulation of private sector promotion policies. The projects implemented during this period were Madibira, TLMP and Selous Game Reserve. Only TLMP had specific provisions for promoting private sector participation in the management of the marketing infrastructure and the Dodoma Abattoir.
5.2.3.2 In the context of private sector participation, all projects involved the private sector in the contracting and procurement of goods and services through specific project activities such as civil works and consultancy services. Through these activities large sums of money were injected in the economies of the project areas which created secondary and tertiary impacts through induced complementary private sector activities. There are, for instance, emerging private sector non- agricultural economies in both Madibira and Chimala, which have been induced by the construction and development of those projects. In a broader sense, many of the Bank Group financed projects were and are implemented among and by local communities. The most recent projects have recognised that poverty reduction and the improvement of food security can only be achieved by direct participation of the poor themselves and hence the focus on active community participation, which directly promotes private sector development.
5.2.4 Regional Integration
Regional integration, in the context of Bank Group policy, was not addressed specifically in any Bank Group financed project, except the SPFS which was executed by FAO within the context of South-South Cooperation Agreement signed between FAO, GOT and the Government of Egypt. Through this Cooperation, the Egyptian Government provided technicians to GOT to help implement the project in seven districts. But like private sector participation, there have been some unintended impacts. For instance, the construction of Dakawa Rice Project could have influenced the siting of the Cholima Rice Research Centre, which was a Cooperation project between the GOT and the Government of Korea. The Dakawa Rice Project constructed an airfield which the Research Centre hopes would become one of the regional airfields from which aircraft could fly to control the quelea- quelea bird. The control of this bird is a regional programme. Certain programmes in research have a regional dimension and therefore the strengthening of research and extension services created the capacity to enhance such regional programmes.
5.3 Counterfactual Assessment
5.3.1 The counterfactual is an assessment of a hypothetical situation that could prevail in the project areas were there no Bank Group interventions. This assessment is based on the examination of what other investments or interventions could have occurred in two sub-sectors (irrigation and research and extension) before and after the period of Bank Group interventions. In the irrigation sub-sector the Bank Group was one of the earliest major investors in large-scale projects. While the Bank Group appears to have been an important pioneer in this area, the Chinese were also active in similar projects in Mbarali and Ruvu. Records show that other organisations (FAO, World Bank, GTZ) were active in sponsoring irrigation studies, and from the late 1980s to the 1990s several donors have been financing irrigation projects. It is therefore difficult to hypothecate what the situation would be were the Bank
25 Group not present. It would appear that this sub-sector attracted the interest of other investors besides the Bank Group, but the Bank Group’s share was certainly significant and has had impact on the current government’s policies and strategies.
5.3.2 In the research and extension sub-sector, the Bank Group participated as co-financier with other donors in projects in which it had no part in identification, preparation and design. The Bank Group’s performance in these projects was eclipsed by those of other partners who proceeded with the implementation of their components of the projects without much coordination with the Bank Group. It would appear that, were the Bank Group not present in the projects, the other financiers would have proceeded without the Bank Group anyway. This is demonstrated by the fact that: (a) World Bank launched the second phase of the two projects even before the Bank Group’s components were completed; (b) some of the components of the research and extension projects which the Bank Group did not complete were completed by the World Bank and other donors; and (c) the Bank Group is currently out of the sub-sector but other donors are continuing their support.
5.3.3 Other sub-sectors (livestock, natural resources, marketing, district support, etc) can be similarly assessed and it would be found that other investors were always present to carry developments. In dealing with the counterfactual, therefore, the “with” and “without” question applied to individual projects on the ground does not apply. Rather, the alternative question might be: what would the Bank Group do differently were it given the chance to re-package its completed aid programmes? It should also be remembered that the Bank Group is a major regional development institution for Africa and its activities in Tanzania as a member country are part of its responsibilities. The ARD sector is the mainstay of the Tanzanian economy and the Bank Group’s involvement in it should not be subject to hypothetical questions. However, the Bank Group faces many challenges, including competition for niches where it has comparative advantage with others, and therefore the issue for the Bank Group is to ensure that it has a reasonable presence in the sector.
6. CONTRIBUTORS’ PERFORMANCE
6.1 The Government and Executing Agencies
6.1.1 The contribution of the government should be seen from the strategic and long-term perspectives of the evolution of its macro-economic policy and sectoral goals, which overtime constituted the environment for Bank Group’s assistance. From this perspective, Government’s commitments and prioritisation of development needs are assessed as having been satisfactory in the aggregate, taking the entire Bank Group ARD sector portfolio overtime. Crucially, the Government, having realised that its basic development policy up to the mid 1980s was seriously flawed, instituted and implemented economic reforms which have vastly improved the environment for investment. Government has also, during the course of the reforms, undertaken considerable sectoral analysis to identify constraints to agricultural growth and development and has, through a sector-wide approach, embraced stakeholders in a participatory process to design an Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) to guide both domestic and external investment in the ARD sector in the medium term. The GOT also created a Joint Donor Agricultural Sector Support Group and the Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS) to strengthen GOT-Donor dialogue. The significant economic reforms have created a policy and macro environment necessary for the opening up of the economy. This is having a positive side effect on the quality of government services and the management of the policy and planning process, and has increased awareness among the various stakeholders about the projects and of the conditions necessary for overall improved performance of future projects.
26 6.1.2 The government consistently demonstrated its commitments and ownership by continued support or promotion of the projects in its regular policy statements and dialogue with the Bank Group. The real problem of the government has been the translation of these commitments into realistic budgetary allocations. Because of the severe budgetary constraints, the share of the ARD sector in the National Budget has been generally low and this has been compounded by too many counter-part funding commitments which at times complicated the prioritisation of the budget. In at least two cases the GOT resolved the problem of counter-part contribution by allowing projects to retain all or part of the statutory revenues collected by the projects (TLMP, Selous). This was a positive move which, if maintained, would help to partially resolve the problems of counter-part funds in some projects.
6.1.3 Government commitments included fulfilling the necessary covenants for the implementation of projects. The government satisfactorily fulfilled the covenants even though there were delays in certain instances. The government also set up Project Management Units to carry out the day to day management of projects and staffed them with qualified staff who received additional training in particular skills such as project planning and management, monitoring and evaluation, procurement, financial management and accounting, and disbursement procedures. The setting up and operation of the PIUs did not, however, resolve satisfactorily the problems of coordination on the one hand, and of supervision, monitoring and evaluation on the other. One of the present problems in coordination is caused by the split of the ARD sector portfolio among several ministries. This has increased the difficulty and cost of coordination and management.
6.1.4 Supervision, monitoring and reporting of progress are among the key responsibilities of the Government and the executing agencies of the various projects. This function has been inadequately carried out in projects, especially those implemented during the late 70s and early 80s. The inadequacy of supervision and monitoring contributed to the poor performance by the contractors. Although the situation has been improving overtime, the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit of MAFS does not yet adequately report on projects and lacks executive powers of inspection and supervision of projects. The M&E unit of the Planning and Privatisation Division of MAFS has not built up an adequate database on on-going projects to track their performance.
6.2 The Bank Group
6.2.1 The assessment of the Bank Group contribution should be looked at from the point of view of the totality of its assistance to the ARD sector, which has spanned 27 years of lending in Tanzania. On the whole, the Bank Group has been active in supporting Tanzania’s ARD sector and its contribution has been positive and satisfactory. However, the Bank Group's project identification and preparation was inadequate in several projects implemented in the 1980s. The Bank Group’s entry into the irrigation sub-sector through the parastatal NAFCO was uncritical of the government’s policy and strategy given that other options could have been applied to reflect the likely overall impact of the projects on poverty reduction and improvement of household food security in the medium and long- term. In the case of NALRP and NALERP, the Bank Group did not play a proactive role either in the project identification and preparation or in determining the components to be financed. The Bank Group’s use of studies and economic sector work as tools for maintaining a lead as well as link to development opportunities has not been fully exploited. As a result the Bank Group has presently a narrowly focused sector portfolio of on-going projects.
6.2.2 The procurement and disbursement systems of the Bank Group were a major source of difficulties to the executing agencies. The failure to effectively manage these systems was partly responsible for the considerable under-achievement of targets in a number of projects. It is, however, difficult to isolate Bank Group performance in terms of the operation of the systems generally, from
27 the local and international practices. The responsibility should be shared with GOT as well and perhaps with other donors. While inefficiency in procurement and disbursement was an important factor, inefficiency in project implementation also persisted because the Bank Group did not provide for regular project supervision and review missions, mid-term reviews and active follow up of recommendations for most of the projects. Since the mid 1990s, however, the Bank Group has increased the frequency of its supervision missions to one or two missions per project per year. Sector work was initiated in 2002 and Mid-term reviews are also mandatory for projects under implementation, which will facilitate the redesigning of projects mid-course.
6.2.3 While an attempt is made to isolate the contributions of the Government and the Bank Group, the overall implementation performance of the sector portfolio should be seen against the background of long drawn-out time lags and lead times, which characterized most of the projects reviewed in this study. This review evaluation has revealed that it took an average of 15 months from the time projects were approved to the time loans became effective, and for studies it took an average of 22 months. The shortest time was 6 months (for the Dakawa Supplementary loans), while the longest time was 30 months for the TLMP (Annex 1, Part 2). Only four projects were effective within less than 15 months from the date of their approval (Dakawa, Kapunga, SPFS, Selous). The main explanation for the lagged time between the approval and effective dates was the delay by the Government in meeting some of the conditions precedent to the loans, but several instances were also reported of delayed responses by the Bank Group. Lagged effective dates continue to affect project implementation, and it is an issue that must be addressed by the Government and the Bank Group.
6.3 Co-financiers
6.3.1 Within the agriculture and rural development sector the Bank Group has co-financed at least four projects with the GOT and other donors. These included NARLP, NALERP, Dakawa Rice, Kapunga Rice and the AMSDP. The latter project has just commenced, while there are no details on Dakawa and Kapunga. In the NALRP, the Bank Group was the co-principal financier with IDA and both contributed 35% to the project while the GOT and other partners (Netherlands, SPAAR, ODA and FRG/ISNAR) contributed 8% and 22% respectively. In NALERP, the IDA was the principal partner contributing 60% while the Bank Group and GOT each contributed 30% and 10% respectively. While both projects broadly achieved their objectives, coordination among the various donors emerged as a major factor in the effectiveness and efficiency of the overall implementation. In NALRP, the World Bank’s ICR points out that the enhancement and institutionalisation of coordination of donors was a key intended objective, but this could not be achieved because the various donors preferred to fund identifiable research activities that best fitted with their own aid programmes and strategies. Better coordination of the project was achieved only after the establishment of a GOT–Donor Consultation Group which ensured regular exchange of information.
6.3.2 In the NALERP, there was no arrangement for the coordination of the co-financiers similar to the one organised under SPAAR in NALRP. Both the Bank Group and IDA operated in parallel. The IDA implemented its components timely as per schedule and its credit was fully disbursed, but as the principal partner in the co-financing arrangement it moved almost entirely single-handedly to direct the course of the overall project. It, for instance, carried out with the GOT the Mid-Term Review and used the results to substantially change the project without the Bank Group participation as partner and co- financier. IDA also proceeded to prepare and launch the second phase of the project (NAEP II) before NALERP was completed and evaluated. In both the NALRP and NALERP, the Bank Group’s components seriously lagged behind those of IDA and other donors. The overall experience with co- financing arrangements was unsatisfactory.
28 6.4 Contribution of Exogenous Factors
6.4.1 Several exogenous factors were also at play that affected the overall performance of Bank Group’s assistance overtime, but the changing political and macro-economic policy environments and the distabilising external shocks are especially important to mention. In particular, it was noted earlier (para 2.1.2) that UJAMAA policy had had a negative impact on economic incentives across all sectors of the economy. Coupled with a series of distabilising shocks that occurred in the 1970s and early 1980s - which included the oil price shocks of the 1970s, the collapse of key commodity prices in the world markets, recurring droughts, the break up of the East African Community, and the 1979/80 War against the Amin Regime in Uganda – the overall impact of these policies was a severe economic crisis manifested by declines in outputs and incomes during the 1970s and 1980s and much of the early 1990s. Over 80% of the Bank Group’s portfolio was committed during this time when the national economy was at its low point, which is a factor that could have contributed to its reduced performance due to the low incentive structure in the ARD sector.
6.4.2 The process of economic reforms and liberalisation, which came with the Economic Recovery Programme of 1986 and continued into the 1990s and beyond, also created problems although of a different nature. These included severe budgetary restrictions in line with macro-economic targets, and the restructuring and re-organisation of public services which involved the cut down of services and retrenchment of personnel across the services. The decisions were often made at macro level and implemented across the board regardless of the impacts they might have on the operations of individual projects and the various covenants that the GOT made with the Bank Group. In the research and extension sub-sector, for instance, staff retrenchment reduced the agreed targets for field-level operations and adversely affected performance of the projects at that level. The reforms and liberalisation policies also hit hard the Dakawa and Kapunga state farm irrigation projects which subsequently closed down and are awaiting possibilities of privatisation as a possible solution to the current state of limbo they are in.
7. MAIN CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS AND CHALLENGES
7.1 Conclusions
7.1.1 The Bank Group’s assistance has made a significant contribution to Tanzania’s agricultural and rural development sector, and has been broadly relevant and appropriate and addressed direct production issues. However, the Bank Group’s assistance showed no clear pattern in sub-sectoral interventions that linked current or on-going commitments to what had been implemented in the past, which would imply that the Bank Group did not have practical pipelines of bankable interventions that could be relied upon in the planning of assistance in the medium term.
7.1.2 Over 80% of the Bank Group’s assistance went to support the irrigation sub-sector projects whose overall performance was not satisfactory, which tended to pull down the overall performance of the sector portfolio. Projects which had a significant presence of smallholder participation achieved their objectives the most, while the state farm projects collapsed. From the strategic planning point, therefore, assistance to smallholder projects offered the greatest opportunities for poverty eradication, improved food security and sustained development
7.1.3 The Bank Group ARD sector portfolio experienced long and overdrawn implementation time due to lengthy delays and sometimes protracted performances usually associated with problems of procurement and contracting, which were partly the causes of inefficiency in implementation.
29 Following the improvements in management and supervision, projects implemented since the mid 1990s have performed satisfactorily, and the overall performance of the portfolio toward achievement of long-term development objectives also improved.
7.1.4 The Bank Group has contributed substantially to institutional and human capacity development at four broad levels: at the project or programme management level for the management of projects and acquisition of special skills; at the sectoral level for improved linkages of policy; at the sub- sectoral level for the creation and development of institutions for long-term sustainability of projects or programmes; and at the operational level for the promotion of some institutional best practices.
7.2 Lessons Learned11
7.2.1 Project design issues arising from Bank Group assistance strategy demonstrate the need for strong joint efforts between the Bank Group, the government and direct and indirect beneficiaries in identification and design of development projects or programmes. The experiences from the completed and ongoing projects show the crucial importance (for the achievement of successful outcomes) of involving smallholders’ right from the inception of projects where the objective is poverty reduction and improved food security and well-being. Moreover, focusing on the participation of smallholders in the early selection and design of projects could result in alternative investment options that are cheaper.
7.2.2 As a corollary, the Bank Group’s over-concentration of resources in the irrigation sub-sector was a case of putting too many eggs in one basket. The dismal failure of the large state farms affected the Bank Group’s overall image of agricultural projects and was partly responsible for the slow down of new commitments during the mid 1990s to the early 2000s. Opportunities could have been lost in the process.
7.2.3 While the Bank Group has made substantial contributions in infrastructure development, these have not assured increased or sustained agricultural production. The stock of idle or underutilized infrastructure is expensive to maintain without the revenues that should be generated by the projects.
7.2.4 Focusing on institutional and human resource development, coupled with institutionalization of best practices, is necessary in ensuring long-term sustainability of the benefits from development projects. However, institutional capacity building did not necessarily remove the problems of inter- agency coordination of government policies and programmes where the ARD sector portfolio is divided among several ministries.
7.2.5 Government commitments are necessary to create conditions for the sustainability of projects by establishing symbiotic relationship between public service provision and direct stakeholders/beneficiary participation. This approach enhances the prospect for successful implementation of cost recovery measures in projects.
7.2.6 Project impacts on cross-cutting issues (such as poverty, food security, gender, private sector participation, etc.) can only be properly captured with specific impact studies which were not available for this review.
11 This subsection summarises only the key lessons relating to outcome of Bank Group’s assistance. Additional lessons are given in Annex 4.
30 7.3 Recommendations for Feedback
7.3.1 Government officials and other stakeholders should participate in project identification, preparation and appraisals. There is also a need for: (a) in-built flexibility in the design and implementation of policies and programmes, although this must be grounded on the decision-making environment in which the Bank Group and the GOT are in constant dialogue and review of projects; and b) effective and flexible mechanisms for exchange of information among the various stakeholders and donors supporting projects in the same sector and/or sub-sector.
7.3.2 The Bank Group should define, within its CSP and sector review process, a mechanism to link the past, the present and the future. One way is to carry a pipeline of past and on-going projects in an information system or database that is used for regular discussions with the Government and other stakeholders. This should be backed by a system of regular consultations and studies.
7.3.3 Institutional and human resource development should be implemented in tandem in development assistance. However, this must be combined with the institutionalization of best practices in project implementation. Moreover, appropriate mechanism needs to be put in place to tap the existing pool of local experts that have benefited one way or another from donors’ capacity building assistance.
7.3.4 The infrastructure and construction components in Bank Group financed projects should be complemented by more investments in directly income generating activities, in particular export diversification or export promoting ventures. This would serve the purpose of developing the capacity of the country to generate foreign exchange earnings to pay for some of the needed inputs and for maintenance of the existing infrastructure.
7.3.5 Both the Government and the Bank Group should consider additional support to those areas where the Bank Group has already made substantial investments (such as irrigation, livestock and wildlife amongst others), and where there appear to be no immediate follow-up investments to move the programmes or the policies forward.
7.3.6 Both the Bank Group and GOT should address issues of efficiency and sustainability of projects. In the area of efficiency, this should include strengthening the M & E systems to yield data that is needed to monitor performance and to review changes in FRRs and ERRs, strengthen project oversight to improve overall implementation, and set realistic time scheduling of implementation activities. In the area of sustainability, the requirements for financial sustainability need to be in-built into projects at the design stage, and indicators of sustainability should be monitored during implementation.
7.3.7 To properly capture impacts of the Bank Group’s development assistance (on poverty, gender, environment, etc), it is necessary to: a) carry out socio-economic baseline surveys of project areas before projects are implemented as part of pre-project activity; and b) in projects that have been completed or are on-going, specific impact studies should be undertaken.
Annex 1 Part 1 Page 1 of 7 BASIC PROJECT INFORMATION Project Objectives, Components, Outputs, Current Status SUB-SECTOR / PROJECT OBJECTIVES COMPONENTS / OUTPUTS CURRENT STATUS A. Irrigation / Drainage Goal: Food Self-Sufficiency: Developments: • Increase rice production so as to • Land development – 2000 had out of a • Complex was closed down in 1998 and 1. Dakawa Rice Project reduce rice imports; total of 3.562 ha; NAFCO was closed down in 2001, • Create employment and improve • Irrigation Infrastructure; being a loss making parastatal; Date approved: Various living conditions; • Farm equipment / machinery; • The complex, except the rice mill, is Amount Approved: UA 17.06 m • Basis for agro-industrial development • Workshop Complexes: farm under Care Taker Committee set up by Amount Disbursed: UA 15.27m of rural areas; machinery workshop, vehicle the Regional & District • Serve as demonstration to surrounding workshop. Administrations; Committee allocates Location/ Outreach: farms. • Buildings – office blocks, staff houses, land to individuals on a seasonal basis 50km on the Morogoro-dodoma road, on the recreation facilities, rest house, to grow rice on payment of Tsh. 50,000 north side of the Wami river in the Dakawa Production achievements: swimming pool; per ha. Basin (Mvomero district, Morogoro region). Records not available. In 2004/05 farmers • Aerodrome: access roads, farm roads; • In October 2003 the Committee Total area 3,562 ha, of which 2000 ha hired 1000 ha and in 2005 season planned • Rice mill complex of 3.5 metric tons allocated developed land to various developed. to hire 2000 ha. clean rice output per hour. categories of stakeholders as follows: • Irrigation infrastructure: a six-pump Dakawa villagers 496.8 ha; Cholima electric pumping station, open main Research Centre 127.2 ha; Surimu canals, secondary and tertiary canals. (NGO) 24 ha; MAFS model farm 200 • Farm machinery/equipment: 4 ha; Daka-Coop 400 ha; Ex-NAFCO combine harvesters, 2 caterpillar workers 80 ha; Cholima workers 64 ha; tractors, general farm tractors, regional and distric staff 400 ha; trucks/vehicles, oil pump station. leaders 160 ha; others 48 ha. The undeveloped area would be allocated as follows: Dakawa villagers 400 ha; Mtibwa Outgrowers Association 400 ha; other applicants 762 ha. • The rice mill complex has been sold off to a private company based in Dar. 2. Kapunga Rice Irrigation Project Goal: Food Self-Sufficiency: • Land Development: • The NAFCO farm (3000 ha) was • Increase rice production as rapidly as - 3,000 ha NAFCO farm closed down in 2001 when NAFCO Date approved: 14/12/87 possible; - Kapunga small-holders 800 ha was wound up. A Care Taker 23/12/87 • Improve well being of rural farms; - Chimala small-holders 1,150 ha (600 Committee set up by Parastatal Sector Amount Approved: existing + 550 ha new) Reform commission (PSRC) rents out Loan: UA 40.84 m Production achievements:1991/92 – land to individuals on a seasonal basis; Grant: UA 6.44 m 1993/94 • Infrastructure Development: • The infrastructure is shut down except Amount Disbursed: All - Irrigation/Drainage Infrastructure irrigation canals which are used by NAFCO farm - Social Infrastructure: staff houses, a individual farmers on rental fee basis; Location/ Outreach: Production(mt/yr) – 7,525 school, dispensary, workers canteen, • The small-holders components are Mbarali District in Mbeya region, 40 km Average yield(mt/ha) – 2.5 guest houses, etc. operating but on a reduced level due to from Mbeya City and 800 km from Dar-es- Area cultivated – 3,010 ha - Economic Infrastructure: Workshops, technical problems and lack of Salaam (on the Usangu Plains). warehouses, water supply, office effective services; blocks, electricity, fuel store etc. • Government has yet to decide on privatisation options. • Project comprises: 3000 ha Ex- Kapunga smallholders - Rice mill complex, with input of 6
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NAFCO farm; 800 ha under Production(mt/yr) – 1,293 mt/hr of paddy/ 4mt/hr operating Kapunga Smallholder Scheme; Average yield(mt/ha) – 3.10 capacity; 8 storage silos for paddy 1,150 ha under Chimala Area cultivated – 421 ha (2 years) (10,000 mt). Smallholders Scheme. Total number of smallholders expected to be Chimala smallholders 1,800 families. Production(mt/yr) – 3,097 • Additional 2,000 ha of paddy are Average yield(mt/ha) – 2.75 grown by new smallholders in the Area cultivated – 1,126 ha vicinity attracted to use the drainage water. NB: Since 2001 NAFCO farm is hired to smallholders and other interested farmers – 2,100 ha put to crop in 2004/05 season. 3. Madibira Small-holder Agricultural Goal: GDP growth and poverty alleviation. • Irrigation / Drainage Infrastructure: • Activity is vibrant on the schema, and Development Project • Enhance production capacity of - 55 km of Canals and protection dykes; 3155 farmers are on the list of smallholders; - 3000 ha rice irrigated farm; applicants, therefore demand of land is Date Approved: 03/09/93 • Improve living standards; - 140 km access roads and tracks. high. Amount Approved: UA 21.92m • Sustainable management of the • Economic and Social Infrastructure: • There were management problems with Amount Disbursed: UA 21.55m environment; - Office blocks, workshops, laboratory, MAMCOS last year but these are being • Improved access to social services – staff houses, clinic, school, water sorted out as new management has Location/Outreach: health & education. supply. been appointed; Mbarali District, in Mbeya Region, 89 km • Agricultural Development; • Not all land has been leveled (about from Rujewa, the District Headquarters and Production achievements 2000/01 – - Rice mill complex 3.5 mt/hr capacity; 140 ha) or so cannot be used; about 200 km from Mbeya city. 2004/05: - Marketing Cooperative (MAMCOS); • The project has submitted proposals to • The project catchment area has five • Area cultivated: 2,483 ha - 50 ha research farm; savings coop M- GOT for rectification of technical villages with a population of about • Production: 12,403 m/tons SACCO. problems. 30,000 people. • Average yield: 4.82 mt/ha • Environment: • Rice mill not functioning since April • The gavity irrigation system draws its - One-room lab and wildlife bufter zone 2004. water from the Ndembera River fence; • Only one generating set is used at a - Afforestation (over 400 ha); time as they are not syncronised. • Agricultural machinery and • Madibirwa-Rujewa 89 km road to be equipment: 6 farm tractors, 40 power rehabilitated under AMSDP. tillers, roller compactor, crowler loader, 2 dump tracks, towered grader, long reach excavator; generating sets (3 but not syncronised) 4. Zanzibar Rainfed Rice Development Goal: Improved food security and living • Institutional Support: Construction of • Project reportedly has done well in Project: standards. buildings, offices and provision of staff training, and provision of houses Date Approved: 18/12/80 • Increase rice production on 5,800 ha of vehicle; and access roads; Amount Approved: 7.37 m land already under rice cultivation by • Mechanisation Services to Farmers: • Project is not doing well in other Amount Disbursed: 7.28 m 11,600 rice farmers; farm machinery and equipment, rice aspects, and Government of Zanzibar • Assist Ministry of Agriculture of milling facilities, tractor hire services, financial support is very weak. Zanzibar to build and strengthen etc. Zanzibar/Pamba Islands essential services for rice development. • Infrastructure: 127km of feeder roads • Create employment. constructed/rehabilitated; • Procurement and distribution of
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agricultural inputs; • Technical assistance – 4 Technical Specialists and Project Manager. 5. Smallholders Rice Irrigation Project: Goal: Food Security through food self- • For each of the two locations (Kitivo • Irrigation Development report that the sufficiency. and Mwamapuli) the project has schemes are doing well. During last Date Approved: 08/04/82 • Increase rice production and reduce rice provided: year’s drought they sustained good Amount Approved: UA 7.37 m imports; - a Mobile Construction Unit; maize crop;’ Amount Disbursed: UA 6.18 m • Settle farmers in permanent villages, - Infrastructure: houses, offices, stores • The Tabora and Tanga schemes operate with assured high income sources and from crops and inputs, workshop on the same model, i.e. replicas of each Location/Outreach: access to social amenities; facilities, equipment, etc., other, except for a dam in Mwamapuli; The project is located in Kitivo, in Tanga • Development capacity of Ministry of - A dam in Mwamapuli; • Irrigation technology is simple, based Region with 810 families, and Agriculture to construct and develop - Farm machinery and other agricultural on gravity system essentially Mwamapuli in Tabora Region with 720 smallholders irrigation schemes; equipment for crop production; comprising an intake weir, main canals, families. • Improve skills and create employment - Revolving fund for seasonal credit for and distribution structures; opportunities in rural areas farm inputs and land preparation; • Rice and maize are the crops grown; - Operating costs for personnel and O & • Management is by Irrigation M for machinery and equipment. Committees. 6. Special Programme for Food Security Goal: Food Security: The project operates through 4 • The project is due to end in March (SPFs): • Rapid and sustained increase in food components: 2005, but no concrete information was production and improved livelihoods - Crop intensification: focussing on available whether it will have achieved Date Approved: 17/05/2000 for small farmers through adoption of demonstration of improved production all the physical objective. Amount Approved: UA 0.77 m improved agricultural technology; technologies, formation of Participatory • A lot of effort has been put in forming Amount Disbursed: UA 0.77 m Farmers Groups (PFGs) and Farmers Field the PFGs and FFSs, but the new area Schools (FFS), etc; developed under irrigation appears to Location/Outreach: - Enterprise diversification, focussing on be about 500 – 600 ha, or about 36% - Project is located in seven sites in three improving sources of incomes; 45% of the target; districts and regions as follows: - Water Control, focussing on technologies • The farmers in Mgambanlenga have for irrigation development to increase and problems with water – see pages along • Morogoro Region - Kilosa District: stabilise agricultural productivity. The sections of their canals and propose the Two sites at Msolwa and Kilangali; technologies include five main fields: (a) lining up of the entire canal; • Iringa Region - Iringa District at rehabilitation of water intakes and • They also complain of lack of water in Mgambalenga; headworks at 7 sites; (b) desilting and the Mgambalenga River during • Tanga Region - Korogwe District at reprofiling 26,400 m of main and 38,550 m August-December and proper that new Chekelei; of secondary canals at five sites; (c) intake be located in Lukosi River. Kwamugumi, Kwemazandu and desilting and reprofiling 37,100 m of drains Mangamikocheni; at five sites; and (d) construction / • The project targets to reach 2,216 rehabilitation of division boxes, and (e) families, and develop 1,370 ha of new formation of Water Users Groups (WUGs); irrigated land. - Constraints analysis and resolution, focusing on farm level, technology and institutional constraints associated with implementation of the above components.
B. Agricultural Research and Extension Goal: Increased agricultural productivity • Short and long-term training in research • Agricultural and livestock research, through improved delivery of research planning and management; and support to it, has been undergoing
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7. National Agricultural Research & services: • Procurement of essential research an evolutionary processes following Livestock Research Project (NARLP): • Organise agricultural an d livestock facilities, including vehicles and NARLP. research in an integrated manner to equipment; • TARP II, funded by the World Bank, Date Approved: 23/08/88 improve its capacity and efficiency; • Rehabilitation of 5 research stations, continued uplifting research; Amount Approved: UA 6.17 m • Lay foundation for an effective and including offices, laboratories, work- • A new Agricultural Services Support Amount Disbursed: UA 6.01 m efficient future research system; shops and residential houses: Programme (ASSP) has been designed • Prepare a Research Master Plan with specifically at: Temeke, Mpwapwa, as a follow-up to TARP II, but with the Location/Outreach: priority research activities underscored Ukiriguru, Kongwa and Tango – LRC; objective to integrate the provision to Project is nationally based by a research fund. • Contributing to Agric. Research Fund; support to research and extension • Priority funding for on-going research in services. roots and tubes; cotton; livestock production and diseases; sorghum and millet (added later after research stations reorganisation).
8. National Agricultural and Livestock Goal: Increased agricultural productivity • Reorganisation and strengthening of the • Those are now 3 lead Ministries – Extension Rehabilitation Project and rural incomes through provision of Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock MAFs, MCM and MWLD – in place of (NALERP): improved extension services; Development; the form on Ministry. • Reorganise and strengthen the capacity • Short and long-term training in • Like NALRP, there has been a Date Approved: 23/08/88 of Ministry of Agriculture and extension planning and management; continuing evolution of assistance to the Amount Approved: UA 6.52 m Livestock Development to plan, • Procurement of essential extension extension services after the end Amount Disbursed: UA 5.88 m implement and supervise extension facilities, including equipment and kits; NALERP; activities; • Construction and rehabilitation of 4 • The World Bank financed Phase II Location/Outreach: • Lay the foundation for the development training centres (Ilonga, Ukiriguru, (NAEP II) alone, and this is being Nationally based project and expansion of an integrated, Mpwapwa, Mtwara); DivEO houses, followed-up by the planned Agricultural effective and sustainable agricultural etc. Services Support Project (ASSP) which and livestock extension service in will integrate support to both extension Tanzania. and research. C. Livestock Development Goal: Improved income and livelihood of • Rehabilitation of 56 primary markets, 90 • The project activities have been livestock produces; night camps, 13 holding grounds, 15 Vet completed except for some contractual 9. Livestock Marketing Project • Contribution to GDP growth and check points, 9 railway sidings, 60 cattle obligations and TA and Project poverty alleviation; wagons, and 940 km of stock routes; Management. The testing of Dodowa Date Approved: 27/06/1992 • Organise efficient marketing chain for • Design, construction of a modern Abattoir was on-going and is planned to Amount Approved: UA 9.21m livestock, meat and meat products; abattoir and Vocational Meat Training be commissioned in March 2005. The Amount Disbursed: UA7.89m • Increase volume of wholesale meat for Centre in Dodome; project completion/disbursement is Date Completed: 31/12/2005 local consumption and for exports; • Short and long-term training of local scheduled for 31 December 2005; • Increase off-take and quality of beef staff; • The Project Management expressed Location/Outreach: cattle from traditional producing areas • Provision of short and long-term satisfaction with the project 12 regions north of the Central Railway (for 9.7% to 13.7%); Technical Assistance; performance. Line that runs from Dar to Kigoma • Reduce mortality rates and weight losses • Curriculum design for the Vocational • There are demands by Project in marketing of livestock; Meat Training Centre; Management for extension of the project to the south of the country • Improve hygiene in animal and meat • Strengthening of Marketing Information handling, and strengthen GOT capacity Services;
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to monitor and evaluate livestock • Procurement of vehicles and equipment. marketing. D. National Resources (Wildlife): Goal: GDP growth and poverty alleviation; • Integrated Buffer Zone Management • Only one activity is going on, i.e. the • Create sustainable and effective - Integrated Buffer Zone Management Plan construction of staff houses, expected to 10. Selons Game Reserve Management management in Selons Game Reserves - Mahenge – SGR Road be completed by August 2005. Project (SGR) and its buffer zones through - Community base Micro projects • Socio-Economic Baseline Survey was biodiversity conservation and - Community Wildlife Management carried out and Integrated Buffer Zone Date Approved: 26/11/1997 improvement of infrastructure; Programmes Management Plan completed. Now Amount Approved: UA 5.91m - Responses capabilities of field staff. awaiting follow-up action. Amount Disbursed: UA 3.56m • Infrastructure and Maintenance • The Project has ran out of financial Project is on-going but expected to close by - 7,000 km Game Reserve roads network resources before major infrastructure 31/12/05. - 1,000 km of border demarcation development could be completed. - 25 air strips. Location/Outreach: • SGR Staff Housing South-eastern Tanzania. SGR is 50,000 sq. - Staff houses and functional buildings in 8 km in size, and the buffer zones covers two camps districts (Ilanga and Kilombero). - Water supply to 8 camps • Institutional Supports - PMU Staff training - Vehicles and Equipment E. Marketing and Agro-processing Goal: Increase in incomes and food security • Agricultural Marketing Policy • The Bank Group component, which of rural poor in northern and southern Development: - comprising national and covers Rural Marketing Infrastructure, 11. Agricultural Marketing Systems Tanzania. local government policy development. became effective on 25 February 2004. Development Programme • Improve the structures, conduct and • Producer Empowerment and Market • No substantial activities have started, performance of agricultural marketing Linkages:- only about US $80,000 from the grant Date Approved: 18/09/2002 and pricing systems in the country’ - Organisational strengthening of farmers element has been received by the PMU. Amount Approved: • This will provide incentives to and traders/processors Loan: UA 15.0 m smallholders to increase and diversify - Market Information Grant: UA 1.00m production; and the number of traders - Producer Groups Market Access Co-financiers: IFAD who interact with small farms to - Traders and Processors Market Access. Irish Aid increase. • Financial Market Support Services Other co-financiers - Rural Inventory Credit Scheme Districts/Communities - Traders/Processors Loan Guarantee GOT Scheme • Rural Marketing Infrastructure Location/Outreach: - Institutional Strengthening and Technical 8 districts in 4 regions: Assistance - Arusha Zone: 4 Regions, 4 Districts; - Road works, and other market - Mbeya Zone: 4 Regions, 4 Districts. infrastructure • The PMU is located in Arusha. - Programme Organisation and Management.
F. District Planning/Investment Goal: Increase agricultural GDP growth and • Farmer Capacity Building: – • This is a recently approved project
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12. District Agricultural Sector Investment reduce rural poverty and food insecurity; - District Training Capacity (November 2004) Project (DASIP) • Increase productivity and income of - Farmer Training (10,000 farmer groups). • The loan agreement was signed on 11th Date Approved: 24/11/4002 rural households in the project area • Community Planning and Investment in February 2005 Amount Approved: within the overall framework of Rural Agriculture (450,000 h/hs):- • Hence, pre-project activities are only just Loan UA 36 m Development Strategy and Agricultural - Capacity building for planning and starting. Grant: UA 7m Development Sector Strategy. implementation Location/Outreach: - Medium size rural infrastructure 25 districts in the north-west of Tanzania, - Agricultural micro-projects and covering 5 regions of Kagera (5 districts), infrastructure Kigoma (3 districts), Mara (4 districts), - Agricultural technology investments. Mwanza (6 districts) and Shyinyanga (7 • Support to Rural Micro-financial districts). Services and Marketing (450,000 h/hs):- - Rural Financial Services • The PMU is located in Mwanza. - Marketing.
G. Studies • To determine the technical feasibility • An Interim Report in September 1985 • The study has not resulted in an and economic viability of providing and a Final Draft Study Report in June investment project for the Bank Group. 13. Morogoro Village Irrigation Study technical and financial support for 1986. construction of 4 irrigation schemes of • Study was suspended due to depute Date Approved: 8/4/1982 about 4,000 ha in Morogoro, 140 km between the GOT and the consulting Amount Approved: UA 0.40m west of Dar Es Salaam. firm. Amount Disbursed: UA 0.23m • The GOT requested for cancellation of the balance of the loan.
14. Kapunga and Madibira Rice Study • Undertake detailed engineering designs • There was two separate feasibility • The study was completed in April 1985 for the envisaged Kapunga and studies: and resulted in two projects Date Approved: 10/11/1981 Madibira Rice Projects, based on - Kapunga Rice Irrigation Feasibility by subsequently financed by the Bank: i.e. Amount Approved: UA 1.20 m feasibility studies carried out separately Agrar Und Hydrotechnik of Germany in Kapunga Rice Irrigation Project Amount Disbursed: UA 0.98m by two firms: Agrar Und Hydro-technik 1977/78; approved in December 1987, and (Kapunga) and Sir William Halcrow & - Madibira Rice Project Feasibility by Sir Madibira Smallholders Agricultural Partners (Madibira). William Halcrow & Partners almost at Development Project approved in the same time. September 1993. Both projects were • The Bank funded a detailed design study implemented and completed. for Kapunga/Madibira project (through the NTF) and this was undertaken by Sir William Halcrow & Partners in 1981/83. • After updating the information the Bank appraised the project in April 1985.
15. Dodoma Livestock Development • Determine the economic and • Study package constituted a number of • The study resulted in the Tanzania Study: operational feasibility of supplying project proposals none of which could Livestock Marketing Project (TLMP)
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adequate red meat to Dodoma Region, provide a basis for investment; which the Bank financed from 1994 to Date Approved: 12/12/1985 and Dodoma City in particular. This • ADB in 1991 requested 2005 (is just closing). Amount Approved: UA 0.51 m was in anticipation of the expansion of FAO/Investment Centre to review the Amount Disbursed: UA 0.40m population of response to government proposals withy GOT and come up with decision to move the country’s capital a more coherent project proposal; to Dodoma. • FAO/Investment Centre with GOT came up with a project proposal which was appraised by the Bank in 1992.
16. Kagera Sugar Estate Rehabilitation • Overall objective was: • Project design with focus on poverty The Kagera Sugar Estate was privated and Study: • Design our effective rehabilitation alleviation; the study results were used to restructive strategy for the Kagera Sugar Estate; • Environmental Impact Assessment; and plan the developments. Date approved: 10 July 1993 • Determine extent to which the • Socio-economic investigation of Amount Approved: UA 0.61 m rehabilitated estate can contribute to labour, employment, women, Amount Disbursed: UA 0.43m poverty alleviation in the area; participation, etc. • Use the information to formulate a • Pros pert for import substitution of comprehensive project suitable for sugar. consideration by the Bank or any of the donors.
17. Dakawa Integrated Irrigation Project • To prepare an appropriate project as a • Identification of the optimal use of • A comprehensive study was (Dakowa II) Study. follow on to Dakawa Rice Project existing resource and the completed in 1995 by consultants Date approved: 11 June 1990 which had been implemented, with a improvement needs of Dakowa I; - TAN consult Ltd, Tanzania, in Amount Approved: UA 0. 49 m view to providing the bases for • Conducting studies in the proposed association with Mott MacDonald Amount Disbursed: UA 0.46m integrated sustainable agricultural expansion area to determine suitability International Ltd, of UK development. for the planned form extension; • The study was submitted to the GOT • Determination of the and the bank feasibility/possibility of the proposed • There has been no outcome as yet agro-industrial activities; from the study.
Annex 1 Part 2 BASIC PROJECT INFORMATION
Summary of Bank Group ARD Portfolio Trend (N°. of Operations) – 1971 – 2004 (UA Million)
Sub-Sector 1971-75 1976-85 ERP1 ESAP EPCP2 CSP1 CSP2 CSP3 Total Bank 1986-89 1990-92 1993-95 1996-98 1999-01 2002-04 Implementation No. Amt. No. Amt. No. Amt. No. Amt. No. Amt. No. Amt. No. Amt. No. Amt. No. Amt. Involvement 1. Irrigation: Dakawa Rice -- -- 4 17.06 -- 1 0.49 4 17.06 16 Yrs. 9 m Dakawa II Study ------1 0.49 7 Yrs. 7 m Zanzibar Rainfed -- -- 1 7.37 1 7.37 19 Yrs. Kapunga/Madiriba -- -- 1 1.20 1 1.20 12 Yrs. 2 m Morogoro V.Study -- -- 1 0.49 1 0.49 13 Yrs. 9 m Tabora/Tanga -- -- 1 7.37 1 7.37 15 Yrs. 9m Kapunga Rice ------2 47.28 2 47.28 11 Yrs. Madibira S/Holders ------1 21.92 1 21.92 5 Yrs. SPFS ------1 0.77 1 0.77 5 Yrs. 2. Res/Ext.: NALRP ------1 6.17 1 6.17 13 Yrs. 4 m NALERP ------1 6.52 1 6.52 11 Yrs. 4 m 3. Livestock: Dodoma / Study -- -- 1 0.51 1 0.51 9 Yrs TLMP ------1 9.21 1 9.21 14 Yrs 4. Sugar: Kagera Est. Study ------1 0.61 1 0.61 4 Yrs. 8 m 5. Wildlife : Selous G. R ------1 5.91 1 5.91 8 Yrs. 6. Marketing: AMSDP ------2 16.90 2 16.90 New 7. Districts: DASIP ------2 43.09 2 43.00 New Total Agriculture -- -- 9 34.0 4 59.97 2 9.70 2 22.53 1 5.91 1 0.77 4 59.90 23 192.78 Other sectors
8. Transport 2 8.61 3 21.00 1 17.68 4 60.13 1 1.47 3 30.81 2 62.65 2 16.93 18 219.28
9. Industry 2 4.50 2 8.00 -- -- 2 1.44 ------6 13.94
10. Public Utilities -- -- 6 44.22 5 20.10 5 65.28 2 3.19 1 0.78 3 40.12 1 15.51 23 189.20
11. Social -- -- 1 6.45 1 0.59 -- -- 1 0.65 4 43.91 3 8.32 2 15.82 12 75.74
12. Multi-Sector ------1 28.55 2 55.26 -- -- 1 45.00 3 41.17 -- 50.0 7 219.98
Total other 4 13.11 12 79.67 8 66.92 13 182.11 4 5.31 9 120.5 11 152.26 5 98.26 66 718.14 sectors Total 4 13.11 21 113.67 12 126.89 15 191.81 6 27.84 10 126.41 12 153.03 9 158.16 89 910.92
Note: 1. Bank Implementation involvement is from date of approval to date of final disbursement.
Annex 1 Part 3 BASIC PROJECT INFORMATION
Projects, Loans and Grants Covered in the Evaluation a) Lending Operations Projects Amount Approved – UA Million Amount Disbursed – UA Million N°. of ADB ADF NTF TAF Total ADB ADF NTF TAF Total Loans Grants Dakawa Rice 4.50 12.56 -- -- 17.06 3.89 11.35 -- -- 15.24 4 -- Zanzibar Rainfed -- 7.37 -- -- 7.37 -- 7.28 -- -- 7.28 1 -- S/Holder Irrigation -- 7.37 -- -- 7.37 -- 6.18 -- -- 6.18 1 -- Kapunga Rice -- 40.84 6.44 -- 47.28 -- 40.84 6.44 -- 47.28 2 -- Madibira Smallholder -- 21.92 -- -- 21.92 -- 21.55 -- -- 21.55 1 -- NALRP -- 6.52 -- -- 6.52 -- 5.88 -- -- 5.88 1 -- NALERP -- 6.17 -- -- 6.17 -- 6.01 -- -- 6.01 1 -- SPFS* ------0.77 0.77 ------0.77 0.77 -- 1 TLMP* -- 9.21 -- -- 9.21 -- 7.89 -- -- 7.89 1 -- Selous* G.R -- 5.91 ------5.91 -- 3.56 -- -- 3.56 1 -- A MSDP -- 15.90 -- 1.0 16.90 ------0.06 0.06 1 1 DASIP -- 43.00 -- -- 43.00 ------1 1 Total Lending 4.50 176.77 6.44 1.77 189.48 3.89 110.54 6.44 0.83 121.70 15 3 Note: Projects marked with * due for closure during 2005
b) Non-Lending Operations Projects Amount Approved – UA Million Amount Disbursed – UA Million N°. of ADB ADF NTF TAF Total ADB ADF NTF TAF Total Loans Grants Kapunga/Madibira -- -- 1.20 -- 1.20 -- -- 0.98 -- 0.98 1 -- Morogoro Village Irrig ------0.49 0.49 ------0.23 0.23 -- 1 Dodoma Livestock ------0.51 0.51 ------0.40 0.40 -- 1 Dakawa II -- 0.49 -- -- 0.49 -- 0.46 -- -- 0.46 -- 1 Kagera Sugar ------0.61 0.61 ------0.43 0.43 -- 1 Agric. Sector Review ------1 Total Non-Lending -- 0.49 1.20 1.61 3.30 -- 0.46 0.98 1.06 2.50 1 4 GR. TOTALS 4.50 177.26 7.64 3.38 192.78 3.89 111.00 7.42 1.89 124.20 16 7
Annex 2 Page 1 of 20 TANZANIA PROJECT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION RATINGS
1. Project Title : Dakawa Rice Project
Evaluation Criteria
No Component Indicators Score Remarks (evidence) 1 Relevance and quality at entry 2.3 Dakawa was unsatisfactory. Though consistent with GOT 1.1 Consistency with country overall 3 policy at the time, the failure of state farms and the development strategy winding up of NAFCO has shown that the choice of 1.2 Consistence with Bank assistance strategy 3 strategy was inappropriate. As a state farm, the project 1.3 Macro-economic policy/sector policy 2 could not be expected to alleviate poverty of rural people 1.4 Poverty reduction/social equality 2 and promote the private sector. 1.5 Human resource development 2 1.6 Institutional/private sector development 2 1.7 Quality at entry 2 2 Achievement of Objectives and 1.2 Highly unsatisfactory. Though the infrastructure was Outcomes (Efficacy) established, most of it is idle and deteriorating. There is 2.1 Agricultural policy goal 1 no management on site to look after the assets. The rice 2.2 Social objectives 1 mill is intact and sold to a private investor. 2.3 Institutional development objectives 1 2.4 Private sector development 1 2.5 Financial objectives 1 2.6 Physical objectives 2 2.7 Environment objectives 1 3 Efficiency 1.0 Highly unsatisfactory. The huge investments are not Efficiency (ERR/FRR) 1 utilised and going to waste. Cost-effectiveness (Cost & Time variations) 1 4 Institutional development Impact 1.0 Highly unsatisfactory. NAFCO has wound out. The Care Gov. planning & management capacity 1 Taker Committee is an ad hoc “crisis” arrangement which M & E systems 1 does not sit on the site. The stakeholders now trying to Financial system 1 establish a cooperative but their interests vary NGO capacity 1 considerably. Aid coordination effectiveness 1 5 Sustainability 1.3 Not likely, unless a new policy and strategy is designed, Institutional support/viability (Gov. 2 including the options for privatisation. The present financial & legal commitment) arrangement of renting land to farmers seasonally does Technical viability 2 not provide good prospects for sustainability because it is National stakeholder ownership 2 ad hoc and the farmers have no certainty of having land Stakeholder participation (presence of 1 rights. enabling/disabling factors) Economic viability 1 Financial viability 1 Social viability/Equity resilience 1 Resilience to exogenous factors 1 Environmental resilience 1 6 Aggregate Performance Indicator 1.4 Highly unsatisfactory. 7 Impacts 1.7 The impacts are low because the scheme was closed Poverty 2 several years now. The planning and design did not Food security 2 incorporate the participation of local farmers and the Gender 1 private sector. Environment 2 Regional integration 2 Private sector development 1 Community participation 2
Annex 2 Page 2 of 20 Borrower and Executing Agency Performance
No Component Indicators Score Remarks/evidence 1. Quality of Preparation 2 Executing agency was NAFCO a parastatal closed since Commitment to policy reform 2001. No records were available on the performance of NAFCO and GOT- the SAR and PCR were not available. Level of participation in preparation Government’s liberalization policy, though positive at 2 Quality of Implementation 2 macro level, adversely affected the project. Assignment of key staff Managerial performance of executing agency Adherence to time schedule and costs mid-course adjustments 3 Compliance with Covenants 2 4 Adequacy of monitoring & evaluation 1 and reporting 5 Satisfactory operations 1 6 Overall performance 1.6 Highly unsatisfactory.
Bank Performance
No Component Indicators Score Remarks 1. At identification/preparation/appraisal 2 No records available on Bank Group performance Project consistency with government 2 - i.e. no SAR, no PCR, no supervision reports. strategy - There were other financers but no records are Project consistency with Bank strategy for 2 available on their performance. (NB: information country on the existence of co-financers was found in the Relevance of Bank support 1 NALRP SAR which referred to this). Timely Bank support 2 - Bank Group was not critical enough of GOT Quality of analyses 1 strategy, to advice on other options for increasing Adequacy of lending instrument 1 food production using smallholders. Quality of co-ordination 1 Implementation and supervision plans 1
2 Quality of supervision Highly unsatisfactory. If the project was well supervised, Problem solving 1 and problems identified, the current state of Adequacy of follow up on recommendations 1 abandonment would have been avoided. Attention to sustainability issues 1 3 Overall performance 1.3 Highly unsatisfactory.
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TANZANIA PROJECT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION RATINGS
2. Project Title: Kapunga Rice Irrigation Project (NAFCO)
Evaluation Criteria
No Component Indicators Score Remarks (evidence) 1 Relevance and quality at entry 2.7 Kapunga was satisfactory on this benchmark, mainly 1.1 Consistency with country overall 3 because it incorporated the participation of small holders development strategy and gender balance. Therefore, while consistent with 1.2 Consistence with Bank assistance strategy 3 GOT policy of large state farming, it recognised the 1.3 Macro-economic policy/sector policy 3 importance and the needs of the local people. 1.4 Poverty reduction/social equality 3 1.5 Human resource development 3 1.6 Institutional/private sector development 2 1.7 Quality at entry 2 2 Achievement of Objectives and 2.4 Unsatisfactory. The state farm component has ceased Outcomes (Efficacy) production for several years, which the small holders are 2.1 Agricultural policy goal 2 continuing at a reduced scale because they lack technical 2.2 Social objectives 2 support from the GOT – i.e. extension advice, etc. the 2.3 Institutional development objectives 2 physical infrastructure were achieved but are now not 2.4 Private sector development 1 used. 2.5 Financial objectives 2 2.6 Physical objectives 2 2.7 Environment objectives 1 3 Efficiency 1.7 Unsatisfactory. The PCR (1994) calculated an optimistic Efficiency (ERR/FRR) 2.0 ERR/FRR but this has since been rendered irrelevant. Cost-effectiveness (Cost & Time variations) 2.0 4 Institutional development Impact 2.0 Unsatisfactory. NAFCO was closed, while the small Gov. planning & management capacity 2 holders had no institutional development. Current efforts M & E systems 2 to organise cooperatives is not responding to the large Financial system 2 institutional vacuum. NGO capacity 2 Aid coordination effectiveness 2 5 Sustainability 2.2 Unlikely for the ex-NAFCO state farm unless new Institutional support/viability (Gov. 2 policies and strategies are put in place, including options financial & legal commitment) for privatisation. The small holders have a good chance of Technical viability 2 being sustainable, but they lack adequate technical National stakeholder ownership 2 support. Stakeholder participation (presence of 3 enabling/disabling factors) Economic viability 2 Financial viability 2 Social viability/Equity resilience 3 Resilience to exogenous factors 2 Environmental resilience 2 6 Aggregate Performance Indicator 2.3 Unsatisfactory. 7 Impacts 3 Impacts are satisfactory because: Poverty 3 - There is a reasonable level of asset management as Food security 2 ex-NAFCO staff are on site and rent out facilities. Gender 2 - The incorporation of local participation has attracted Environment 2 private sector developments around the scheme, and Regional integration 2 there are “new small holders” rice growers in the Private sector development 3 surrounding areas. Community participation 3
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Borrower and Executing Agency Performance
No Component Indicators Score Remarks/evidence 1. Quality of Preparation Based on the PCR information, this was satisfactory. Commitment to policy reform 2 Macro-economic reforms, though positive at macro level, adversely affected the project. Level of participation in preparation 3 2 Quality of Implementation Based on the PCR information, this was satisfactory. Assignment of key staff 2 Implementation was efficient and within the scheduled time. There were sufficient mid-course adjustments of the 3 Managerial performance of project design, and covenants were timely complied with. executing agency Monitoring and evaluation was not adequate within 3 Government and the closure of NAFCO and the scheme Adherence to time schedule and implies unsatisfactory operations. costs mid-course adjustments 3 Compliance with Covenants 3 4 Adequacy of monitoring & evaluation 2 and reporting 5 Satisfactory operations 2 6 Overall performance 2.4 Unsatisfactory overall.
Bank Performance
No Component Indicators Score Remarks/Evidence 1. At identification/preparation/appraisal Overall unsatisfactory. Though the small holders were Project consistency with government 3 incorporated, there was no adequate provision for strategy institutional capacity building for them. They Project consistency with Bank strategy for 2 consequently did not obtain technical support from country NAFCO or the Government. Relevance of Bank support 3 Timely Bank support 2 Quality of analyses 3 Adequacy of lending instrument Quality of co-ordination 2 Implementation and supervision plans 2 2 Quality of supervision According to the PCR, Bank Supervisions were good. Problem solving 2 But information could not be obtained on the number of Adequacy of follow up on recommendations 3 supervisions. Attention to sustainability issues 2 3 Overall performance 2.3 Unsatisfactory
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TANZANIA PROJECT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION RATINGS
3. Project Title: Madibira Small holder Agricultural Development Project
Evaluation Criteria
No Component Indicators Score Remarks (evidence) 1 Relevance and quality at entry 2.8 Madibira was satisfactory. Besides incorporating the new 1.1 Consistency with country overall 3 GOT macro-economic policy changes, it focused on the development strategy participation of local communities in the 5 villages 1.2 Consistence with Bank assistance strategy 3 surrounding it. It had a strong poverty reduction and 1.3 Macro-economic policy/sector policy 3 social improvement focus. 1.4 Poverty reduction/social equality 3 1.5 Human resource development 3 1.6 Institutional/private sector development 2 1.7 Quality at entry 3 2 Achievement of Objectives and 2.7 Satisfactory performance. Outcomes (Efficacy) - Sectoral and social objectives were being met and 2.1 Agricultural policy goal 3 there is a strong private sector developing around the 2.2 Social objectives 3 scheme. 2.3 Institutional development objectives 3 - Physical production is increasing and financial 2.4 Private sector development 3 objectives, though not fully met, are likely to be met. 2.5 Financial objectives 2 - MAMCOS/ M-SACCO are initiative small holder 2.6 Physical objectives 3 institutions being developed. 2.7 Environment objectives 2 3 Efficiency 2.5 Satisfactory. PCR estimates ERR at 18% and FRR at Efficiency (ERR/FRR) 3 13%, equivalent to similar schemes implemented Cost-effectiveness (Cost & Time variations) 2 elsewhere. 4 Institutional development Impact 2.7 Satisfactory. Government support for Madibira is strong, Gov. planning & management capacity 3 as well as Bank Group support. Technical support M & E systems 2 therefore exists. Financial system 3 - Financial system being developed through M- NGO capacity 2 SACCO. Aid coordination effectiveness 3 5 Sustainability 2.6 - Sustainability is likely. Not only is Government Institutional support/viability (Gov. 3 support strong, but the project draws its local financial & legal commitment) support directly from the villages which are the Technical viability 2 beneficiaries. National stakeholder ownership 3 - Both economic and financial viability are likely, Stakeholder participation (presence of 3 given the current level of yields being achieved. enabling/disabling factors) Economic viability 3 Financial viability 2 Social viability/Equity resilience 3 Resilience to exogenous factors 2 Environmental resilience 2 6 Aggregate Performance Indicator 2.6 Satisfactory. 7 Impacts 2.7 Satisfactory. With current production averaging over Poverty 3 12,000 metric tons, the direct impacts on poverty and Food security 3 local food security is strong. Madibira currently supplies Gender 3 9-10,000 metric tons of grain to the rest of communities Environment 2 and beyond. Regional integration 2 A vibrant local private sector is being induced into the Private sector development 3 area. Community participation 3
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Borrower and Executing Agency Performance
No Component Indicators Score Remarks/evidence 1. Quality of Preparation Borrower performance is satisfactory. Government policy Commitment to policy reform 3 reforms are now focusing on small holders and the poor, recognising that poverty can only be reduced by direct Level of participation in preparation 3 participation of the poor. The Government has designed the key staff to ensure successful implementation of the project. 2 Quality of Implementation Government provided a strong technical management Assignment of key staff 3 team and the project was implemented timely. Managerial performance of executing 3 agency Adherence to time schedule and costs mid- 3 course adjustments
3 Compliance with Covenants 3 All covenants were met 4 Adequacy of monitoring & evaluation 2 Government monitoring is weak. Communication is poor. and reporting 5 Satisfactory operations 3 Satisfactory 6 Overall performance 2.8 Satisfactory.
Bank Performance
No Component Indicators Score Remarks 1. At identification/preparation/appraisal Bank Group performance is satisfactory. From the PCR, Project consistency with government 3 GOT information, and other records, it was noted that strategy the Bank provided strong support to Madibira (see Project consistency with Bank strategy for 3 EPCP2 1993 – 95). country Bank group focused on smallholder development. Relevance of Bank support 3 Timely Bank support 3 Quality of analyses 3 Adequacy of lending instrument 3 Quality of co-ordination 3 Implementation and supervision plans 3
2 Quality of supervision The Bank Group adequately supervised the project Problem solving 3 during implementation. Adequacy of follow up on recommendations 3 Attention to sustainability issues 2 3 Overall performance 2.9 Satisfactory
Annex 2 Page 7 of 20 TANZANIA PROJECT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION RATINGS
4. Project Title: Zanzibar Rainfed Rice Development Project
Evaluation Criteria
No Component Indicators Score Remarks (evidence) 1 Relevance and quality at entry 2.4 The project scores satisfactorily in targeting small scale 1.1 Consistency with country overall 3 farming families (11,600 rice farmers cultivating 5,800ha development strategy of rice) and in focusing on capacity development of the 1.2 Consistence with Bank assistance strategy 3 Ministry of agriculture and the farmers. However, while 1.3 Macro-economic policy/sector policy 2 consistent with both GOT and Bank Group policy on food 1.4 Poverty reduction/social equality 3 security, the quality and the eventual success was 1.5 Human resource development 3 compromised by inappropriate choice of strategy at the 1.6 Institutional/private sector development 1 operational level. The project was not supported by full 1.7 Quality at entry 2 assessment of local constraints and potentials. 2 Achievement of Objectives and 2.5 The project made satisfactory progress towards provision Outcomes (Efficacy) of infrastructure – houses, offices, stores, 2.1 Agricultural policy goal 3 construction/rehabilitation of 127km of feeder roads; 2.2 Social objectives 2 staff capacity through training; organization of farmers 2.3 Institutional development objectives 2 associations. The project reached 80% of the targeted 2.4 Private sector development 1 farmers, and achieved 60% of rice output target. 2.5 Financial objectives 2 Performance of the other crops was below 40%. The 2.6 Physical objectives 2 broader objective of sustained production and 2.7 Environment objectives 2 productivity was not likely to be achieved due to the rainfed rice production technology which had proven to be unsound. 3 Efficiency 2.0 The project was marred by exceptionally prolonged Efficiency (ERR/FRR) 2 implementation – which was 17.7 years from Cost-effectiveness (Cost & Time variations) 2 effectiveness to completion. However, this was partly contributed by frequent sanctions on the country. 4 Institutional development Impact 2.0 This was not satisfactory. Despite the local infrastructure Gov. planning & management capacity 2 built and the training support provided, the Ministry of M & E systems 2 Agriculture of Zanzibar remained very weak, and the Financial system 2 farmers’ organizations could not be sufficiently NGO capacity 2 strengthened to manage the project on their own. The Aid coordination effectiveness 2 coordination between the Bank and the Government was insufficient which partly explains the lengthy implementation period. 5 Sustainability 2.0 While project had a strong basis for community Institutional support/viability (Gov. 2 participation and support, technical soundness and financial & legal commitment) government commitments were not obvious. Supervision Technical viability 1 reports indicate that the choice of rainfed technology was National stakeholder ownership 2 probably inappropriate. Information on economic and Stakeholder participation (presence of 2 financial performance were lacking to assess financial enabling/disabling factors) viability. Farmers operations were not self-sustaining and Economic viability 2 they depended almost entirely on government services. Financial viability 2 Government contribution to the project ceased from the Social viability/Equity resilience 2 1995/96 FY. On the whole, the Zanzibar government did Resilience to exogenous factors 2 not fulfill its financial obligations thereafter. Environmental resilience 2 6 Aggregate Performance Indicator 2.3 Unsatisfactory overall. 7 Impacts 2 Poverty and food security impacts could not be assessed Poverty 2 in the absence of systematically kept records of project Food security 2 performance. But these were unlikely to be significant Gender 2 given that the objective of improving production and
Annex 2 Page 8 of 20 Environment 2 productivity were unlikely to be achieved due to Regional integration 2 technological problems of rainfed rice production which Private sector development 2 appeared not to have fitted well into the local climatic Community participation 3 environment. Gender, environment and regional integration did not feature in project design.
Borrower and Executing Agency Performance
No Component Indicators Score Remarks/evidence 1. Quality of Preparation The GOT continued its commitments to policy reforms. Commitment to policy reform 3 It was not evident, however, that initial preparation of project was thorough. Level of participation in preparation 2 2 Quality of Implementation Implementation was unduly over-drawn over long period Assignment of key staff 2 nearing two decades, which was highly unsatisfactory. Staff assignment and managerial performance was Managerial performance of executing 1 unsatisfactory. agency Adherence to time schedule and costs mid- 1 course adjustments 3 Compliance with Covenants 2 Unsatisfactory. Budgetary commitments were not fulfilled. 4 Adequacy of monitoring & evaluation 2 The paucity of data/records on the project points to and reporting inadequacy in the monitoring and evaluation of the project. 5 Satisfactory operations 2 Project operations were generally unsatisfactory. 6 Overall performance 1.9 (2) Unsatisfactory on the overall
Bank Performance
No Component Indicators Score Remarks 1. At identification/preparation/appraisal The Bank Group intervention was consistent with GOT Project consistency with government 3 priorities, and its support was relevant. However, it was strategy not satisfactorily packaged and delivered. There is doubt Project consistency with Bank strategy for 3 about the quality of the technical, economic and country financial analysis of the project prior to its Relevance of Bank support 3 implementation, and the Bank appeared to have acted Timely Bank support 1 purely on the basis of government’s request to rescue an Quality of analyses 2 on-going farmer’s rice scheme that could have been Adequacy of lending instrument 2 going badly. Poor coordination and implementation and Quality of co-ordination 1 supervision plans contributed to the over-drawn Implementation and supervision plans 1 implementation time. 2 Quality of supervision Overall supervision of the project was inadequate; and Problem solving 2 problem solving and follow-up of recommendations was Adequacy of follow up on recommendations 2 unsatisfactory. Though the Government of Zanzibar had Attention to sustainability issues 2 proposed a change in technology from rainfed to irrigated rice production, this was not acted upon. 3 Overall performance 2 Unsatisfactory on the overall.
Annex 2 Page 9 of 20 TANZANIA PROJECT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION RATINGS 5. Project Title: Smallholders Rice Irrigation Project
Evaluation Criteria No Component Indicators Score Remarks (evidence) 1 Relevance and quality at entry 2.6 The project addressed satisfactorily the priorities of 1.1 Consistency with country overall 3 government on food security and the settlement of development strategy farmers in permanent villages with assured sources of 1.2 Consistence with Bank assistance strategy 3 income. Poverty reduction was thus adequately addressed. 1.3 Macro-economic policy/sector policy 3 The project scores low on institutional/human resource 1.4 Poverty reduction/social equality 3 development although one of the objectives was to 1.5 Human resource development 2 strengthen the Ministry’s planning capacity. There was no 1.6 Institutional/private sector development 2 evidence of a detailed feasibility study and analysis of the 1.7 Quality at entry 2 project. 2 Achievement of Objectives and 2.6 The project achieved its target of 810 farmers in Kitivo Outcomes (Efficacy) (Tanga) and 720 farmers in Mwamapuli (Tabora). The 2.1 Agricultural policy goal 3 project also achieved its infrastructure development 2.2 Social objectives 3 targets – intake weirs, main canals, secondary and 2.3 Institutional development objectives 2 tertiary canals and a dam at Mwamapuli. Though no 2.4 Private sector development 2 figures were availed, the Irrigation Development Unit at 2.5 Financial objectives 2 MAFS praised the production achievement of the project. 2.6 Physical objectives 3 It was reported that the farmers in Kitivo and 2.7 Environment objectives 3 Mwamapuli made significant contribution to food production during the 2003/04 drought that hit many districts in Tanzania. 3 Efficiency 2.0 The major factors affecting efficiency of project were Efficiency (ERR/FRR) 2 unduly lengthy implementation – which was nearly 16 Cost-effectiveness (Cost & Time variations) 2 years in total. This affected timeliness in achievement of objectives and outputs. 4 Institutional development Impact 2.4 There is evidence that the project contributed to the Gov. planning & management capacity 3 planning capacity of the Ministry, and also the M & E systems 2 organization of farmers into irrigation management Financial system 2 committees. The entire project infrastructure was NGO capacity 3 satisfactorily established, but the overall financial and Aid coordination effectiveness 2 economic systems were unsatisfactory. 5 Sustainability 2.5 The project basis for sustainability is its uncomplicated Institutional support/viability (Gov. 2 technology – a simple gravity system that farmers can financial & legal commitment) operate and maintain – and its roots in the local Technical viability 3 community. There is also apparently good government National stakeholder ownership 3 support at least politically though evidence of technical Stakeholder participation (presence of 3 and financial support was not apparent. Resilience to enabling/disabling factors) exogenous factors and environmental considerations Economic viability 3 could not be assessed due to paucity of data, but given Financial viability 2 the overall macro-economic situation this could be Social viability/Equity resilience 3 important. Resilience to exogenous factors 2 Environmental resilience 2 6 Aggregate Performance Indicator 2.5 Satisfactory overall. 7 Impacts 2.6 The Irrigation Development Unit at MAFS reported that Poverty 3 the project was doing well in food production. In 2003/04 Food security 3 the farmers in Kitivo and Mwamapuli contributed to food Gender 2 security when a severe draught hit much of the country – Environment 3 thus demonstrating that simple low-cost irrigation Regional integration 2 systems can be viable when properly planned. Private sector development 2 Community participation 3
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Borrower and Executing Agency Performance
No Component Indicators Score Remarks/evidence 1. Quality of Preparation Although Government continued to foster policy reforms Commitment to policy reform 3 but the depth of the participation in project preparation and activities were not obvious. Level of participation in preparation 2 2 Quality of Implementation Project implementation was very prolonged (over 16 Assignment of key staff 2 years), which signified inadequacy in project management and non-adherence to covenants. Managerial performance of executing 2 agency Adherence to time schedule and costs mid- 2 course adjustments 3 Compliance with Covenants 2 Unsatisfactory 4 Adequacy of monitoring & evaluation 2 The paucity of data/records points to the inadequacy of and reporting the M&E systems. 5 Satisfactory operations 2 Generally unsatisfactory 6 Overall performance 2 Unsatisfactory on the whole.
Bank Performance
No Component Indicators Score Remarks 1. At identification/preparation/appraisal 2 Though relevant and consistent with GOT’s policy and Project consistency with government priority, the Bank Group assistance in this project was strategy not supported by adequate analysis of the Project consistency with Bank strategy for 3 implementation requirements. The Bank appeared to country have responded to GOT’s request to support an existing Relevance of Bank support 3 scheme that needed a rescue operation. This explains the Timely Bank support 2 protracted nature of the implementation and the apparent Quality of analyses 2 absence of a coherent plan for supervision. Adequacy of lending instrument 2 Quality of co-ordination 2 Implementation and supervision plans 2 2 Quality of supervision This was among the early projects approved in the early Problem solving 2 1980s, in which the Bank had weak supervisions. Adequacy of follow up on recommendations 2 Problem solving and supervisions follow-ups were thus Attention to sustainability issues 2 weak. 3 Overall performance 2 Unsatisfactory
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TANZANIA PROJECT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION RATINGS 6. Project Title: Special Programme for Food Security
Evaluation Criteria
No Component Indicators Score Remarks (evidence) 1 Relevance and quality at entry 3.0 The SPFS was satisfactory. It was designed with a focus 1.1 Consistency with country overall 3 on poverty reduction and improvement of food security in development strategy poor and food insecure countries. It had a strong 1.2 Consistence with Bank assistance strategy 3 participatory approach. 1.3 Macro-economic policy/sector policy 3 1.4 Poverty reduction/social equality 3 1.5 Human resource development 3 1.6 Institutional/private sector development 3 1.7 Quality at entry 3 2 Achievement of Objectives and 3.0 Satisfactory. Though the project is still on-going, there Outcomes (Efficacy) are strong pointers that it will achieve its outputs. 2.1 Agricultural policy goal 3 2.2 Social objectives 3 2.3 Institutional development objectives 3 2.4 Private sector development 3 2.5 Financial objectives 3 2.6 Physical objectives 3 2.7 Environment objectives 3 3 Efficiency 3.0 - ERR and FRR calculated at 34% - 36% and 22% - Efficiency (ERR/FRR) 3 33%, respectively. Cost-effectiveness (Cost & Time variations) 3 - Farmerrs have in-built cost recovery measures through SACAs and SACCOs. 4 Institutional development Impact 3.0 Government support systems for SPFS are established at Gov. planning & management capacity 3 national, regional and district level (SPFS Teams). At M & E systems 3 local stakeholder levels, FFS, PFGs and WUGs are Financial system 3 established and registered as legal entities. NGO capacity 3 Aid coordination effectiveness 3 5 Sustainability 3.0 Besides Government commitments (ensuring the SFPS is Institutional support/viability (Gov. 3 implemented by districts as part of the regular extension financial & legal commitment) system), the PFGs, FFGs and WUGs are inherently Technical viability 3 farmers organisations. As noted under efficiency, National stakeholder ownership 3 economic and financial viability is strong. Some technical Stakeholder participation (presence of 3 problems in leaking canals exist but are surmountable. enabling/disabling factors) Economic viability 3 Financial viability 3 Social viability/Equity resilience 3 Resilience to exogenous factors 3 Environmental resilience 3 6 Aggregate Performance Indicator 3.0 Satisfactory. 7 Impacts 3.0 The projecty is designed to directly address poverty, food Poverty 3 security and gender balance (part of the food security Food security 3 problems). Private sector development is inherent in the Gender 3 design and there was strong South-South Cooperation Environment 3 (GOT-Egypt-FAO). Regional integration 3 Private sector development 3 Community participation 3
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Borrower and Executing Agency Performance
No Component Indicators Score Remarks/evidence 1. Quality of Preparation Satisfactory. Government promoted the project as part of Commitment to policy reform 3 National Food Security Policy, which directly involves local farmers. Level of participation in preparation 3 2 Quality of Implementation Key staff have been assigned at national, regional, district Assignment of key staff 3 and local levels. Managerial performance of 3 executing agency Adherence to time schedule and 2 costs mid-course adjustments 3 Compliance with Covenants 3 Satisfactory. 4 Adequacy of monitoring & evaluation 2 Monitoring is not adequate as information is not and reporting systematically and regularly supplied through the system for following actual programs on the ground. 5 Satisfactory operations 2 6 Overall performance 2.7 Satisfactory.
Bank Performance
No Component Indicators Score Remarks 1. At identification/preparation/appraisal No records available on Bank Group performance Project consistency with government 3 - i.e. no SAR, no PCR, no supervision reports. strategy - There were other financers but no records are Project consistency with Bank strategy for 3 available on their performance. (NB: information country on the existence of co-financers was found in the Relevance of Bank support 3 NALRP SAR which referred to this). Timely Bank support 4 Quality of analyses 3 Adequacy of lending instrument 3 Quality of co-ordination 3 Implementation and supervision plans 3 2 Quality of supervision Highly unsatisfactory. Problem solving 3 Adequacy of follow up on recommendations 2 Attention to sustainability issues 3 3 Overall performance 2.9
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TANZANIA PROJECT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION RATINGS
7. Project Title: National Agricultural and Livestock Research Project (NALRP)
Evaluation Criteria
No Component Indicators Score Remarks (evidence) 1 Relevance and quality at entry 2.9 Satisfactory. The project addressed the needs of research, 1.1 Consistency with country overall 3 especially the reinvigoration of the service to support the development strategy policy to increase productivity. The Bank Group 1.2 Consistence with Bank assistance strategy 3 appraised the project on the basis of GOT/ WB 1.3 Macro-economic policy/sector policy 3 Preparation Report which was satisfactory. 1.4 Poverty reduction/social equality 3 1.5 Human resource development 3 1.6 Institutional/private sector development 2 1.7 Quality at entry 3 2 Achievement of Objectives and 2.7 - Satisfactory on the overall, despite shortfalls in the Outcomes (Efficacy) number of research institutes actually rehabilitated 2.1 Agricultural policy goal 3 (5 out of 6). 2.2 Social objectives 3 - But institutional development objectives were 2.3 Institutional development objectives 3 achieved and human resource capacity strengthened 2.4 Private sector development 2 (4 PhDs, 16 MScs and 1 Bsc). 2.5 Financial objectives 2 2.6 Physical objectives 3 2.7 Environment objectives 3 3 Efficiency 2.0 ERR and FRR not calculated. But long implementation Efficiency (ERR/FRR) 2 delays caused inefficiencies in resource utilisation. Cost-effectiveness (Cost & Time variations) 2 4 Institutional development Impact 2.6 Satisfactory. Research planning and management capacity Gov. planning & management capacity 3 vastly improved. The 10 – Year Research Master Plan M & E systems 2 established a framework for institutional development of Financial system 2 research and research capacity. NGO capacity 3 Aid coordination effectiveness 3 5 Sustainability 2.4 Unsatisfactory. But research service is a public good and Institutional support/viability (Gov. 3 sustainability is dependent on Government budgetary financial & legal commitment) commitments. This has not been strong. Donor support is Technical viability 3 required for sustainability. National stakeholder ownership 3 Stakeholder participation (presence of 2 enabling/disabling factors) Economic viability 2 Financial viability 2 Social viability/Equity resilience 2 Resilience to exogenous factors 2 Environmental resilience 3 6 Aggregate Performance Indicator 2.5 Marginally satisfactory. 7 Impacts 2.6 The impacts of research are indirect and long term, but Poverty 3 are beginning to be realised through increased yields of Food security 3 crops, livestock and improved pest and disease control. Gender 2 Environment 3 Regional integration 3 Private sector development 2 Community participation 2
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Borrower and Executing Agency Performance
No Component Indicators Score Remarks/evidence 1. Quality of Preparation Government introduced economic reforms in 1986, Commitment to policy reform 3 which formed the basis for the rehabilitation of research systems. Level of participation in preparation 3 2 Quality of Implementation Key staff were assigned and the Department of Research Assignment of key staff 3 and Training was established to implement the project. Managerial performance of 3 executing agency Adherence to time schedule and 2 costs mid-course adjustments 3 Compliance with Covenants 2 Borrower was unable to regularly submit Work Plans and budgets, and because of budgetary constraints was unable to meet its contributions in time. 4 Adequacy of monitoring & evaluation 2 and reporting 5 Satisfactory operations 2 6 Overall performance 2.5 Marginally satisfactory.
Bank Performance
No Component Indicators Score Remarks 1. At identification/preparation/appraisal The Bank Group joined the project as co-financer and its Project consistency with government 3 assistance was consistent with the needs to restructure strategy and re-organise the research service. But on the whole, Project consistency with Bank strategy for 3 the Bank Group’s follow up was inadequate. Long country delays in procurement and disbursement put the Bank Relevance of Bank support 3 behind other co-financers by 3 years. Only 10 Timely Bank support 2 supervision missions were carried out during such a long Quality of analyses 3 time. Adequacy of lending instrument 2 Quality of co-ordination 2 Implementation and supervision plans 2
2 Quality of supervision Problem solving 2 Adequacy of follow up on recommendations 2 Attention to sustainability issues 2 3 Overall performance 2.4 Unsatisfactory
Annex 2 Page 15 of 20 TANZANIA PROJECT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION RATINGS
8. Project Title: National Agricultural and Livestock Extension Rehabilitation Project (NALERP)
Evaluation Criteria
No Component Indicators Score Remarks (evidence) 1 Relevance and quality at entry 2.6 Satisfactory. NALERP was relevant to the needs of GOT 1.1 Consistency with country overall 3 to reinvigorate the service. The Bank Group appraised the development strategy project on the basis WB/ GOT Preparation Report which 1.2 Consistence with Bank assistance strategy 3 was considered satisfactory. This meant that it uncritically 1.3 Macro-economic policy/sector policy 3 accepted the assumptions underlying project design. 1.4 Poverty reduction/social equality 2 1.5 Human resource development 3 1.6 Institutional/private sector development 2 1.7 Quality at entry 2 2 Achievement of Objectives and 2.7 Satisfactory, on the overall, despite shortfalls in certain Outcomes (Efficacy) civil works e.g. DivEO houses. But training was 2.1 Agricultural policy goal 3 successful – 5 PhDs, 22 MScs, 10 BScs. Unified 2.2 Social objectives 3 extension system achieved at district level but unified 2.3 Institutional development objectives 3 central command was not achieved. 2.4 Private sector development 2 2.5 Financial objectives 2 2.6 Physical objectives 3 2.7 Environment objectives 3 3 Efficiency 2.0 ERRs and FRR not calculated but are not strictly relevant Efficiency (ERR/FRR) 2 to extension which is a public good. Serious procurement Cost-effectiveness (Cost & Time variations) 2 and disbursement delays resulted in inefficiency. 4 Institutional development Impact 2.4 Unsatisfactory. Only the unified system was achieved at Gov. planning & management capacity 3 district level. At national level, extension coordination is M & E systems 2 still a problem despite efforts of the ASLMs through the Financial system 2 ASDP process. NGO capacity 3 Aid coordination effectiveness 2 5 Sustainability 2.4 Sustainability of extension services is unlikely without Institutional support/viability (Gov. 3 Government budgetary commitments (which is weak) and financial & legal commitment) continued donor support. The service should be regarded Technical viability 2 as a public good. National stakeholder ownership 3 Stakeholder participation (presence of 3 enabling/disabling factors) Economic viability 2 Financial viability 2 Social viability/Equity resilience 2 Resilience to exogenous factors 2 Environmental resilience 3 6 Aggregate Performance Indicator 2.6 Satisfactory. 7 Impacts 2.7 Extension impacts were indirect, and depended much on Poverty 3 the level of technology adoption by farmers. Other Food security 3 impacts were positive especially on environment and Gender 2 increased participatory approaches being adopted. Environment 3 Regional integration 3 Private sector development 2 Community participation 3
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Borrower and Executing Agency Performance
No Component Indicators Score Remarks/evidence 1. Quality of Preparation Government was committed to policy reforms through Commitment to policy reform 3 ERP, and actively participated in project identification and preparation through a Task Force it set up for this Level of participation in preparation 3 purpose. GOT also assigned qualified staff and the PIU 2 Quality of Implementation was adequately staffed. However Government had severe Assignment of key staff 3 budgetary constraints thus failing to meet all its counterpart contributions. GOT also retrenched staff at Managerial performance of 3 the lower levels. But GOT continues strong support for executing agency the unified system at district level. Adherence to time schedule and 2 costs mid-course adjustments 3 Compliance with Covenants 2 4 Adequacy of monitoring & evaluation 2 and reporting 5 Satisfactory operations 2 6 Overall performance 2.5 Marginally satisfactory.
Bank Performance
No Component Indicators Score Remarks 1. At identification/preparation/appraisal The Bank Group joined the project as co-financer and its Project consistency with government 3 assistance was consistent and relevant to the needs of strategy GOT. But the Bank Group’s follow-up with supervision Project consistency with Bank strategy for 3 and coordination with IDA and GOT were inadequate. country In addition, the procurement and disbursement processes Relevance of Bank support 3 were lengthy and resulted in delayed implementation of Timely Bank support 2 the project. Quality of analyses 2 Adequacy of lending instrument Quality of co-ordination 2 Implementation and supervision plans 2
2 Quality of supervision Problem solving 2 Adequacy of follow up on recommendations 2 Attention to sustainability issues 2 3 Overall performance 2.3 Unsatisfactory
Annex 2 Page 17 of 20 TANZANIA PROJECT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION RATINGS
9. Project Title: Tanzania Livestock Marketing Project (TLMP)
Evaluation Criteria
No Component Indicators Score Remarks (evidence) 1 Relevance and quality at entry 3.0 Satisfactory. Project was designed within the Government 1.1 Consistency with country overall 3 national policy of increasing meat supply to meet the development strategy growing demand in major cities: Dar, Dodoma, 1.2 Consistence with Bank assistance strategy 3 Morogoro, etc. the project had a strong poverty focus 1.3 Macro-economic policy/sector policy 3 even though it targeted the marketing chain only. Private 1.4 Poverty reduction/social equality 3 sector development was part of the design. 1.5 Human resource development 3 1.6 Institutional/private sector development 3 1.7 Quality at entry 3 2 Achievement of Objectives and 3.0 Satisfactory. Food security goals and social objectives are Outcomes being met, the livestock trade has increased as deliveries 2.1 Agricultural policy goal 3 of livestock to Dar, etc indicates. Physical outputs have 2.2 Social objectives 3 been achieved: markets, holding grounds, rail wagons, 2.3 Institutional development objectives 3 night camps, water, etc; Dodoma abattoir and Meat 2.4 Private sector development 3 Training Centre. 2.5 Financial objectives 3 2.6 Physical objectives 3 2.7 Environment objectives 3 3 Efficiency 3.0 ERR and FRR not yet calculated as PCR is yet to be Efficiency (ERR/FRR) 3 prepared. But indications are strong that project is Cost-effectiveness (Cost & Time variations) 3 economically and financially viable. Cost-recovery mechanisms were effective. 4 Institutional development Impact 2.6 Substantial. The TLMP management team was strong and Gov. planning & management capacity 3 technical capacity was provided through training of M & E systems 2 specialist. Government is committed to privatising Financial system 3 marketing infrastructure, abattoirs, etc. NGO capacity 3 Aid coordination effectiveness 2 5 Sustainability 2.9 Sustainability is likely. Technical, economic and financial Institutional support/viability (Gov. 3 viabilities are strong, as national and local stakeholders’ financial & legal commitment) ownership. The livestock traders have a very favorable Technical viability 3 perception and attitude towards the project, which is National stakeholder ownership 3 contributing to effective admi9nistraion of cost-recovery Stakeholder participation (presence of 3 measures. enabling/disabling factors) Economic viability 3 Financial viability 3 Social viability/Equity resilience 3 Resilience to exogenous factors 2 Environmental resilience 3 6 Aggregate Performance Indicator 2.9 Satisfactory. 7 Impacts 2.7 Security in marketing of stock has vastly improved as Poverty 3 secondary markets with high security increased by 175%. Food security 3 Primary and boarder markets are acting as catalysts in the Gender 2 marketing chain. Employment has increased in secondary Environment 3 activities. 60% of the induced employments are women. Regional integration 3 Private sector development 3 Community participation 2
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Borrower and Executing Agency Performance
No Component Indicators Score Remarks/evidence 1. Quality of Preparation GOT continued strengthening policy reforms and Commitment to policy reform 3 constituted privatisation measures. Level of participation in preparation 3 2 Quality of Implementation The GOT set up a strong and independent decision- Assignment of key staff 3 making PMU and allowed retention of marketing fees as its contribution. It exceeded its counter contribution by Managerial performance of executing 3 115%. agency Adherence to time schedule and costs mid- 2 course adjustments
3 Compliance with Covenants 3 GOT complied with all covenants 4 Adequacy of monitoring & evaluation 2 This was adequate, despite the PMU being located in Dar and reporting and far away from main project area. 5 Satisfactory operations 3 Operations were overall satisfactory 6 Overall performance 2.8 Satisfactory.
Bank Performance
No Component Indicators Score Remarks 1. At identification/preparation/appraisal The Bank identified project within the national policy Project consistency with government 3 and the Bank’s Agricultural Sector Policy of 1990. strategy Following initial study which did not provide Project consistency with Bank strategy for 3 satisfactory investment options, the Bank requested FAO country Investment Centre to review and improve the quality of Relevance of Bank support 3 the proposals. The quality at entry was therefore Timely Bank support 2 satisfactory. Quality of analyses 3 Adequacy of lending instrument Quality of co-ordination 3 Implementation and supervision plans 3 2 Quality of supervision The Bank performance was unsatisfactory on Problem solving 2 procurement procedures in the beginning, which delayed Adequacy of follow up on recommendations 2 the project implementation by 3 years. But afterwards Attention to sustainability issues progress was smooth. 3 3 Overall performance 2.7 Satisfactory
Annex 2 Page 19 of 20 TANZANIA PROJECT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION RATINGS
10. Project Title: Selous Game Reserve Management Project (SGRMP)
Evaluation Criteria
No Component Indicators Score Remarks (evidence) 1 Relevance and quality at entry 2.7 Satisfactory. The project addresses the sustainable 1.1 Consistency with country overall 3 management of the SGR by incorporating the residents of development strategy the buffer zones as beneficiaries. This would in the long- 1.2 Consistence with Bank assistance strategy 3 term result in a symbiotic relationship that would ensure 1.3 Macro-economic policy/sector policy 3 adequate protection of wildlife at the same time ensure 1.4 Poverty reduction/social equality 3 poverty reduction and food security. 1.5 Human resource development 3 1.6 Institutional/private sector development 2 1.7 Quality at entry 2 2 Achievement of Objectives and 2.4 Unsatisfactory. The project is due to close by December Outcomes (Efficacy) 2005, but it had achieved little of the key objectives. Only 2.1 Agricultural policy goal 3 1220 km out of 7000 km of roads have been rehabilitated, 2.2 Social objectives 3 and only 3 out of 25 airfields. Integrated Buffer Zone 2.3 Institutional development objectives 2 Management Plan has been prepared but no budget was 2.4 Private sector development 2 provided for its implementation. 2.5 Financial objectives 2 2.6 Physical objectives 2 2.7 Environment objectives 3 3 Efficiency 2.0 No ERR and FRR yet, but their have been substantial Efficiency (ERR/FRR) 2 under achievements of targets due to inadequate Cost-effectiveness (Cost & Time variations) 2 budgeting. 4 Institutional development Impact 2.5 Marginally satisfactory. Although the Steering Gov. planning & management capacity 3 Committee is reported to have given excellent support to M & E systems 3 the project, the PMU itself has not adequate training Financial system 2 support, e.g. in 2003 no training programme was NGO capacity 2 undertaken because of late approval. Aid coordination effectiveness 2 5 Sustainability 2.5 Could be attained but marginally likely. GOT’s budget Institutional support/viability (Gov. 3 commitments have not been strong, and the project was financial & legal commitment) under-budgeted in the key areas of infrastructure Technical viability 2 provision and maintenance including staff housing. National stakeholder ownership 3 Sustainability would be likely if the project is reviewed Stakeholder participation (presence of 2 and re-financed properly. enabling/disabling factors) Economic viability 3 Financial viability 2 Social viability/Equity resilience 2 Resilience to exogenous factors 2 Environmental resilience 3 6 Aggregate Performance Indicator 2.4 Unsatisfactory. 7 Impacts 2.4 Impacts are very low. A socio-economic survey taken in Poverty 2 2002 showed the level of poverty to be intense in the Food security 2 buffer zones. The survey indicated that the local interest I Gender 2 the project was good but cautious due o failure of earlier Environment 3 interventions. Regional integration 3 Private sector development 2 Community participation 3
Annex 2 Page 20 of 20 Borrower and Executing Agency Performance
No Component Indicators Score Remarks/evidence 1. Quality of Preparation Government commitment is strong, but it was indicated Commitment to policy reform 3 that the amount of time devoted to project preparation and appraisal was little. Level of participation in preparation 2 2 Quality of Implementation Key qualified staff were assigned and the performance of Assignment of key staff 3 the PMU was strong. But frequent cancellation of projects by CTB caused delays in implementation of key 3 Managerial performance of project components. executing agency Adherence to time schedule and 2 costs mid-course adjustments 3 Compliance with Covenants 3 Satisfactory 4 Adequacy of monitoring & evaluation 2 Though quarterly reports are regularly made, they do not and reporting show actual progress towards achievement of goals. 5 Satisfactory operations 2 Government budgetary support is weak 6 Overall performance 2.5 Marginally satisfactory.
Bank Performance
No Component Indicators Score Remarks 1. At identification/preparation/appraisal The project was introduced following need for the Project consistency with government 3 Bank to intervene to support Selous Game Reserve strategy (under its national resources intervention strategy) as Project consistency with Bank strategy for 3 an important biodiversity conservation programme. country Bank support was timely; the GTZ which had been in Relevance of Bank support 3 Selous for sometime was pulling out. Timely Bank support 3 Quality of analyses 2 Adequacy of lending instrument Quality of co-ordination 2 Implementation and supervision plans 3 2 Quality of supervision Bank supervisions were adequate as there has been at Problem solving 3 least one supervision per year. Adequacy of follow up on recommendations 2 Attention to sustainability issues 3 3 Overall performance 2.7 Satisfactory
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RECENTLY APPROVED AND ON-GOING PROJECTS
1. Overview and Summary
1.1 In the most recent past (during CSP2002 - 2004) the Bank Group has approved two projects – Agricultural Marketing Systems Development Programme (AMSDP) and District Agricultural sector Investment Project (DASIP). The table below summarises basic information on the status of the two projects.
Table 1: Summary Status of Recently Approved Projects Project Sub-sector Amount Date Date Signed Date Effective Amount Cluster Approved Approved Disbursed AMSDP Marketing/Agro- 15.90 ADF 18-09-02 12-05-03 15-12-03 0.00 processing 1.00 TAF* 18-09-02 12-05-03 15-12-03 0.06 DASIP District Support 36.00 ADF 24-11-04 11-02-05 Na 0.00 7.00 ADF* 24-11-04 11-02-05 Na 0.00 Note: *These are grants.
1.2 The new projects were approved after a lull of more than ten years, during which time the Bank Group slowed down on new commitments to the sector but preferred to consolidate existing operations and to await government’s formulation of a comprehensive agricultural sector development strategy. These projects fall into two clusters, namely (a) marketing and agro-processing, and (b) district support under the Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP). The total approved loans and grants for these projects was UA 59.90 million or 31% of approved Bank Group agriculture and rural development portfolio. The goals and objectives of the projects are summarized and compared below.
Table 2: Summary and Comparison of Goals and Objectives AMSDP DASIP Sectoral Goal To increase the incomes and food security of the To increase agricultural GDP growth, reduce rural poor in the northern and southern zones of poverty and food insecurity Tanzania. Specific To improve the structure, conduct and To increase productivity and incomes of rural Objectives performance of agricultural marketing systems in households in the project area, leading to the country so as to provide financial incentives improved food security and livelihoods within for realizing the specific objectives of increased the overall framework of the RDS and ASDS. and diversified production of small farmers; and increased numbers of medium-scale entrepreneurs who interact with groups of small- scale producers and traders in rural areas.
1.3 A comparison of the AMSDP and DASIP shows that they have practically the same objectives, namely to contribute towards poverty reduction in the project areas by enhancing food security and increasing incomes of the households. The projects' rationale and strategic contexts are the same, namely low levels of household productivity and incomes and hence the pervarsity of poverty in the project areas. The table below compares the basic components of the two projects, which are broadly similar.
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Table 3: Comparison of Components of the AMSDP and DASIP AMSDP DASIP Components and sub-components No. of Components and sub-components No. of Sub- Sub- Comp Comp. A. Support for Policy development 2 A. Farmer Capacity Building 2 1. National Policy Development 1. Training Capacity 2. Local Government Policy Development 2. Farmer Training B. Producer Empowerment and Market Linkages 4 B. Community Planning in Agric. 4 1. Organisational strengthening: Groups & Assoc. 1. District Capacity Building 2. Market Information 2. Medium size Rural Infrastructure 3. Producer Group Market Access 3. Village Micro Projects and 4. Trader and Processor Market Access Infrastructure C. Financial Support Services 1 4. Agricultural Technology D. Rural Marketing Infrastructure 2 Investment 1. Institutional Support for Infrastructure Improv’t C. Rural Microfinance & Marketing 1 2. Road Works and Other Marketing Infrastructure D. Project Coordination & Mgt 1 E. Programme Organisation and Coordination 1 1. Project Coordination Unit
1.4. The AMSDP covers 18 districts in three regions of the northern zone (Arusha, Kilimanjaro and Tanga regions) and 18 districts in four regions of the southern zone (Iringa, Ruvuma, Mbeya and Rukwa regions); while the DASIP covers 25 districts in five regions of the North-West of the country (Kagera, Kigoma, Mara, Mwanza and Shyinyanga regions).
2 Key Findings and Overall Assessment of New Projects
2.1. Because these projects are very recent and little implementation history, this review does not address their performance but only the relevance and quality at entry of the projects to identify whether there were new departures from the previous projects, and whether factors that contribute to achievement of objectives/outputs, institutional development impact and sustainability of future benefits were adequately built into the projects design.
2.2. The relevance and quality at entry criterion has actually two components: relevance and quality at entry. The key elements of relevance are: (a) whether the projects were designed to address well identified and defined constraints, (b) whether other alternative solutions to the constraints were not available, (c) whether the problems to be addressed would adversely affect the long-term performance of the sectors if the assistance were not provided, and (d) whether the country attached high priority to the projects.
2.3. On the other hand, quality at entry concerns project identification, design, preparation and appraisal, and has at least five basic elements:
a) Components should not be too many to create complexity that over-stretches the capacity of the Executing Agency to allocate physical and human resources.
b) Specific plan to implement each component should be clearly identified in the project; such plan should specify timetable of implementation of the component to ensure maximum positive enforcement of the other components.
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c) A baseline of key data describing the initial situation from which a monitoring matrix of the implementation process can identify the outputs and achievements of the project.
d) Participation of the beneficiaries of the project should be brought on board as early as possible, to give genuine meaning to the term “ownership”.
e) Risks that threaten the successful implementation of the project.
2.4. In terms of relevance, the rationale and strategic contexts of the two projects are rooted in the government's overarching goal of poverty eradication and improved food security as expounded in the PRSP, ASDS. The component activities are designed to be consistent with the principles of the ASDP, which includes decentralisation of planning and economic development. In this context, the projects are consistent with the country overall strategy, and are also consistent with the Bank Group's policies and strategies as expounded in its 10-year "Agriculture and Rural Development Sector Bank Group Policy" which was launched in 2000. The two projects place emphasis on strong institutional capacity in the line ministries and in the local governments and local communities. They are also built on the principle of participatory approaches involving local communities in planning and implementation. They would be rated highly satisfactory on the basis of relevance.
2.5. In terms of quality at entry, the main components of the projects have been kept as few and as simple as possible. This reduces the chance that implementation arrangements could be complex and hence the risk of not achieving the objectives and outputs. The preparation and appraisal of the new projects have avoided past inadequacies, especially the absence of participatory approaches; now local communities will be encouraged to own-up to the activities of the projects.
2.6. Both projects place reliance on existing institutional structures, both public and private (local communities, NGOs, private service providers) for implementation of the projects. In addition, specific capacity building and community mobilisation is provided for the key stakeholders including project beneficiaries. The projects have also made efforts to link the provision of micro credit with the development and commercial activities of the beneficiaries. The implementation of these projects would create the market and strengthen the demand for rural financial services. In addition, the sustainability of the projects and environmental impacts and mitigation measures have been explicitly addressed in the new projects. The projects also address economic and social impact analysis, as well as environmental factors. In the calculations of EIRR the impacts of possible delays and changes in costs have been factored into the project design through sensitively analysis.
2.7. Besides well structured implementation and institutional arrangements, close supervision, monitoring and evaluation have been built into the projects’ implementation processes. For instance, the Bank Group will supervise both projects twice a year for five (AMSDP) and six (DASIP) years respectively. In addition, provision is made for mid-term reviews involving the Bank Group, GOT and other stakeholders.
2.8. In the case of AMSDP, it was noted during the field visit that the operational structure for the management of the project might be complex. The project is under the overall coordination of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) as the lead agency based in Dar-es-Salaam, but the Project Coordination Unit (PCU) is based in Arusha – where the Project Coordinator, Project Engineer and Financial Controller are based. The Project Coordinator reports too the Permanent secretary in the PMO. On the other hand, the coordination of policy is by the Ministry of Cooperatives and Marketing (MCM) which is based in Dodoma City.
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2.9. From the policy and strategy angle, it was also noted during the field mission that the ASDP was undergoing important reviews whose results needed to be kept in view by the Bank Group. For instance:
a) Both the AMSDP and DASIP focus their interventions at the district level. In this regard the Bank Group must keep an eye on the ASDP review process. The specific objective of the current ASDP review are (i) to assess the adequacy of the ASDP design as defined in the framework and process document, and ii) to review performance standards of the various stakeholders involved in the ASDP process. The ASDP review may therefore affect the way the DASIP will operate.
b) ASDS contains, amongst other things, the requirement that its implementation be through the District Agricultural Development Plans (DADPs) which will be a sub-set of the overall District Development Plans (DDPs). 70% of the ASDP resources are envisaged to be channeled through the districts. In this respect, the Bank Group has done a commendable work in the design of DASIP. At the same time, the government is formulating a consolidated programme to support the DADPs initially starting in selected districts in Dodoma, Rukwa, Ruvuma and Coast Regions. Thereafter, it is expected that the government will roll out the programme to the rest of the country. These developments will have implications for the Bank Group’s assistance to the DASIP.
2.10. Among the issues that may arise is how the ASDP as a whole will function, given that donors are expected to bite into it either through basket funding/budget support or through stand-alone projects. It was noted that some donors were of the view that budget support would eliminate the need for stand-alone projects, and that area-based or region-specific projects were not the way forward. This concept will directly affect AMSDP and DASIP because they are essentially regional projects.
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Matrix of Key Lessons, Recommendations and Follow-up Responsibilities
Policy/Strategy Area Key Lessons Key Recommendations Follow-up Responsibilities Relevance – Project design, 1. Project design issues arising from Bank Group 1. Government officials and other stakeholders should Government, preparation, policy and assistance strategy demonstrate the need for strong joint efforts participate in project identification, preparation and appraisals. stakeholders, donors, strategy choices. between the Bank Group, the government and direct and indirect There is also a need for: (a) in-built flexibility in the design and Bank Group beneficiaries in identification and design of development projects implementation of policies and programmes, although this must or programmes. be grounded on the decision-making environment in which the Bank Group and the GOT are in constant dialogue and review 2. The experiences from the completed and ongoing of projects; and b) effective and flexible mechanisms for projects show the crucial importance (for the achievement of exchange of information among the various stakeholders and successful outcomes) of involving smallholders’ right from the donors supporting projects in the same sector and/or sub-sector. inception of projects where the objective is poverty reduction and improved food security and well-being. Moreover, focusing on the 2. The Bank Group should define, within its CSP and Bank Group, participation of smallholders in the early selection and design of sector review process, a mechanism to link the past, the present Government, Ministry projects could result in alternative investment options that are and the future. One way is to carry a pipeline of past and on- of Public Service cheaper. going projects in an information system or database that is used for regular discussions with the Government and other 3. As a corollary, the Bank Group’s over-concentration of stakeholders. This should be backed by a system of regular resources in the irrigation sub-sector was a case of putting too consultations and studies. many eggs in one basket. The dismal failure of the large state farms must have affected the Bank Group’s overall image of agricultural projects, which might have been partly responsible for the slow down of new commitments during the mid 1990s to the early 2000s. Opportunities could have been lost in the process.
Achievement of objectives, 4. While the Bank Group has made substantial 3. The infrastructure and construction components in Bank Group, Institutional development contributions in infrastructure development, these have not Bank Group financed projects should be complemented by Government and sustainability assured increased or sustained agricultural production. The stock more investments in directly income generating activities, in of idle or underutilized infrastructure is expensive to maintain particular export diversification or export promoting ventures. without the revenues that should be generated by the projects. This would serve the purpose of developing the capacity of the country to generate foreign exchange earnings to pay for some of the needed inputs and for maintenance of the existing infrastructure.
4. Both the Government and the Bank Group should Bank Group, consider additional support to those areas where the Bank Government Group has already made substantial investments (such as irrigation, livestock and wildlife amongst others), where there appear to be no immediate follow-up investments to move the programmes or the policies forward.
Annex 4 Page 2 of 2 5. Focusing on institutional and human resource 5. Institutional and human resource development should Bank Group, development is necessary in ensuring long-term sustainability of be implemented in tandem in development assistance. However, Government, Ministry development projects but this must be combined with the this must be combined with the institutionalization of best of Public Service promotion of institutional best practices at the operational levels. practices in project implementation. Moreover, appropriate However, institutional capacity building did not necessarily mechanism needs to be put in place to tap the existing pool of remove the problems of inter-agency coordination of government local experts that have benefited one way or another from policies and programmes where the ARD sector portfolio is donors’ capacity building assistance. divided among several ministries.
6. Government commitment plays an important part in 6. Both the Bank Group and GOT should address issues Bank Group, creating conditions for the sustainability of projects by of efficiency and sustainability of projects. In the area of Government establishing a symbiotic relationship between public service efficiency, this should include strengthening the M & E systems provision and direct stakeholders/beneficiary participation. This to yield data that is needed to monitor performance and to approach enhances the prospect for successful implementation of review changes in FRRs and ERRs, strengthen project oversight cost recovery measures in projects. to improve overall implementation, and set realistic time scheduling of implementation activities. In the area of sustainability, the requirements for financial sustainability need to be in-built into projects at the design stage, and indicators of sustainability should be monitored during implementation.
Impacts on cross-cutting 7. Project impacts on cross-cutting issues (such as poverty, 7. To properly capture impacts of the Bank Group’s Bank Group, issues food security, gender, private sector participation, etc.) are largely development assistance (on poverty, gender, environment, etc), Government induced and are wider than the direct outputs of projects (such as it is necessary to: a) carry out socio-economic baseline surveys production). Moreover, the most significant benefits of projects of project areas before projects are implemented as part of pre- can be non-agricultural developments that take place in the project project activity; and b) in projects that have been completed or areas, which can only be properly captured with specific impact are on-going, specific impact studies should be undertaken. studies. 8. Poverty and food insecurity are intertwined problems at the national level and beyond the scope of any single donor assistance. The solution requires a much wider spectrum of actions both at the national and international level. The Bank Group’s assistance can therefore be considered as contributing to a much bigger problem in which all the various stakeholders including farmers, civil society and donor agencies, amongst others, are involved.
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BASIC INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT SECTOR PERFORMANCE DATA – SELECTED YEARS.
1. Land, Population, income and Poverty
1980 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003
Land area (000km2) 884 884 884 884 884 884
Population (million) 18.6 29.7 33.7 34.4 35.2 36.0
Population density (Per km2) 21 34 38 39 40 41
Average population growth rate (%) 1975-84 1985-94 1995-02 1980-2002 3.2 3.2 2.5 2.9
Poverty Estimates: % of Population Below Poverty Line % of Population Under-nourished Rural National 1990-92 35 1991 40.8 38.6 2000/01 38.7 35.7 1999-2001 43
2. Structure and Growth of GDP (% Share of Key Sectors)
a) % Share 1990 2002 b) Growth 1990-2002 Agriculture 46 44 3.4 Industry 18 17 4.1 Services 36 39 3.3 Total GDP 100 100 3.5
3. Agricultural Output and Productivity a) Output of Major Food Crops (000 metric tons) Crop 1980 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 Annual Growth % 1975-84 1985-89 1990-02 Maize 1,720 3,128 2,159 2,452 2,551 2,698 2,701 0.3 0.6 0.0 Sorghum 695 537 478 561 664 736 700 0.9 0.7 0.1 Rice 262 718 614 778 782 514 514 -0.1 1.3 0.0 Millet 460 300 218 194 219 207 300 0.9 -0.1 0.0 Cassava 5,644 6,896 7,209 7,182 7,120 6,884 6,888 0.3 -0.3 0.0 Cereals 2,961 na 4,759 4,312 4,247 4,296 na 5.8 0.6* 0.6*
*Figures refer to cereal annual growth rate in 1985-94 and 1995-2002, respectively. b) Crop, Livestock and Food Production Indices (1989-91 = 100) Year Crop Production Index Food Production Index Food Production Index Per Livestock Production Capita Index 1980 78 73 101 na 1995 100 105 89 na 2000 107 113 84 na 2001 108 113 82 na 2002 109 112 80 na 1979-81 80.5 75.4 - 69.2 1999-2001 107.7 112.8 - 126.9
Annex 5 Page 2 of 2 c) Average Yields of Key Crops – in 000 hectograms per hectare Year Coffee Cotton Tea Maize Rice Sorghum Millet Cassava
1980 4.2 4.5 10.9 12.3 11.9 6.9 7.6 107.3 1995 3.5 6.8 13.1 16.3 15.8 12.2 11.3 102.1 2000 4.0 5.8 12.4 14.6 15.1 10.4 8.7 87.9 2001 4.5 5.8 13.4 17.1 12.8 11.9 10.3 104.2 2002 4.5 5.2 13.4 17.1 12.8 11.5 12.0 104.2 2003 4.5 4.8 13.4 15.4 12.8 10.3 10.8 104.2
4. Exports of Key agricultural Commodities (000 metric tons)
Crop 1980 1995 2000 2001 2002 % Annual Growth 1975-84 1985-94 1995-2002
Coffee 43 48 54 48 36 0.8 0.3 -0.4 Cotton 31 71 30 30 31 -3.9 9.0 -12.7 Sisal 48 11 13 14 13 -12.1 -14.6 6.1 Tea 13 22 23 23 24 2.6 8.0 1.4 Sugar 13 11 16 46 25 33.4 0.4 18.3 Tobacco 83 171 195 191 241 -7.4 8.2 2.3
5. Value of Agricultural Exports and Food Imports (US$ millions) a) Agricultural 1990 1993 1995 1997 2002 % Annual Growth Exports 1975-84 1985-94 1995-2002 279 303 431 400 647 -0.2 0.8 3.3 % of total - 74 73 50 72 exports b) Food 1993 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 imports 58 97 169 200 176 169 147 % of total 3.9 6.4 12.3 14.6 12.9 10.8 9.7 imports
6. Other Key Agricultural Data a) Land use - % of Land area Under: Arable Land Permanent Crop Land Other Land 1980 3.5 1.0 95.5 2001 4.5 1.1 94.4 b) Agricultural Inputs Per capita arable Irrigated land % Land under Fertilizer use Tractors per 100 Tractors per land (ha) of crop land cereals (million 000 grams/ha km2 of arable 1000 agric ha) land workers 1979-81 0.16 3.1 2.83 11.0 35 1 1999-2001 0.12 3.3 2.98 5.6 19 1
Data Sources: World Bank - African development Indicators 2005 - World Development Indicators 2005 - Tanzania data Sources (Various)
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LIST OF SELECTED KEY DOCUMENTS REVIEWED AND/OR CONSULTED
A. Bank Group and Related Project Documents
1. African Development Fund: Tanzania: Kapunga Rice Irrigation Project – Project Completion Report, December 1994.
2. African Development Bank: Madibira Smallholder Agricultural Development Programme, Project Completion Report – October 2000.
3. African Development Fund: Appraisal Report – National Agricultural and Livestock Extension Rehabilitation Project - Tanzania, July 1988.
4. African Development Fund: Appraisal Report – National Agricultural and Livestock Rehabilitation Project, July 1988.
5. Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security: Tanzania Agricultural Livestock Research Project – Project Completion Report, June 2002.
6. African Development Fund: National Agricultural and Livestock Research Project – Project Completion Report, 2002.
7. Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security: National Agricultural and Livestock Extension Rehabilitation Project – Project Completion Report, June 2002.
8. African Development Fund: National Agricultural and Livestock Extension Rehabilitation Project – Project Completion Report, September 2002.
9. African Development Fund: National Agricultural and Livestock Extension Rehabilitation Project – Project Performance Evaluation Report, March 2004.
10. Food and Agriculture Organisation: Special Programme for Food Security – Phase I, Project Document UTF/URT/117/URT.
11. Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations – Impact Study of the Tanzania SPFS, June 2004.
12. FAO/DFID Joint Analytical Study of the Application of Sustainable Livelihood Approaches in the FAO Special Programme for Food Security – Tanzania Mission Report, March 2001.
13. African Development Fund: Tanzania - Selous Game Reserve Management Project, Appraisal Report, November 1996.
14. African Development Fund: Selous Game Reserve Management Project - ADB Supervision Mission Reports.
15. United Republic of Tanzania: Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, Wildlife Division – Selous Game Reserve Management Project, Quarterly Implementation Reports for 2003 and 2004.
16. Selous Game Reserve Management Project (ADF/TANG/GAM-RES/98/27) – Socio-economic Survey of the Buffer Zones of the Selous Game Reserve, March 2004.
17. United Republic of Tanzania: Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, Wildlife Division – SGRMP, Integrated Management Plan for the Buffer Zone of Selous Game Reserve in KIlombero and Ulangu Districts – by Tescult International Limited, September 2003.
18. ADF – Tanzania National Agricultural and Livestock Research Project, Supervision Report, 23 December 1998.
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19. ADF – National Agricultural and Livestock Extension Rehabilitation Project – Various Technical and Supervision Reports – various years.
20. African development Fund: Tanzania Livestock Marketing Project, Appraisal Report, December 1991.
21. Ministry of Water and Livestock development: Environmental Impact Assessment for the Proposed Dodoma Abattoirs and Associated Infrastructure Project – by JSB Envidep Ltd, August 2003.
22. Compliance Alliance and Associates: Alternative Options Study for the Tanzania Livestock Marketing Project May 2003.
23. African development Bank: Tanzania Livestock Marketing Development Project, Supervision Mission Aide Memoire, December 2004.
24. United Republic of Tanzania: National Agriculture and Food Corporation – Feasibility Study of Dakawa Integrated Irrigation Project (Dakawa II) – July 1995.
25. African Development Bank/FAO – Investment Center - United Republic of Tanzania: Northwest Agriculture Development Project – Preparation Report (Vol 1 of 2) – September 2004.
26. African Development Fund: Appraisal Report of District Agriculture Sector Investment Projects.
27. African Development Fund: Sector Rehabilitation Programme – Programme Performance Evaluation report, August 2001.
28. International Fund for Agricultural Development: United Republic of Tanzania – Agricultural Marketing Systems Development Programme – Appraisal Report August 2001.
B. Other Relevant Project Documents
29. World Bank – Implementation Completion Report, National Agricultural Extension Project II, June 2004.
30. Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, Implementation Completion Report – National Agricultural Extension Report, 5 December 2003.
31. World Bank – ICR Report No. 30929, River Basin Management and Smallholder Irrigation Improvement Project, December 14, 2004.
32. World Bank: Participatory agricultural development and Empowerment Project, Project Appraisal document, April 2003.
C. GOT and Bank Group Policy and Related Documents
33. United Republic of Tanzania, Planning Commission - Tanzania Development Vision 2025 –, 1995.
34. United Republic of Tanzania, Vice President’s Office: The National Poverty Eradication Strategy –Dar, June 1998.
35. United republic of Tanzania: National Land Policy – Ministry of Lands and Human Settlements Development, 1997.
36. United republic of Tanzania: Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security - Tanzania National Irrigation Master Plan (NIMP).
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37. United Republic of Tanzania: Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security – Agricultural Sector Development Strategy, 2001.
38. United Republic of Tanzania: Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security – Agricultural Sector Development Programme, Framework and Process document, March 2003..
39. United Republic of Tanzania: National Medium Term Investment Programme, September 2004.
40. District Agriculture Integrated Survey, 1998/99 – National Report, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives and National Bureau of Statistics, February 2001.
41. ADB/ADF: Tanzania - Economic Prospects and Country Programme 1993-95, Revised Version March 1993.
42. African development Bank: Tanzania – Country Strategy Paper 1996-98, February 1996.
43. African development Bank: Tanzania – Country Strategy Paper 1999-2001, March 2000.
44. African development Bank: Tanzania – Country Strategy Paper 2002-2004, May 2003.
45. United Republic of Tanzania, Vice President’s Office – National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty, January 2005.
46. African Development Bank: Review of 2001 – 2002 Evaluation Results - OPEV, March 2004.
47. African Development Bank: Tanzania Country Portfolio Review Report - October 1997
D. Others
48. Sustainable Management of the Usangu Wetland and its Catchments – March 2001.
49. The Annual Poverty and Human Development Report, 2004 (P&HDR) – by Research and Analysis Working Group.
50. International Fund for Agriculture Development: United Republic of Tanzania – Country Programme Evaluation Report, February 2003, report No. 1350-TZ.
51. IFPRI: Agriculture in Tanzania since 1986, Follower or Leader – World Bank Country Study, June 2000.