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Disaggregating Xi Jinping's China1 March 2021 Published since 1940 | Vol.69 No. 11 Disaggregating Xi Jinping’s China1 By Emile Dirks and Diana Fu Synopsis Today, President Xi Jinping is the most powerful Chinese leader in a generation. As Canada navigates one of the thorniest periods in its relationship with China, it is imperative to analyze how Xi's policies have impacted China's diverse population. Under Xi's rule, the party-state has pushed forward with anti-poverty campaigns and social reforms, providing greater financial and social security to some of China’s poorest. However, for many of China’s ethnic and religious minorities Xi’s tenure has been marked by growing repression. These developments make it tempting to view Xi's rule as a break from the past. However, his administration has continued the many of the policies of his predecessor while deepening the reach of the central party-state. This report disaggregates Chinese society by examining the impact of Xi's rule on China's rural poor, migrant workers, and ethnic minorities. 1This report draws partially from Fu, D. and E. Dirks. Forthcoming. “The Xi Jinping Era of Chinese Politics.” in The Oxford Illustrated History of Modern China, 3rd edition. Wasserstrom, J. (ed). Oxford University Press. download at thecic.org A CIC publication | thecic.org Emile Dirks is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political AboutScience at the University Author of Toronto. His research examines how China's Ministry of Public Security blurs the lines between crime control and political repression through the policing of "key populations" viewed as threats to social stability. Over his career, Emile has served as a Chinese Government Scholarship-funded visiting scholar at Yunnan University's School of Public Administration and as a non-resident research associate at the London School of Economics' former International Drug Policy Unit. As an independent researcher, Emile has written about Chinese politics, human rights, and drug policy for media outlets like The New York Times, VICE, The Globe and Mail and Foreign Policy. His research into a little-known police program targeting tens of millions of men and boys across China for DNA collection Canadian International Council was the basis for both the June 2020 report "Genomic Surveillance: Inside China's DNA dragnet" published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (co-written by Prof. James Leibold of La Trobe University) and a New York Times' investigative report written by President and Research Director / Ben Rowswell Sui-Lee Wee. Programming Manager / Daniel Lis Operations Manager / Catherine Hume Diana Fu is associate professor of political science at The Chair of the Board / William C. Graham University of Toronto and director of the East Asia Seminar Series at the Asian Institute, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy. She is a non-resident fellow at Brookings and a public Copyright 2021 by the Canadian International Council. intellectuals fellow at the National Committee on US-China The opinions expressed in this publication are Relations. She is also a member of the Royal Society of Canada’s those of the author and do not necessarily reflect College of New Scholars, Artists, and Scientists. Her research the views of the Canadian International Council examines popular contention, state control, civil society, and or its Board of Directors. authoritarian citizenship, with a focus on contemporary China. She is author of the award-winning book “Mobilizing Without the Masses: Control and Contention in China” (2018, Cambridge University Press and Columbia Weatherhead Series). Her articles have appeared in Comparative Political Studies (co-winner of the 2017 best article in CPS), Governance (winner of the 2019 American Sociological Association’s Distinguished Scholarly Article Award), Modern China, Perspectives on Politics, and The China Journal. Dr. Fu’s research and commentary on Chinese politics have appeared in BBC World Service, Bloomberg TV, CBC, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Reuters, US News & World Report, The Economist, The Financial Times, The Globe & Mail, and The New York Times, among others. She was a television host and scriptwriter for the TVO documentary series, “China Here and Now.” She holds a D.Phil. in Politics and an M.Phil. in Development Studies with distinction from Oxford University, where she studied as a Rhodes Scholar. She is currently serving as National Co-secretary of the Rhodes Scholarship for China. Vol. 69 No. 11 | March 2021 2 The People’s Republic of China is the world’s largest and When the Chinese government speaks of human rights, it most powerful authoritarian state. Increasingly, the party- often frames the topic in terms of economic and social 4 state is synonymous with one person: Xi Jinping. Since development. According to the government’s 2019 white coming to power in 2012, Xi has sought to consolidate paper on human rights, “China regards the rights to one-man rule. In early 2018, China’s National People’s subsistence and development as the primary and basic 5 Congress made two major revisions to the country’s human rights." And in turn, protecting these social rights constitution. The first was removing presidential term has been tied to national economic development. Between limits. The second was elevating “Xi Jinping Thought on 1978 and 2008, China’s economy grew at an average rate 6 Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” to a of roughly 9.8% per year. The fruits of this growth position as one of China’s official guiding ideologies. Both contributed to declining poverty rates. During that same revisions strengthened his hand. With term limits lifted, period, the party-state boasted of lifting 800 million 7 Xi may now rule beyond the end of his second term in Chinese citizens out of poverty. 2023. And with the addition of “Xi Jinping Thought” to the preamble of the constitution, Xi is now synonymous High-speed growth, however, was only part of the reason for poverty reduction. Under Hu Jintao, targeted poverty with China’s one-party state. The Communist Party’s alleviation programs and the redistribution of wealth twenty-five-member politburo designation of him as “the downwards also played key roles.8 In 2011, the same year people’s leader” in December 2019 further cemented Xi as that China surpassed Japan to become the world’s second- the most powerful Chinese leader in a generation.2 largest economy, Beijing raised the poverty line by eighty per cent, bringing it in line with the World Banks’ then- As Canada navigates one of the thorniest periods in its poverty line of $1.25 a day and giving 128 million more relationship with China, it is imperative to analyze how Xi citizens access to anti-poverty assistance.9 One consistent consolidated power and how his policies have impacted a focus of state-led poverty-reduction efforts has been diverse population. Under his rule, the party-state has China’s rural areas, which have lagged behind in reaping pushed forward with anti-poverty campaigns and social the benefits of the nation’s wealth. Anti-poverty measures reforms left unfinished by his predecessor, President Hu introduced by Xi’s predecessor, including rural pension Jintao. These moves have brought greater financial and systems and medical cooperatives,10 led to early social security for some of China’s poorest. However, for successes. According to the Center for Strategic and many of China’s ethnic and religious minorities Xi’s International Studies, in 2015, 5.7% of China’s tenure as China’s core leader has been marked by growing countryside was classified as being in extreme poverty, a surveillance and repression. These changes have been so significant decrease from 73.5% in 1990.11 dramatic that it is tempting to view his rule as a sharp break from the past. Yet in many ways, Xi has continued Building on the gains made under his predecessors, Xi the earlier policies while deepening the reach of the vowed the party-state would eliminate rural poverty by central party-state. This report disaggregates Chinese the end of 2020.12 As with past efforts, Xi’s administration society by focusing on the impact of the Xi administration relied on state investment and targeted social programs. on three populations: the rural poor, migrant workers, In 2014, the Chinese government identified 832 counties and ethnic minorities. as impoverished.13 Since 2015, his administration has spent roughly US$700 billion (C$880 billion) in grants Uplifting the Poor and loans to boost transportation linkages between cities and remote rural communities, construct new homes for “No region or ethnic group can be left behind” rural residents, and improve reliable access to electricity – Xi Jinping on poverty alleviation, 20163 and clean drinking water.14 Xi’s poverty-alleviation 2 https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-chinas-troubles-mushroom-xi-collects-a-special-title-11577525539 3 https://www.economist.com/china/2016/10/01/rich-province-poor-province 4 http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-12/10/c_137663928.htm 5 http://www.chinahumanrights.org/html/special/20180305/?pc_hash=AwDd0m 6 Dollar, D., Huang, Y., and Yao, Y. (2020). “China 2049: Economic Challenges of a Rising Global Power.” The Brookings Institution. 7 https://www.scmp.com/topics/xi-jinpings-poverty-alleviation-campaign 8 http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/ctenglish/2018/tpxw/201903/t20190303_800158732.html; https://fairbank.fas.harvard.edu/wp-content/ uploads/2018/08/2018-19_CICCSummary_Dillon.pdf 9 http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/gdxw/t882697.htm 10 https://blogs.worldbank.org/eastasiapacific/ending-poverty-in-china-what-explains-great-poverty-reduction-and-a-simultaneous-increase-in- inequality-in-rural-areas 11 https://chinapower.csis.org/poverty/ 12https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-society-poverty-idUSKBN26U0XV 13 https://jamestown.org/program/behind-xi-jinpings-declaration-of-victory-over-poverty/ 14 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/31/world/asia/china-poverty-xi-jinping.html; Vol.
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