ANNUAL REVIEWS Further Commitment Devices Click here for quick links to Annual Reviews content online, including: Gharad Bryan, Dean Karlan, and Scott Nelson • Other articles in this volume • Top cited articles Department of Economics, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520; • Top downloaded articles email:
[email protected] • Our comprehensive search Annu. Rev. Econ. 2010. 2:671–98 Key Words First published online as a Review in Advance on commitment contracts, present-biased preferences, self-control, June 4, 2010 temptation models, hyperbolic preferences The Annual Review of Economics is online at econ.annualreviews.org Abstract by Harvard University on 02/12/13. For personal use only. This article’s doi: We review the recent evidence on commitment devices and discuss 10.1146/annurev.economics.102308.124324 how this evidence relates to theoretical questions about the demand Copyright © 2010 by Annual Reviews. Annu. Rev. Econ. 2010.2:671-698. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org for, and effectiveness of, commitment. Several important distinc- All rights reserved tions emerge. First, we distinguish between what we call hard and 1941-1383/10/0904-0671$20.00 soft commitments and identify how soft commitments, in particu- lar, can help with various dilemmas, both in explaining empirical behavior and in designing effective commitment devices. Second, we highlight the importance of certain modeling assumptions in predicting when commitment devices will be demanded and exam- ine the laboratory and field evidence on the demand for commit- ment devices. Third, we present the evidence on both informal and formal commitment devices, and we conclude with a discussion of policy implications, including sin taxes, consumer protection, and commitment device design.