Justice, Justification and Self-Respect
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JUSTICE, JUSTIFICATION AND SELF-RESPECT by CATRIONA McKINNON A thesis submitted to the University of London in accordance with the requirements of the degree of PhD in the Department of Philosophy, University College London. ProQuest Number:10015011 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest. ProQuest 10015011 Published by ProQuest LLC(2016). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Abstract This thesis explores the role of self-respect in liberal justification and debates about justice, it is argued that self-respect depends on doing certain things with the right self-conception, and thus that there are two sorts of ways in which political institutions and procedures governing the distribution of goods can impede the development of self-respect: by damaging the conditions of self-respect supporting action, and by undermining self conceptions without which putative self-respect supporting action is impotent. With respect to questions of liberal justification, acceptance or rejection of opportunity for self-respect as a criterion of justice does not settle hard metaethical questions about the extent to which political justification should mirror moral truth. Nevertheless, positing self-respect as a justificatory value helps in clarifying what is at issue between the two dominant positions. Perfectionism and Neutralism. With respect to justice-related questions about liberty and group membership, appeal to opportunity for self-respect allows for a fine-grained distinction between different sorts of groups, which supports an unequal distribution of the right to exclude consistent with the priority of liberty. With respect to distributive justice, appeal to opportunity for self-respect recommends a sufficiency approach to the distribution of economic goods qua social basis of self-respect, and suggests the adoption of unconditional basic income as policy. To Dad and Fiona, with love. TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements 6 - 7 Introduction 8-13 Chapter One: Liberal Justification 14 - 43 1.1 Outline 14 1.2 The Need for Justification 15 1.3 Access and Acceptance 19 1.4 The Liberal Ideal 23 1.5 Perfectionist Justification 29 1.6 Neutralist Justification 37 Chapter Two: The Liberal Dichotomy 44 - 92 2.1 Outline 44 2.2 Raz’s Challenge 46 2.3 A Neutralist Strategy 51 2.4 Self-Respect: An Intuitive Thought 58 2.5 Self-Respect and the Stepford Wives 61 2.6 Strong Evaluation and Self-Respect 72 2.7 The Liberal Dichotomy 83 Chapter Three: Self-Respect 93 -130 3.1 Outline 93 3.2 Self-Respect: Some Meta-Features 95 3.3 Rawlsian Self-Respect 107 3.4 An Inclusive Constituency 129 Chapter Four: Liberty 131 -167 Outline 131 2 The Social Bases of Self-Respect 133 3 Equal Liberty 139 4 The Priority of Liberty 146 5 Self-Respect and the Two Moral Powers 155 Chapter Five: Self-Respect and Group Membership 168 - 211 5.1 Outline 168 5.2 The ‘Communitarian’ Approach 171 5.3 Group Membership: Kymlicka and Raz 179 5.4 Group Membership: Practical Opportunities 190 5.5 Exit and Entry 198 5.6 The Right to Exclude 203 Chapter Six: Distributive Justice: Advantage 212 - 257 6.1 Outline 212 6.2 Two Problems for Rawls 216 6.3 Envy and Equality: A First Look 227 6.4 Envy and Equality: A Second Look 233 6.5 Self-Respect and Envy 239 6.6 Maximin Opportunity for Self-Respect:Towards Sufficiency? 253 Chapter Seven: Distributive Justice: Unconditional Basic 258 - 301 Income 7.1 Outline 258 7.2 Current Conditional Benefits 263 7.3 Willingness to Work 267 7.4 Means-Testing 273 7.5 Contribution-Reciprocity: Surfers as Scroungers 279 7.6 Rawlsian Reciprocity: Surfers as Cheats 294 7.7 Conclusion 301 Conclusion 302 - 307 Bibliography 308 - 327 Acknowledgements. I have been very lucky in the help and support I have received from friends, family and colleagues over the last four years of reading and writing. First and foremost, I want to thank my two supervisors, Jonathan Wolff and Véronique Munoz-Dardé, both at the Dept, of Philosophy, University College London. Their acuity, encouragement, generosity, understanding, sound advice, good humour and, above all, philosophical talent have shown me what it is to be a good academic and a decent person. I am certain that I could not have finished this without them and I am very grateful to them both. Next I would like to thank my colleagues in and around the Dept, of Politics, University of Exeter for their warmth and intellectual stimulation. Thanks in particular for their kindness and help to Dario Castiglione, Iain Hampsher-Monk, Andy Hindmoor, Cécile Laborde, Nigel Pleasants and Keith Zimmerman. Some good friends have kept me from brooding and worrying. Thanks to Karen Chung, Ian Cross and Baby Boo for making me laugh, to Neil Storer for his understanding and patience, to Hallvard Lillehammer for his sense of perspective and solidarity, and to Jamie Munn for his positivity, optimism and companionship. I have talked about various parts of this thesis in different places. Material on Rawls in chapter 3 was presented at the University of Reading, December 1995. A version of ‘Self-Respect and the Stepford Wives’ (2.5) was read to the Joint Session of the Mind Association and the Aristotelian Society, University College Dublin, July 1996, and was subsequently published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Vol. XCVII. I discussed a very early draft of material in 5.2 at the Wolfson Society, University of Oxford, December 1996. In May 1997 I gave paper on ‘Self- Respect and Cultural Diversity’ at the Royal Irish Academy’s conference on ‘Liberalism and Pluralism’; this served as the basis for chapter 5. In December 1997 I presented a paper on Envy to the Exeter Political Theory Workshop; the same paper was read to the UCL Philosophy Society in March 1998. I presented material on Justification at the Political Studies Association Annual Conference at Keele University in April 1998. Finally, many early drafts of chapters were presented to the UCL Senior and Thesis Seminars. Thanks to audiences at all these meetings. Finally, I want to thank my dad, Jim, and my sister, Fiona, for their unswerving support and love, and for their faith that this thesis would eventually materialise. Two years of work for this thesis was supported by a studentship from the British Academy Humanities Research Board. INTRODUCTION Most people would agree that self-respect is of great importance in their lives. The loss of self-respect is seen as a thing to be feared, associated with personal tragedy and social ostracization. Miners in dole queues, delinquents on council estates, and homeless people under Waterloo bridge form the focus of television news reports lamenting the loss of social conditions—full employment, a sense of community, the provision of housing and welfare benefits—enabling every member of society to see themselves as the equal of all others, and to live a fulfilling life. The loss of self-respect can also serve as the stuff of great drama. In Arthur Miller’s Death of a Salesman Willy Loman struggles to disguise, from his family and himself, the damage done to his self-respect by his failure to achieve an illusory dream. In Robert Bolt’s A Man For All Seasons Thomas More refuses renounce the authority of the Pope, claiming that ‘The Apostolic Succession of the Pope is—... Why, it’s a theory yes; you can’t see it; can’t touch it; it’s a theory. But what matters to me is not whether it’s true or not but that I believe it to be true, or rather not that I believe it, but that I believe it’.* Jude in Hardy’s Jude the Obscure dies in misery and self-loathing after resigning himself to an unhappy marriage, in part a reaction to the abandonment of his academic ambitions. When we react to Willy Loman’s story with pity, to Thomas More’s stance with admiration, and to Jude Pawley’s fate with horror I think we show that we value self-respect, and understand the enormity of losing it. The tragedy (in the cases of Willy Loman and Jude Fawley) and greatness (in the case of Thomas More) of these stories relates in large part to how the characters fight to protect their self-respect, regardless of their success. How, if at all, should this intuitive recognition of the importance of self- respect affect our thinking about political issues? In this thesis I explore the idea of self-respect as a critical tool for making progress in two areas of liberal egalitarian thought. The usefulness of self-respect as a conceptual resource has been under-appreciated by liberal thinkers who often make no more than a passing reference to self-respect. In many cases, self-respect is conflated with self-esteem and, implicitly or explicitly, put to one side in political debates as a psychological state like cheerfulness which, although important to the individual, lies outside the remit of political philosophy. I think that this conflation is a mistake, and that important opportunities for making progress in certain liberal debates are missed when it is made.