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North Korea's Organization and Guidance Department North Korea’s ORGANIZATION AND GUIDANCE DEPARTMENT The Control Tower of Human Rights Denial ROBERT COLLINS North Korea’s ORGANIZATION AND GUIDANCE DEPARTMENT The Control Tower of Human Rights Denial Committee for Human Rights in North Korea By Robert Collins Copyright © 2019 Committee for Human Rights in North Korea Printed in the United States of America All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior permission of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other noncommercial uses permitted by copyright law. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea 1001 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 435 Washington, DC 20036 P: (202) 499-7970 www.hrnk.org Print ISBN: 978-0-9995358-3-7 Digital ISBN: 978-0-9995358-4-4 Library of Congress Control Number: 2019950052 Dedicated to Steve Bradner. The Control Tower of Human Rights Denial Board of Directors Gordon Flake, Co-Chair Nicholas Eberstadt Katrina Lantos Swett, Co-Chair Carl Gershman John Despres, Co-Vice-Chair Robert Joseph Suzanne Scholte, Co-Vice-Chair Stephen Kahng Helen-Louise Hunter, Secretary David Kim Kevin McCann, Treasurer Robert King Roberta Cohen, Co-Chair Emeritus Jung-Hoon Lee Andrew Natsios, Co-Chair Emeritus Debra Liang-Fenton Morton Abramowitz Winston Lord Jerome Cohen David Maxwell Rabbi Abraham Cooper Marcus Noland Jack David Jacqueline Pak Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director Robert Collins Table of Contents About the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK)............. IV About the Author: Robert M. Collins..................................... V Acknowledgements....................................................... VI Acronyms.............................................................. VII Terms.................................................................. IX Foreword ............................................................... X Executive Summary ................................................... XIII Section 1: Introduction ................................................ 1 Section 2: Historical Background ....................................... 7 Section 3: Mission & Tasks of the Organization and Guidance Department................................................ 13 A. Ideology ......................................................... 13 B. Missions ......................................................... 15 C. Tasks ............................................................ 17 Section 4: Organization ............................................... 22 A. Overview ......................................................... 25 B. Party Headquarters Committee ..................................... 26 C. Mass Party Directorate ........................................... 28 D. Party Life Guidance Section ...................................... 29 E. Supreme Leader’s Personal Secretariat ............................ 34 F. General Affairs Section ........................................... 35 G. Cadre Section .................................................... 36 H. Inspection Section ............................................... 39 I. Party Member Registration Section ................................ 40 I NORTH KOREA’S ORGANIZATION AND GUIDANCE DEPARTMENT The Control Tower of Human Rights Denial J. Petitions Section ................................................ 41 K. Reports Section .................................................. 41 L. Section 65 ....................................................... 42 M. Military Directorate ............................................. 44 N. Seventh Section .................................................. 48 O. Other Sections ................................................... 49 Section 5: Comparative Perspective of the OGD ......................... 50 Section 6: Korean Workers’ Party ...................................... 55 A. Party Congress ................................................... 56 B. Central Committee ................................................ 59 C. Executive Policy Bureau .......................................... 62 D. Politburo ........................................................ 64 E. Central Military Committee ....................................... 66 F. Korean Workers’ Party Political Committees ....................... 67 G. Party Cells ...................................................... 70 H. Policymaking Process ............................................. 71 Section 7: Propaganda and Agitation Department ........................ 77 A. Key Personnel .................................................... 81 Section 8: Party-Military Relations ................................... 85 A. Kim Jong-il & Military-First Politics ............................ 86 B. Overview ......................................................... 87 C. Central Military Committee ....................................... 89 D. Korean People’s Army Party Committee ............................. 90 E. General Political Bureau ......................................... 92 F. Military Security Command ........................................ 96 Section 9: Regional Roles ............................................ 100 A. Regional Party Structure ........................................ 100 B. Local Organization Departments .................................. 102 C. Implementation Committee ........................................ 105 II Robert Collins Section 10: Societal Control ......................................... 107 A. Party Organizational Life ....................................... 108 B. Saenghwal Chonghwa (Self-Criticism) Sessions .................... 111 C. Societal Control ................................................ 107 Section 11: Life as an OGD Cadre ..................................... 116 Section 12: Organization and Guidance Department Leadership, Past and Present.......................................... 121 A. Supreme Leaders, Kim Family, and the Organization and Guidance Department ............................ 122 B. Organization and Guidance Department Leaders: 1940s–1950s ..................................................... 132 C. Organization and Guidance Department Leaders: 1960s–1970s ..................................................... 134 D. Organization and Guidance Department Leaders: 1980s–1990s ..................................................... 137 E. Organization and Guidance Department Leaders: 2000–2011 ....................................................... 144 F. Organization and Guidance Department Leaders: 2011–Present .................................................... 148 G. Other Organization and Guidance Department Leaders About Whom Little is Known ...................................... 165 Section 13: The Future of the Organization and Guidance Department .................................................. 166 Bibliography ......................................................... 173 A. Books, Journal Articles, and Official Sources .................... 173 B. Press and Online Articles ....................................... 178 III NORTH KOREA’S ORGANIZATION AND GUIDANCE DEPARTMENT The Control Tower of Human Rights Denial About the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) is the leading U.S.- based nonpartisan, non-governmental organization in the field of North Korean human rights research and advocacy, tasked to focus international attention on human rights abuses in that country. It is HRNK’s mission to persistently remind policymakers, opinion leaders, and the general public that more than 20 million North Koreans need our attention. Since its establishment in October 2001, HRNK has played an important intellectual leadership role in North Korean human rights issues by publishing more than 35 major reports (available at https://www.hrnk.org/publications/hrnkpublications.php). Recent reports have addressed issues including political prison camps, the dominant role that Pyongyang plays in North Korea’s political system, North Korea’s state sponsorship of terrorism, the role of illicit activities in the North Korean economy, the structure of the internal security appara- tus, the songbun social classification system, and the abduction of foreign citizens. HRNK is now the first non-governmental organization that solely focuses on North Korean human rights issues to receive consultative status at the United Nations (UN). It was also the first organization to propose that the human rights situation in North Korea be addressed by the UN Secu- rity Council. HRNK was directly and actively involved in all stages of the process supporting the work of the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) on North Korean human rights. Its reports have been cited numerous times in the report of the COI, the reports of the UN Special Rapporteur on North Korean human rights, a report by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, a report of the UN Secretary-General António Guterres, and several U.S. Department of State Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Human Rights Reports. HRNK has also regularly been invited to provide expert testimony before the U.S. Congress. IV Robert Collins About the Author: Robert M. Collins Robert M. Collins completed 37 years of service as a soldier and U.S. Department of the Army civilian employee. He served 31 years in
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