Explaining Support for Authoritarianism in New Democracies

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Explaining Support for Authoritarianism in New Democracies University of Vermont ScholarWorks @ UVM UVM College of Arts and Sciences College Honors Theses Undergraduate Theses 2015 Explaining Support for Authoritarianism in New Democracies Andrew G. Goss University of Vermont Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uvm.edu/castheses Recommended Citation Goss, Andrew G., "Explaining Support for Authoritarianism in New Democracies" (2015). UVM College of Arts and Sciences College Honors Theses. 18. https://scholarworks.uvm.edu/castheses/18 This Undergraduate Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Undergraduate Theses at ScholarWorks @ UVM. It has been accepted for inclusion in UVM College of Arts and Sciences College Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ UVM. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Explaining Support for Authoritarianism in New Democracies Andrew Goss April 17, 2015 1 “Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.” -Winston Churchill Chapter 1: Introduction In the last few decades, significant democratic advances have been made all across the world. A body of research on democratization has emerged to explain this phenomenon. However, one important question is often overlooked in the rush to try to explain the global democratic push: do the citizens of these democratizing countries actually want democracy? Often the answer seems to be yes. Perhaps because of universally accepted norms, positive connotations with the word itself, or dreams of economic success, democracy retains a large margin of support compared to authoritarian alternatives across the world, especially when investigated in simple terms. However, this support is not uniform and falters in some new democracies more than others. Surveys in several of these countries have revealed that surprisingly large constituencies still view an authoritarian government as preferable. This thesis will investigate the puzzle demonstrated in Chart 1.1, which shows the percentage of respondents across Latin America and Africa who agreed that authoritarianism, or a “non-democratic regime,” can be preferable to democracy. No country exceeded 30% support for authoritarianism—good news for democracy—but there is significant variance across different countries. Average authoritarian support in Latin America is 18.4% and ranges from 11.9% in Bolivia to 28.9% in Honduras. In Africa, authoritarian support is generally lower. The African average is 11%, less than even the lowest Latin American country. However, there is still notable variance across the region and Lesotho presents itself as a significant outlier with 29.7% of survey takers agreeing that an authoritarian regime could be preferable. The puzzle 2 that emerges in Chart 1.1 is: what explains the wide variation between countries in levels of popular support for authoritarianism? Chart 1.1: Authoritarian Support in Africa and Latin America Sources: Afrobarometer 2008/2009, Latinobarómetro 2011 The puzzle is also apparent when we examine patterns of authoritarian support in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). To investigate this region , the best available source is the World Values Survey (WVS). We can gain a relevant glimpse into authorit arian support based on the percentage of survey takers who reject (view as fairly bad or very bad) both military rule and rule by a strong leader who “does not have to deal with parliament or elections.” In Romania and Ukraine, the level of rejection is extremel y low: 18.8% and 27% respectively. In Poland and Estonia, the rate of rejection is hi gher: 56% and 58.6%. While the number of country cases is limited, it is convenient for analysis that the four countries divide neatly into categories of high and low authoritarian support. 3 Using similar measures of support for concrete regime alternatives in Latin America and Africa shows even greater variation in support for authoritarian regime types in these regions. 29.2% of respondents across 18 countries in Latin America agreed that they “would support a military government in replacement of a democratic one if things got bad.” Conditional support for military rule reached as high as 56.6% in Guatemala and as low as 9% in Costa Rica. In Africa, support for one-party rule reached 39.2%, 36.2%, and 34.1% in Lesotho, Mozambique and Burkina Faso respectively. The same measure found only 4.9% support in Senegal and less than a tenth in Madagascar. Appendix A lists these various measures of authoritarian support across the three regions observed in this study. These trends highlight the significant variation among different new democracies with regards to their support for the idea of an authoritarian regime. These measures of authoritarian support will serve as the dependent variable in the following investigation of the factors that might contribute to the differences observed. I will examine why authoritarian support remains a key feature in the political makeup of many of these countries despite the adoption of at least nominally democratic institutions. Beginning with the relevant literature, I will investigate factors that might be causing the persistence or emergence of support for non-democratic regime alternatives. Literature Review and Hypotheses The major thrust of academic work related to this particular issue has addressed the causes of support for democracy rather than support for authoritarianism . In many ways support for democracy (or democratic legitimacy) is the opposite side of the same coin and can offer clues for this project. However, there are important differences between these two measures of support. For example, a lack of democratic support could indicate widespread indifference to 4 regime type rather than an embrace of some concrete non-democratic alternative. Measures of support for authoritarianism also tend to show larger disparities between countries and can therefore guide a more careful and nuanced investigation. In this project, I am interested in investigating the root sources of popular support for the aim of reintroducing authoritarian institutions into newly democratic countries. Since the division between these two research questions is not well defined and often overlapping, the following review of the literature will draw on both measures of regime support in order to form hypotheses. Explanations for regime support tend to focus on economic, political and cultural factors. One classic line of scholarship has emphasized the role of economic factors in determining support for democracy. Writing in the 1950s Seymour Martin Lipset made the case that modernization would promote democratization. 1 His theory of modernization suggests that through industrialization, urbanization, and widening of education, democratic values would develop among the people. Later scholars have stressed the importance of the more immediate economic experience of new democracies in shaping attitudes toward democracy. 2 Proponents of this argument expect to find support for democracy in states that achieve growth and wealth under democratic institutions. Conversely, an experience of hardship and scarcity should decrease commitment to democracy. This school of thought helps generate the following hypothesis regarding support for authoritarianism: poor and/or stagnant economic performance under democratic institutions will cause disenchantment with democracy and a consequent preference for authoritarian rule . 1 Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” The American Political Science Review (1959), 69-105. 2 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Herbert Kitschelt, “The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe,” Politics and Society (1992), 7-50. 5 The investigation of these factors, carried out in Chapter 2, questions this hypothesis, drawing from and expanding on the literature presented above. I measure levels of education, urbanization, GDP per capita, GDP growth, inflation, economic inequality and poverty in countries with high popular authoritarian support as compared to those with lower support. Additionally, seeking to fully grasp the economic realities for citizens in these countries, I look at the effect of survey takers’ assessments of their countries’ and their own household economic situations on regime support. Many theorists warn against putting too much stock into a country’s economic experience to explain support for democracy and authoritarian alternatives. Numerous studies looking at a wide variety of possible explanations suggest that political variables rather than economic variables are most important.3 This body of research expects to find support for democracy and rejection of authoritarianism in states where democratic institutions have achieved rule of law, individual freedoms and rights, meaningful elections, and limits on corruption. Where this has failed, citizens will feel less committed to democracy and be more likely to embrace authoritarian options. The hypothesis that emerges from this literature is as follows: Failure to guarantee certain basic freedoms and securities associated with democratic institutions will drive citizens in new democracies to support some form of authoritarianism. Chapter 3 investigates this hypothesis and the importance of the political system for determining authoritarian support.
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